GCVE-1988-2026-0497

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Parasoft Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT anonymous deserialization in the database restore path to JSP command execution as uid=1000 (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Parasoft Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT, the closed-source commercial continuous-testing, service-virtualisation and environment-management product from Parasoft, a United States software-testing vendor headquartered in Monrovia, California. The affected component is the em web application inside the vendor's own container image, running on Tomcat 10.1.57 with Jasper and Java 17. Three first-party defects compose into an unauthenticated command-execution chain that needs two HTTP requests and nothing else: an unfiltered ObjectInputStream over an uploaded backup archive, a licensing filter that decides whether to run at all by testing the raw un-normalised request URI, and a remember-me authentication service that hands an anonymous request an authenticated administrator principal when no external security provider has been configured. Type and root cause. Unfiltered deserialization of attacker-controlled data, CWE-502 primary, composed with an interpretation conflict in the licensing filter, CWE-436 primary and co-equal with CWE-863 as its authorisation consequence, and enabled by a fail-open authentication branch, CWE-287. The honest count is three first-party defects rather than one, and that matters to whoever fixes it, because the defect owners, the fixes and the independent value to an attacker all differ. The licensing defect. EMLicenseFilter is 175 lines and behaves as an authorisation boundary, being what stops an unlicensed instance from serving its administrative API. Its decision procedure reads the request URI raw at line 165 and tests it at line 166 against a chain of exemption clauses including endsWith("about"), endsWith("welcome"), endsWith("forgot"), endsWith("notlicensed"), contains("/resources/") and contains("/images/"), none of which is anchored by a separator or a segment boundary. A branch at lines 167 to 171 additionally reassigns the whole exemption set rather than accumulating into it when the request accepts JSON. The test has exactly one consumer in the class: shouldNotFilter() at line 47 calling isLicenseRequired() at line 48. So a matching URI does not weaken one decision, it suppresses the entire doFilterInternal() body, including the /tdm/api/v guard at line 99 and the unlicensed-instance redirect to /em/license at line 118. Because a servlet container strips semicolon-delimited path parameters from each segment before it performs servlet mapping, the filter and the router disagree about the identity of one request: a target of /em/database/restore;welcome is exempted by the filter and still routed to the restore handler by the container. That disagreement is the textbook shape of CWE-436. Measured read-only on a live instance, with the control that carries the argument: GET /em/database/currentConfig -> 302, Location: /em/license, zero-length body GET /em/database/currentConfig;welcome -> 200, 204 bytes, application/json;charset=utf-8, disclosing the schema version, the HyperSQL type, the database user and the jdbc:hsqldb:file URL of the platform's own database files GET /em/database/currentConfig;about -> the same 200/204, so this is the clause list and not one word GET /em/database/currentConfigwelcome (no semicolon) -> 404, 792 bytes GET /em/tdm/api/v2/servers;welcome -> 200, 160 bytes, a well-formed serversResponse XML document with an empty servers element, so Jersey routed and ran the resource method the same pair over TLS -> 200/204 with the bypass and 302/0 without it, so the HTTPS listener is an equivalent surface and not a redirect shell The no-semicolon control is the load-bearing row: the only variable that changed is the presence of a semicolon path parameter, and the outcome flipped from a licensing redirect to a 200 carrying live database configuration to a caller who had never authenticated. The bypass is not a skeleton key, and that was measured rather than assumed: handlers performing their own licensing check are unaffected, the coverage-agent endpoints reading the license manager directly and continuing to return 403 with a 90-byte unlicensed body across all seventeen of their mappings even with the bypass applied, while a server-resource feature gate kept returning 403 with a 94-byte body. What the bypass unlocks is everything whose enforcement lives only in the filter, which includes the whole /em/database subtree and the entire /em/tdm/api/v version tree. One related first-party defect sits in the same filter and matters for detection: line 113 flushes the response output stream and line 115 then calls setStatus(403), so licence refusals surface as HTTP 200 with a JSON body carrying status 403, which makes them invisible to any status-based monitoring. The