GCVE-1988-2026-0495

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler, root command execution (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Edimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO wireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single authenticated POST that looks like an ordinary WAN settings submission reaches system() with a request-controlled username interpolated unquoted into a shell command line, behind a sanitiser that inspects exactly one character, and the web server process that executes it runs as root. Type and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server that serves the management interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit big-endian MIPS, MIPS-I, uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256 ec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a SquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp from 2015. The registration websFormDefine("setWAN", ...) at 0x478484, handler at 0x441cec and name string at 0x4a6250, publishes POST /goform/setWAN. Inside the handler the WAN mode is read from the request and dispatched: websGetVar(wp, "wanMode", "") at 0x441d3c, atoi at 0x441d44, apmib_set(0x102, &wanMode) at 0x441d54, then addiu v1, zero, 2 at 0x441d60 and beq v0, v1, 0x441e74 at 0x441d6c. On the PPP branch, wanMode 2, the username field is taken from the request by websGetVar for pppUserName, whose name string is at 0x4953f4, copied with strcpy at 0x441e94 into a fixed stack buffer, measured with strlen at 0x441ea8, and scanned by an inline byte loop between 0x441ebc and 0x441ee4 whose only comparison is addiu a0, zero, 0x3b, a semicolon. Finding one, the loop writes a NUL and stops. That single-character scan is the entire sanitisation on the path. The value then goes into sprintf at 0x441ee8 using the format string at 0x49a510, echo %s > /tmp/UserName and from there into system(buf2) at 0x441f1c, reached through the PLT slot at 0x4c6d60, which hands the line to /bin/sh -c. A pipe, an ampersand, a backtick, a dollar sign with parentheses and an embedded newline are never inspected, so a username containing no semicolon reaches the shell untouched. The verified payload is a username of |id > /tmp/marker #, which builds the command line echo |id > /tmp/marker # > /tmp/UserName The shell treats the hash as a comment that swallows the sink's own redirect and runs id as the right-hand side of a pipeline, so the injected command executes and the file the handler was supposed to write is never created. The defence that arrives too late. An escape loop that replaces a hash with a backslash-escaped hash does exist in this handler, running between 0x441f4c and 0x441fb0. Two facts dispose of it. First, the instruction order: the loop is after system() at 0x441f1c and there is no branch back to it. Second, the buffer: the loop writes into the configuration buffer at sp+0x18, which is what apmib_set(0x6d, ...) stores at 0x44200c, not the buffer handed to the shell. The developer escaped the hash character for the value that gets stored and escaped nothing for the value that gets executed, which is a defensible priority if the threat model is a hash in a stored username breaking some later script that reads the configuration, and no defence at all against this sink. The dynamic replication confirms the consequence: the hash in the injected username reaches the shell as a comment and the sink's own redirect never fires. The sanitiser audit, and one trap for anyone re-reading the decompilation. Between websGetVar and system the only operations on the value are strcpy at 0x441e94, strlen at 0x441ea8, the inline immediate-0x3b scan and the unquoted sprintf at 0x441ee8. No regex call, no inet_aton, no isdigit, no isalnum, no strchr, no strcspn, no vendor validation helper and no custom validator appears on that path. The inet_aton calls that do exist in this function, at 0x441dd0 and 0x441e14, belong to the static-IP branch, wanMode 1, reached via the branch at 0x441d8c; the wanMode 2 comparison sends execution straight to the PPP branch and never enters that code. A quick read of the decompilation therefore misleads, because the function as a whole does contain address validation while the path that matters contains none. One root cause, three reachable parameters. The same construction appears three times in this handler, each selected by a value the request supplies: pppUserName on wanMode 2, with the sink region 0x441e74 to 0x441f1c and configuration object 0x6d written after the sink; pptpUserName on wanMode 3, from 0x4420d0 onward, configuration object 0xf3; and L2TPUserName on wanMode 6, from 0x44246c onward, configuration object 0x128. All three use the same immediate-0x3b scan, the same echo format string and the same system() call shape. The wanMode 2 path was verified instruction by instruction and replicated dynamically; the other two are reported from reading the same handler, which is a structural claim