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Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg

Governmental, Luxembourg

GNA-1

The Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (CIRCL) is a government-driven initiative designed to provide a systematic response facility to computer security threats and incidents.


Website
https://www.circl.lu
Email
info@circl.lu
GNA identifier
GNA-1 GCVE registry Recent publications

Recent vulnerabilities

355 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1

GCVE-1-2026-20236 (CVE-2026-133190)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:43 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:44
VLAI
Title
MISP CryptographicKey: Revoked PGP Keys Still Validate Protected Event Signatures and Key Revocation Sync Is Ineffective
Summary
MISP, a threat intelligence sharing platform, contains a vulnerability in its cryptographic key management for protected (PGP-signed) events. Two related defects allow a revoked PGP key to remain effective for signing and validating protected events. First, the validateProtectedEvent() method in the CryptographicKey model iterates over the event's stored cryptographic keys to verify a PGP signature but does not check the revoked flag on each key. A key explicitly marked as revoked is still used to validate signatures, meaning an entity whose key has been revoked can continue to sign protected events and have them accepted by the MISP instance. Second, the captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() method, responsible for synchronizing the key list when a sync user edits a protected event, contained a query bug (find('first') instead of find('all')) that caused only the first stored key to be considered. As a result, revocations of additional keys were never persisted, keys absent from the pushed list were not removed, and entries lacking an explicit fingerprint were mismatched and incorrectly deleted. Additionally, the revocation logic did not enforce the invariant that a revocation, once stored, is never lifted by subsequent pushes. A third minor issue: a signed protected event submitted without any cryptographic keys triggered an unhandled 500 error rather than a proper rejection response. Preconditions: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or edit protected events on the MISP instance. The impact is that revoked keys retain signing authority, key revocations propagated by sync partners are silently dropped, and the integrity of the protected-event trust chain is compromised. In a multi-instance MISP deployment, events signed by revoked keys can propagate to other instances, extending the integrity impact across the sync network.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 14:35 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-345 - Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
  • CWE-287 - Improper Authentication
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-19 14:35
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67.patch ad525a5a8146…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
eee1f8b675c5 fix: [security] Revoked keys no longer sign protected events, ad525a5a8146…
Fix summary

The fix enforces key revocation in signature validation by skipping any key whose revoked flag is set before attempting PGP verification. It corrects the key-sync query to retrieve all stored keys (not just the first), ensures revocations are persisted and never lifted by a subsequent push, properly removes keys absent from the pushed list, and computes a fingerprint for entries that lack one so they match their stored counterpart. A signed protected event with no keys is now refused with a proper error response instead of an unhandled 500.

Patch summary

In CryptographicKey.php: (1) validateProtectedEvent() now checks $supplied_key['revoked'] and continues (skips) if set, before calling verifySignature(). (2) captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() changes find('first') to find('all') so all stored keys are considered. (3) A pre-loop computes a fingerprint via extractKeyData() for pushed entries that lack one. (4) The revocation branch is restructured: it now saves only the revoked flag (id + revoked=1) and the condition uses !empty() checks to ensure a revocation is never lifted. (5) The $existingKey array access is flattened (removing the nested 'CryptographicKey' key). (6) deleteAll() is guarded with an empty check on $toRemove. (7) The no-keys error message includes the event UUID and the log entry uses event ID 0. In tests/testregressions.py: a new ProtectedEventKeyRevocation test class adds nine regression tests covering revoked-key rejection, unrevoked-key acceptance, revocation persistence, non-lifting of revocations, key removal, fingerprint-less entry match

CVSS rationale

AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application; the attacker interacts via the HTTP API. AC:L: exploitation requires only signing an event with a revoked key and submitting it; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: no special targeting beyond network reachability to the MISP instance. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add/edit protected events. UI:N: no victim interaction is required. VC:N: no confidentiality impact is evident. VI:H: integrity is significantly impacted because revoked keys retain signing authority and revocations are not applied, undermining the trust chain for protected events. VA:N: the 500-error issue is minor and does not constitute a meaningful availability impact. SC:N: no secondary confidentiality impact. SI:H: in a multi-instance MISP sync network, events signed by revoked keys can propagate to peer instances, extending the integrity compromise. SA:N: no secondary availability impact.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-345 The signature verification routine validated the cryptographic signature but failed to verify the authenticity/validity of the signing key by checking its revocation status. A revoked key was treated as a valid signing authority, which is a failure to fully verify data authenticity.
  • CWE-287 The system accepted a revoked key as a valid credential for signing protected events, effectively failing to authenticate the signer's current authorization status. The key revocation mechanism was bypassed.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-124 The revoked-key state is an exceptional condition in the key lifecycle that the application failed to handle correctly during signature validation and key synchronization. The attacker exploits the system's failure to treat a revoked key as an exceptional (invalid) state. This is the closest CAPEC pattern; a more specific 'key revocation bypass' pattern does not exist in the CAPEC catalog, so CAPEC-124 is the best available match.
  • CAPEC-100 The key-sync path is vulnerable to manipulation of the pushed key list: by omitting keys or crafting entries without fingerprints, an attacker can prevent revocations from being applied or cause valid keys to be removed. This is a secondary attack vector enabled by the same code defects. The mapping is approximate because the primary issue is a logic flaw rather than direct parameter injection.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit are assumed affected.
  • The attacker is assumed to be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or edit protected events; unauthenticated exploitation is not evidenced.
  • The secondary integrity impact (SI:H) assumes a multi-instance MISP sync deployment; in a single-instance deployment the secondary impact may be lower.
  • CAPEC-124 is selected as the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers cryptographic key revocation bypass, so the mapping is approximate.
  • The Co-Authored-By line for Claude Opus 5.5 is treated as a tool credit; it is unclear whether this represents AI-assisted development or a placeholder.
  • The 500-error issue (signed event without keys) is treated as a minor robustness defect subsumed under the primary revocation-bypass vulnerability rather than a separate issue.
  • CVSS AT:N is used because the only options are N or P; the attacker does perform active interaction (submitting a signed event), but no special passive observation position is required.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 5 11 medium 7
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-14 11:53 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (eee1f8b675c5c472fa73b41982824c0c17dd639e): fix: [security] Revoked keys no longer sign protected events, https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67.patch
  2. 2026-11-19 14:34 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67.patch

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GCVE-1-2026-20342 (CVE-2026-133188)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:32
VLAI
Title
MISP Protected Event Signature Bypass via Whitespace Injection in JSON Keys and Identifiers
Summary
MISP contains a vulnerability in the cryptographic signature verification of protected events. When a MISP instance signs a protected event for synchronization, it strips all whitespace from the JSON body before computing the PGP signature (preg_replace("/\s+/", "", $data)). The receiving instance performs the same whitespace-stripping before verification. Because the signature covers only the whitespace-free representation, a network relay positioned between two MISP instances can insert whitespace characters into JSON object keys (effectively renaming fields) or into identifier values such as UUIDs, timestamps, and distribution fields without invalidating the signature. The receiving instance accepts the modified event as authentic. The vulnerability affects the protected event synchronization path: event creation (EventsController::add), event editing (EventsController::edit), event viewing (EventsController::view1), and server-to-server pull synchronization (ServerSyncTool, Server model). An attacker with a network position to intercept and modify traffic between MISP instances can alter the semantic content of protected events while the PGP signature still validates, undermining the integrity guarantees that protected events are designed to provide. The fix introduces two complementary mechanisms. First, a post-verification scan rejects any received body that contains whitespace in JSON keys (except under Galaxy cluster 'meta' keys) or in identifier-like values (uuid, id, timestamp, distribution, date). Second, a new exact-byte signature scheme (x-pgp-signature-v2) signs the body as transmitted, without whitespace normalization. MISP 3.0 and later peers exchange this exact-byte signature; older peers retain the legacy whitespace-stripped signature. A signature_version field is embedded in protected events so that a 3.0 receiver refuses a body carrying that marker if only the legacy signature is present. Both mechanisms together close the whitespace-injection vector while preserving backward compatibility with pre-3.0 instances.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 14:26 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-347 - Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
  • CWE-345 - Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-19 14:26
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
patch set (2 sources) b81058778949…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
d5a3e9900708 fix: [security] Protected events refuse signed data with bd22e66a2c32…
18d0e9a77d0c fix: [security] Protected events are signed over their exact 4340f1f4d2e8…
Fix summary

The vulnerability is remediated by (1) adding a post-signature-verification scan that rejects protected event bodies containing whitespace in JSON keys or identifier values, and (2) introducing an exact-byte PGP signature (x-pgp-signature-v2) that covers the body as transmitted without whitespace normalization. MISP 3.0+ peers use the exact-byte signature exclusively; older peers retain the legacy whitespace-stripped signature. A signature_version marker in the event body ensures that a 3.0 receiver refuses a legacy-only signature for events that were signed over exact bytes, preventing downgrade attacks.

