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- GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988GCVE-1988-2026-0492
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Synametrics Syncrify 6.2 build 1178 authenticated PublicLink chunk-upload path traversal to /etc/cron.d and root command execution (7.5)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Synametrics
Syncrify 6.2 build 1178, the closed-source incremental backup and
file-replication server from Synametrics Technologies, Inc. (United States). The
product is written in Java, distributed for Linux as a tarball archive, and
served by an embedded Tomcat 9.0.113 through the vendor's in-house sradef
framework, whose single front controller routes every request as
/app?operation=<op>&st=<step> to a handler registered in WorkerMappings.xml.
Type and root cause. Path traversal, CWE-22 primary, with CWE-269 improper
privilege management and CWE-78 OS command injection as contributing
classifications that describe the deployment shape converting a file write into
an execution rather than a defect inside the application. The PublicLink
handler, operation=pb, implements the server's PublicLink client protocol. Its
chunked-upload branch, selected by st=u, reads a length-prefixed binary frame
straight from request.getInputStream(), which means the server's parameter
parsing, form decoding and any framework-level parameter validation are all
bypassed by construction: the field that decides the write destination is not a
parameter. At PublicLink.java:70-110 the decompiled method reads four big-endian
int32 values and one length-prefixed UTF-8 string, then does this:
int protocol = readInt(in); // 4-byte big-endian
int chunkNumber = readInt(in); // read, then not used to bound
// or place the write
int totalChunks = readInt(in); // read, then not used either
int size = readInt(in); // declared length of the body
String filename = readString(in); // [int32 len][UTF-8 bytes],
// attacker-controlled
File base = E(); // this user's PublicLinks folder
File target = new File(base, filename);
if (!target.getParentFile().exists()) {
target.getParentFile().mkdirs();
}
BufferedOutputStream out = new BufferedOutputStream(
new FileOutputStream(target, true)); // append mode
byte[] buf = new byte[size];
readFully(buf);
out.write(buf);
out.close();
return 0; // 0 means success to the caller
new File(base, filename) is reached with no rejection of "..", no rejection of
path separators, no base-name extraction and no canonical containment check.
base is /opt/Syncrify/PublicLinks/<user>/<generated-folder>, five components
below the filesystem root, so a chunk name of ../../../../../etc/cron.d/<name>
leaves the per-user PublicLinks folder and lands a cron fragment, creating any
missing parent directory on the way because of the mkdirs() call. The branch
returns 0, f() at PublicLink.java:127 converts that into the client reply
code="1" with <payload>0</payload>, and the host cron daemon then reads the
fragment as a root-authored job definition and runs its command field through a
shell on the next minute boundary. The application itself never constructs,
quotes or invokes a command line, and every execution site in the product uses
an argument vector with no shell, so this could not have been fixed by argument
hygiene at the application layer; the execution happens one component later.
The identity reached was observed rather than inferred, and it is uid=0(root)
gid=0(root) groups=0(root). Two independent artifacts establish that the writer
process held uid 0: the fragment landed as -rw-r--r-- 1 root root at mode 0644,
and a file's owner after creation is the effective uid of the process that
created it; and the scheduled job's own output reported uid 0, the fragment
naming root in its user field, which a scheduler will not honour for a job file
it does not already trust.
What makes this an oversight rather than a design decision is the asymmetry
with the rest of the same tree. Three sibling families in the same product,
written against the same client protocol, check the same kind of field and
reject the same kind of content: the profile-upload, profile-fetch and
file-splitter handlers refuse names containing path separators by testing
character codes with indexOf(47) and indexOf(92); the multipart upload path
collapses the client-supplied name through getName() of a constructed File,
which discards every directory component; and the download path runs the name
through indexOf("..") and answers 404 on a match. The chunk-upload branch calls
none of them. When one member of a family omits the defense all of its siblings
implement, the economical explanation is that the check was not written rather
than that it lives somewhere else. There is also no decoding step between the
socket and the constructor on this branch, so no encoding trick is involved and
none is needed: what the client puts in the frame is what the path is built
from.
How confirmation works, and what was deliberately not reproduced. Confirmation
is by host-side artifacts, not by the HTTP reply, and that distinction matters.
The reply is a success oracle, so an attacker learns from the network alone that
a write was accepted and can iterate on naming from there, but a successful
reply is not proof of a successful destination: the code never inspects the
resolved path, so a wrong traversal depth still yields code="1" and simply
writes somewhere else with intermediate directories created as needed. The
read-back of the marker file is the only sufficient signal. Four controls were
exercised and the published tool automates one of them. A traversing name and a
non-traversing name were driven through identical authentication, identical
framing and the identical route in the same session; the benign write was
accepted and landed inside the user's own PublicLinks folder, and the assertion
that neither the cron fragment path nor the marker path existed is what isolates
the traversal as the cause of the outcome and of nothing else. A sibling-handler
control confirmed at the Java level that the multipart family's getName()
collapse, applied to a traversing name against the same PublicLinks base,
returns the bare final component and keeps the write inside the root. A dispatch
control built against st=f instead reached a different void E() overload at
PublicLink.java:951 that parses a request parameter named ed as a Long and
performed no write anywhere; that control is what fixed the sink to this branch
rather than to the handler in general, since an initial static reading had
attributed the upload to st=f and the request built on that reading produced no
file at all. Authentication controls established that the credential gate is
live. The published advisory reproduces the identity string and the frame field
lengths derived from the field values, but deliberately not the run's own byte
capture, which was not preserved; not the generated PublicLinks folder name,
which embeds the run's timestamp; not the credential pair, which are mandatory
tool arguments with no default; and not the per-run fragment name or the marker
path. The payload was an identity capture into a marker file. No repository data
was read, no product file was modified or deleted, and the fragment and the
marker were removed after verification together with stopping the service.
Scoring. One score is published: 7.5 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The arithmetic is shown so any
reader can reproduce it with the CVSS 3.1 base algorithm and its
round-up-to-the-tenth rule: ISS = 1 - (0.44 x 0.44 x 0.44) = 0.914816; Impact
for S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119; Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.44 x
0.62 x 0.85 = 1.620146; Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.620146) =
Roundup(7.493265) = 7.5. AV:N is the honest classification of the component
because the vulnerable component is an HTTP handler on a network-bound servlet
connector and the credential it accepts exists precisely so that remote backup
clients can use it; the deployment-dependent exposure of that listener is priced
in attack complexity rather than smuggled into the attack vector. AC:H carries
two conditions outside the attacker's control: that the listener carrying this
route be reachable from the attacker's position, and that the host run a
scheduler that scans /etc/cron.d. PR:L records that the least privileged
principal proven sufficient is an authenticated backup user, the product's
lowest-trust account type. Scope is Unchanged, for the identity reason given
below.
A conditional reading of 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H,
is published alongside it and is labelled conditional everywhere it appears. It
applies only where the listener carrying /app?operation= is reachable from the
attacker's network position, which is the normal operating mode for a backup
server whose clients push data to it remotely, and it removes the first of the
two AC:H conditions by assuming that deployment posture. It computes as
Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.77 x 0.62 x 0.85 = 2.835255, Base =
Roundup(5.873119 + 2.835255) = Roundup(8.708374) = 8.8. The published score is
7.5 and never 8.8; a reader whose deployment keeps the portal on a management
network should read the 7.5.
Two further readings are published as explicitly rejected, both with their
arithmetic, so that a reader who disagrees with either call can see exactly what
it is worth rather than take our word for it. The changed-scope variant of the
same metrics, 8.6 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, is rejected because the identity
reached is the same root identity the server process already holds on the same
host, so no component authority boundary is crossed by the outcome: the server
process is root over this host by construction of the deployment, and the
compromised scheduler and the compromised server sit inside one authority
domain. Its arithmetic: Impact for S:C = 7.52 x (0.914816 - 0.029) - 3.25 x
(0.914816 x 0.9731 - 0.02)^13 = 6.661336 - 0.533310 = 6.128026; Exploitability
with PR at the S:C value of 0.68 = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.44 x 0.68 x 0.85 = 1.776934;
Base = Roundup(1.08 x (6.128026 + 1.776934)) = Roundup(8.537357) = 8.6. The
privilege gain in this finding is real and substantial, and it is expressed by
the metrics meant to carry it, PR:L for the low-trust principal and C:H/I:H/A:H
for the totality of what root on this host controls; Scope is not the vehicle
for expressing privilege distance and using it that way would double-count the
same fact.
The second rejected reading is the one we want readers to notice, because it is
the one that could most easily be misused in our favour. Treating the loopback
binding we observed in our own testbed as though it were the shipped default
yields 7.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H: Exploitability =
8.22 x 0.55 x 0.77 x 0.62 x 0.85 = 1.834577, Base = Roundup(5.873119 +
1.834577) = Roundup(7.707696) = 7.8. We reject it, and rejecting it lowers the
number we publish by 0.3 rather than raising it. That rejected local-vector
reading of 7.8 is higher than the 7.5 we publish at AV:N. So the rejection is
not a scoring maneuver and cannot be read as one: choosing AV:N with AC:H is the
conservative reading on this finding, and a reader who disagrees with us about
the factory default of that binding ends up with a larger figure than ours, not
a smaller one. The advisory says this itself, in those terms. The reason for the
rejection is evidential rather than convenient: that loopback binding was
applied by us, in the configuration, before any testing began, so that the host
carried no public exposure while research was in progress, and we hold no
shipped artifact, no configuration template, no installer script excerpt and no
documentation quotation, that states the factory value of that binding in either
direction. Not that it binds publicly by default, and not that it binds loopback
by default: the premise is unestablished by artifact, which is exactly why the
attack comple
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Synametrics | Syncrify |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Syncrify",
"vendor": "Synametrics",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Synametrics\nSyncrify 6.2 build 1178, the closed-source incremental backup and\nfile-replication server from Synametrics Technologies, Inc. (United States). The\nproduct is written in Java, distributed for Linux as a tarball archive, and\nserved by an embedded Tomcat 9.0.113 through the vendor\u0027s in-house sradef\nframework, whose single front controller routes every request as\n/app?operation=\u003cop\u003e\u0026st=\u003cstep\u003e to a handler registered in WorkerMappings.xml.\n\nType and root cause. Path traversal, CWE-22 primary, with CWE-269 improper\nprivilege management and CWE-78 OS command injection as contributing\nclassifications that describe the deployment shape converting a file write into\nan execution rather than a defect inside the application. The PublicLink\nhandler, operation=pb, implements the server\u0027s PublicLink client protocol. Its\nchunked-upload branch, selected by st=u, reads a length-prefixed binary frame\nstraight from request.getInputStream(), which means the server\u0027s parameter\nparsing, form decoding and any framework-level parameter validation are all\nbypassed by construction: the field that decides the write destination is not a\nparameter. At PublicLink.java:70-110 the decompiled method reads four big-endian\nint32 values and one length-prefixed UTF-8 string, then does this:\n\n int protocol = readInt(in); // 4-byte big-endian\n int chunkNumber = readInt(in); // read, then not used to bound\n // or place the write\n int totalChunks = readInt(in); // read, then not used either\n int size = readInt(in); // declared length of the body\n String filename = readString(in); // [int32 len][UTF-8 bytes],\n // attacker-controlled\n\n File base = E(); // this user\u0027s PublicLinks folder\n File target = new File(base, filename);\n if (!target.getParentFile().exists()) {\n target.getParentFile().mkdirs();\n }\n BufferedOutputStream out = new BufferedOutputStream(\n new FileOutputStream(target, true)); // append mode\n byte[] buf = new byte[size];\n readFully(buf);\n out.write(buf);\n out.close();\n return 0; // 0 means success to the caller\n\nnew File(base, filename) is reached with no rejection of \"..\", no rejection of\npath separators, no base-name extraction and no canonical containment check.\nbase is /opt/Syncrify/PublicLinks/\u003cuser\u003e/\u003cgenerated-folder\u003e, five components\nbelow the filesystem root, so a chunk name of ../../../../../etc/cron.d/\u003cname\u003e\nleaves the per-user PublicLinks folder and lands a cron fragment, creating any\nmissing parent directory on the way because of the mkdirs() call. The branch\nreturns 0, f() at PublicLink.java:127 converts that into the client reply\ncode=\"1\" with \u003cpayload\u003e0\u003c/payload\u003e, and the host cron daemon then reads the\nfragment as a root-authored job definition and runs its command field through a\nshell on the next minute boundary. The application itself never constructs,\nquotes or invokes a command line, and every execution site in the product uses\nan argument vector with no shell, so this could not have been fixed by argument\nhygiene at the application layer; the execution happens one component later.\n\nThe identity reached was observed rather than inferred, and it is uid=0(root)\ngid=0(root) groups=0(root). Two independent artifacts establish that the writer\nprocess held uid 0: the fragment landed as -rw-r--r-- 1 root root at mode 0644,\nand a file\u0027s owner after creation is the effective uid of the process that\ncreated it; and the scheduled job\u0027s own output reported uid 0, the fragment\nnaming root in its user field, which a scheduler will not honour for a job file\nit does not already trust.\n\nWhat makes this an oversight rather than a design decision is the asymmetry\nwith the rest of the same tree. Three sibling families in the same product,\nwritten against the same client protocol, check the same kind of field and\nreject the same kind of content: the profile-upload, profile-fetch and\nfile-splitter handlers refuse names containing path separators by testing\ncharacter codes with indexOf(47) and indexOf(92); the multipart upload path\ncollapses the client-supplied name through getName() of a constructed File,\nwhich discards every directory component; and the download path runs the name\nthrough indexOf(\"..\") and answers 404 on a match. The chunk-upload branch calls\nnone of them. When one member of a family omits the defense all of its siblings\nimplement, the economical explanation is that the check was not written rather\nthan that it lives somewhere else. There is also no decoding step between the\nsocket and the constructor on this branch, so no encoding trick is involved and\nnone is needed: what the client puts in the frame is what the path is built\nfrom.\n\nHow confirmation works, and what was deliberately not reproduced. Confirmation\nis by host-side artifacts, not by the HTTP reply, and that distinction matters.\nThe reply is a success oracle, so an attacker learns from the network alone that\na write was accepted and can iterate on naming from there, but a successful\nreply is not proof of a successful destination: the code never inspects the\nresolved path, so a wrong traversal depth still yields code=\"1\" and simply\nwrites somewhere else with intermediate directories created as needed. The\nread-back of the marker file is the only sufficient signal. Four controls were\nexercised and the published tool automates one of them. A traversing name and a\nnon-traversing name were driven through identical authentication, identical\nframing and the identical route in the same session; the benign write was\naccepted and landed inside the user\u0027s own PublicLinks folder, and the assertion\nthat neither the cron fragment path nor the marker path existed is what isolates\nthe traversal as the cause of the outcome and of nothing else. A sibling-handler\ncontrol confirmed at the Java level that the multipart family\u0027s getName()\ncollapse, applied to a traversing name against the same PublicLinks base,\nreturns the bare final component and keeps the write inside the root. A dispatch\ncontrol built against st=f instead reached a different void E() overload at\nPublicLink.java:951 that parses a request parameter named ed as a Long and\nperformed no write anywhere; that control is what fixed the sink to this branch\nrather than to the handler in general, since an initial static reading had\nattributed the upload to st=f and the request built on that reading produced no\nfile at all. Authentication controls established that the credential gate is\nlive. The published advisory reproduces the identity string and the frame field\nlengths derived from the field values, but deliberately not the run\u0027s own byte\ncapture, which was not preserved; not the generated PublicLinks folder name,\nwhich embeds the run\u0027s timestamp; not the credential pair, which are mandatory\ntool arguments with no default; and not the per-run fragment name or the marker\npath. The payload was an identity capture into a marker file. No repository data\nwas read, no product file was modified or deleted, and the fragment and the\nmarker were removed after verification together with stopping the service.\n\nScoring. One score is published: 7.5 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The arithmetic is shown so any\nreader can reproduce it with the CVSS 3.1 base algorithm and its\nround-up-to-the-tenth rule: ISS = 1 - (0.44 x 0.44 x 0.44) = 0.914816; Impact\nfor S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.873119; Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.44 x\n0.62 x 0.85 = 1.620146; Base = Roundup(5.873119 + 1.620146) =\nRoundup(7.493265) = 7.5. AV:N is the honest classification of the component\nbecause the vulnerable component is an HTTP handler on a network-bound servlet\nconnector and the credential it accepts exists precisely so that remote backup\nclients can use it; the deployment-dependent exposure of that listener is priced\nin attack complexity rather than smuggled into the attack vector. AC:H carries\ntwo conditions outside the attacker\u0027s control: that the listener carrying this\nroute be reachable from the attacker\u0027s position, and that the host run a\nscheduler that scans /etc/cron.d. PR:L records that the least privileged\nprincipal proven sufficient is an authenticated backup user, the product\u0027s\nlowest-trust account type. Scope is Unchanged, for the identity reason given\nbelow.\n\nA conditional reading of 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H,\nis published alongside it and is labelled conditional everywhere it appears. It\napplies only where the listener carrying /app?operation= is reachable from the\nattacker\u0027s network position, which is the normal operating mode for a backup\nserver whose clients push data to it remotely, and it removes the first of the\ntwo AC:H conditions by assuming that deployment posture. It computes as\nExploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.77 x 0.62 x 0.85 = 2.835255, Base =\nRoundup(5.873119 + 2.835255) = Roundup(8.708374) = 8.8. The published score is\n7.5 and never 8.8; a reader whose deployment keeps the portal on a management\nnetwork should read the 7.5.\n\nTwo further readings are published as explicitly rejected, both with their\narithmetic, so that a reader who disagrees with either call can see exactly what\nit is worth rather than take our word for it. The changed-scope variant of the\nsame metrics, 8.6 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, is rejected because the identity\nreached is the same root identity the server process already holds on the same\nhost, so no component authority boundary is crossed by the outcome: the server\nprocess is root over this host by construction of the deployment, and the\ncompromised scheduler and the compromised server sit inside one authority\ndomain. Its arithmetic: Impact for S:C = 7.52 x (0.914816 - 0.029) - 3.25 x\n(0.914816 x 0.9731 - 0.02)^13 = 6.661336 - 0.533310 = 6.128026; Exploitability\nwith PR at the S:C value of 0.68 = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.44 x 0.68 x 0.85 = 1.776934;\nBase = Roundup(1.08 x (6.128026 + 1.776934)) = Roundup(8.537357) = 8.6. The\nprivilege gain in this finding is real and substantial, and it is expressed by\nthe metrics meant to carry it, PR:L for the low-trust principal and C:H/I:H/A:H\nfor the totality of what root on this host controls; Scope is not the vehicle\nfor expressing privilege distance and using it that way would double-count the\nsame fact.\n\nThe second rejected reading is the one we want readers to notice, because it is\nthe one that could most easily be misused in our favour. Treating the loopback\nbinding we observed in our own testbed as though it were the shipped default\nyields 7.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H: Exploitability =\n8.22 x 0.55 x 0.77 x 0.62 x 0.85 = 1.834577, Base = Roundup(5.873119 +\n1.834577) = Roundup(7.707696) = 7.8. We reject it, and rejecting it lowers the\nnumber we publish by 0.3 rather than raising it. That rejected local-vector\nreading of 7.8 is higher than the 7.5 we publish at AV:N. So the rejection is\nnot a scoring maneuver and cannot be read as one: choosing AV:N with AC:H is the\nconservative reading on this finding, and a reader who disagrees with us about\nthe factory default of that binding ends up with a larger figure than ours, not\na smaller one. The advisory says this itself, in those terms. The reason for the\nrejection is evidential rather than convenient: that loopback binding was\napplied by us, in the configuration, before any testing began, so that the host\ncarried no public exposure while research was in progress, and we hold no\nshipped artifact, no configuration template, no installer script excerpt and no\ndocumentation quotation, that states the factory value of that binding in either\ndirection. Not that it binds publicly by default, and not that it binds loopback\nby default: the premise is unestablished by artifact, which is exactly why the\nattack comple"
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] Synametrics Syncrify 6.2 build 1178 authenticated PublicLink chunk-upload path traversal to /etc/cron.d and root command execution (7.5)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0491
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] South River Technologies Titan MFT Server 26.0.0 first-run administrator setup chained to job post-command injection, NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM (8.1)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability chain in South
River Technologies Titan MFT Server 26.0.0.364, the NextGen generation of the
commercial managed file transfer server from South River Technologies (Annapolis,
Maryland, United States). The product runs as a single .NET 8 process,
titanmft.exe, registered as the Windows service SrtTitanMFTServerService under
LocalSystem, serves a Blazor Server administration application on 0.0.0.0:47443
over TLS, and drives transfers with EF Core over SQLite.
Before anything else, the framing. This is a first-run window, which is a
deployment state, and it is not an absence of authentication. The window opens
when installation completes and the service starts listening, and it closes the
instant the first administrator account exists. While the administration
database's nxUserParams table holds zero rows, the login route renders an
"Initial Admin User Setup" screen to any client that can reach the listener.
Once one administrator exists, that route renders a credential form instead and
this chain's account-creation half has no route whatsoever. The product has
three authentication planes and the message-level one is closed; we measured it
closed, in the same run, at the same time the setup screen was available. What
is exposed is a state, and no configured deployment is exposed to the half that
creates the account.
Type: CWE-306, Missing Authentication for Critical Function, on the first-run
administrator-creation path, chained with CWE-78, Improper Neutralization of
Special Elements used in an OS Command, on the job post-command path.
CWE-250/CWE-269 (LocalSystem execution with no privilege separation) and
CWE-209/CWE-200 (unauthenticated stack-trace echo and window-state leak) are
named as contributing and are deliberately not folded into the score. CWE-1188
is deliberately not used: no insecure default credential ships with this
product, and implying that rotating a password closes the exposure would be
false, because creating the first administrator closes it.
The gate is a row count and nothing else. MxSvrParams.cs:518-520 evaluates
`RunWizard = !nxUserParams.AdminUserExists() && !CreateAdminAtConsole`, and the
clearest form of the same predicate is in the legacy route:
if (!nxUserParams.AdminUserExists())
CreateAdminUser(li.user.NxDecryptAPI(), li.pass.NxDecryptAPI());
There is no bootstrap ticket, no CAPTCHA, no first-boot token, no localhost
restriction and no channel binding. We counted zero `[Authorize]` attributes
across the 1,880 decompiled files of the ServerCore assembly, so every
authorisation decision in the product lives in application logic, and for the
setup screen that logic is the empty-table test. Submitting the screen calls
`AppState.CreateAdminUser` followed by `AppState.Login` inside the same
in-process circuit and lands the anonymous client in the management console at
`/SvrHome/<guid>/<guid>`.
The sink is the job post-command. The field labelled `Execute After File
Transfer Task` is persisted verbatim into `nxJobs.document.PostCommandText` and
is executed by the transfer engine:
// MxUtilSvrJobHandler.cs:970-972 trigger predicate
if (P_0.IsSuccess() || Job.ExecuteCustomPostProcessOnFileTransferTaskFailure)
return !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(Job.PostCommandText);
// MxUtilSvrJobHandler.cs:979-982 call site
LogMsg("Post Command: " + Job.PostCommandText);
RunCustomProcessAsync(Job.PostCommandText, Job.PostWorkingDir, Job.PostTimeout)
// MxUtilSvrJobHandler.cs:991 onward (a second pass over the same
// decompilation records this routine at :996)
if (command.TrimStart().StartsWith("cmd", OrdinalIgnoreCase)) {
fileName = "cmd.exe";
arguments = "/c " + command.Substring(3).Trim();
} else {
int num = command.IndexOf(' ');
fileName = num > 0 ? command.Substring(0, num) : command;
arguments = num > 0 ? command.Substring(num + 1) : "";
}
StartInfo = new ProcessStartInfo { FileName = fileName, Arguments = arguments,
WorkingDirectory = workingDir, UseShellExecute = false, ... }
Four properties make this a command injection rather than a command launcher:
the `cmd`-prefix special case reconstitutes full shell semantics, so
redirection, chaining, percent-expansion and quoting are all live in the payload
space; otherwise the value is split on its first space with no quoting
discipline; `Arguments` is a string rather than a vector, so `ArgumentList`
never protects the value; and there is no allow-list, no path canonicalisation,
no executable-existence check, no metacharacter rejection and no server-side
re-validation between the write and the process start. The only inspection of
the value on the path is `IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, which answers "should I run
anything" and not "is this safe". `UseShellExecute = false` with no
impersonation, no restricted token, no job object and no integrity-level
downgrade means the child inherits the service token, which is LocalSystem.
Identity reached: `NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM`. The proof is a marker file, 21 bytes,
content `nt authority\system`, written by the injected `cmd /c whoami` child;
its modification time sits 76 milliseconds after the job-completion timestamp
the product itself recorded in its own job-history table for that run. That
offset is the attribution evidence: at that precision the file was written by
the step that followed transfer completion in that job, not by anything else on
the host.
How confirmation works, and what was deliberately not reproduced. The control
leg repeated the entire pipeline with one variable removed: using the
administrator the exploit itself had created, the same job was re-opened, its
`PostCommandText` cleared (confirmed empty both in the field and in the job
document), saved, and run again. The job completed - a second job-history row,
Completed, successful, zero files transferred - and the marker was untouched:
same byte length, same modification time to the millisecond. The two runs were
111.6 seconds apart. That single leg removes every alternative explanation for
the marker that does not involve the injected field: it was not written by the
transfer engine or any pipeline stage, it is not a leftover artifact from
installation or from an earlier experiment, and it was not written by a
scheduled task, a service restart or a background process, because the only
difference between the two runs is one field's contents.
