Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-407

Allowed-with-Review

Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

An algorithm in a product has an inefficient worst-case computational complexity that may be detrimental to system performance and can be triggered by an attacker, typically using crafted manipulations that ensure that the worst case is being reached.

262 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-2Q4P-G7HV-5RGV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-06 20:37 – Updated: 2026-08-06 20:37
VLAI
Summary
league/commonmark: Quadratic-time denial of service when parsing crafted Markdown
Details

Impact

Affected versions of league/commonmark can have quadratic time complexity when parsing specially crafted Markdown lines. In practical terms, doubling the length of an affected line can make the parser perform roughly four times as much work. The parser identifies locations using character positions, but regular-expression matches report byte positions. These positions differ when a UTF-8 character uses more than one byte. Several parsing paths repeatedly rescan growing portions of the line to translate between the two positions. The Autolink extension can also copy and validate the remaining line at every URL-like prefix.

In current 2.x releases, a single non-ASCII character anywhere on a line can place that whole line on the slower multibyte path. An attacker can combine it with a long run of leading whitespace or repeated Markdown punctuation, causing increasingly large rescans. When the Autolink extension is enabled, repeated URL-like prefixes provide another trigger, even on ASCII-only lines. Each trigger fits within one long line, so complex Markdown structure is unnecessary.

An attacker who can submit Markdown for conversion can use a comparatively small request to consume disproportionate CPU time and allocation activity. Repeated or concurrent requests can occupy all available PHP workers and prevent legitimate requests from completing. The core paths affect CommonMarkConverter, GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter, and custom environments. The autolink-specific path affects applications using AutolinkExtension or GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension. Applications that process only trusted Markdown are not remotely exploitable. The impact is limited to availability: it does not disclose data, change rendered output, or bypass rendering restrictions. Settings such as html_input and allow_unsafe_links do not mitigate the issue because the expensive work occurs before rendering.

Patches

The issue is patched in 2.9.0 and later. Starting in that release, the parser records UTF-8 character-to-byte positions incrementally, converts ordered regular-expression match positions without restarting from the beginning of the line, and matches autolinks against the original line instead of copying every remaining suffix. The affected work then grows in direct proportion to the input size while preserving existing Markdown output and configuration behavior. Versions from 0.6.0 through 2.8.3 are affected. The 0.x and 1.x release lines are no longer supported, so their users must upgrade to 2.9.0 or later.

Workarounds

If you cannot upgrade immediately, reject or truncate inputs with excessively long individual lines before passing them to the converter. A total request-size limit is also useful, but a per-line limit is important because every demonstrated trigger fits on one line. Choose limits appropriate for the application and enforce them before Markdown parsing begins. Restricting conversion to trusted users, applying strict execution-time limits, rate-limiting requests, and limiting concurrent conversions can further reduce exposure, but these measures are not complete substitutes for upgrading.

Disabling AutolinkExtension and avoiding GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension removes the autolink-specific trigger, but the core multibyte parsing paths remain reachable in the standard parser. Existing nesting, delimiter, raw-HTML, and unsafe-link configuration options do not eliminate all affected paths. Applications that must continue processing untrusted Markdown should therefore enforce input limits even when autolinking is disabled.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "league/commonmark"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71488"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1050",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-06T20:37:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAffected versions of `league/commonmark` can have quadratic time complexity when parsing specially crafted Markdown lines. In practical terms, doubling the length of an affected line can make the parser perform roughly four times as much work. The parser identifies locations using character positions, but regular-expression matches report byte positions. These positions differ when a UTF-8 character uses more than one byte. Several parsing paths repeatedly rescan growing portions of the line to translate between the two positions. The Autolink extension can also copy and validate the remaining line at every URL-like prefix.\n\nIn current 2.x releases, a single non-ASCII character anywhere on a line can place that whole line on the slower multibyte path. An attacker can combine it with a long run of leading whitespace or repeated Markdown punctuation, causing increasingly large rescans. When the Autolink extension is enabled, repeated URL-like prefixes provide another trigger, even on ASCII-only lines. Each trigger fits within one long line, so complex Markdown structure is unnecessary.\n\nAn attacker who can submit Markdown for conversion can use a comparatively small request to consume disproportionate CPU time and allocation activity. Repeated or concurrent requests can occupy all available PHP workers and prevent legitimate requests from completing. The core paths affect `CommonMarkConverter`, `GithubFlavoredMarkdownConverter`, and custom environments. The autolink-specific path affects applications using `AutolinkExtension` or `GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension`. Applications that process only trusted Markdown are not remotely exploitable. The impact is limited to availability: it does not disclose data, change rendered output, or bypass rendering restrictions. Settings such as `html_input` and `allow_unsafe_links` do not mitigate the issue because the expensive work occurs before rendering.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe issue is patched in `2.9.0` and later. Starting in that release, the parser records UTF-8 character-to-byte positions incrementally, converts ordered regular-expression match positions without restarting from the beginning of the line, and matches autolinks against the original line instead of copying every remaining suffix. The affected work then grows in direct proportion to the input size while preserving existing Markdown output and configuration behavior. Versions from `0.6.0` through `2.8.3` are affected. The 0.x and 1.x release lines are no longer supported, so their users must upgrade to `2.9.0` or later.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade immediately, reject or truncate inputs with excessively long individual lines before passing them to the converter. A total request-size limit is also useful, but a per-line limit is important because every demonstrated trigger fits on one line. Choose limits appropriate for the application and enforce them before Markdown parsing begins. Restricting conversion to trusted users, applying strict execution-time limits, rate-limiting requests, and limiting concurrent conversions can further reduce exposure, but these measures are not complete substitutes for upgrading.\n\nDisabling `AutolinkExtension` and avoiding `GithubFlavoredMarkdownExtension` removes the autolink-specific trigger, but the core multibyte parsing paths remain reachable in the standard parser. Existing nesting, delimiter, raw-HTML, and unsafe-link configuration options do not eliminate all affected paths. Applications that must continue processing untrusted Markdown should therefore enforce input limits even when autolinking is disabled.",
  "id": "GHSA-2q4p-g7hv-5rgv",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T20:37:20Z",
  "published": "2026-08-06T20:37:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/security/advisories/GHSA-2q4p-g7hv-5rgv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/commit/a6ef6cdc308dfa39a34239c35818e75892a0e6a8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/commit/a70979ea0d7d3377bd7127536748454a922bf5eb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/commit/c97b02e5e652b992033b93ba5d6182f706343fc6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thephpleague/commonmark/releases/tag/2.9.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "league/commonmark: Quadratic-time denial of service when parsing crafted Markdown"
}

