GCVE-1988-2026-0191
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-09 13:32
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260126-1 :: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities in dormakaba Access Manager
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260126-1 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities
product: dormakaba Access Manager
vulnerable version: Multiple firmware and hardware revisions (details below)
fixed version: Multiple firmware and hardware revisions (details below)
CVE number: CVE-2025-59097, CVE-2025-59098, CVE-2025-59099,
CVE-2025-59100, CVE-2025-59101, CVE-2025-59102,
CVE-2025-59103, CVE-2025-59104, CVE-2025-59105,
CVE-2025-59106, CVE-2025-59107, CVE-2025-59108
impact: critical
homepage:https://www.dormakaba.com/
found: 2024-03-18
by: Clemens Stockenreitner (Office Vienna)
Werner Schober (Office Vienna)
Supported by the HW Lab Vienna
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"The Kaba exos 9300 basic system is the cornerstone of your access
management solution. Use it to resolves all your basic employees,
system, user and peripheral management tasks and initiate targeted
security measures as required. [...] "
Source:https://www.dormakaba.com/gb-en/offering/products/electronic-access-data/corporate-access-control-solutions/dormakaba-exos-9300-base-system--ka_500000
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides multiple patches which should be installed immediately.
More details can be found at the following locations:
- Solution at the end of this advisory
- SEC Consult blog post:https://r.sec-consult.com/dormakaba
- Vendor website / security page:https://www.dormakabagroup.com/en/security-advisories
- Your dormakaba partner
Tested Architecture Overview
-----------------------------------
The tested system is the enterprise grade physical access system from
dormakaba. The tested system consists of the following components:
------------------------------
dormakaba exos 9300
------------------------------
Exos 9300 is a piece of software based on C# running on a central Windows server with
an MSSQL, or Oracle database as central storage.
Exos consists of multiple modules (e.g. basis, employee management, key depot, access,
visitor management, 3rd party management). Exos is used to centrally manage users,
keys, cards as well as the configuration of the access manager. Devices in the
exos environment are addressed using a special addressing scheme. The address scheme
described in the following table is going to be important.
┌────────────────────┬───────────────────────────┬───────────────┬───────────────────────────────────────────┬───────────────────────────┬───────────────────┐
│ I │ 01 │ 00 │ 01 │
00 │ 00 │
├────────────────────┼───────────────────────────┼───────────────┼───────────────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────┼───────────────────┤
│ Port Type │ Communication Hub Address │ Port Address │ Access Hub Address │ 00 =
Door Manager │ Datapoint Address │
│ I = Access Manager │ Values: 01-99 │ Values: 00-99 │ Values: 00-99 │ 01 =
Access Point │ Values: 00-20 │
│ B = Serial │ │ │ Fixed to 01 for Access Hubs with Ethernet │ 02 =
Turnstile │ │
│ C = Modem │ │ │ │ 03 = IO
Controller │ │
│ E = Ethernet │ │ │ │ Fixed to
00 in most cases │ │
│ R = remote │ │ │ │
│ │
└────────────────────┴───────────────────────────┴───────────────┴───────────────────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────────┴───────────────────┘
------------------------------
dormakaba Access Manager
------------------------------
The access manager is a component that is configured via exos. The configuration
between exos and access manager is exchanged via a SOAP interface. Per default
the data exchange is unencrypted. Encryption is only available starting with
access manager hardware release K7.
The access manager is a custom piece of hardware with multiple inputs and outputs.
The device offers the following interfaces:
- Digital Inputs
- 3x DC Output Relays
- 2x RS-232
- 1x RS-485 (Used to connect to access manager extension systems e.g. Kaba 9125)
- 1x RJ45
- 1x Micro USB
- 2x Coax (Used to connect registration units e.g. 9001, 9002)
The tested hardware was an access manager 9200-k5 running Windows CE embedded,
and an access manager 9200-k7 running Linux.
------------------------------
dormakaba Registration Unit
------------------------------
dormakaba registration units can be either a Legic/Mifare card reader,
or a PIN pad used to enter a PIN to deactivate alarming systems, or as
an additional authentication.