The payload was chosen to prove identity and nothing else. What we deliberately
did not do: no destructive action, no persistence, no lateral movement, no
domain compromise, no access to any partner system, and no second command shape
beyond the one successful-transfer run and its empty-command control. The
pre-transfer counterpart of the same field was not executed, so its
exploitability is inference from shared code shape and is not claimed. The
failing-transfer-with-payload combination was not executed either; the predicate
reading that makes it work at all comes from the code plus the control row's
semantics, and we do not claim that combination as measured. The published
advisory reproduces the identity string but not the per-run marker path or the
host names from the run.
Scoring. The primary published rating is 8.1 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Arithmetic:
ISS = 1 - (0.44)^3 = 0.914816; Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.87311872;
Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.44 x 0.85 x 0.85 = 2.2211673;
Base = min(5.87311872 + 2.2211673, 10) = 8.09428602; Roundup = 8.1, band High.
Why AC:H and therefore why 8.1 is the headline. The chain requires the target
to be inside a state the attacker cannot create: an installation that has not
yet completed first-time setup. The attacker can discover such targets cheaply
and cannot bring the condition about, cannot extend it and cannot re-open it
from the network; once the operator completes setup the first half is gone for
good. CVSS 3.1 places "the attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker's
control" in Attack Complexity High, and a transient deployment state that must
be found rather than caused is squarely that. We also never measured a typical
window duration in any environment, so claiming AC:L as the headline would
silently assume the very deployment fact we declined to measure.
Conditional reading, published as conditional and never as the headline: 9.8
Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, Exploitability
8.22 x 0.85 x 0.77 x 0.85 x 0.85 = 3.887042775, Base 9.760161495, Roundup 9.8.
It applies to one installation confirmed to be inside its first-run window,
where the state condition is already satisfied and what remains is four form
submissions and a menu click. Use it when triaging a specific host; use 8.1
when triaging a fleet or a vendor. The two figures may not be swapped.
Rejected readings, named so the rejection is auditable.
- Scope Changed: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H computes to 9.1,
and the conditional under S:C would be 10.0. The argument is coherent - the
host OS is governed by Windows rather than by the product's authorisation
component - and we reject it, because the child is created by the service
inside the service's own LocalSystem token on the service's own host, and
executing as the same service identity on the same host does not change
scope. Adopting Changed also puts a conditional 10.0 on the table, which
invites exactly the "this product has no authentication" misreading that the
framing above exists to prevent.
- Sink only: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H computes to 7.2. The
post-command field on its own is a documented administrator feature; an
administrator reaching LocalSystem is a privilege-separation weakness rather
than remote code execution, and publishing either half in isolation would
misrepresent the finding.
No recorded score exists to correct here, and that is worth saying explicitly
because it is unusual: the material this analysis is built from carries no CVSS
vector and no base score for this finding, so both readings were derived from
the metric definitions and the measured facts, computed with the CVSS 3.1 base
formula, and rounded up to the tenth as that formula specifies. PR:N is a
property of the chain start, not of the sink in isolation: the least privileged
principal that reaches the sink by the documented path is a principal that did
not exist before the request.
Authentication, and the negative-control evidence behind the framing. The
counter-gate measurement is the load-bearing one, and its detail matters: within
the same service instance, in the same pass, an unauthenticated
`POST /WebApi/Process` returned 401 with an empty body while the first-run
wizard was simultaneously available to that same unauthenticated client, and
`POST /api/Authenticate/Login` returned 500 with an empty body because the REST
administration plane is gated by `RESTEnableAdminApi`, which has no row by
default and so makes the controller constructor throw. That is a counter-gate,
not a post-setup result: message-level authentication was demonstrably intact
and demonstrably irrelevant, because this chain never traverses it. We are also
correcting a detail of our own record rather than leaving it to be inferred: no
post-setup HTTP status sample was ever captured from the login route. Our
post-window evidence is exactly three observations - the setup screen is no
longer rendered, a credential form is rendered in its place, and the created
administrator's credentials were accepted through it. We are not going to invent
a 401 on that route.
The setup screen itself was measured as having zero preconditions: it submitted
successfully with the EULA checkbox untouched (present but non-blocking), with no
ticket parameter, with no CAPTCHA element in the DOM, with no first-boot token,
and from
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | South River Technologies |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
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"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "South River Technologies",
"vendor": "unknown",
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{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability chain in South\nRiver Technologies Titan MFT Server 26.0.0.364, the NextGen generation of the\ncommercial managed file transfer server from South River Technologies (Annapolis,\nMaryland, United States). The product runs as a single .NET 8 process,\ntitanmft.exe, registered as the Windows service SrtTitanMFTServerService under\nLocalSystem, serves a Blazor Server administration application on 0.0.0.0:47443\nover TLS, and drives transfers with EF Core over SQLite.\n\nBefore anything else, the framing. This is a first-run window, which is a\ndeployment state, and it is not an absence of authentication. The window opens\nwhen installation completes and the service starts listening, and it closes the\ninstant the first administrator account exists. While the administration\ndatabase\u0027s nxUserParams table holds zero rows, the login route renders an\n\"Initial Admin User Setup\" screen to any client that can reach the listener.\nOnce one administrator exists, that route renders a credential form instead and\nthis chain\u0027s account-creation half has no route whatsoever. The product has\nthree authentication planes and the message-level one is closed; we measured it\nclosed, in the same run, at the same time the setup screen was available. What\nis exposed is a state, and no configured deployment is exposed to the half that\ncreates the account.\n\nType: CWE-306, Missing Authentication for Critical Function, on the first-run\nadministrator-creation path, chained with CWE-78, Improper Neutralization of\nSpecial Elements used in an OS Command, on the job post-command path.\nCWE-250/CWE-269 (LocalSystem execution with no privilege separation) and\nCWE-209/CWE-200 (unauthenticated stack-trace echo and window-state leak) are\nnamed as contributing and are deliberately not folded into the score. CWE-1188\nis deliberately not used: no insecure default credential ships with this\nproduct, and implying that rotating a password closes the exposure would be\nfalse, because creating the first administrator closes it.\n\nThe gate is a row count and nothing else. MxSvrParams.cs:518-520 evaluates\n`RunWizard = !nxUserParams.AdminUserExists() \u0026\u0026 !CreateAdminAtConsole`, and the\nclearest form of the same predicate is in the legacy route:\n\n if (!nxUserParams.AdminUserExists())\n CreateAdminUser(li.user.NxDecryptAPI(), li.pass.NxDecryptAPI());\n\nThere is no bootstrap ticket, no CAPTCHA, no first-boot token, no localhost\nrestriction and no channel binding. We counted zero `[Authorize]` attributes\nacross the 1,880 decompiled files of the ServerCore assembly, so every\nauthorisation decision in the product lives in application logic, and for the\nsetup screen that logic is the empty-table test. Submitting the screen calls\n`AppState.CreateAdminUser` followed by `AppState.Login` inside the same\nin-process circuit and lands the anonymous client in the management console at\n`/SvrHome/\u003cguid\u003e/\u003cguid\u003e`.\n\nThe sink is the job post-command. The field labelled `Execute After File\nTransfer Task` is persisted verbatim into `nxJobs.document.PostCommandText` and\nis executed by the transfer engine:\n\n // MxUtilSvrJobHandler.cs:970-972 trigger predicate\n if (P_0.IsSuccess() || Job.ExecuteCustomPostProcessOnFileTransferTaskFailure)\n return !string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(Job.PostCommandText);\n\n // MxUtilSvrJobHandler.cs:979-982 call site\n LogMsg(\"Post Command: \" + Job.PostCommandText);\n RunCustomProcessAsync(Job.PostCommandText, Job.PostWorkingDir, Job.PostTimeout)\n\n // MxUtilSvrJobHandler.cs:991 onward (a second pass over the same\n // decompilation records this routine at :996)\n if (command.TrimStart().StartsWith(\"cmd\", OrdinalIgnoreCase)) {\n fileName = \"cmd.exe\";\n arguments = \"/c \" + command.Substring(3).Trim();\n } else {\n int num = command.IndexOf(\u0027 \u0027);\n fileName = num \u003e 0 ? command.Substring(0, num) : command;\n arguments = num \u003e 0 ? command.Substring(num + 1) : \"\";\n }\n StartInfo = new ProcessStartInfo { FileName = fileName, Arguments = arguments,\n WorkingDirectory = workingDir, UseShellExecute = false, ... }\n\nFour properties make this a command injection rather than a command launcher:\nthe `cmd`-prefix special case reconstitutes full shell semantics, so\nredirection, chaining, percent-expansion and quoting are all live in the payload\nspace; otherwise the value is split on its first space with no quoting\ndiscipline; `Arguments` is a string rather than a vector, so `ArgumentList`\nnever protects the value; and there is no allow-list, no path canonicalisation,\nno executable-existence check, no metacharacter rejection and no server-side\nre-validation between the write and the process start. The only inspection of\nthe value on the path is `IsNullOrWhiteSpace`, which answers \"should I run\nanything\" and not \"is this safe\". `UseShellExecute = false` with no\nimpersonation, no restricted token, no job object and no integrity-level\ndowngrade means the child inherits the service token, which is LocalSystem.\n\nIdentity reached: `NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM`. The proof is a marker file, 21 bytes,\ncontent `nt authority\\system`, written by the injected `cmd /c whoami` child;\nits modification time sits 76 milliseconds after the job-completion timestamp\nthe product itself recorded in its own job-history table for that run. That\noffset is the attribution evidence: at that precision the file was written by\nthe step that followed transfer completion in that job, not by anything else on\nthe host.\n\nHow confirmation works, and what was deliberately not reproduced. The control\nleg repeated the entire pipeline with one variable removed: using the\nadministrator the exploit itself had created, the same job was re-opened, its\n`PostCommandText` cleared (confirmed empty both in the field and in the job\ndocument), saved, and run again. The job completed - a second job-history row,\nCompleted, successful, zero files transferred - and the marker was untouched:\nsame byte length, same modification time to the millisecond. The two runs were\n111.6 seconds apart. That single leg removes every alternative explanation for\nthe marker that does not involve the injected field: it was not written by the\ntransfer engine or any pipeline stage, it is not a leftover artifact from\ninstallation or from an earlier experiment, and it was not written by a\nscheduled task, a service restart or a background process, because the only\ndifference between the two runs is one field\u0027s contents.\n\nThe payload was chosen to prove identity and nothing else. What we deliberately\ndid not do: no destructive action, no persistence, no lateral movement, no\ndomain compromise, no access to any partner system, and no second command shape\nbeyond the one successful-transfer run and its empty-command control. The\npre-transfer counterpart of the same field was not executed, so its\nexploitability is inference from shared code shape and is not claimed. The\nfailing-transfer-with-payload combination was not executed either; the predicate\nreading that makes it work at all comes from the code plus the control row\u0027s\nsemantics, and we do not claim that combination as measured. The published\nadvisory reproduces the identity string but not the per-run marker path or the\nhost names from the run.\n\nScoring. The primary published rating is 8.1 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Arithmetic:\nISS = 1 - (0.44)^3 = 0.914816; Impact at S:U = 6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.87311872;\nExploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.44 x 0.85 x 0.85 = 2.2211673;\nBase = min(5.87311872 + 2.2211673, 10) = 8.09428602; Roundup = 8.1, band High.\n\nWhy AC:H and therefore why 8.1 is the headline. The chain requires the target\nto be inside a state the attacker cannot create: an installation that has not\nyet completed first-time setup. The attacker can discover such targets cheaply\nand cannot bring the condition about, cannot extend it and cannot re-open it\nfrom the network; once the operator completes setup the first half is gone for\ngood. CVSS 3.1 places \"the attack depends on conditions beyond the attacker\u0027s\ncontrol\" in Attack Complexity High, and a transient deployment state that must\nbe found rather than caused is squarely that. We also never measured a typical\nwindow duration in any environment, so claiming AC:L as the headline would\nsilently assume the very deployment fact we declined to measure.\n\nConditional reading, published as conditional and never as the headline: 9.8\nCritical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, Exploitability\n8.22 x 0.85 x 0.77 x 0.85 x 0.85 = 3.887042775, Base 9.760161495, Roundup 9.8.\nIt applies to one installation confirmed to be inside its first-run window,\nwhere the state condition is already satisfied and what remains is four form\nsubmissions and a menu click. Use it when triaging a specific host; use 8.1\nwhen triaging a fleet or a vendor. The two figures may not be swapped.\n\nRejected readings, named so the rejection is auditable.\n - Scope Changed: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H computes to 9.1,\n and the conditional under S:C would be 10.0. The argument is coherent - the\n host OS is governed by Windows rather than by the product\u0027s authorisation\n component - and we reject it, because the child is created by the service\n inside the service\u0027s own LocalSystem token on the service\u0027s own host, and\n executing as the same service identity on the same host does not change\n scope. Adopting Changed also puts a conditional 10.0 on the table, which\n invites exactly the \"this product has no authentication\" misreading that the\n framing above exists to prevent.\n - Sink only: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H computes to 7.2. The\n post-command field on its own is a documented administrator feature; an\n administrator reaching LocalSystem is a privilege-separation weakness rather\n than remote code execution, and publishing either half in isolation would\n misrepresent the finding.\n\nNo recorded score exists to correct here, and that is worth saying explicitly\nbecause it is unusual: the material this analysis is built from carries no CVSS\nvector and no base score for this finding, so both readings were derived from\nthe metric definitions and the measured facts, computed with the CVSS 3.1 base\nformula, and rounded up to the tenth as that formula specifies. PR:N is a\nproperty of the chain start, not of the sink in isolation: the least privileged\nprincipal that reaches the sink by the documented path is a principal that did\nnot exist before the request.\n\nAuthentication, and the negative-control evidence behind the framing. The\ncounter-gate measurement is the load-bearing one, and its detail matters: within\nthe same service instance, in the same pass, an unauthenticated\n`POST /WebApi/Process` returned 401 with an empty body while the first-run\nwizard was simultaneously available to that same unauthenticated client, and\n`POST /api/Authenticate/Login` returned 500 with an empty body because the REST\nadministration plane is gated by `RESTEnableAdminApi`, which has no row by\ndefault and so makes the controller constructor throw. That is a counter-gate,\nnot a post-setup result: message-level authentication was demonstrably intact\nand demonstrably irrelevant, because this chain never traverses it. We are also\ncorrecting a detail of our own record rather than leaving it to be inferred: no\npost-setup HTTP status sample was ever captured from the login route. Our\npost-window evidence is exactly three observations - the setup screen is no\nlonger rendered, a credential form is rendered in its place, and the created\nadministrator\u0027s credentials were accepted through it. We are not going to invent\na 401 on that route.\n\nThe setup screen itself was measured as having zero preconditions: it submitted\nsuccessfully with the EULA checkbox untouched (present but non-blocking), with no\nticket parameter, with no CAPTCHA element in the DOM, with no first-boot token,\nand from "
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],
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"description": "CWE-1188",
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"type": "CWE"
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"description": "CWE-200",
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] South River Technologies Titan MFT Server 26.0.0 first-run administrator setup chained to job post-command injection, NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM (8.1)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0490
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] SmartBear Collaborator Server 15.1.15101 authenticated DOORS/Simulink review-file upload zip-slip to anonymous webroot Groovy Server Page execution as uid 1001 (7.5)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in SmartBear
Collaborator Server 15.1.15101, the closed-source peer and technical code-review
platform from SmartBear that runs as a Java web application on Apache Tomcat. One
low-privilege authenticated account plants a Groovy Server Page in the Tomcat
webroot through an archive-extraction path traversal, and any anonymous client -
a crawler, a scanner, anyone - then executes it with an ordinary GET, yielding
operating-system command execution as uid=1001(collab) inside the product's own
JVM. Root was not reached, is not claimed, and no privilege escalation was
attempted.
Read the deployment-shape caveat first, because it decides whether this chain
works at all and it is the reason the published headline carries Attack
Complexity High. The only shipped artifact this research exercised was the
vendor's official container image, and in that image used exactly as shipped THE
CHAIN DOES NOT WORK. The image declares the webserver content directory as a
VOLUME and the installer never creates that path, so the container runtime
creates the mount point itself as drwxr-xr-x owned by root while the service runs
as uid 1001; the first filesystem call of the whole feature,
Files.createDirectories(destVersionDir.toPath()) at
HtmlBaseFilesUploadService.java:77, fails with EACCES before any archive entry is
read and no byte is ever written. That block cannot be worked around from inside
the product, because setWebserver has exactly one call site, at startup, from the
content-webserver context parameter declared at ROOT.xml:92 with
override="false". The shape in which the chain does succeed is the native,
non-container install, and that shape was never run on a real host: the claim
that a native install leaves that directory owned by the service account is a
labelled structural inference from the shipped archive, not a measurement. This
advisory therefore does not claim that every deployment of this product is
exploitable.
Type and root cause. CWE-22, path traversal through archive entry names, with
CWE-94 (code generation via the *.gsp template mapping), CWE-732, CWE-693,
CWE-668 and CWE-916 contributing. The JSON-API command
ReviewService.addDoorsFiles accepts a zip archive from any authenticated user
and dispatches through ReviewServiceImpl.addZipFiles:969-1001 to the first-party
extractor com.smartbear.ccollab.doors.DoorsFilesUploadService.upload. Across that
extraction loop the only validation of an entry is that the entry object is not
null (:73-75) and the only filter is the keyword list
IGNORE_FILES_KEYWORDS = {"__MACOSX"} declared at :63 and applied at :79. The
entry name is passed through a cosmetic square-bracket substitution at :77 -
Strings.replaceSquareBracketsToRound, which exists to satisfy the downstream
DOORS document parser and has nothing to do with paths - and is then concatenated
into a destination at :78 with
File entryDestination = new File(uploadContext.getDestVersionDir(), fileName);
The two-argument File(File, String) constructor concatenates lexically: it does
not canonicalise, does not resolve against the base and does not reject
parent-directory segments. There is no normalize() call, no startsWith(destDir)
containment test, no canonical-path comparison, no rejection of an absolute name,
no rejection of a backslash-separated name, no extension allowlist or blocklist
on this route, no cap on entry count or cumulative uncompressed size, and no
per-object authorisation on the caller-supplied reviewId. Line :83 then creates
whatever parent directories the attacker's name implies and line :84 opens the
output stream, new FileOutputStream(entryDestination), which is the sink. An
entry named ../../../../../webapps/ROOT/<name>.gsp escapes the per-review version
directory and lands in the Tomcat webroot.
A sibling implementation shares the identical defect and the identical parent
class: com.smartbear.ccollab.matlab.SimulinkFilesUploadService.copyFilesFromZip
at :186-203 resolves destDir.resolve(zipEntry.getName()).toFile() at :188 with
no normalize(), no startsWith(destDir) and no .. rejection, and is reachable from
ReviewService.addSimulinkFiles. Its checkArchive at :157-161 constrains only the
first entry, which must be named exactly webview.html, and then ignores the rest
- a format assertion, not a containment control. One root cause with two code
instances is reported here as a single finding; the Simulink instance was never
exercised end to end and carries two further gates, so its practical
exploitability is strictly weaker and is claimed on source reading only. A
restricted-file-pattern check that genuinely exists lives only in the sibling
servlet VersionContentUploadServlet:90-93, on the JSON-API-free route, and it
validates the version's already-existing paths rather than names inside the
archive.
The destination geometry is what makes a relative traversal practical instead of
theoretical. The shared parent fixes the base: HtmlBaseFilesUploadService builds
webServerFolder as <mode>/<reviewId>/<zip name without extension> at :70-71,
joins it to SystemGlobals.getWebserver() at :74, and
SystemGlobals.java:130 declares that value as the relative string
"collaborator-webserver", so it resolves against the JVM working directory,
measured as /usr/local/ccollab_server/tomcat. The complete destination is
therefore
/usr/local/ccollab_server/tomcat/collaborator-webserver/<mode>/<reviewId>/
<zipbase>/ver<N>
Every segment is fixed by product logic or returned to the attacker, so the
required climb is a deterministic function the attacker can compute: depth = 4 +
n, where n is the number of path segments in the declared zip name after
stripping .zip, and the constant 4 counts ver<N>, the mode segment, the review
identifier and the webserver directory-name segment. Two independent
measurements agree with it at two different values of n - five segments for a
flat zip name, six for a zip name of the form <dir>/<name>.zip, both markers
executing anonymously. Depth must be exact in both directions, and overshooting
is not a safety margin: POSIX clamps ".." at the filesystem root, so too many
segments turn the target into the absolute path /webapps/ROOT/<name>.gsp and the
mandatory pre-write Files.createDirectories at :83 then fails with EACCES with
nothing written, while undershooting lands silently inside the content tree, is
served behind the authenticated /webserver/* prefix where an anonymous client
receives 401, and leaves an attacker file on disk.
The execution half is first-party configuration. The ROOT webapp's own
web.xml:271-278 maps *.gsp to the upstream groovy.servlet.TemplateServlet on the
anonymous surface, so a plain unauthenticated GET of the planted path compiles
the page in memory and evaluates it. That is what converts a
post-authentication arbitrary file write into code execution triggered by
anyone, and it is why the write side and the trigger side sit on opposite sides
of the authentication boundary: the party who plants the file and the party who
runs it need not be the same.
Confirmation, and what was deliberately not reproduced. The chain is
self-verifying rather than interpretive: the planted template runs a single
read-only identity command and echoes its output into the anonymous response
body, together with a Generated by Groovy TemplateServlet timing comment that
proves evaluation rather than static serving. The observed identity string was
verbatim uid=1001(collab) gid=1001(collab) groups=1001(collab), with an empty
effective capability set. The strongest result came from an independently
rebuilt container with a different random marker tag, a different
non-administrator account and a freshly created review; the reference
implementation was then run end to end twice more against a writable-mount
instance, so the finding rests on four mutually independent execution records,
three of which used values that could not have been carried over from an earlier
run. What was deliberately not reproduced: no reverse shell, no persistence, no
scanning, no brute force, no mass traversal, no deletion of anything on the
target and no write outside the single marker file. The marker template is left
in place rather than removed by the tool, because removing it requires container
or host access the tool has no business holding, and an explicit manual cleanup
instruction is printed instead. Per-run marker tokens, session ticket values and
container identities are withheld from the published advisory as artefacts of one
execution on one host: tickets are 30-day credentials and were logged out at
teardown.
Scoring. The published headline is 7.5 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, recomputed from first principles
with the CVSS 3.1 round-up-to-tenth rule: ISS = 1 - (0.44 * 0.44 * 0.44) =
0.914816; Impact at Scope Unchanged = 6.42 * 0.914816 = 5.87311872;
Exploitability = 8.22 * 0.85 * 0.44 * 0.62 * 0.85 = 1.62014556; base =
min(7.49326428, 10) = 7.49326428, rounded up to 7.5. Attack Complexity is High
on the headline not because the traversal is subtle - it is not, the depth is
deterministic, there is no race and there is no state to gather - but because
success depends on a condition the attacker neither controls nor can verify from
the product: that the upload tree is writable by the service uid. On the one
shipped artifact actually exercised, the official container image used exactly as
shipped, that condition is false, and on the shape where it is believed to hold
it was never observed. Rating exploitability Low on the strength of an installer
that was never run would let the headline rest on the one deployment shape that
was never tested while the shape that was tested forbids the chain. This is the
honest rating, not a pessimistic one: the chain is complete and deterministic
wherever the precondition holds and the severity band does not move.
One conditional reading is published beside it, labelled as conditional: 8.8
High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Exploitability = 8.22 *
0.85 * 0.77 * 0.62 * 0.85 = 2.83525473, Impact 5.87311872, base =
min(8.70837345, 10) = 8.70837345, rounded up to 8.8. It applies to
installations in which the upload tree is writable by the service uid: the
native install shape, and any container deployment where that volume was created
with service-account ownership or chowned during deployment automation. The
argument for Low there is real and runs like this: :77 creates the destination
tree itself, on the line before the first archive entry is read, so the
precondition is implied by the usability of the attacked feature - any
installation in which DOORS review-file upload can return success is an
installation in which that tree is already writable by uid 1001, and an attacker
who can call addDoorsFiles and get anything other than a permission-derived
InternalError is already in the exploitable shape. It is not the headline
because those shapes were argued from the archive rather than run. Both readings
are High, and neither says this is remotely exploitable without an account. The
blocked shape is not handled as an Environmental metric adjustment, because
Environmental describes the scorer's own deployment and would leave the base
score looking unconditional.
