- GNA identifier
- GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988GCVE-1988-2026-0472
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[ROOTEDCON] Call for Papers 2027 · RootedCON2027 (Madrid)
Summary
-=] About RootedCON
RootedCON is a technology and cybersecurity conference that will take place in Madrid (Spain) from March 4 to 6, 2027.
This will be our XVII EDITION!
With an attendance of between 9,000 and 10,000 people, it is the most relevant specialized conference in the country
and one of the most important in Europe. We welcome students, Security Forces and Corps, technology and information
security professionals, and, above all, passionate individuals.
As in every edition, we want it to be truly special :) We are adding more activities and collaborations!
-=] Types of Talks
We accept these formats:
- Lightning Talk: 25 minutes.
- Standard Talk: 50 minutes.
- Practical Workshop: 110 minutes (hands-on lab, proposals to be evaluated).
- Other format: tell us in the comments of the submission.
The number of slots for each type is limited. We can adjust the schedule to extend or reduce a talk if the proposal
warrants it.
We encourage you to BE ORIGINAL. We accept *unusual* and thematic talks, also on culture or politics, as long as they
revolve around technology or information security.
-=] Trainings
You can submit training proposals directly at Call for Papers. Trainings are one of the elements that generate the most
interest at Rooted, so any innovative proposal is very welcome.
- RootedLAB: 1 day (8-9 hours).
- RootedBOOTCAMP: 3 days (24 to 30 hours).
* Trainings have their own model: someone from the team will contact you to explain the details and conditions.
-=] International Speakers
There will be simultaneous translation between Spanish and English in all rooms, so feel free to submit your talk, no
matter where you are from :)
Indicate in the submission the language in which you will present:
[ES] - Spanish
[EN] - English
-=] Topics We Are Looking For
Any interesting topic related to TECHNOLOGY. Some examples, without limiting ourselves to them:
- ANY original topic that adds value to our audience!
- Artificial Intelligence (not just LLM, please): how to attack it, how to use it to attack and defend, prompt
injection, agents, deep learning, MCP, A2A, swarms,...
No fluff: this is a hot topic, dedicate time to research it.
- APT, botnets, and malware. And, obviously, ransomware!
- Biohacking and alternative disciplines.
- Hacking in any environment: IT, OT, IoT, cloud, edge, satellites, mobile...
- Reverse engineering, debugging, hooking, fuzzing, exploiting, DFIR...
- Cryptoassets and cryptocurrencies (crypto bros abstain).
- Financial technology (FinTech).
- Hardware hacking: JTAG, SWD, DAP, consoles...
- Video games and cheats.
- Cryptography (including post-quantum), steganography, covert channels...
- #CryptograFREE: defend your Fundamental Rights on the Internet.
- DEV/SEC/OPS and MLOPS and AIOPS and...:
DEV: MQTT, AMQP, development patterns, distributed systems, CI/CD...
OPS: orchestration, virtualization and containers, artifacts, supply chain...
- Culture, philosophy and ethics, future, innovation... the world!
-=] How to Submit Your Talk
We only accept talks submitted from the official Call for Papers:
https://reg.rootedcon.com/callforpaper/
Any proposal submitted through another channel is considered "unofficial" and has no guarantee of being selected.
-=] Speaker Benefits
Each selected speaker enjoys:
- ONE extra ticket for a companion.
- Dinner with speakers, trainers, sponsors, and the RootedCON team (no companions or family).
- Hotel covered by RootedCON: focused on the days of the event.
- Travel covered by RootedCON: on the dates of the event.
- Full access to all areas of the conference throughout the event.
- Possibility to repeat the talk, depending on the final evaluation.
- Some free drinks at the party :)
- Management of potential job offers.
- A gift from the organization.
-=] Speaker Obligations
Every speaker who submits a talk and is selected must:
a) Ensure that the talk is TECHNICAL and backed by proof of concept (PoC). If there is no PoC, it must be justified.
Technical does not mean "computers": there are legal, financial, psychological, military... and, of course, IT
technicians :)
b) Deliver the materials for the talk by the agreed dates before the conference, including the details of the PoCs.
c) Explicitly accept that the materials of the talk, as well as the audio and video, will be published in any format
and medium, in the systems of RootedCON or others.
d) Confirm their participation when the talk is accepted and complete their details (verified phone number and, if
requesting travel or hotel, identity document).
e) SIGN the speaker contract and explicit permission for image rights, to be recorded (and the recording
disseminated).
*Please*, make sure you understand your obligations as a speaker before submitting a proposal.
-=] Sponsors
RootedCON is always looking for new quality sponsors. If you have a proposal or believe your organization may be
interested, write to us at:
patrocinadores-AT-rootedcon.com
IMPORTANT: due to the technical essence of the conference and what our attendees tell us in surveys, we recommend
sponsors prepare a talk aligned with what our audience expects.
Any help, comment, idea, proposal, or collaboration will be thoroughly considered: this type of input is very important
to us, as we depend on you to build the conference.
-=] Important Things to Keep in Mind
1. Time management is crucial. It’s better to request a longer slot than to squeeze the talk into twenty minutes and
run out of time for audience questions.
2. We will value EXCLUSIVE talks more highly, which have not been presented in any other forum, blog, website, event,
or conference.
3. We believe in responsible disclosure: if you are going to show a 0-day, we need confirmation that you have notified
the manufacturer or the affected party. If you haven’t done so, we can help you.
4. We can cancel participation if materials do not arrive on time. Delays affect travel, hotel, and other benefits.
5. PLEASE, *BE CLEAR* with your needs when submitting the talk: travel (and city of origin), hotel, transfers, and
dinner. Details will be finalized after acceptance, but RootedCON reserves the right not to cover needs that were not
indicated in the submission.
-=] Contact
info-AT-rootedcon.com
Full call: https://reg.rootedcon.com/cfp/oldskool/116
Submit your talk: https://reg.rootedcon.com/callforpaper/submit/116/
Deadline: Dec. 28, 2026, 12:59 a.m.
--
Román Ramírez Giménez
CEO
/RootedCON
rramirez () rootedcon com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Call for Papers |
Affected:
unknown
|
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And, obviously, ransomware!\n - Biohacking and alternative disciplines.\n - Hacking in any environment: IT, OT, IoT, cloud, edge, satellites, mobile...\n - Reverse engineering, debugging, hooking, fuzzing, exploiting, DFIR...\n - Cryptoassets and cryptocurrencies (crypto bros abstain).\n - Financial technology (FinTech).\n - Hardware hacking: JTAG, SWD, DAP, consoles...\n - Video games and cheats.\n - Cryptography (including post-quantum), steganography, covert channels...\n - #CryptograFREE: defend your Fundamental Rights on the Internet.\n - DEV/SEC/OPS and MLOPS and AIOPS and...:\n DEV: MQTT, AMQP, development patterns, distributed systems, CI/CD...\n OPS: orchestration, virtualization and containers, artifacts, supply chain...\n - Culture, philosophy and ethics, future, innovation... the world!\n\n\n-=] How to Submit Your Talk\n\nWe only accept talks submitted from the official Call for Papers:\n\n https://reg.rootedcon.com/callforpaper/\n\nAny proposal submitted through another channel is considered \"unofficial\" and has no guarantee of being selected.\n\n\n-=] Speaker Benefits\n\nEach selected speaker enjoys:\n\n - ONE extra ticket for a companion.\n - Dinner with speakers, trainers, sponsors, and the RootedCON team (no companions or family).\n - Hotel covered by RootedCON: focused on the days of the event.\n - Travel covered by RootedCON: on the dates of the event.\n - Full access to all areas of the conference throughout the event.\n - Possibility to repeat the talk, depending on the final evaluation.\n - Some free drinks at the party :)\n - Management of potential job offers.\n - A gift from the organization.\n\n\n-=] Speaker Obligations\n\nEvery speaker who submits a talk and is selected must:\n\n a) Ensure that the talk is TECHNICAL and backed by proof of concept (PoC). If there is no PoC, it must be justified. \nTechnical does not mean \"computers\": there are legal, financial, psychological, military... and, of course, IT \ntechnicians :)\n\n b) Deliver the materials for the talk by the agreed dates before the conference, including the details of the PoCs.\n\n c) Explicitly accept that the materials of the talk, as well as the audio and video, will be published in any format \nand medium, in the systems of RootedCON or others.\n\n d) Confirm their participation when the talk is accepted and complete their details (verified phone number and, if \nrequesting travel or hotel, identity document).\n \n e) SIGN the speaker contract and explicit permission for image rights, to be recorded (and the recording \ndisseminated).\n\n*Please*, make sure you understand your obligations as a speaker before submitting a proposal.\n\n\n-=] Sponsors\n\nRootedCON is always looking for new quality sponsors. 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If you haven\u2019t done so, we can help you.\n\n4. We can cancel participation if materials do not arrive on time. Delays affect travel, hotel, and other benefits.\n\n5. PLEASE, *BE CLEAR* with your needs when submitting the talk: travel (and city of origin), hotel, transfers, and \ndinner. Details will be finalized after acceptance, but RootedCON reserves the right not to cover needs that were not \nindicated in the submission.\n\n\n-=] Contact\n\n info-AT-rootedcon.com\n\nFull call: https://reg.rootedcon.com/cfp/oldskool/116\nSubmit your talk: https://reg.rootedcon.com/callforpaper/submit/116/\nDeadline: Dec. 28, 2026, 12:59 a.m.\n\n-- \nRom\u00e1n Ram\u00edrez Gim\u00e9nez\nCEO\n/RootedCON\nrramirez () rootedcon com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0471
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] StreamSets Transformer 3.17.0 auth-mode none fallback and un-sandboxed ScalaDTransform execution to container root (8.1 primary)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in
StreamSets Transformer, the Spark-engine data-pipeline platform from
StreamSets Inc. (subsequently acquired by IBM), verified on version 3.17.0
analysed from the official container image.
Type: failing-open authentication plus un-sandboxed code injection. On the
web tier, CWE-306 and CWE-1188 with CWE-285 on the authorisation side: when
the effective http.authentication value resolves to none, the embedded
servlet container installs no authentication handler at all, and the same
state with DPM disabled registers a filter on every path that makes every
role check pass and presents a synthesised admin principal. At the sink,
CWE-94: the REST pipeline API accepts an attacker-chosen pipeline whose
ScalaDTransform code field, an unconstrained text configuration entry, is
compiled with the full Scala compiler and executed inside the service JVM,
which runs as uid 0. The research records exactly three absences on that
path: no SecurityManager, no sandbox and no API allowlist.
