Organization

Vulnerability Disclosure Archive

GNA-1988

GNA identifier
GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications

Recent vulnerabilities

581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988

GCVE-1988-2026-0432

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
Title
SCHUTZWERK-SA-2024-006: Stored Cross-Site Scripting via text fields in H5P module (h5p-nodejs-library) of Lumi Education
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 executed in victims' browsers when viewing the affected H5P content. Metadata ======== - - Affected product: h5p-nodejs-library - - Affected version: All versions prior to 9.3.3 - - Vendor: Lumi Education UG - - Problem type(s): - - CVE ID: CVE-2025-47828 - - CVE URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-47828 - - CVSS 3.1 score: 6.4 (Medium) - - CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N - - Advisory URL: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2024-006/ Details ======= therefore store arbitrary HTML and JavaScript in these fields. JavaScript alert function: POST /api/v3/h5p-editor/edit/670e69f55301ad663ba69f9e HTTP/2 Host: example.com [...] { "library": "H5P.Timeline 1.1", "params": { "params": { "timeline": { "defaultZoomLevel": "0", "height": 600, "asset": { "media": "<script>alert('Alert from media')</script>", "credit": "<script>alert('Alert from media')</script>", "caption": "<script>alert('Alert from media')</script>" }, "date": [ { "asset": {}, "text": "<p>SW_BodyText2</p>\n", "startDate": "1900", "endDate": "9999", "headline": "SW_HEADLINE2", "tag": "SW_tags" } ], "language": "en", "headline": "SW_Headline", "text": "<div>SW_BodyText</div>" } }, "metadata": { "embedTypes": [ "iframe" ], "language": "en", "mainLibrary": "H5P.Timeline", "preloadedDependencies": [ { "machineName": "TimelineJS", "majorVersion": 1, "minorVersion": 1 }, { "machineName": "H5P.Timeline", "majorVersion": 1, "minorVersion": 1 } ], "defaultLanguage": "en", "license": "U", "title": "SW_Timeline-Title", "authors": [], "changes": [], "extraTitle": "SW_Timeline-Title" } }, "parentId": "670e36de4c1be96f1bc6bf65", "parentType": "lessons" } server accepted the request and responded with 201 Created. via stored XSS is possible. Risk ==== new roles to existing ones. Solution/Mitigation =================== Update h5p-nodejs-library to version 9.3.3[0] or later. Timeline ======== - - 2024-10-14 Vulnerability discovered - - 2024-11-07 Initial contact attempt with the developer - - 2024-11-28 Third contact attempt via a message in the Lumi Slack channel - - 2025-02-11 Release of h5p-nodejs-library v9.3.3 the vulnerability - - 2025-05-11 CVE-2025-47828 published by MITRE delayed for undisclosed reasons. - - 2026-09-22 Advisory released Credits ======= SCHUTZWERK GmbH. Footnotes ========= [0] https://github.com/Lumieducation/H5P-Nodejs-library/releases/tag/v9.3.3 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- iQJOBAEBCgA4FiEEgLsg7Oj/wY3LSF87GrXfkTIXLrsFAmqzbasaHGFkdmlzb3Jp ZXNAc2NodXR6d2Vyay5jb20ACgkQGrXfkTIXLrsfVA/9Gl1qipXoGJB/01grCy2a r9FpwoVkM7LsRCev1w/6RHiBcHeSzxuIufMVd+HHGHmEr3ZwU3XEbuin3LGvuqdJ CEWHVfLxqMVDl2N0WE6mQYCI6tTPHKUSovYo8U9Nq8OA+lzLsOQpFckmPEqpw1gg 0nifTBsfQ9pe09hC3sOJJFywRrFBopSULyltY1UsORfD8Kf5QSTGS3Px/H2o5xeW 8FRoAzaggpJlDvKkEGMKPAGArVEyFLB9PckwYGo2OrmfaQXRv/YjkZiOM0JzvkIf tpvGMDqx3/3VYi/BIQK5a6iK06NrUn2+jpKFowXubeHh74vMbzm8r7JyoZOApB19 Z6y4p6tyWQPps4PZVFKursUoTnnOu5ERe+9btglxQ6RZuJsbJwBlXAbhL78ZJ307 zSqPQNs51Hf3j9Nn8z3dVZxjJO6ifTCL7cRXpkWpLX+T67CYQ83IPWLTJ1tc5az2 ogKQtG8BfYLVTnnavjENXAzmTLEYcx8mmkz5bPiK9gPq59VRWRrbgwvRuRjeJ7QC P3eFZSzH0+Fgr+7T9FX461lb+C8kX7nyh+dxiOGM09mZL+CIJKyWtsTrmQyyrRzO qhmV7nHV7VMQQKa+udQnRepgCTfWtNwcg/gx/9h11fKVwkE3w+Sdw8anzcHQbFH0 4R7MzYDSPi2iGERjgs4GSNo= =qFXH -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX Phone +49 731 977 191 0 advisories () schutzwerk com / www.schutzwerk.com Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors: Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391 Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Relationships
analysis GCVE-1988-2026-0432 (this record)