GHSA-2WVJ-GVC7-GFHX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-20 12:30 – Updated: 2026-08-19 12:32
VLAI
Details

NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 is vulnerable to a degradation of service attack related to parsing long lists of incoming EDNS options. An adversary sending queries with too many EDNS options can hold Unbound threads hostage while they are parsing and creating internal data structures for the options. Coordinated attacks can result in degradation and/or denial of service. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix to limit acceptable incoming EDNS options (100).

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
6.6 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/U:Red
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1050",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-20T10:16:27Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "NLnet Labs Unbound up to and including version 1.25.0 is vulnerable to a degradation of service attack related to parsing long lists of incoming EDNS options. An adversary sending queries with too many EDNS options can hold Unbound threads hostage while they are parsing and creating internal data structures for the options. Coordinated attacks can result in degradation and/or denial of service. Unbound 1.25.1 contains a patch with a fix to limit acceptable incoming EDNS options (100).",
  "id": "GHSA-2wvj-gvc7-gfhx",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T12:32:10Z",
  "published": "2026-05-20T12:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:24013"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36320"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:36777"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:37282"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:54769"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-41292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2480125"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-41292.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/unbound/CVE-2026-41292.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Red",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-2X83-8G95-XH59

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 19:36 – Updated: 2026-06-25 19:36
VLAI
Summary
MessagePack-CSharp: ExpandoObject formatter can perform quadratic insertion work on untrusted maps
Details

Summary

ExpandoObjectFormatter.Deserialize populates System.Dynamic.ExpandoObject by calling IDictionary<string, object>.Add for each map entry. ExpandoObject internally maintains member names in array-like structures, so inserting many distinct keys can require repeated linear scans and array copies.

For large attacker-controlled maps, this produces quadratic CPU and allocation behavior. The issue is especially surprising because ExpandoObjectResolver.Options is configured with MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData, but collision-resistant dictionary comparers cannot protect ExpandoObject insertion internals.

Impact

Applications are affected when they deserialize untrusted MessagePack maps into ExpandoObject using ExpandoObjectResolver or related resolver options.

A hostile payload containing many distinct keys can cause CPU exhaustion and allocation churn disproportionate to the input size. This can make a server unresponsive or exhaust memory under concurrent request load.

This is not a hash-collision attack against a configurable dictionary comparer. The super-linear behavior comes from ExpandoObject's insertion model, so MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData does not eliminate the cost.

Affected components

  • Package: MessagePack
  • APIs: ExpandoObjectFormatter.Deserialize, ExpandoObjectResolver
  • Data type: System.Dynamic.ExpandoObject
  • Finding ID: MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-102

Patches

Fixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.

Upgrade guidance:

  1. Upgrade MessagePack to the patched version for your release line.
  2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.

Potential fixes include applying a map-entry count limit for ExpandoObject under untrusted-data settings, buffering into a security-aware dictionary before materializing a bounded ExpandoObject, or otherwise rejecting maps large enough to trigger quadratic behavior.

Workarounds

Patching is recommended.

Until a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted payloads into ExpandoObject. Prefer strongly typed DTOs or dictionaries with security-aware comparers and explicit count limits. Enforce request-size and map-entry limits at the transport or application layer.