Scoring. Dual-scored, with the primary reading named first:
- PRIMARY, as distributed, 8.1 High, vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. Attack complexity
is high because success depends on a target state the attacker
does not control: the shipped properties file sets aster, so the
anonymous state is reached by operator choice or by loss of the property.
- CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H,
for deployments whose effective mode does resolve to none, including the
verified instance, where the chain completed deterministically. This is
the deployment-conditional reading and is not the factory-state rating.
Impact: anonymous code execution as uid 0 inside the container on the first
command, with no escalation step; unrestricted read of every stored pipeline
definition including connection configuration, of the product property
files and of the container filesystem; arbitrary modification of product
state; and availability impact on an engine that sits between upstream
sources and downstream warehouses. No sandbox was bypassed, because none
exists on the compile-and-run path.
Verification boundary, stated plainly. Verified end to end over plain HTTP
against a live instance of the official container image, three independent
runs, each leaving a per-run unique root-owned marker file; the identity
command returned uid 0 inside the container and command output was recovered
out of band from the container filesystem. No instance was exercised at its
shipped property value, so no bypass of the authenticated configuration is
claimed; the property-loss fallback is established from decompiled code
rather than a live experiment; container root was reached with no escape
attempted or claimed; only version 3.17.0 was tested. The shipped
proof-of-concept takes every target detail as a parameter and includes a
probe mode that tests the precondition without attacking.
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/streamsets-transformer-auth-none-scaladtransform-code-execution
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
The vendor has been notified through the product-security intake the vendor
publishes for this product line. No vulnerability identifier has been
assigned to this finding yet.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | StreamSets Transformer |
Affected:
unknown
|
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GCVE-1988-2026-0470
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] RCDevs WebADM 2.4.14 authenticated log viewer sid command injection to webadm uid 999 code execution (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in RCDevs WebADM
2.4.14, Freeware Edition, the closed-source IAM/MFA management platform from RCDevs
Security SA (Luxembourg) that fronts the vendor's OpenOTP, SpanKey and TiQR
authentication products.
Type: OS command injection (CWE-78, with CWE-20 and CWE-116 contributing, and
CWE-732/CWE-276 and CWE-250 added for two auxiliary conditions). The administrator
console log viewer admin/logfile_viewer.php interpolates the sid GET parameter,
percent-decoded once and with no escaping of any kind, into the single-quoted shell
command grep -E '<sid>' <logfile> | tail -n 10000 which the page hands to PHP's
popen(). A single apostrophe closes the quoted grep pattern, everything after it is
parsed by /bin/sh as command text, and the trailing quote pair re-opens an empty
quoted string that swallows the remainder of the pipeline. There is no escapeshellarg,
no escapeshellcmd, no quote stripping, no charset allow-list and no length cap on the
recorded path; the absence of a filter, not the bypass of one, is the root cause.
Commands execute as the webadm service account, uid=999(webadm) gid=999(webadm)
groups=999(webadm), the identity the webadm-httpd workers run under with no privilege
drop configured. Root was not achieved, is not claimed, and no privilege escalation
was attempted.
The endpoint does not echo command output into its HTTP response, so confirmation is
out-of-band: the injected command appends a line to /opt/webadm/logs/webadm.log and
the same endpoint reads that file back over HTTPS when asked for a different log
selector. This also means the finding is self-verifying rather than interpretive.
The published advisory reproduces the identity string but deliberately not the
per-run marker token or the container hostname from the run, since both are artefacts
of one execution on one host.
Scoring. One score is published: 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
That vector computes to 7.107826 raw and is taken to 7.2 by the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth
Roundup, which is why a calculator reporting 7.1 is not in disagreement with anything
but with the specification's rounding rule. Our research record carried a higher base
score beside this same PR:H vector, and that pairing cannot compute; the higher figure
is the base score of the PR:L variant, which asserts that an authenticated principal
below administrator reaches the sink. This research did not support that assertion:
the session is issued by an LDAP bind as the administrator DN, the no-cookie negative
control never reached popen(), and no lower-privileged console role was documented.
The advisory therefore publishes 7.2 alone and leaves PR:L as an open question about
the product's role model, to be amended if an auditor- or help-desk-class role can
open this viewer in a shipped or supported configuration. Scope Changed was
considered and rejected: under S:C the same vector would compute to 9.1, but the
injected command runs as the same identity, on the same host, with the same backend
access the vulnerable application already holds, so no authorization boundary is
crossed. No unauthenticated reading is published. License registration was required
to bring the console up, the record documents no vendor-shipped default administrator
credential, and this research did not establish whether one exists, so no PR:N figure
is claimed on evidence the record does not carry.
Authentication: post-authentication console administrator. Eleven endpoints reachable
without a console session were examined in full, plus two independent adversarial
passes tasked specifically with breaking the "a session is required" conclusion. That
sweep found no shell sink and no file-write sink reachable from unauthenticated input;
every include hit was a static framework bootstrap; the certificate signing daemon on
port 5000 carries no shell strings; and the mail() transport keeps recipients off the
command line, removing the notification path as an injection route. The advisory
publishes that disposition table so the negative result is auditable. Unauthenticated
remote code execution was not reached and none is claimed.
Impact: arbitrary OS command execution as the webadm application account on the host
that runs an identity platform, which is why the qualitative weight exceeds what the
number alone conveys. From uid 999 an attacker can read and rewrite platform
configuration under /opt/webadm, including the httpd and PHP configuration defining
routing, authentication domains and backend connectivity - a persistence path that
survives a service restart without touching the operating system; reach the directory
backend on the local LDAP listener and the application database on the local MariaDB
listener with the credentials the application itself carries, which for an MFA
platform means user records, OTP state and second-factor enrolments, so modification
can disable, redirect or re-enrol a user's second factor; interact with the
certificate signing daemon from inside the trust boundary where its network-level
protections no longer apply; write to product logs, supporting both anti-forensics
and the observation channel this exploit uses; and disrupt availability of the console
and of the authentication path it fronts, locking out users of every relying
application. Everything gained sits inside the authorization domain the application
already occupies, hence Scope Unchanged, but the content of that domain is the
identity infrastructure of whatever WebADM was deployed to protect.
Verification boundary, stated plainly. All dynamic work was performed against a
Docker container running WebADM 2.4.14 Freeware Edition, reached over TLS on the
container's HTTPS listener by a pure-standard-library Python client, driven from the
container host, and recorded across four independent runs that each used their own
marker and all returned the same uid 999 identity. The container's published ports
were mapped to loopback addresses and no request crossed a network boundary, so
remote reachability is argued from the product's own binding configuration for an
admin console vhost that exists to be reached over a network, not measured from a
separate host. The application ships as a Blowfish-encrypted opcache file_cache corpus
that only the vendor's custom webadm-runphp interpreter (PHP 8.2.30, ZTS) decodes at
load time, so there is no plaintext PHP on disk: the decoder was located in that
interpreter by following cross-references to the container magic, the parser and the
decryption were reimplemented offline, and 315 files were recovered. That recovery
yields the literal string layer, not vendor source text, so the sink construction in
the advisory is labelled as a reconstruction from decoded string literals plus
observed behaviour, confirmed by the executed result. Exactly one command shape was
executed and only that shape is claimed - a single echo carrying three command
substitutions and a redirection into the product log - because the target shell
rejected top-level parentheses and statement separators inside the injected text; a
nested sh -c wrapper, a pipeline, an && -joined chain and any write into the document
root were never exercised. Privilege escalation, persistence and lateral movement to
the LDAP or MariaDB backends were reasoned about from the identity and the listener
layout, not executed. Only WebADM 2.4.14 Freeware Edition was tested; other versions
and licensed editions with additional web service modules installed are unclaimed.
Two detection notes worth carrying into any rule. Every /admin/*.php request returns
HTTP 200 together with the WebADM doctype even with no session cookie, because the
framework renders the common HTML shell before the page logic runs the session check,
so status code, response length and doctype are unusable as authorization signals and
will produce false positives if used that way. Detect on shell metacharacters in sid,
above all the apostrophe, and on unstructured lines appearing in
/opt/webadm/logs/webadm.log; process ancestry alone is weak, because a webadm-httpd
child running grep and tail for the viewer is normal behaviour.
Mitigation summary: escapeshellarg() on sid at the sink (escapeshellcmd is not an
acceptable substitute, since it does not move a value out of the quoting context it
was placed in); remove the shell entirely with proc_open() over an argument vector or
filter the file in PHP with a bounded tail counter, which also covers the second
interpolation site, the file operand derived from the log selector; validate sid
against the alphanumeric shape the product's own random_id() generates and return 400
on mismatch; resolve the log selector through a fixed server-side enumeration; set an
explicit minimal User= and Group= for the httpd workers and stop the service account
from appending to any log the viewer displays back; set disable_functions in php.ini,
which the recorded configuration does not; and add a regression test that fails on a
metacharacter. Until a patch exists operators should bind the admin vhost to a
management interface, VPN or mutually authenticated proxy, treat console
administrator credentials as tier-zero secrets behind a second factor, alert on the
indicators above, and on suspicion of exploitation rotate the administrator, LDAP and
database credentials and audit second-factor enrolments for the interval in question.