------------------------------
Electric lock
------------------------------
The lock used for the tested setup is an Assa Abloy/effeff Profix 118. The lock
is simply controlled via a relay contact connected to the Access Manager. As
soon as a user successfully authenticates with a registration unit,
the relay connected to the lock is switched and the door opens.
The system is depicted in the following diagram.
┌─────────┐
│ │
│exos 9300│ ┌──────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│ │ │ Reg Unit │ │ Pin Pad │
└────┬────┘ │ ┌──┐ │ │ x x x │
│ │ │┼┼│ │ │ x x x │
Ethernet──────►│ │ └──┘ │ │ x x x │
│ │ 9001 │ │ 9002 │
┌────┴────┐ └─────┬────┘ └─────┬────┘
│ Access │ │ │
│ Manager ├────────────────────┴─────────────┘
│ 9200 │ ▲
└────┬────┘ │
│ Coax
│
DC Relay───► │
│
┌──┴──┐
│ │
│ │
│ │
│ ─┤◄──────Electric Lock
│ │
│ │
└─────┘
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Unauthenticated SOAP API (CVE-2025-59097)
The exos 9300 application can be used to configure access managers (e.g. 9200,
9230 and 9290). The configuration is done in a graphical user interface on the
dormakaba exos server. As soon as the save button is clicked in exos 9300, the
whole configuration is sent to the selected access manager via SOAP. The SOAP
request is sent without any prior authentication or authorization by default.
Though authentication and authorization can be configured using IPsec for 9200-K5
devices and mTLS for 9200-K7 devices, it is not enabled by default and must
therefore be activated with additional steps.
This insecure default allows an attacker with network level access to completely
control the whole environment. An attacker is for example easily able to conduct
the following tasks without prior authentication:
- Re-configure access managers (e.g. remove alarming system requirements)
- Freely re-configure the inputs and outputs - Open all connected doors permanently
- Open all doors for a defined time interval
- Change the admin password
- and many more
Network level access can be gained due to an insufficient network segmentation as well
as missing LAN firewalls. Some devices with an insecure configuration have been
identified to be directly exposed to the internet as well.
Vulnerable Versions:
- 92xx-K5: All versions on the market
- 92xx-K7: <BAME 06.00
2) Trace Functionality Leaking Sensitive Data (CVE-2025-59098)
The access manager is offering a trace functionality to debug errors and issues
with the device. The trace functionality is implemented as a simple TCP socket.
A tool called TraceClient.exe, provided by dormakaba via the Access Manager web
interface, is used to connect to the socket and receive debug information. The data
is permanently broadcast on the TCP socket. The socket can be accessed without
any authentication or encryption.
The transmitted data is based on the set verbosity level. The verbosity level can be
set using the HTTP(S) endpoint with the service interface password or with the guessable
identifier of the device via the SOAP interface.
The transmitted data contains sensitive data like the Card ID as well as all
button presses on registration units. This allows an attacker with network level
access to retrieve all entered PINs on a registration unit.
Vulnerable Versions:
- 92xx-K5: <XAMB 04.06.212
- 92xx-K7: <BAME 05.02.156
3) Unauthenticated Path Traversal (CVE-2025-59099)
The Access Manager is using the open source web server "CompactWebServer" written
in C#. This web server is affected by a path traversal vulnerability, which
allows an attacker to directly access files via simple GET requests without
prior authentication.
Hence, it is possible to retrieve all files stored on the file system, including
the SQLite database Database.sq3, containing badge information and the corresponding
PIN codes. Additionally, when trying to access certain files, the web server crashes
and becomes unreachable for about 60 seconds. This can be abused to continuously send
the request and cause denial of service.
Vulnerable Versions:
- 92xx-K5: <XAMB 04.05.21
- 92xx-K7: <BAME 04.05.16
4) Unauthenticated Access to the SQLite Database (CVE-2025-59100)
The web interface offers a functionality to export the internal SQLite database.