Resources

  • MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-102: ExpandoObjectFormatter quadratic insertion behavior
  • CWE-407: Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.5.301"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48511"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T19:36:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`ExpandoObjectFormatter.Deserialize` populates `System.Dynamic.ExpandoObject` by calling `IDictionary\u003cstring, object\u003e.Add` for each map entry. `ExpandoObject` internally maintains member names in array-like structures, so inserting many distinct keys can require repeated linear scans and array copies.\n\nFor large attacker-controlled maps, this produces quadratic CPU and allocation behavior. The issue is especially surprising because `ExpandoObjectResolver.Options` is configured with `MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData`, but collision-resistant dictionary comparers cannot protect `ExpandoObject` insertion internals.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize untrusted MessagePack maps into `ExpandoObject` using `ExpandoObjectResolver` or related resolver options.\n\nA hostile payload containing many distinct keys can cause CPU exhaustion and allocation churn disproportionate to the input size. This can make a server unresponsive or exhaust memory under concurrent request load.\n\nThis is not a hash-collision attack against a configurable dictionary comparer. The super-linear behavior comes from `ExpandoObject`\u0027s insertion model, so `MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` does not eliminate the cost.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- APIs: `ExpandoObjectFormatter.Deserialize`, `ExpandoObjectResolver`\n- Data type: `System.Dynamic.ExpandoObject`\n- Finding ID: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-102`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nPotential fixes include applying a map-entry count limit for `ExpandoObject` under untrusted-data settings, buffering into a security-aware dictionary before materializing a bounded `ExpandoObject`, or otherwise rejecting maps large enough to trigger quadratic behavior.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted payloads into `ExpandoObject`. Prefer strongly typed DTOs or dictionaries with security-aware comparers and explicit count limits. Enforce request-size and map-entry limits at the transport or application layer.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-102`: `ExpandoObjectFormatter` quadratic insertion behavior\n- CWE-407: Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity",
  "id": "GHSA-2x83-8g95-xh59",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T19:36:23Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T19:36:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-2x83-8g95-xh59"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48511"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MessagePack-CSharp: ExpandoObject formatter can perform quadratic insertion work on untrusted maps"
}

GHSA-33MW-Q7RJ-MJWJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 15:30 – Updated: 2026-06-05 16:24
VLAI
Summary
Django has Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity
Details

An issue was discovered in 6.0 before 6.0.2, 5.2 before 5.2.11, and 4.2 before 4.2.28.

ASGIRequest allows a remote attacker to cause a potential denial-of-service via a crafted request with multiple duplicate headers. Earlier, unsupported Django series (such as 5.0.x, 4.1.x, and 3.2.x) were not evaluated and may also be affected.

Django would like to thank Jiyong Yang for reporting this issue.

Severity
2.7 (Low)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.0a1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.0.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "5.2a1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Django"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.2a1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.28"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14550"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T19:29:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T15:16:11Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in 6.0 before 6.0.2, 5.2 before 5.2.11, and 4.2 before 4.2.28.\n\n`ASGIRequest` allows a remote attacker to cause a potential denial-of-service via a crafted request with multiple duplicate headers.\nEarlier, unsupported Django series (such as 5.0.x, 4.1.x, and 3.2.x) were not evaluated and may also be affected.\n\nDjango would like to thank Jiyong Yang for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-33mw-q7rj-mjwj",
  "modified": "2026-06-05T16:24:05Z",
  "published": "2026-02-03T15:30:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14550"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/eb22e1d6d643360e952609ef562c139a100ea4eb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/dev/releases/security"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/django/django"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/django/PYSEC-2026-43.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/django-announce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2026/feb/03/security-releases"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Django has Inefficient Algorithmic Complexity"
}

GHSA-382J-8MXH-C7X2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-25 18:35
VLAI
Summary
MessagePack-CSharp: Denial of service vulnerabilities can swamp the CPU or crash the process with stack and heap overflows
Details

Summary

MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime() can allocate stack memory based on an attacker-controlled MessagePack extension length. In the slow path for timestamp extension parsing, the computed tokenSize includes the extension body length from the wire and is used in a stackalloc operation before the extension length is validated as one of the valid timestamp sizes.

A very small payload can claim a large timestamp extension body and cause a stack allocation large enough to trigger an uncatchable StackOverflowException, terminating the host process.

Impact

Applications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads into types containing DateTime values. This path is available through the standard formatter set and does not require opting into typeless serialization, LZ4 compression, Unity-specific resolvers, or other specialized features.

MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData and MaximumObjectGraphDepth do not mitigate this issue because the crash is caused by a single-frame stack allocation, not by object graph recursion.

An attacker can send a MessagePack timestamp extension header with an oversized body length and insufficient body bytes. The reader enters the slow path, attempts to stack-allocate a buffer sized from that declared length, and can terminate the process before a catchable serialization exception is thrown.

Affected components

  • Package: MessagePack
  • API: MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime
  • Data types: DateTime and formatter paths that call ReadDateTime
  • Finding IDs: MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020, related stack allocation finding MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001

Patches

Fixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.

Upgrade guidance:

  1. Upgrade MessagePack to the patched version for your release line.
  2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.

The fix should validate timestamp extension lengths before any stack allocation. Valid MessagePack timestamp payload lengths are limited to the supported timestamp encodings, so oversized extension lengths should fail with a catchable MessagePack serialization exception before the slow path allocates a buffer.

Workarounds

Patching is recommended.

Until a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted MessagePack payloads into schemas that contain DateTime or DateTimeOffset values. Where possible, enforce strict maximum message sizes and reject malformed extension payloads before they reach MessagePack-CSharp.

There is no complete workaround for applications that must deserialize attacker-controlled MessagePack data containing date/time fields with affected versions.

Resources

  • MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020: ReadDateTime stack allocation from attacker-controlled extension length
  • MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001: related attacker-controlled stack allocation finding in MessagePackReader
  • CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

CVE split rationale

This vulnerability is independently fixable in the DateTime extension parsing path by validating extension lengths before stack allocation. It is separate from recursive stack overflows, LZ4 issues, and collection allocation bugs.

