GCVE-1-2026-20342 (CVE-2026-133188)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:32qwen3.8:27b
4 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-19 14:26 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
patch set (2 sources)
b81058778949… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
d5a3e9900708
|
fix: [security] Protected events refuse signed data with | bd22e66a2c32… |
18d0e9a77d0c
|
fix: [security] Protected events are signed over their exact | 4340f1f4d2e8… |
Fix summary
The vulnerability is remediated by (1) adding a post-signature-verification scan that rejects protected event bodies containing whitespace in JSON keys or identifier values, and (2) introducing an exact-byte PGP signature (x-pgp-signature-v2) that covers the body as transmitted without whitespace normalization. MISP 3.0+ peers use the exact-byte signature exclusively; older peers retain the legacy whitespace-stripped signature. A signature_version marker in the event body ensures that a 3.0 receiver refuses a legacy-only signature for events that were signed over exact bytes, preventing downgrade attacks.
Patch summary
Patch 1 (d5a3e9900) adds a private method __hasUnsignedWhitespace() to CryptographicKey that recursively scans decoded JSON for whitespace in string keys (excluding 'meta' sub-keys) and in values whose keys match identifier patterns (uuid, id, timestamp, distribution, date). validateProtectedEvent() now calls this check after a successful signature verification and returns false with a log entry if unsigned whitespace is found. Patch 2 (18d0e9a77) extends signWithInstanceKey() and verifySignature() with an $exact parameter that skips whitespace stripping. A new signatureHeaders() method selects the appropriate signature header(s) based on the peer's MISP version. EventsController, ServerSyncTool, and RestResponseComponent are updated to emit and consume the x-pgp-signature-v2 header. The signature_version field is injected into protected event bodies. Server.php passes the v2 header to validateProtectedEvent(). A new test file ProtectedEventExactSignatureTest.php (339 lines) covers acceptance, rejection, and
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The attacker operates over the network, intercepting and modifying traffic between MISP instances. AC:L: Inserting whitespace characters into JSON is a simple, deterministic transformation requiring no special conditions. AT:N: The target does not need to be in a particular state; any protected event in transit is vulnerable. PR:N: The attacker does not require authentication to the MISP instance; a network relay position suffices. UI:N: No user interaction is required; the tampered event is processed automatically. VC:N: No confidentiality impact; the attack modifies data, not exposes it. VI:H: The attacker can rename JSON fields and alter identifier values (UUIDs, timestamps), changing the semantic meaning of protected events while the signature still validates. VA:N: No availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: The impact is confined to the receiving MISP instance's data integrity; no cross-scope or availability effects are evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-347 The PGP signature was computed and verified over a whitespace-stripped representation of the JSON body rather than the exact bytes transmitted. This allowed an attacker to modify the data (by inserting whitespace into keys or identifiers) without invalidating the signature, constituting an improper verification of the cryptographic signature's coverage.
- CWE-345 The signature verification mechanism did not fully ensure the authenticity of the received data because the normalization step (whitespace removal) created a gap between the signed representation and the actual data, allowing undetected modifications.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The digital signature mechanism was implemented over a normalized (whitespace-stripped) representation of the data rather than the exact transmitted bytes. An attacker in a relay position exploits this by inserting whitespace into JSON keys or identifier values, which survives the normalization and thus the signature check. CAPEC-126 is the closest match; uncertainty exists because the CAPEC catalog does not have a more specific pattern for signature-coverage gaps introduced by data normalization.
Assumptions to verify
- The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern; the CAPEC catalog lacks a more specific entry for signature-coverage gaps introduced by data normalization before signing.
- CVSS PR:N assumes the attacker only needs a network relay position and does not require authentication to either MISP instance; if the deployment requires authenticated relay, PR would be elevated.
- CVSS VI:H assumes that renaming JSON fields or altering timestamps in protected events constitutes a high integrity impact; if the specific deployment treats these fields as non-critical, VI could be L.
- The affected version boundary (< 3.0.0) is inferred from the patch's version_compare logic; the exact last affected release is not stated in the patch.
- The Galaxy cluster 'meta' key exclusion from the whitespace scan means whitespace in meta keys remains a residual (documented) limitation, not a vulnerability.
- SSVC technical_impact is set to 'partial' as the attacker can only insert whitespace, not arbitrarily rewrite event content; if field renaming has critical downstream effects in a specific deployment, 'total' may be more appropriate.