A rejected reading is recorded here with a correction to our own arithmetic, so
that nobody inherits it. A Scope-Changed candidate - PR:L, S:C and all three
impact metrics High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - was carried
during analysis and is rejected on the merits: the write and the evaluation
happen in the same JVM, the same ROOT web application and the same uid 1001, over
directories that account already owns, so no resource under a different security
authority is affected; that an anonymous client can pull the trigger is a fact
about who pulls it, which Attack Vector and User Interaction already price. The
strongest case for Chan
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| same weakness class, same vendor, different product line, with shared code | SmartBear Collaborator Server |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "SmartBear Collaborator Server",
"vendor": "same weakness class, same vendor, different product line, with shared code",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in SmartBear\nCollaborator Server 15.1.15101, the closed-source peer and technical code-review\nplatform from SmartBear that runs as a Java web application on Apache Tomcat. One\nlow-privilege authenticated account plants a Groovy Server Page in the Tomcat\nwebroot through an archive-extraction path traversal, and any anonymous client -\na crawler, a scanner, anyone - then executes it with an ordinary GET, yielding\noperating-system command execution as uid=1001(collab) inside the product\u0027s own\nJVM. Root was not reached, is not claimed, and no privilege escalation was\nattempted.\n\nRead the deployment-shape caveat first, because it decides whether this chain\nworks at all and it is the reason the published headline carries Attack\nComplexity High. The only shipped artifact this research exercised was the\nvendor\u0027s official container image, and in that image used exactly as shipped THE\nCHAIN DOES NOT WORK. The image declares the webserver content directory as a\nVOLUME and the installer never creates that path, so the container runtime\ncreates the mount point itself as drwxr-xr-x owned by root while the service runs\nas uid 1001; the first filesystem call of the whole feature,\nFiles.createDirectories(destVersionDir.toPath()) at\nHtmlBaseFilesUploadService.java:77, fails with EACCES before any archive entry is\nread and no byte is ever written. That block cannot be worked around from inside\nthe product, because setWebserver has exactly one call site, at startup, from the\ncontent-webserver context parameter declared at ROOT.xml:92 with\noverride=\"false\". The shape in which the chain does succeed is the native,\nnon-container install, and that shape was never run on a real host: the claim\nthat a native install leaves that directory owned by the service account is a\nlabelled structural inference from the shipped archive, not a measurement. This\nadvisory therefore does not claim that every deployment of this product is\nexploitable.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-22, path traversal through archive entry names, with\nCWE-94 (code generation via the *.gsp template mapping), CWE-732, CWE-693,\nCWE-668 and CWE-916 contributing. The JSON-API command\nReviewService.addDoorsFiles accepts a zip archive from any authenticated user\nand dispatches through ReviewServiceImpl.addZipFiles:969-1001 to the first-party\nextractor com.smartbear.ccollab.doors.DoorsFilesUploadService.upload. Across that\nextraction loop the only validation of an entry is that the entry object is not\nnull (:73-75) and the only filter is the keyword list\nIGNORE_FILES_KEYWORDS = {\"__MACOSX\"} declared at :63 and applied at :79. The\nentry name is passed through a cosmetic square-bracket substitution at :77 -\nStrings.replaceSquareBracketsToRound, which exists to satisfy the downstream\nDOORS document parser and has nothing to do with paths - and is then concatenated\ninto a destination at :78 with\n\n File entryDestination = new File(uploadContext.getDestVersionDir(), fileName);\n\nThe two-argument File(File, String) constructor concatenates lexically: it does\nnot canonicalise, does not resolve against the base and does not reject\nparent-directory segments. There is no normalize() call, no startsWith(destDir)\ncontainment test, no canonical-path comparison, no rejection of an absolute name,\nno rejection of a backslash-separated name, no extension allowlist or blocklist\non this route, no cap on entry count or cumulative uncompressed size, and no\nper-object authorisation on the caller-supplied reviewId. Line :83 then creates\nwhatever parent directories the attacker\u0027s name implies and line :84 opens the\noutput stream, new FileOutputStream(entryDestination), which is the sink. An\nentry named ../../../../../webapps/ROOT/\u003cname\u003e.gsp escapes the per-review version\ndirectory and lands in the Tomcat webroot.\n\nA sibling implementation shares the identical defect and the identical parent\nclass: com.smartbear.ccollab.matlab.SimulinkFilesUploadService.copyFilesFromZip\nat :186-203 resolves destDir.resolve(zipEntry.getName()).toFile() at :188 with\nno normalize(), no startsWith(destDir) and no .. rejection, and is reachable from\nReviewService.addSimulinkFiles. Its checkArchive at :157-161 constrains only the\nfirst entry, which must be named exactly webview.html, and then ignores the rest\n- a format assertion, not a containment control. One root cause with two code\ninstances is reported here as a single finding; the Simulink instance was never\nexercised end to end and carries two further gates, so its practical\nexploitability is strictly weaker and is claimed on source reading only. A\nrestricted-file-pattern check that genuinely exists lives only in the sibling\nservlet VersionContentUploadServlet:90-93, on the JSON-API-free route, and it\nvalidates the version\u0027s already-existing paths rather than names inside the\narchive.\n\nThe destination geometry is what makes a relative traversal practical instead of\ntheoretical. The shared parent fixes the base: HtmlBaseFilesUploadService builds\nwebServerFolder as \u003cmode\u003e/\u003creviewId\u003e/\u003czip name without extension\u003e at :70-71,\njoins it to SystemGlobals.getWebserver() at :74, and\nSystemGlobals.java:130 declares that value as the relative string\n\"collaborator-webserver\", so it resolves against the JVM working directory,\nmeasured as /usr/local/ccollab_server/tomcat. The complete destination is\ntherefore\n\n /usr/local/ccollab_server/tomcat/collaborator-webserver/\u003cmode\u003e/\u003creviewId\u003e/\n \u003czipbase\u003e/ver\u003cN\u003e\n\nEvery segment is fixed by product logic or returned to the attacker, so the\nrequired climb is a deterministic function the attacker can compute: depth = 4 +\nn, where n is the number of path segments in the declared zip name after\nstripping .zip, and the constant 4 counts ver\u003cN\u003e, the mode segment, the review\nidentifier and the webserver directory-name segment. Two independent\nmeasurements agree with it at two different values of n - five segments for a\nflat zip name, six for a zip name of the form \u003cdir\u003e/\u003cname\u003e.zip, both markers\nexecuting anonymously. Depth must be exact in both directions, and overshooting\nis not a safety margin: POSIX clamps \"..\" at the filesystem root, so too many\nsegments turn the target into the absolute path /webapps/ROOT/\u003cname\u003e.gsp and the\nmandatory pre-write Files.createDirectories at :83 then fails with EACCES with\nnothing written, while undershooting lands silently inside the content tree, is\nserved behind the authenticated /webserver/* prefix where an anonymous client\nreceives 401, and leaves an attacker file on disk.\n\nThe execution half is first-party configuration. The ROOT webapp\u0027s own\nweb.xml:271-278 maps *.gsp to the upstream groovy.servlet.TemplateServlet on the\nanonymous surface, so a plain unauthenticated GET of the planted path compiles\nthe page in memory and evaluates it. That is what converts a\npost-authentication arbitrary file write into code execution triggered by\nanyone, and it is why the write side and the trigger side sit on opposite sides\nof the authentication boundary: the party who plants the file and the party who\nruns it need not be the same.\n\nConfirmation, and what was deliberately not reproduced. The chain is\nself-verifying rather than interpretive: the planted template runs a single\nread-only identity command and echoes its output into the anonymous response\nbody, together with a Generated by Groovy TemplateServlet timing comment that\nproves evaluation rather than static serving. The observed identity string was\nverbatim uid=1001(collab) gid=1001(collab) groups=1001(collab), with an empty\neffective capability set. The strongest result came from an independently\nrebuilt container with a different random marker tag, a different\nnon-administrator account and a freshly created review; the reference\nimplementation was then run end to end twice more against a writable-mount\ninstance, so the finding rests on four mutually independent execution records,\nthree of which used values that could not have been carried over from an earlier\nrun. What was deliberately not reproduced: no reverse shell, no persistence, no\nscanning, no brute force, no mass traversal, no deletion of anything on the\ntarget and no write outside the single marker file. The marker template is left\nin place rather than removed by the tool, because removing it requires container\nor host access the tool has no business holding, and an explicit manual cleanup\ninstruction is printed instead. Per-run marker tokens, session ticket values and\ncontainer identities are withheld from the published advisory as artefacts of one\nexecution on one host: tickets are 30-day credentials and were logged out at\nteardown.\n\nScoring. The published headline is 7.5 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, recomputed from first principles\nwith the CVSS 3.1 round-up-to-tenth rule: ISS = 1 - (0.44 * 0.44 * 0.44) =\n0.914816; Impact at Scope Unchanged = 6.42 * 0.914816 = 5.87311872;\nExploitability = 8.22 * 0.85 * 0.44 * 0.62 * 0.85 = 1.62014556; base =\nmin(7.49326428, 10) = 7.49326428, rounded up to 7.5. Attack Complexity is High\non the headline not because the traversal is subtle - it is not, the depth is\ndeterministic, there is no race and there is no state to gather - but because\nsuccess depends on a condition the attacker neither controls nor can verify from\nthe product: that the upload tree is writable by the service uid. On the one\nshipped artifact actually exercised, the official container image used exactly as\nshipped, that condition is false, and on the shape where it is believed to hold\nit was never observed. Rating exploitability Low on the strength of an installer\nthat was never run would let the headline rest on the one deployment shape that\nwas never tested while the shape that was tested forbids the chain. This is the\nhonest rating, not a pessimistic one: the chain is complete and deterministic\nwherever the precondition holds and the severity band does not move.\n\nOne conditional reading is published beside it, labelled as conditional: 8.8\nHigh, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Exploitability = 8.22 *\n0.85 * 0.77 * 0.62 * 0.85 = 2.83525473, Impact 5.87311872, base =\nmin(8.70837345, 10) = 8.70837345, rounded up to 8.8. It applies to\ninstallations in which the upload tree is writable by the service uid: the\nnative install shape, and any container deployment where that volume was created\nwith service-account ownership or chowned during deployment automation. The\nargument for Low there is real and runs like this: :77 creates the destination\ntree itself, on the line before the first archive entry is read, so the\nprecondition is implied by the usability of the attacked feature - any\ninstallation in which DOORS review-file upload can return success is an\ninstallation in which that tree is already writable by uid 1001, and an attacker\nwho can call addDoorsFiles and get anything other than a permission-derived\nInternalError is already in the exploitable shape. It is not the headline\nbecause those shapes were argued from the archive rather than run. Both readings\nare High, and neither says this is remotely exploitable without an account. The\nblocked shape is not handled as an Environmental metric adjustment, because\nEnvironmental describes the scorer\u0027s own deployment and would leave the base\nscore looking unconditional.\n\nA rejected reading is recorded here with a correction to our own arithmetic, so\nthat nobody inherits it. A Scope-Changed candidate - PR:L, S:C and all three\nimpact metrics High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - was carried\nduring analysis and is rejected on the merits: the write and the evaluation\nhappen in the same JVM, the same ROOT web application and the same uid 1001, over\ndirectories that account already owns, so no resource under a different security\nauthority is affected; that an anonymous client can pull the trigger is a fact\nabout who pulls it, which Attack Vector and User Interaction already price. The\nstrongest case for Chan"
}
],
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{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-22",
"description": "CWE-22",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-668",
"description": "CWE-668",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-693",
"description": "CWE-693",
"lang": "en",
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},
{
"cweId": "CWE-732",
"description": "CWE-732",
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"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-916",
"description": "CWE-916",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-94",
"description": "CWE-94",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
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"references": [
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"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/19"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/19"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/smartbear-collaborator-doors-upload-zip-slip-webroot-gsp-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/19"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] SmartBear Collaborator Server 15.1.15101 authenticated DOORS/Simulink review-file upload zip-slip to anonymous webroot Groovy Server Page execution as uid 1001 (7.5)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0490",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/19",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "fa2934455827d2e9656fe0eb8d368db9afc71b32d23fc4c64080535e17c0e875",
"evidenceScore": 11,
"messageId": "",
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"cveMetadata": {
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"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:03Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0489
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] PacsOne Server 7.3.9 authenticated DICOMweb STOW-RS SOP Instance UID path traversal to www-data code execution on a PACS host (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in PacsOne
Server 7.3.9, Premium Edition, Linux x86-64 distribution, the closed-source
commercial PACS (medical imaging archive and DICOM server) from RainbowFish
Software, California, United States. The product combines a native C++ DICOM
and HL7 service with a PHP web interface of 204 endpoints running on MySQL
and Apache, fronted by a single Apache alias that maps /pacsone to the
product's php/ directory.
Type: path traversal on a file-write sink (CWE-22 primary; CWE-73 External
Control of File Name or Path and CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
contributing). The DICOMweb STOW-RS handler stowrs.php reads the SOP Instance
UID attribute (0008,0018) out of the posted DICOM object and uses it as the
storage filename. In import() in dicomweb.php, approximately lines
1391-1440, the construction is:
$uid = $rawTags->getAttr(0x00080018);
$dir = dirname($tempfile);
$newfile = $dir . "/" . $uid;
rename($tempfile, $newfile);
$dir is the per-day study directory under the configured archive root, from
getStowRsStoreDir() in database.php:1780; $tempfile is staged in that same
directory by DicomWebStow::__construct (dicomweb.php:1165), which reads the raw
body from php://input, splits it on the declared boundary and writes each
application/dicom part through tempnam() and file_put_contents(); and $uid is
the raw attribute value as it appeared on the wire: RawTags::getAttr()
(dicom.php:4516) returns it unfiltered, and the Explicit VR parser
parseDataExplicit() (dicom.php:4378) applies trim() only, which is VR padding
normalisation and not a security control. The presence checks in store()
(dicomweb.php:1592) verify only that
the SOP Class, SOP Instance, Study and Series Instance UIDs are non-empty,
which any non-empty string satisfies. There is no character whitelist, no
canonicalisation, no length bound and no containment check on this path, so a
SOP Instance UID of ../../../php/x.php moves the received object out of the
study directory and into the directory Apache serves through the /pacsone
alias. The 128-byte DICOM Part 10 preamble is never interpreted by the DICOM
parser, so it can carry a PHP marker script, and once the file is in the
served tree mod_php executes it under the web server identity.
The identity reached is uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data)
groups=33(www-data) - the Apache worker serving the request, confirmed by id,
whoami, a read of /etc/passwd, a marker write-and-read under /tmp, hostname
and uname. There is no child process and no identity change in this chain.
Root was not reached and is not claimed; no privilege escalation, no
container or host escape, and no contact with any other machine was
attempted.
The ordering inside import() decides both whether the write is usable and
whether a reproduction appears to work. rename() executes BEFORE the database
inserts, so no database-layer control - schema constraint, length limit,
uniqueness check - sits upstream of the damage, and the operation is not
transactional: the file lands even when the corresponding study record never
does. Each of the image, series, study and patient inserts is followed on
failure by unlink($newfile), so a minimal DICOM object writes the payload and
then deletes it, returning HTTP 409 with failure reason 272 (ProcessingFailure).
Making all four inserts succeed requires Patient Name (0010,0010), Patient ID
(0010,0020) and the pixel attributes (0028,xxxx). Anyone attempting a
reproduction without those attributes will watch the file disappear and may
conclude this is a false positive. It is not.
The root cause is an asymmetry rather than a general absence of input
validation. The product contains a UID validator, isUidValid(), and does call
it on the unauthenticated wadoAnonymized.php read path, where its character
whitelist blocks "/" and therefore blocks traversal. The store path that turns
a UID into a filename never calls it. Two details narrow where a fix has to
go: the server uses the dataset value and not the file meta header value, so
a validator bolted onto the meta header parse alone would miss this (the
verified object carried an ordinary dotted UID in (0002,0003) and the
traversal in (0008,0018)); and the parser is structurally lenient - it
accepted a (0028,xxxx) group emitted in non-ascending order - so leniency
cannot be relied on to reject malformed identifiers either.
How confirmation works. The STOW-RS JSON response echoes the identifier back,
so the outcome is machine-readable without any filesystem access: the nested
sequence carries (0008,1155) with the traversal string verbatim plus a
per-instance Retrieve URL in which it appears percent-encoded, a success
arrives as HTTP 200 and a failure as HTTP 409 with failure reason 272. That
makes the one deployment-variable quantity - how many ../ components separate
the study directory from a served directory - cheap to enumerate with clear
feedback and one request per guess, which is why Attack Complexity is rated
Low. Three components on the layout we configured; Setup.exe lets the
operator choose the archive directory, so another installation needs a
different count. The target directory has to satisfy only two conditions: the
web server user can write into it, and something served by the web server
executes files there. Relocating the archive outside the web tree is therefore
hardening rather than a fix. We did not reconcile this build's use of
(0008,1199) for the successful-store sequence against the DICOM PS3.18
STOW-RS response definition, and nothing in the finding depends on that tag
numbering. Execution is then confirmed by an unauthenticated GET for the
written file: the gate protects the store operation, not the file the store
operation created. The response body begins with the command's stdout and is
followed by the binary remainder of the DICOM object rendered as literal
output, which is itself evidence that the whole object, preamble included, was
written intact. The file on disk was 580 bytes - the size of the object sent -
owned by the web server identity at mode 0600. That mode is what tempnam()
creates and rename() preserved; it does not obstruct execution, because the
writer, the owner and the interpreter are the same uid.
What was deliberately not reproduced: the rename()/unlink() pairing on the
failure branch, which is argued from POSIX rename() atomic-replace semantics
and from the shipped code rather than exercised. Because unlink($newfile)
operates on the same attacker-chosen path, a deliberately failing store can
replace and then remove an existing file that the web server user can write.
The primitive is then not only "write an attacker-chosen file" but also
"replace and then delete a file whose name the attacker chooses, inside any
directory the web server user can write". No procedure for it is published and
the PoC refuses to target any path that already resolves. No denial-of-service
test was performed either.
Scoring. The published score is 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
PR:H is load-bearing: only an administrator-role account was demonstrated to
reach the DICOMweb STOW-RS route. hasaccess() in database.php:315 evaluates
isAdministrator() first, which returns true unconditionally for the
administrator group, and for everyone else selects the stowrs column of the
privilege table; the privilege table on the tested installation held exactly
one row, that administrator, with stowrs=1. No lower-privileged role was
demonstrated or documented to hold stowrs. The vector's arithmetic: ISS
0.914816, Impact(S:U) 5.873119, Exploitability 1.234708, unrounded base
7.107826, taken to 7.2 by the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth Roundup - which is why a
calculator reporting 7.1 is disagreeing with the rounding rule, not with the
score. For the record, no numeric CVSS value accompanied the verification
evidence gathered for this finding (that evidence recorded its type,
authentication requirement and achieved identity), so 7.2 is derived here from
the vector rather than copied from a recorded figure, and there is no
recorded-versus-computed discrepancy to correct.
One conditional reading is published alongside it and is never the headline.
In a deployment that grants the stowrs permission to a non-administrator
account - the realistic shapes being an acquisition device such as a modality
or scanner workstation, a partner PACS federated to the archive, or an imaging
application service account, all of which is what a DICOMweb store interface
exists to serve - the least privileged principal reaching the sink is a
low-privileged user and the honest rating for that deployment is 8.8 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, Exploitability 2.835255 and
unrounded base 8.708373. We did not demonstrate that any non-administrator
account can be granted stowrs through the product and found no code path that
grants it to one, so this reading is conditional on a deployment state we did
not prove. An operator can establish which reading applies to them with one
query against the privilege table.
Two readings were considered and rejected, published with their arithmetic for
transparency. S:C would compute to 9.1 (Impact(S:C) 6.128026, Exploitability
2.286496, unrounded 9.087684) and is rejected: the PHP interpreter that
executes the payload is part of the same product serving the vulnerable
endpoint, on the same host, under the same service identity, and our traversal
target was inside the product's own served directory, so no second component
with an independent authorization boundary was crossed and no cross-account or
cross-machine outcome was demonstrated. A third argument for S:C is tempting
and still wrong in CVSS terms - that the victim of the confidentiality impact
is the patient whose imaging is stored, who is certainly not the principal
that authenticated - because scope concerns which component's authorization
boundary is crossed, not who suffers the consequence. The clinical weight of
that data is carried by the impact metrics, all three High. AC:H would compute
to 6.6 (unrounded 6.578666) and is rejected because the traversal depth is
discoverable with observable feedback at a cost of one request per guess. We
publish no PR:N vector: no unauthenticated path to this sink exists. The
bypass-file branch in the STOW-RS code path, which accepts fixed wado
credentials when a referenced file is present, is dead code on a default
installation because that file does not exist; we did not create it, we attach
no rating to a state the product does not ship, and we recommend the branch be
deleted.
Authentication: post-authentication, and the gate was tested by behaviour
rather than trusted from configuration. The performed negative control is a
persistence differential: two requests to the same endpoint with the same
account and the same object layout, differing only in whether Patient Name and
Patient ID were present. The incomplete object produced HTTP 409 and left
nothing in the served directory, having been removed by the failure branch's
unlink(); the complete object produced HTTP 200 and left a 580-byte file at
exactly the location the UID named. That establishes both that the file's
presence is a consequence of the store path completing and that its location
is the UID, since nothing else in the request specified a directory; it also
excludes mishandling of the temporary file, which tempnam() creates inside the
study directory and which would never appear in the served PHP tree on its
own. A third control comes from a sibling endpoint and was observed: UID-shaped
attacker input on the unauthenticated wadoAnonymized.php path passes through
isUidValid(), whose whitelist contains no "/", so the same input class validated
does not traverse and unvalidated does.