Patch summary

Patch 1 (d5a3e9900) adds a private method __hasUnsignedWhitespace() to CryptographicKey that recursively scans decoded JSON for whitespace in string keys (excluding 'meta' sub-keys) and in values whose keys match identifier patterns (uuid, id, timestamp, distribution, date). validateProtectedEvent() now calls this check after a successful signature verification and returns false with a log entry if unsigned whitespace is found. Patch 2 (18d0e9a77) extends signWithInstanceKey() and verifySignature() with an $exact parameter that skips whitespace stripping. A new signatureHeaders() method selects the appropriate signature header(s) based on the peer's MISP version. EventsController, ServerSyncTool, and RestResponseComponent are updated to emit and consume the x-pgp-signature-v2 header. The signature_version field is injected into protected event bodies. Server.php passes the v2 header to validateProtectedEvent(). A new test file ProtectedEventExactSignatureTest.php (339 lines) covers acceptance, rejection, and

CVSS rationale

AV:N: The attacker operates over the network, intercepting and modifying traffic between MISP instances. AC:L: Inserting whitespace characters into JSON is a simple, deterministic transformation requiring no special conditions. AT:N: The target does not need to be in a particular state; any protected event in transit is vulnerable. PR:N: The attacker does not require authentication to the MISP instance; a network relay position suffices. UI:N: No user interaction is required; the tampered event is processed automatically. VC:N: No confidentiality impact; the attack modifies data, not exposes it. VI:H: The attacker can rename JSON fields and alter identifier values (UUIDs, timestamps), changing the semantic meaning of protected events while the signature still validates. VA:N: No availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: The impact is confined to the receiving MISP instance's data integrity; no cross-scope or availability effects are evidenced.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-347 The PGP signature was computed and verified over a whitespace-stripped representation of the JSON body rather than the exact bytes transmitted. This allowed an attacker to modify the data (by inserting whitespace into keys or identifiers) without invalidating the signature, constituting an improper verification of the cryptographic signature's coverage.
  • CWE-345 The signature verification mechanism did not fully ensure the authenticity of the received data because the normalization step (whitespace removal) created a gap between the signed representation and the actual data, allowing undetected modifications.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-126 The digital signature mechanism was implemented over a normalized (whitespace-stripped) representation of the data rather than the exact transmitted bytes. An attacker in a relay position exploits this by inserting whitespace into JSON keys or identifier values, which survives the normalization and thus the signature check. CAPEC-126 is the closest match; uncertainty exists because the CAPEC catalog does not have a more specific pattern for signature-coverage gaps introduced by data normalization.
Assumptions to verify
  • The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern; the CAPEC catalog lacks a more specific entry for signature-coverage gaps introduced by data normalization before signing.
  • CVSS PR:N assumes the attacker only needs a network relay position and does not require authentication to either MISP instance; if the deployment requires authenticated relay, PR would be elevated.
  • CVSS VI:H assumes that renaming JSON fields or altering timestamps in protected events constitutes a high integrity impact; if the specific deployment treats these fields as non-critical, VI could be L.
  • The affected version boundary (< 3.0.0) is inferred from the patch's version_compare logic; the exact last affected release is not stated in the patch.
  • The Galaxy cluster 'meta' key exclusion from the whitespace scan means whitespace in meta keys remains a residual (documented) limitation, not a vulnerability.
  • SSVC technical_impact is set to 'partial' as the attacker can only insert whitespace, not arbitrarily rewrite event content; if field renaming has critical downstream effects in a specific deployment, 'total' may be more appropriate.
  • The Co-Authored-By line credits an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); inclusion as a remediation developer follows the explicit metadata but is atypical for CVE credit conventions.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 5 11 medium 7
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-13 11:25 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (d5a3e9900708e409bc9c517c57aa819883ca879e): fix: [security] Protected events refuse signed data with https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5a3e9900.patch
  2. 2026-11-17 13:37 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (18d0e9a77d0c1d790a1742d9d886bf033d303ac6): fix: [security] Protected events are signed over their exact https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/18d0e9a77.patch
  3. 2026-11-19 14:25 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5a3e9900.patch
  4. 2026-11-19 14:25 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/18d0e9a77.patch

{
  "containers": {
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        {
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
          ],
          "modules": [
            "app/Model/CryptographicKey.php",
            "app/Controller/EventsController.php",
            "app/Lib/Tools/ServerSyncTool.php",
            "app/Model/Server.php",
            "app/Controller/Component/RestResponseComponent.php"
          ],
          "product": "misp",
          "programFiles": [],
          "repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
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          "versions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "MISP contains a vulnerability in the cryptographic signature verification of protected events. When a MISP instance signs a protected event for synchronization, it strips all whitespace from the JSON body before computing the PGP signature (preg_replace(\"/\\s+/\", \"\", $data)). The receiving instance performs the same whitespace-stripping before verification. Because the signature covers only the whitespace-free representation, a network relay positioned between two MISP instances can insert whitespace characters into JSON object keys (effectively renaming fields) or into identifier values such as UUIDs, timestamps, and distribution fields without invalidating the signature. The receiving instance accepts the modified event as authentic.\n\nThe vulnerability affects the protected event synchronization path: event creation (EventsController::add), event editing (EventsController::edit), event viewing (EventsController::view1), and server-to-server pull synchronization (ServerSyncTool, Server model). An attacker with a network position to intercept and modify traffic between MISP instances can alter the semantic content of protected events while the PGP signature still validates, undermining the integrity guarantees that protected events are designed to provide.\n\nThe fix introduces two complementary mechanisms. First, a post-verification scan rejects any received body that contains whitespace in JSON keys (except under Galaxy cluster \u0027meta\u0027 keys) or in identifier-like values (uuid, id, timestamp, distribution, date). Second, a new exact-byte signature scheme (x-pgp-signature-v2) signs the body as transmitted, without whitespace normalization. MISP 3.0 and later peers exchange this exact-byte signature; older peers retain the legacy whitespace-stripped signature. A signature_version field is embedded in protected events so that a 3.0 receiver refuses a body carrying that marker if only the legacy signature is present. Both mechanisms together close the whitespace-injection vector while preserving backward compatibility with pre-3.0 instances."
        }
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            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
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            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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          "value": "The vulnerability is remediated by (1) adding a post-signature-verification scan that rejects protected event bodies containing whitespace in JSON keys or identifier values, and (2) introducing an exact-byte PGP signature (x-pgp-signature-v2) that covers the body as transmitted without whitespace normalization. MISP 3.0+ peers use the exact-byte signature exclusively; older peers retain the legacy whitespace-stripped signature. A signature_version marker in the event body ensures that a 3.0 receiver refuses a legacy-only signature for events that were signed over exact bytes, preventing downgrade attacks."
        }
      ],
      "title": "MISP Protected Event Signature Bypass via Whitespace Injection in JSON Keys and Identifiers",
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            "bcp-05-x-02": {
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                  "The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern; the CAPEC catalog lacks a more specific entry for signature-coverage gaps introduced by data normalization before signing.",
                  "CVSS PR:N assumes the attacker only needs a network relay position and does not require authentication to either MISP instance; if the deployment requires authenticated relay, PR would be elevated.",
                  "CVSS VI:H assumes that renaming JSON fields or altering timestamps in protected events constitutes a high integrity impact; if the specific deployment treats these fields as non-critical, VI could be L.",
                  "The affected version boundary (\u003c 3.0.0) is inferred from the patch\u0027s version_compare logic; the exact last affected release is not stated in the patch.",
                  "The Galaxy cluster \u0027meta\u0027 key exclusion from the whitespace scan means whitespace in meta keys remains a residual (documented) limitation, not a vulnerability.",
                  "SSVC technical_impact is set to \u0027partial\u0027 as the attacker can only insert whitespace, not arbitrarily rewrite event content; if field renaming has critical downstream effects in a specific deployment, \u0027total\u0027 may be more appropriate.",
                  "The Co-Authored-By line credits an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); inclusion as a remediation developer follows the explicit metadata but is atypical for CVE credit conventions."
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                "capecRationale": [
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                "draft": false,
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                "generatedAt": "2026-11-19T14:26:06.814235Z",
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                },
                "patchSha256": "b81058778949ad6e64fefc78c4a9806e7776068075a40a338d47eb1d26eafde6",
                "patchSummary": "Patch 1 (d5a3e9900) adds a private method __hasUnsignedWhitespace() to CryptographicKey that recursively scans decoded JSON for whitespace in string keys (excluding \u0027meta\u0027 sub-keys) and in values whose keys match identifier patterns (uuid, id, timestamp, distribution, date). validateProtectedEvent() now calls this check after a successful signature verification and returns false with a log entry if unsigned whitespace is found.\n\nPatch 2 (18d0e9a77) extends signWithInstanceKey() and verifySignature() with an $exact parameter that skips whitespace stripping. A new signatureHeaders() method selects the appropriate signature header(s) based on the peer\u0027s MISP version. EventsController, ServerSyncTool, and RestResponseComponent are updated to emit and consume the x-pgp-signature-v2 header. The signature_version field is injected into protected event bodies. Server.php passes the v2 header to validateProtectedEvent(). A new test file ProtectedEventExactSignatureTest.php (339 lines) covers acceptance, rejection, and",
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  "cveMetadata": {
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    "datePublished": "2026-11-19T14:31:05.261489Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-11-19T14:32:32.740Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:32:32.835040Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2.0"
}