After executing the database export, an automatic download is started and the
device reboots. After rebooting, the exported database is deleted and cannot be
accessed anymore. However, it was noticed that sometimes the device does not reboot
and therefore the exported database is not deleted, or the device reboots and the
export is not deleted for unknown reasons. The path where the database export is
located can be accessed without prior authentication. This leads to the fact that
an attacker might be able to get access to the exported database without prior
authentication. The database includes sensitive data like passwords, card pins,
encrypted Mifare sitekeys and much more.
Vulnerable Versions:
- 92xx-K5: <XAMB 04.06.212
5) Insufficient Session Management (CVE-2025-59101)
Instead of typical session tokens or cookies, it is verified on a per-request basis
if the originating IP address has once successfully logged in. As soon as an
authentication request from a certain source IP is successful, the IP address
is handled as authenticated. No other session information is stored. Therefore,
it is possible to spoof the IP address of a logged-in user to gain access to
the Access Manager web interface.
Vulnerable Versions:
- 92xx-K5: <XAMB 04.06.212
- 92xx-K7: <BAME 04.07.268
6) Secrets Stored in Plaintext in Database (CVE-2025-59102)
The web server of the Access Manager offers a functionality to download a backup
of the local database stored on the device. This database contains the whole
configuration. This includes encrypted MIFARE keys, card data, user PINs and
much more. The PINs are even stored unencrypted. Combined with the fact that an
attacker can e
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
22 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dormakaba | SEC Consult SA-20260126-1 |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0191 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-59097
- related CVE-2025-59098
- related CVE-2025-59099
- related CVE-2025-59100
- related CVE-2025-59101
- related CVE-2025-59102
- related CVE-2025-59103
- related CVE-2025-59104
- related CVE-2025-59105
- related CVE-2025-59106
- related CVE-2025-59107
- related CVE-2025-59108
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "SEC Consult SA-20260126-1",
"vendor": "Dormakaba",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260126-1 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities\n product: dormakaba Access Manager\n vulnerable version: Multiple firmware and hardware revisions (details below)\n fixed version: Multiple firmware and hardware revisions (details below)\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2025-59097, CVE-2025-59098, CVE-2025-59099,\n CVE-2025-59100, CVE-2025-59101, CVE-2025-59102,\n CVE-2025-59103, CVE-2025-59104, CVE-2025-59105,\n CVE-2025-59106, CVE-2025-59107, CVE-2025-59108\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: critical\n homepage:https://www.dormakaba.com/\n found: 2024-03-18\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0by: Clemens Stockenreitner (Office Vienna)\n Werner Schober (Office Vienna)\n Supported by the HW Lab Vienna\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"The Kaba exos 9300 basic system is the cornerstone of your access\nmanagement solution. Use it to resolves all your basic employees,\nsystem, user and peripheral management tasks and initiate targeted\nsecurity measures as required. [...] \"\n\nSource:https://www.dormakaba.com/gb-en/offering/products/electronic-access-data/corporate-access-control-solutions/dormakaba-exos-9300-base-system--ka_500000\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides multiple patches which should be installed immediately.\nMore details can be found at the following locations:\n- Solution at the end of this advisory\n- SEC Consult blog post:https://r.sec-consult.com/dormakaba\n- Vendor website / security page:https://www.dormakabagroup.com/en/security-advisories\n- Your dormakaba partner\n\n\nTested Architecture Overview\n-----------------------------------\nThe tested system is the enterprise grade physical access system from\ndormakaba. The tested system consists of the following components:\n\n------------------------------\ndormakaba exos 9300\n------------------------------\nExos 9300 is a piece of software based on C# running on a central Windows server with\nan MSSQL, or Oracle database as central storage.\nExos consists of multiple modules (e.g. basis, employee management, key depot, access,\nvisitor management, 3rd party management). Exos is used to centrally manage users,\nkeys, cards as well as the configuration of the access manager. Devices in the\nexos environment are addressed using a special addressing scheme. The address scheme\ndescribed in the following table is going to be important.