CVE-2026-133163 (GCVE-0-2026-133163)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-19 13:55 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:25| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-19 13:50 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719.patch
5b0f387b75bb… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
e4fa7371938d
|
fix: [security] Sync users change protected events only | 5b0f387b75bb… |
Fix summary
A shared authorization check (isProtectedFromSyncUser / assertNotProtectedFromSyncUser) was introduced in the Event model and enforced across all write paths. The check denies any non-internal, non-site-admin sync user from modifying a protected event through any route other than events/edit with a valid signature. The check is now invoked in the ACL component (modify, publish, tag), in the CryptographicKeys, Events, and Tags controllers, and in the Event, EventReport, Galaxy, and MispAttribute models, closing every previously unprotected write path.
Patch summary
Added Event::isProtectedFromSyncUser() and Event::assertNotProtectedFromSyncUser() methods that return true / throw ForbiddenException when the user has perm_sync but lacks perm_site_admin and perm_sync_internal, and the target event has protected=1. Inserted calls to these methods in: ACLComponent::canModifyEvent(), canPublishEvent(), canModifyTag(); CryptographicKeysController::add() and delete(); EventsController::populate(), upload_sample(), upload_analysis_file(); TagsController::__findObjectByUuid(); Event::userCanModifyEvent() and upload_stix(); EventReport::fetchIfAuthorized(); Galaxy::detachCluster() and detachClusterByTagId(); MispAttribute::deleteAttribute(). Also added the 'protected' field to the event query in upload_sample. Added a comprehensive regression test class (ProtectedEventSyncWrites) covering all affected routes plus control tests for internal sync users, org admins, and post-unprotect behavior.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: Exploitation requires only standard API calls with a valid sync user token; no race conditions, timing, or special configuration needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: An authenticated user with the sync permission (not site admin, not internal sync) in the event's creator organization is required. UI:N: No victim interaction is needed. VC:N: The sync user already has read access to the event; no additional confidentiality exposure. VI:H: The attacker can fully modify, delete, add, and unprotect event data, completely defeating the integrity guarantee of the protection mechanism. VA:N: No denial-of-service impact is evident. SC/SI/SA:N: No evidence in the patch of direct impact on subsequent systems; cross-instance impact via publish is possible but not explicitly addressed in the patch evidence.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The event protection authorization check was present only on the events/edit route. All other write endpoints (attributes, objects, populate, publish, unprotect, tags, reports, galaxy clusters, cryptographic keys) lacked the equivalent check, allowing a sync user to bypass the protection mechanism entirely.
- CWE-285 The authorization logic did not correctly account for the combination of sync-user role and event protection state across all code paths, resulting in an inconsistent enforcement of the protection policy.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-66 The access control policy for protected events was incorrectly configured: the protection check was applied to only one of many write endpoints. An attacker with a valid sync user account exploited the missing checks on the remaining endpoints to modify protected events. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of a partially enforced access control rule. Uncertainty: CAPEC-66 is a broad category; a more specific sub-pattern for 'inconsistent authorization enforcement across endpoints' does not exist in the CAPEC taxonomy, so this is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- Affected version range is unspecified; the patch does not include version tags or release boundaries. All MISP versions prior to this commit are assumed affected.
- CVSS SI (subsequent system integrity) is set to N. In practice, a modified protected event could be published to other MISP instances, potentially affecting them, but the patch does not explicitly address or evidence this cross-instance impact.
- CAPEC-66 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC specifically covers 'inconsistent authorization enforcement across multiple endpoints of the same application'.
- The assumption that the attacker must belong to the same organization as the event creator (orgc_id match) is based on the existing perm_modify_org and perm_publish checks that were already present; the new check is an additional gate on top of those.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); it is listed as a tool credit rather than a human remediation developer.
- The commit date (2026-11-11) is taken at face value from the patch metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | high | 6 |
- 2026-11-11 12:12 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (e4fa7371938d51840ad098e3f727b74f1b5b0831): fix: [security] Sync users change protected events only https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719.patch
- 2026-11-19 13:49 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719.patch
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"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"ssvcData": {
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-19T13:50:03Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-133163",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-19T14:24:34.101519Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-19T14:17:29.263",
"references": [
{
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/e4fa73719"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-285"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-862"
}
],
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.