GCVE-1-2026-20330 (CVE-2026-133184)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:23 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:23
VLAI
Title
MISP Push Mechanism Discloses Unpublished and Inaccessible Events to Remote Server
Summary
MISP contains an authorization and input-validation flaw in its event push mechanism. When a user with push permissions initiates a push of events to a remote MISP instance, the system fails to enforce two critical checks: (1) it does not verify that an event is published before including it in the push, allowing unpublished (i.e., not yet publicly shared) events to be transmitted to the remote server; and (2) it does not verify that the pushing user has read access to the event, causing events the user cannot fetch to be sent as empty event shells, thereby disclosing the existence and metadata of events the user is not authorized to view. Additionally, the remote server's reply selecting which offered events to accept is used without validating that the selected identifiers actually correspond to events in the offered set, potentially allowing the remote to reference events outside the intended scope. The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with push permissions on the source MISP instance and a configured push target. The security impact is unauthorized disclosure of confidential threat-intelligence data (unpublished events and events restricted by user permissions) to a remote MISP instance that should not receive them.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 14:21 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
  • CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-19 14:21
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/0a60e142b.patch 393b70d07120…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
0a60e142b048 fix: [security] A push target only picks from the events 393b70d07120…
Fix summary

The fix enforces three security controls in the push path: (1) an explicit check that the event's 'published' flag is set before the event is eligible for push, returning a descriptive error if it is not; (2) a guard that skips any event for which the pushing user's fetch returns empty, preventing transmission of inaccessible events as empty shells; and (3) validation of the remote server's event-selection reply so that only UUIDs present in the originally offered event list are accepted, discarding any identifiers the remote references that were not part of the push offer.

Patch summary

In app/Model/Event.php, a new early-return check is added at the top of uploadEventToServer() that rejects the push if $event['Event']['published'] is empty. In app/Model/Server.php, three changes are made: (a) in the push() loop, a 'continue' statement is added when fetchEvent() returns empty, skipping inaccessible events; (b) the lastpushedid fallback logic is corrected to preserve the existing value when both successes and fails are empty; (c) in getEventIdsForPush(), the remote's JSON reply is validated as an array, filtered to string values, and then cross-referenced against the UUIDs in the $request (offered events) array so that only UUIDs present in both sets are returned.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: The push occurs over the network between MISP instances. AC:L: Triggering a push is a standard user action with no special race or timing conditions. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: An authenticated user with push permissions is required. UI:N: No additional user interaction beyond initiating the push. VC:L: Confidential event data (unpublished events, events the user cannot access) is disclosed to the remote server. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact on the source. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: The remote server receives data but its own confidentiality, integrity, and availability are not compromised.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The push mechanism does not enforce that events are published or that the pushing user has read access before transmitting them to a remote server, constituting a missing authorization check on data egress.
  • CWE-20 The remote server's reply selecting events to accept is used without validating that the referenced identifiers belong to the set of events actually offered in the push request, allowing out-of-scope references.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-126 The MISP push mechanism relies on a trusted relationship between the source and remote MISP instances. The source trusts the push flow and the remote's reply without enforcing proper authorization (published status, user access) or validating the remote's selection against the offered set. The closest CAPEC is Leverage Trusted Relationship because the vulnerability arises from insufficient validation within a trusted inter-system data exchange. Uncertainty: no CAPEC perfectly captures 'missing authorization on outbound data push'; CAPEC-126 is the best available match for a trusted-relationship data-flow flaw.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit are assumed affected.
  • PR:L assumes the attacker needs a standard authenticated user with push permissions; if push is restricted to administrators only, PR could be H.
  • VC:L assumes the disclosed data (unpublished events, inaccessible event metadata) constitutes a low confidentiality impact; if the events contain highly sensitive threat intelligence, the impact could be higher.
  • CAPEC-126 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC precisely describes 'missing authorization on outbound data push in a trusted inter-system exchange.'
  • The remote server's ability to reference non-offered events (CWE-20 component) is assessed as low impact because the events would still need to exist and be accessible on the source; the primary impact is the authorization bypass (CWE-862).
  • The 'Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5' credit is included as listed in the commit metadata; its role as a remediation developer is inferred from the co-authorship line.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-13 09:02 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (0a60e142b048513ef48a103ef15ae56e3b679e0e): fix: [security] A push target only picks from the events https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/0a60e142b.patch
  2. 2026-11-19 14:20 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/0a60e142b.patch

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GCVE-1-2026-20268 (CVE-2026-133183)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:19 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:19
VLAI
Title
MISP: Remote Pull and Feed Operations Can Modify Sharing Group Metadata Without Organization Membership
Summary
MISP contains an authorization flaw in the handling of remote pull and feed operations. When a non-internal pull or a feed processes incoming data and encounters an existing sharing group, the application did not verify that the remote server's organization was actually a member of that sharing group before allowing the group's metadata to be updated. The captureRemote mechanism previously stored only a boolean flag indicating whether the link was internal, and the authorization check in captureSGExisting relied solely on that flag. For non-internal pulls and feeds, the check was insufficient: a remote server whose organization was not a member of the target sharing group could still cause the group record to be modified (for example, altering the local flag, the modified timestamp, or other group properties). A feed, which has no associated server organization at all, could likewise trigger an update to an existing sharing group's metadata. The security impact is an integrity violation: an authenticated remote entity with sync or feed privileges can alter sharing group attributes that govern how data is distributed among organizations, potentially changing the local flag or other access-relevant properties of groups it does not belong to. The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with the ability to initiate a pull or feed (a sync user or feed administrator) and a target sharing group that exists on the local instance. No unauthenticated access or user interaction is required.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 14:13 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-19 14:13
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/389ce674c.patch 74f3a4178ae1…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
389ce674c1f8 fix: [security] Pulls and feeds no longer update sharing 74f3a4178ae1…
Fix summary

The fix introduces a proper authorization check for remote capture operations. The captureRemote method now receives the full server context (or null for feeds) and stores both the internal flag and the remote organization identifier. A new __remoteMayUpdate method verifies that, for non-internal pulls, the remote organization is a member of the target sharing group (as owning org, in the SharingGroupOrg list, or via an all_orgs entry). For feeds (server is null), the update is always refused. When the check fails, the sharing group record is left unchanged while the pulled data still attaches to it, preserving data integrity without granting unauthorized metadata modification.