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/rcdevs-webadm-logfile-viewer-sid-command-injection
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
RCDevs Security SA has been notified through the general corporate contact mailbox it
publishes for enquiries, support and problem submissions; the vendor publishes no
RFC 9116 security.txt and we found no product security page, vulnerability-disclosure
policy or researcher intake form, so there was no pre-publication channel for us to
use and this disclosure is unconditional. No vulnerability identifier has been
assigned to this finding yet.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "WebADM",
"vendor": "Rcdevs",
"versions": [
{
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"version": "unknown"
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"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
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"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in RCDevs WebADM\n2.4.14, Freeware Edition, the closed-source IAM/MFA management platform from RCDevs\nSecurity SA (Luxembourg) that fronts the vendor\u0027s OpenOTP, SpanKey and TiQR\nauthentication products.\n\nType: OS command injection (CWE-78, with CWE-20 and CWE-116 contributing, and\nCWE-732/CWE-276 and CWE-250 added for two auxiliary conditions). The administrator\nconsole log viewer admin/logfile_viewer.php interpolates the sid GET parameter,\npercent-decoded once and with no escaping of any kind, into the single-quoted shell\ncommand grep -E \u0027\u003csid\u003e\u0027 \u003clogfile\u003e | tail -n 10000 which the page hands to PHP\u0027s\npopen(). A single apostrophe closes the quoted grep pattern, everything after it is\nparsed by /bin/sh as command text, and the trailing quote pair re-opens an empty\nquoted string that swallows the remainder of the pipeline. There is no escapeshellarg,\nno escapeshellcmd, no quote stripping, no charset allow-list and no length cap on the\nrecorded path; the absence of a filter, not the bypass of one, is the root cause.\nCommands execute as the webadm service account, uid=999(webadm) gid=999(webadm)\ngroups=999(webadm), the identity the webadm-httpd workers run under with no privilege\ndrop configured. Root was not achieved, is not claimed, and no privilege escalation\nwas attempted.\n\nThe endpoint does not echo command output into its HTTP response, so confirmation is\nout-of-band: the injected command appends a line to /opt/webadm/logs/webadm.log and\nthe same endpoint reads that file back over HTTPS when asked for a different log\nselector. This also means the finding is self-verifying rather than interpretive.\nThe published advisory reproduces the identity string but deliberately not the\nper-run marker token or the container hostname from the run, since both are artefacts\nof one execution on one host.\n\nScoring. One score is published: 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.\nThat vector computes to 7.107826 raw and is taken to 7.2 by the CVSS ceiling-to-tenth\nRoundup, which is why a calculator reporting 7.1 is not in disagreement with anything\nbut with the specification\u0027s rounding rule. Our research record carried a higher base\nscore beside this same PR:H vector, and that pairing cannot compute; the higher figure\nis the base score of the PR:L variant, which asserts that an authenticated principal\nbelow administrator reaches the sink. This research did not support that assertion:\nthe session is issued by an LDAP bind as the administrator DN, the no-cookie negative\ncontrol never reached popen(), and no lower-privileged console role was documented.\nThe advisory therefore publishes 7.2 alone and leaves PR:L as an open question about\nthe product\u0027s role model, to be amended if an auditor- or help-desk-class role can\nopen this viewer in a shipped or supported configuration. Scope Changed was\nconsidered and rejected: under S:C the same vector would compute to 9.1, but the\ninjected command runs as the same identity, on the same host, with the same backend\naccess the vulnerable application already holds, so no authorization boundary is\ncrossed. No unauthenticated reading is published. License registration was required\nto bring the console up, the record documents no vendor-shipped default administrator\ncredential, and this research did not establish whether one exists, so no PR:N figure\nis claimed on evidence the record does not carry.\n\nAuthentication: post-authentication console administrator. Eleven endpoints reachable\nwithout a console session were examined in full, plus two independent adversarial\npasses tasked specifically with breaking the \"a session is required\" conclusion. That\nsweep found no shell sink and no file-write sink reachable from unauthenticated input;\nevery include hit was a static framework bootstrap; the certificate signing daemon on\nport 5000 carries no shell strings; and the mail() transport keeps recipients off the\ncommand line, removing the notification path as an injection route. The advisory\npublishes that disposition table so the negative result is auditable. Unauthenticated\nremote code execution was not reached and none is claimed.\n\nImpact: arbitrary OS command execution as the webadm application account on the host\nthat runs an identity platform, which is why the qualitative weight exceeds what the\nnumber alone conveys. From uid 999 an attacker can read and rewrite platform\nconfiguration under /opt/webadm, including the httpd and PHP configuration defining\nrouting, authentication domains and backend connectivity - a persistence path that\nsurvives a service restart without touching the operating system; reach the directory\nbackend on the local LDAP listener and the application database on the local MariaDB\nlistener with the credentials the application itself carries, which for an MFA\nplatform means user records, OTP state and second-factor enrolments, so modification\ncan disable, redirect or re-enrol a user\u0027s second factor; interact with the\ncertificate signing daemon from inside the trust boundary where its network-level\nprotections no longer apply; write to product logs, supporting both anti-forensics\nand the observation channel this exploit uses; and disrupt availability of the console\nand of the authentication path it fronts, locking out users of every relying\napplication. Everything gained sits inside the authorization domain the application\nalready occupies, hence Scope Unchanged, but the content of that domain is the\nidentity infrastructure of whatever WebADM was deployed to protect.\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly. All dynamic work was performed against a\nDocker container running WebADM 2.4.14 Freeware Edition, reached over TLS on the\ncontainer\u0027s HTTPS listener by a pure-standard-library Python client, driven from the\ncontainer host, and recorded across four independent runs that each used their own\nmarker and all returned the same uid 999 identity. The container\u0027s published ports\nwere mapped to loopback addresses and no request crossed a network boundary, so\nremote reachability is argued from the product\u0027s own binding configuration for an\nadmin console vhost that exists to be reached over a network, not measured from a\nseparate host. The application ships as a Blowfish-encrypted opcache file_cache corpus\nthat only the vendor\u0027s custom webadm-runphp interpreter (PHP 8.2.30, ZTS) decodes at\nload time, so there is no plaintext PHP on disk: the decoder was located in that\ninterpreter by following cross-references to the container magic, the parser and the\ndecryption were reimplemented offline, and 315 files were recovered. That recovery\nyields the literal string layer, not vendor source text, so the sink construction in\nthe advisory is labelled as a reconstruction from decoded string literals plus\nobserved behaviour, confirmed by the executed result. Exactly one command shape was\nexecuted and only that shape is claimed - a single echo carrying three command\nsubstitutions and a redirection into the product log - because the target shell\nrejected top-level parentheses and statement separators inside the injected text; a\nnested sh -c wrapper, a pipeline, an \u0026\u0026 -joined chain and any write into the document\nroot were never exercised. Privilege escalation, persistence and lateral movement to\nthe LDAP or MariaDB backends were reasoned about from the identity and the listener\nlayout, not executed. Only WebADM 2.4.14 Freeware Edition was tested; other versions\nand licensed editions with additional web service modules installed are unclaimed.\n\nTwo detection notes worth carrying into any rule. Every /admin/*.php request returns\nHTTP 200 together with the WebADM doctype even with no session cookie, because the\nframework renders the common HTML shell before the page logic runs the session check,\nso status code, response length and doctype are unusable as authorization signals and\nwill produce false positives if used that way. Detect on shell metacharacters in sid,\nabove all the apostrophe, and on unstructured lines appearing in\n/opt/webadm/logs/webadm.log; process ancestry alone is weak, because a webadm-httpd\nchild running grep and tail for the viewer is normal behaviour.\n\nMitigation summary: escapeshellarg() on sid at the sink (escapeshellcmd is not an\nacceptable substitute, since it does not move a value out of the quoting context it\nwas placed in); remove the shell entirely with proc_open() over an argument vector or\nfilter the file in PHP with a bounded tail counter, which also covers the second\ninterpolation site, the file operand derived from the log selector; validate sid\nagainst the alphanumeric shape the product\u0027s own random_id() generates and return 400\non mismatch; resolve the log selector through a fixed server-side enumeration; set an\nexplicit minimal User= and Group= for the httpd workers and stop the service account\nfrom appending to any log the viewer displays back; set disable_functions in php.ini,\nwhich the recorded configuration does not; and add a regression test that fails on a\nmetacharacter. Until a patch exists operators should bind the admin vhost to a\nmanagement interface, VPN or mutually authenticated proxy, treat console\nadministrator credentials as tier-zero secrets behind a second factor, alert on the\nindicators above, and on suspicion of exploitation rotate the administrator, LDAP and\ndatabase credentials and audit second-factor enrolments for the interval in question.\n\nFull technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/rcdevs-webadm-logfile-viewer-sid-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nRCDevs Security SA has been notified through the general corporate contact mailbox it\npublishes for enquiries, support and problem submissions; the vendor publishes no\nRFC 9116 security.txt and we found no product security page, vulnerability-disclosure\npolicy or researcher intake form, so there was no pre-publication channel for us to\nuse and this disclosure is unconditional. No vulnerability identifier has been\nassigned to this finding yet.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0469
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Maian Cart 3.8 addBanners unrestricted banner upload to PHP webshell and administrator command execution (7.2 primary, PR:H)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Maian
Cart 3.8, the self-hosted PHP shopping-cart system from Maian Media (Maian
Script World), verified end to end against a real installation of that
version.
Type: unrestricted upload of a file with a dangerous type (CWE-434), realized
as OS command execution (CWE-78) through an attacker-supplied PHP webshell,
with CWE-269 bearing on the execution privilege context. The Store Banners
page of the administration backend (route /admin/index.php?p=settings&s=9)
dispatches multipart uploads to addBanners() in
admin/control/classes/class.system.php:376-413, which reads the raw client
filename at line 386, derives the stored extension from it at line 392 with
strrchr on the lower-cased name, composes the stored name at line 393 as the
banner prefix plus a counter from the banners table plus that extension, and
writes the file with move_uploaded_file at line 401, a second call site being
recorded at line 410. There is no extension allow-list, no MIME or finfo
validation and no getimagesize() content check anywhere on the path;
mc_safeImport at line 377 is an SQL-escaping pass over $_POST and never
touches $_FILES, and is_uploaded_file only confirms the file arrived over
HTTP. With the shipped defaults RENAME_BANNERS=1 and BANNER_PREFIX='img_',
an upload named shell.php is stored as img_1.php: the rename regenerates the
base name and preserves the attacker's extension. The destination,
content/_theme_default/images/banners/, is inside the document root and
carries no deny rule, in explicit contrast to admin/import/.htaccess,
admin/attachments/.htaccess and content/_theme_default/cache/.htaccess, all
of which ship Deny from all, so a plain GET for the stored img_<id>.php is
handed to the PHP interpreter and a one-line shell_exec webshell yields
command execution in the web server process context. move_uploaded_file runs
before the INSERT INTO banners statement, so the shell survives even a failing
INSERT. The product's own image allow-list ($imgAllow at class.products.php:9,
applied at :1213 and :1907 in addAdditionalProductPictures) is the one-line
control this handler omits.
Scoring. Four readings are published with their vectors, labelled, rather than
one number:
- PRIMARY, and the only classification this advisory claims: 7.2 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The sink sits behind the
webmaster gate at admin/control/system-load.php:79
(mc_isWebmasterLoggedIn, whose underlying test at functions.php:324-336
requires a fully populated webmaster session array).
- CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H,
for a deployment that retains an unchanged, known or guessable
administrator credential. This reading is this advisory's own construction,
not a figure produced by the research record, which scores the finding only
under the 7.2 vector and records that the unauthenticated objective was not
reached. It describes deployment state rather than product state: the
product ships no fixed factory credential, the install wizard writes the
operator-chosen USERNAME and PASSWORD into access.php, and no installation
whose credentials were guessable was verified. Its sole basis is the
companion observation that the installer-provisioned credential is never
forced to rotate (a CWE-798-class note about persistent provisioned
credentials without a rotation gate). It does not change the primary
classification.