- The Co-Authored-By line credits an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); inclusion as a remediation developer follows the explicit metadata but is atypical for CVE credit conventions.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
5 | 11 | medium | 7 |
- 2026-11-13 11:25 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (d5a3e9900708e409bc9c517c57aa819883ca879e): fix: [security] Protected events refuse signed data with https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5a3e9900.patch
- 2026-11-17 13:37 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (18d0e9a77d0c1d790a1742d9d886bf033d303ac6): fix: [security] Protected events are signed over their exact https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/18d0e9a77.patch
- 2026-11-19 14:25 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5a3e9900.patch
- 2026-11-19 14:25 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/18d0e9a77.patch
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"modules": [
"app/Model/CryptographicKey.php",
"app/Controller/EventsController.php",
"app/Lib/Tools/ServerSyncTool.php",
"app/Model/Server.php",
"app/Controller/Component/RestResponseComponent.php"
],
"product": "misp",
"programFiles": [],
"repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"vendor": "misp",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "2.5.51",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndIncluding": "2.5.51",
"versionStartIncluding": "0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "ENISA"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5.5"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "MISP contains a vulnerability in the cryptographic signature verification of protected events. When a MISP instance signs a protected event for synchronization, it strips all whitespace from the JSON body before computing the PGP signature (preg_replace(\"/\\s+/\", \"\", $data)). The receiving instance performs the same whitespace-stripping before verification. Because the signature covers only the whitespace-free representation, a network relay positioned between two MISP instances can insert whitespace characters into JSON object keys (effectively renaming fields) or into identifier values such as UUIDs, timestamps, and distribution fields without invalidating the signature. The receiving instance accepts the modified event as authentic.\n\nThe vulnerability affects the protected event synchronization path: event creation (EventsController::add), event editing (EventsController::edit), event viewing (EventsController::view1), and server-to-server pull synchronization (ServerSyncTool, Server model). An attacker with a network position to intercept and modify traffic between MISP instances can alter the semantic content of protected events while the PGP signature still validates, undermining the integrity guarantees that protected events are designed to provide.\n\nThe fix introduces two complementary mechanisms. First, a post-verification scan rejects any received body that contains whitespace in JSON keys (except under Galaxy cluster \u0027meta\u0027 keys) or in identifier-like values (uuid, id, timestamp, distribution, date). Second, a new exact-byte signature scheme (x-pgp-signature-v2) signs the body as transmitted, without whitespace normalization. MISP 3.0 and later peers exchange this exact-byte signature; older peers retain the legacy whitespace-stripped signature. A signature_version field is embedded in protected events so that a 3.0 receiver refuses a body carrying that marker if only the legacy signature is present. Both mechanisms together close the whitespace-injection vector while preserving backward compatibility with pre-3.0 instances."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-126 Exploiting Incorrectly Implemented Digital Signatures"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 6.9,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
},
{
"format": "SSVC",
"other": {
"content": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-19T14:26:06Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "SSVC"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-347",
"description": "CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-345",
"description": "CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5a3e9900"
},
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/18d0e9a77"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The vulnerability is remediated by (1) adding a post-signature-verification scan that rejects protected event bodies containing whitespace in JSON keys or identifier values, and (2) introducing an exact-byte PGP signature (x-pgp-signature-v2) that covers the body as transmitted without whitespace normalization. MISP 3.0+ peers use the exact-byte signature exclusively; older peers retain the legacy whitespace-stripped signature. A signature_version marker in the event body ensures that a 3.0 receiver refuses a legacy-only signature for events that were signed over exact bytes, preventing downgrade attacks."
}
],
"title": "MISP Protected Event Signature Bypass via Whitespace Injection in JSON Keys and Identifiers",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "full",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern; the CAPEC catalog lacks a more specific entry for signature-coverage gaps introduced by data normalization before signing.",
"CVSS PR:N assumes the attacker only needs a network relay position and does not require authentication to either MISP instance; if the deployment requires authenticated relay, PR would be elevated.",
"CVSS VI:H assumes that renaming JSON fields or altering timestamps in protected events constitutes a high integrity impact; if the specific deployment treats these fields as non-critical, VI could be L.",
"The affected version boundary (\u003c 3.0.0) is inferred from the patch\u0027s version_compare logic; the exact last affected release is not stated in the patch.",
"The Galaxy cluster \u0027meta\u0027 key exclusion from the whitespace scan means whitespace in meta keys remains a residual (documented) limitation, not a vulnerability.",
"SSVC technical_impact is set to \u0027partial\u0027 as the attacker can only insert whitespace, not arbitrarily rewrite event content; if field renaming has critical downstream effects in a specific deployment, \u0027total\u0027 may be more appropriate.",
"The Co-Authored-By line credits an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); inclusion as a remediation developer follows the explicit metadata but is atypical for CVE credit conventions."
],
"capecRationale": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"rationale": "The digital signature mechanism was implemented over a normalized (whitespace-stripped) representation of the data rather than the exact transmitted bytes. An attacker in a relay position exploits this by inserting whitespace into JSON keys or identifier values, which survives the normalization and thus the signature check. CAPEC-126 is the closest match; uncertainty exists because the CAPEC catalog does not have a more specific pattern for signature-coverage gaps introduced by data normalization."