Patch summary

Three files are modified. In Feed.php, two calls to SharingGroup::captureRemote change the first argument from false to null, indicating a feed has no server context. In Server.php, the pull method now passes the full $server array instead of a derived boolean. In SharingGroup.php, the static $remoteCapture variable changes from a boolean to an associative array holding internal (bool) and remote_org_id (int|null). The captureRemote method signature changes from accepting a bool to accepting an array or null. A new private method __remoteMayUpdate is added, which returns true for internal links, and for non-internal links checks that remote_org_id is set, the group is not local, and the remote org matches the group's org_id, appears in SharingGroupOrg, or is covered by an all_orgs SharingGroupServer entry. In captureSGExisting, a guard clause is inserted before the existing update logic: if a remote capture is active and __remoteMayUpdate returns false, the method returns the existing group id without further

CVSS rationale

AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application; pulls and feeds are initiated over HTTP. AC:L: An attacker with a configured pull or feed simply triggers the operation; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with sync or feed privileges to initiate a pull or feed. UI:N: No victim interaction is required; the operation runs server-side. VC:N: No confidentiality impact is evident from the patch. VI:L: The integrity impact is limited to sharing group metadata (local flag, modified timestamp, org associations) being altered by an unauthorized remote entity. VA:N: No availability impact. SC:N/SI:N/SA:N: No evidence of impact on other systems; the modification is confined to the local MISP instance's sharing group record. SI is set to N rather than L because the patch does not demonstrate that the metadata change propagates to or alters the behavior of connected MISP instances; this is an assumption recorded below.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The application failed to verify that the remote server's organization was a member of the target sharing group before permitting metadata updates during pull and feed operations. The authorization check was simply absent for the non-internal remote case; only a boolean internal flag was stored and checked, with no membership validation.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-114 The remote sync user or feed process is granted the ability to modify sharing group metadata beyond what its organizational membership should permit. The authorization logic incorrectly treats any non-internal remote capture as having the same update rights as an internal one, or fails to distinguish between a remote entity that is a group member and one that is not. This is the closest CAPEC pattern to an authorization-logic flaw where the privilege boundary is miscalculated. Uncertainty: no CAPEC pattern precisely describes 'missing membership check on a shared resource update'; CAPEC-114 is selected as the best available match for an incorrectly scoped privilege.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit are assumed affected.
  • The PR:L assumption assumes the attacker must be an authenticated user with sync or feed privileges; the patch does not explicitly state the minimum role required.
  • SI:N assumes that modifying a local sharing group's metadata does not propagate integrity changes to remote MISP instances; the patch does not provide evidence of cross-instance impact.
  • The CAPEC-114 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC precisely describes a missing membership-authorization check on a shared resource update.
  • The patch commit date is 2026-11-12; the actual release timeline and fixed version are unknown.
  • The Co-Authored-By line credits 'Claude Opus 5.5' as a remediation developer; this is recorded as-is from the commit metadata without independent verification.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-12 11:53 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (389ce674c1f8596f247bccb76a35669da691bc3c): fix: [security] Pulls and feeds no longer update sharing https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/389ce674c.patch
  2. 2026-11-19 14:12 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/389ce674c.patch

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GCVE-1-2026-20316 (CVE-2026-133178)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:11 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:11
VLAI
Title
CSV Formula Injection in Case and Task Exports in flowintel
Summary
flowintel allows users with editor-level access to author case and task fields, including aggregated tags. When these records are exported as CSV, the field values are written verbatim into the output file. Because no sanitisation is applied to user-supplied text before CSV serialisation, an attacker can store values that begin with spreadsheet formula triggers (such as =, +, -, @, or their fullwidth Unicode equivalents, or leading control/whitespace characters). When a victim opens the exported CSV in a spreadsheet application (e.g. Microsoft Excel, LibreOffice Calc), the stored text is interpreted and executed as a live formula rather than displayed as literal text. This can lead to unintended data manipulation within the spreadsheet, potential data exfiltration via formula functions, or execution of downstream commands depending on the spreadsheet application and its configuration. The vulnerability requires the victim to actively open the CSV file in a spreadsheet application; the flowintel application itself is not directly compromised. Affected: <4.1.0
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-18 14:21 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-147 - Improper Neutralization of Input with Special Element Used for a Spreadsheet (CSV and DSL)
  • CWE-116 - Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , ≤ 4.0.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-18 14:21
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/adef89f5c82729da7bdf1c25b32ba8660b8376d5.patch 5c27997cbe9f…
Confidence
high
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
adef89f5c827 fix: [security] Neutralise formulas in case and task CSV 5c27997cbe9f…
Fix summary

A shared CSV cell formatter (csv_safe_cell) is introduced that detects formula-like strings—those beginning with =, +, -, @, their fullwidth Unicode variants, or leading control/whitespace characters—and prefixes them with an apostrophe so spreadsheet applications treat the content as literal text. All case and task CSV export rows now pass every cell value through this formatter before writing, while numeric and ordinary text values are left unchanged.

Patch summary

New file app/utils/csv_utils.py defines csv_safe_cell(value) which returns an empty string for None, prepends an apostrophe to strings that start with tab/CR/LF or whose lstrip()-ed form begins with =, +, -, @, or fullwidth equivalents (=, +, -, @), and otherwise returns the value unchanged. In app/tools/tools.py the _cases_to_csv function is modified so that both case rows and task rows are wrapped with a dict comprehension applying csv_safe_cell to every field before writer.writerow. The user manual (doc/user-manual.md) gains a note explaining the apostrophe-prefixing behaviour and that JSON exports preserve original text.

CVSS rationale

AV:N – exploitation occurs over the network via the web interface. AC:L – crafting formula-like text requires no special conditions. AT:N – no specific attack prerequisites. PR:L – the attacker needs editor-level access to create or modify case/task fields. UI:A – the victim must actively open the CSV in a spreadsheet application for the formula to execute. VC/VI/VA:N – the primary system (flowintel) suffers no direct confidentiality, integrity, or availability impact. SC:L – the secondary system (spreadsheet) may leak data via formula functions. SI:L – the secondary system's data integrity can be altered by injected formulas. SA:N – no availability impact on the secondary system.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-147 The patch directly addresses the case where user-controlled text is written into a CSV file without neutralising spreadsheet formula triggers (=, +, -, @, fullwidth variants, control characters). This is the exact definition of CWE-147.
  • CWE-116 More broadly, the CSV output encoding did not escape or neutralise special characters that carry meaning in the downstream consumer (spreadsheet application), fitting the general CWE-116 category.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-117 The patch neutralises spreadsheet formula injection via CSV export, which is the canonical CSV Injection attack pattern. An attacker stores formula-like text in application fields; when the CSV is opened in a spreadsheet, the formula executes. CAPEC-117 is the most specific and directly applicable pattern. Confidence is high because the commit message, code changes, and documentation all explicitly reference spreadsheet formula neutralisation in CSV output.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version range is not explicitly stated in the patch; the metadata field 'affected_version' contains the placeholder value '0'. All versions prior to commit adef89f5 are assumed affected.
  • PR:L assumes the attacker needs at least editor-level access to create or modify case/task fields, based on the editor_required decorator visible in the surrounding code. If the application allows unauthenticated case creation, PR would be N.
  • The CVSS secondary-scope impact (SC:L, SI:L) assumes the victim's spreadsheet application executes injected formulas; actual impact depends on the specific application and its security settings.
  • CAPEC-117 (CSV Injection) is selected as the closest match; if this CAPEC ID is not present in the target CAPEC version, CAPEC-66 (Leverage Executable Code) would be the next-best alternative.
  • The fullwidth Unicode formula triggers (=, +, -, @) are included in the fix, suggesting the developers considered non-ASCII bypass vectors; the CVSS does not separately account for this as it does not change the base score.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 8 11 high 5
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-06 09:54 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (adef89f5c82729da7bdf1c25b32ba8660b8376d5): fix: [security] Neutralise formulas in case and task CSV https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/adef89f5c82729da7bdf1c25b32ba8660b8376d5.patch
  2. 2026-11-18 14:21 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/adef89f5c82729da7bdf1c25b32ba8660b8376d5.patch