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GCVE-1988-2026-0431

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Server Technology PRO3X PDU 030600 port_mux listener program override to root command execution (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Server Technology (Legrand group) PRO3X series intelligent rack PDUs, firmware spdu-pro3x-030600 build 46640 (ARM 32-bit uClibc Linux). Type: authenticated listener program override leading to root command execution (CWE-78, CWE-269; a separate hard-coded factory credential is reported as CWE-798). PRO3X PDUs run port_mux, an inetd-style launcher that starts every protocol listener with fork + execv and never drops privileges, so listeners run as root. The executable path is proto_listener_entry.program in cfg_pmux.cdl, typed nctl_nspc_nempty_str_512, a free-form string with no whitelist, and an authenticated administrator rewrites it through setConfiguration (POST /J/cfg). Pointing the port 80 http listener at /bin/sh with arguments -c "<cmd>" applies at runtime: the next TCP connection to port 80 executes the attacker's command as uid 0. Scoring. This finding is dual-scored, with the conditional figure published alongside the primary: - PRIMARY, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. An authenticated administrator is required, and that gate was verified unbypassed. - CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Where the factory default administrator credential is left unchanged, unrotated units are open with no privileged secret. Impact: root (uid 0) on the rack power distribution controller, a critical-infrastructure power monitoring and control appliance. Full configuration control follows; the disabled modbus (502) and mbusd (503) listeners can be armed with attacker-chosen programs. Outlet switching and power cycling were not separately exercised by this proof-of-concept. Authentication: post-authentication administrator (with a shipped default administrator credential reported separately as CWE-798). Verification boundary, stated plainly. No physical PRO3X hardware was used, and the three-step HTTP chain (POST /J/auth, POST /J/cfg, then the TCP trigger) was NOT exercised end to end against a device. What was dynamically proven is the root execution primitive: port_mux fork + execv of an injected /bin/sh -c as uid 0, run twice inside a network namespace under qemu-arm-static against the rootfs unpacked from the firmware Squashfs, each producing a root-owned marker containing uid=0(root). Each link of the HTTP delivery path was confirmed component by component (httpd.conf routing, the BusyBox SCM_RIGHTS descriptor passing, the administrator credential accepted by auth_cli, and the configuration write accepted and read back through cfgc). SCM_RIGHTS descriptor passing between the separate httpd and jsonrpcd processes does not complete under qemu user-mode emulation, which is an emulation-environment limitation rather than a property of the vulnerability. Only this build was tested; no other build or model is claimed. Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/servertech-pro3x-port-mux-command-injection Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