A fourth control is shipped but was not executed, and we say so plainly. The
published PoC carries a conforming-UID control mode that send
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | PacsOne Server |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0489 (this record)
- possibly related CVE-2018-25124
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "PacsOne Server",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in PacsOne\nServer 7.3.9, Premium Edition, Linux x86-64 distribution, the closed-source\ncommercial PACS (medical imaging archive and DICOM server) from RainbowFish\nSoftware, California, United States. The product combines a native C++ DICOM\nand HL7 service with a PHP web interface of 204 endpoints running on MySQL\nand Apache, fronted by a single Apache alias that maps /pacsone to the\nproduct\u0027s php/ directory.\n\nType: path traversal on a file-write sink (CWE-22 primary; CWE-73 External\nControl of File Name or Path and CWE-20 Improper Input Validation\ncontributing). The DICOMweb STOW-RS handler stowrs.php reads the SOP Instance\nUID attribute (0008,0018) out of the posted DICOM object and uses it as the\nstorage filename. In import() in dicomweb.php, approximately lines\n1391-1440, the construction is:\n\n $uid = $rawTags-\u003egetAttr(0x00080018);\n $dir = dirname($tempfile);\n $newfile = $dir . \"/\" . $uid;\n rename($tempfile, $newfile);\n\n$dir is the per-day study directory under the configured archive root, from\ngetStowRsStoreDir() in database.php:1780; $tempfile is staged in that same\ndirectory by DicomWebStow::__construct (dicomweb.php:1165), which reads the raw\nbody from php://input, splits it on the declared boundary and writes each\napplication/dicom part through tempnam() and file_put_contents(); and $uid is\nthe raw attribute value as it appeared on the wire: RawTags::getAttr()\n(dicom.php:4516) returns it unfiltered, and the Explicit VR parser\nparseDataExplicit() (dicom.php:4378) applies trim() only, which is VR padding\nnormalisation and not a security control. The presence checks in store()\n(dicomweb.php:1592) verify only that\nthe SOP Class, SOP Instance, Study and Series Instance UIDs are non-empty,\nwhich any non-empty string satisfies. There is no character whitelist, no\ncanonicalisation, no length bound and no containment check on this path, so a\nSOP Instance UID of ../../../php/x.php moves the received object out of the\nstudy directory and into the directory Apache serves through the /pacsone\nalias. The 128-byte DICOM Part 10 preamble is never interpreted by the DICOM\nparser, so it can carry a PHP marker script, and once the file is in the\nserved tree mod_php executes it under the web server identity.\n\nThe identity reached is uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data)\ngroups=33(www-data) - the Apache worker serving the request, confirmed by id,\nwhoami, a read of /etc/passwd, a marker write-and-read under /tmp, hostname\nand uname. There is no child process and no identity change in this chain.\nRoot was not reached and is not claimed; no privilege escalation, no\ncontainer or host escape, and no contact with any other machine was\nattempted.\n\nThe ordering inside import() decides both whether the write is usable and\nwhether a reproduction appears to work. rename() executes BEFORE the database\ninserts, so no database-layer control - schema constraint, length limit,\nuniqueness check - sits upstream of the damage, and the operation is not\ntransactional: the file lands even when the corresponding study record never\ndoes. Each of the image, series, study and patient inserts is followed on\nfailure by unlink($newfile), so a minimal DICOM object writes the payload and\nthen deletes it, returning HTTP 409 with failure reason 272 (ProcessingFailure).\nMaking all four inserts succeed requires Patient Name (0010,0010), Patient ID\n(0010,0020) and the pixel attributes (0028,xxxx). Anyone attempting a\nreproduction without those attributes will watch the file disappear and may\nconclude this is a false positive. It is not.\n\nThe root cause is an asymmetry rather than a general absence of input\nvalidation. The product contains a UID validator, isUidValid(), and does call\nit on the unauthenticated wadoAnonymized.php read path, where its character\nwhitelist blocks \"/\" and therefore blocks traversal. The store path that turns\na UID into a filename never calls it. Two details narrow where a fix has to\ngo: the server uses the dataset value and not the file meta header value, so\na validator bolted onto the meta header parse alone would miss this (the\nverified object carried an ordinary dotted UID in (0002,0003) and the\ntraversal in (0008,0018)); and the parser is structurally lenient - it\naccepted a (0028,xxxx) group emitted in non-ascending order - so leniency\ncannot be relied on to reject malformed identifiers either.\n\nHow confirmation works. The STOW-RS JSON response echoes the identifier back,\nso the outcome is machine-readable without any filesystem access: the nested\nsequence carries (0008,1155) with the traversal string verbatim plus a\nper-instance Retrieve URL in which it appears percent-encoded, a success\narrives as HTTP 200 and a failure as HTTP 409 with failure reason 272. That\nmakes the one deployment-variable quantity - how many ../ components separate\nthe study directory from a served directory - cheap to enumerate with clear\nfeedback and one request per guess, which is why Attack Complexity is rated\nLow. Three components on the layout we configured; Setup.exe lets the\noperator choose the archive directory, so another installation needs a\ndifferent count. The target directory has to satisfy only two conditions: the\nweb server user can write into it, and something served by the web server\nexecutes files there. Relocating the archive outside the web tree is therefore\nhardening rather than a fix. We did not reconcile this build\u0027s use of\n(0008,1199) for the successful-store sequence against the DICOM PS3.18\nSTOW-RS response definition, and nothing in the finding depends on that tag\nnumbering. Execution is then confirmed by an unauthenticated GET for the\nwritten file: the gate protects the store operation, not the file the store\noperation created. The response body begins with the command\u0027s stdout and is\nfollowed by the binary remainder of the DICOM object rendered as literal\noutput, which is itself evidence that the whole object, preamble included, was\nwritten intact. The file on disk was 580 bytes - the size of the object sent -\nowned by the web server identity at mode 0600. That mode is what tempnam()\ncreates and rename() preserved; it does not obstruct execution, because the\nwriter, the owner and the interpreter are the same uid.\n\nWhat was deliberately not reproduced: the rename()/unlink() pairing on the\nfailure branch, which is argued from POSIX rename() atomic-replace semantics\nand from the shipped code rather than exercised. Because unlink($newfile)\noperates on the same attacker-chosen path, a deliberately failing store can\nreplace and then remove an existing file that the web server user can write.\nThe primitive is then not only \"write an attacker-chosen file\" but also\n\"replace and then delete a file whose name the attacker chooses, inside any\ndirectory the web server user can write\". No procedure for it is published and\nthe PoC refuses to target any path that already resolves. No denial-of-service\ntest was performed either.\n\nScoring. The published score is 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.\nPR:H is load-bearing: only an administrator-role account was demonstrated to\nreach the DICOMweb STOW-RS route. hasaccess() in database.php:315 evaluates\nisAdministrator() first, which returns true unconditionally for the\nadministrator group, and for everyone else selects the stowrs column of the\nprivilege table; the privilege table on the tested installation held exactly\none row, that administrator, with stowrs=1. No lower-privileged role was\ndemonstrated or documented to hold stowrs. The vector\u0027s arithmetic: ISS\n0.914816, Impact(S:U) 5.873119, Exploitability 1.234708, unrounded base\n7.107826, taken to 7.2 by the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth Roundup - which is why a\ncalculator reporting 7.1 is disagreeing with the rounding rule, not with the\nscore. For the record, no numeric CVSS value accompanied the verification\nevidence gathered for this finding (that evidence recorded its type,\nauthentication requirement and achieved identity), so 7.2 is derived here from\nthe vector rather than copied from a recorded figure, and there is no\nrecorded-versus-computed discrepancy to correct.\n\nOne conditional reading is published alongside it and is never the headline.\nIn a deployment that grants the stowrs permission to a non-administrator\naccount - the realistic shapes being an acquisition device such as a modality\nor scanner workstation, a partner PACS federated to the archive, or an imaging\napplication service account, all of which is what a DICOMweb store interface\nexists to serve - the least privileged principal reaching the sink is a\nlow-privileged user and the honest rating for that deployment is 8.8 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, Exploitability 2.835255 and\nunrounded base 8.708373. We did not demonstrate that any non-administrator\naccount can be granted stowrs through the product and found no code path that\ngrants it to one, so this reading is conditional on a deployment state we did\nnot prove. An operator can establish which reading applies to them with one\nquery against the privilege table.\n\nTwo readings were considered and rejected, published with their arithmetic for\ntransparency. S:C would compute to 9.1 (Impact(S:C) 6.128026, Exploitability\n2.286496, unrounded 9.087684) and is rejected: the PHP interpreter that\nexecutes the payload is part of the same product serving the vulnerable\nendpoint, on the same host, under the same service identity, and our traversal\ntarget was inside the product\u0027s own served directory, so no second component\nwith an independent authorization boundary was crossed and no cross-account or\ncross-machine outcome was demonstrated. A third argument for S:C is tempting\nand still wrong in CVSS terms - that the victim of the confidentiality impact\nis the patient whose imaging is stored, who is certainly not the principal\nthat authenticated - because scope concerns which component\u0027s authorization\nboundary is crossed, not who suffers the consequence. The clinical weight of\nthat data is carried by the impact metrics, all three High. AC:H would compute\nto 6.6 (unrounded 6.578666) and is rejected because the traversal depth is\ndiscoverable with observable feedback at a cost of one request per guess. We\npublish no PR:N vector: no unauthenticated path to this sink exists. The\nbypass-file branch in the STOW-RS code path, which accepts fixed wado\ncredentials when a referenced file is present, is dead code on a default\ninstallation because that file does not exist; we did not create it, we attach\nno rating to a state the product does not ship, and we recommend the branch be\ndeleted.\n\nAuthentication: post-authentication, and the gate was tested by behaviour\nrather than trusted from configuration. The performed negative control is a\npersistence differential: two requests to the same endpoint with the same\naccount and the same object layout, differing only in whether Patient Name and\nPatient ID were present. The incomplete object produced HTTP 409 and left\nnothing in the served directory, having been removed by the failure branch\u0027s\nunlink(); the complete object produced HTTP 200 and left a 580-byte file at\nexactly the location the UID named. That establishes both that the file\u0027s\npresence is a consequence of the store path completing and that its location\nis the UID, since nothing else in the request specified a directory; it also\nexcludes mishandling of the temporary file, which tempnam() creates inside the\nstudy directory and which would never appear in the served PHP tree on its\nown. A third control comes from a sibling endpoint and was observed: UID-shaped\nattacker input on the unauthenticated wadoAnonymized.php path passes through\nisUidValid(), whose whitelist contains no \"/\", so the same input class validated\ndoes not traverse and unvalidated does.\n\nA fourth control is shipped but was not executed, and we say so plainly. The\npublished PoC carries a conforming-UID control mode that send"
}
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] PacsOne Server 7.3.9 authenticated DICOMweb STOW-RS SOP Instance UID path traversal to www-data code execution on a PACS host (7.2)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0488
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Maian Pal 2.1 product image upload with no extension allow-list to PHP webshell and www-data uid 33 code execution (7.2, PR:H)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Maian Pal
2.1, the self-hosted PHP shopping-cart script from Maian Media (United Kingdom),
oriented at PayPal checkout and distributed as a commercial closed-source archive,
verified end to end against a real installation of that version in three
independent reproductions.
Type: unrestricted upload of a file with a dangerous type (CWE-434 primary, with
CWE-94 and CWE-693 contributing - the stored object is subsequently interpreted as
code, and the served upload directory lacks the execution restriction that
equivalent directories in the same product carry), realised as OS command
execution (CWE-78 describes what the demonstration payload does once it runs and
is not scored separately). The product-image handling of the administration
product create and update operations, `ajax-ops=add` and `ajax-ops=add-edit`,
passes the multipart field fm[ifile][] to products::pictures() at
`class.products.php:333` through `class.products.php:410`. The stored name is
chosen from the client-supplied filename by a single ternary:
// class.products.php:372 - no extension allow-list anywhere on this path
$picPath = ($cfg['rename'] == 'yes'
? $cfg['imgprf'] . $ID . '-' . $nextPic . strrchr($name, '.')
: $name);
// class.products.php:~390 - written before any validation
move_uploaded_file($temp, $picFldr . '/' . $picPath);
With $cfg supplied by thumbcfg() at `class.products.php:615`, whose shipped
default is 'rename' => 'no', that assignment reduces to $picPath = $name, so the
client controls the entire stored name including the extension and a .php file
lands on disk intact as content/products/<ID>/<name>.php. There is no extension
allow-list and no deny-list, no finfo or MIME verification, no re-encoding to
strip an embedded payload, no server-generated filename with a type-derived
extension, and no rollback of the write when later validation fails. strtolower()
appears only in the non-default rename='yes' branch and is cosmetic.
The root cause has two independently fixable halves, and this advisory keeps them
separate because fixing one without the other leaves the chain standing.
The first half is the handler: what may be written. The second is the directory:
whether what is written may execute. That second half lines up in this product
because the destination sits inside the document root and the front-controller
rewrite claims only paths that do not exist on disk - `RewriteCond !-f` guarding
`RewriteRule ^([^?]*) index.php?_msw_=$1 [L,QSA]` - so a file that exists is handed
straight to the PHP handler, and requesting it with a query string executes it.
Nothing in content/products/ disables that handler. Our review of the shipped tree
found an Apache deny file carrying `Deny from all` present in admin/import/, and
found content/products/ carrying no such file.
The contrast that makes this an omission rather than a design decision is inside
one product and one shipped version: two handlers accept files from a browser, and
one of them checks the extension and writes into a deny-protected directory while
the other does neither. We are precise about the evidentiary weight of each half
of that comparison, because it matters. That admin/import/ carries `Deny from all`
and that content/products/ carries nothing are both anchored artefacts of the
shipped tree. The statement that the product's attachment upload path applies an
extension allow-list into a deny-protected directory is a source-level reading of
the shipped PHP that we did not reduce to a line citation, and we label it as
such. It is offered here the same way we put it to the seller: as a contrast worth
confirming, since part of the argument that this is an omission rests on it.
The ordering inside the handler makes the failure path worse rather than safer,
and this is the detail most likely to be missed by a fix that only adds a check
downstream. move_uploaded_file() runs before any thumbnail inspection, and the
validation that does run is not fatal. getimagesize() inside thumbnail() runs
after the write and is used only to select a thumbnail strategy, never to accept
or reject the upload; for a PHP file it fails, the switch falls through to a
suppressed @copy(), and the original is never unlinked. So a non-image upload
leaves two objects in a served directory - the original plus a tmb_-prefixed
sibling - deletes neither, and still reports {"status":"ok"}. The failure path
yields two files rather than zero, silently. Any cleanup that removes only the
obviously named object leaves the second one behind.
Turning rename on would not fix this either, and it deserves emphasis because it
is the obvious operator-facing knob: in the rename='yes' branch the stem is
server-generated but the extension is still taken from the client filename via
strrchr(), so a .php upload produces a server-named file that is still
executable. We derived that from the assignment expression and did not run the
rename='yes' configuration, so it is an argument from code rather than a dynamic
result.
Commands execute as the web server service account, observed as
`uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)` in three independent
reproductions with distinct random filenames, plus a marker written to an absolute
path outside the document root and read back afterwards from the host. No
privilege escalation of any kind was attempted or observed: no kernel exploit, no
sudo right, no writable service unit, no container escape. Root was not reached
and is not claimed; the ceiling of this finding is code execution as the web
server user.
How confirmation works. The chain is two requests. One POST creates the object
and the create response itself embeds `?p=add&id=<ID>`, so the attacker learns
the numeric product directory without guessing and the filename is one they
chose - predictability of the final URL is total. One GET to
`/content/products/<ID>/<name>.php?cmd=<command>` executes it and returns the
output in the response body, prefixed by a marker that proves the body came from
PHP execution rather than from static file serving. Both operations report
{"status":"ok"}. What was deliberately not reproduced: no data theft, no database
modification, no persistence beyond the uploaded file, no lateral movement and no
exploitation of a live third-party system - all verification targeted our own
instance, and the payload's default command is a non-destructive identity query.
Scoring. One score is published: 7.2 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, the CVSS 3.1 base arithmetic for
which is shown in full in the advisory and was re-checked against an independent
implementation of that formula. AV:N because the sink sits on the product's
ordinary HTTP(S) listener, with no separate management port, no RPC endpoint and
no background listener, and nothing in the chain depends on source address, user
agent or session age beyond validity. AC:L because one POST creates the object and
one GET executes it, so there is no race window, no multi-step state to prepare and
no unusual configuration requirement: the chain depends only on shipped defaults
(thumbcfg() 'rename' => 'no', no deny file in content/products/), and the licence
restriction RESTR_PRODUCTS = 50 does not obstruct the first product create. UI:N
because no victim browser or user action is involved - the attacker authenticates
with their own credentials and there is no forgery step.
PR:H is published because only an authenticated administrator session was
demonstrated. The credential pair is the one the installer provisions (LG_USER
and LG_PASS in `control/_cfg.php`), mswPerms() gates every administration
operation except login and logout, and no graduated back-end role was shown to
reach ajax-ops=add. Four named alternative readings are published against that
7.2 so that each rejection is auditable, and one of them is conditional rather
than rejected:
- Scope Changed, AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.1. Rejected. The
vulnerable component is the administration back-end and the impacted
resources are that application's own files, its own database reached with
the very credentials the application holds, and the operating-system
context of the web server process it runs inside. The achieved identity is
the same service account the application always ran as, on the same host,
and nothing outside its reach before the upload came into reach
afterwards. Publishing S:C would require a database-server compromise
independent of the application's credentials, a container escape or a
distinct host, and none was demonstrated.
- Unauthenticated, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8. Rejected, and
this is the tempting headline for a public-facing shopping cart that we
decline to print as ours. The storefront dispatcher's 56 unauthenticated
AJAX operations contain no file-upload, command-execution, code-evaluation
or deserialization primitive - only include() of language and class files -
the administration login was reviewed on six specific bypass axes with no
success, and the product ships no factory credential and no usable
SECRET_KEY.
- Lower-privileged back-end role, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.8.
Published as a conditional reading, labelled as such and never as the
headline. The dispatcher exposes users, users-edit, permissions and
permissions-edit, so the product may model back-end accounts narrower than
the single installer-provisioned administrator; mswPerms() was established
in our review only as an authentication gate over the dispatch, not as a
per-operation authorization matrix; and no principal short of full
administrator was demonstrated reaching ajax-ops=add. If a restricted
back-end account can create or update products, that account is the
least-privileged principal reaching the sink and PR:L is the faithful
metric, at Impact 5.87311872 plus Exploitability 2.83525473, base
8.70837345, rounded up. We did not round our rating up to it, because
doing so would assert a privilege model we did not observe.
- Elevated complexity, AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 6.6, and user
interaction, AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 6.8. Both printed only
so the rejections are inspectable: there is no race, no ordering constraint
beyond one POST and one GET, no requirement that the target be in an
unusual state, and no victim action at any point in the chain.
Contributing weaknesses are reported and deliberately not scored into the vector:
the single-round SHA-1 mswEnc() credential transform, loose `==` comparisons on
hash and token strings, the absence of any enforced rotation of the
installer-provisioned secret, and the inconsistency between upload handlers inside
one shipped version. None of them lowers the privilege required to reach the sink
and none raises the impact of the upload once it is reached. There is also no
numeric base score in our own record against this vector that could disagree with
it, so no correction notice accompanies the figure.
Authentication: post-authentication administrator plus the session CSRF token, and
both gates were treated as things to attack rather than as configuration to trust.
There are no factory credentials in Maian Pal 2.1: the installer forces LG_USER,
LG_PASS and SECRET_KEY to be set, `control/_cfg-sample.php:62` ships only the
placeholder text "Your secret key value goes here", and this is not a
default-credential report. The login path was reviewed for a missing or permissive
permission configuration, a route that skips the gate, a predictable CSRF token, a
pre-computable credential hash, a factory-credential fallback, a
comparison-timing difference and a secondary authentication branch, and none was
found; t
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Pal",
"vendor": "Maian",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Maian Pal\n2.1, the self-hosted PHP shopping-cart script from Maian Media (United Kingdom),\noriented at PayPal checkout and distributed as a commercial closed-source archive,\nverified end to end against a real installation of that version in three\nindependent reproductions.\n\nType: unrestricted upload of a file with a dangerous type (CWE-434 primary, with\nCWE-94 and CWE-693 contributing - the stored object is subsequently interpreted as\ncode, and the served upload directory lacks the execution restriction that\nequivalent directories in the same product carry), realised as OS command\nexecution (CWE-78 describes what the demonstration payload does once it runs and\nis not scored separately). The product-image handling of the administration\nproduct create and update operations, `ajax-ops=add` and `ajax-ops=add-edit`,\npasses the multipart field fm[ifile][] to products::pictures() at\n`class.products.php:333` through `class.products.php:410`. The stored name is\nchosen from the client-supplied filename by a single ternary:\n\n // class.products.php:372 - no extension allow-list anywhere on this path\n $picPath = ($cfg[\u0027rename\u0027] == \u0027yes\u0027\n ? $cfg[\u0027imgprf\u0027] . $ID . \u0027-\u0027 . $nextPic . strrchr($name, \u0027.\u0027)\n : $name);\n\n // class.products.php:~390 - written before any validation\n move_uploaded_file($temp, $picFldr . \u0027/\u0027 . $picPath);\n\nWith $cfg supplied by thumbcfg() at `class.products.php:615`, whose shipped\ndefault is \u0027rename\u0027 =\u003e \u0027no\u0027, that assignment reduces to $picPath = $name, so the\nclient controls the entire stored name including the extension and a .php file\nlands on disk intact as content/products/\u003cID\u003e/\u003cname\u003e.php. There is no extension\nallow-list and no deny-list, no finfo or MIME verification, no re-encoding to\nstrip an embedded payload, no server-generated filename with a type-derived\nextension, and no rollback of the write when later validation fails. strtolower()\nappears only in the non-default rename=\u0027yes\u0027 branch and is cosmetic.\n\nThe root cause has two independently fixable halves, and this advisory keeps them\nseparate because fixing one without the other leaves the chain standing.\n\nThe first half is the handler: what may be written. The second is the directory:\nwhether what is written may execute. That second half lines up in this product\nbecause the destination sits inside the document root and the front-controller\nrewrite claims only paths that do not exist on disk - `RewriteCond !-f` guarding\n`RewriteRule ^([^?]*) index.php?_msw_=$1 [L,QSA]` - so a file that exists is handed\nstraight to the PHP handler, and requesting it with a query string executes it.\nNothing in content/products/ disables that handler. Our review of the shipped tree\nfound an Apache deny file carrying `Deny from all` present in admin/import/, and\nfound content/products/ carrying no such file.\n\nThe contrast that makes this an omission rather than a design decision is inside\none product and one shipped version: two handlers accept files from a browser, and\none of them checks the extension and writes into a deny-protected directory while\nthe other does neither. We are precise about the evidentiary weight of each half\nof that comparison, because it matters. That admin/import/ carries `Deny from all`\nand that content/products/ carries nothing are both anchored artefacts of the\nshipped tree. The statement that the product\u0027s attachment upload path applies an\nextension allow-list into a deny-protected directory is a source-level reading of\nthe shipped PHP that we did not reduce to a line citation, and we label it as\nsuch. It is offered here the same way we put it to the seller: as a contrast worth\nconfirming, since part of the argument that this is an omission rests on it.\n\nThe ordering inside the handler makes the failure path worse rather than safer,\nand this is the detail most likely to be missed by a fix that only adds a check\ndownstream. move_uploaded_file() runs before any thumbnail inspection, and the\nvalidation that does run is not fatal. getimagesize() inside thumbnail() runs\nafter the write and is used only to select a thumbnail strategy, never to accept\nor reject the upload; for a PHP file it fails, the switch falls through to a\nsuppressed @copy(), and the original is never unlinked. So a non-image upload\nleaves two objects in a served directory - the original plus a tmb_-prefixed\nsibling - deletes neither, and still reports {\"status\":\"ok\"}. The failure path\nyields two files rather than zero, silently. Any cleanup that removes only the\nobviously named object leaves the second one behind.\n\nTurning rename on would not fix this either, and it deserves emphasis because it\nis the obvious operator-facing knob: in the rename=\u0027yes\u0027 branch the stem is\nserver-generated but the extension is still taken from the client filename via\nstrrchr(), so a .php upload produces a server-named file that is still\nexecutable. We derived that from the assignment expression and did not run the\nrename=\u0027yes\u0027 configuration, so it is an argument from code rather than a dynamic\nresult.\n\nCommands execute as the web server service account, observed as\n`uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)` in three independent\nreproductions with distinct random filenames, plus a marker written to an absolute\npath outside the document root and read back afterwards from the host. No\nprivilege escalation of any kind was attempted or observed: no kernel exploit, no\nsudo right, no writable service unit, no container escape. Root was not reached\nand is not claimed; the ceiling of this finding is code execution as the web\nserver user.\n\nHow confirmation works. The chain is two requests. One POST creates the object\nand the create response itself embeds `?p=add\u0026id=\u003cID\u003e`, so the attacker learns\nthe numeric product directory without guessing and the filename is one they\nchose - predictability of the final URL is total. One GET to\n`/content/products/\u003cID\u003e/\u003cname\u003e.php?cmd=\u003ccommand\u003e` executes it and returns the\noutput in the response body, prefixed by a marker that proves the body came from\nPHP execution rather than from static file serving. Both operations report\n{\"status\":\"ok\"}. What was deliberately not reproduced: no data theft, no database\nmodification, no persistence beyond the uploaded file, no lateral movement and no\nexploitation of a live third-party system - all verification targeted our own\ninstance, and the payload\u0027s default command is a non-destructive identity query.\n\nScoring. One score is published: 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, the CVSS 3.1 base arithmetic for\nwhich is shown in full in the advisory and was re-checked against an independent\nimplementation of that formula. AV:N because the sink sits on the product\u0027s\nordinary HTTP(S) listener, with no separate management port, no RPC endpoint and\nno background listener, and nothing in the chain depends on source address, user\nagent or session age beyond validity. AC:L because one POST creates the object and\none GET executes it, so there is no race window, no multi-step state to prepare and\nno unusual configuration requirement: the chain depends only on shipped defaults\n(thumbcfg() \u0027rename\u0027 =\u003e \u0027no\u0027, no deny file in content/products/), and the licence\nrestriction RESTR_PRODUCTS = 50 does not obstruct the first product create. UI:N\nbecause no victim browser or user action is involved - the attacker authenticates\nwith their own credentials and there is no forgery step.\n\nPR:H is published because only an authenticated administrator session was\ndemonstrated. The credential pair is the one the installer provisions (LG_USER\nand LG_PASS in `control/_cfg.php`), mswPerms() gates every administration\noperation except login and logout, and no graduated back-end role was shown to\nreach ajax-ops=add. Four named alternative readings are published against that\n7.2 so that each rejection is auditable, and one of them is conditional rather\nthan rejected:\n\n - Scope Changed, AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.1. Rejected. The\n vulnerable component is the administration back-end and the impacted\n resources are that application\u0027s own files, its own database reached with\n the very credentials the application holds, and the operating-system\n context of the web server process it runs inside. The achieved identity is\n the same service account the application always ran as, on the same host,\n and nothing outside its reach before the upload came into reach\n afterwards. Publishing S:C would require a database-server compromise\n independent of the application\u0027s credentials, a container escape or a\n distinct host, and none was demonstrated.\n - Unauthenticated, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8. Rejected, and\n this is the tempting headline for a public-facing shopping cart that we\n decline to print as ours. The storefront dispatcher\u0027s 56 unauthenticated\n AJAX operations contain no file-upload, command-execution, code-evaluation\n or deserialization primitive - only include() of language and class files -\n the administration login was reviewed on six specific bypass axes with no\n success, and the product ships no factory credential and no usable\n SECRET_KEY.\n - Lower-privileged back-end role, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.8.\n Published as a conditional reading, labelled as such and never as the\n headline. The dispatcher exposes users, users-edit, permissions and\n permissions-edit, so the product may model back-end accounts narrower than\n the single installer-provisioned administrator; mswPerms() was established\n in our review only as an authentication gate over the dispatch, not as a\n per-operation authorization matrix; and no principal short of full\n administrator was demonstrated reaching ajax-ops=add. If a restricted\n back-end account can create or update products, that account is the\n least-privileged principal reaching the sink and PR:L is the faithful\n metric, at Impact 5.87311872 plus Exploitability 2.83525473, base\n 8.70837345, rounded up. We did not round our rating up to it, because\n doing so would assert a privilege model we did not observe.\n - Elevated complexity, AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 6.6, and user\n interaction, AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 6.8. Both printed only\n so the rejections are inspectable: there is no race, no ordering constraint\n beyond one POST and one GET, no requirement that the target be in an\n unusual state, and no victim action at any point in the chain.\n\nContributing weaknesses are reported and deliberately not scored into the vector:\nthe single-round SHA-1 mswEnc() credential transform, loose `==` comparisons on\nhash and token strings, the absence of any enforced rotation of the\ninstaller-provisioned secret, and the inconsistency between upload handlers inside\none shipped version. None of them lowers the privilege required to reach the sink\nand none raises the impact of the upload once it is reached. There is also no\nnumeric base score in our own record against this vector that could disagree with\nit, so no correction notice accompanies the figure.\n\nAuthentication: post-authentication administrator plus the session CSRF token, and\nboth gates were treated as things to attack rather than as configuration to trust.\nThere are no factory credentials in Maian Pal 2.1: the installer forces LG_USER,\nLG_PASS and SECRET_KEY to be set, `control/_cfg-sample.php:62` ships only the\nplaceholder text \"Your secret key value goes here\", and this is not a\ndefault-credential report. The login path was reviewed for a missing or permissive\npermission configuration, a route that skips the gate, a predictable CSRF token, a\npre-computable credential hash, a factory-credential fallback, a\ncomparison-timing difference and a secondary authentication branch, and none was\nfound; t"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-434",
"description": "CWE-434",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-693",
"description": "CWE-693",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-78",
"description": "CWE-78",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-94",
"description": "CWE-94",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
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"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
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"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description",
"exploit"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/17"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/17"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/maian-pal-product-image-upload-webshell-rce"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/17"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] Maian Pal 2.1 product image upload with no extension allow-list to PHP webshell and www-data uid 33 code execution (7.2, PR:H)",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
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"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0488",
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"automated": true,
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"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0487
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Maian Guardian 2.1 license generator projid command injection to www-data uid 33 code execution (7.2, PR:H)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Maian
Guardian 2.1, the self-hosted licensing system for PHP applications encoded
with SourceGuardian, distributed as a closed-source commercial PHP script by
Maian Script World (United Kingdom) and verified end to end against a real
installation of that version.