rather than a demonstrated one. A patch confined to the PPP path leaves the PPTP and L2TP paths injectable. A static comparison against a second model, offered as a lead and not as a finding. A second Edimax firmware image, BR-6208AC_V2_1.03, carries a different webs build, ELF 32-bit MSB MIPS-I, 816568 bytes, SHA256 3ad10a41d11c8cd59185eab6c9ce67b18cd2118942eb2201f48540d7846a0328, whose setWAN implementation matches instruction for instruction: handler at 0x448710, websGetVar for pppUserName at 0x4488b8, strcpy at 0x4488bc, the same inline immediate-0x3b scan at 0x4488dc to 0x4488fc, the same sprintf into /tmp/UserName at 0x448920 with its format string at 0x4a6954, system() at 0x448940, the same three parameters on the same three wanMode values, and the same single-realm Basic authentication model behind the same configuration flag. The differing addresses and binary size come from a different product build; the vulnerable path itself does not differ. The reasonable inference is a shared source component in the vendor's router software base. That model was not tested, nothing was executed from that image, no score covers it, and it is not an exploited finding on it. Scope of the pattern. A count of the shipped registration table found 91 /goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call, so the architectural root cause is a management server that builds shell command lines by string interpolation rather than one careless field. /goform/setWAN is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime gate (/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and /goform/formAdvManagement, which redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime exceeds 600 seconds), so it is reachable at any time the device is up. Authentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in normal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration object 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is past setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic registered from the directive "Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd", covers every /goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The product has no second lower-privileged role, so Privileges Required is High rather than Low: one realm entry, one password file, one account, an Allow directive handler at 0x407688 that is a stub answering "This version of Boa doesn't support access controls", a type-None string at 0x49070c that is never passed to auth_add, and a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no Allow directive. The calling process is root because the shipped etc/boa/boa.conf declares User root, the server performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or capability drop, and it writes /var/run/webs.pid, which requires root on this filesystem, so the landing identity is uid=0(root) and there is no escalation step in the chain. Attack complexity is Low: the only branch to satisfy, wanMode, is supplied by the attacker, and there is no race, timing window, memory-layout requirement, gadget or user-specific state. The practical network position on a stock device is a host on the wired LAN or an associated wireless client, because the shipped firewall script drops WAN-originated SYN at firewall.sh:180, installs a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187 and accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189; that position includes guest wireless clients, any compromised device behind the router and anything bridged onto the segment, and remote management or a port forward moves it to the open internet. Severity. The published score is 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 = 0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) = Roundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is published because it is a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next to a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so the figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the researchers' own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with their arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from Exploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no basic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1 High, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base Roundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root after it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6 High, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because success depends on no condition outside the attacker's control. An adjacent-vector reading is published as a labelled alternative at 6.8 High, from Exploitability 0.900610 and Base Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest description of a stock device whose WAN-side input policy drops new connections; AV:N is retained because the service is bound to the device's own network stack and addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router