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GCVE-1988-2026-0430

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Netsis NetOpenX REST 2.0.6.9 Unauthenticated SQL injection to xp_cmdshell SYSTEM command execution (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Logo Netsis NetOpenX REST 2.0.6.9 (also distributed as Netsis Nox REST), the REST API gateway of the Netsis enterprise ERP suite. Type: unauthenticated SQL injection in the OAuth 2.0 token endpoint leading to operating-system command execution via SQL Server xp_cmdshell (CWE-89, CWE-306, CWE-78). A single POST /api/v2/token carrying no client and no user credentials supplies a form field named idmuserid that is concatenated raw into a SQL statement by ServiceManager.GetIdmUserLastSessionInfo, issued before OAuthManager.LogIn actually validates the credentials. The backend is SQL Server, so a semicolon yields a stacked batch that enables xp_cmdshell and then runs an OS command. Scoring. This finding is dual-scored, with the stricter readings published alongside the headline rather than in a footnote, each against its own vector: - PRIMARY, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This is the recorded headline figure and it describes only the elevation tier, that is the configuration where the service's SQL login holds sysadmin, as it did in the verified environment. It is not a claim that command execution is available on every deployment. - CONDITIONAL, 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The same impact set under a stricter attack-complexity judgement that treats the sysadmin property of the service login, a deployment characteristic outside the attacker's control, as a condition of command execution. - CONDITIONAL lower bound, 7.5 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N. Where the service login is not sysadmin, the same request still yields unauthenticated blind SQL injection with data disclosure but no OS access. Impact: at the elevation tier, OS command execution on the ERP database host with the identity of the SQL Server service account (NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM in the verified configuration), meaning control of the ERP financial and accounting database, exfiltration of it, and a pivot into the internal network. The injection is blind at the HTTP layer. Authentication: unauthenticated. The pipeline registers no global authorization filter, the token endpoint is an OWIN middleware route on which action filters never apply, and the shipped SQL fragment blacklist is inert. Verification boundary, stated plainly. This was NOT verified against a stock installed product reached across a network. A complete Netsis ERP deployment was not achievable in the lab, so the chain was driven against a reconstruction of the product pipeline (the real OWIN Startup, OAuthConfig, WebApiConfig and authorization-server provider, hosted via WebApp.Start on loopback 127.0.0.1:8977, against a real SQL Server Express instance whose NETSIS login held sysadmin), with exactly one method body, ServiceManager.GetConnectionString, rewritten by a Mono.Cecil IL patch to clear a commercial licensing gate that is not a security boundary. The sink, the authentication logic, the routing table, the OAuth provider and the SQL concatenation were all left as unmodified product code. Because the reconstruction's listener was bound to loopback, remote network exposure is a code and deployment argument rather than an observed remote run. Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/netsis-netopenx-unauth-sqli-xp-cmdshell-rce Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

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GCVE-1988-2026-0429

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] MultiTech Conduit AEP 6.3.6 Authenticated import_config filename command injection to root RCE (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in MultiTech Conduit AEP (models mtcdt / mtcdtip / mtcdtiphp), IoT gateways running mLinux on ARM 32-bit. Type: authenticated OS command injection (CWE-78) through the uploaded filename of the admin-only upload_config command. The management API is served by lighttpd on TCP 8080 and proxied to the proprietary FastCGI daemon /usr/bin/rcell_api. The import_config handler wraps the client-supplied filename in single quotes to build import_config '<filename>' and runs it through MTS::System::cmd, which disassembly confirms is popen(cmd, "r"), that is /bin/sh -c. The multipart parser strips only surrounding double quotes and reduces the value to a basename; single quotes are never escaped, so a filename of x'; <CMD> ;# breaks out of the quoting. Scoring. Single base score, not dual-scored: - 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. PR:H because command/upload_config is granted only in the administrator permission profile. Impact: root command execution on a gateway that bridges constrained field devices with IP infrastructure (the daemon runs as uid 0), giving full filesystem read, configuration rewrite, persistence and pivot. The injected command output is redirected rather than echoed, so the injection is blind at the protocol level and confirmation rests on a server-side artefact. Authentication: authenticated administrator. No factory default credentials exist; the administrator account is provisioned by the deployer at commissioning. An exhaustive review of the unauthenticated surface found no route to this sink without a valid admin session, so the finding is scoped as post-authentication. Verification boundary, stated plainly. Verified end to end by emulation only: the root filesystem extracted from the AEP 6.3.6 firmware image was run under qemu-arm-static inside a chroot and started through its angel supervisor, with no physical Conduit device used at any point. Against the running daemon in socket mode with an admin session established from a non-loopback REMOTE_ADDR, the upload returned {"code":200,"status":"success","type":"upload"} and produced a root-owned marker containing uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root), while a benign filename returned HTTP 400 and created nothing. AEP 6.3.0 is evidenced by patch diff (the import_config handler is unchanged); the claimed range 6.3.0 through 6.3.6 follows from that endpoint comparison and the intermediates were not each executed. Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/multitech-conduit-import-config-command-injection Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Multitech Conduit AEP Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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GCVE-1988-2026-0428