\n\n\u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n\u2502 I \u2502 01 \u2502 00 \u2502 01 \u2502 \n 00 \u2502 00 \u2502\n\u251c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u253c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2524\n\u2502 Port Type \u2502 Communication Hub Address \u2502 Port Address \u2502 Access Hub Address \u2502 00 = \nDoor Manager \u2502 Datapoint Address \u2502\n\u2502 I = Access Manager \u2502 Values: 01-99 \u2502 Values: 00-99 \u2502 Values: 00-99 \u2502 01 = \nAccess Point \u2502 Values: 00-20 \u2502\n\u2502 B = Serial \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 Fixed to 01 for Access Hubs with Ethernet \u2502 02 = \nTurnstile \u2502 \u2502\n\u2502 C = Modem \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 03 = IO \nController \u2502 \u2502\n\u2502 E = Ethernet \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 Fixed to \n00 in most cases \u2502 \u2502\n\u2502 R = remote \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 \n \u2502 \u2502\n\u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518\n\n------------------------------\ndormakaba Access Manager\n------------------------------\nThe access manager is a component that is configured via exos. The configuration\nbetween exos and access manager is exchanged via a SOAP interface. Per default\nthe data exchange is unencrypted. Encryption is only available starting with\naccess manager hardware release K7.\nThe access manager is a custom piece of hardware with multiple inputs and outputs.\nThe device offers the following interfaces:\n- Digital Inputs\n- 3x DC Output Relays\n- 2x RS-232\n- 1x RS-485 (Used to connect to access manager extension systems e.g. Kaba 9125)\n- 1x RJ45\n- 1x Micro USB\n- 2x Coax (Used to connect registration units e.g. 9001, 9002)\n\nThe tested hardware was an access manager 9200-k5 running Windows CE embedded,\nand an access manager 9200-k7 running Linux.\n\n------------------------------\ndormakaba Registration Unit\n------------------------------\ndormakaba registration units can be either a Legic/Mifare card reader,\nor a PIN pad used to enter a PIN to deactivate alarming systems, or as\nan additional authentication.\n\n------------------------------\nElectric lock\n------------------------------\nThe lock used for the tested setup is an Assa Abloy/effeff Profix 118. The lock\nis simply controlled via a relay contact connected to the Access Manager. As\nsoon as a user successfully authenticates with a registration unit,\nthe relay connected to the lock is switched and the door opens.\n\nThe system is depicted in the following diagram.\n\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502exos 9300\u2502 \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510 \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502 Reg Unit \u2502 \u2502 Pin Pad \u2502\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518 \u2502 \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2510 \u2502 \u2502 x x x \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502 \u2502\u253c\u253c\u2502 \u2502 \u2502 x x x \u2502\nEthernet\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u25ba\u2502 \u2502 \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2518 \u2502 \u2502 x x x \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502 9001 \u2502 \u2502 9002 \u2502\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2510 \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518 \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518\n \u2502 Access \u2502 \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 Manager \u251c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518\n \u2502 9200 \u2502 \u25b2\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u252c\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518 \u2502\n \u2502 Coax\n \u2502\n DC Relay\u2500\u2500\u2500\u25ba \u2502\n \u2502\n \u250c\u2500\u2500\u2534\u2500\u2500\u2510\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 \u2500\u2524\u25c4\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500Electric Lock\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2502 \u2502\n \u2514\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2518\n\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Unauthenticated SOAP API (CVE-2025-59097)\nThe exos 9300 application can be used to configure access managers (e.g. 9200,\n9230 and 9290). The configuration is done in a graphical user interface on the\ndormakaba exos server. As soon as the save button is clicked in exos 9300, the\nwhole configuration is sent to the selected access manager via SOAP. The SOAP\nrequest is sent without any prior authentication or authorization by default.\nThough authentication and authorization can be configured using IPsec for 9200-K5\ndevices and mTLS for 9200-K7 devices, it is not enabled by default and must\ntherefore be activated with additional steps.