- CONSIDERED AND NOT ADOPTED: 8.8 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, which differs from the
primary vector only in Privileges Required and was not adopted because no
role below webmaster reaches the settings module in the recorded gate
model; and 9.1 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, which would require Scope
Changed and does not fit, the vulnerable component and the impacted
component being the same security authority.
Authentication: administrator session. The login handler
(admin/control/modules/system/portal.php:26-47) requires process=1, a cs_rf
CSRF token matching the hidden field served on the login page, a user value
equal to the USERNAME constant in access.php and a password verified through
mc_PassHash; the trigger is isset($_POST['process_banners']) at
settings.php:84-87. The unauthenticated objective was pursued and exhaustively
ruled out: ajax.php exposes no file-write or command primitive an
unauthenticated caller can steer; forging the persistent administrator cookie
is infeasible because mc_encrypt(SECRET_KEY . DB_NAME) requires the
per-installation database name, which is not remotely discoverable; the only
gadget found was PHPMailer's __destruct, not exploitable into a dangerous sink
in this codebase, so no object-population chain exists; the login path is not
injectable; and every move_uploaded_file call site identified sits under the
gated /admin/ backend. No unauthenticated route to the sink is claimed.
Impact: arbitrary OS command execution as the web server process, uid=0(root)
in the laboratory capture because the test web tier ran as root, typically
www-data or apache in production. Full read and write access to store source
code, application configuration including the database credentials the
application itself reads, uploaded order attachments and the surrounding file
system; database access with the application's own privileges, meaning the
store's orders, customer records and settings; persistence, since the stored
img_<id>.php outlives the administrator session and nothing in the product
scans for or removes it; and a pivot into whatever segments the store host can
reach. For an insider or credential-holder the upload is audit-invisible: it
appears in the interface as an ordinary banner addition.
Verification boundary, stated plainly. Verified end to end against a real Maian
Cart 3.8 installation: the product's own install wizard run to completion on a
Linux laboratory host, creating 62 database tables and populating the settings
rows, with MySQL 8.0.46 on a dedicated laboratory schema and account, and the
web tier being the PHP built-in server bound to loopback for laboratory
safety. That process ran as root for the session in question, which is why
uid=0(root) was observed and why the stored 39-byte shell, exactly the length
of the one-line payload, was owned by root. Three independent runs reached
command execution, the third being a from-scratch re-analysis pass by an
independent reviewer who rebuilt the audit and shipped a second, distinctly
named shell through the same handler, stored as img_3.php. An adversarial
refutation review searched for a global upload sanitizer, a deny rule for the
banners directory, FilesMatch restrictions on .php, getimagesize usage on this
path, web-server configuration hardening and install-time hardening, found
none, and left the finding standing. No vendor-hosted or third-party
installation was touched, and no post-exploitation was performed beyond
identity and file-system probes.
What was not exercised: the production Apache and mod_php stack was not run,
so execution under Apache rests on static evidence plus the research record's
own assertion that Apache with mod_php is the default production deployment,
an assertion not substantiated from a vendor document; a non-root process
identity was not demonstrated, so the claim is command execution at whatever
identity the web server holds; the updateBanners edit path, the
TRADE_THEME_FOLDER branch and the dead-code uploadWebLogo variant
(class.system.php:956, same pattern, no call site, excluded from the finding)
were not exercised; only 3.8 was tested. One precondition is unresolved and
stated rather than smoothed over: the banners directory must already exist on
disk. It was absent in the first laboratory iteration, move_uploaded_file
failed with a no-such-file-or-directory error, and the directory was created
manually before a later iteration succeeded; move_uploaded_file does not
create directories and the handler's only filesystem guard tests the
destination file, not the directory. No artifact establishes which product
component creates it, so no first-upload directory creation is claimed.
Related product, scoped out. The research record notes that the sibling Maian
Support product exhibits the same CWE-434-class pattern, a content tree
without .htaccess protection combined with Apache AllowOverride All. That
product is out of scope for this advisory: no exploitation attempt was made
there and no identifier is claimed for it.
Fix direction, in short: enforce an extension allow-list at the sink reusing
the control already in class.products.php; validate uploaded content with
getimagesize() or finfo; discard the client-supplied extension and name stored
files server-side; make the banner storage non-executable by moving it outside
the document root or shipping a deny rule plus documented nginx-equivalent
guidance; route every move_uploaded_file call site through one shared
validator; force first-login rotation of the installer-provisioned
administrator credential; and remove or gate the dead uploadWebLogo code.
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/maian-cart-addbanners-upload-extension-webshell-rce
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
The vendor has been notified through the support mailbox it publishes for its
products. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maianscriptworld | Maian Cart |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Maian\nCart 3.8, the self-hosted PHP shopping-cart system from Maian Media (Maian\nScript World), verified end to end against a real installation of that\nversion.\n\nType: unrestricted upload of a file with a dangerous type (CWE-434), realized\nas OS command execution (CWE-78) through an attacker-supplied PHP webshell,\nwith CWE-269 bearing on the execution privilege context. The Store Banners\npage of the administration backend (route /admin/index.php?p=settings\u0026s=9)\ndispatches multipart uploads to addBanners() in\nadmin/control/classes/class.system.php:376-413, which reads the raw client\nfilename at line 386, derives the stored extension from it at line 392 with\nstrrchr on the lower-cased name, composes the stored name at line 393 as the\nbanner prefix plus a counter from the banners table plus that extension, and\nwrites the file with move_uploaded_file at line 401, a second call site being\nrecorded at line 410. There is no extension allow-list, no MIME or finfo\nvalidation and no getimagesize() content check anywhere on the path;\nmc_safeImport at line 377 is an SQL-escaping pass over $_POST and never\ntouches $_FILES, and is_uploaded_file only confirms the file arrived over\nHTTP. With the shipped defaults RENAME_BANNERS=1 and BANNER_PREFIX=\u0027img_\u0027,\nan upload named shell.php is stored as img_1.php: the rename regenerates the\nbase name and preserves the attacker\u0027s extension. The destination,\ncontent/_theme_default/images/banners/, is inside the document root and\ncarries no deny rule, in explicit contrast to admin/import/.htaccess,\nadmin/attachments/.htaccess and content/_theme_default/cache/.htaccess, all\nof which ship Deny from all, so a plain GET for the stored img_\u003cid\u003e.php is\nhanded to the PHP interpreter and a one-line shell_exec webshell yields\ncommand execution in the web server process context. move_uploaded_file runs\nbefore the INSERT INTO banners statement, so the shell survives even a failing\nINSERT. The product\u0027s own image allow-list ($imgAllow at class.products.php:9,\napplied at :1213 and :1907 in addAdditionalProductPictures) is the one-line\ncontrol this handler omits.\n\nScoring. Four readings are published with their vectors, labelled, rather than\none number:\n- PRIMARY, and the only classification this advisory claims: 7.2 High,\n CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The sink sits behind the\n webmaster gate at admin/control/system-load.php:79\n (mc_isWebmasterLoggedIn, whose underlying test at functions.php:324-336\n requires a fully populated webmaster session array).\n- CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H,\n for a deployment that retains an unchanged, known or guessable\n administrator credential. This reading is this advisory\u0027s own construction,\n not a figure produced by the research record, which scores the finding only\n under the 7.2 vector and records that the unauthenticated objective was not\n reached. It describes deployment state rather than product state: the\n product ships no fixed factory credential, the install wizard writes the\n operator-chosen USERNAME and PASSWORD into access.php, and no installation\n whose credentials were guessable was verified. Its sole basis is the\n companion observation that the installer-provisioned credential is never\n forced to rotate (a CWE-798-class note about persistent provisioned\n credentials without a rotation gate). It does not change the primary\n classification.\n- CONSIDERED AND NOT ADOPTED: 8.8 High,\n CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, which differs from the\n primary vector only in Privileges Required and was not adopted because no\n role below webmaster reaches the settings module in the recorded gate\n model; and 9.1 High,\n CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H, which would require Scope\n Changed and does not fit, the vulnerable component and the impacted\n component being the same security authority.\n\nAuthentication: administrator session. The login handler\n(admin/control/modules/system/portal.php:26-47) requires process=1, a cs_rf\nCSRF token matching the hidden field served on the login page, a user value\nequal to the USERNAME constant in access.php and a password verified through\nmc_PassHash; the trigger is isset($_POST[\u0027process_banners\u0027]) at\nsettings.php:84-87. The unauthenticated objective was pursued and exhaustively\nruled out: ajax.php exposes no file-write or command primitive an\nunauthenticated caller can steer; forging the persistent administrator cookie\nis infeasible because mc_encrypt(SECRET_KEY . DB_NAME) requires the\nper-installation database name, which is not remotely discoverable; the only\ngadget found was PHPMailer\u0027s __destruct, not exploitable into a dangerous sink\nin this codebase, so no object-population chain exists; the login path is not\ninjectable; and every move_uploaded_file call site identified sits under the\ngated /admin/ backend. No unauthenticated route to the sink is claimed.\n\nImpact: arbitrary OS command execution as the web server process, uid=0(root)\nin the laboratory capture because the test web tier ran as root, typically\nwww-data or apache in production. Full read and write access to store source\ncode, application configuration including the database credentials the\napplication itself reads, uploaded order attachments and the surrounding file\nsystem; database access with the application\u0027s own privileges, meaning the\nstore\u0027s orders, customer records and settings; persistence, since the stored\nimg_\u003cid\u003e.php outlives the administrator session and nothing in the product\nscans for or removes it; and a pivot into whatever segments the store host can\nreach. For an insider or credential-holder the upload is audit-invisible: it\nappears in the interface as an ordinary banner addition.\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly. Verified end to end against a real Maian\nCart 3.8 installation: the product\u0027s own install wizard run to completion on a\nLinux laboratory host, creating 62 database tables and populating the settings\nrows, with MySQL 8.0.46 on a dedicated laboratory schema and account, and the\nweb tier being the PHP built-in server bound to loopback for laboratory\nsafety. That process ran as root for the session in question, which is why\nuid=0(root) was observed and why the stored 39-byte shell, exactly the length\nof the one-line payload, was owned by root. Three independent runs reached\ncommand execution, the third being a from-scratch re-analysis pass by an\nindependent reviewer who rebuilt the audit and shipped a second, distinctly\nnamed shell through the same handler, stored as img_3.php. An adversarial\nrefutation review searched for a global upload sanitizer, a deny rule for the\nbanners directory, FilesMatch restrictions on .php, getimagesize usage on this\npath, web-server configuration hardening and install-time hardening, found\nnone, and left the finding standing. No vendor-hosted or third-party\ninstallation was touched, and no post-exploitation was performed beyond\nidentity and file-system probes.\n\nWhat was not exercised: the production Apache and mod_php stack was not run,\nso execution under Apache rests on static evidence plus the research record\u0027s\nown assertion that Apache with mod_php is the default production deployment,\nan assertion not substantiated from a vendor document; a non-root process\nidentity was not demonstrated, so the claim is command execution at whatever\nidentity the web server holds; the updateBanners edit path, the\nTRADE_THEME_FOLDER branch and the dead-code uploadWebLogo variant\n(class.system.php:956, same pattern, no call site, excluded from the finding)\nwere not exercised; only 3.8 was tested. One precondition is unresolved and\nstated rather than smoothed over: the banners directory must already exist on\ndisk. It was absent in the first laboratory iteration, move_uploaded_file\nfailed with a no-such-file-or-directory error, and the directory was created\nmanually before a later iteration succeeded; move_uploaded_file does not\ncreate directories and the handler\u0027s only filesystem guard tests the\ndestination file, not the directory. No artifact establishes which product\ncomponent creates it, so no first-upload directory creation is claimed.\n\nRelated product, scoped out. The research record notes that the sibling Maian\nSupport product exhibits the same CWE-434-class pattern, a content tree\nwithout .htaccess protection combined with Apache AllowOverride All. That\nproduct is out of scope for this advisory: no exploitation attempt was made\nthere and no identifier is claimed for it.\n\nFix direction, in short: enforce an extension allow-list at the sink reusing\nthe control already in class.products.php; validate uploaded content with\ngetimagesize() or finfo; discard the client-supplied extension and name stored\nfiles server-side; make the banner storage non-executable by moving it outside\nthe document root or shipping a deny rule plus documented nginx-equivalent\nguidance; route every move_uploaded_file call site through one shared\nvalidator; force first-login rotation of the installer-provisioned\nadministrator credential; and remove or gate the dead uploadWebLogo code.\n\nFull technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/maian-cart-addbanners-upload-extension-webshell-rce\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nThe vendor has been notified through the support mailbox it publishes for its\nproducts. No vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0468
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] IPConfigure Orchid VMS 26.3.0 authenticated DNF repository GPG-key property command injection to root (7.2)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in
IPConfigure Orchid VMS, installed as Orchid Recorder, version 26.3.0.