deserialization defect. The restore path lands in com.parasoft.ctp.core.database.backup.AbstractDatabaseBackup, a class of 518 lines and 19,851 bytes: :14 import java.io.ObjectInputStream; :111 ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in); :112 int numTables = ois.readInt(); :117 TableMetadata tableMetadata = (TableMetadata) ois.readObject(); :126 Connection connection = this.provider.getConnection(); where in is the database.ser member of an uploaded zip. Three properties are decisive. The cast is applied to whatever readObject() returned, so it constrains nothing: the gadget executes during the call and the ClassCastException is thrown afterwards. getConnection() sits nine lines lower, so no database needs to exist, to be reachable or to accept the supplied parameters for the payload to have already run, which makes that ordering the cheapest structural fix available and one needing no understanding of gadget chains. And the int read at line 112 is consumed before the object read. The caller is the web-layer controller EMDatabaseController, 1359 lines, whose restore handler at line 707 or 708 takes a StandardMultipartHttpServletRequest and hard-compares zip member names against the literals "version.txt" at line 725 and "database.ser" at line 733, a shape check that says nothing about content. The absence of any filter is not an inference from one search: in the whole shipped product ObjectInputStream appears in 68 files with 149 occurrences in the core tree and in 3 files in the web layer, readObject appears in 81 files, and ObjectInputFilter appears in 0 files, jdk.serialFilter in 0 files and serialFilter in 0 files. Three zeros, across a class name, a system property and its short alias, in an image unpacked and searched as artefacts against a positive control of 81 files containing readObject, is a strong result: the product has no deserialization filtering anywhere in its construction. Two sibling readObject() calls on the same class of untrusted stream sit in the same file at lines 323 and 435, in a row-draining routine and a row-binding routine; they were read from source and not detonated, and they are named so a fix covers the class rather than the call site. The fail-open authentication gate. The application has three Spring Security filter chains and all three register the same remember-me service, EMRememberMeServices, 483 lines, with the security configuration in CTPSecurityWebConfig, 318 lines. Neither hop of the chain is an unprotected route: /database is explicitly matched to authenticated(), and the images allow-list is /images/welcome/star rather than a doubled-asterisk glob over /images, so a page written to images/<leaf>.jsp also needs an authenticated subject at the security layer. Both hops sit behind the authentication boundary. The finding is therefore described accurately as the product handing an anonymous request an authenticated administrative principal: // EMRememberMeServices.java:140-148, abridged if (request.getHeader("Authorization") != null) { return null; // :140-142 defer to credentials } pstsecClient = PSTSecServiceClient.getInstance(); // :146 if (pstsecClient == null) { // :148 the fail-open branch return this.createAuthenticationToken("admin", "admin", EmUserInfo.Role.ADMIN, request); } The token registers new SimpleGrantedAuthority("ROLE_ADMIN") and wraps it in a Spring Security User whose authenticated flag is true, so the resulting principal is a genuinely authenticated administrator rather than the container's anonymous principal, and the authenticated() matcher that CTPSecurityWebConfig line 283 demands for /database is satisfied by it. The condition guarding all of this is the absence of the external security-provider client, which in the untouched vendor image, with no setup step performed, does not exist. Measured with its control in the same run: an anonymous GET of the users/current resource under the /em/api/v3 context returned 200 with the 39-byte body {"id":1,"login":"admin","role":"ADMIN"}, and the identical request carrying Authorization: Bearer garbage returned 401 with an empty body. The control shows the fail-open branch is specific to requests presenting no credential at all, so the behaviour is not "authentication is off" but "an absent credential is more trusted than a wrong one". CSRF is separately not an obstacle, because CsrfSecurityRequestMatcher is a 28-line class whose anchored exemption alternation at line 19 includes /database, with GET, HEAD, TRACE and OPTIONS exempt by method at line 22. The write primitive and the execution sink. Reconstituting the stream's first object, a java.util.HashSet, forces a hashCode() on its single element, a TiedMapEntry wrapping a LazyMap whose transformer factory is a ConstantTransformer holding attacker bytes and whose decorated map is an aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap whose folder field is an absolute path: readObject() -> HashSet.readObject -> HashMap.putVal -> key.hashCode() -> commons-collections4 