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MessagePack"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48502"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-125",
      "CWE-190",
      "CWE-407",
      "CWE-409",
      "CWE-470",
      "CWE-502",
      "CWE-674",
      "CWE-789"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T22:16:47Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime()` can allocate stack memory based on an attacker-controlled MessagePack extension length. In the slow path for timestamp extension parsing, the computed `tokenSize` includes the extension body length from the wire and is used in a `stackalloc` operation before the extension length is validated as one of the valid timestamp sizes.\n\nA very small payload can claim a large timestamp extension body and cause a stack allocation large enough to trigger an uncatchable `StackOverflowException`, terminating the host process.\n\n## Impact\n\nApplications are affected when they deserialize untrusted payloads into types containing `DateTime` values. This path is available through the standard formatter set and does not require opting into typeless serialization, LZ4 compression, Unity-specific resolvers, or other specialized features.\n\n`MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` and `MaximumObjectGraphDepth` do not mitigate this issue because the crash is caused by a single-frame stack allocation, not by object graph recursion.\n\nAn attacker can send a MessagePack timestamp extension header with an oversized body length and insufficient body bytes. The reader enters the slow path, attempts to stack-allocate a buffer sized from that declared length, and can terminate the process before a catchable serialization exception is thrown.\n\n## Affected components\n\n- Package: `MessagePack`\n- API: `MessagePackReader.ReadDateTime`\n- Data types: `DateTime` and formatter paths that call `ReadDateTime`\n- Finding IDs: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020`, related stack allocation finding `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001`\n\n## Patches\n\nFixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions.\n\nUpgrade guidance:\n\n1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line.\n2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions.\n\nThe fix should validate timestamp extension lengths before any stack allocation. Valid MessagePack timestamp payload lengths are limited to the supported timestamp encodings, so oversized extension lengths should fail with a catchable MessagePack serialization exception before the slow path allocates a buffer.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nPatching is recommended.\n\nUntil a patched version is available, avoid deserializing untrusted MessagePack payloads into schemas that contain `DateTime` or `DateTimeOffset` values. Where possible, enforce strict maximum message sizes and reject malformed extension payloads before they reach MessagePack-CSharp.\n\nThere is no complete workaround for applications that must deserialize attacker-controlled MessagePack data containing date/time fields with affected versions.\n\n## Resources\n\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-020`: `ReadDateTime` stack allocation from attacker-controlled extension length\n- `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-CROW-MEM-001`: related attacker-controlled stack allocation finding in `MessagePackReader`\n- CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n\n## CVE split rationale\n\nThis vulnerability is independently fixable in the DateTime extension parsing path by validating extension lengths before stack allocation. It is separate from recursive stack overflows, LZ4 issues, and collection allocation bugs.",
  "id": "GHSA-382j-8mxh-c7x2",
  "modified": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
  "published": "2026-06-25T18:35:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp/security/advisories/GHSA-382j-8mxh-c7x2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48502"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MessagePack-CSharp/MessagePack-CSharp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MessagePack-CSharp: Denial of service vulnerabilities can swamp the CPU or crash the process with stack and heap overflows"
}

GHSA-395F-4HP3-45GV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 21:49 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:49
VLAI
Summary
shell-quote: Quadratic-complexity Denial of Service in `parse()` (CWE-407)
Details

Summary

shell-quote's parse() finalizes its token list with a reduce that uses Array.prototype.concat as the accumulator. Each prev.concat(arg) copies the entire growing array, so parse() runs in O(n²) in the number of tokens. An unauthenticated attacker who can submit a string to any code path that calls parse() on it can block the single-threaded Node.js event loop for tens of seconds with a small input — a denial of service. The trigger needs no shell metacharacters (plain space-separated words suffice), so input filters that only screen for ;, |, $, or backticks do not help.

Root cause

parse.js (lines 200–203), in parseInternal — this path runs on every parse() call:

}).reduce(function (prev, arg) { // finalize parsed arguments
    // TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat
    return typeof arg === 'undefined' ? prev : prev.concat(arg);
}, []);

prev.concat(arg) allocates a new array and copies all of prev on every iteration, so producing an N-token result costs 1 + 2 + … + N = O(N²) copies. A second acc.concat(s) reduce in the module.exports wrapper (lines 211–224, reached only when env is a function) has the same shape. The maintainer's own // TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat already flags the construct.

Proof of Concept

const { parse } = require('shell-quote');
const ms = fn => { const t = process.hrtime.bigint(); fn(); return Number(process.hrtime.bigint()-t)/1e6; };
for (const N of [16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]) {
  console.log(N, 'tokens ->', ms(() => parse('x '.repeat(N))).toFixed(0), 'ms');
}

Measured on shell-quote@1.8.4, Node v24:

input (N tokens) bytes parse() ratio vs prev (2× input)
16 000 32 KB 678 ms —
32 000 64 KB 4 169 ms ×6.2
64 000 128 KB 14 914 ms ×3.6
128 000 256 KB 57 319 ms ×3.8

Time grows ~×4 per 2× input → confirmed O(n²). A ~128 KB input blocks the event loop ~15 s; ~256 KB → ~57 s; a few hundred KB more → minutes. image poc.js

Impact

parse() is synchronous on the main thread; while it copies arrays quadratically the entire event loop is blocked and the process serves no other requests. Any service that calls parse() on attacker-influenced input (command parsers, chat-ops / bot command handlers, REPLs, build-script / arg-string splitters) can be driven to a sustained DoS with a single small request. No code execution and no data disclosure — availability only.