Type: OS command injection (CWE-78, with CWE-20 bearing on it because no
character validation exists anywhere on the path; CWE-250 bears on the
result). The server property package.dnf.repo.gpg_key, the URL or path of
the GPG key signing the vendor RPM repository, is written through the
authenticated management REST API and persisted to the server properties
file untouched. On service start or restart the package-management thread
formats it into the unquoted command template rpm --import {} and hands the
result to popen, that is to a shell. Every shell metacharacter in the value,
separators, pipes, backticks, command substitutions and redirections, is
interpreted as command syntax. The shipped service unit carries no user
directive, so the injected command runs as uid 0. The injection fires during
thread initialization and repeats on every subsequent boot until the
property is corrected.
Scoring. Dual-scored, with the primary reading named first:
- PRIMARY, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The write
endpoint requires the config permission, which the vendor's own shipped
OpenAPI role table grants in base scope to exactly one role,
Administrator, so the privilege prerequisite is administrative.
- CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, for installations that still
accept the administrator credential the vendor's own installer declares as
the packaged default; on such a deployment no privilege has to be obtained
at all. This is the deployment-conditional reading, not the headline.
The advisory also discloses, and deliberately does not adopt, an
intermediate 8.8 reading carried by our own earlier research record paired
with a low-privilege metric: the arithmetic is correct for that vector but
that privilege level contradicts the shipped role table. A scope-changed
reading is rejected and not claimed.
Impact: arbitrary command execution as uid 0 on a video management server
with one authenticated request plus the restart that request itself causes;
read and rewrite of the recorded video archive, that is of physical-security
evidence; persistence through the service unit or loaded libraries; and
lateral reach from a host that by design spans camera networks. This is a
post-authentication finding: the unauthenticated surface was exhausted, with
nearly every specified path requiring authentication, the few unauthenticated
endpoints parameterless and read-only, and traversal and bypass attempts all
rejected. Debian-family deployments take the APT branch and never reach this
sink; RHEL-family deployments are affected.
Verification boundary, stated plainly. A real installation of the vendor's
Debian bundle inside a Linux container, driven purely through the documented
HTTP API with the installer-default credential; three independent root-owned
marker artifacts were produced and command substitution was demonstrably
evaluated on the target. One departure from stock is declared: the DNF code
path was entered by presenting the Debian-family container as RHEL-family and
supplying the repository directory and template files the code requires,
which a native RHEL-family host provides by itself. No native RHEL host was
exploited, no container escape was attempted or claimed, and only the 26.3.0
bundle was installed and executed.
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/ipconfigure-orchid-vms-dnf-gpg-key-command-injection
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
The vendor has been notified through the corporate contact address published
on its own site, as no security-specific intake is published. No
vulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ipconfigure | Orchid VMS |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in\nIPConfigure Orchid VMS, installed as Orchid Recorder, version 26.3.0.\n\nType: OS command injection (CWE-78, with CWE-20 bearing on it because no\ncharacter validation exists anywhere on the path; CWE-250 bears on the\nresult). The server property package.dnf.repo.gpg_key, the URL or path of\nthe GPG key signing the vendor RPM repository, is written through the\nauthenticated management REST API and persisted to the server properties\nfile untouched. On service start or restart the package-management thread\nformats it into the unquoted command template rpm --import {} and hands the\nresult to popen, that is to a shell. Every shell metacharacter in the value,\nseparators, pipes, backticks, command substitutions and redirections, is\ninterpreted as command syntax. The shipped service unit carries no user\ndirective, so the injected command runs as uid 0. The injection fires during\nthread initialization and repeats on every subsequent boot until the\nproperty is corrected.\n\nScoring. Dual-scored, with the primary reading named first:\n- PRIMARY, 7.2 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The write\n endpoint requires the config permission, which the vendor\u0027s own shipped\n OpenAPI role table grants in base scope to exactly one role,\n Administrator, so the privilege prerequisite is administrative.\n- CONDITIONAL, 9.8 Critical,\n CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, for installations that still\n accept the administrator credential the vendor\u0027s own installer declares as\n the packaged default; on such a deployment no privilege has to be obtained\n at all. This is the deployment-conditional reading, not the headline.\nThe advisory also discloses, and deliberately does not adopt, an\nintermediate 8.8 reading carried by our own earlier research record paired\nwith a low-privilege metric: the arithmetic is correct for that vector but\nthat privilege level contradicts the shipped role table. A scope-changed\nreading is rejected and not claimed.\n\nImpact: arbitrary command execution as uid 0 on a video management server\nwith one authenticated request plus the restart that request itself causes;\nread and rewrite of the recorded video archive, that is of physical-security\nevidence; persistence through the service unit or loaded libraries; and\nlateral reach from a host that by design spans camera networks. This is a\npost-authentication finding: the unauthenticated surface was exhausted, with\nnearly every specified path requiring authentication, the few unauthenticated\nendpoints parameterless and read-only, and traversal and bypass attempts all\nrejected. Debian-family deployments take the APT branch and never reach this\nsink; RHEL-family deployments are affected.\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly. A real installation of the vendor\u0027s\nDebian bundle inside a Linux container, driven purely through the documented\nHTTP API with the installer-default credential; three independent root-owned\nmarker artifacts were produced and command substitution was demonstrably\nevaluated on the target. One departure from stock is declared: the DNF code\npath was entered by presenting the Debian-family container as RHEL-family and\nsupplying the repository directory and template files the code requires,\nwhich a native RHEL-family host provides by itself. No native RHEL host was\nexploited, no container escape was attempted or claimed, and only the 26.3.0\nbundle was installed and executed.\n\nFull technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/ipconfigure-orchid-vms-dnf-gpg-key-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nThe vendor has been notified through the corporate contact address published\non its own site, as no security-specific intake is published. No\nvulnerability identifier has been assigned to this finding yet.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] IPConfigure Orchid VMS 26.3.0 authenticated DNF repository GPG-key property command injection to root (7.2)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0467
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Circutor LineEds 24.11.14-r0 unauthenticated pwrstudio events.xml shellExecute command injection (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the pwrstudio
daemon shipped in Circutor LineEds (Line Energy Data System) industrial energy gateway
firmware 24.11.14-r0, engine variant pss0. Circutor S.A. is in Spain; the appliance sits
between metering and power-quality instrumentation on one side and an energy-management
or SCADA back office on the other.
Type: operating-system command injection (CWE-78) reached without authentication
(CWE-306). Those two are the classes recorded in the research; the advisory's own
classification additionally maps CWE-285, because the permission gate fails open in two
independent ways, and CWE-20, because the events document is accepted with no schema
validation, as contributing weaknesses, with CWE-250/CWE-269 recorded as bearing on
remediation priority rather than on the defect.
Root cause: the daemon's event engine loads its configuration from events.xml, exposed at
/services/user/events.xml over the management HTTP interface. An event may carry a
shellExecute action whose command and parameter elements are concatenated by
XCEventActionShellExecute::Execute (FUN_00548414) with the wide-string format "%ls %ls"
stored at 0x7cc2d0, converted from wide to narrow, and passed to system() at call site
0x5484bc. Nothing between the socket and the sink neutralises shell metacharacters: no
quoting, no filtering, no allowlist. The format string is the whole reason the injection
works the way it does - two %ls conversions separated by a single space mean the sink
performs concatenation rather than argument separation, so command and parameter become one
shell word sequence with no quoting boundary between them; a payload needs only a statement
separator, not a quote escape. The defect is at that concatenation rather than in the XML
parser, which performs a pure element-to-field copy and is behaving correctly.
Exploitation is two HTTP requests with no delivery precondition of any kind. Step one
writes an event definition into /services/user/events.xml carrying an always-true
condition so it enters the live set on every evaluation pass, a deliberately invalid
command token so the first shell statement fails harmlessly, and a parameter of the form
semicolon, command, semicolon, hash - yielding a shell line such as
"x ;id >/tmp/circutor_eds_vuln_rce_marker;#". Step two requests the restart.xml route,
which makes the engine reload the document through XCEventDriver::LoadXml (FUN_0020acac),
build the action object, evaluate the condition and dispatch Execute. There is no race, no
memory-layout dependency, no file to pre-place on the target and no dependence on another
vulnerability, and because the intermediate state is a file the product itself persists,
the two steps can be separated in time arbitrarily. The binary is compiled with
CONFIG_NO_HASP, so no licence-dongle gate stands between a written event and the shell
action. The image is a non-PIE EXEC, so every offset quoted is a fixed file-and-memory
address reproducible against the same build with no relocation arithmetic.