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Lightstreamer Server 7.4.8 Unauthenticated JMX jvmtiAgentLoad native code execution (8.1)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Lightstreamer Server 7.4.8 build 3506 (with JMS Extender 2.1.0). Type: unauthenticated JMX inspection console allowing an anonymous caller to invoke any MBean operation, reaching jvmtiAgentLoad on com.sun.management:type=DiagnosticCommand to load and run a native agent library inside the broker JVM (CWE-306, CWE-345, CWE-20, CWE-250, CWE-1188) Scoring. This finding is dual-scored on one documented delivery precondition, and both figures are published rather than a single headline number: - PRIMARY, 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This is the conservative figure for an attacker with network access only: the agent library must be delivered to a filesystem path by means outside this endpoint. - CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This is the shipped-default exposure where the precondition is ALREADY satisfied, that is a native shared object is already reachable at a filesystem path the attacker names. Exploitation is then one deterministic HTTP request. The 9.8 figure is conditional, not the primary rating, and is not the headline. Impact: native code execution inside the Lightstreamer JVM as the service process, inheriting that process's full identity. In the verified deployment the process ran as uid=0(root), so the executed commands ran as root; root is not claimed to be a factory-mandated identity, it is whatever account launched the service. The shipping configuration sets <jmxtree_enabled>Y</jmxtree_enabled> and <dashboard><public>Y</public> even though the adjacent comments claim the default is N, and the only remaining check is a Referer header matching the target host, which any HTTP client forges. Authentication: unauthenticated (no credential of any kind). Verification boundary, stated plainly. We verified the MBean-invocation and native-code-execution legs against a research-host deployment reached over loopback (HTTP 200 with "return code: 0", marker files recording uid=0(root), and id/whoami commands chosen by the HTTP client at send time). The native agent library, however, was already present on disk, placed beforehand over an authenticated root session. jvmtiAgentLoad takes a filesystem path and fetches nothing (http:// and file:// were both treated as literal strings), so the fully remote chain including payload delivery is NOT demonstrated by this advisory; what is proven unauthenticated is the request leg, not the delivery leg. Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lightstreamer-unauth-jmx-jvmti-agentload-rce Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

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GCVE-1988-2026-0427

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Lightstreamer Server 7.4.8 Shipped placeholder JMX/RMI credentials plus MLet remote class loading to root RCE (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Lightstreamer Server 7.4.8 build 3506 ENTERPRISE (with JMS Extender 2.1.0). Type: a hard-coded placeholder credential shipped in the distribution (user_changeme / password_changeme) authenticating a cleartext RMI management connector on TCP 8888 bound to every interface; because the connector exposes createMBean, an attacker registers javax.management.loading.MLet and calls getMBeansFromURL against an origin they control, and the loaded MBean's constructor runs Runtime.exec (CWE-798, CWE-319) Scoring. This finding is dual-scored because remote reach depends on the shipped placeholder being left unchanged. Both figures are published: - PRIMARY, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This applies with the shipped placeholder credential unchanged, which is how the distribution archive delivers it (byte-identical to the deployed file, with no documented first-login rotation gate). - CONDITIONAL, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This applies where an operator has rotated the credential but createMBean and MLet remain exposed: the step then needs a genuinely privileged account. Impact: arbitrary command execution as the broker process user, which was root in the tested deployment. Configuration, TLS material and keystores, streamed application data and any other credential configured in lightstreamer_conf.xml are all reachable; the payload MBean stays registered for the JVM lifetime as a persistent command channel. Authentication: none beyond the shipped placeholder pair (empty and wrong credentials were both rejected with SecurityException, so the defect is the credential's provenance, not a bypassable check). Verification boundary, stated plainly. We verified the chain end to end over loopback against a broker unpacked from the distribution archive and started as root, with the attacker HTTP origin simulated on the same research host: four runs (three against the jmxrmi platform MBean server, one against the lsjmx application MBean server), an out-of-band HTTP access log proving a uniquely named JAR was really fetched rather than cached, runCmd returning uid=0(root) and a root-owned proof file. Remote cross-network reach is an assessment of the shipped bind topology (TCP 8888 binds 0.0.0.0 because <listening_interface> is commented out, with no host firewall rule dropping it), not an observed attack crossing a network boundary. The one genuine precondition is that the operator has not replaced the shipped placeholder pair. This is a distinct defect from the separate unauthenticated jvmtiAgentLoad primitive we are disclosing in the same product; it reaches code execution via remote Java class loading rather than a native agent load. Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lightstreamer-default-creds-jmx-rmi-mlet-rce Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