Type: OS command injection (CWE-78 primary; CWE-116, CWE-20 and CWE-561
contributing; CWE-250 and CWE-732 as environmental amplifiers of the same
event). The license-generation routine builds an operating-system command line
by string interpolation and passes it to shell_exec() at
`control/classes/class.licensing.php:261` inside `guardianLicense::create()`, in
order to invoke the external SourceGuardian generator binary. Several of the
interpolated fields arrive unvalidated from the body of the administrator AJAX
operation `POST /admin/index.php?ajax-ops=generate` - projid, projkey, the
license property key and value pairs, and the encoder string - and are placed
inside double quotes rather than argument-quoted, so POSIX command substitution
still applies:
shell_exec(mswSGLicGenPath('"', $this->settings) . " $string $output");
$lock[] = '--projid "' . $this->projid . '"'; // line 112
$lock[] = '--projkey "' . $this->projkey . '"'; // line 113
The rendered command line is therefore
`"<licpath>" --projid "<PROJID>" --projkey "<PROJKEY>" --const "<KEY>=<VALUE>"
... <output>`, where PROJID is whatever an authenticated administrator posted.
PHP hands that text to `/bin/sh -c`, and inside a double-quoted word the shell
does not treat `$(`, a backtick or a backslash as literal. A projid of `$(id)`
spawns `id` in a subshell and substitutes its output into the argument, and it
does so during expansion, before the command word is resolved - which is why a
deployment with a missing or misconfigured generator binary is still fully
exploitable.
The decisive detail is the sanitizer arrangement, and it is the whole root
cause. Three sanitizer-shaped helpers ship with the product; two of them return
their input unchanged and sit in series on the path to the shell, and the one
that correctly wraps escapeshellarg has no call site anywhere in the product:
private function escape($data) { return $data; } // lines 68-70
private function escapeArg($data) { return escapeshellarg($data); }
// lines 72-74
`escape()` is the function actually called on the way to the shell, and it does
nothing. `mswCD()` at lines 152-154 is a second `return $data;`, applied to the
property key and value immediately before `escape()`, so two no-ops are stacked
in a row on the properties path. `escapeArg()` wraps exactly the right primitive
and is dead code: a sweep of all 308 PHP files in the shipped tree found no call
site for it, which reads as a completed remediation that never landed. A fourth
helper, `escapeCmd()` around `escapeshellcmd()`, is real and is invoked, but only
from `head()`, `time_servers()` and `add_lic_info()` - never from `lock()` or
`properties()` - so it guards the fields with the least attacker control and
never sees the two that carry project identifiers. Upstream of the class the
only request-wide filter is `mswMDAM('trim', $_POST)` at
`control/functions.php:342`, which applies trim() and nothing else; there is no
character allow-list, no length cap and no metacharacter rejection anywhere
between the POST body and the shell_exec() argument.
Commands execute as the web server service account, observed as
`uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)`. No setuid transition,
wrapper, privilege drop or sandbox sits between the web worker and the child
process. Root was not reached, was not attempted, and is not claimed.
How confirmation works, and what was deliberately not reproduced. The generate
operation does not echo command output into its HTTP response: it answered HTTP
200 with its ordinary `{"status":"rdr"}` body, the response shape it produces
when the generator creates no valid license file. Proof of execution is
therefore out-of-band by construction. The injected command writes a marker file
and the same installation serves it back over HTTP; one authenticated request
executed six distinct commands into that single file, including a pipeline,
`cat /etc/passwd | head -3`, which is what separates arbitrary command execution
from one hard-coded effect. An earlier iteration of the same chain wrote its
marker outside the document root and was confirmed there first, so write
capability is stated as observed both inside and outside the web tree. The
published advisory reproduces the identity string but elides the container
hostname and the kernel build-timestamp field of the `uname -a` line, since both
are artefacts of one execution on one host rather than evidence about the
product.
Scoring. One score is published: 7.2 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. That vector computes from first
principles to ISS = 1 - (0.44 x 0.44 x 0.44) = 0.914816, Impact(S:U) =
6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.87311872, Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85
= 1.234707705, base 7.107826425, taken to 7.2 by the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth
Roundup - a calculator reporting 7.1 is disagreeing with the rounding rule and
with nothing else. AV:N describes the product's exposure and not our lab's: the
chain is three HTTP requests plus one read-back against the product's single
listener, and the loopback binding in our testbed was our own safety choice, not
a product property. AC:L because nothing outside the attacker's or a normal
deployment's control is needed - ENC_DEBUG is at its shipped value 0
(`control/options.php:37`), which selects the shell_exec() branch, and the
license-generator path is a setting a functioning installation already has.
PR:H is the metric carrying the weight, and the readings on either side of it
are printed with their own vectors so the arithmetic is inspectable. Published
reason: only an installer-provisioned administrator session was demonstrated
reaching the sink. The product does keep a `guard_staff` table, so a multi-user
deployment is possible, but our review found no role or permission column that
separates license generation from any other administrator operation and no
documented staff role with a narrower capability set; every path we traced to
`guardianLicense::create()` sat behind the administrator gate with the same
operation-level CSRF check. Three alternative readings are therefore labelled and
rejected rather than hidden:
- Unauthenticated, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8. Rejected: no
unauthenticated path reaches a sink. The remote license-issuing API at
`control/api/api-remote.php` is gated by a key randomly generated at
install time, which was not bypassed, and the product ships no factory
credential because the installer sets the administrator account.
- Lower-privileged operator, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.8.
Rejected: no role-separated principal was demonstrated reaching the
generate operation, and the guard_staff role model was not established.
Publishing this would rest on an unstudied possibility rather than on a
demonstrated principal.
- Scope Changed, AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.1. Rejected: the
injected command runs as the same identity, on the same host, inside the
same authority the product was granted at install time. No second
authorization boundary was crossed and no cross-machine or cross-account
outcome was demonstrated, so S:C would rate an outcome the evidence does
not contain.
Two things are deliberately priced at zero in this vector. The remote API key
comparison `md5($apiKey) == md5($SETTINGS->apikey)` is reported as a separate
hardening weakness - CWE-328 with a CWE-208 aspect, since hashing both sides with
an unsalted MD5 adds nothing over comparing the raw key and `==` on two digests
is not a constant-time comparison - and it is folded into nothing. It was not
demonstrated to be exploitable, the strength of that gate rests on the entropy
of the install-time random key, and no leak path for it was found. Likewise the
six additional tainted fields on the same sink and the second entry point widen
the patch surface a vendor must cover without changing how hard the demonstrated
injection is to perform, so they contribute nothing to the score. No correction
notice accompanies this figure: our own notes carry no numeric CVSS value for
this finding, so 7.2 is derived from the vector above and nothing else.
Authentication: post-authentication administrator, and the gate held. Every
administrator page and every administrator AJAX operation passes through one
init-level gate at `admin/control/init.php:122`, which is a hard include-time
gate rather than a per-request filter that can be forgotten on one route, and the
generate case carries a second operation-level check that the submitted `cs_rf`
body field or `csrf` header matches the session-bound `csrf_token`. Eight
candidate bypasses were examined and all eight recorded as blocked: forging the
`guardian_access` session value (it embeds the per-install random SECRET_KEY),
omitting or replaying the CSRF token (session-bound, validated per operation,
rotated per page render), injecting the internal `$loginBypass` variable (no
external input reaches it), SQL injection in the login path (the staff lookup is
parameterised and the constant path compares salted SHA-1 digests), a timing
attack on that comparison (equal-length hex digests, no exploitable divergence
identified), a default-credential fallback (the installer forces the operator to
set it), hard-coded LG_USER or LG_PASS (written at install time from operator
input, not compiled in), and guessing the remote API key (randomly generated at
install). The unauthenticated surface was enumerated interface by interface and
parameter by parameter: roughly sixty-two interfaces were inventoried by three
independent methods that agreed, roughly nine answer without credentials (four
static asset trees, the buyer portal front page and its license-lookup
operation, the remote API endpoint refusing a keyless request, the
post-installation installer route, and the login operation itself), and zero of
those nine reach a command-execution, deserialization or file-write sink.
Every parameter of every unauthenticated interface was tested for traversal,
injection, type confusion, over-long input and encoding bypass. Unauthenticated
remote code execution was not reached and none is claimed.
One honesty point about the negative control, because the published exploit
carries a control mode that was never recorded. The script ships a --control
mode that repeats the identical authenticated sequence - same login, same fresh
CSRF token, same generate operation, same field set including a non-empty
licpath and a key/value pair - with a benign project identifier and project key,
points its read-back at a marker name it never injects, and asserts that the
marker URL does not answer. A passing control would rule out that the proof file
pre-existed, that the generate operation writes arbitrary attacker-named files
into the document root as a normal side effect, and that the read-back URL is
served by something other than the written file. What there is not, and what
this post does not pretend otherwise, is an archived control transcript: the
recorded verification output is the injection leg, the control leg is shipped so
that any reader can execute it against their own instance, and inventing a
transcript would be worse than saying so. The structural half of the control
does come from source: the only thing on this path that creates a file inside
the document root is the shell command assembled at `class.licensing.php:261`,
and no branch of the generate operation writes to the content tree on its own.
Impact: arbitrary OS
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Guardian",
"vendor": "Maian",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Maian\nGuardian 2.1, the self-hosted licensing system for PHP applications encoded\nwith SourceGuardian, distributed as a closed-source commercial PHP script by\nMaian Script World (United Kingdom) and verified end to end against a real\ninstallation of that version.\n\nType: OS command injection (CWE-78 primary; CWE-116, CWE-20 and CWE-561\ncontributing; CWE-250 and CWE-732 as environmental amplifiers of the same\nevent). The license-generation routine builds an operating-system command line\nby string interpolation and passes it to shell_exec() at\n`control/classes/class.licensing.php:261` inside `guardianLicense::create()`, in\norder to invoke the external SourceGuardian generator binary. Several of the\ninterpolated fields arrive unvalidated from the body of the administrator AJAX\noperation `POST /admin/index.php?ajax-ops=generate` - projid, projkey, the\nlicense property key and value pairs, and the encoder string - and are placed\ninside double quotes rather than argument-quoted, so POSIX command substitution\nstill applies:\n\n shell_exec(mswSGLicGenPath(\u0027\"\u0027, $this-\u003esettings) . \" $string $output\");\n $lock[] = \u0027--projid \"\u0027 . $this-\u003eprojid . \u0027\"\u0027; // line 112\n $lock[] = \u0027--projkey \"\u0027 . $this-\u003eprojkey . \u0027\"\u0027; // line 113\n\nThe rendered command line is therefore\n`\"\u003clicpath\u003e\" --projid \"\u003cPROJID\u003e\" --projkey \"\u003cPROJKEY\u003e\" --const \"\u003cKEY\u003e=\u003cVALUE\u003e\"\n... \u003coutput\u003e`, where PROJID is whatever an authenticated administrator posted.\nPHP hands that text to `/bin/sh -c`, and inside a double-quoted word the shell\ndoes not treat `$(`, a backtick or a backslash as literal. A projid of `$(id)`\nspawns `id` in a subshell and substitutes its output into the argument, and it\ndoes so during expansion, before the command word is resolved - which is why a\ndeployment with a missing or misconfigured generator binary is still fully\nexploitable.\n\nThe decisive detail is the sanitizer arrangement, and it is the whole root\ncause. Three sanitizer-shaped helpers ship with the product; two of them return\ntheir input unchanged and sit in series on the path to the shell, and the one\nthat correctly wraps escapeshellarg has no call site anywhere in the product:\n\n private function escape($data) { return $data; } // lines 68-70\n private function escapeArg($data) { return escapeshellarg($data); }\n // lines 72-74\n\n`escape()` is the function actually called on the way to the shell, and it does\nnothing. `mswCD()` at lines 152-154 is a second `return $data;`, applied to the\nproperty key and value immediately before `escape()`, so two no-ops are stacked\nin a row on the properties path. `escapeArg()` wraps exactly the right primitive\nand is dead code: a sweep of all 308 PHP files in the shipped tree found no call\nsite for it, which reads as a completed remediation that never landed. A fourth\nhelper, `escapeCmd()` around `escapeshellcmd()`, is real and is invoked, but only\nfrom `head()`, `time_servers()` and `add_lic_info()` - never from `lock()` or\n`properties()` - so it guards the fields with the least attacker control and\nnever sees the two that carry project identifiers. Upstream of the class the\nonly request-wide filter is `mswMDAM(\u0027trim\u0027, $_POST)` at\n`control/functions.php:342`, which applies trim() and nothing else; there is no\ncharacter allow-list, no length cap and no metacharacter rejection anywhere\nbetween the POST body and the shell_exec() argument.\n\nCommands execute as the web server service account, observed as\n`uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)`. No setuid transition,\nwrapper, privilege drop or sandbox sits between the web worker and the child\nprocess. Root was not reached, was not attempted, and is not claimed.\n\nHow confirmation works, and what was deliberately not reproduced. The generate\noperation does not echo command output into its HTTP response: it answered HTTP\n200 with its ordinary `{\"status\":\"rdr\"}` body, the response shape it produces\nwhen the generator creates no valid license file. Proof of execution is\ntherefore out-of-band by construction. The injected command writes a marker file\nand the same installation serves it back over HTTP; one authenticated request\nexecuted six distinct commands into that single file, including a pipeline,\n`cat /etc/passwd | head -3`, which is what separates arbitrary command execution\nfrom one hard-coded effect. An earlier iteration of the same chain wrote its\nmarker outside the document root and was confirmed there first, so write\ncapability is stated as observed both inside and outside the web tree. The\npublished advisory reproduces the identity string but elides the container\nhostname and the kernel build-timestamp field of the `uname -a` line, since both\nare artefacts of one execution on one host rather than evidence about the\nproduct.\n\nScoring. One score is published: 7.2 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. That vector computes from first\nprinciples to ISS = 1 - (0.44 x 0.44 x 0.44) = 0.914816, Impact(S:U) =\n6.42 x 0.914816 = 5.87311872, Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 x 0.77 x 0.27 x 0.85\n= 1.234707705, base 7.107826425, taken to 7.2 by the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth\nRoundup - a calculator reporting 7.1 is disagreeing with the rounding rule and\nwith nothing else. AV:N describes the product\u0027s exposure and not our lab\u0027s: the\nchain is three HTTP requests plus one read-back against the product\u0027s single\nlistener, and the loopback binding in our testbed was our own safety choice, not\na product property. AC:L because nothing outside the attacker\u0027s or a normal\ndeployment\u0027s control is needed - ENC_DEBUG is at its shipped value 0\n(`control/options.php:37`), which selects the shell_exec() branch, and the\nlicense-generator path is a setting a functioning installation already has.\n\nPR:H is the metric carrying the weight, and the readings on either side of it\nare printed with their own vectors so the arithmetic is inspectable. Published\nreason: only an installer-provisioned administrator session was demonstrated\nreaching the sink. The product does keep a `guard_staff` table, so a multi-user\ndeployment is possible, but our review found no role or permission column that\nseparates license generation from any other administrator operation and no\ndocumented staff role with a narrower capability set; every path we traced to\n`guardianLicense::create()` sat behind the administrator gate with the same\noperation-level CSRF check. Three alternative readings are therefore labelled and\nrejected rather than hidden:\n\n - Unauthenticated, AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8. Rejected: no\n unauthenticated path reaches a sink. The remote license-issuing API at\n `control/api/api-remote.php` is gated by a key randomly generated at\n install time, which was not bypassed, and the product ships no factory\n credential because the installer sets the administrator account.\n - Lower-privileged operator, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.8.\n Rejected: no role-separated principal was demonstrated reaching the\n generate operation, and the guard_staff role model was not established.\n Publishing this would rest on an unstudied possibility rather than on a\n demonstrated principal.\n - Scope Changed, AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.1. Rejected: the\n injected command runs as the same identity, on the same host, inside the\n same authority the product was granted at install time. No second\n authorization boundary was crossed and no cross-machine or cross-account\n outcome was demonstrated, so S:C would rate an outcome the evidence does\n not contain.\n\nTwo things are deliberately priced at zero in this vector. The remote API key\ncomparison `md5($apiKey) == md5($SETTINGS-\u003eapikey)` is reported as a separate\nhardening weakness - CWE-328 with a CWE-208 aspect, since hashing both sides with\nan unsalted MD5 adds nothing over comparing the raw key and `==` on two digests\nis not a constant-time comparison - and it is folded into nothing. It was not\ndemonstrated to be exploitable, the strength of that gate rests on the entropy\nof the install-time random key, and no leak path for it was found. Likewise the\nsix additional tainted fields on the same sink and the second entry point widen\nthe patch surface a vendor must cover without changing how hard the demonstrated\ninjection is to perform, so they contribute nothing to the score. No correction\nnotice accompanies this figure: our own notes carry no numeric CVSS value for\nthis finding, so 7.2 is derived from the vector above and nothing else.\n\nAuthentication: post-authentication administrator, and the gate held. Every\nadministrator page and every administrator AJAX operation passes through one\ninit-level gate at `admin/control/init.php:122`, which is a hard include-time\ngate rather than a per-request filter that can be forgotten on one route, and the\ngenerate case carries a second operation-level check that the submitted `cs_rf`\nbody field or `csrf` header matches the session-bound `csrf_token`. Eight\ncandidate bypasses were examined and all eight recorded as blocked: forging the\n`guardian_access` session value (it embeds the per-install random SECRET_KEY),\nomitting or replaying the CSRF token (session-bound, validated per operation,\nrotated per page render), injecting the internal `$loginBypass` variable (no\nexternal input reaches it), SQL injection in the login path (the staff lookup is\nparameterised and the constant path compares salted SHA-1 digests), a timing\nattack on that comparison (equal-length hex digests, no exploitable divergence\nidentified), a default-credential fallback (the installer forces the operator to\nset it), hard-coded LG_USER or LG_PASS (written at install time from operator\ninput, not compiled in), and guessing the remote API key (randomly generated at\ninstall). The unauthenticated surface was enumerated interface by interface and\nparameter by parameter: roughly sixty-two interfaces were inventoried by three\nindependent methods that agreed, roughly nine answer without credentials (four\nstatic asset trees, the buyer portal front page and its license-lookup\noperation, the remote API endpoint refusing a keyless request, the\npost-installation installer route, and the login operation itself), and zero of\nthose nine reach a command-execution, deserialization or file-write sink.\nEvery parameter of every unauthenticated interface was tested for traversal,\ninjection, type confusion, over-long input and encoding bypass. Unauthenticated\nremote code execution was not reached and none is claimed.\n\nOne honesty point about the negative control, because the published exploit\ncarries a control mode that was never recorded. The script ships a --control\nmode that repeats the identical authenticated sequence - same login, same fresh\nCSRF token, same generate operation, same field set including a non-empty\nlicpath and a key/value pair - with a benign project identifier and project key,\npoints its read-back at a marker name it never injects, and asserts that the\nmarker URL does not answer. A passing control would rule out that the proof file\npre-existed, that the generate operation writes arbitrary attacker-named files\ninto the document root as a normal side effect, and that the read-back URL is\nserved by something other than the written file. What there is not, and what\nthis post does not pretend otherwise, is an archived control transcript: the\nrecorded verification output is the injection leg, the control leg is shipped so\nthat any reader can execute it against their own instance, and inventing a\ntranscript would be worse than saying so. The structural half of the control\ndoes come from source: the only thing on this path that creates a file inside\nthe document root is the shell command assembled at `class.licensing.php:261`,\nand no branch of the generate operation writes to the content tree on its own.\n\nImpact: arbitrary OS "
}
],
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{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-116",
"description": "CWE-116",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-20",
"description": "CWE-20",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
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{
"cweId": "CWE-208",
"description": "CWE-208",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
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{
"cweId": "CWE-250",
"description": "CWE-250",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
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{
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"description": "CWE-328",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
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{
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"description": "CWE-561",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-732",
"description": "CWE-732",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-78",
"description": "CWE-78",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
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"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
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"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/16"
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"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
},
{
"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/maian-guardian-license-generator-command-injection"
},
{
"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/16"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] Maian Guardian 2.1 license generator projid command injection to www-data uid 33 code execution (7.2, PR:H)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0486
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Dataedo Portal 26.2.8 with Dataedo Agent 26.2.8 unrestricted scheduler job-type deserialization to Agent-host command execution (8.1)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Dataedo
Portal 26.2.8 together with Dataedo Agent 26.2.8, the closed-source enterprise
data-catalog and data-governance platform from Dataedo sp. z o.o. (Poland).
Both components are in scope because the chain crosses from one to the other:
the Portal discloses a database credential, and the separately installed Agent
executes an injected scheduler job on its own host. In the verified shape the
command ran as `nt authority\system`.
Type: deserialization of untrusted data by unrestricted invocation-type
resolution (CWE-502 primary, with CWE-470 an equally defensible
characterisation of the same mechanism), enabled by insufficiently protected
credentials (CWE-522) under a hard-coded cryptographic key (CWE-321), with
incorrect authorization and missing privilege separation (CWE-863 / CWE-284)
and execution with unnecessary privileges (CWE-250 / CWE-732) contributing.
The entry route works exactly as designed, which is the point. `GET
/api/repository/connection-string` returns the repository database connection
string to a caller holding a repository-management role, encrypted with
`SimpleAES` - an AES-256-CBC construction whose 32-byte key and 16-byte IV are
byte-array literals in the shipped `Dataedo.Settings.dll` and are
byte-identical across builds, with PKCS7 padding and every ciphertext byte
encoded as a three-digit decimal group. Anyone holding a copy of the product
therefore decrypts the response offline; both values are reproduced in the
published proof-of-concept. `GenerateEncryptionKey()` exists at
`Dataedo.Settings:116` and no call path was found that replaces the static
field with its output. A full census counted the same static pair referenced
from 19 assemblies. The recovered login in the tested deployments was `sa`, a
sysadmin-level principal on the repository database - and that database also
holds the Hangfire scheduler storage in the `[Scheduler]` schema.
The sink is on the Agent side. `AgentServiceRegistration.AddScheduler` calls
`AddHangfireServer` twice, once for the `default` queue with a worker count of
one and once for the `priority` queue, and registers no `ITypeResolver`
restriction and no invocation allowlist with either, so Hangfire's default type
resolver will resolve any type name the runtime can load. `FilterInitializer`
then runs `GlobalJobFilters.Clear()` and adds four filters, none of which
constrains execution: `ExecutionCreatingFilter` and `RequestUpdatingFilter` are
`IClientFilter` implementations, which run on the client-side job-creation path
rather than on server-side execution and additionally return early unless the
declaring type implements `ISchedulerTaskExecutor`; `JobCancellationFilter` is
an `IApplyStateFilter` that reacts only to transitions into `DeletedState`;
and `AutomaticRetry` is configured with `Attempts = 0`, which disables retries
and has no bearing on authorization. After `Clear()` nothing in the chain
inspects the invocation type, the declaring type, the method name or the
arguments at execution time. The producer is disciplined and the consumer is
not, and the consumer is the one that executes.
One row into `[Scheduler].Job` plus one row into `[Scheduler].JobQueue` is
therefore enough, and no gadget chain is needed because the invocation document
names the sink directly:
{"Type":"System.Diagnostics.Process, System.Diagnostics.Process",
"Method":"Start",
"ParameterTypes":"[\"System.String\",\"System.String\"]",
"Arguments":"[\"cmd.exe\",\"/c <payload>\"]"}
Three details are load-bearing and none of them is obvious. The `Arguments`
column and the `InvocationData.Arguments` member must both carry the command,
and the latter is a JSON array serialized as a string inside the outer JSON
object, so a Windows path appears with doubled backslashes in the outer
document and quadrupled backslashes in the inner one while the enclosing T-SQL
literal doubles every single quote. `QUOTED_IDENTIFIER` must be ON because the
scheduler schema uses filtered indexes. And the `JobQueue` row must name a
queue the Agent actually polls, otherwise the job exists and is never fetched.
Execution lands on the Agent host as the identity of the Agent process. Two
shapes were observed and both are recorded because they bound the claim:
`whoami` returned `<agent-host>\administrator` when the Agent was launched from
a console under an interactive administrative account, and `nt authority\system`
when it ran resident as a SYSTEM-privileged scheduled task, where filtered
`tasklist` output for PID 4 appended to the same file showed the System process
in session 0 under the Services session name, consistent with a service-context
execution environment. For production the Agent is installed as a Windows
service through `AddWindowsService` with an empty `ServiceConfiguration`, so
the identity is whatever that service is configured with: SYSTEM is what the
default service configuration yielded in the tested shape and is not a claim
about every deployment, and the installer's own service-registration table was
not inspected to finality, so the production service account is an inference
from the host configuration call rather than an artifact-confirmed value.
How confirmation works. The recorded job was assigned identifier 7 and its
state progression was read directly from the storage tables: Enqueued ->
Processing (with the fetching worker's own ServerId recorded) -> Succeeded,
with `PerformanceDuration` of 4 milliseconds and `State.Result` equal to "Can
not serialize the return value". That pair is proof of invocation rather than
of bookkeeping: `Process.Start` returns a live Process object which the
scheduler cannot serialize into its state column, so it records that string,
and a job that had been rejected or never fetched would not have reached
Succeeded at all. A marker file was written on the Agent host by the executed
command. The marker path and the marker token are command-line arguments of the
published tool, and neither the path nor the token from the recorded run is
reproduced here, because both are artefacts of one execution on one host rather
than evidence about the product.