Unauthenticated classification, and it does not rest on a configuration assumption. The
product implements authorization as a per-handler gate rather than as a dispatcher
middleware stage: the gate is one function, FUN_001a93cc, invoked with a permission
constant by whichever handler chooses to invoke it. A cross-reference census of that
function in the shipped binary records 197 call sites, all individual action handlers, all
inside the address range 0x1aexxx to 0x1bfxxx. Both handlers in this chain fall outside it:
the restart handler FUN_001e3554 at 0x1e3554 and the events write handler FUN_0023ace0 at
0x23ace0. The gate is therefore structurally incapable of authorizing either, because it is
never invoked on their paths. The restart handler's only guard is FUN_001a955c, a
three-instruction predicate testing that the request-context fields at +0x34 and +0x4c are
both non-null; those are the request and response object pointers installed
unconditionally by the dispatcher's own setup routine FUN_001add40, which the route entry
at 0x76a480 names at offset +0x0c, ahead of the handler at +0x10. It tests object presence,
not credentials. One honest tension is published rather than smoothed over: the events write
handler and its dispatcher contain no authorization call that we could find, yet the handler
is recorded as capable of both 401 and 200 outcomes and we could not determine what selects
the 401 branch - so a credential-required conditional score is carried alongside the
primary rating precisely to account for that unresolved path.
A second, configuration-independent defect is documented in the same advisory. The gate's
own logic returns success with no check of any kind when the permission constant is not
0x15, and returns success when enforcement is toggled off, so it fails open in two
independent ways for the 197 handlers that do call it. This chain does not depend on that
defect, and the advisory deliberately makes no claim that any specific other route is a
second path to command execution; it is reported as a separate finding for vendor review.
Two claims carried by the research record are deliberately NOT published as fact. First,
that security enforcement is off by default: no shipped artifact supports the default value
- nothing inside the image, no value read from the extracted root filesystem, not the
contents of the engine.xml package, and no vendor documentation of the factory setting. The
unauthenticated classification does not depend on it, because neither route in the chain
invokes the gate at all; the default matters only for the alternative reloadCfg.xml
trigger, whose reload action does call the gate with permission 0x15, and that variant is
treated as conditional. Second, that pwrstudio runs as root on a device: the observed
uid=0(root) is the privilege of the root-run emulation harness, and the device-side account
is inferred from the daemon's ownership of the restart, reload and upgrade routes, since no
init script or service unit was extracted. Neither caveat alters the impact metrics.
Scoring. Four readings were priced and all four are published, two of them as not adopted:
- PRIMARY, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CONDITIONAL, 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, applying where a
deployment rejects anonymous configuration writes - enforcement enabled, or the events
handler's unresolved 401 branch active - so that any valid operator credential suffices.
Nothing else in the chain changes.
- NOT ADOPTED, 10.0 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - the Scope
Changed reading a reviewer who counts the appliance OS as a realm distinct from the
management daemon would apply. We do not adopt it: the command executes inside the
authority the vulnerable component already holds and no sandbox, container,
virtualisation boundary or separate security realm is crossed. Published so the choice is
visible and so the higher number is not mistaken for our claim.
- NOT ADOPTED, 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Attack Complexity
raised despite the absence of any attacker-unsatisfiable precondition.
A PR:H reading of 7.2 is not carried, because nothing indicates the configuration write or
the restart route demands an administrator rather than any authenticated principal.
On scoring accuracy: the research record carried 9.8 with that primary vector and
recomputing it under the CVSS 3.1 base algorithm yields 9.8, so the recorded number is
arithmetically correct. The reconciliation that matters is the grounding rather than the
arithmetic: the record derived PR:N from an asserted factory default for the security
toggle, for which no shipped artifact exists, whereas the advisory derives PR:N from the
handler call census and the two handler decompilations, which are artifact evidence. The
score is unchanged and the reason for it has been replaced with one that survives scrutiny.
We note this because several earlier advisories in this repository carried recorded scores
that did not compute for their recorded vectors.
Impact: arbitrary command execution on an industrial energy gateway with the daemon's
privileges. Confidentiality High - every measurement record, configuration item, credential,
certificate and key on the appliance becomes readable, including whatever it holds to
authenticate to the energy-management back office, and a compromised gateway is an ideal
passive collection point because it sees the traffic it forwards. Integrity High -
measurement data can be altered in transit or at rest before reaching the back office, so
forged consumption, generation or power-quality figures propagate into reporting,
settlement, alarm thresholds and control decisions while arriving through the legitimate
path and are hard to distinguish from real data; event configuration can be rewritten and
firmware pushed through the same management plane, since the upgrade route is served by the
same daemon. Availability High - the attacker controls the very restart and reload
primitives this chain uses, and can reboot on demand, stop measurement collection, drop
configuration or wedge the engine, producing a data outage in the metering path.
Persistence and lateral movement are High in practice on the inference below: a foothold
inside the OT segment on a device that security tooling normally treats as trusted
instrumentation.
Verification boundary, stated plainly. Confirmation used the shipped binary extracted from
the firmware package, run under qemu-arm-static USER-MODE emulation with gdb - no
full-system emulation, so no kernel, device drivers, network stack or reverse-proxy front
end were present. No physical device was used at any point: nothing was powered, connected,
flashed or queried. The daemon's HTTP stack could not be started under emulation, for a
specific reason: its serial initialisation thread loops on an open of a Freescale i.MX
private serial device returning EACCES, the device does not exist under qemu-user and no
device model is provided, so the engine-ready futex is never signalled and the worker thread
that would accept connections is never scheduled. A listening socket on port 1500 does come
up with an accept backlog, but nothing ever issues accept or poll against it, so no request
can be delivered and no response produced.
The real shipped sink function was therefore invoked directly under debugger control with
the field values the documented XML schema produces, using a return-immediately instruction
planted at the sub-object's vtable slot 2 - a bx lr gadget at 0x37510 - to neutralise the
virtual copy so Execute could reach the concatenation and the system() call without a fully
constructed engine. It returned 1 and wrote a 39-byte root-owned marker containing
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root). Two arithmetic checks corroborate rather than
merely assert: the content line plus trailing newline is exactly 39 bytes, and the
wide-conversion lengths independently confirm the payload loaded into the object - 1 for
the single-character command, whose first wide character is 0x78, and 41 for the parameter,
whose first three wide characters are 0x3b, 0x69 and 0x64, i.e. semicolon, i, d - proving
the injection prefix survived the narrow-to-wide conversion intact rather than being
encoded or escaped. A control run with a benign 25-character parameter reached the same
sink, returned the same value and wrote nothing, which is what upgrades this from "we called
a function and a file appeared" to "the file appeared because of the injected statement".
END-TO-END HTTP EXPLOITATION WAS NOT PERFORMED, NO REQUEST WAS EVER DELIVERED TO
pwrstudio, AND NO PHYSICAL DEVICE WAS USED. The unauthenticated write and the unauthenticated
restart are proven statically, from the route table, the handler decompilations and the
caller census; they are not
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
{
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"version": "unknown"
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"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the pwrstudio\ndaemon shipped in Circutor LineEds (Line Energy Data System) industrial energy gateway\nfirmware 24.11.14-r0, engine variant pss0. Circutor S.A. is in Spain; the appliance sits\nbetween metering and power-quality instrumentation on one side and an energy-management\nor SCADA back office on the other.\n\nType: operating-system command injection (CWE-78) reached without authentication\n(CWE-306). Those two are the classes recorded in the research; the advisory\u0027s own\nclassification additionally maps CWE-285, because the permission gate fails open in two\nindependent ways, and CWE-20, because the events document is accepted with no schema\nvalidation, as contributing weaknesses, with CWE-250/CWE-269 recorded as bearing on\nremediation priority rather than on the defect.\n\nRoot cause: the daemon\u0027s event engine loads its configuration from events.xml, exposed at\n/services/user/events.xml over the management HTTP interface. An event may carry a\nshellExecute action whose command and parameter elements are concatenated by\nXCEventActionShellExecute::Execute (FUN_00548414) with the wide-string format \"%ls %ls\"\nstored at 0x7cc2d0, converted from wide to narrow, and passed to system() at call site\n0x5484bc. Nothing between the socket and the sink neutralises shell metacharacters: no\nquoting, no filtering, no allowlist. The format string is the whole reason the injection\nworks the way it does - two %ls conversions separated by a single space mean the sink\nperforms concatenation rather than argument separation, so command and parameter become one\nshell word sequence with no quoting boundary between them; a payload needs only a statement\nseparator, not a quote escape. The defect is at that concatenation rather than in the XML\nparser, which performs a pure element-to-field copy and is behaving correctly.\n\nExploitation is two HTTP requests with no delivery precondition of any kind. Step one\nwrites an event definition into /services/user/events.xml carrying an always-true\ncondition so it enters the live set on every evaluation pass, a deliberately invalid\ncommand token so the first shell statement fails harmlessly, and a parameter of the form\nsemicolon, command, semicolon, hash - yielding a shell line such as\n\"x ;id \u003e/tmp/circutor_eds_vuln_rce_marker;#\". Step two requests the restart.xml route,\nwhich makes the engine reload the document through XCEventDriver::LoadXml (FUN_0020acac),\nbuild the action object, evaluate the condition and dispatch Execute. There is no race, no\nmemory-layout dependency, no file to pre-place on the target and no dependence on another\nvulnerability, and because the intermediate state is a file the product itself persists,\nthe two steps can be separated in time arbitrarily. The binary is compiled with\nCONFIG_NO_HASP, so no licence-dongle gate stands between a written event and the shell\naction. The image is a non-PIE EXEC, so every offset quoted is a fixed file-and-memory\naddress reproducible against the same build with no relocation arithmetic.