GCVE-1988-2026-0502
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Moxa | MAR-2000 firmware |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
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"affected": [
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"product": "MAR-2000 firmware",
"vendor": "Moxa",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
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"credits": [
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"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Moxa\nMAR-2000 series industrial 4G/LTE cellular router, firmware image\nFWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909, from Moxa Inc. (Taiwan). An authenticated\nadministrator converts one stored configuration field into arbitrary command\nexecution as the identity of the product\u0027s model process, because the\nExecuter model builds the launch command of an operator program as a shell\nstring whose program-argument column is never validated by any layer of the\nbackend. This is one of three independent command injection findings\ndocumented for this product and released together as a set.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, with CWE-20 co-equal, in\nthe Executer model at /home/model/system/executer/executer.py inside the\nARM Debian 6.0.8 root filesystem of the firmware, which runs the vendor\u0027s\nMIRF (Mobile Intelligent Routing Framework) stack: a Node.js Express 4.0\nmanagement application on port 80 bound to all interfaces, the express-sanji\nmiddleware bridging REST resources onto a local MQTT broker, and Python 2.6\nmodel scripts that persist configuration and act on it. The model stores\none row per operator program in an SQLite table whose columns include\nfileName and argument. On activation it assembles the command as\nstr(execute_file) + \" \" + str(argument) and launches it with\nsubprocess.Popen(full_command, shell=True, preexec_fn=os.setsid), where the\nrow\u0027s argument bytes are concatenated verbatim and shell=True delegates the\nparsing to /bin/sh: semicolons, background operators, pipes, backticks and\ncommand substitution all have their ordinary meaning. The value\u0027s\nprovenance is a database column set by an HTTP request: the row writer is\ngeneric, taking every key of the PUT /api/v1/system/executer/program/\u003cid\u003e\nrequest\u0027s data object and committing it with a plain SQL\nUPDATE ... SET ... statement, with no per-column semantics anywhere on the\nwrite path. The only gate on execution is a liveness check - the file must\nexist under the user-program directory - and the product\u0027s own multipart\nupload route, POST /api/v1/system/executer/program, satisfies it: the upload\napplies only a filename normalisation, with no allowed-type list and no file\nfilter. The chain is therefore: log in, upload a benign script through the\nproduct\u0027s own route, store \"; \u003ccommand\u003e; #\" in the row\u0027s argument field, and\nactivate the row with PUT /api/v1/system/executer/activatedProgram carrying\nprogramId and runBit 1. The shell runs the uploaded script first, the\nsemicolon ends it, the injected statement runs, and the trailing hash\ncomments out the rest of the line. The same model contains a second,\nstructurally identical sink in its deletion path: it builds\n\"rm -rf %s\" from the row\u0027s unvalidated fileName column and executes it with\nsubprocess.call(..., shell=True), guarded only by a comparison of the raw\nvalue against a single slash, which blocks exactly one value and nothing\nelse, and requires no upload and no activation.\n\nThe two-request chain looks like this after login:\n\n```\n[1] POST /api/v1/system/executer/program multipart, benign script\n -\u003e stored under the user-program directory\n[2] PUT /api/v1/system/executer/program/\u003cid\u003e\n {\"data\": {\"fileName\": \"\u003cuploaded basename\u003e\",\n \"argument\": \"; \u003ccommand\u003e; #\"}}\n -\u003e generic row writer commits both columns verbatim (SQLite)\n[3] PUT /api/v1/system/executer/activatedProgram\n {\"data\": {\"programId\": \u003cid\u003e, \"runBit\": 1}}\n -\u003e Popen(\"\u003cdir\u003e/\u003cfile\u003e ; \u003ccommand\u003e; #\", shell=True)\n```\n\nAuthentication and reach. The validateUser middleware is the only\nauthentication check on the REST surface: it requires a server-side session\nfor every non-GET method, and login is POST /api/login compared against\nbcrypt-hashed entries in the SQLite user table. Past that check there is no\nsecond authorisation layer - the message bridge performs no permission\ntranslation and the broker leg carries no identity - so the product\u0027s single\ndocumented role, the device administrator, is the whole security boundary.\nThe listener binds all interfaces on port 80 in the shipped firmware; no\nWAN exposure is assumed anywhere in the published rating.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 0.914816, impact\n5.873119, exploitability 1.234708 and base 7.107826 rounded up to 7.2,\nPrivileges Required High being the product\u0027s single administrator role. A\nlabelled conditional and never the headline: where a deployment still runs\nthe factory default administrator pair carried by the shipped firmware\u0027s\nSQLite user table, the prerequisite collapses and the chain reads 9.8\nCritical on the PR:N vector (exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161); a\nchanged credential removes it, and the default pair is disclosed as a\nseparate weakness, never folded into the published vector. A PR:L reading\nof 8.8 High is published only as the arithmetic of the rejected variant. The\nscore provenance is disclosed in public: the research record behind this\nadvisory carried 8.8 for all three same-product findings, that figure is the\narithmetic of a PR:L vector, no artefact shows a lower-privileged product\nrole, and every published number was recomputed from its own vector - which\nlowered the researchers\u0027 own figure by 1.6 points. A Scope-Changed reading\ncomputes to 9.1 and is deliberately not published, because the model\nprocess belongs to the same single-purpose appliance authority, and\ncommanding the appliance\u0027s own operating system through its management\nplane is the product\u0027s design rather than an escape.