serves, and because remote management and port forwarding are ordinary documented product features. Default internet exposure is not claimed. Two readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals and are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts the factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than demonstrated: no device was authenticated against, so the path is an inference from the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the sink, and its Scope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately not published for the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still in its pre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads zero, auth_authorize returns success without a challenge for paths outside /mp.asp, /index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers 204, which is captive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that state as the setup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at 0x44cdbc resets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO - LOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and pages such as web/inter_wan.asp:214 and web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to switch their interface. That branch is structural inference only, read from the binary and never exercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an early pass of this research misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state, and the correction downgraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be contested rather than found open, the reading is 8.1 High from Exploitability 2.221167 and Base 8.094286. The factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The i
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Edimax BR-6478AC firmware Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "BR-6478AC firmware",
          "vendor": "Edimax",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nEdimax BR-6478AC, firmware image BR6478AC_v2.20.bin, the dual-band AC1750 SOHO\nwireless router from Edimax Technology Co., Ltd. (Taiwan). A single\nauthenticated POST that looks like an ordinary WAN settings submission reaches\nsystem() with a request-controlled username interpolated unquoted into a shell\ncommand line, behind a sanitiser that inspects exactly one character, and the\nweb server process that executes it runs as root.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-78, OS command injection, in the setWAN\nWAN-configuration handler of bin/webs, the embedded GoAhead-style HTTP server\nthat serves the management interface on TCP port 80. The binary is ELF 32-bit\nbig-endian MIPS, MIPS-I, uClibc, stripped, 762904 bytes, SHA256\nec39c0f9332361e37ab92f1999ac5f00f5742dd6db75f7cb26c0652cfedb32a1, from a\nSquashFS root filesystem of roughly 2.3 MB with an internal build timestamp\nfrom 2015. The registration websFormDefine(\"setWAN\", ...) at 0x478484, handler\nat 0x441cec and name string at 0x4a6250, publishes POST /goform/setWAN. Inside\nthe handler the WAN mode is read from the request and dispatched:\nwebsGetVar(wp, \"wanMode\", \"\") at 0x441d3c, atoi at 0x441d44, apmib_set(0x102,\n\u0026wanMode) at 0x441d54, then addiu v1, zero, 2 at 0x441d60 and beq v0, v1,\n0x441e74 at 0x441d6c. On the PPP branch, wanMode 2, the username field is\ntaken from the request by websGetVar for pppUserName, whose name string is at\n0x4953f4, copied with strcpy at 0x441e94 into a fixed stack buffer, measured\nwith strlen at 0x441ea8, and scanned by an inline byte loop between 0x441ebc\nand 0x441ee4 whose only comparison is addiu a0, zero, 0x3b, a semicolon.\nFinding one, the loop writes a NUL and stops. That single-character scan is\nthe entire sanitisation on the path. The value then goes into sprintf at\n0x441ee8 using the format string at 0x49a510,\n\n    echo %s \u003e /tmp/UserName\n\nand from there into system(buf2) at 0x441f1c, reached through the PLT slot at\n0x4c6d60, which hands the line to /bin/sh -c. A pipe, an ampersand, a\nbacktick, a dollar sign with parentheses and an embedded newline are never\ninspected, so a username containing no semicolon reaches the shell untouched.\nThe verified payload is a username of |id \u003e /tmp/marker #, which builds the\ncommand line\n\n    echo |id \u003e /tmp/marker # \u003e /tmp/UserName\n\nThe shell treats the hash as a comment that swallows the sink\u0027s own redirect\nand runs id as the right-hand side of a pipeline, so the injected command\nexecutes and the file the handler was supposed to write is never created.