\n\nUnauthenticated classification, and it does not rest on a configuration assumption. The\nproduct implements authorization as a per-handler gate rather than as a dispatcher\nmiddleware stage: the gate is one function, FUN_001a93cc, invoked with a permission\nconstant by whichever handler chooses to invoke it. A cross-reference census of that\nfunction in the shipped binary records 197 call sites, all individual action handlers, all\ninside the address range 0x1aexxx to 0x1bfxxx. Both handlers in this chain fall outside it:\nthe restart handler FUN_001e3554 at 0x1e3554 and the events write handler FUN_0023ace0 at\n0x23ace0. The gate is therefore structurally incapable of authorizing either, because it is\nnever invoked on their paths. The restart handler\u0027s only guard is FUN_001a955c, a\nthree-instruction predicate testing that the request-context fields at +0x34 and +0x4c are\nboth non-null; those are the request and response object pointers installed\nunconditionally by the dispatcher\u0027s own setup routine FUN_001add40, which the route entry\nat 0x76a480 names at offset +0x0c, ahead of the handler at +0x10. It tests object presence,\nnot credentials. One honest tension is published rather than smoothed over: the events write\nhandler and its dispatcher contain no authorization call that we could find, yet the handler\nis recorded as capable of both 401 and 200 outcomes and we could not determine what selects\nthe 401 branch - so a credential-required conditional score is carried alongside the\nprimary rating precisely to account for that unresolved path.\n\nA second, configuration-independent defect is documented in the same advisory. The gate\u0027s\nown logic returns success with no check of any kind when the permission constant is not\n0x15, and returns success when enforcement is toggled off, so it fails open in two\nindependent ways for the 197 handlers that do call it. This chain does not depend on that\ndefect, and the advisory deliberately makes no claim that any specific other route is a\nsecond path to command execution; it is reported as a separate finding for vendor review.\n\nTwo claims carried by the research record are deliberately NOT published as fact. First,\nthat security enforcement is off by default: no shipped artifact supports the default value\n- nothing inside the image, no value read from the extracted root filesystem, not the\ncontents of the engine.xml package, and no vendor documentation of the factory setting. The\nunauthenticated classification does not depend on it, because neither route in the chain\ninvokes the gate at all; the default matters only for the alternative reloadCfg.xml\ntrigger, whose reload action does call the gate with permission 0x15, and that variant is\ntreated as conditional. Second, that pwrstudio runs as root on a device: the observed\nuid=0(root) is the privilege of the root-run emulation harness, and the device-side account\nis inferred from the daemon\u0027s ownership of the restart, reload and upgrade routes, since no\ninit script or service unit was extracted. Neither caveat alters the impact metrics.\n\nScoring. Four readings were priced and all four are published, two of them as not adopted:\n- PRIMARY, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n- CONDITIONAL, 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, applying where a\n deployment rejects anonymous configuration writes - enforcement enabled, or the events\n handler\u0027s unresolved 401 branch active - so that any valid operator credential suffices.\n Nothing else in the chain changes.\n- NOT ADOPTED, 10.0 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H - the Scope\n Changed reading a reviewer who counts the appliance OS as a realm distinct from the\n management daemon would apply. We do not adopt it: the command executes inside the\n authority the vulnerable component already holds and no sandbox, container,\n virtualisation boundary or separate security realm is crossed. Published so the choice is\n visible and so the higher number is not mistaken for our claim.\n- NOT ADOPTED, 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Attack Complexity\n raised despite the absence of any attacker-unsatisfiable precondition.\nA PR:H reading of 7.2 is not carried, because nothing indicates the configuration write or\nthe restart route demands an administrator rather than any authenticated principal.\n\nOn scoring accuracy: the research record carried 9.8 with that primary vector and\nrecomputing it under the CVSS 3.1 base algorithm yields 9.8, so the recorded number is\narithmetically correct. The reconciliation that matters is the grounding rather than the\narithmetic: the record derived PR:N from an asserted factory default for the security\ntoggle, for which no shipped artifact exists, whereas the advisory derives PR:N from the\nhandler call census and the two handler decompilations, which are artifact evidence. The\nscore is unchanged and the reason for it has been replaced with one that survives scrutiny.\nWe note this because several earlier advisories in this repository carried recorded scores\nthat did not compute for their recorded vectors.\n\nImpact: arbitrary command execution on an industrial energy gateway with the daemon\u0027s\nprivileges. Confidentiality High - every measurement record, configuration item, credential,\ncertificate and key on the appliance becomes readable, including whatever it holds to\nauthenticate to the energy-management back office, and a compromised gateway is an ideal\npassive collection point because it sees the traffic it forwards. Integrity High -\nmeasurement data can be altered in transit or at rest before reaching the back office, so\nforged consumption, generation or power-quality figures propagate into reporting,\nsettlement, alarm thresholds and control decisions while arriving through the legitimate\npath and are hard to distinguish from real data; event configuration can be rewritten and\nfirmware pushed through the same management plane, since the upgrade route is served by the\nsame daemon. Availability High - the attacker controls the very restart and reload\nprimitives this chain uses, and can reboot on demand, stop measurement collection, drop\nconfiguration or wedge the engine, producing a data outage in the metering path.\nPersistence and lateral movement are High in practice on the inference below: a foothold\ninside the OT segment on a device that security tooling normally treats as trusted\ninstrumentation.\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly. Confirmation used the shipped binary extracted from\nthe firmware package, run under qemu-arm-static USER-MODE emulation with gdb - no\nfull-system emulation, so no kernel, device drivers, network stack or reverse-proxy front\nend were present. No physical device was used at any point: nothing was powered, connected,\nflashed or queried. The daemon\u0027s HTTP stack could not be started under emulation, for a\nspecific reason: its serial initialisation thread loops on an open of a Freescale i.MX\nprivate serial device returning EACCES, the device does not exist under qemu-user and no\ndevice model is provided, so the engine-ready futex is never signalled and the worker thread\nthat would accept connections is never scheduled. A listening socket on port 1500 does come\nup with an accept backlog, but nothing ever issues accept or poll against it, so no request\ncan be delivered and no response produced.\n\nThe real shipped sink function was therefore invoked directly under debugger control with\nthe field values the documented XML schema produces, using a return-immediately instruction\nplanted at the sub-object\u0027s vtable slot 2 - a bx lr gadget at 0x37510 - to neutralise the\nvirtual copy so Execute could reach the concatenation and the system() call without a fully\nconstructed engine. It returned 1 and wrote a 39-byte root-owned marker containing\nuid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root). Two arithmetic checks corroborate rather than\nmerely assert: the content line plus trailing newline is exactly 39 bytes, and the\nwide-conversion lengths independently confirm the payload loaded into the object - 1 for\nthe single-character command, whose first wide character is 0x78, and 41 for the parameter,\nwhose first three wide characters are 0x3b, 0x69 and 0x64, i.e. semicolon, i, d - proving\nthe injection prefix survived the narrow-to-wide conversion intact rather than being\nencoded or escaped. A control run with a benign 25-character parameter reached the same\nsink, returned the same value and wrote nothing, which is what upgrades this from \"we called\na function and a file appeared\" to \"the file appeared because of the injected statement\".\n\nEND-TO-END HTTP EXPLOITATION WAS NOT PERFORMED, NO REQUEST WAS EVER DELIVERED TO\npwrstudio, AND NO PHYSICAL DEVICE WAS USED. The unauthenticated write and the unauthenticated\nrestart are proven statically, from the route table, the handler decompilations and the\ncaller census; they are not"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0466
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Asustor ADM 3.5.9.RWM1 (AS602T) music.cgi act=live stored-filename command injection reaching system() (8.8 primary, PR:L)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the
media handler of the ADM (ASUSTOR Data Master) management portal, verified by
static analysis on the AS602T running ADM 3.5.9.RWM1 (x86-64, first-
generation G1 firmware line, from the distributed image
ADM_X64_G1_3.5.9.RWM1_AS602T.img).
Type: OS command injection (CWE-78), enabled by an argument-quoting breakout
(CWE-88) and by an incomplete list of disallowed values (CWE-184). In the
act=live branch of usr/builtin/webman/portal/apis/fileExplorer/music.cgi the
handler composes an ffmpeg transcode command with snprintf at 0x4029a9 using
the format string at 0x4035f8, which places the stored media file path inside
a pair of literal shell double quotes, and executes the result at 0x4029b6
through As_System in libgeneral.so.0.0 (0x4509b), which is system(), that is
/bin/sh -c. The stored path arrives through the file parameter of act=add,
read by O_CGI_AGENT::Get_Param at 0x401cab, split only on comma, colon and
question mark (0x4036f7) and copied verbatim into the music-list entry field
at +0x84; the handler never imports the library's general escaping helper.
Before execution As_System calls
Try_Escaping_Characters_To_Avoid_Command_Injection (0x44f95), whose deny-list
at 0xb25da is exactly two bytes, the backtick and the dollar sign. When
neither appears the helper returns 0x72, the escape buffer stays empty and the
original string reaches the shell unmodified, so a file name of the shape
x";id>marker;#.mp3 closes the application's own quote, chains a command with a
semicolon and comments out the rest of the format string with a hash, using
neither denied byte. Because the dollar sign is escaped, command substitution
does not work, and the injected command must be free of slash, comma, colon
and question mark; the quote, semicolon, pipe, ampersand, redirection
characters and hash are never examined.
Scoring. Three readings are published with their vectors rather than one
flattering number:
- PRIMARY, 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The only
property consulted between caller and handler on this path is session
validity: O_CGI_AGENT::Revive_Session (0x4017b0 / 0x4017ee) is fail-closed
and runs before any act dispatch, and nothing in the handler's entry path
consults a role or privilege attribute.
- CONDITIONAL AND UNTESTED, 7.2 High,
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, for a deployment that
confines the media library or the file explorer to the administrator role.
No authentication of any kind took place in this research, no ADM
permission artefact establishing that confinement was located, and the
reading was never exercised, so it is published as a configuration-
dependent alternative and not as an observation.
- CONSIDERED AND REJECTED, the unauthenticated vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, which would compute to 9.8.
It is not claimed: the session gate is fail-closed, the eleven
pre-authentication portal interfaces enumerated during this research
contain no As_System or As_Popen sink, and two independent sweeps of the
unauthenticated surface, HTTP and non-HTTP, both concluded the sink is not
reachable without a session.
A factory default administrator credential pair (CWE-798) also exists in this
build and is reported as a separate issue. It is not the vector used here and
it justifies no metric value above.
Impact: command execution in the CGI process's identity on a storage
appliance, which reaches every volume, share and snapshot the device hosts,
including other users' home shares and backup data landed on the device,
because no privilege separation exists between the portal role and the file
system; stored data can be modified or destroyed, firmware-update staging
files replaced, persistent implants installed in the root filesystem or in
scheduled tasks, and configuration and credential stores rewritten; the
device can be stopped, rebooted, its shares unmounted, or its data encrypted
or wiped. Where the portal is published to the internet for remote access, one
valid portal credential is the only barrier between an internet-based attacker
and that outcome. CVSS scope stays Unchanged: vulnerable and impacted
components sit inside one security authority.