End-to-end confirmation: a minimal HTTP server that calls parse() on the request body, hit with one POST of 'x '.repeat(32000) (~63 KB), froze for ~4.5 s. An out-of-process probe client issuing harmless GET /ping requests (normally ~1 ms) observed 27 consecutive pings stalled by up to 4374 ms during that single request — i.e. every concurrent client was denied service for the whole parse. Scaling the body to a few hundred KB extends the outage to minutes.

This is the same class as several accepted 2026 advisories for quadratic-parser DoS on untrusted input (e.g. markdown-it CVE-2026-48988, js-yaml CVE-2026-53550, python-multipart CVE-2026-53539). It is distinct from the known shell-quote command-injection issues (CVE-2021-42740, CVE-2016-10541, CVE-2026-9277), which are all in quote(), not parse().

Suggested remediation

Replace the O(n²) concat-in-reduce with a linear flatten that pushes into the accumulator instead of reallocating and copying it on every iteration. Apply the same shape to the wrapper's acc.concat(s) reduce. A defensive input-length cap on parse() is a cheap additional stop-gap.

Maintainer note (edit): the originally-suggested Array.prototype.flat() is ES2019 / Node 11+, but shell-quote declares engines: node >= 0.4, so .flat() would silently drop support for older runtimes. The fix instead flattens one-level array tokens with forEach/push — and deliberately not push.apply(...), since spreading a large array into function arguments can exceed the engine's argument count limit. Output is byte-identical to the current code across strings, undefined holes, one-level array tokens, and {op}/{comment}/{op:'glob'} objects, and finalizing is now linear (1,024,000 tokens in ~150 ms vs ~57 s for 128,000 before). Thanks for the clear report and PoC — the analysis and reproduction were spot on.

Disclosure

Found by source audit + wall-clock confirmation against 1.8.4 (and verified the same code is present on main). Reported privately here; no public disclosure until a fix is available.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.8.4"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "shell-quote"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-13311"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T21:49:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T05:16:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`shell-quote`\u0027s `parse()` finalizes its token list with a `reduce` that uses\n`Array.prototype.concat` as the accumulator. Each `prev.concat(arg)` copies the entire growing\narray, so `parse()` runs in **O(n\u00b2)** in the number of tokens. An unauthenticated attacker who\ncan submit a string to any code path that calls `parse()` on it can block the single-threaded\nNode.js event loop for tens of seconds with a small input \u2014 a denial of service. The trigger\nneeds **no shell metacharacters** (plain space-separated words suffice), so input filters that\nonly screen for `;`, `|`, `$`, or backticks do not help.\n\n### Root cause\n`parse.js` (lines 200\u2013203), in `parseInternal` \u2014 this path runs on **every** `parse()` call:\n\n```js\n}).reduce(function (prev, arg) { // finalize parsed arguments\n    // TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat\n    return typeof arg === \u0027undefined\u0027 ? prev : prev.concat(arg);\n}, []);\n```\n\n`prev.concat(arg)` allocates a new array and copies all of `prev` on every iteration, so\nproducing an N-token result costs `1 + 2 + \u2026 + N = O(N\u00b2)` copies. A second `acc.concat(s)`\nreduce in the `module.exports` wrapper (lines 211\u2013224, reached only when `env` is a function)\nhas the same shape. The maintainer\u0027s own `// TODO: replace this whole reduce with a concat`\nalready flags the construct.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n```js\nconst { parse } = require(\u0027shell-quote\u0027);\nconst ms = fn =\u003e { const t = process.hrtime.bigint(); fn(); return Number(process.hrtime.bigint()-t)/1e6; };\nfor (const N of [16000, 32000, 64000, 128000]) {\n  console.log(N, \u0027tokens -\u003e\u0027, ms(() =\u003e parse(\u0027x \u0027.repeat(N))).toFixed(0), \u0027ms\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nMeasured on `shell-quote@1.8.4`, Node v24:\n\n| input (N tokens) | bytes  | `parse()` | ratio vs prev (2\u00d7 input) |\n|-----------------:|-------:|----------:|:------------------------:|\n| 16 000           | 32 KB  |    678 ms | \u2014                        |\n| 32 000           | 64 KB  |  4 169 ms | \u00d76.2                     |\n| 64 000           | 128 KB | 14 914 ms | \u00d73.6                     |\n| 128 000          | 256 KB | **57 319 ms** | \u00d73.8                 |\n\nTime grows ~\u00d74 per 2\u00d7 input \u2192 confirmed O(n\u00b2). A ~128 KB input blocks the event loop ~15 s;\n~256 KB \u2192 ~57 s; a few hundred KB more \u2192 minutes.\n\u003cimg width=\"656\" height=\"214\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e8955b0e-0527-45ca-94b7-c3a2d8c0c82e\" /\u003e\n[poc.js](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/29255995/poc.js)\n\n### Impact\n`parse()` is synchronous on the main thread; while it copies arrays quadratically the entire\nevent loop is blocked and the process serves no other requests. Any service that calls `parse()`\non attacker-influenced input (command parsers, chat-ops / bot command handlers, REPLs,\nbuild-script / arg-string splitters) can be driven to a sustained DoS with a single small\nrequest. No code execution and no data disclosure \u2014 availability only.\n\nEnd-to-end confirmation: a minimal HTTP server that calls `parse()` on the request body, hit\nwith **one** `POST` of `\u0027x \u0027.repeat(32000)` (~63 KB), froze for ~4.5 s. An out-of-process probe\nclient issuing harmless `GET /ping` requests (normally ~1 ms) observed **27 consecutive pings\nstalled by up to 4374 ms** during that single request \u2014 i.e. every concurrent client was denied\nservice for the whole parse. Scaling the body to a few hundred KB extends the outage to minutes.\n\nThis is the same class as several accepted 2026 advisories for quadratic-parser DoS on\nuntrusted input (e.g. markdown-it CVE-2026-48988, js-yaml CVE-2026-53550,\npython-multipart CVE-2026-53539). It is **distinct** from the known `shell-quote`\ncommand-injection issues (CVE-2021-42740, CVE-2016-10541, CVE-2026-9277), which are all in\n`quote()`, not `parse()`.\n\n### Suggested remediation\nReplace the O(n\u00b2) concat-in-reduce with a linear flatten that **pushes into the\naccumulator** instead of reallocating and copying it on every iteration. Apply the\nsame shape to the wrapper\u0027s `acc.concat(s)` reduce. A defensive input-length cap on\n`parse()` is a cheap additional stop-gap.\n\n\u003e **Maintainer note (edit):** the originally-suggested `Array.prototype.flat()` is\n\u003e ES2019 / Node 11+, but `shell-quote` declares `engines: node \u003e= 0.4`, so `.flat()`\n\u003e would silently drop support for older runtimes. The fix instead flattens one-level\n\u003e array tokens with `forEach`/`push` \u2014 and deliberately not `push.apply(...)`, since\n\u003e spreading a large array into function arguments can exceed the engine\u0027s argument\n\u003e count limit. Output is byte-identical to the current code across strings, `undefined`\n\u003e holes, one-level array tokens, and `{op}`/`{comment}`/`{op:\u0027glob\u0027}` objects, and\n\u003e finalizing is now linear (1,024,000 tokens in ~150 ms vs ~57 s for 128,000 before).\n\u003e Thanks for the clear report and PoC \u2014 the analysis and reproduction were spot on.\n\n### Disclosure\nFound by source audit + wall-clock confirmation against 1.8.4 (and verified the same code is\npresent on `main`). Reported privately here; no public disclosure until a fix is available.",
  "id": "GHSA-395f-4hp3-45gv",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:49:34Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T21:49:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/security/advisories/GHSA-395f-4hp3-45gv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13311"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/commit/7ff5488599d01c323514f02f5efb74088dd134ec"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ljharb/shell-quote/releases/tag/v1.9.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/shell-quote"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "shell-quote: Quadratic-complexity Denial of Service in `parse()` (CWE-407)"
}