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GCVE-1988-2026-0426

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Lantronix SGX5150 9.13.0.0R7 Authenticated FsBrowseClean command injection to root RCE (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Lantronix SGX5150, firmware 9.13.0.0R7, an IT/OT device server. Type: authenticated OS command injection (CWE-78) in the FsBrowseClean AJAX handler (0x5eea0) of /bin/ltrx_evo. A per-character filter blocks & | < ; ! $ backslash backtick and > but permits single quote, hash and newline. The path POST parameter is concatenated into /sbin/ltrx_usb_umount '%s' and run through /bin/sh -c as root. Sending path=x'%0a<cmd>%20%23 closes the quoted argument, opens a new shell line carrying the attacker's command, and comments out the trailing quote. The sink is blind. Scoring. This finding is dual-scored, and the conditional figure is NOT verified, which is stated rather than glossed: - PRIMARY, adopted, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. PR:H rests on a genuine privileged web session being required. - CONDITIONAL, NOT verified, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Applies only if the device serial number is obtainable, which would make the factory administrator password (recorded as serial-derived) no secret and the chain effectively unauthenticated. Serial recovery was NOT verified, and neither was the derivation itself. - SEPARATE secondary defect, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, reachable only where Digest authentication is configured: the Digest username extractor at 0xff838 verifies no nonce, realm or response, so a forged Authorization: Digest username="admin" header alone sets the identity to admin. This is independent of, and not additive to, the primary finding. Scoring note. The research record attached 8.8 to the PR:H vector. That vector computes to 7.2, not 8.8 under CVSS 3.1; this advisory recomputes from the vector printed beside it and reports 7.2, keeping 8.8 only as a labelled PR:L hypothetical (no lower-privileged account passing the filesystem write test was enumerated, so it is not claimed). Impact: root execution on an industrial gateway (ltrx_evo runs as root), giving full read of configuration and serial traffic, arbitrary root modification, persistent implantation, total availability loss and a pivot into segmented networks. Authentication: an authenticated web session satisfying IsGroupListWritable(identity, "filesystem"); the session precondition is static analysis, not dynamically verified. Verification boundary, stated plainly. No physical SGX5150 hardware was used at any point; verification is sink-faithful rather than full-stack. The character filter, the IseUSB gate and the sink construction were replicated in a chroot of the extracted ARM rootfs under qemu-arm-static, and the injected newline vector passed the product's own filter and ran as root via the product's own /bin/sh and marker owned by root:root. End-to-end HTTP against a live daemon was not achievable, because ltrx_evo requires NVRAM state, the encrypted factory.xcr device-serial material and a ZMQ IPC stack that could not be reconstructed outside the device. Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/lantronix-sgx5150-fsbrowseclean-command-injection Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Lantronix SGX5150 Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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GCVE-1988-2026-0425