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GCVE-1-2026-20326 (CVE-2026-133177)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:11 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:11
VLAI
Title
MISP: Insufficient Authorization Allows Sync Users and External Feeds to Overwrite Organisation Details
Summary
MISP contains an authorization flaw in the sharing group capture logic. When a sharing group is re-captured with a newer modified timestamp and an updated roster, the application unconditionally overwrote the type, nationality, sector, and contacts fields of every organisation listed in the roster, including the host organisation. This behaviour was reachable by any user holding the perm_sync role, and additionally by any external server pulled from or any feed fetched, because those operations execute with the privileges of the site administrator who initiated them. As a result, a low-privileged sync user or a malicious/compromised external feed or pull source could silently corrupt organisation records on the receiving MISP instance without any site-admin or internal-sync authorization. The vulnerability does not disclose data or affect availability; the impact is limited to integrity of organisation metadata (type, nationality, sector, contacts). The fix restricts organisation detail updates to internal sync operations (pulls over links flagged as internal, or senders holding perm_sync_internal) and site administrators; all other sync, pull, and feed operations may only match existing organisations by UUID or create new ones, without modifying their stored details.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 14:09 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
MISP MISP Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-19 14:09
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/28120b549.patch d09428c54d1d…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
28120b549f6b fix: [security] Regular sync, pulls and feeds no longer edit d09428c54d1d…
Fix summary

The fix introduces a privilege gate on organisation detail updates during sharing group capture. A new static context flag (captureRemote) is set by Feed and Server pull code paths to indicate whether the capture originates from an internal link. A new authorization check (__mayUpdateOrgDetails) permits overwriting organisation fields only when the operation is an internal sync or the acting user holds perm_site_admin or perm_sync_internal. All other sync, pull, and feed operations are restricted to matching or creating organisations without editing their existing details.

Patch summary

In SharingGroup.php, a static $remoteCapture flag and captureRemote() wrapper are added; captureSG() now computes an $updateOrgDetails boolean via __mayUpdateOrgDetails() and passes it to captureSGOrgs(), which forwards it to Organisation::captureOrg() instead of the previous $force parameter. Feed.php wraps both downloadAndSaveEventFromFeed() and downloadFromFeedInitiator() in SharingGroup::captureRemote(false, ...). Server.php refactors pull() to detect the internal flag from the server record and wraps the actual pull in SharingGroup::captureRemote($internal, ...). A regression test class (OrganisationDetailsSyncScope) in tests/testregressions.py verifies that a plain sync user cannot modify org details, while an internal-sync user and a site admin can.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application; sync, pull, and feed operations occur over HTTP. AC:L: exploitation requires only pushing a sharing group with a newer modified date and a roster containing modified organisation details; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: no attack-target manipulation is required. PR:L: the attacker needs a low-privileged sync user account (perm_sync) or control of an external feed/pull source; no admin credentials are required. UI:N: no user interaction is needed; the overwrite occurs automatically during capture. VC:N: no confidential data is disclosed. VI:L: organisation metadata (type, nationality, sector, contacts) can be silently altered, a limited integrity impact. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: the impact is confined to the MISP instance's own organisation records with no cross-scope effect.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The sharing group capture path performed organisation detail updates without checking whether the acting user or data source was authorized to modify those fields. Any sync user, external feed, or non-internal pull could overwrite organisation records, indicating a missing authorization check on the write operation.
  • CWE-285 The authorization model did not distinguish between creating/matching an organisation and editing its details during sync, pull, or feed operations. The privilege boundary between regular sync users and internal-sync/site-admin users was not enforced for organisation field updates.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-114 The application incorrectly adjusted the effective privilege level during sync, pull, and feed operations: external data sources and low-privileged sync users were granted the ability to modify organisation records that should have been restricted to site admins or internal-sync users. The attacker exploits this over-privileged code path by pushing a sharing group roster containing modified organisation details. CAPEC-114 is the closest match because the core issue is that the application's privilege model did not correctly scope what operations a given role or data source may perform on organisation records. Uncertainty: no CAPEC pattern specifically describes data-integrity abuse via a sync/replication channel, so CAPEC-114 is selected as the best available approximation.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the fix is applied to the main development branch and the exact version boundary is unknown.
  • PR:L assumes the attacker holds a sync user account (perm_sync) or controls an external feed/pull source; if the attacker must first compromise a feed, the effective privilege requirement could be higher.
  • VI:L assumes that overwriting organisation metadata (type, nationality, sector, contacts) constitutes a limited integrity impact; if downstream consumers rely on these fields for access decisions, the impact could be higher.
  • CAPEC-114 is selected as the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically models data-integrity abuse through a replication/sync channel, so the mapping is approximate.
  • The Co-Authored-By line credits Claude Opus 5.5 as a remediation developer; this is recorded as it appears in the commit metadata but the role is inferred from the co-authorship context.
  • AT:N assumes no special conditions on the target are needed beyond a standard MISP deployment with sync, pull, or feed functionality enabled.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-12 08:26 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (28120b549f6b3949d7354731cd483cc1e436cf8c): fix: [security] Regular sync, pulls and feeds no longer edit https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/28120b549.patch
  2. 2026-11-19 14:08 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/28120b549.patch

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                "fixSummary": "The fix introduces a privilege gate on organisation detail updates during sharing group capture. A new static context flag (captureRemote) is set by Feed and Server pull code paths to indicate whether the capture originates from an internal link. A new authorization check (__mayUpdateOrgDetails) permits overwriting organisation fields only when the operation is an internal sync or the acting user holds perm_site_admin or perm_sync_internal. All other sync, pull, and feed operations are restricted to matching or creating organisations without editing their existing details.",
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                "patchSummary": "In SharingGroup.php, a static $remoteCapture flag and captureRemote() wrapper are added; captureSG() now computes an $updateOrgDetails boolean via __mayUpdateOrgDetails() and passes it to captureSGOrgs(), which forwards it to Organisation::captureOrg() instead of the previous $force parameter. Feed.php wraps both downloadAndSaveEventFromFeed() and downloadFromFeedInitiator() in SharingGroup::captureRemote(false, ...). Server.php refactors pull() to detect the internal flag from the server record and wraps the actual pull in SharingGroup::captureRemote($internal, ...). A regression test class (OrganisationDetailsSyncScope) in tests/testregressions.py verifies that a plain sync user cannot modify org details, while an internal-sync user and a site admin can.",
                "patchTruncated": false,
                "patches": [
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                    "patchSha256": "d09428c54d1d346e930e8bbf886cda9a96e024ec1011f70637284aae96a11a6f",
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                  },
                  {
                    "cweId": "CWE-285",
                    "rationale": "The authorization model did not distinguish between creating/matching an organisation and editing its details during sync, pull, or feed operations. The privilege boundary between regular sync users and internal-sync/site-admin users was not enforced for organisation field updates."
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    "datePublished": "2026-11-19T14:11:20.825698Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-11-19T14:11:33.323Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:11:33.418772Z",
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GCVE-1-2026-20319 (CVE-2026-133175)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:06 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:06
VLAI
Title
MISP Missing Authorization in Sync Proposal Endpoints Allows Cross-Event Data Access and Modification
Summary
MISP contains an authorization bypass in its server-to-server proposal synchronization mechanism. Two related flaws were identified: 1. The events/pushProposals endpoint located the target event by UUID without enforcing any access-control check. A sync user with perm_sync could push shadow-attribute proposals to any event on the local instance, including events with restricted distribution (e.g., distribution level 0, visible only to the owning organisation). The stored proposal also carried the sender-supplied event_uuid and event_org_id rather than the local event's actual identity, corrupting the data model. 2. When accepting an edit proposal (old_id != 0), the code resolved the target live attribute by UUID alone (Attribute.uuid = shadow.uuid) without scoping the lookup to the proposal's own event. A malicious sync user could therefore craft a proposal whose uuid matched an attribute in a different event; upon acceptance, the wrong attribute would be modified or deleted. The same unscoped lookup existed in the ShadowAttribute::acceptProposal path. Preconditions: an authenticated user with sync permission (perm_sync) on a MISP instance that participates in server-to-server synchronisation. The attacker must know or enumerate the UUID of a target event or attribute. Security impact: unauthorised read access to restricted events, unauthorised insertion of proposals onto events the user cannot see, and unauthorised modification or deletion of attributes belonging to other events. This compromises the confidentiality and integrity of threat-intelligence data across organisational boundaries within a MISP deployment.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 14:02 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
  • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-19 14:02
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch f2ec162442da…
Confidence
medium
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
19a5e8444ff2 fix: [security] Synced proposals reach only events the sender f2ec162442da…
Fix summary

The fix enforces proper authorization scoping at two levels. First, pushProposals now resolves the event through fetchSimpleEvent (which applies ACL) and the pull path uses a new __eventSyncedWithServer helper that verifies the event is actually shared with the syncing server before accepting proposals. The stored event_id, event_uuid, and event_org_id are taken from the local event record, not from sender-supplied fields. Second, a new findTargetAttribute method requires all three of Attribute.id, Attribute.event_id, and Attribute.uuid to match simultaneously, ensuring an edit proposal can only affect an attribute within its own event. Acceptance paths now reject the proposal if the target attribute cannot be resolved within the correct event scope.