TiedMapEntry.hashCode() -> getValue() -> commons-collections4 LazyMap.get(key) // transform the key -> map.put(key, value) // invokeinterface, virtual dispatch -> aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap.put(key, byte[]) -> writeToPath(folder + File.separator + key, bytes) That class was read at the bytecode level to establish four facts, all of which are what make the write arbitrary. The folder field is declared private final String, is not transient, and the class declares no readObject of its own, so it is populated by the inherited HashMap.readObject path through defaultReadObject, which assigns whatever the stream carries, and both writeToPath and the store routine read it with an explicit getfield so the compiler has not inlined it. writeToPath performs getfield folder, builds a StringBuilder, concatenates a separator and the key, and stores the result, which is the entire function: there is no forced extension appended to the key, and the value passes a checkcast to a byte array, so the content is any bytes at all. Validation is absent in every form, with zero occurrences of File.getName(), Path.normalize(), getCanonicalPath(), startsWith(), a regular expression or a length truncation in that write path; keys carrying slashes or relative traversals both work, and because concatenation with an empty folder yields a leading double separator, which POSIX treats as a valid absolute path, an absolute destination is reachable too. And it does not fire on deserialization alone, which is the subtle part: HashMap.readObject reconstitutes entries through putVal, package-private, final and not overridden, so it bypasses the overridden put that contains the write, which is why the TiedMapEntry to LazyMap to Map.put prefix is needed to force a virtual dispatch. The only content constraint found anywhere is that the bytes must not be exactly the four-byte sentinel IDEM. In the publish
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
unknown Parasoft Continuous Testing Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Parasoft Continuous Testing",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Parasoft\nContinuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT, the closed-source commercial\ncontinuous-testing, service-virtualisation and environment-management product\nfrom Parasoft, a United States software-testing vendor headquartered in\nMonrovia, California. The affected component is the em web application inside\nthe vendor\u0027s own container image, running on Tomcat 10.1.57 with Jasper and\nJava 17. Three first-party defects compose into an unauthenticated\ncommand-execution chain that needs two HTTP requests and nothing else: an\nunfiltered ObjectInputStream over an uploaded backup archive, a licensing\nfilter that decides whether to run at all by testing the raw un-normalised\nrequest URI, and a remember-me authentication service that hands an anonymous\nrequest an authenticated administrator principal when no external security\nprovider has been configured.\n\nType and root cause. Unfiltered deserialization of attacker-controlled data,\nCWE-502 primary, composed with an interpretation conflict in the licensing\nfilter, CWE-436 primary and co-equal with CWE-863 as its authorisation\nconsequence, and enabled by a fail-open authentication branch, CWE-287. The\nhonest count is three first-party defects rather than one, and that matters to\nwhoever fixes it, because the defect owners, the fixes and the independent\nvalue to an attacker all differ.\n\nThe licensing defect. EMLicenseFilter is 175 lines and behaves as an\nauthorisation boundary, being what stops an unlicensed instance from serving\nits administrative API. Its decision procedure reads the request URI raw at\nline 165 and tests it at line 166 against a chain of exemption clauses\nincluding endsWith(\"about\"), endsWith(\"welcome\"), endsWith(\"forgot\"),\nendsWith(\"notlicensed\"), contains(\"/resources/\") and contains(\"/images/\"),\nnone of which is anchored by a separator or a segment boundary. A branch at\nlines 167 to 171 additionally reassigns the whole exemption set rather than\naccumulating into it when the request accepts JSON. The test has exactly one\nconsumer in the class: shouldNotFilter() at line 47 calling isLicenseRequired()\nat line 48. So a matching URI does not weaken one decision, it suppresses the\nentire doFilterInternal() body, including the /tdm/api/v guard at line 99 and\nthe unlicensed-instance redirect to /em/license at line 118. Because a servlet\ncontainer strips semicolon-delimited path parameters from each segment before\nit performs servlet mapping, the filter and the router disagree about the\nidentity of one request: a target of /em/database/restore;welcome is exempted\nby the filter and still routed to the restore handler by the container. That\ndisagreement is the textbook shape of CWE-436. Measured read-only on a live\ninstance, with the control that carries the argument:\n\n    