GCVE-1-2026-20319 (CVE-2026-133175)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:06 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:06| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-19 14:02 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch
f2ec162442da… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
19a5e8444ff2
|
fix: [security] Synced proposals reach only events the sender | f2ec162442da… |
Fix summary
The fix enforces proper authorization scoping at two levels. First, pushProposals now resolves the event through fetchSimpleEvent (which applies ACL) and the pull path uses a new __eventSyncedWithServer helper that verifies the event is actually shared with the syncing server before accepting proposals. The stored event_id, event_uuid, and event_org_id are taken from the local event record, not from sender-supplied fields. Second, a new findTargetAttribute method requires all three of Attribute.id, Attribute.event_id, and Attribute.uuid to match simultaneously, ensuring an edit proposal can only affect an attribute within its own event. Acceptance paths now reject the proposal if the target attribute cannot be resolved within the correct event scope.
Patch summary
In EventsController::pushProposals, the raw Event::find by UUID was replaced with Event::fetchSimpleEvent (ACL-aware) and the inline proposal-saving loop was extracted into ShadowAttribute::capture which now receives the already-authorized event and overwrites event_id, event_uuid, and event_org_id from the local record. In ShadowAttributesController::__accept and ShadowAttribute::acceptProposal, the unscoped Attribute::find by UUID was replaced with ShadowAttribute::findTargetAttribute which matches id + event_id + uuid. A new private method __eventSyncedWithServer validates that a pulled proposal's event is shared with the remote server (via distribution level, sharing group, or orgc ownership) before capture. pullProposals now pre-resolves and caches the authorized event per UUID. Regression tests (ProposalSyncScope) verify hidden events return the same response as missing events, stored columns reflect local identity, cross-event edit proposals are rejected, and duplicate/newer-version handling is correct
CVSS rationale
AV:N - MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L - the attack requires crafting a standard API request with a known/guessed UUID; no race conditions or special timing needed. AT:N - no prior data tampering required; the attack payload is the request itself. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with perm_sync. UI:N - no victim interaction needed. VC:L - the sync user can retrieve event data (including attributes) from events they should not see. VI:H - the user can modify or delete attributes in events outside their authorization scope, and inject proposals onto restricted events. VA:N - no denial-of-service impact evidenced. SC/SI/SA:N - impact is confined to the vulnerable MISP instance's own data; no cross-system impact is demonstrated by the patch.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The pushProposals endpoint and the pullProposals capture path did not verify that the sync user had access to the target event before storing proposals. The event was located by a user-supplied UUID with no ACL enforcement, allowing proposals to be attached to events outside the user's permitted scope.
- CWE-639 The edit-proposal acceptance path resolved the target attribute using only the user-controlled UUID field (Attribute.uuid) without scoping to the event, allowing an attacker to reference an attribute in a different event and have it modified or deleted. The user-controlled key (uuid) was used as the sole discriminator for a sensitive operation.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The sync user holds legitimate perm_sync privileges, but the application fails to correctly scope those privileges to the events and attributes the user is authorized to access. The attacker exploits the missing authorization boundary to perform actions (push proposals to restricted events, modify foreign attributes) that exceed the intended scope of their role. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of an authenticated user leveraging an authorization gap to reach resources outside their permitted set. Uncertainty: CAPEC-126 typically describes privilege escalation; here the user already has sync rights but the application's scoping is incorrect, making this a best-available match rather than an exact fit.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the fix is applied to the main development branch and the exact version boundary is unknown.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs only a standard sync-permission role; if the deployment requires additional administrative setup to enable sync, the effective privilege requirement may be higher.
- CVSS VC:L assumes the attacker can observe event data in the API response; if the deployment suppresses event details in error responses, confidentiality impact may be lower.
- CAPEC-126 is the closest available mapping; the exact pattern is an authorization-scoping gap rather than a classic privilege escalation, so the mapping is approximate.
- The SSVC technical_impact of 'total' assumes the attacker can fully modify or delete target attributes; if the deployment has additional compensating controls (e.g., audit logging, backup restoration), the effective impact may be partial.