Patch summary

In EventsController::pushProposals, the raw Event::find by UUID was replaced with Event::fetchSimpleEvent (ACL-aware) and the inline proposal-saving loop was extracted into ShadowAttribute::capture which now receives the already-authorized event and overwrites event_id, event_uuid, and event_org_id from the local record. In ShadowAttributesController::__accept and ShadowAttribute::acceptProposal, the unscoped Attribute::find by UUID was replaced with ShadowAttribute::findTargetAttribute which matches id + event_id + uuid. A new private method __eventSyncedWithServer validates that a pulled proposal's event is shared with the remote server (via distribution level, sharing group, or orgc ownership) before capture. pullProposals now pre-resolves and caches the authorized event per UUID. Regression tests (ProposalSyncScope) verify hidden events return the same response as missing events, stored columns reflect local identity, cross-event edit proposals are rejected, and duplicate/newer-version handling is correct

CVSS rationale

AV:N - MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L - the attack requires crafting a standard API request with a known/guessed UUID; no race conditions or special timing needed. AT:N - no prior data tampering required; the attack payload is the request itself. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with perm_sync. UI:N - no victim interaction needed. VC:L - the sync user can retrieve event data (including attributes) from events they should not see. VI:H - the user can modify or delete attributes in events outside their authorization scope, and inject proposals onto restricted events. VA:N - no denial-of-service impact evidenced. SC/SI/SA:N - impact is confined to the vulnerable MISP instance's own data; no cross-system impact is demonstrated by the patch.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The pushProposals endpoint and the pullProposals capture path did not verify that the sync user had access to the target event before storing proposals. The event was located by a user-supplied UUID with no ACL enforcement, allowing proposals to be attached to events outside the user's permitted scope.
  • CWE-639 The edit-proposal acceptance path resolved the target attribute using only the user-controlled UUID field (Attribute.uuid) without scoping to the event, allowing an attacker to reference an attribute in a different event and have it modified or deleted. The user-controlled key (uuid) was used as the sole discriminator for a sensitive operation.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-126 The sync user holds legitimate perm_sync privileges, but the application fails to correctly scope those privileges to the events and attributes the user is authorized to access. The attacker exploits the missing authorization boundary to perform actions (push proposals to restricted events, modify foreign attributes) that exceed the intended scope of their role. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of an authenticated user leveraging an authorization gap to reach resources outside their permitted set. Uncertainty: CAPEC-126 typically describes privilege escalation; here the user already has sync rights but the application's scoping is incorrect, making this a best-available match rather than an exact fit.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the fix is applied to the main development branch and the exact version boundary is unknown.
  • CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs only a standard sync-permission role; if the deployment requires additional administrative setup to enable sync, the effective privilege requirement may be higher.
  • CVSS VC:L assumes the attacker can observe event data in the API response; if the deployment suppresses event details in error responses, confidentiality impact may be lower.
  • CAPEC-126 is the closest available mapping; the exact pattern is an authorization-scoping gap rather than a classic privilege escalation, so the mapping is approximate.
  • The SSVC technical_impact of 'total' assumes the attacker can fully modify or delete target attributes; if the deployment has additional compensating controls (e.g., audit logging, backup restoration), the effective impact may be partial.
  • The patch does not specify whether the vulnerability is exploitable only during active server-to-server sync or also via direct API calls to pushProposals; both paths are fixed, suggesting both were vulnerable.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 medium 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-11 16:40 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (19a5e8444ff21a8304c5ac3bdd91f5dae9599472): fix: [security] Synced proposals reach only events the sender https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch
  2. 2026-11-19 14:02 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch

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GCVE-1-2026-20341 (CVE-2026-133165)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:00 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:00
VLAI
Title
MISP Object Reference Cross-Event Integrity Violation via UUID Scope Bypass
Summary
MISP contains an authorization and scope flaw in the ObjectReference model's captureReference method. When a user saves an event (via REST API, sync, or feeds), any object reference included in the payload is looked up by its UUID across the entire MISP instance rather than being scoped to the event being saved. An authenticated user with permission to add or edit events can therefore include the UUID of an object reference belonging to a different event—including events in other organizations that the user cannot view—and cause the system to overwrite that foreign reference's relationship_type, comment, deleted flag, and timestamp with attacker-supplied values. The affected reference is neither deleted nor recreated in the attacker's event; its fields are silently rewritten in place. This constitutes a cross-tenant integrity violation: data integrity of object references in events the attacker has no read or write access to is compromised. The vulnerability is reachable through any event save path (REST add/edit, inter-instance sync, feed ingestion) and requires only a valid authenticated session with event modification privileges and knowledge or discovery of a target reference UUID.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 13:57 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
  • CWE-640 - Weak Reference Resolution
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-19 13:57
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/c9bd0eff5.patch e307b313d1d2…
Confidence
high
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
c9bd0eff523b fix: [security] Event saves no longer rewrite other events' e307b313d1d2…
Fix summary

The fix adds an event-scope ownership check in ObjectReference::captureReference(). After locating an existing reference by UUID, the code now verifies that the reference's event_id matches the event currently being saved. If the UUID belongs to a different event, the reference is skipped (neither updated nor recreated in the saving event) and a warning-level system log entry is written recording the blocked operation, the target event ID, and the foreign event ID that owns the UUID.

Patch summary

In app/Model/ObjectReference.php, a nine-line guard is inserted in captureReference() immediately after the existing-reference lookup: it casts both the stored event_id and the incoming $eventId to integers and compares them; on mismatch it calls loadLog()->createLogEntry() with a 'warning' severity and a descriptive message, then returns true to skip the update. In tests/testregressions.py, a new ObjectReferenceCaptureScope test class (156 lines) is added with four test methods: (1) event add with a forged foreign UUID leaves the victim reference unchanged and does not create a copy; (2) event edit with a forged foreign UUID leaves the victim reference unchanged; (3) the owner can still update their own reference's comment and timestamp; (4) a genuinely new reference UUID is still created normally. The tests use two separate organizations and least-privileged users to verify cross-tenant isolation.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application with a REST API. AC:L: the attacker only needs to include a known or discovered UUID in a standard event save payload; no race conditions or special timing required. AT:N: no need to intercept or tamper with in-transit data. PR:L: requires an authenticated user with permission to add or edit events (least-privileged role suffices per the regression tests). UI:N: no victim interaction needed. VC:N: the attack writes to records; no confidentiality impact is demonstrated. VI:H: multiple fields (relationship_type, comment, deleted, timestamp) on foreign references can be overwritten, corrupting data integrity. VA:N: setting the deleted flag is a data modification, not a service denial. SC:N: no impact on external systems' confidentiality. SI:H: integrity of data belonging to other organizations within the same MISP instance is compromised. SA:N: no security-functionality impact on other components.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-639 The object reference UUID is a user-supplied key used to look up and modify a record. The lookup was performed without verifying that the record belongs to the event (and by extension the organization) of the authenticated user, allowing modification of records outside the user's authorization scope.
  • CWE-640 The reference UUID was resolved against the entire instance's object references table rather than being constrained to the event being saved, resulting in resolution to an unintended record in a different event/organization.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-114 The attacker manipulates the UUID parameter within a legitimate event save request to target a different object reference record. The application trusts the UUID as a direct pointer without validating ownership scope. CAPEC-114 is the closest match because the core technique is supplying a crafted identifier parameter to redirect a write operation to an unintended resource. Uncertainty: no dedicated CAPEC exists for cross-tenant IDOR via UUID; CAPEC-114 is the best available approximation.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit are assumed affected.
  • PR:L assumes the attacker needs only a standard authenticated user with event add/edit permission; the regression tests confirm a least-privileged role suffices.
  • The CAPEC-114 mapping is an approximation; no CAPEC specifically covers cross-tenant IDOR via UUID in a multi-tenant application.
  • VC:N assumes the attack does not enable reading foreign reference data; the patch evidence shows only write/overwrite impact.
  • VA:N assumes setting the 'deleted' flag on a reference is an integrity modification rather than an availability denial; the reference record still exists in the database.
  • The commit date of 2026-11-11 is taken at face value from the patch metadata.
  • No evidence of active exploitation or public PoC was found in the patch or metadata; SSVC exploitation is set to 'none'.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 6 11 high 7
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-11 13:24 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (c9bd0eff523b6936b66923830c1c26fe3bee3d53): fix: [security] Event saves no longer rewrite other events' https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/c9bd0eff5.patch
  2. 2026-11-19 13:56 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/c9bd0eff5.patch