The strongest single piece of evidence in the package is an argument-provenance
control. The first injection attempt wrote a placeholder token into the
`[Scheduler].Job.Arguments` column while the `InvocationData` document was
correct, and the Agent's run log recorded the shell complaining that the
placeholder was not recognized as an internal or external command. That
establishes that the executed arguments came from the database row and not from
any configuration, command line or code path inside the Agent, and it
identified the column mismatch in the same breath. Without it a reviewer could
reasonably ask whether the observed execution was an artefact of the test rig;
with it the causality is direct.
What was deliberately not reproduced. The published tool issues no destructive
command, creates no account, deletes no catalog data and touches no downstream
data source. The static key was validated in both cryptographic directions -
decrypting a production-shaped ciphertext, and building one offline that the
real Agent binary subsequently accepted into its own configuration file and
connected with, which confirms the key, the IV and the encoding independently
of the decryption direction - but no domain-controller or domain-administrative
outcome was attempted, downstream data sources were not accessed, and NetNTLMv2
capture through the outbound-SQL surface described in the adjacent group was
never demonstrated end to end.
Scoring. One score is published: 8.1 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H. Computed from that vector with
CVSS 3.1 weights: ISS = 1 - (0.44 ^ 3) = 0.914816; Impact under Scope Changed =
7.52 * 0.885816 - 3.25 * (0.870207 ^ 13) = 6.127958; Exploitability = 8.22 *
0.85 * 0.44 * 0.50 * 0.85 = 1.306569, the PR weight being 0.50 precisely
because Scope is Changed; base = 1.08 * 7.434527 = 8.029289; 8.1 after the
ceiling-to-tenth Roundup.
A reading of this chain as zero-click and anonymous is withdrawn, and the
reversal argument is printed because it is more useful than the original claim
was. An earlier reading asserted that an unauthenticated attacker could switch
a running Portal's repository to an attacker-controlled database and that an
already-installed Agent would follow the Portal onto that repository and
execute injected jobs there - an anonymous, remote path to SYSTEM. The Agent
reads its repository connection string from its own configuration file, at
`Dataedo.Agent.Startup/ServicesConfigurator.cs:43`, and exposes no controller
and no remote-configuration endpoint of any kind, so nothing that happens to
the Portal's configuration propagates to an installed Agent. The propagation
leg of the claim does not exist. A second sub-claim fell with it: that a
healthy, already-configured instance can be silently switched to another
repository. `POST /api/repository/set` answers HTTP 409 with an explicit
"already configured" message, `create-on-existing-database` surfaces
`RepositoryAlreadyConfiguredException` through `lastOperation.error`, and the
validator's `IsConfigured` gate was confirmed by experiment; the HTTP 202 from
`connect-and-upgrade` is a fire-and-forget acknowledgement that carries no
information about whether any switch happened, and the subsequent state read
showed the configured repository unchanged. Every figure published here was
computed from the vector printed beside it, and no score built on the withdrawn
premise was carried over.
AC:H carries the two conditions that remain once PR:H is granted: a Dataedo
Agent must actually be attached to that repository database - the Agent is a
separately installed component, and with none attached the injected row is
never fetched and nothing executes - and the attacker must have a network path
to the repository listener. Both held in the verified shape and neither is a
property the product guarantees. PR:H because only a principal holding role
action 11 or above was demonstrated to reach the disclosure, and PR:L is
supported by no evidence in this package. UI:N because no victim click, page
visit or administrator action on the Agent host participates.
Scope is Changed, argued on component and host grounds. The vulnerable
component is the Portal web application, whose authority ends at its own
process, its application-pool or service identity and the set of resources its
role model governs; nothing in that model extends to a second machine. The
impacted component is the Dataedo Agent host - a separately installed
component, running as a separate process under a separate identity on a
separate machine - reached only through a third component, the repository
database, whose credentials are themselves the object of the confidentiality
failure. Two observations make the boundary concrete rather than merely
administrative: the attacker never authenticates to the Agent at all, and the
identity gained is not the Portal's identity in any shape, since the Portal
runs under a web-tier identity while the outcome is a machine-level identity on
a Windows host. What Scope does NOT rest on: it is not justified by the
anonymity of the adjacent group below, which is scored nowhere in this vector;
not by the CORS item or the signing-key item; and not by downstream data-source
compromise, which is a consequence of the Agent-host identity rather than an
independent scope change.
The rejected reading is printed so that the difference is auditable: 6.6
Medium, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, where Impact = 6.42 *
0.914816 = 5.873095 and Exploitability = 8.22 * 0.85 * 0.44 * 0.27 * 0.85 =
0.705547 under the Scope-Unchanged PR weight of 0.27, summing to 6.578642. It
is rejected because the execution demonstrably occurs on another host under
another component's service identity, and scoring it
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Dataedo Portal |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Dataedo Portal",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Dataedo\nPortal 26.2.8 together with Dataedo Agent 26.2.8, the closed-source enterprise\ndata-catalog and data-governance platform from Dataedo sp. z o.o. (Poland).\nBoth components are in scope because the chain crosses from one to the other:\nthe Portal discloses a database credential, and the separately installed Agent\nexecutes an injected scheduler job on its own host. In the verified shape the\ncommand ran as `nt authority\\system`.\n\nType: deserialization of untrusted data by unrestricted invocation-type\nresolution (CWE-502 primary, with CWE-470 an equally defensible\ncharacterisation of the same mechanism), enabled by insufficiently protected\ncredentials (CWE-522) under a hard-coded cryptographic key (CWE-321), with\nincorrect authorization and missing privilege separation (CWE-863 / CWE-284)\nand execution with unnecessary privileges (CWE-250 / CWE-732) contributing.\n\nThe entry route works exactly as designed, which is the point. `GET\n/api/repository/connection-string` returns the repository database connection\nstring to a caller holding a repository-management role, encrypted with\n`SimpleAES` - an AES-256-CBC construction whose 32-byte key and 16-byte IV are\nbyte-array literals in the shipped `Dataedo.Settings.dll` and are\nbyte-identical across builds, with PKCS7 padding and every ciphertext byte\nencoded as a three-digit decimal group. Anyone holding a copy of the product\ntherefore decrypts the response offline; both values are reproduced in the\npublished proof-of-concept. `GenerateEncryptionKey()` exists at\n`Dataedo.Settings:116` and no call path was found that replaces the static\nfield with its output. A full census counted the same static pair referenced\nfrom 19 assemblies. The recovered login in the tested deployments was `sa`, a\nsysadmin-level principal on the repository database - and that database also\nholds the Hangfire scheduler storage in the `[Scheduler]` schema.\n\nThe sink is on the Agent side. `AgentServiceRegistration.AddScheduler` calls\n`AddHangfireServer` twice, once for the `default` queue with a worker count of\none and once for the `priority` queue, and registers no `ITypeResolver`\nrestriction and no invocation allowlist with either, so Hangfire\u0027s default type\nresolver will resolve any type name the runtime can load. `FilterInitializer`\nthen runs `GlobalJobFilters.Clear()` and adds four filters, none of which\nconstrains execution: `ExecutionCreatingFilter` and `RequestUpdatingFilter` are\n`IClientFilter` implementations, which run on the client-side job-creation path\nrather than on server-side execution and additionally return early unless the\ndeclaring type implements `ISchedulerTaskExecutor`; `JobCancellationFilter` is\nan `IApplyStateFilter` that reacts only to transitions into `DeletedState`;\nand `AutomaticRetry` is configured with `Attempts = 0`, which disables retries\nand has no bearing on authorization. After `Clear()` nothing in the chain\ninspects the invocation type, the declaring type, the method name or the\narguments at execution time. The producer is disciplined and the consumer is\nnot, and the consumer is the one that executes.\n\nOne row into `[Scheduler].Job` plus one row into `[Scheduler].JobQueue` is\ntherefore enough, and no gadget chain is needed because the invocation document\nnames the sink directly:\n\n {\"Type\":\"System.Diagnostics.Process, System.Diagnostics.Process\",\n \"Method\":\"Start\",\n \"ParameterTypes\":\"[\\\"System.String\\\",\\\"System.String\\\"]\",\n \"Arguments\":\"[\\\"cmd.exe\\\",\\\"/c \u003cpayload\u003e\\\"]\"}\n\nThree details are load-bearing and none of them is obvious. The `Arguments`\ncolumn and the `InvocationData.Arguments` member must both carry the command,\nand the latter is a JSON array serialized as a string inside the outer JSON\nobject, so a Windows path appears with doubled backslashes in the outer\ndocument and quadrupled backslashes in the inner one while the enclosing T-SQL\nliteral doubles every single quote. `QUOTED_IDENTIFIER` must be ON because the\nscheduler schema uses filtered indexes. And the `JobQueue` row must name a\nqueue the Agent actually polls, otherwise the job exists and is never fetched.\n\nExecution lands on the Agent host as the identity of the Agent process. Two\nshapes were observed and both are recorded because they bound the claim:\n`whoami` returned `\u003cagent-host\u003e\\administrator` when the Agent was launched from\na console under an interactive administrative account, and `nt authority\\system`\nwhen it ran resident as a SYSTEM-privileged scheduled task, where filtered\n`tasklist` output for PID 4 appended to the same file showed the System process\nin session 0 under the Services session name, consistent with a service-context\nexecution environment. For production the Agent is installed as a Windows\nservice through `AddWindowsService` with an empty `ServiceConfiguration`, so\nthe identity is whatever that service is configured with: SYSTEM is what the\ndefault service configuration yielded in the tested shape and is not a claim\nabout every deployment, and the installer\u0027s own service-registration table was\nnot inspected to finality, so the production service account is an inference\nfrom the host configuration call rather than an artifact-confirmed value.\n\nHow confirmation works. The recorded job was assigned identifier 7 and its\nstate progression was read directly from the storage tables: Enqueued -\u003e\nProcessing (with the fetching worker\u0027s own ServerId recorded) -\u003e Succeeded,\nwith `PerformanceDuration` of 4 milliseconds and `State.Result` equal to \"Can\nnot serialize the return value\". That pair is proof of invocation rather than\nof bookkeeping: `Process.Start` returns a live Process object which the\nscheduler cannot serialize into its state column, so it records that string,\nand a job that had been rejected or never fetched would not have reached\nSucceeded at all. A marker file was written on the Agent host by the executed\ncommand. The marker path and the marker token are command-line arguments of the\npublished tool, and neither the path nor the token from the recorded run is\nreproduced here, because both are artefacts of one execution on one host rather\nthan evidence about the product.\n\nThe strongest single piece of evidence in the package is an argument-provenance\ncontrol. The first injection attempt wrote a placeholder token into the\n`[Scheduler].Job.Arguments` column while the `InvocationData` document was\ncorrect, and the Agent\u0027s run log recorded the shell complaining that the\nplaceholder was not recognized as an internal or external command. That\nestablishes that the executed arguments came from the database row and not from\nany configuration, command line or code path inside the Agent, and it\nidentified the column mismatch in the same breath. Without it a reviewer could\nreasonably ask whether the observed execution was an artefact of the test rig;\nwith it the causality is direct.\n\nWhat was deliberately not reproduced. The published tool issues no destructive\ncommand, creates no account, deletes no catalog data and touches no downstream\ndata source. The static key was validated in both cryptographic directions -\ndecrypting a production-shaped ciphertext, and building one offline that the\nreal Agent binary subsequently accepted into its own configuration file and\nconnected with, which confirms the key, the IV and the encoding independently\nof the decryption direction - but no domain-controller or domain-administrative\noutcome was attempted, downstream data sources were not accessed, and NetNTLMv2\ncapture through the outbound-SQL surface described in the adjacent group was\nnever demonstrated end to end.\n\nScoring. One score is published: 8.1 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H. Computed from that vector with\nCVSS 3.1 weights: ISS = 1 - (0.44 ^ 3) = 0.914816; Impact under Scope Changed =\n7.52 * 0.885816 - 3.25 * (0.870207 ^ 13) = 6.127958; Exploitability = 8.22 *\n0.85 * 0.44 * 0.50 * 0.85 = 1.306569, the PR weight being 0.50 precisely\nbecause Scope is Changed; base = 1.08 * 7.434527 = 8.029289; 8.1 after the\nceiling-to-tenth Roundup.\n\nA reading of this chain as zero-click and anonymous is withdrawn, and the\nreversal argument is printed because it is more useful than the original claim\nwas. An earlier reading asserted that an unauthenticated attacker could switch\na running Portal\u0027s repository to an attacker-controlled database and that an\nalready-installed Agent would follow the Portal onto that repository and\nexecute injected jobs there - an anonymous, remote path to SYSTEM. The Agent\nreads its repository connection string from its own configuration file, at\n`Dataedo.Agent.Startup/ServicesConfigurator.cs:43`, and exposes no controller\nand no remote-configuration endpoint of any kind, so nothing that happens to\nthe Portal\u0027s configuration propagates to an installed Agent. The propagation\nleg of the claim does not exist. A second sub-claim fell with it: that a\nhealthy, already-configured instance can be silently switched to another\nrepository. `POST /api/repository/set` answers HTTP 409 with an explicit\n\"already configured\" message, `create-on-existing-database` surfaces\n`RepositoryAlreadyConfiguredException` through `lastOperation.error`, and the\nvalidator\u0027s `IsConfigured` gate was confirmed by experiment; the HTTP 202 from\n`connect-and-upgrade` is a fire-and-forget acknowledgement that carries no\ninformation about whether any switch happened, and the subsequent state read\nshowed the configured repository unchanged. Every figure published here was\ncomputed from the vector printed beside it, and no score built on the withdrawn\npremise was carried over.\n\nAC:H carries the two conditions that remain once PR:H is granted: a Dataedo\nAgent must actually be attached to that repository database - the Agent is a\nseparately installed component, and with none attached the injected row is\nnever fetched and nothing executes - and the attacker must have a network path\nto the repository listener. Both held in the verified shape and neither is a\nproperty the product guarantees. PR:H because only a principal holding role\naction 11 or above was demonstrated to reach the disclosure, and PR:L is\nsupported by no evidence in this package. UI:N because no victim click, page\nvisit or administrator action on the Agent host participates.\n\nScope is Changed, argued on component and host grounds. The vulnerable\ncomponent is the Portal web application, whose authority ends at its own\nprocess, its application-pool or service identity and the set of resources its\nrole model governs; nothing in that model extends to a second machine. The\nimpacted component is the Dataedo Agent host - a separately installed\ncomponent, running as a separate process under a separate identity on a\nseparate machine - reached only through a third component, the repository\ndatabase, whose credentials are themselves the object of the confidentiality\nfailure. Two observations make the boundary concrete rather than merely\nadministrative: the attacker never authenticates to the Agent at all, and the\nidentity gained is not the Portal\u0027s identity in any shape, since the Portal\nruns under a web-tier identity while the outcome is a machine-level identity on\na Windows host. What Scope does NOT rest on: it is not justified by the\nanonymity of the adjacent group below, which is scored nowhere in this vector;\nnot by the CORS item or the signing-key item; and not by downstream data-source\ncompromise, which is a consequence of the Agent-host identity rather than an\nindependent scope change.\n\nThe rejected reading is printed so that the difference is auditable: 6.6\nMedium, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, where Impact = 6.42 *\n0.914816 = 5.873095 and Exploitability = 8.22 * 0.85 * 0.44 * 0.27 * 0.85 =\n0.705547 under the Scope-Unchanged PR weight of 0.27, summing to 6.578642. It\nis rejected because the execution demonstrably occurs on another host under\nanother component\u0027s service identity, and scoring it "
}
],
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"cweId": "CWE-200",
"description": "CWE-200",
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"type": "CWE"
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"description": "CWE-918",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] Dataedo Portal 26.2.8 with Dataedo Agent 26.2.8 unrestricted scheduler job-type deserialization to Agent-host command execution (8.1)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0485
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] CloudPanel 2.5.4-3 site-settings rootDirectory nginx virtual-host injection to host root code execution (8.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in CloudPanel
Community Edition 2.5.4-3+clp-bookworm, the closed-source server-management panel
from cloudpanel.io (Germany) that provisions and supervises nginx, php-fpm,
MariaDB and hosted web sites from a Symfony application listening on port 8443.
The build under advisory is the vendor's own distribution package, 69,183,476
bytes, md5 24c36a4739ce065c5c188c89def06f29, on Debian bookworm x86_64. Only
this build was tested; no other version, edition or deployment target is
claimed, in either direction.
Type: injection of control characters into a configuration file that a second
parser then reads as syntax, CWE-93 primary, with CWE-20, CWE-74 and CWE-269 /
CWE-250 contributing. This is not command injection and we do not classify it as
CWE-78: the writer that puts the text on disk is
`echo %s | /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/tee %s` with both substitutions passed through
`escapeshellarg`, so the newlines travel inside a single-quoted shell argument as
data and no shell metacharacter reaches a command line. The sink is the virtual-host
renderer. `RootDirectory.php` owns the `{{root}}` placeholder and composes it at
label `b9892` as
`rtrim(sprintf("root /home/%s/htdocs/%s;", $siteUser, $rootDirectory), "/")`.
That `rtrim` is dead code, because the format string always ends with a semicolon
and so its result can never end with a slash. Between the value entering the
method and being composed into a directive there is no call of any kind - no
`basename`, no `realpath`, no `preg_match`, no allowlist, no blacklist, no length
check, no character check. The database value is the concatenated value. The
attacker therefore does not control the `root` directive's value but its tail,
which is sufficient: a leading semicolon terminates the already-started directive
cleanly and the injected blocks that follow land at server context ahead of the
template's own `location` blocks, where the `^~` prefix match outranks regex
locations. `{{root}}` appears twice in the hosting template, so the payload is
inserted twice, once per server block, which is consistent with the observed
file growth.
The double standard is the useful part for anyone auditing a similar form. The
same form family validates the domain name with a dedicated constraint whose
pattern excludes `/` and `\`; the command-line channel clamps the identical
root-directory value with `ltrim(rtrim($x,"/"),"/")`; and a neighbouring
free-text field on the same page has a four-step pre-submit normalization that
rewrites double quotes to single ones. The web-channel `rootDirectory` value
passes through none of these. Its only declared constraint is a not-null check,
and its entity setter performs no sanitization.
What turns a configuration write into host-root execution is vendor packaging,
not attacker choice. The vendor's own `nginx-common 1.30.4-1+clp-bookworm` ships
an `/etc/nginx/nginx.conf` whose line 1 is literally `user root;` and whose line
119 is `include /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/*.conf;` (md5
6727bffeb96cb3e03b85d00eac39c47c, 3,077 bytes, taken from the package payload
rather than transcribed from a note). The same package ships
`/home/clp/services/php-fpm/fpm/pool.d/file-manager.conf` declaring
`user = root` and `group = clp` on `/run/clp-fm-php-fpm.sock`, with no
`php_admin_value`, no `open_basedir`, no `disable_functions` and no
`security.limit_extensions` anywhere in its seventeen lines. So an injected
block carrying `dav_methods PUT; create_full_put_path on; alias /tmp/;` yields an
anonymous WebDAV write primitive, and a second injected block carrying
`root /tmp; include /etc/nginx/fastcgi_params; fastcgi_pass unix:/run/clp-fm-php-fpm.sock;`
hands anonymous PHP execution to a pool that runs as root.
The identity reached is host `uid=0(root) gid=1000(clp) groups=1000(clp),0(root)`,
corroborated in the same response body by `posix_getuid()` and `posix_geteuid()`
returning 0, by `whoami` returning `root`, by the uploaded file landing as
`-rw------- 1 root root`, and by a filesystem-type read showing the marker landed
on durable overlay storage rather than tmpfs. The exact shape of that identity
string matters and it is not decoration: `id` run from outside the container
prints `gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`, and a pool declaring only `user = root`
would print the same, so the `gid=1000(clp) groups=1000(clp),0(root)` that came
back over HTTP can only have been produced by the product's own execution path
through a pool declaring `user = root; group = clp;`. Labelled honestly, that is
a morphological inference from verbatim strings in two independent rounds plus a
packaged pool file whose bytes are on record; the reviewing pass did not itself
start a File Manager pool to observe the shape directly.
Confirmation and what was deliberately not reproduced. The save answers 302 with
no error text, and the product cannot report failure at all, because its reload
success check returns true unconditionally and the reload is backgrounded. So the
proof channel is the two anonymous requests plus the marker body, and four
requirements were defined in advance and checked in every round: a live `id`
containing `uid=0(root)` with no uid hardcoded in the uploaded script; device
self-attestation values in the body that are absent from our own payload and our
own script, with a positive control proving the search works and with two
witnesses downgraded honestly (the boot identifier is shared across containers on
one host kernel and the application secret is a factory constant, so the genuinely
device-unique witness is the container hostname, differing between the two sets
and independently embedded by `uname`); a fresh nonce per round appearing
simultaneously in the uploaded filename, in a comment line inside the written
virtual host and in the marker body, paired with the post-reload digest of that
specific file and a per-nonce `nginx -T` hit count that goes 0 to 1 for the
current round and back to 0 for the previous one; and evidence being response-body
content and size, never a status code, since 201 and 200 both occurred in failed
rounds too.
Deliberately not reproduced, and not claimed: cross-tenant impact, because no
second tenant was present; whether an illegal payload is rolled back under
vendor-native wiring, since both native sets used legal payloads and the
no-rollback behaviour was measured only under harness wiring; where injected text
lands in the PHP-site template, because that template is not in the package at all
and is imported at install time by a `git clone` of an external repository into a
database column; the second injection point of the same shape feeding the
`{{settings}}` placeholder, which static analysis says has the same exposure but
for which no dynamic round was run and no control was constructed; and whether a
local console invocation of the same sink, which the sudoers drop-in grants to any
local user, can inject this field. One measured anomaly carries no established
mechanism either: when the injected block omits the fastcgi parameter include the
execution leg returns a silent zero-byte body, the phenomenon was observed twice,
and two proposed mechanisms were both contradicted by the logs.
Scoring. One score is published: 8.8 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, derived from first principles - ISS
0.914816, Unchanged impact 5.873119, exploitability 2.835255, base 8.708374,
ceiling-to-tenth Roundup 8.8. No correction to any recorded score is needed. No
conditional or higher reading is published: we identified no deployment state that
makes this chain unauthenticated, and publishing a hypothetical PR:N figure
conditioned on an unproven bypass would be inventing severity.
Privileges Required is the metric worth arguing hardest, so both directions are
given. It is PR:L and not PR:N, because no anonymous path reaches this sink: the
catch-all access-control rule requires full authentication, twelve URI-mismatch
variants against one protected route produced zero admissions, the anonymous
identity-swap primitive described below yields an identity with zero additional
capability confined to a route space that does not exist, and there is no factory
credential to use since the product ships with zero users. It is not PR:H, because
ROLE_ADMIN was never required - the settings page is not under `^/admin`, the
handler declares `ROLE_USER` exactly once, and the injection was performed with
`ROLE_USER` sessions and observed to take effect. Had only an administrator been
demonstrated, the correct metric would be High and the same impact weights would
produce 7.2, so getting this one metric wrong moves the score by 1.6 points.
Scope: Unchanged, and this is the reading a triage process will question first,
because the outcome is host uid=0 on a multi-tenant hosting panel. The temptation
to publish Changed is genuine and we state it accurately rather than dismissing
it: the vulnerable component is the panel application authorised to a tenant role,
while the achieved impact lands on the host operating system and, in a
multi-tenant deployment, on every other tenant's site - components outside the
panel's own authorisation boundary, impacted in their own right, by an action
authorised as "a tenant edits a setting on their own site". That is the textbook
argument for Changed and it is not strained. We publish Unchanged for three
reasons in increasing order of weight. First, the privilege ceiling is produced
entirely by the vendor's own shipped configuration - `user root;` in the vendor
nginx build, `user = root` in the vendor File Manager pool, and
`clp ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL` in the vendor sudoers drop-in - so every step of
the escalation is performed by a component the product itself installed,
configured and invoked, and the product is the authority at each step. No second
product's exposed interface is being reached through the first product's flaw;
what is reached is the host, through identities the product established. Second,
the cross-tenant consequence is a capability inference and not a measurement: we
did not run the verification on a host with a second tenant installed and we
measured no impact on another tenant, and publishing Scope Changed on an untested
cross-tenant claim is precisely the class of overreach that produces public
corrections. Third, the conservative value already communicates the finding - 8.8
High reads as remote authenticated host-root code execution to every triage
process that consumes it, so nothing decision-relevant is lost by declining the
upgrade. The Changed-scope form of the same facts,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, is recorded in the analysis as a
rejected reading: it is not published as a headline and no number is attached to
it. If a triage process or an identifier-assigning authority prefers the Changed
reading on the grounds that a tenant-scope authorisation boundary is crossed to
affect the host and other tenants, the argument above is the complete case for it
and the only missing evidence is a two-tenant measurement.