- The patch does not specify whether the vulnerability is exploitable only during active server-to-server sync or also via direct API calls to pushProposals; both paths are fixed, suggesting both were vulnerable.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-11 16:40 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (19a5e8444ff21a8304c5ac3bdd91f5dae9599472): fix: [security] Synced proposals reach only events the sender https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch
- 2026-11-19 14:02 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"modules": [
"EventsController (pushProposals)",
"ShadowAttributesController (__accept)",
"ShadowAttribute model (capture, pullProposals, acceptProposal)"
],
"product": "misp",
"programFiles": [
"app/Controller/EventsController.php",
"app/Controller/ShadowAttributesController.php",
"app/Model/ShadowAttribute.php"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"vendor": "misp",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "2.5.51",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndIncluding": "2.5.51",
"versionStartIncluding": "0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5.5"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "ENISA"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "CERT.pl"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "MISP contains an authorization bypass in its server-to-server proposal synchronization mechanism. Two related flaws were identified:\n\n1. The events/pushProposals endpoint located the target event by UUID without enforcing any access-control check. A sync user with perm_sync could push shadow-attribute proposals to any event on the local instance, including events with restricted distribution (e.g., distribution level 0, visible only to the owning organisation). The stored proposal also carried the sender-supplied event_uuid and event_org_id rather than the local event\u0027s actual identity, corrupting the data model.\n\n2. When accepting an edit proposal (old_id != 0), the code resolved the target live attribute by UUID alone (Attribute.uuid = shadow.uuid) without scoping the lookup to the proposal\u0027s own event. A malicious sync user could therefore craft a proposal whose uuid matched an attribute in a different event; upon acceptance, the wrong attribute would be modified or deleted. The same unscoped lookup existed in the ShadowAttribute::acceptProposal path.\n\nPreconditions: an authenticated user with sync permission (perm_sync) on a MISP instance that participates in server-to-server synchronisation. The attacker must know or enumerate the UUID of a target event or attribute.\n\nSecurity impact: unauthorised read access to restricted events, unauthorised insertion of proposals onto events the user cannot see, and unauthorised modification or deletion of attributes belonging to other events. This compromises the confidentiality and integrity of threat-intelligence data across organisational boundaries within a MISP deployment."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-126 Exploiting Incorrectly Adjusted Privileges"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 6.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "HIGH",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
},
{
"format": "SSVC",
"other": {
"content": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-19T14:02:59Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "SSVC"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"description": "CWE-862 Missing Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-639",
"description": "CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The fix enforces proper authorization scoping at two levels. First, pushProposals now resolves the event through fetchSimpleEvent (which applies ACL) and the pull path uses a new __eventSyncedWithServer helper that verifies the event is actually shared with the syncing server before accepting proposals. The stored event_id, event_uuid, and event_org_id are taken from the local event record, not from sender-supplied fields. Second, a new findTargetAttribute method requires all three of Attribute.id, Attribute.event_id, and Attribute.uuid to match simultaneously, ensuring an edit proposal can only affect an attribute within its own event. Acceptance paths now reject the proposal if the target attribute cannot be resolved within the correct event scope."
}
],
"title": "MISP Missing Authorization in Sync Proposal Endpoints Allows Cross-Event Data Access and Modification",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "full",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the fix is applied to the main development branch and the exact version boundary is unknown.",
"CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs only a standard sync-permission role; if the deployment requires additional administrative setup to enable sync, the effective privilege requirement may be higher.",
"CVSS VC:L assumes the attacker can observe event data in the API response; if the deployment suppresses event details in error responses, confidentiality impact may be lower.",
"CAPEC-126 is the closest available mapping; the exact pattern is an authorization-scoping gap rather than a classic privilege escalation, so the mapping is approximate.",
"The SSVC technical_impact of \u0027total\u0027 assumes the attacker can fully modify or delete target attributes; if the deployment has additional compensating controls (e.g., audit logging, backup restoration), the effective impact may be partial.",
"The patch does not specify whether the vulnerability is exploitable only during active server-to-server sync or also via direct API calls to pushProposals; both paths are fixed, suggesting both were vulnerable."
],
"capecRationale": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"rationale": "The sync user holds legitimate perm_sync privileges, but the application fails to correctly scope those privileges to the events and attributes the user is authorized to access. The attacker exploits the missing authorization boundary to perform actions (push proposals to restricted events, modify foreign attributes) that exceed the intended scope of their role. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of an authenticated user leveraging an authorization gap to reach resources outside their permitted set. Uncertainty: CAPEC-126 typically describes privilege escalation; here the user already has sync rights but the application\u0027s scoping is incorrect, making this a best-available match rather than an exact fit."