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GCVE-1-2026-20180 (CVE-2026-133163)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 13:51 – Updated: 2026-11-19 13:55
VLAI
Title
MISP: External Sync User Can Modify Protected Events Without Signature via Multiple Write Routes
Summary
MISP contains an authorization bypass affecting the event protection mechanism. In MISP, a protected event is designed to be modifiable only through the events/edit endpoint with a valid cryptographic signature. However, the protection check was enforced solely on that single route. All other write endpoints that operate on an event—attributes (add, edit, delete), objects (delete), events (populate, publish, unprotect, upload_sample, upload_analysis_file), tags (attach, detach), event reports (edit, delete), galaxy clusters (attach, detach), and cryptographic keys (add, delete)—lacked the equivalent check. As a result, an authenticated user holding the sync permission (perm_sync) who is neither a site administrator nor an internal sync user (perm_sync_internal), and who belongs to the same organization as the event's creator (orgc_id), could modify, delete, or add data to a protected event without providing a valid signature. This included the ability to unprotect the event entirely, publish it to other instances, and add cryptographic signing keys that would subsequently permit signed edits, effectively nullifying the protection mechanism. The vulnerability requires an authenticated sync user account within the event's creator organization. No user interaction or special network conditions are required; standard API calls to the affected endpoints are sufficient. The security impact is a loss of integrity over protected threat-intelligence events: an attacker can inject, alter, or remove attributes, objects, tags, reports, and galaxy cluster associations, and can remove the protection flag or add signing keys to enable persistent unauthorized modification.
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-19 13:50 UTC
CWE
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.51 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-19 13:50
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719.patch 5b0f387b75bb…
Confidence
high
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
e4fa7371938d fix: [security] Sync users change protected events only 5b0f387b75bb…
Fix summary

A shared authorization check (isProtectedFromSyncUser / assertNotProtectedFromSyncUser) was introduced in the Event model and enforced across all write paths. The check denies any non-internal, non-site-admin sync user from modifying a protected event through any route other than events/edit with a valid signature. The check is now invoked in the ACL component (modify, publish, tag), in the CryptographicKeys, Events, and Tags controllers, and in the Event, EventReport, Galaxy, and MispAttribute models, closing every previously unprotected write path.

Patch summary

Added Event::isProtectedFromSyncUser() and Event::assertNotProtectedFromSyncUser() methods that return true / throw ForbiddenException when the user has perm_sync but lacks perm_site_admin and perm_sync_internal, and the target event has protected=1. Inserted calls to these methods in: ACLComponent::canModifyEvent(), canPublishEvent(), canModifyTag(); CryptographicKeysController::add() and delete(); EventsController::populate(), upload_sample(), upload_analysis_file(); TagsController::__findObjectByUuid(); Event::userCanModifyEvent() and upload_stix(); EventReport::fetchIfAuthorized(); Galaxy::detachCluster() and detachClusterByTagId(); MispAttribute::deleteAttribute(). Also added the 'protected' field to the event query in upload_sample. Added a comprehensive regression test class (ProtectedEventSyncWrites) covering all affected routes plus control tests for internal sync users, org admins, and post-unprotect behavior.

CVSS rationale

AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: Exploitation requires only standard API calls with a valid sync user token; no race conditions, timing, or special configuration needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: An authenticated user with the sync permission (not site admin, not internal sync) in the event's creator organization is required. UI:N: No victim interaction is needed. VC:N: The sync user already has read access to the event; no additional confidentiality exposure. VI:H: The attacker can fully modify, delete, add, and unprotect event data, completely defeating the integrity guarantee of the protection mechanism. VA:N: No denial-of-service impact is evident. SC/SI/SA:N: No evidence in the patch of direct impact on subsequent systems; cross-instance impact via publish is possible but not explicitly addressed in the patch evidence.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-862 The event protection authorization check was present only on the events/edit route. All other write endpoints (attributes, objects, populate, publish, unprotect, tags, reports, galaxy clusters, cryptographic keys) lacked the equivalent check, allowing a sync user to bypass the protection mechanism entirely.
  • CWE-285 The authorization logic did not correctly account for the combination of sync-user role and event protection state across all code paths, resulting in an inconsistent enforcement of the protection policy.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-66 The access control policy for protected events was incorrectly configured: the protection check was applied to only one of many write endpoints. An attacker with a valid sync user account exploited the missing checks on the remaining endpoints to modify protected events. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of a partially enforced access control rule. Uncertainty: CAPEC-66 is a broad category; a more specific sub-pattern for 'inconsistent authorization enforcement across endpoints' does not exist in the CAPEC taxonomy, so this is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
  • Affected version range is unspecified; the patch does not include version tags or release boundaries. All MISP versions prior to this commit are assumed affected.
  • CVSS SI (subsequent system integrity) is set to N. In practice, a modified protected event could be published to other MISP instances, potentially affecting them, but the patch does not explicitly address or evidence this cross-instance impact.
  • CAPEC-66 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC specifically covers 'inconsistent authorization enforcement across multiple endpoints of the same application'.
  • The assumption that the attacker must belong to the same organization as the event creator (orgc_id match) is based on the existing perm_modify_org and perm_publish checks that were already present; the new check is an additional gate on top of those.
  • The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); it is listed as a tool credit rather than a human remediation developer.
  • The commit date (2026-11-11) is taken at face value from the patch metadata.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 7 11 high 6
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-11 12:12 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e4fa7371938d51840ad098e3f727b74f1b5b0831): fix: [security] Sync users change protected events only https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719.patch
  2. 2026-11-19 13:49 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719.patch

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GCVE-1-2026-20314 (CVE-2026-133157)

Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 13:42 – Updated: 2026-11-19 13:42
VLAI
Title
CSV Formula Injection in Audit Log CSV Exports in flowintel
Summary
flowintel contains a CSV injection vulnerability in its audit log CSV export functionality. Attacker-influenced text recorded in audit logs could be interpreted as spreadsheet formulas when an administrator opened the exported CSV file in a spreadsheet application. The vulnerable behavior allowed an attacker who could influence audit log content (for example by generating network traffic that is captured and logged) to embed formula-like strings (such as =CMD() or =HYPERLINK()) into audit entries. When the resulting CSV export was opened in a spreadsheet application, these strings could be executed as formulas, potentially leading to data exfiltration, data manipulation, or execution of further malicious actions within the spreadsheet context. Preconditions: - An attacker must be able to influence content that is recorded in flowintel audit logs. - An administrator or user must export the audit logs to CSV and open the file in a spreadsheet application that interprets formulas. Security impact: - Potential information disclosure from the spreadsheet or linked resources. - Potential integrity impact on data within the spreadsheet application. - No direct compromise of the flowintel application itself. Affected version: <4.1.0
SSVC
Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial
Supplier · CNA (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-11-18 14:21 UTC
CWE
  • CWE-1236 - Formula Injection
  • CWE-74 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component
Assigner
CIRCL GNA GNA-1
GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
flowintel flowintel Affected: 0 , ≤ 4.0.0 (semver)
    cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Create a notification for this product.
GCVE extensions
bcp-05-x-01
AI-assisted vulnerability information annotation
GCVE-BCP-05-X-01
Whole record AI-generated Human-reviewed GNA-1

Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.

ai-computer-assisted:llm-generatedai-computer-assisted:classification
Model Source Identifier
qwen3.8:27b ollama qwen3.8:27b
bcp-05-x-02
Patch-to-vulnerability generation provenance
GCVE-BCP-05-X-02
Generator
patch2vuln.py on 2026-11-18 14:21
Model
qwen3.8:27b
Input
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/25ad65000e62ee68a1a3444aeec73bd258189951.patch 985a4b0d9641…
Confidence
high
Commit Subject Patch SHA-256
25ad65000e62 fix: [security] Neutralise formulas in audit log CSV exports 985a4b0d9641…
Fix summary

The audit log CSV export now routes all cell values through a shared literal-text formatter (csv_safe_cell) that neutralises formula-like content by prefixing it with an apostrophe, ensuring the text is treated as inert data when opened in a spreadsheet application. Typed numeric values and JSON exports remain unaffected.

Patch summary

In app/tools/audit_logs_core.py, the rows_to_csv function was modified to import and apply csv_safe_cell from ..utils/csv_utils to every cell value before writing to the CSV writer, replacing the previous raw value pass-through. The user manual (doc/user-manual.md) was updated to explicitly state that the formula-protection behaviour also applies to audit-log CSV exports.

CVSS rationale

AV:N because the attacker-influenced content enters via network traffic captured by flowintel. AC:L because crafting a formula-like string in logged data is straightforward. AT:N because no special race or timing conditions are required. PR:N because the attacker does not need an account in flowintel to generate traffic that is logged. UI:A because an administrator must actively open the CSV in a spreadsheet application for the formula to execute. VC/VI/VA are N because the flowintel application itself is not compromised. SC:L and SI:L reflect the potential for a spreadsheet formula to read or modify data in the adjacent spreadsheet context. SA:N because there is no evidence of availability impact on the adjacent component.

Weakness rationale
  • CWE-1236 The vulnerability allows attacker-controlled text to be written into a CSV file without neutralisation, so that spreadsheet applications interpret the text as executable formulas. This is the precise definition of formula injection.
  • CWE-74 The CSV output is consumed by a downstream component (spreadsheet application) that interprets special characters (leading =, +, -, @) as formula delimiters. The product failed to neutralise these special elements before output.
Attack pattern rationale
  • CAPEC-119 CAPEC-119 directly describes the technique of injecting malicious formulas or commands into CSV files that are later opened in spreadsheet applications. The patch evidence (attacker-influenced audit text becoming spreadsheet formulas in a CSV export) is a textbook instance of this attack pattern. No uncertainty in this mapping.
Assumptions to verify
  • The affected version is recorded as '0' from the explicit context; no specific version range or fixed version is provided in the patch metadata.
  • The assumption that the attacker can influence audit log content via network traffic is inferred from the commit message stating 'Attacker-influenced audit text'; the exact mechanism of influence is not detailed in the patch.
  • CVSS impact on adjacent components (SC:L, SI:L) assumes the spreadsheet formula could read or modify data; the patch does not specify the exact capabilities of the injected formulas.
  • The csv_safe_cell utility was introduced for a prior finding (F142) and is assumed to correctly neutralise all formula-triggering characters (=, +, -, @, tab, newline).
  • CAPEC-119 mapping is considered high-confidence; no uncertainty noted.
Model comparison

Selected qwen3.8:27b by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.

Model Score Agreement Confidence Assumptions
qwen3.8:27b 8 11 high 5
bcp-05-x-03
Vulnerability handling and disclosure timeline
GCVE-BCP-05-X-03
  1. 2026-11-06 09:54 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (25ad65000e62ee68a1a3444aeec73bd258189951): fix: [security] Neutralise formulas in audit log CSV exports https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/25ad65000e62ee68a1a3444aeec73bd258189951.patch
  2. 2026-11-18 14:20 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/25ad65000e62ee68a1a3444aeec73bd258189951.patch

{
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          "product": "flowintel",
          "programFiles": [
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          "repo": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel",
          "vendor": "flowintel",
          "versions": [
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              "lessThanOrEqual": "4.0.0",
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              "operator": "OR"
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      "credits": [
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          "type": "reporter",
          "value": "elhoim"
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      "descriptions": [
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          "value": "flowintel contains a CSV injection vulnerability in its audit log CSV export functionality. Attacker-influenced text recorded in audit logs could be interpreted as spreadsheet formulas when an administrator opened the exported CSV file in a spreadsheet application.\n\nThe vulnerable behavior allowed an attacker who could influence audit log content (for example by generating network traffic that is captured and logged) to embed formula-like strings (such as =CMD() or =HYPERLINK()) into audit entries. When the resulting CSV export was opened in a spreadsheet application, these strings could be executed as formulas, potentially leading to data exfiltration, data manipulation, or execution of further malicious actions within the spreadsheet context.\n\nPreconditions:\n- An attacker must be able to influence content that is recorded in flowintel audit logs.\n- An administrator or user must export the audit logs to CSV and open the file in a spreadsheet application that interprets formulas.\n\nSecurity impact:\n- Potential information disclosure from the spreadsheet or linked resources.\n- Potential integrity impact on data within the spreadsheet application.\n- No direct compromise of the flowintel application itself.\n\nAffected version: \u003c4.1.0"
        }
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            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
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            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
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            "subIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
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            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
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      "problemTypes": [
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      ],
      "solutions": [
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          "value": "The audit log CSV export now routes all cell values through a shared literal-text formatter (csv_safe_cell) that neutralises formula-like content by prefixing it with an apostrophe, ensuring the text is treated as inert data when opened in a spreadsheet application. Typed numeric values and JSON exports remain unaffected."
        }
      ],
      "title": "CSV Formula Injection in Audit Log CSV Exports in flowintel",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "extensions": {
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                  "The affected version is recorded as \u00270\u0027 from the explicit context; no specific version range or fixed version is provided in the patch metadata.",
                  "The assumption that the attacker can influence audit log content via network traffic is inferred from the commit message stating \u0027Attacker-influenced audit text\u0027; the exact mechanism of influence is not detailed in the patch.",
                  "CVSS impact on adjacent components (SC:L, SI:L) assumes the spreadsheet formula could read or modify data; the patch does not specify the exact capabilities of the injected formulas.",
                  "The csv_safe_cell utility was introduced for a prior finding (F142) and is assumed to correctly neutralise all formula-triggering characters (=, +, -, @, tab, newline).",
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                "cvssRationale": "AV:N because the attacker-influenced content enters via network traffic captured by flowintel. AC:L because crafting a formula-like string in logged data is straightforward. AT:N because no special race or timing conditions are required. PR:N because the attacker does not need an account in flowintel to generate traffic that is logged. UI:A because an administrator must actively open the CSV in a spreadsheet application for the formula to execute. VC/VI/VA are N because the flowintel application itself is not compromised. SC:L and SI:L reflect the potential for a spreadsheet formula to read or modify data in the adjacent spreadsheet context. SA:N because there is no evidence of availability impact on the adjacent component.",
                "fixSummary": "The audit log CSV export now routes all cell values through a shared literal-text formatter (csv_safe_cell) that neutralises formula-like content by prefixing it with an apostrophe, ensuring the text is treated as inert data when opened in a spreadsheet application. Typed numeric values and JSON exports remain unaffected.",
                "generatedAt": "2026-11-18T14:21:08.189351Z",
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                "modelComparison": {
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                  "selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
                  "selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
                },
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                "weaknessRationale": [
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                  },
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                    "cweId": "CWE-74",
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            "bcp-05-x-03": {
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                    "description": "Corrective change authored (25ad65000e62ee68a1a3444aeec73bd258189951): fix: [security] Neutralise formulas in audit log CSV exports",
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  "cveMetadata": {
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-133157",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-19T13:42:04.260146Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-11-19T13:42:50.926Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T13:42:51.950405Z",
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}
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