Authentication: post-authentication, lowest panel role. Sessions are ordinary
Symfony sessions issued by a login POST carrying `userName`, `password` and
`_csrf_token`. The site-settings page is not under `^/admin`, so it falls to the
catch-all rule requiring full authentication; the singular `role:` key in that
rule is valid rather than a silent typo, because the framework's configuration
normalization folds it into the plural form, and the dynamic proof that the
catch-all is live is that an anonymous request for a deliberately nonexistent
path returns 302 to the login page rather than 404, meaning the access-control
check fires before route resolution. Fourteen sampled protected paths all
redirected, and twelve URI-mismatch variants - trailing slash, doubled slash,
encoded slash, matrix-semicolon path parameter, dot segments, percent-encoded
letters, a null byte, upper-
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mgt Commerce | Cloudpanel |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Cloudpanel",
"vendor": "Mgt Commerce",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in CloudPanel\nCommunity Edition 2.5.4-3+clp-bookworm, the closed-source server-management panel\nfrom cloudpanel.io (Germany) that provisions and supervises nginx, php-fpm,\nMariaDB and hosted web sites from a Symfony application listening on port 8443.\nThe build under advisory is the vendor\u0027s own distribution package, 69,183,476\nbytes, md5 24c36a4739ce065c5c188c89def06f29, on Debian bookworm x86_64. Only\nthis build was tested; no other version, edition or deployment target is\nclaimed, in either direction.\n\nType: injection of control characters into a configuration file that a second\nparser then reads as syntax, CWE-93 primary, with CWE-20, CWE-74 and CWE-269 /\nCWE-250 contributing. This is not command injection and we do not classify it as\nCWE-78: the writer that puts the text on disk is\n`echo %s | /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/tee %s` with both substitutions passed through\n`escapeshellarg`, so the newlines travel inside a single-quoted shell argument as\ndata and no shell metacharacter reaches a command line. The sink is the virtual-host\nrenderer. `RootDirectory.php` owns the `{{root}}` placeholder and composes it at\nlabel `b9892` as\n`rtrim(sprintf(\"root /home/%s/htdocs/%s;\", $siteUser, $rootDirectory), \"/\")`.\nThat `rtrim` is dead code, because the format string always ends with a semicolon\nand so its result can never end with a slash. Between the value entering the\nmethod and being composed into a directive there is no call of any kind - no\n`basename`, no `realpath`, no `preg_match`, no allowlist, no blacklist, no length\ncheck, no character check. The database value is the concatenated value. The\nattacker therefore does not control the `root` directive\u0027s value but its tail,\nwhich is sufficient: a leading semicolon terminates the already-started directive\ncleanly and the injected blocks that follow land at server context ahead of the\ntemplate\u0027s own `location` blocks, where the `^~` prefix match outranks regex\nlocations. `{{root}}` appears twice in the hosting template, so the payload is\ninserted twice, once per server block, which is consistent with the observed\nfile growth.\n\nThe double standard is the useful part for anyone auditing a similar form. The\nsame form family validates the domain name with a dedicated constraint whose\npattern excludes `/` and `\\`; the command-line channel clamps the identical\nroot-directory value with `ltrim(rtrim($x,\"/\"),\"/\")`; and a neighbouring\nfree-text field on the same page has a four-step pre-submit normalization that\nrewrites double quotes to single ones. The web-channel `rootDirectory` value\npasses through none of these. Its only declared constraint is a not-null check,\nand its entity setter performs no sanitization.\n\nWhat turns a configuration write into host-root execution is vendor packaging,\nnot attacker choice. The vendor\u0027s own `nginx-common 1.30.4-1+clp-bookworm` ships\nan `/etc/nginx/nginx.conf` whose line 1 is literally `user root;` and whose line\n119 is `include /etc/nginx/sites-enabled/*.conf;` (md5\n6727bffeb96cb3e03b85d00eac39c47c, 3,077 bytes, taken from the package payload\nrather than transcribed from a note). The same package ships\n`/home/clp/services/php-fpm/fpm/pool.d/file-manager.conf` declaring\n`user = root` and `group = clp` on `/run/clp-fm-php-fpm.sock`, with no\n`php_admin_value`, no `open_basedir`, no `disable_functions` and no\n`security.limit_extensions` anywhere in its seventeen lines. So an injected\nblock carrying `dav_methods PUT; create_full_put_path on; alias /tmp/;` yields an\nanonymous WebDAV write primitive, and a second injected block carrying\n`root /tmp; include /etc/nginx/fastcgi_params; fastcgi_pass unix:/run/clp-fm-php-fpm.sock;`\nhands anonymous PHP execution to a pool that runs as root.\n\nThe identity reached is host `uid=0(root) gid=1000(clp) groups=1000(clp),0(root)`,\ncorroborated in the same response body by `posix_getuid()` and `posix_geteuid()`\nreturning 0, by `whoami` returning `root`, by the uploaded file landing as\n`-rw------- 1 root root`, and by a filesystem-type read showing the marker landed\non durable overlay storage rather than tmpfs. The exact shape of that identity\nstring matters and it is not decoration: `id` run from outside the container\nprints `gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`, and a pool declaring only `user = root`\nwould print the same, so the `gid=1000(clp) groups=1000(clp),0(root)` that came\nback over HTTP can only have been produced by the product\u0027s own execution path\nthrough a pool declaring `user = root; group = clp;`. Labelled honestly, that is\na morphological inference from verbatim strings in two independent rounds plus a\npackaged pool file whose bytes are on record; the reviewing pass did not itself\nstart a File Manager pool to observe the shape directly.\n\nConfirmation and what was deliberately not reproduced. The save answers 302 with\nno error text, and the product cannot report failure at all, because its reload\nsuccess check returns true unconditionally and the reload is backgrounded. So the\nproof channel is the two anonymous requests plus the marker body, and four\nrequirements were defined in advance and checked in every round: a live `id`\ncontaining `uid=0(root)` with no uid hardcoded in the uploaded script; device\nself-attestation values in the body that are absent from our own payload and our\nown script, with a positive control proving the search works and with two\nwitnesses downgraded honestly (the boot identifier is shared across containers on\none host kernel and the application secret is a factory constant, so the genuinely\ndevice-unique witness is the container hostname, differing between the two sets\nand independently embedded by `uname`); a fresh nonce per round appearing\nsimultaneously in the uploaded filename, in a comment line inside the written\nvirtual host and in the marker body, paired with the post-reload digest of that\nspecific file and a per-nonce `nginx -T` hit count that goes 0 to 1 for the\ncurrent round and back to 0 for the previous one; and evidence being response-body\ncontent and size, never a status code, since 201 and 200 both occurred in failed\nrounds too.\n\nDeliberately not reproduced, and not claimed: cross-tenant impact, because no\nsecond tenant was present; whether an illegal payload is rolled back under\nvendor-native wiring, since both native sets used legal payloads and the\nno-rollback behaviour was measured only under harness wiring; where injected text\nlands in the PHP-site template, because that template is not in the package at all\nand is imported at install time by a `git clone` of an external repository into a\ndatabase column; the second injection point of the same shape feeding the\n`{{settings}}` placeholder, which static analysis says has the same exposure but\nfor which no dynamic round was run and no control was constructed; and whether a\nlocal console invocation of the same sink, which the sudoers drop-in grants to any\nlocal user, can inject this field. One measured anomaly carries no established\nmechanism either: when the injected block omits the fastcgi parameter include the\nexecution leg returns a silent zero-byte body, the phenomenon was observed twice,\nand two proposed mechanisms were both contradicted by the logs.\n\nScoring. One score is published: 8.8 High,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, derived from first principles - ISS\n0.914816, Unchanged impact 5.873119, exploitability 2.835255, base 8.708374,\nceiling-to-tenth Roundup 8.8. No correction to any recorded score is needed. No\nconditional or higher reading is published: we identified no deployment state that\nmakes this chain unauthenticated, and publishing a hypothetical PR:N figure\nconditioned on an unproven bypass would be inventing severity.\n\nPrivileges Required is the metric worth arguing hardest, so both directions are\ngiven. It is PR:L and not PR:N, because no anonymous path reaches this sink: the\ncatch-all access-control rule requires full authentication, twelve URI-mismatch\nvariants against one protected route produced zero admissions, the anonymous\nidentity-swap primitive described below yields an identity with zero additional\ncapability confined to a route space that does not exist, and there is no factory\ncredential to use since the product ships with zero users. It is not PR:H, because\nROLE_ADMIN was never required - the settings page is not under `^/admin`, the\nhandler declares `ROLE_USER` exactly once, and the injection was performed with\n`ROLE_USER` sessions and observed to take effect. Had only an administrator been\ndemonstrated, the correct metric would be High and the same impact weights would\nproduce 7.2, so getting this one metric wrong moves the score by 1.6 points.\n\nScope: Unchanged, and this is the reading a triage process will question first,\nbecause the outcome is host uid=0 on a multi-tenant hosting panel. The temptation\nto publish Changed is genuine and we state it accurately rather than dismissing\nit: the vulnerable component is the panel application authorised to a tenant role,\nwhile the achieved impact lands on the host operating system and, in a\nmulti-tenant deployment, on every other tenant\u0027s site - components outside the\npanel\u0027s own authorisation boundary, impacted in their own right, by an action\nauthorised as \"a tenant edits a setting on their own site\". That is the textbook\nargument for Changed and it is not strained. We publish Unchanged for three\nreasons in increasing order of weight. First, the privilege ceiling is produced\nentirely by the vendor\u0027s own shipped configuration - `user root;` in the vendor\nnginx build, `user = root` in the vendor File Manager pool, and\n`clp ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL` in the vendor sudoers drop-in - so every step of\nthe escalation is performed by a component the product itself installed,\nconfigured and invoked, and the product is the authority at each step. No second\nproduct\u0027s exposed interface is being reached through the first product\u0027s flaw;\nwhat is reached is the host, through identities the product established. Second,\nthe cross-tenant consequence is a capability inference and not a measurement: we\ndid not run the verification on a host with a second tenant installed and we\nmeasured no impact on another tenant, and publishing Scope Changed on an untested\ncross-tenant claim is precisely the class of overreach that produces public\ncorrections. Third, the conservative value already communicates the finding - 8.8\nHigh reads as remote authenticated host-root code execution to every triage\nprocess that consumes it, so nothing decision-relevant is lost by declining the\nupgrade. The Changed-scope form of the same facts,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, is recorded in the analysis as a\nrejected reading: it is not published as a headline and no number is attached to\nit. If a triage process or an identifier-assigning authority prefers the Changed\nreading on the grounds that a tenant-scope authorisation boundary is crossed to\naffect the host and other tenants, the argument above is the complete case for it\nand the only missing evidence is a two-tenant measurement.\n\nAuthentication: post-authentication, lowest panel role. Sessions are ordinary\nSymfony sessions issued by a login POST carrying `userName`, `password` and\n`_csrf_token`. The site-settings page is not under `^/admin`, so it falls to the\ncatch-all rule requiring full authentication; the singular `role:` key in that\nrule is valid rather than a silent typo, because the framework\u0027s configuration\nnormalization folds it into the plural form, and the dynamic proof that the\ncatch-all is live is that an anonymous request for a deliberately nonexistent\npath returns 302 to the login page rather than 404, meaning the access-control\ncheck fires before route resolution. Fourteen sampled protected paths all\nredirected, and twelve URI-mismatch variants - trailing slash, doubled slash,\nencoded slash, matrix-semicolon path parameter, dot segments, percent-encoded\nletters, a null byte, upper-"
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] CloudPanel 2.5.4-3 site-settings rootDirectory nginx virtual-host injection to host root code execution (8.8)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0484
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Auerswald COMmander 6000 / 6000R 8.6D unauthenticated provisioning import zip-slip to root binary hijack and root code execution (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Auerswald
COMmander 6000 and COMmander 6000R, firmware 8.6D build 128154, the
closed-source enterprise IP-PBX and unified-communications appliances from
Auerswald (Germany). Two unauthenticated HTTP requests, carrying no cookie and
no credential of any kind, yield uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) on an
appliance that holds extension credentials, SIP trunk credentials, call detail
records and voicemail for every user it serves.
Type and root cause. CWE-22, path traversal in the zip-slip form, inside a
root archive extraction; CWE-73, CWE-434, CWE-862 and CWE-250 contribute. The
finding is explicitly not classified as CWE-78, and this is worth stating
because it changes the fix: no command string is injected at either hop, and
every argument to every observed execve is either a compile-time constant or a
value that passed the product's own whitelist legitimately. Escaping and
character whitelisting are already implemented correctly in this product. The
missing controls are archive containment and route authorization, and a
command-injection patch would close nothing.
The chain has two hops and both are needed. Hop 1 is the write primitive: the
unauthenticated route /provisioning_data_import stores one multipart/form-data
part at /data/provisioning/import/<basename> and then spawns, as root,
posix_spawn("../minizip/miniunz", "-o", "-x", <zip>, "-d",
"/data/provisioning/import/")
captured verbatim from the syscall trace of the product's own process. Neither
the application nor the bundled extractor inspects archive entry names, so an
entry named ../../../opt/auerswald/hping2 escapes the extraction directory and
overwrites a root-owned mode-0755 binary with attacker bytes. Because the write
truncates an existing file, the original permission bits survive and the result
is immediately executable; there is no separate chmod primitive and none is
needed. The -o flag is what makes the replacement silent, converting the
extractor's refuse-to-clobber default into clobber-without-prompt. Hop 2 is the
consumer: a second unauthenticated request to /netdiagnostic_execute makes root
run
/bin/sh -c "/opt/auerswald/hping2 -1 -I eth0 -c 3 <target> -p <port>"
The diagnostics handler validates the target argument against the charset
0-9A-Za-z.-:/ and that whitelist works as intended; what it cannot protect is
the bytes sitting at a path that appears as a compile-time constant in the
command. The kernel honours the attacker's #!/bin/sh shebang, and the payload's
stdout is captured into the HTTP response body, so the result is read back
directly and no out-of-band channel is involved. Both handlers live in the
vendor's own in-house FastCGI application, a 3,498,560-byte binary started by
init as root behind a stock lighttpd 1.4.64 on an ARM32 glibc embedded Linux
userland, which never drops privilege. The rootfs contains no suid or sgid
binary at all, so there is no privilege boundary between the web application
and the operating system.
How confirmation works. Request 1 is a multipart POST whose part name is equal
to the filename. That is the vendor's own client contract, recovered from the
shipped JavaScript, which appends the file object to a FormData under the
file's own name; requests built the conventional way with a fixed field name
are rejected by the application's parser, and that failure is indistinguishable
from "the server filters uploads" unless the client is read. Request 2 is an
ordinary urlencoded diagnostics POST. The payload echoes a run-unique token
plus the uid and user name to stdout, which the handler returns in the response
body, and appends the output of id to a marker file under /data/log. The
published advisory prints the identity string and the landing paths but
deliberately not the per-run token or a marker filename from a specific run,
since both are artefacts of one execution on one testbed.
What was deliberately not reproduced. No persistence was installed. The same
write primitive reaches the init-respawned service scripts under
/opt/auerswald/scripts/run-*, the lighttpd configuration and the web document
root; those targets are named as statically available so that a defender can
scope an incident, and none was fired. No configuration database, certificate,
private key, credential or call record was read or removed, and no destructive,
encrypting or exfiltrating payload is published. One elegant approach was tried
and does not work, which is recorded here because it is a reproduction trap:
overwriting the extractor itself so that the next import request executes the
payload. The slip write happens inside the currently executing extractor
process, the target file ends up zero bytes long, and the next invocation fails
with ENOEXEC. The doctrine that follows is to never overwrite a binary that is
executing the write.
A correction to our own earlier reading of this chain, published because it was
wrong and a maintainer could otherwise chase it. During this work we
hypothesised that the rejections of conventionally built uploads were caused by
the web server not spooling request bodies to an upload directory, rather than
by the part name. That hypothesis is withdrawn. mod_fastcgi forwards the body
to the backend over the FastCGI STDIN stream whether or not it spools to disk,
the application parses that stream itself, and once the part name matched the
filename the bytes were stored correctly on the first attempt. Nothing about
the web server configuration was blocking the upload, and a change that added
an upload directory directive would not have altered the outcome.
Scoring. One score is published: 9.8 Critical,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The Impact Sub-Score is
1 - 0.44^3 = 0.914816, Impact under Scope Unchanged is 6.42 * 0.914816 =
5.873119, Exploitability is 8.22 * 0.85 * 0.77 * 0.85 * 0.85 = 3.887043, and
the sum 9.760162 rounds up to 9.8 under the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth rule.
An alternative reading is argued in the advisory and not adopted as the
headline: Scope Changed. A network-facing management service yielding host-wide
root on an appliance that also holds call records, extension credentials and a
managed phone fleet is the kind of outcome Scope Changed was written to
express, and AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H computes to 10.0 - the
Scope-Changed impact term is 6.128026, exploitability is unchanged at
3.887043, the sum times 1.08 exceeds the maximum and is capped. We publish
Scope Unchanged because of one fact: the application is already uid 0 by
design, and the rootfs contains no suid or sgid binary because the vendor's
design never needed one, so there is no authority boundary between the web
component and the telephony component for the chain to cross. It exercises,
through a defect, an authority the vulnerable component already held.
Publishing 10.0 would attribute a boundary crossing this product's architecture
does not have, and would obscure the more useful message to the maintainer: the
privilege separation that would make Scope Unchanged the comfortable answer is
itself a fix worth making.
AC:L is a decision, not a default. There is no race, no timing window, no
memory-layout dependency, no on-path position, no brute force and no dependency
on the hardware abstraction layer, and the chain was demonstrated twice, in the
freshly initialised state and again in a tightened state described below. The
one non-obvious requirement, the part-name-equals-filename contract, is
attacker-side correctness recoverable from the vendor's own shipped client
rather than an environmental condition. Amplifier facts observed elsewhere in
the image - an empty root password field in /etc/passwd with no /etc/shadow in
this image, the telnet facility behind an AccessLevel 6 route, a site-wide
unsafe-inline CSP, an unenforced client certificate on the provisioning socket -
are kept out of the arithmetic and reported separately, because folding them in
would inflate the vector. No CVSS figure was recorded alongside the
verification, so there is no recorded number for this vector to disagree with.
Authentication: none, and that is proven rather than assumed. Both routes are
declared AccessLevel 2 in the product's own route table and both answered 200
to a request carrying no Cookie header and no Authorization header, not an
expired session but no session material at all. The route table in .data holds
750 named entries, and the product's gate - one session and credential
evaluator at 0x15958, which is the sole caller of the access check at 0xf5d68 -
covers the service-technician family (AccessLevel 4), the DAA/daemon family
(AccessLevel 6), the two packet-capture routes registered under those families
and one login route: twelve of 750. The remaining 738 answer 200 to a
cookie-less request, and more than forty of them were sampled during mapping,
each returning live configuration data or performing a state change. lighttpd
contributes nothing to authorization: its FastCGI configuration sends every URL
to the backend socket, and three probes with no referer, with the ip-editor
referer and with an unrelated referer produced no access difference.
The strongest internal evidence that this is a systemic coverage gap rather than
two unlucky omissions sits on a single shared handler. FUNC 0x3b018, which
streams a packet capture back to the caller, is registered three times under
three names: ethernettrace.pcap at declared level 2 answers 200, starts a root
tcpdump on eth0 with snaplen 9018 and streams the capture to the requesting
client, while servicetrace.pcap at level 4 and daemontools.pcap at level 6 both
answer 401. Same function address, same code, opposite outcome, so
authorization in this product is attached to route families rather than to the
operations those routes expose.
What was not broken is credited explicitly. The login route is fail-closed:
four password values across four parameter alias sets each produced an empty
cookie. The vendor service-technician challenge is not forgeable from the image
because verification is public-key only, against two DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo
blobs shipped in the firmware, and the device holds no private key; the
response space is also only 65536 wide with a four-attempt lockout, so it is
not brute-forceable either. The ForceAdmin and BEARER branches of the session
evaluator were not read instruction by instruction, so no claim is made about
them in either direction - unexamined is not disproved, and this chain does not
depend on them. The declared AccessLevel value in the route table is not the
enforced level, and the product's own data proves it: the DAA login route is
recorded at level 0 and answers 401. We do not claim that all 738 unguarded
routes are individually dangerous; we map the population and prove the two
members this chain needs.
Impact: complete control of a device that terminates and records every call it
serves. Root here means the SIP stack, the voicemail and voice-mail
distribution components, the DSP channel configuration, trunk configuration and
every extension the appliance serves, so calls can be placed, redirected,
recorded or dropped. The configuration database under /data/db/ carries fields
including cryptPasswd, passwd, passwdLdap, AdminPasswd, AdminPasswdHash,
passwordHash and remote_access_token; user certificate private keys sit under
/data/certs/user-certs; SIP trunk and gateway credentials live in the
provisioning data; and toll fraud is the standard real-world monetisation of
exactly this position, usually discovered on an invoice rather than through a
security alert. Call detail records, billing structures and voicemail content
for every user become readable - who called whom, when, for how long and at what
cost - which for an organisation whose calls carry customer, legal, medical or
financial content is a reportable data-breach event. The appliance auto-provisi
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Auerswald | COMmander 6000 |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "COMmander 6000",
"vendor": "Auerswald",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Auerswald\nCOMmander 6000 and COMmander 6000R, firmware 8.6D build 128154, the\nclosed-source enterprise IP-PBX and unified-communications appliances from\nAuerswald (Germany). Two unauthenticated HTTP requests, carrying no cookie and\nno credential of any kind, yield uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) on an\nappliance that holds extension credentials, SIP trunk credentials, call detail\nrecords and voicemail for every user it serves.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-22, path traversal in the zip-slip form, inside a\nroot archive extraction; CWE-73, CWE-434, CWE-862 and CWE-250 contribute. The\nfinding is explicitly not classified as CWE-78, and this is worth stating\nbecause it changes the fix: no command string is injected at either hop, and\nevery argument to every observed execve is either a compile-time constant or a\nvalue that passed the product\u0027s own whitelist legitimately. Escaping and\ncharacter whitelisting are already implemented correctly in this product. The\nmissing controls are archive containment and route authorization, and a\ncommand-injection patch would close nothing.\n\nThe chain has two hops and both are needed. Hop 1 is the write primitive: the\nunauthenticated route /provisioning_data_import stores one multipart/form-data\npart at /data/provisioning/import/\u003cbasename\u003e and then spawns, as root,\n\n posix_spawn(\"../minizip/miniunz\", \"-o\", \"-x\", \u003czip\u003e, \"-d\",\n \"/data/provisioning/import/\")\n\ncaptured verbatim from the syscall trace of the product\u0027s own process. Neither\nthe application nor the bundled extractor inspects archive entry names, so an\nentry named ../../../opt/auerswald/hping2 escapes the extraction directory and\noverwrites a root-owned mode-0755 binary with attacker bytes. Because the write\ntruncates an existing file, the original permission bits survive and the result\nis immediately executable; there is no separate chmod primitive and none is\nneeded. The -o flag is what makes the replacement silent, converting the\nextractor\u0027s refuse-to-clobber default into clobber-without-prompt. Hop 2 is the\nconsumer: a second unauthenticated request to /netdiagnostic_execute makes root\nrun\n\n /bin/sh -c \"/opt/auerswald/hping2 -1 -I eth0 -c 3 \u003ctarget\u003e -p \u003cport\u003e\"\n\nThe diagnostics handler validates the target argument against the charset\n0-9A-Za-z.-:/ and that whitelist works as intended; what it cannot protect is\nthe bytes sitting at a path that appears as a compile-time constant in the\ncommand. The kernel honours the attacker\u0027s #!/bin/sh shebang, and the payload\u0027s\nstdout is captured into the HTTP response body, so the result is read back\ndirectly and no out-of-band channel is involved. Both handlers live in the\nvendor\u0027s own in-house FastCGI application, a 3,498,560-byte binary started by\ninit as root behind a stock lighttpd 1.4.64 on an ARM32 glibc embedded Linux\nuserland, which never drops privilege. The rootfs contains no suid or sgid\nbinary at all, so there is no privilege boundary between the web application\nand the operating system.\n\nHow confirmation works. Request 1 is a multipart POST whose part name is equal\nto the filename. That is the vendor\u0027s own client contract, recovered from the\nshipped JavaScript, which appends the file object to a FormData under the\nfile\u0027s own name; requests built the conventional way with a fixed field name\nare rejected by the application\u0027s parser, and that failure is indistinguishable\nfrom \"the server filters uploads\" unless the client is read. Request 2 is an\nordinary urlencoded diagnostics POST. The payload echoes a run-unique token\nplus the uid and user name to stdout, which the handler returns in the response\nbody, and appends the output of id to a marker file under /data/log. The\npublished advisory prints the identity string and the landing paths but\ndeliberately not the per-run token or a marker filename from a specific run,\nsince both are artefacts of one execution on one testbed.\n\nWhat was deliberately not reproduced. No persistence was installed. The same\nwrite primitive reaches the init-respawned service scripts under\n/opt/auerswald/scripts/run-*, the lighttpd configuration and the web document\nroot; those targets are named as statically available so that a defender can\nscope an incident, and none was fired. No configuration database, certificate,\nprivate key, credential or call record was read or removed, and no destructive,\nencrypting or exfiltrating payload is published. One elegant approach was tried\nand does not work, which is recorded here because it is a reproduction trap:\noverwriting the extractor itself so that the next import request executes the\npayload. The slip write happens inside the currently executing extractor\nprocess, the target file ends up zero bytes long, and the next invocation fails\nwith ENOEXEC. The doctrine that follows is to never overwrite a binary that is\nexecuting the write.\n\nA correction to our own earlier reading of this chain, published because it was\nwrong and a maintainer could otherwise chase it. During this work we\nhypothesised that the rejections of conventionally built uploads were caused by\nthe web server not spooling request bodies to an upload directory, rather than\nby the part name. That hypothesis is withdrawn. mod_fastcgi forwards the body\nto the backend over the FastCGI STDIN stream whether or not it spools to disk,\nthe application parses that stream itself, and once the part name matched the\nfilename the bytes were stored correctly on the first attempt. Nothing about\nthe web server configuration was blocking the upload, and a change that added\nan upload directory directive would not have altered the outcome.\n\nScoring. One score is published: 9.8 Critical,\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The Impact Sub-Score is\n1 - 0.44^3 = 0.914816, Impact under Scope Unchanged is 6.42 * 0.914816 =\n5.873119, Exploitability is 8.22 * 0.85 * 0.77 * 0.85 * 0.85 = 3.887043, and\nthe sum 9.760162 rounds up to 9.8 under the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth rule.\n\nAn alternative reading is argued in the advisory and not adopted as the\nheadline: Scope Changed. A network-facing management service yielding host-wide\nroot on an appliance that also holds call records, extension credentials and a\nmanaged phone fleet is the kind of outcome Scope Changed was written to\nexpress, and AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H computes to 10.0 - the\nScope-Changed impact term is 6.128026, exploitability is unchanged at\n3.887043, the sum times 1.08 exceeds the maximum and is capped. We publish\nScope Unchanged because of one fact: the application is already uid 0 by\ndesign, and the rootfs contains no suid or sgid binary because the vendor\u0027s\ndesign never needed one, so there is no authority boundary between the web\ncomponent and the telephony component for the chain to cross. It exercises,\nthrough a defect, an authority the vulnerable component already held.\nPublishing 10.0 would attribute a boundary crossing this product\u0027s architecture\ndoes not have, and would obscure the more useful message to the maintainer: the\nprivilege separation that would make Scope Unchanged the comfortable answer is\nitself a fix worth making.\n\nAC:L is a decision, not a default. There is no race, no timing window, no\nmemory-layout dependency, no on-path position, no brute force and no dependency\non the hardware abstraction layer, and the chain was demonstrated twice, in the\nfreshly initialised state and again in a tightened state described below. The\none non-obvious requirement, the part-name-equals-filename contract, is\nattacker-side correctness recoverable from the vendor\u0027s own shipped client\nrather than an environmental condition. Amplifier facts observed elsewhere in\nthe image - an empty root password field in /etc/passwd with no /etc/shadow in\nthis image, the telnet facility behind an AccessLevel 6 route, a site-wide\nunsafe-inline CSP, an unenforced client certificate on the provisioning socket -\nare kept out of the arithmetic and reported separately, because folding them in\nwould inflate the vector. No CVSS figure was recorded alongside the\nverification, so there is no recorded number for this vector to disagree with.\n\nAuthentication: none, and that is proven rather than assumed. Both routes are\ndeclared AccessLevel 2 in the product\u0027s own route table and both answered 200\nto a request carrying no Cookie header and no Authorization header, not an\nexpired session but no session material at all. The route table in .data holds\n750 named entries, and the product\u0027s gate - one session and credential\nevaluator at 0x15958, which is the sole caller of the access check at 0xf5d68 -\ncovers the service-technician family (AccessLevel 4), the DAA/daemon family\n(AccessLevel 6), the two packet-capture routes registered under those families\nand one login route: twelve of 750. The remaining 738 answer 200 to a\ncookie-less request, and more than forty of them were sampled during mapping,\neach returning live configuration data or performing a state change. lighttpd\ncontributes nothing to authorization: its FastCGI configuration sends every URL\nto the backend socket, and three probes with no referer, with the ip-editor\nreferer and with an unrelated referer produced no access difference.\n\nThe strongest internal evidence that this is a systemic coverage gap rather than\ntwo unlucky omissions sits on a single shared handler. FUNC 0x3b018, which\nstreams a packet capture back to the caller, is registered three times under\nthree names: ethernettrace.pcap at declared level 2 answers 200, starts a root\ntcpdump on eth0 with snaplen 9018 and streams the capture to the requesting\nclient, while servicetrace.pcap at level 4 and daemontools.pcap at level 6 both\nanswer 401. Same function address, same code, opposite outcome, so\nauthorization in this product is attached to route families rather than to the\noperations those routes expose.\n\nWhat was not broken is credited explicitly. The login route is fail-closed:\nfour password values across four parameter alias sets each produced an empty\ncookie. The vendor service-technician challenge is not forgeable from the image\nbecause verification is public-key only, against two DER SubjectPublicKeyInfo\nblobs shipped in the firmware, and the device holds no private key; the\nresponse space is also only 65536 wide with a four-attempt lockout, so it is\nnot brute-forceable either. The ForceAdmin and BEARER branches of the session\nevaluator were not read instruction by instruction, so no claim is made about\nthem in either direction - unexamined is not disproved, and this chain does not\ndepend on them. The declared AccessLevel value in the route table is not the\nenforced level, and the product\u0027s own data proves it: the DAA login route is\nrecorded at level 0 and answers 401. We do not claim that all 738 unguarded\nroutes are individually dangerous; we map the population and prove the two\nmembers this chain needs.\n\nImpact: complete control of a device that terminates and records every call it\nserves. Root here means the SIP stack, the voicemail and voice-mail\ndistribution components, the DSP channel configuration, trunk configuration and\nevery extension the appliance serves, so calls can be placed, redirected,\nrecorded or dropped. The configuration database under /data/db/ carries fields\nincluding cryptPasswd, passwd, passwdLdap, AdminPasswd, AdminPasswdHash,\npasswordHash and remote_access_token; user certificate private keys sit under\n/data/certs/user-certs; SIP trunk and gateway credentials live in the\nprovisioning data; and toll fraud is the standard real-world monetisation of\nexactly this position, usually discovered on an invoice rather than through a\nsecurity alert. Call detail records, billing structures and voicemail content\nfor every user become readable - who called whom, when, for how long and at what\ncost - which for an organisation whose calls carry customer, legal, medical or\nfinancial content is a reportable data-breach event. The appliance auto-provisi"
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] Auerswald COMmander 6000 / 6000R 8.6D unauthenticated provisioning import zip-slip to root binary hijack and root code execution (9.8)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0483
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Abyss Web Server X1 2.16.22.0 first-run console credential takeover to configuration-write log-as-CGI command execution (7.5)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability chain in
Abyss Web Server X1 2.16.22.0, the free edition of the closed-source Abyss
web server from Aprelium (Tunisia), a product family that has shipped for
more than twenty years. The release artefacts identify 2.16.22.0 as the
vendor's current official release. Between first start and the moment an
administrator sets a console password, any client admitted by the shipped
console access rule can register that administrator with no credential at
all, and three ordinary configuration forms afterwards convert the
configuration plane into an execution plane: the host access log becomes a
shell script inside CGI scope, and any anonymous request to the log path
executes it.