}
],
"commit": "19a5e8444ff21a8304c5ac3bdd91f5dae9599472",
"confidence": "medium",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "ENISA and CERT.pl"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5.5"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "ENISA"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "CERT.pl"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "AV:N - MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L - the attack requires crafting a standard API request with a known/guessed UUID; no race conditions or special timing needed. AT:N - no prior data tampering required; the attack payload is the request itself. PR:L - requires an authenticated user with perm_sync. UI:N - no victim interaction needed. VC:L - the sync user can retrieve event data (including attributes) from events they should not see. VI:H - the user can modify or delete attributes in events outside their authorization scope, and inject proposals onto restricted events. VA:N - no denial-of-service impact evidenced. SC/SI/SA:N - impact is confined to the vulnerable MISP instance\u0027s own data; no cross-system impact is demonstrated by the patch.",
"draft": false,
"fixSummary": "The fix enforces proper authorization scoping at two levels. First, pushProposals now resolves the event through fetchSimpleEvent (which applies ACL) and the pull path uses a new __eventSyncedWithServer helper that verifies the event is actually shared with the syncing server before accepting proposals. The stored event_id, event_uuid, and event_org_id are taken from the local event record, not from sender-supplied fields. Second, a new findTargetAttribute method requires all three of Attribute.id, Attribute.event_id, and Attribute.uuid to match simultaneously, ensuring an edit proposal can only affect an attribute within its own event. Acceptance paths now reject the proposal if the target attribute cannot be resolved within the correct event scope.",
"generatedAt": "2026-11-19T14:02:59.946447Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"potentialErrors": [],
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 11,
"assumptionCount": 6,
"confidence": "medium",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 6
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "f2ec162442da92be164bb57d7bd5cd1ddffdf1febdf6b1305bfaa0b7a182ffc3",
"patchSummary": "In EventsController::pushProposals, the raw Event::find by UUID was replaced with Event::fetchSimpleEvent (ACL-aware) and the inline proposal-saving loop was extracted into ShadowAttribute::capture which now receives the already-authorized event and overwrites event_id, event_uuid, and event_org_id from the local record. In ShadowAttributesController::__accept and ShadowAttribute::acceptProposal, the unscoped Attribute::find by UUID was replaced with ShadowAttribute::findTargetAttribute which matches id + event_id + uuid. A new private method __eventSyncedWithServer validates that a pulled proposal\u0027s event is shared with the remote server (via distribution level, sharing group, or orgc ownership) before capture. pullProposals now pre-resolves and caches the authorized event per UUID. Regression tests (ProposalSyncScope) verify hidden events return the same response as missing events, stored columns reflect local identity, cross-event edit proposals are rejected, and duplicate/newer-version handling is correct",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "19a5e8444ff21a8304c5ac3bdd91f5dae9599472",
"date": "Wed, 11 Nov 2026 17:40:47 +0100",
"patchSha256": "f2ec162442da92be164bb57d7bd5cd1ddffdf1febdf6b1305bfaa0b7a182ffc3",
"retrievedAt": "2026-11-19T14:02:15.217844Z",
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Synced proposals reach only events the sender"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch",
"ssvc": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-19T14:02:59Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"subject": "fix: [security] Synced proposals reach only events the sender",
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"rationale": "The pushProposals endpoint and the pullProposals capture path did not verify that the sync user had access to the target event before storing proposals. The event was located by a user-supplied UUID with no ACL enforcement, allowing proposals to be attached to events outside the user\u0027s permitted scope."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-639",
"rationale": "The edit-proposal acceptance path resolved the target attribute using only the user-controlled UUID field (Attribute.uuid) without scoping to the event, allowing an attacker to reference an attribute in a different event and have it modified or deleted. The user-controlled key (uuid) was used as the sole discriminator for a sensitive operation."
}
]
}
},
"bcp-05-x-03": {
"x_timeline": {
"events": [
{
"description": "Corrective change authored (19a5e8444ff21a8304c5ac3bdd91f5dae9599472): fix: [security] Synced proposals reach only events the sender",
"id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
"references": [
"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-11T16:40:47Z",
"type": "fix-developed"
},
{
"description": "Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time.",
"id": "evt-fix-available-1",
"references": [
"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/19a5e8444.patch"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-19T14:02:15.217844Z",
"type": "fix-available"
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-20319"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-133175",
"datePublished": "2026-11-19T14:06:19.202418Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-19T14:06:35.301Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:06:35.514271Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2.0"
}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.