\n\nThe defence that arrives too late. An escape loop that replaces a hash with a\nbackslash-escaped hash does exist in this handler, running between 0x441f4c\nand 0x441fb0. Two facts dispose of it. First, the instruction order: the loop\nis after system() at 0x441f1c and there is no branch back to it. Second, the\nbuffer: the loop writes into the configuration buffer at sp+0x18, which is\nwhat apmib_set(0x6d, ...) stores at 0x44200c, not the buffer handed to the\nshell. The developer escaped the hash character for the value that gets stored\nand escaped nothing for the value that gets executed, which is a defensible\npriority if the threat model is a hash in a stored username breaking some\nlater script that reads the configuration, and no defence at all against this\nsink. The dynamic replication confirms the consequence: the hash in the\ninjected username reaches the shell as a comment and the sink\u0027s own redirect\nnever fires.\n\nThe sanitiser audit, and one trap for anyone re-reading the decompilation.\nBetween websGetVar and system the only operations on the value are strcpy at\n0x441e94, strlen at 0x441ea8, the inline immediate-0x3b scan and the unquoted\nsprintf at 0x441ee8. No regex call, no inet_aton, no isdigit, no isalnum, no\nstrchr, no strcspn, no vendor validation helper and no custom validator\nappears on that path. The inet_aton calls that do exist in this function, at\n0x441dd0 and 0x441e14, belong to the static-IP branch, wanMode 1, reached via\nthe branch at 0x441d8c; the wanMode 2 comparison sends execution straight to\nthe PPP branch and never enters that code. A quick read of the decompilation\ntherefore misleads, because the function as a whole does contain address\nvalidation while the path that matters contains none.\n\nOne root cause, three reachable parameters. The same construction appears\nthree times in this handler, each selected by a value the request supplies:\npppUserName on wanMode 2, with the sink region 0x441e74 to 0x441f1c and\nconfiguration object 0x6d written after the sink; pptpUserName on wanMode 3,\nfrom 0x4420d0 onward, configuration object 0xf3; and L2TPUserName on wanMode\n6, from 0x44246c onward, configuration object 0x128. All three use the same\nimmediate-0x3b scan, the same echo format string and the same system() call\nshape. The wanMode 2 path was verified instruction by instruction and\nreplicated dynamically; the other two are reported from reading the same\nhandler, which is a structural claim rather than a demonstrated one. A patch\nconfined to the PPP path leaves the PPTP and L2TP paths injectable.\n\nA static comparison against a second model, offered as a lead and not as a\nfinding. A second Edimax firmware image, BR-6208AC_V2_1.03, carries a\ndifferent webs build, ELF 32-bit MSB MIPS-I, 816568 bytes, SHA256\n3ad10a41d11c8cd59185eab6c9ce67b18cd2118942eb2201f48540d7846a0328, whose setWAN\nimplementation matches instruction for instruction: handler at 0x448710,\nwebsGetVar for pppUserName at 0x4488b8, strcpy at 0x4488bc, the same inline\nimmediate-0x3b scan at 0x4488dc to 0x4488fc, the same sprintf into\n/tmp/UserName at 0x448920 with its format string at 0x4a6954, system() at\n0x448940, the same three parameters on the same three wanMode values, and the\nsame single-realm Basic authentication model behind the same configuration\nflag. The differing addresses and binary size come from a different product\nbuild; the vulnerable path itself does not differ. The reasonable inference is\na shared source component in the vendor\u0027s router software base. That model was\nnot tested, nothing was executed from that image, no score covers it, and it\nis not an exploited finding on it.\n\nScope of the pattern. A count of the shipped registration table found 91\n/goform/form* handlers, of which roughly 85 reach a system() or popen() call,\nso the architectural root cause is a management server that builds shell\ncommand lines by string interpolation rather than one careless field.\n/goform/setWAN is not one of the four routes carrying a post-boot uptime gate\n(/mp.asp, /goform/mp, /advanced_management.asp and /goform/formAdvManagement,\nwhich redirect to /index.asp once /proc/uptime exceeds 600 seconds), so it is\nreachable at any time the device is up.\n\nAuthentication and reach. The route requires a valid administrative session in\nnormal operation. The gate auth_authorize at 0x404d00 reads configuration\nobject 0x1bc, the setup-wizard flag, through apmib_get; once the device is\npast setup the security store at 0x4c7004, a single / entry of type Basic\nregistered from the directive \"Auth / /etc/boa/boa.passwd\", covers every\n/goform/ path with HTTP Basic authentication. The product has no second\nlower-privileged role, so Privileges Required is High rather than Low: one\nrealm entry, one password file, one account, an Allow directive handler at\n0x407688 that is a stub answering \"This version of Boa doesn\u0027t support access\ncontrols\", a type-None string at 0x49070c that is never passed to auth_add,\nand a shipped configuration carrying one Auth directive and no Allow\ndirective. The calling process is root because the shipped etc/boa/boa.conf\ndeclares User root, the server performs no setuid, chroot, namespace or\ncapability drop, and it writes /var/run/webs.pid, which requires root on this\nfilesystem, so the landing