GET /em/database/currentConfig\n        -\u003e 302, Location: /em/license, zero-length body\n    GET /em/database/currentConfig;welcome\n        -\u003e 200, 204 bytes, application/json;charset=utf-8, disclosing the\n           schema version, the HyperSQL type, the database user and the\n           jdbc:hsqldb:file URL of the platform\u0027s own database files\n    GET /em/database/currentConfig;about\n        -\u003e the same 200/204, so this is the clause list and not one word\n    GET /em/database/currentConfigwelcome     (no semicolon)\n        -\u003e 404, 792 bytes\n    GET /em/tdm/api/v2/servers;welcome\n        -\u003e 200, 160 bytes, a well-formed serversResponse XML document with an\n           empty servers element, so Jersey routed and ran the resource method\n    the same pair over TLS\n        -\u003e 200/204 with the bypass and 302/0 without it, so the HTTPS\n           listener is an equivalent surface and not a redirect shell\n\nThe no-semicolon control is the load-bearing row: the only variable that\nchanged is the presence of a semicolon path parameter, and the outcome flipped\nfrom a licensing redirect to a 200 carrying live database configuration to a\ncaller who had never authenticated. The bypass is not a skeleton key, and that\nwas measured rather than assumed: handlers performing their own licensing\ncheck are unaffected, the coverage-agent endpoints reading the license manager\ndirectly and continuing to return 403 with a 90-byte unlicensed body across all\nseventeen of their mappings even with the bypass applied, while a server-resource\nfeature gate kept returning 403 with a 94-byte body. What the bypass unlocks is\neverything whose enforcement lives only in the filter, which includes the whole\n/em/database subtree and the entire /em/tdm/api/v version tree. One related\nfirst-party defect sits in the same filter and matters for detection: line 113\nflushes the response output stream and line 115 then calls setStatus(403), so\nlicence refusals surface as HTTP 200 with a JSON body carrying status 403,\nwhich makes them invisible to any status-based monitoring.\n\nThe deserialization defect. The restore path lands in\ncom.parasoft.ctp.core.database.backup.AbstractDatabaseBackup, a class of 518\nlines and 19,851 bytes:\n\n    :14   import java.io.ObjectInputStream;\n    :111  ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in);\n    :112  int numTables = ois.readInt();\n    :117  TableMetadata tableMetadata = (TableMetadata) ois.readObject();\n    :126  Connection connection = this.provider.getConnection();\n\nwhere in is the database.ser member of an uploaded zip. Three properties are\ndecisive. The cast is applied to whatever readObject() returned, so it\nconstrains nothing: the gadget executes during the call and the\nClassCastException is thrown afterwards. getConnection() sits nine lines\nlower, so no database needs to exist, to be reachable or to accept the supplied\nparameters for the payload to have already run, which makes that ordering the\ncheapest structural fix available and one needing no understanding of gadget\nchains. And the int read at line 112 is consumed before the object read. The\ncaller is the web-layer controller EMDatabaseController, 1359 lines, whose\nrestore handler at line 707 or 708 takes a StandardMultipartHttpServletRequest\nand hard-compares zip member names against the literals \"version.txt\" at line\n725 and \"database.ser\" at line 733, a shape check that says nothing about\ncontent. The absence of any filter is not an inference from one search: in the\nwhole shipped product ObjectInputStream appears in 68 files with 149 occurrences\nin the core tree and in 3 files in the web layer, readObject appears in 81\nfiles, and ObjectInputFilter appears in 0 files, jdk.serialFilter in 0 files and\nserialFilter in 0 files. Three zeros, across a class name, a system property and\nits short alias, in an image unpacked and searched as artefacts against a\npositive control of 81 files containing readObject, is a strong result: the\nproduct has no deserialization filtering anywhere in its construction. Two\nsibling readObject() calls on the same class of untrusted stream sit in the same\nfile at lines 323 and 435, in a row-draining routine and a row-binding routine;\nthey were read from source and not detonated, and they are named so a fix covers\nthe class rather than the call site.