GHSA-3C89-47F8-W5C6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-09 06:30 – Updated: 2025-01-09 06:30
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 15.7 prior to 17.5.5, starting from 17.6 prior to 17.6.3, and starting from 17.7 prior to 17.7.1. It was possible to trigger a DoS by creating cyclic references between epics.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-6324"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-09T06:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 15.7 prior to 17.5.5, starting from 17.6 prior to 17.6.3, and starting from 17.7 prior to 17.7.1. It was possible to trigger a DoS by creating cyclic references between epics.",
  "id": "GHSA-3c89-47f8-w5c6",
  "modified": "2025-01-09T06:30:24Z",
  "published": "2025-01-09T06:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6324"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2553716"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://about.gitlab.com/releases/2025/01/08/patch-release-gitlab-17-7-1-released/#cyclic-reference-of-epics-leads-resource-exhaustion"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/468914"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3JXR-9VMJ-R5CP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 20:51 – Updated: 2026-07-20 20:51
VLAI
Summary
brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups
Details

Summary

brace-expansion's expand() exhibits exponential-time - O(2ⁿ) - behavior in the number of consecutive non-expanding {} groups. A short, all-ASCII input (~90 bytes/30 groups) blocks the calling thread for minutes; a slightly longer input hangs it effectively indefinitely. Because the dominant consumers run on Node's single-threaded event loop, one small input can fully stall a worker/process.

In expand_, post is computed unconditionally at the top of the function, before the early-return branches that don't use it:

const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : [''];   // always recurses
  ...
if (!isSequence && !isOptions) {
  if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\}/)) {
    str = m.pre + '{' + m.body + escClose + m.post;
    return expand_(str, max, true); // restart — `post` discarded
  }
  return [str];
}

For input like a{},{},…, the first {} is non-expanding, so control reaches the {a},b} rewrite branch - but expand_ has already recursed into post over the entire remaining tail, only to throw the result away. Each level therefore spawns two recursive expansions over essentially the same remaining work: T(n) = 2·T(n−1) ⇒ O(2ⁿ).

The max option does not mitigate this: max only bounds the output-building loops; neither the post recursion nor the rewrite recursion consults it.

