GCVE-1-2026-20326 (CVE-2026-133177)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-19 14:11 – Updated: 2026-11-19 14:11| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/28120b549 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-19 14:09 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/28120b549.patch
d09428c54d1d… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
28120b549f6b
|
fix: [security] Regular sync, pulls and feeds no longer edit | d09428c54d1d… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a privilege gate on organisation detail updates during sharing group capture. A new static context flag (captureRemote) is set by Feed and Server pull code paths to indicate whether the capture originates from an internal link. A new authorization check (__mayUpdateOrgDetails) permits overwriting organisation fields only when the operation is an internal sync or the acting user holds perm_site_admin or perm_sync_internal. All other sync, pull, and feed operations are restricted to matching or creating organisations without editing their existing details.
Patch summary
In SharingGroup.php, a static $remoteCapture flag and captureRemote() wrapper are added; captureSG() now computes an $updateOrgDetails boolean via __mayUpdateOrgDetails() and passes it to captureSGOrgs(), which forwards it to Organisation::captureOrg() instead of the previous $force parameter. Feed.php wraps both downloadAndSaveEventFromFeed() and downloadFromFeedInitiator() in SharingGroup::captureRemote(false, ...). Server.php refactors pull() to detect the internal flag from the server record and wraps the actual pull in SharingGroup::captureRemote($internal, ...). A regression test class (OrganisationDetailsSyncScope) in tests/testregressions.py verifies that a plain sync user cannot modify org details, while an internal-sync user and a site admin can.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application; sync, pull, and feed operations occur over HTTP. AC:L: exploitation requires only pushing a sharing group with a newer modified date and a roster containing modified organisation details; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: no attack-target manipulation is required. PR:L: the attacker needs a low-privileged sync user account (perm_sync) or control of an external feed/pull source; no admin credentials are required. UI:N: no user interaction is needed; the overwrite occurs automatically during capture. VC:N: no confidential data is disclosed. VI:L: organisation metadata (type, nationality, sector, contacts) can be silently altered, a limited integrity impact. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: the impact is confined to the MISP instance's own organisation records with no cross-scope effect.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The sharing group capture path performed organisation detail updates without checking whether the acting user or data source was authorized to modify those fields. Any sync user, external feed, or non-internal pull could overwrite organisation records, indicating a missing authorization check on the write operation.
- CWE-285 The authorization model did not distinguish between creating/matching an organisation and editing its details during sync, pull, or feed operations. The privilege boundary between regular sync users and internal-sync/site-admin users was not enforced for organisation field updates.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The application incorrectly adjusted the effective privilege level during sync, pull, and feed operations: external data sources and low-privileged sync users were granted the ability to modify organisation records that should have been restricted to site admins or internal-sync users. The attacker exploits this over-privileged code path by pushing a sharing group roster containing modified organisation details. CAPEC-114 is the closest match because the core issue is that the application's privilege model did not correctly scope what operations a given role or data source may perform on organisation records. Uncertainty: no CAPEC pattern specifically describes data-integrity abuse via a sync/replication channel, so CAPEC-114 is selected as the best available approximation.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the fix is applied to the main development branch and the exact version boundary is unknown.
- PR:L assumes the attacker holds a sync user account (perm_sync) or controls an external feed/pull source; if the attacker must first compromise a feed, the effective privilege requirement could be higher.
- VI:L assumes that overwriting organisation metadata (type, nationality, sector, contacts) constitutes a limited integrity impact; if downstream consumers rely on these fields for access decisions, the impact could be higher.
- CAPEC-114 is selected as the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically models data-integrity abuse through a replication/sync channel, so the mapping is approximate.
- The Co-Authored-By line credits Claude Opus 5.5 as a remediation developer; this is recorded as it appears in the commit metadata but the role is inferred from the co-authorship context.
- AT:N assumes no special conditions on the target are needed beyond a standard MISP deployment with sync, pull, or feed functionality enabled.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-12 08:26 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (28120b549f6b3949d7354731cd483cc1e436cf8c): fix: [security] Regular sync, pulls and feeds no longer edit https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/28120b549.patch
- 2026-11-19 14:08 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/28120b549.patch
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}
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"PR:L assumes the attacker holds a sync user account (perm_sync) or controls an external feed/pull source; if the attacker must first compromise a feed, the effective privilege requirement could be higher.",
"VI:L assumes that overwriting organisation metadata (type, nationality, sector, contacts) constitutes a limited integrity impact; if downstream consumers rely on these fields for access decisions, the impact could be higher.",
"CAPEC-114 is selected as the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically models data-integrity abuse through a replication/sync channel, so the mapping is approximate.",
"The Co-Authored-By line credits Claude Opus 5.5 as a remediation developer; this is recorded as it appears in the commit metadata but the role is inferred from the co-authorship context.",
"AT:N assumes no special conditions on the target are needed beyond a standard MISP deployment with sync, pull, or feed functionality enabled."
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Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.