\n\nVerification method, and its boundary. Two evidence classes carry the\nfinding, kept separate in the published advisory. The firmware\u0027s own\napplication sources establish the entry path, the storage semantics and the\nexact sink construction, read from the shipped files. The dynamic layer is\na sink-level replication on an isolated cloud Linux sandbox: the model\u0027s\nexact concatenation with the shell=True launch, carrying a benign upload\nstand-in, an injection payload and a benign control; with the payload in the\nargument position a marker file containing uid=0(root) was created, and the\ncontrol produced the benign program launch and nothing else. The deletion\nconstruction was replicated with the same method and also produced its\nmarker. The boundary is stated plainly: end-to-end detonation against\npowered-on hardware is outside this research record, and the identity of the\nmodel process on the device was neither measured nor claimed - uid=0(root)\nis the replication sandbox\u0027s identity and nothing broader rests on it.\n\nImpact. Arbitrary command execution as the identity of the Python model\nprocess, begun by one authenticated configuration write and one activation\nrequest, with no memory corruption and no protocol manipulation in the\nchain. The command line is a stored configuration value that persists across\nreboots and re-executes on every activation of the row, so the payload is\nreboot-durable without persistence work by the attacker. The deletion sink\nextends the class to a field reachable without any upload and allows\ndestructive filesystem operations wherever the injected metacharacters\nlead. The compromise yields the router\u0027s complete configuration, control of\nits forwarding and cellular function, and availability at will over a\ndevice deployed as communication infrastructure. The two requests that\nmatter are indistinguishable in shape from ordinary administrator activity,\nso the readable signals are content-level: program rows whose argument\ncontains shell metacharacters, unexpected files in the user-program\ndirectory, unexpected child processes under the model daemon. The web\nstack\u0027s separate property of answering unauthenticated GET requests across\nthe API surface is a read-exposure issue reported on its own and is not\npart of this chain.\n\nRemediation: execute activated programs without a shell, with the\nexecutable path and the argument as separate execv-style arguments; validate\nthe argument at the row-write boundary in the model rather than only in a\nweb form; constrain fileName to the set of stored uploads and associate rows\nto files by an opaque server-side handle; rebuild the deletion path with an\nargument vector; restrict the multipart upload to executable-basename types\nand add a regression test that writes a metacharacter-bearing argument,\nactivates the row, and asserts rejection at write time or execution without\nshell interpretation. Operators until a patch exists: change the factory\ndefault administrator credential at commissioning, keep the management\nlistener off WAN-facing addresses, audit the program table and user-program\ndirectory on a schedule, and disable the Executer feature where operator\nprograms are not used.\n\nProof of concept. The published tool is a standard-library-only Python 3\nclient that drives the full chain: it logs in, uploads a benign two-line\nshell script through the multipart route, writes the argument payload into a\nchosen row, activates the row, and reports; it verifies both the write and\nthe activation responses and exits non-zero with an explicit message at each\nfailure point. Target, credential, row id, marker command and timeouts are\narguments; the default target is loopback. No persistence, no reverse shell,\nno destructive action; the default command writes a single marker file so\nthe outcome is observable without a second channel. Use it only against\nsystems you own or are authorised to test.\n\nThe vendor\u0027s product security team mailbox, published on the vendor\u0027s own\nsecurity advisories page, was used for the unconditional notification; no\nreport form was submitted and no individual was addressed by name. This\ndisclosure is unconditional: the research is published, no permission was\nasked for, no embargo was requested, nothing is withheld pending a reply,\nand remediation questions are answered at no cost. No vulnerability\nidentifier has been assigned to this finding.\n\nTwo companion advisories for the same product are published alongside this\none, independent findings that share only the entry architecture - a\ndifferent model file, REST resource, configuration field and sink each: an\nIPsec tunnel address injection through the route-management shell commands,\nand a scenario ping condition injection through the auto-executing ping\nthread, both at the second and third URLs below.\n\nFull technical analysis and the reproducible proof of concept, published\nunconditionally:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-executer-program-argument-command-injection\n\nCompanion advisories for the same product, independent findings:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-network-ipsec-command-injection\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/mar-2000-scenario-ping-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] Moxa MAR-2000 firmware FWR_MAR2000_V1.0_Build_15010909 command injection in the Executer program activation path (7.2)",
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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