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] FME Flow 2026.2 Zip-Slip arbitrary file write to code execution as LocalSystem (8.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Safe Software FME Flow 2026.2 build 26333. Type: path-traversal write inside archive extraction (Zip-Slip) in COM.safe.web.upload.StoreManager.extract(), shipped in clients-webservicesutil-1.0.jar (CWE-22). The sink builds each destination path from ZipArchiveEntry.getName() verbatim; commons-compress 1.26.2 does not normalise "..", and the class's own canonical containment check isPathValid() is called only from the constructor, never from the extraction path. Scoring. This finding is dual-scored, and the conditional figure is a non-default configuration that is published alongside the primary, not instead of it: - PRIMARY, 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This is the post-authentication rating: any authenticated user, including the low-privilege fmeuser and fmeguest roles, can drive it. The upload branch that sets opt_extractarchive=true performs no role or isPermitted check. - CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. This applies only where a public app is published with requireAuthentication=false and allowTemporaryUploads=true, which is NOT a shipped default. The 9.8 figure is conditional and is not the headline. Impact: arbitrary file write anywhere the Tomcat process can write, outside the upload sandbox (create-only; an existing destination file is neither truncated nor overwritten). On a default single-machine Windows install the repository root and WEBAPPSDIR share one ancestor volume, so the write reaches an expanded web application's document root; with unpackWARs=true, no /* servlet mapping in fmeserver.war, and Tomcat installed as the FMEFlowAppServer service running as .\LocalSystem, requesting the dropped .jsp yields command execution as LocalSystem. This is a low-privilege-to-LocalSystem escalation. Authentication: authenticated (any valid token; no role check on the archive extraction branch). Verification boundary, stated plainly. We verified the vulnerable code itself, not a deployed installation. A harness compiled against the exact jars that ship with FME Flow 2026.2 called the real StoreManager.extract on a Linux lab host against Tomcat 10.1.42 on loopback; a zip entry name carrying enough "../" wrote a .jsp outside the sandbox and the container then compiled and executed it (marker recorded uid=0 on the Linux host). A complete Windows FME Flow installation was NOT deployed (it requires PostgreSQL plus a product licence), so the end-to-end HTTP delivery chain rests on the decompiled source rather than on a live run against the product. On Windows the Tomcat service identity is .\LocalSystem, established from installer artefacts (configureTomcat.bat and the MSI property FMEFLOWUSER=LocalSystem) rather than observed; the expected production marker is whoami = nt authority\system. This is distinct from the previously published HTTP path-traversal fixes in this product, whose ".." sequences travel in the request URL and are collapsed by the container's normalisation. Here the traversal travels inside zip entry names in the request body, which URL normalisation never inspects, so those fixes do not cover this vector. Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/fme-flow-zipslip-arbitrary-file-write-rce Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Safe Fme Flow Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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GCVE-1988-2026-0424

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
Title
[0day-rubbish] Cambium cnMatrix EX3024F 6.2.1-r4 SSL CSR COMMON_NAME command injection to root RCE (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the Cambium cnMatrix EX3024F managed switch, firmware 6.2.1-r4. Type: OS command injection (CWE-78, with CWE-20 bearing on it because percent-decoding is the only processing applied; CWE-250/CWE-269 bear on remediation priority). The COMMON_NAME form field submitted to POST /iss/specific/ssl_digitalcert.html is extracted by HttpGetValuebyName, percent-decoded by issDecodeSpecialChar, copied with strncpy(buf, COMMON_NAME, 100) and interpolated unfiltered into the double-quoted -subj "%s" argument of an openssl req command string that the management daemon ISS.exe hands to system(). Five functions stand between the HTTP parser and the sink and none validate the data. A subject of ";id;echo " closes the quote and injects a statement; the daemon runs as root, so the injected command does too. Scoring. This finding is dual-scored, with the deployment-conditional upper bound published alongside the verified baseline: - PRIMARY baseline, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. A valid administrative session is required; the page is gated by a server-side session table plus an administrator privilege check that is on by default. - CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. A deployment-conditional upper bound where an installation retains a default, weak or publicly known administrator password, a common condition for network switches; the privilege prerequisite collapses in practice while the technical chain is unchanged. The advisory does not adopt the recorded vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H with its paired 8.8, because the analysis documents an administrator-only check rather than any-low-privilege-user access, so PR:H (7.2) is the faithful metric. A 9.1 scope-changed reading is also rejected: the compromised OS and the daemon sit inside one authorization domain, the daemon being already root over that OS. Impact: root command execution on a managed switch, a forwarding-plane device rather than only a management plane: full compromise of configuration and keys, installation of a persistent backdoor that survives reboot, a pivot into adjacent segments, and live manipulation or denial of the traffic it carries. Authentication: post-authentication administrator. Verification boundary, stated plainly. Confirmation used an extracted firmware image under qemu-aarch64-static user-mode emulation. Because the daemon cannot complete initialisation without the Marvell switch ASIC driver and never binds an HTTP port in emulation, the real shipped sink function (SslGenCertRequest) was invoked directly under debugger control with the payload an HTTP POST would deliver; it returned 0 and wrote a 36-byte root-owned marker containing uid=0(root) gid=0(root). End-to-end HTTP exploitation against a device was NOT performed and no physical hardware was used. The five-handler HTTP-to-sink path is proven statically by decompilation and cross-reference, not by an observed network request. Any model or firmware revision beyond EX3024F 6.2.1-r4 is inference and unconfirmed. Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept: https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/cambium-cnmatrix-ssl-csr-command-injection Project archive (ongoing disclosure series): https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish The vendor has been notified through its published security contact. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet. -- 0day Rubbish Research Team disclosure () 0day-rubbish com https://0day-rubbish.com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Cambium cnMatrix EX3024F Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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GCVE-1988-2026-0423