\n\nThe fail-open authentication gate. The application has three Spring Security\nfilter chains and all three register the same remember-me service,\nEMRememberMeServices, 483 lines, with the security configuration in\nCTPSecurityWebConfig, 318 lines. Neither hop of the chain is an unprotected\nroute: /database is explicitly matched to authenticated(), and the images\nallow-list is /images/welcome/star rather than a doubled-asterisk glob over\n/images, so a page written to images/\u003cleaf\u003e.jsp also needs an authenticated\nsubject at the security layer. Both hops sit behind the authentication\nboundary. The finding is therefore described accurately as the product handing\nan anonymous request an authenticated administrative principal:\n\n    // EMRememberMeServices.java:140-148, abridged\n    if (request.getHeader(\"Authorization\") != null) {\n        return null;                    // :140-142 defer to credentials\n    }\n    pstsecClient = PSTSecServiceClient.getInstance();   // :146\n    if (pstsecClient == null) {          // :148 the fail-open branch\n        return this.createAuthenticationToken(\"admin\", \"admin\",\n                 EmUserInfo.Role.ADMIN, request);\n    }\n\nThe token registers new SimpleGrantedAuthority(\"ROLE_ADMIN\") and wraps it in a\nSpring Security User whose authenticated flag is true, so the resulting\nprincipal is a genuinely authenticated administrator rather than the container\u0027s\nanonymous principal, and the authenticated() matcher that CTPSecurityWebConfig\nline 283 demands for /database is satisfied by it. The condition guarding all of\nthis is the absence of the external security-provider client, which in the\nuntouched vendor image, with no setup step performed, does not exist. Measured\nwith its control in the same run: an anonymous GET of the users/current resource\nunder the /em/api/v3 context returned 200 with the 39-byte body\n{\"id\":1,\"login\":\"admin\",\"role\":\"ADMIN\"}, and the identical request carrying\nAuthorization: Bearer garbage returned 401 with an empty body. The control shows\nthe fail-open branch is specific to requests presenting no credential at all, so\nthe behaviour is not \"authentication is off\" but \"an absent credential is more\ntrusted than a wrong one\". CSRF is separately not an obstacle, because\nCsrfSecurityRequestMatcher is a 28-line class whose anchored exemption alternation\nat line 19 includes /database, with GET, HEAD, TRACE and OPTIONS exempt by method\nat line 22.\n\nThe write primitive and the execution sink. Reconstituting the stream\u0027s first\nobject, a java.util.HashSet, forces a hashCode() on its single element, a\nTiedMapEntry wrapping a LazyMap whose transformer factory is a\nConstantTransformer holding attacker bytes and whose decorated map is an\naspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap whose folder field is an absolute\npath:\n\n    readObject() -\u003e HashSet.readObject -\u003e HashMap.putVal -\u003e key.hashCode()\n      -\u003e commons-collections4 TiedMapEntry.hashCode() -\u003e getValue()\n      -\u003e commons-collections4 LazyMap.get(key)  // transform the key\n         -\u003e map.put(key, value)  // invokeinterface, virtual dispatch\n      -\u003e aspectjweaver SimpleCache$StoreableCachingMap.put(key, byte[])\n      -\u003e writeToPath(folder + File.separator + key, bytes)\n\nThat class was read at the bytecode level to establish four facts, all of which\nare what make the write arbitrary. The folder field is declared private final\nString, is not transient, and the class declares no readObject of its own, so it\nis populated by the inherited HashMap.readObject path through defaultReadObject,\nwhich assigns whatever the stream carries, and both writeToPath and the store\nroutine read it with an explicit getfield so the compiler has not inlined it.\nwriteToPath performs getfield folder, builds a StringBuilder, concatenates a\nseparator and the key, and stores the result, which is the entire function: there\nis no forced extension appended to the key, and the value passes a checkcast to a\nbyte array, so the content is any bytes at all. Validation is absent in every\nform, with zero occurrences of File.getName(), Path.normalize(),\ngetCanonicalPath(), startsWith(), a regular expression or a length truncation in\nthat write path; keys carrying slashes or relative traversals both work, and\nbecause concatenation with an empty folder yields a leading double separator,\nwhich POSIX treats as a valid absolute path, an absolute destination is reachable\ntoo. And it does not fire on deserialization alone, which is the subtle part:\nHashMap.readObject reconstitutes entries through putVal, package-private, final\nand not overridden, so it bypasses the overridden put that contains the write,\nwhich is why the TiedMapEntry to LazyMap to Map.put prefix is needed to force a\nvirtual dispatch. The only content constraint found anywhere is that the bytes\nmust not be exactly the four-byte sentinel IDEM. In the publish"
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        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
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        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "[0day-rubbish] Parasoft Continuous Testing Platform 10.7.5-SNAPSHOT anonymous deserialization in the database restore path to JSP command execution as uid=1000 (9.8)",
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          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0497",
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