identity is uid=0(root) and there is no escalation\nstep in the chain. Attack complexity is Low: the only branch to satisfy,\nwanMode, is supplied by the attacker, and there is no race, timing window,\nmemory-layout requirement, gadget or user-specific state. The practical\nnetwork position on a stock device is a host on the wired LAN or an associated\nwireless client, because the shipped firewall script drops WAN-originated SYN\nat firewall.sh:180, installs a default DROP input policy at firewall.sh:187\nand accepts input on other interfaces at firewall.sh:189; that position\nincludes guest wireless clients, any compromised device behind the router and\nanything bridged onto the segment, and remote management or a port forward\nmoves it to the open internet.\n\nSeverity. The published score is 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, from ISS = 1 - 0.44^3 =\n0.914816, Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119, Exploitability = 8.22 x\n0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85 = 1.234708 and Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.234708) =\nRoundup(7.107826) = 7.2. The provenance of that number is published because it\nis a correction: the research notes behind this work carried 8.8 written next\nto a PR:H vector, and 8.8 is the arithmetic of PR:L rather than of PR:H, so\nthe figure was recomputed from the vector and published at 7.2, lowering the\nresearchers\u0027 own number by 1.6 points. Four further readings are printed with\ntheir arithmetic. Privileges Required Low is rejected at 8.8 High, from\nExploitability 2.835255 and Base Roundup(8.708373), because the product has no\nbasic-user role for that metric to describe. Scope Changed is rejected at 9.1\nHigh, from Impact at S:C = 6.128026, Exploitability 2.286496 and Base\nRoundup(1.08 x 8.414522), because webs is root before the attack and root\nafter it and nothing is escaped. Attack Complexity High is rejected at 6.6\nHigh, from Exploitability 0.705547 and Base Roundup(6.578666), because success\ndepends on no condition outside the attacker\u0027s control. An adjacent-vector\nreading is published as a labelled alternative at 6.8 High, from\nExploitability 0.900610 and Base Roundup(6.773729), and it is the honest\ndescription of a stock device whose WAN-side input policy drops new\nconnections; AV:N is retained because the service is bound to the device\u0027s own\nnetwork stack and addressable over IP by every host on the segment the router\nserves, and because remote management and port forwarding are ordinary\ndocumented product features. Default internet exposure is not claimed.\n\nTwo readings at 9.8 Critical are published as explicitly labelled conditionals\nand are never the headline. The first applies where a deployment still accepts\nthe factory credential shipped in the firmware, and it is reasoned rather than\ndemonstrated: no device was authenticated against, so the path is an inference\nfrom the shipped password file plus the injection proven at the sink, and its\nScope Changed variant, which computes to 10.0, is deliberately not published\nfor the Scope reason above. The second applies to a device still in its\npre-configuration setup state: when configuration object 0x1bc reads zero,\nauth_authorize returns success without a challenge for paths outside /mp.asp,\n/index.asp and /, at 0x4052d0, while /generate_204 answers 204, which is\ncaptive-portal behaviour. Three shipped artefacts identify that state as the\nsetup wizard rather than normal operation: formwizResetDefault at 0x44cdbc\nresets the device and displays Resettowizard, formWizSetup prints NO -\nLOGIN-WEB when the flag is set to 1, and pages such as web/inter_wan.asp:214\nand web/admin_timezone.asp:95 read the same flag to switch their interface.\nThat branch is structural inference only, read from the binary and never\nexercised, and the state ends when setup completes; an early pass of this\nresearch misread it as an unauthenticated post-setup state, and the correction\ndowngraded the finding to PR:H. If the window has to be contested rather than\nfound open, the reading is 8.1 High from Exploitability 2.221167 and Base\n8.094286.\n\nThe factory credential is a separate weakness and not the vector. The i"
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        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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      "title": "[0day-rubbish] Edimax BR-6478AC firmware v2.20 authenticated command injection in the setWAN WAN-configuration handler, root command execution (7.2)",
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}



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Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


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Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

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    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.