}
],
"commit": "18d0e9a77d0c1d790a1742d9d886bf033d303ac6",
"confidence": "medium",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "ENISA"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5.5"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "AV:N: The attacker operates over the network, intercepting and modifying traffic between MISP instances. AC:L: Inserting whitespace characters into JSON is a simple, deterministic transformation requiring no special conditions. AT:N: The target does not need to be in a particular state; any protected event in transit is vulnerable. PR:N: The attacker does not require authentication to the MISP instance; a network relay position suffices. UI:N: No user interaction is required; the tampered event is processed automatically. VC:N: No confidentiality impact; the attack modifies data, not exposes it. VI:H: The attacker can rename JSON fields and alter identifier values (UUIDs, timestamps), changing the semantic meaning of protected events while the signature still validates. VA:N: No availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: The impact is confined to the receiving MISP instance\u0027s data integrity; no cross-scope or availability effects are evidenced.",
"draft": false,
"fixSummary": "The vulnerability is remediated by (1) adding a post-signature-verification scan that rejects protected event bodies containing whitespace in JSON keys or identifier values, and (2) introducing an exact-byte PGP signature (x-pgp-signature-v2) that covers the body as transmitted without whitespace normalization. MISP 3.0+ peers use the exact-byte signature exclusively; older peers retain the legacy whitespace-stripped signature. A signature_version marker in the event body ensures that a 3.0 receiver refuses a legacy-only signature for events that were signed over exact bytes, preventing downgrade attacks.",
"generatedAt": "2026-11-19T14:26:06.814235Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"potentialErrors": [],
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 11,
"assumptionCount": 7,
"confidence": "medium",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 5
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "b81058778949ad6e64fefc78c4a9806e7776068075a40a338d47eb1d26eafde6",
"patchSummary": "Patch 1 (d5a3e9900) adds a private method __hasUnsignedWhitespace() to CryptographicKey that recursively scans decoded JSON for whitespace in string keys (excluding \u0027meta\u0027 sub-keys) and in values whose keys match identifier patterns (uuid, id, timestamp, distribution, date). validateProtectedEvent() now calls this check after a successful signature verification and returns false with a log entry if unsigned whitespace is found.\n\nPatch 2 (18d0e9a77) extends signWithInstanceKey() and verifySignature() with an $exact parameter that skips whitespace stripping. A new signatureHeaders() method selects the appropriate signature header(s) based on the peer\u0027s MISP version. EventsController, ServerSyncTool, and RestResponseComponent are updated to emit and consume the x-pgp-signature-v2 header. The signature_version field is injected into protected event bodies. Server.php passes the v2 header to validateProtectedEvent(). A new test file ProtectedEventExactSignatureTest.php (339 lines) covers acceptance, rejection, and",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "d5a3e9900708e409bc9c517c57aa819883ca879e",
"date": "Fri, 13 Nov 2026 12:25:34 +0100",
"patchSha256": "bd22e66a2c3212896f9b0c25657a4e3d2e47ff2ba6bd377d33b4b62b2c524e08",
"retrievedAt": "2026-11-19T14:25:13.678489Z",
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5a3e9900.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5a3e9900.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Protected events refuse signed data with"
},
{
"commit": "18d0e9a77d0c1d790a1742d9d886bf033d303ac6",
"date": "Tue, 17 Nov 2026 14:37:58 +0100",
"patchSha256": "4340f1f4d2e8a9f0806650a0896c11c11533e3d6ec6df786707ecdf2fd8120a5",
"retrievedAt": "2026-11-19T14:25:13.961710Z",
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/18d0e9a77.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/18d0e9a77.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Protected events are signed over their exact"
}
],
"source": "patch set (2 sources)",
"ssvc": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-19T14:26:06Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"subject": "fix: [security] Protected events are signed over their exact",
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-347",
"rationale": "The PGP signature was computed and verified over a whitespace-stripped representation of the JSON body rather than the exact bytes transmitted. This allowed an attacker to modify the data (by inserting whitespace into keys or identifiers) without invalidating the signature, constituting an improper verification of the cryptographic signature\u0027s coverage."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-345",
"rationale": "The signature verification mechanism did not fully ensure the authenticity of the received data because the normalization step (whitespace removal) created a gap between the signed representation and the actual data, allowing undetected modifications."
}
]
}
},
"bcp-05-x-03": {
"x_timeline": {
"events": [
{
"description": "Corrective change authored (d5a3e9900708e409bc9c517c57aa819883ca879e): fix: [security] Protected events refuse signed data with",
"id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
"references": [
"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5a3e9900.patch"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-13T11:25:34Z",
"type": "fix-developed"
},
{
"description": "Corrective change authored (18d0e9a77d0c1d790a1742d9d886bf033d303ac6): fix: [security] Protected events are signed over their exact",
"id": "evt-fix-developed-2",
"references": [
"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/18d0e9a77.patch"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-17T13:37:58Z",
"type": "fix-developed"
},
{
"description": "Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time.",
"id": "evt-fix-available-1",
"references": [
"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/d5a3e9900.patch"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-19T14:25:13.678489Z",
"type": "fix-available"
},
{
"description": "Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time.",
"id": "evt-fix-available-2",
"references": [
"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/18d0e9a77.patch"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-19T14:25:13.961710Z",
"type": "fix-available"
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-20342"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"cveId": "CVE-2026-133188",
"datePublished": "2026-11-19T14:31:05.261489Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-19T14:32:32.740Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-19T14:32:32.835040Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2.0"
}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.