Type and root cause. CWE-306, missing authentication for a critical
function, is primary, and CWE-78, OS command injection, is co-equal rather
than subordinate. CWE-284, CWE-73, CWE-362, CWE-352, CWE-328 and CWE-250
contribute and are reported separately without raising any metric. The two
primary classifications are co-equal because removing either one alone
removes the chain while leaving every other weakness discussed here intact.
It is worth stating what this finding is not, because the technique is the
interesting part: there is no memory corruption, no deserialisation gadget
and no file-upload primitive anywhere in it. The write primitive is the
product's own supported configuration form, and the command enters the
written file through a quote-context escape in a request header field. A fix
that only adds authentication to the console leaves the log-as-interpreter
collision in place; a fix that only filters the header leaves the
unauthenticated credential creation in place. Neither half is sufficient on
its own.
The console authenticates with HTTP Basic on its default port 9999, binds
`bindip` `*` by default, and issues no session cookie anywhere - every
endpoint answers without `Set-Cookie`, including the endpoint that creates
the administrator. On first start the generated `abyss.conf` carries a
`<console>` node with no `<login>` and no `<password>` element, and the
startup terminal prints a message telling the operator to browse
`http://127.0.0.1:9999` to continue with the console access configuration.
While that state holds, `GET /console/` answers a distinctive `302` and the
bootstrap chain leads to `GET /console/credentials` answering `200` with a
creation form plus a `$$xxvxd` page token; a credential-free `POST` to that
endpoint installs the administrator. On an instance that has never been
configured the redirect first passes through `/console/language`; on an
instance whose language is already chosen it goes straight to
`/console/credentials`. Both shapes are unauthenticated throughout. After the
install the same endpoint answers `401` with
`WWW-Authenticate: Basic Realm="Abyss Web Server Console"`, so the
attacker's own POST is what closes the window.
The three forms that follow are a direct serialisation of the configuration
tree - each HTML control's `NAME` is the XML key path it writes - so what
they accept is exactly what the configuration can hold.
- `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/scripting/paths/path@0/edit` takes
`vpath=/` with `type=0` (CGI) and writes
`<paths><path><vpath>/</vpath><type>0</type>...</path></paths>`. A
`vpath` of `/` places the entire virtual path space of the host inside
CGI scope, which includes files the server writes into the document root
itself. There is no minimum-depth requirement and no warning about scope
width.
- `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/log` takes an arbitrary absolute filesystem
path in its `file` control and a `format` of `.combined`, writing
`<log><file>(absolute path inside the document root)</file><denied/>
<format>.combined</format></log>`. No whitelist, no restriction to a log
directory, no rejection of a destination inside the document root, and no
canonicalisation. The control renders with a `Browse` selector that walks
the target's directory tree from the filesystem root downwards, so the
document root does not have to be guessed.
- `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/scripting/interpreters/interpreter@0/edit`
takes an arbitrary executable path with `interface=0`, `checkexists=yes`
and `type=0`, and a second-step extensions sub-form then associates an
arbitrary extension string. Submitting `/bin/sh` and `ext=log` writes
`<interpreters><interpreter><file>/bin/sh</file>...<ext>log</ext>
</interpreter></interpreters>`. `checkexists=yes` is satisfied because
`/bin/sh` exists; nothing reasons about whether the extension names a
content type rather than a destination type, whether the interpreter is a
general-purpose shell, or whether the server itself writes files with
that extension.
`POST /` carrying `/restart=Restart` - the product's own restart button, with
the main page showing "The configuration has changed. Press [Restart] to
apply the modifications." and host status `Running(Updated)` - applies all
three. The request-serving slave process bounces, and only the new
generation writes into the newly configured log destination. The access log
is now a shell script inside CGI scope. A request whose `User-Agent` is
`zz"; (command); #` appends a `.combined` line in which that value lands
inside the format's own double-quoted field, where the quote closes the
field, the semicolon separates a statement and the trailing comment swallows
the remainder. An anonymous `GET` on the log path then makes the product
start the CGI child `/bin/sh (log file)`, and the shell reads the whole file
line by line, executing the semicolon segment. Commands run as the identity
of the server process.
How confirmation works. The final trigger answers `500`, not `200`, and that
is the appearance of success rather than failure: `/bin/sh` writes no CGI
headers, so the product cannot construct a valid CGI response and answers
with its standard 348-byte error page while the CGI log records `Broken pipe`
for that invocation. Proof is server-side and three-channel rather than
client-observed. The product's own CGI error log names the child it spawned
directly, `CGI: [/bin/sh x.log ] URI: /x.log`, interleaved with the shell's
own diagnostics `x.log: line N: 127.0.0.1: command not found` - those are the
log's ordinary leading fields being treated as command words, and they do not
stop execution of later lines, which is why a noisy log prefix is harmless.
The diagnostics incremented from two lines to four as the log grew between
fires, which is causality visible in the log: each fire re-reads the whole
file and re-executes every line. A marker file written by the injected
command contained `uid=uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`, 43 bytes and
root-owned; the doubled prefix is the injected command's own literal, not a
product string, and the identity the server process ran under is
`uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`. Neither HTTP status in the last two
steps indicates failure - the smuggling request only has to be logged, and it
was answered `404` with a 336-byte body on a nonexistent path precisely so
it would have no other effect on the target.
What was deliberately not reproduced. The published advisory reproduces the
identity string and the product's own log lines; it does not publish the
per-run marker token, the credential pair used in verification or any
hostname from the run, because all three are artefacts of one execution
rather than facts about the product. No credential was leaked, seeded or
reused: the pair was chosen by the test operator at that moment, it is not a
product default, and this post reproduces no credential. No reverse shell, no
callback listener, no persistence mechanism and no destructive payload was
exercised.
Scoring. One score is published: 7.5 High,
`CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`. That vector computes to
7.493264 raw - ISS 0.914816, Impact(S:U) 5.873119, Exploitability
1.620146 from weights AV 0.62, AC 0.44, PR 0.85, UI 0.85 - and is taken to
7.5 by the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth Roundup. No pre-existing numeric score was
inherited: the sources behind this advisory carried no computed CVSS figure,
so there was nothing to correct, and every number published here was computed
from its vector.
The Attack Vector is Adjacent, not Network, and the reason is an artefact
rather than a judgement call. The console binds every interface by default
and the shipped documentation presents that as the recommended setting, but
its `ipcontrol` block permits loopback, all three RFC1918 IPv4 ranges
(`10.0.0.1-10.255.255.254`, `172.16.0.1-172.31.255.254`,
`192.168.0.1-192.168.255.254`) and IPv6 unique-local plus link-local, with no
deny entries, and refuses public-internet sources. The check is evaluated on
the connected socket peer and was measured not to be influenced by
`X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP`. Those same address-range literals appear as
byte literals inside the stripped binaries. A default installation is
therefore not internet-reachable, and no published score assumes that it is.
The adjacent position is genuinely wide in practice - the whole office LAN,
the whole home LAN, every tenant on a shared management VLAN, every container
on a bridge network, every instance on a cloud VPC subnet - but it is
adjacent, and the headline vector says so.
The Attack Complexity is High because success requires arriving before the
administrator arms the console. The endpoint answers `401` from the moment a
credential exists, and that was measured in every verification round. The
window's field duration is not established and is not estimated anywhere in
this research; the advisory invents no figure for it.
Two conditional readings are published alongside the primary, each labelled
as conditional and neither quoted as the headline.
- Conditional A, the window left open indefinitely:
`CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 8.8 High
(Exploitability 2.835255, base 8.708373). Applies where automation
installs and never arms the console, where appliances are staged before
deployment, or where containers and host images regenerate a pristine
configuration on every restart, so the attacker polls an unauthenticated
state rather than racing a person.
- Conditional B, the console also exposed to a network:
`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 9.8 Critical
(Exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161), and with the window contested
`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 8.1 High
(Exploitability 2.221167, base 8.094286). Applies where an operator
publishes port 9999 through NAT or a port forward, binds it on a publicly
addressed host, or relays through a same-host reverse proxy whose
forwarded traffic presents a permitted socket peer. That proxy shape
passes `ipcontrol` without any header logic being consulted at all. Both
are conditional on a deployment change we did not test.
One reading was rejected. Scope Changed was considered seriously and refused:
`CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` computes to 8.4 (ISS
0.914816, Impact(S:C) 6.128026, Exploitability 1.620146, base 1.08 times
7.748172 = 8.368026) and is not published as the finding's score. Three
reasons. Both listeners belong to one product and one process family - a CLI
master and a `--slave --interactive` service process - so the console and the
host plane are two doors into one authority, not two authorities, and
applying configuration to the serving plane is the product's documented
intended behaviour. The CGI child runs as the server process's own identity
on the same host, in the same filesystem view, so no different security
authority is crossed. And the operating-system consequences depend on how the
deployment runs the server, which is established below as
deployment-dependent; scoring Changed on the strength of a root deployment we
could not
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aprelium Technologies | Abyss Web Server |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Abyss Web Server",
"vendor": "Aprelium Technologies",
"versions": [
{
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"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability chain in\nAbyss Web Server X1 2.16.22.0, the free edition of the closed-source Abyss\nweb server from Aprelium (Tunisia), a product family that has shipped for\nmore than twenty years. The release artefacts identify 2.16.22.0 as the\nvendor\u0027s current official release. Between first start and the moment an\nadministrator sets a console password, any client admitted by the shipped\nconsole access rule can register that administrator with no credential at\nall, and three ordinary configuration forms afterwards convert the\nconfiguration plane into an execution plane: the host access log becomes a\nshell script inside CGI scope, and any anonymous request to the log path\nexecutes it.\n\nType and root cause. CWE-306, missing authentication for a critical\nfunction, is primary, and CWE-78, OS command injection, is co-equal rather\nthan subordinate. CWE-284, CWE-73, CWE-362, CWE-352, CWE-328 and CWE-250\ncontribute and are reported separately without raising any metric. The two\nprimary classifications are co-equal because removing either one alone\nremoves the chain while leaving every other weakness discussed here intact.\nIt is worth stating what this finding is not, because the technique is the\ninteresting part: there is no memory corruption, no deserialisation gadget\nand no file-upload primitive anywhere in it. The write primitive is the\nproduct\u0027s own supported configuration form, and the command enters the\nwritten file through a quote-context escape in a request header field. A fix\nthat only adds authentication to the console leaves the log-as-interpreter\ncollision in place; a fix that only filters the header leaves the\nunauthenticated credential creation in place. Neither half is sufficient on\nits own.\n\nThe console authenticates with HTTP Basic on its default port 9999, binds\n`bindip` `*` by default, and issues no session cookie anywhere - every\nendpoint answers without `Set-Cookie`, including the endpoint that creates\nthe administrator. On first start the generated `abyss.conf` carries a\n`\u003cconsole\u003e` node with no `\u003clogin\u003e` and no `\u003cpassword\u003e` element, and the\nstartup terminal prints a message telling the operator to browse\n`http://127.0.0.1:9999` to continue with the console access configuration.\nWhile that state holds, `GET /console/` answers a distinctive `302` and the\nbootstrap chain leads to `GET /console/credentials` answering `200` with a\ncreation form plus a `$$xxvxd` page token; a credential-free `POST` to that\nendpoint installs the administrator. On an instance that has never been\nconfigured the redirect first passes through `/console/language`; on an\ninstance whose language is already chosen it goes straight to\n`/console/credentials`. Both shapes are unauthenticated throughout. After the\ninstall the same endpoint answers `401` with\n`WWW-Authenticate: Basic Realm=\"Abyss Web Server Console\"`, so the\nattacker\u0027s own POST is what closes the window.\n\nThe three forms that follow are a direct serialisation of the configuration\ntree - each HTML control\u0027s `NAME` is the XML key path it writes - so what\nthey accept is exactly what the configuration can hold.\n\n - `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/scripting/paths/path@0/edit` takes\n `vpath=/` with `type=0` (CGI) and writes\n `\u003cpaths\u003e\u003cpath\u003e\u003cvpath\u003e/\u003c/vpath\u003e\u003ctype\u003e0\u003c/type\u003e...\u003c/path\u003e\u003c/paths\u003e`. A\n `vpath` of `/` places the entire virtual path space of the host inside\n CGI scope, which includes files the server writes into the document root\n itself. There is no minimum-depth requirement and no warning about scope\n width.\n - `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/log` takes an arbitrary absolute filesystem\n path in its `file` control and a `format` of `.combined`, writing\n `\u003clog\u003e\u003cfile\u003e(absolute path inside the document root)\u003c/file\u003e\u003cdenied/\u003e\n \u003cformat\u003e.combined\u003c/format\u003e\u003c/log\u003e`. No whitelist, no restriction to a log\n directory, no rejection of a destination inside the document root, and no\n canonicalisation. The control renders with a `Browse` selector that walks\n the target\u0027s directory tree from the filesystem root downwards, so the\n document root does not have to be guessed.\n - `POST /hosts/host@0/edit/scripting/interpreters/interpreter@0/edit`\n takes an arbitrary executable path with `interface=0`, `checkexists=yes`\n and `type=0`, and a second-step extensions sub-form then associates an\n arbitrary extension string. Submitting `/bin/sh` and `ext=log` writes\n `\u003cinterpreters\u003e\u003cinterpreter\u003e\u003cfile\u003e/bin/sh\u003c/file\u003e...\u003cext\u003elog\u003c/ext\u003e\n \u003c/interpreter\u003e\u003c/interpreters\u003e`. `checkexists=yes` is satisfied because\n `/bin/sh` exists; nothing reasons about whether the extension names a\n content type rather than a destination type, whether the interpreter is a\n general-purpose shell, or whether the server itself writes files with\n that extension.\n\n`POST /` carrying `/restart=Restart` - the product\u0027s own restart button, with\nthe main page showing \"The configuration has changed. Press [Restart] to\napply the modifications.\" and host status `Running(Updated)` - applies all\nthree. The request-serving slave process bounces, and only the new\ngeneration writes into the newly configured log destination. The access log\nis now a shell script inside CGI scope. A request whose `User-Agent` is\n`zz\"; (command); #` appends a `.combined` line in which that value lands\ninside the format\u0027s own double-quoted field, where the quote closes the\nfield, the semicolon separates a statement and the trailing comment swallows\nthe remainder. An anonymous `GET` on the log path then makes the product\nstart the CGI child `/bin/sh (log file)`, and the shell reads the whole file\nline by line, executing the semicolon segment. Commands run as the identity\nof the server process.\n\nHow confirmation works. The final trigger answers `500`, not `200`, and that\nis the appearance of success rather than failure: `/bin/sh` writes no CGI\nheaders, so the product cannot construct a valid CGI response and answers\nwith its standard 348-byte error page while the CGI log records `Broken pipe`\nfor that invocation. Proof is server-side and three-channel rather than\nclient-observed. The product\u0027s own CGI error log names the child it spawned\ndirectly, `CGI: [/bin/sh x.log ] URI: /x.log`, interleaved with the shell\u0027s\nown diagnostics `x.log: line N: 127.0.0.1: command not found` - those are the\nlog\u0027s ordinary leading fields being treated as command words, and they do not\nstop execution of later lines, which is why a noisy log prefix is harmless.\nThe diagnostics incremented from two lines to four as the log grew between\nfires, which is causality visible in the log: each fire re-reads the whole\nfile and re-executes every line. A marker file written by the injected\ncommand contained `uid=uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`, 43 bytes and\nroot-owned; the doubled prefix is the injected command\u0027s own literal, not a\nproduct string, and the identity the server process ran under is\n`uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)`. Neither HTTP status in the last two\nsteps indicates failure - the smuggling request only has to be logged, and it\nwas answered `404` with a 336-byte body on a nonexistent path precisely so\nit would have no other effect on the target.\n\nWhat was deliberately not reproduced. The published advisory reproduces the\nidentity string and the product\u0027s own log lines; it does not publish the\nper-run marker token, the credential pair used in verification or any\nhostname from the run, because all three are artefacts of one execution\nrather than facts about the product. No credential was leaked, seeded or\nreused: the pair was chosen by the test operator at that moment, it is not a\nproduct default, and this post reproduces no credential. No reverse shell, no\ncallback listener, no persistence mechanism and no destructive payload was\nexercised.\n\nScoring. One score is published: 7.5 High,\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`. That vector computes to\n7.493264 raw - ISS 0.914816, Impact(S:U) 5.873119, Exploitability\n1.620146 from weights AV 0.62, AC 0.44, PR 0.85, UI 0.85 - and is taken to\n7.5 by the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth Roundup. No pre-existing numeric score was\ninherited: the sources behind this advisory carried no computed CVSS figure,\nso there was nothing to correct, and every number published here was computed\nfrom its vector.\n\nThe Attack Vector is Adjacent, not Network, and the reason is an artefact\nrather than a judgement call. The console binds every interface by default\nand the shipped documentation presents that as the recommended setting, but\nits `ipcontrol` block permits loopback, all three RFC1918 IPv4 ranges\n(`10.0.0.1-10.255.255.254`, `172.16.0.1-172.31.255.254`,\n`192.168.0.1-192.168.255.254`) and IPv6 unique-local plus link-local, with no\ndeny entries, and refuses public-internet sources. The check is evaluated on\nthe connected socket peer and was measured not to be influenced by\n`X-Forwarded-For` or `X-Real-IP`. Those same address-range literals appear as\nbyte literals inside the stripped binaries. A default installation is\ntherefore not internet-reachable, and no published score assumes that it is.\nThe adjacent position is genuinely wide in practice - the whole office LAN,\nthe whole home LAN, every tenant on a shared management VLAN, every container\non a bridge network, every instance on a cloud VPC subnet - but it is\nadjacent, and the headline vector says so.\n\nThe Attack Complexity is High because success requires arriving before the\nadministrator arms the console. The endpoint answers `401` from the moment a\ncredential exists, and that was measured in every verification round. The\nwindow\u0027s field duration is not established and is not estimated anywhere in\nthis research; the advisory invents no figure for it.\n\nTwo conditional readings are published alongside the primary, each labelled\nas conditional and neither quoted as the headline.\n\n - Conditional A, the window left open indefinitely:\n `CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 8.8 High\n (Exploitability 2.835255, base 8.708373). Applies where automation\n installs and never arms the console, where appliances are staged before\n deployment, or where containers and host images regenerate a pristine\n configuration on every restart, so the attacker polls an unauthenticated\n state rather than racing a person.\n - Conditional B, the console also exposed to a network:\n `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 9.8 Critical\n (Exploitability 3.887043, base 9.760161), and with the window contested\n `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` = 8.1 High\n (Exploitability 2.221167, base 8.094286). Applies where an operator\n publishes port 9999 through NAT or a port forward, binds it on a publicly\n addressed host, or relays through a same-host reverse proxy whose\n forwarded traffic presents a permitted socket peer. That proxy shape\n passes `ipcontrol` without any header logic being consulted at all. Both\n are conditional on a deployment change we did not test.\n\nOne reading was rejected. Scope Changed was considered seriously and refused:\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` computes to 8.4 (ISS\n0.914816, Impact(S:C) 6.128026, Exploitability 1.620146, base 1.08 times\n7.748172 = 8.368026) and is not published as the finding\u0027s score. Three\nreasons. Both listeners belong to one product and one process family - a CLI\nmaster and a `--slave --interactive` service process - so the console and the\nhost plane are two doors into one authority, not two authorities, and\napplying configuration to the serving plane is the product\u0027s documented\nintended behaviour. The CGI child runs as the server process\u0027s own identity\non the same host, in the same filesystem view, so no different security\nauthority is crossed. And the operating-system consequences depend on how the\ndeployment runs the server, which is established below as\ndeployment-dependent; scoring Changed on the strength of a root deployment we\ncould not"
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displaying 91 - 100 publications in total 581