Measured on 5.0.6:

groups (n) input bytes time
20 60 130 ms
24 72 1.9 s
26 78 7.8 s
30 (PoC) 90 ~2 min

Proof of concept

const { expand } = require('brace-expansion');
// 30 non-expanding groups, ~90 bytes — blocks for minutes:
expand('a{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{}');

Impact

Any application that passes attacker-influenced strings to brace-expansion.expand() - directly or transitively via minimatch/glob brace patterns - can be driven into a multi-minute-to-indefinite CPU hang by a tiny request, denying service on that thread/process.

Remediation

Upgrade to a patched release. The fix: 1. Defers computing post until after the early-return branches (and computes it locally in the $-suffix branch), so post is only expanded when a brace set actually expands and the value is used. This alone removes the exponential. 1. Converts the {a},b} rewrite from recursion to an in-function loop, so a long run of rewrites cannot grow the call stack.

Verified: the PoC drops from ~2 min to 0.55 ms, 5,000 groups complete in ~344 ms, and output is identical to 5.0.6 across a behavioral-equivalence suite (sequences, padding, $-prefix, a{},b}c, {},a}b, x{{a,b}}y, etc.). Post-fix complexity is ~O(n²) on this input class - acceptable for the security fix; a linear rewrite can be a non-urgent follow-up.

If immediate upgrade isn't possible, avoid passing untrusted input to expand() / glob brace patterns, or run such expansion under a timeout/worker.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
7.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "brace-expansion"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "brace-expansion"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "brace-expansion"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-13149"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T20:51:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T10:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nbrace-expansion\u0027s expand() exhibits exponential-time - O(2\u207f) - behavior in the number of consecutive non-expanding {} groups. A short, all-ASCII input (~90 bytes/30 groups) blocks the calling thread for minutes; a slightly longer input hangs it effectively indefinitely. Because the dominant consumers run on Node\u0027s single-threaded event loop, one small input can fully stall a worker/process.\n\nIn `expand_`, `post` is computed unconditionally at the top of the function, before the early-return branches that don\u0027t use it:\n```js\nconst post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : [\u0027\u0027];   // always recurses\n  ...\nif (!isSequence \u0026\u0026 !isOptions) {\n  if (m.post.match(/,(?!,).*\\}/)) {\n    str = m.pre + \u0027{\u0027 + m.body + escClose + m.post;\n    return expand_(str, max, true); // restart \u2014 `post` discarded\n  }\n  return [str];\n}\n```\n\nFor input like a{},{},\u2026, the first {} is non-expanding, so control reaches the {a},b} rewrite branch - but `expand_` has already recursed into post over the entire remaining tail, only to throw the result away.\nEach level therefore spawns two recursive expansions over essentially the same remaining work: `T(n) = 2\u00b7T(n\u22121) \u21d2 O(2\u207f)`.\n\nThe max option does not mitigate this: max only bounds the output-building loops; neither the post recursion nor the rewrite recursion consults it.\n  \nMeasured on 5.0.6:\n\n| groups (n) | input bytes | time |\n|---|---|---|\n| 20 | 60 | 130 ms |\n| 24 | 72 | 1.9 s |\n| 26 | 78 | 7.8 s |\n| 30 (PoC) | 90 | ~2 min |\n\n### Proof of concept\n```js\nconst { expand } = require(\u0027brace-expansion\u0027);\n// 30 non-expanding groups, ~90 bytes \u2014 blocks for minutes:\nexpand(\u0027a{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{},{}\u0027);\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application that passes attacker-influenced strings to brace-expansion.expand() - directly or transitively via minimatch/glob brace patterns - can be driven into a multi-minute-to-indefinite CPU hang by a tiny request, denying service on that thread/process.\n\n### Remediation\n\nUpgrade to a patched release. The fix:\n1. Defers computing post until after the early-return branches (and computes it locally in the $-suffix branch), so post is only expanded when a brace set actually expands and the value is used. This alone removes the exponential.\n1. Converts the {a},b} rewrite from recursion to an in-function loop, so a long run of rewrites cannot grow the call stack.\n\nVerified: the PoC drops from ~2 min to 0.55 ms, 5,000 groups complete in ~344 ms, and output is identical to 5.0.6 across a behavioral-equivalence suite (sequences, padding, $-prefix, a{},b}c, {},a}b, x{{a,b}}y, etc.). Post-fix complexity is ~O(n\u00b2) on this input class - acceptable for the security fix; a linear rewrite can be a non-urgent follow-up.\n\nIf immediate upgrade isn\u0027t possible, avoid passing untrusted input to expand() / glob brace patterns, or run such expansion under a timeout/worker.",
  "id": "GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T20:51:10Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T20:51:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/security/advisories/GHSA-3jxr-9vmj-r5cp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/122"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/pull/123"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/835d6be91201122d9adffb0c0c8c094189ace265"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/c7e33ec13ac1a684c116720843ce24e208611754"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/commit/d74e63030c012e3b7ae81657b8d665619cd51b95"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases/tag/v1.1.16"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases/tag/v2.1.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/juliangruber/brace-expansion/releases/tag/v5.0.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/package/brace-expansion"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/S:N/AU:Y/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "brace-expansion: DoS via exponential-time expansion of consecutive non-expanding {} groups"
}

GHSA-3QV4-JM22-WQX7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-21 18:32 – Updated: 2024-10-20 00:30
VLAI
Details

The dormakaba Saflok system before the November 2023 software update allows an attacker to unlock arbitrary doors at a property via forged keycards, if the attacker has obtained one active or expired keycard for the specific property, aka the "Unsaflok" issue. This occurs, in part, because the key derivation function relies only on a UID. This affects, for example, Saflok MT, and the Confidant, Quantum, RT, and Saffire series.