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-10-02 04:57 – Updated: 2026-10-02 04:57
VLAI
Title
[NotCVE-2026-0019] game-music-emu through 0.6.5 VGM Command Interpreter Missing Operand Length Check Allows Heap Out-of-Bounds Read
Summary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- NotCVE Advisory — NotCVE-2026-0019 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- [-] Summary: An out-of-bounds read in the VGM command interpreter of game-music-emu (libgme), the open-source video game music emulation library, allows an attacker who supplies a crafted .vgm or .vgz file to read heap memory past the end of the buffer holding the file. The read happens as soon as playback begins. CVSS:3.1 5.4 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L). [-] Affected: game-music-emu (libgme) through 0.6.5 (present in 0.6.0, 0.6.3 and 0.6.5), and master as of commit fe8da4b. Default builds; no fixed version is verified. [-] Technical Description: The command loop of Vgm_Emu_Impl::run_commands() (gme/Vgm_Emu_Impl.cpp) is bounded only by while ( vgm_time < end_time && pos < data_end ) which validates the position of the opcode byte and nothing else. Each opcode handler then fetches its operands from pos unconditionally. The source records the gap in a TODO at the loop head: "be sure there are enough bytes left in stream for particular command so we don't read past end". When a command stream ends right after an opcode byte, the operand fetch crosses the end of the allocation made by Gme_File::load_(). Maximum over-read per handler: - PSG and Game Gear register writes (*pos++): 1 byte - 16-bit delay 0x61 (pos[0], pos[1]): up to 2 bytes - YM2413 and YM2612 register writes: up to 2 bytes - PCM seek 0xE0 (pos[0] .. pos[3]): up to 4 bytes - data block header 0x67 (pos[1], get_le32( pos + 2 )): up to 6 bytes The bytes read are consumed as sound-chip register data, so adjacent heap contents can influence the decoded audio (limited, indirect disclosure). AddressSanitizer aborts on the over-read; the researcher's two proof-of-concept files reproduce it at two sites (a trailing 0x50 PSG write and a trailing 0x67 data block header). Under a standard allocator a read of this size normally stays within the same chunk, so a crash is layout-dependent rather than reliable. No write, length control or code execution is shown. Reachability: VGM/VGZ support is in the default build. FFmpeg's libavformat/libgme.c calls gme_open_data() and then gme_start_track() inside read_header_gme(), so a server-side transcoder reaches the defect while merely reading a file's header. VLC exposes the library through its gme demux module, which handles VGM and VGZ. Weaknesses: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read CWE-126: Buffer Over-read CAPEC-540: Overread Buffers [-] Credit: Discovered by netspacer1124 (https://github.com/netspacer1124). [-] Full Details and Updates: https://notcve.org/notcve/NotCVE-2026-0019 [-] Main References: https://github.com/libgme/game-music-emu https://raw.githubusercontent.com/libgme/game-music-emu/0.6.5/gme/Vgm_Emu_Impl.cpp https://ffmpeg.org/doxygen/5.1/libgme_8c_source.html [-] About NotCVE: NotCVE (https://notcve.org) assigns public, timestamped NotCVE IDs to vulnerabilities not acknowledged by vendors. Vendor will not assign a CVE? Request a NotCVE: https://notcve.org/form/ · Contributors: https://notcve.org/hall/ _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Credits

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