\n\nThis insecure default allows an attacker with network level access to completely\ncontrol the whole environment. An attacker is for example easily able to conduct\nthe following tasks without prior authentication:\n- Re-configure access managers (e.g. remove alarming system requirements)\n- Freely re-configure the inputs and outputs - Open all connected doors permanently\n- Open all doors for a defined time interval\n- Change the admin password\n- and many more\n\nNetwork level access can be gained due to an insufficient network segmentation as well\nas missing LAN firewalls. Some devices with an insecure configuration have been\nidentified to be directly exposed to the internet as well.\n\nVulnerable Versions:\n- 92xx-K5: All versions on the market\n- 92xx-K7: \u003cBAME 06.00\n\n2) Trace Functionality Leaking Sensitive Data (CVE-2025-59098)\nThe access manager is offering a trace functionality to debug errors and issues\nwith the device. The trace functionality is implemented as a simple TCP socket.\nA tool called TraceClient.exe, provided by dormakaba via the Access Manager web\ninterface, is used to connect to the socket and receive debug information. The data\nis permanently broadcast on the TCP socket. The socket can be accessed without\nany authentication or encryption.\n\nThe transmitted data is based on the set verbosity level. The verbosity level can be\nset using the HTTP(S) endpoint with the service interface password or with the guessable\nidentifier of the device via the SOAP interface.\n\nThe transmitted data contains sensitive data like the Card ID as well as all\nbutton presses on registration units. This allows an attacker with network level\naccess to retrieve all entered PINs on a registration unit.\n\nVulnerable Versions:\n- 92xx-K5: \u003cXAMB 04.06.212\n- 92xx-K7: \u003cBAME 05.02.156\n\n\n3) Unauthenticated Path Traversal (CVE-2025-59099)\nThe Access Manager is using the open source web server \"CompactWebServer\" written\nin C#. This web server is affected by a path traversal vulnerability, which\nallows an attacker to directly access files via simple GET requests without\nprior authentication.\n\nHence, it is possible to retrieve all files stored on the file system, including\nthe SQLite database Database.sq3, containing badge information and the corresponding\nPIN codes. Additionally, when trying to access certain files, the web server crashes\nand becomes unreachable for about 60 seconds. This can be abused to continuously send\nthe request and cause denial of service.\n\nVulnerable Versions:\n- 92xx-K5: \u003cXAMB 04.05.21\n- 92xx-K7: \u003cBAME 04.05.16\n\n4) Unauthenticated Access to the SQLite Database (CVE-2025-59100)\nThe web interface offers a functionality to export the internal SQLite database.\nAfter executing the database export, an automatic download is started and the\ndevice reboots. After rebooting, the exported database is deleted and cannot be\naccessed anymore. However, it was noticed that sometimes the device does not reboot\nand therefore the exported database is not deleted, or the device reboots and the\nexport is not deleted for unknown reasons. The path where the database export is\nlocated can be accessed without prior authentication. This leads to the fact that\nan attacker might be able to get access to the exported database without prior\nauthentication. The database includes sensitive data like passwords, card pins,\nencrypted Mifare sitekeys and much more.\n\nVulnerable Versions:\n- 92xx-K5: \u003cXAMB 04.06.212\n\n5) Insufficient Session Management (CVE-2025-59101)\nInstead of typical session tokens or cookies, it is verified on a per-request basis\nif the originating IP address has once successfully logged in. As soon as an\nauthentication request from a certain source IP is successful, the IP address\nis handled as authenticated. No other session information is stored. Therefore,\nit is possible to spoof the IP address of a logged-in user to gain access to\nthe Access Manager web interface.\n\nVulnerable Versions:\n- 92xx-K5: \u003cXAMB 04.06.212\n- 92xx-K7: \u003cBAME 04.07.268\n\n6) Secrets Stored in Plaintext in Database (CVE-2025-59102)\nThe web server of the Access Manager offers a functionality to download a backup\nof the local database stored on the device. This database contains the whole\nconfiguration. This includes encrypted MIFARE keys, card data, user PINs and\nmuch more. The PINs are even stored unencrypted. Combined with the fact that an\nattacker can e"
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"url": "http://kbr.kaba.ch/services/ICommunicationHub2IdmmService\""
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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"title": "SEC Consult SA-20260126-1 :: Multiple Critical Vulnerabilities in dormakaba Access Manager",
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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