Severity
5.6 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-29916"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-03-21T17:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The dormakaba Saflok system before the November 2023 software update allows an attacker to unlock arbitrary doors at a property via forged keycards, if the attacker has obtained one active or expired keycard for the specific property, aka the \"Unsaflok\" issue. This occurs, in part, because the key derivation function relies only on a UID. This affects, for example, Saflok MT, and the Confidant, Quantum, RT, and Saffire series.",
  "id": "GHSA-3qv4-jm22-wqx7",
  "modified": "2024-10-20T00:30:35Z",
  "published": "2024-03-21T18:32:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-29916"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=39779291"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://unsaflok.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/saflok-hotel-lock-unsaflok-hack-technique"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4cx0RUV7i0s"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4C5F-9MJ4-M247

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-05 15:07 – Updated: 2026-01-05 15:07
VLAI
Summary
flagd: Multiple Go Runtime CVEs Impact Security and Availability
Details

Summary

In 2025, several vulnerabilities in the Go Standard Library were disclosed, impacting Go-based applications like flagd (the evaluation engine for OpenFeature). These CVEs primarily focus on Denial of Service (DoS) through resource exhaustion and Race Conditions in database handling.

CVE ID Impacted Package Severity Description & Impact on flagd
CVE-2025-47907 database/sql 7.0 (High) Race Condition: Canceling a query during a Scan call can return data from the wrong query. Critical if flagd uses SQL-based sync providers (e.g., Postgres), potentially leading to incorrect flag configurations.
CVE-2025-61725 net/mail 7.5 (High) DoS: Inefficient complexity in ParseAddress. Attackers can provide crafted email strings with large domain literals to exhaust CPU if flagd parses email-formatted metadata.
CVE-2025-61723 encoding/pem 7.5 (High) DoS: Quadratic complexity when parsing invalid PEM inputs. Relevant if flagd loads TLS certificates or keys via PEM files from untrusted sources.
CVE-2025-61729 crypto/x509 7.5 (High) Resource Exhaustion: HostnameError.Error() lacks string concatenation limits. A malicious TLS certificate with thousands of hostnames could crash flagd during connection handshakes.
CVE-2025-58188 net/http Medium Request Smuggling: Improper header handling in HTTP/1.1. Could allow attackers to bypass security filters positioned in front of flagd sync or evaluation APIs.
CVE-2025-58187 archive/zip Medium DoS: Improper validation of malformed ZIP archives. Impacts flagd if configured to fetch and unpack zipped configuration bundles from remote providers.
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/open-feature/flagd/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/open-feature/flagd/flagd-proxy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/open-feature/flagd/flagd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-362",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-407",
      "CWE-444",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-05T15:07:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIn 2025, several vulnerabilities in the Go Standard Library were disclosed, impacting Go-based applications like flagd (the evaluation engine for OpenFeature). These CVEs primarily focus on Denial of Service (DoS) through resource exhaustion and Race Conditions in database handling. \n\n| CVE ID | Impacted Package | Severity | Description \u0026 Impact on flagd |\n| -- | -- | -- | -- |\n| CVE-2025-47907 | database/sql | 7.0 (High) | Race Condition:  Canceling a query during a Scan call can return data from the wrong query. Critical if flagd uses SQL-based sync providers (e.g., Postgres), potentially leading to incorrect flag configurations. |\n| CVE-2025-61725 | net/mail | 7.5 (High) | DoS: Inefficient complexity in ParseAddress.  Attackers can provide crafted email strings with large domain literals to exhaust CPU if flagd parses email-formatted metadata. |\n| CVE-2025-61723 | encoding/pem | 7.5 (High) | DoS: Quadratic complexity when parsing invalid PEM inputs. Relevant if flagd loads TLS certificates or keys via PEM files from untrusted sources. |\n| CVE-2025-61729 | crypto/x509 | 7.5 (High) | Resource Exhaustion: HostnameError.Error() lacks string concatenation limits. A malicious TLS certificate with thousands of hostnames could crash flagd during connection handshakes. |\n| CVE-2025-58188 | net/http | Medium | Request Smuggling: Improper header handling in HTTP/1.1. Could allow attackers to bypass security filters positioned in front of flagd sync or evaluation APIs. |\n| CVE-2025-58187 | archive/zip | Medium | DoS:  Improper validation of malformed ZIP archives.  Impacts flagd if configured to fetch and unpack zipped configuration bundles from remote providers. |",
  "id": "GHSA-4c5f-9mj4-m247",
  "modified": "2026-01-05T15:07:46Z",
  "published": "2026-01-05T15:07:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-feature/flagd/security/advisories/GHSA-4c5f-9mj4-m247"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-feature/flagd/pull/1840"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-feature/flagd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-feature/flagd/releases/tag/core%2Fv0.13.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "flagd: Multiple Go Runtime CVEs Impact Security and Availability"
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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