Verification boundary, stated plainly, and it is narrower than the finding may
first appear. No physical AS602T was used, no whole-system emulation of ADM
was achieved, and no request was ever sent to a device: login.cgi, upload.cgi
and music.cgi were never addressed over the network, so every request and
response shape published comes from static analysis, and end-to-end HTTP
exploitation against a NAS is not claimed. The executed evidence is a faithful
C replication of the sink semantics, reproducing the format string, the
argument order, the 1024-byte buffer bound and the backslash-parity counting
logic of the escaping helper including the 0x72 return, compiled and run as
uid 0 on a generic x86-64 Linux analysis host: the quote-breakout payload
produced a 39-byte root-owned marker containing uid=0(root) gid=0(root)
groups=0(root), while a command-substitution control payload, which shows the
escaper does work on the dollar sign, and a benign file name produced nothing.
uid 0 was measured only in that harness; the on-device CGI process identity
was never measured and root on the appliance is an inference from how handlers
of this class commonly run on network-attached storage. Neither the real
music.cgi binary nor the real libgeneral.so.0.0 was executed. The static chain
was independently re-derived from the raw disassembly by a second analyst,
including the sink, the call site, the register mapping (rcx the fixed ffmpeg
literal, r8 the stored path at +0x84, xmm0 the seek time), the identity of
As_System and the two-byte deny-list, and an adversarial falsification pass
over four angles could not refute any link.
Affected scope: ADM 3.5.9.RWM1 on AS602T is verified; ADM 4.0.7.RVG1 on
AS1002T (ARM Marvell 88F6820) is cross-checked at code and command level,
music.cgi importing As_System and Get_Param but not Get_Escaped_String_General
with a byte-identical -i "%s" sink format, and the constructed command
producing a root marker under ARM user-mode emulation with that build's own
root filesystem, which is not a demonstration that its HTTP surface behaves
identically; other ADM builds older than 5.1.2 on other models are unverified
candidates that this advisory does not report as affected; and in the newer
ADM 5.1.4 build compared during this research As_System and As_Popen remain
exported at the same offsets but have no callers, with command execution moved
to Execute_Command_File and Execute_Command_Line (fork plus execv plus an
argument tokeniser, no shell), so that build was recorded as having no
equivalent remote code execution. No modern ADM release was run dynamically
and nothing here implies that any current release is vulnerable.
Fix direction, in short: invoke the transcoder with fork plus execv instead of
system(), retire the As_System and As_Popen wrappers library-wide, stop
treating a two-byte deny-list as an injection defence, allow-list file names
at both ingest and the command-construction site, store uploads under a
server-generated name, and run the media handlers under a non-root service
account. The vendor already ships the argv-based primitive in newer builds.
Full technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept, whose dry-run
mode performs no network I/O:
https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/asustor-adm-music-cgi-live-command-injection
Project archive (ongoing disclosure series):
https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish
The vendor has been notified through the product-security intake it publishes
for reports about its products.
--
0day Rubbish Research Team
disclosure () 0day-rubbish com
https://0day-rubbish.com
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Adm",
"vendor": "Asustor",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nmedia handler of the ADM (ASUSTOR Data Master) management portal, verified by\nstatic analysis on the AS602T running ADM 3.5.9.RWM1 (x86-64, first-\ngeneration G1 firmware line, from the distributed image\nADM_X64_G1_3.5.9.RWM1_AS602T.img).\n\nType: OS command injection (CWE-78), enabled by an argument-quoting breakout\n(CWE-88) and by an incomplete list of disallowed values (CWE-184). In the\nact=live branch of usr/builtin/webman/portal/apis/fileExplorer/music.cgi the\nhandler composes an ffmpeg transcode command with snprintf at 0x4029a9 using\nthe format string at 0x4035f8, which places the stored media file path inside\na pair of literal shell double quotes, and executes the result at 0x4029b6\nthrough As_System in libgeneral.so.0.0 (0x4509b), which is system(), that is\n/bin/sh -c. The stored path arrives through the file parameter of act=add,\nread by O_CGI_AGENT::Get_Param at 0x401cab, split only on comma, colon and\nquestion mark (0x4036f7) and copied verbatim into the music-list entry field\nat +0x84; the handler never imports the library\u0027s general escaping helper.\nBefore execution As_System calls\nTry_Escaping_Characters_To_Avoid_Command_Injection (0x44f95), whose deny-list\nat 0xb25da is exactly two bytes, the backtick and the dollar sign. When\nneither appears the helper returns 0x72, the escape buffer stays empty and the\noriginal string reaches the shell unmodified, so a file name of the shape\nx\";id\u003emarker;#.mp3 closes the application\u0027s own quote, chains a command with a\nsemicolon and comments out the rest of the format string with a hash, using\nneither denied byte. Because the dollar sign is escaped, command substitution\ndoes not work, and the injected command must be free of slash, comma, colon\nand question mark; the quote, semicolon, pipe, ampersand, redirection\ncharacters and hash are never examined.\n\nScoring. Three readings are published with their vectors rather than one\nflattering number:\n- PRIMARY, 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The only\n property consulted between caller and handler on this path is session\n validity: O_CGI_AGENT::Revive_Session (0x4017b0 / 0x4017ee) is fail-closed\n and runs before any act dispatch, and nothing in the handler\u0027s entry path\n consults a role or privilege attribute.\n- CONDITIONAL AND UNTESTED, 7.2 High,\n CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, for a deployment that\n confines the media library or the file explorer to the administrator role.\n No authentication of any kind took place in this research, no ADM\n permission artefact establishing that confinement was located, and the\n reading was never exercised, so it is published as a configuration-\n dependent alternative and not as an observation.\n- CONSIDERED AND REJECTED, the unauthenticated vector\n CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, which would compute to 9.8.\n It is not claimed: the session gate is fail-closed, the eleven\n pre-authentication portal interfaces enumerated during this research\n contain no As_System or As_Popen sink, and two independent sweeps of the\n unauthenticated surface, HTTP and non-HTTP, both concluded the sink is not\n reachable without a session.\n\nA factory default administrator credential pair (CWE-798) also exists in this\nbuild and is reported as a separate issue. It is not the vector used here and\nit justifies no metric value above.\n\nImpact: command execution in the CGI process\u0027s identity on a storage\nappliance, which reaches every volume, share and snapshot the device hosts,\nincluding other users\u0027 home shares and backup data landed on the device,\nbecause no privilege separation exists between the portal role and the file\nsystem; stored data can be modified or destroyed, firmware-update staging\nfiles replaced, persistent implants installed in the root filesystem or in\nscheduled tasks, and configuration and credential stores rewritten; the\ndevice can be stopped, rebooted, its shares unmounted, or its data encrypted\nor wiped. Where the portal is published to the internet for remote access, one\nvalid portal credential is the only barrier between an internet-based attacker\nand that outcome. CVSS scope stays Unchanged: vulnerable and impacted\ncomponents sit inside one security authority.\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly, and it is narrower than the finding may\nfirst appear. No physical AS602T was used, no whole-system emulation of ADM\nwas achieved, and no request was ever sent to a device: login.cgi, upload.cgi\nand music.cgi were never addressed over the network, so every request and\nresponse shape published comes from static analysis, and end-to-end HTTP\nexploitation against a NAS is not claimed. The executed evidence is a faithful\nC replication of the sink semantics, reproducing the format string, the\nargument order, the 1024-byte buffer bound and the backslash-parity counting\nlogic of the escaping helper including the 0x72 return, compiled and run as\nuid 0 on a generic x86-64 Linux analysis host: the quote-breakout payload\nproduced a 39-byte root-owned marker containing uid=0(root) gid=0(root)\ngroups=0(root), while a command-substitution control payload, which shows the\nescaper does work on the dollar sign, and a benign file name produced nothing.\nuid 0 was measured only in that harness; the on-device CGI process identity\nwas never measured and root on the appliance is an inference from how handlers\nof this class commonly run on network-attached storage. Neither the real\nmusic.cgi binary nor the real libgeneral.so.0.0 was executed. The static chain\nwas independently re-derived from the raw disassembly by a second analyst,\nincluding the sink, the call site, the register mapping (rcx the fixed ffmpeg\nliteral, r8 the stored path at +0x84, xmm0 the seek time), the identity of\nAs_System and the two-byte deny-list, and an adversarial falsification pass\nover four angles could not refute any link.\n\nAffected scope: ADM 3.5.9.RWM1 on AS602T is verified; ADM 4.0.7.RVG1 on\nAS1002T (ARM Marvell 88F6820) is cross-checked at code and command level,\nmusic.cgi importing As_System and Get_Param but not Get_Escaped_String_General\nwith a byte-identical -i \"%s\" sink format, and the constructed command\nproducing a root marker under ARM user-mode emulation with that build\u0027s own\nroot filesystem, which is not a demonstration that its HTTP surface behaves\nidentically; other ADM builds older than 5.1.2 on other models are unverified\ncandidates that this advisory does not report as affected; and in the newer\nADM 5.1.4 build compared during this research As_System and As_Popen remain\nexported at the same offsets but have no callers, with command execution moved\nto Execute_Command_File and Execute_Command_Line (fork plus execv plus an\nargument tokeniser, no shell), so that build was recorded as having no\nequivalent remote code execution. No modern ADM release was run dynamically\nand nothing here implies that any current release is vulnerable.\n\nFix direction, in short: invoke the transcoder with fork plus execv instead of\nsystem(), retire the As_System and As_Popen wrappers library-wide, stop\ntreating a two-byte deny-list as an injection defence, allow-list file names\nat both ingest and the command-construction site, store uploads under a\nserver-generated name, and run the media handlers under a non-root service\naccount. The vendor already ships the argv-based primitive in newer builds.\n\nFull technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept, whose dry-run\nmode performs no network I/O:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/asustor-adm-music-cgi-live-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nThe vendor has been notified through the product-security intake it publishes\nfor reports about its products.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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"lang": "en",
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}
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] Asustor ADM 3.5.9.RWM1 (AS602T) music.cgi act=live stored-filename command injection reaching system() (8.8 primary, PR:L)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0465
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[0day-rubbish] Advantech WebAccess Node 9.2.3 unauthenticated CrystalRpt.aspx file upload and path traversal to code execution in w3wp.exe (9.8)
Summary
0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Advantech
WebAccess Node 9.2.3, the closed-source industrial SCADA/HMI web server from
Advantech (Taiwan).
Type: unrestricted file upload (CWE-434) compounded by path traversal (CWE-22), on
a page that performs no authorization decision at all (CWE-306). CWE-73 and CWE-862
also map; CWE-250/CWE-269 apply conditionally where the pool runs at high
privilege. In the WaCrpt ASP.NET Web Forms application served under
/broadweb/WaCrpt/, the fileSubmit_Click handler in bin\WaCrpt.dll concatenates two
attacker-supplied form fields into
Server.MapPath("~/report/" + projName + "_" + nodeName + "/"), gates the result on
nothing but Directory.Exists(rptDirPath), then calls FileUpload1.SaveAs(filePath)
with no extension validation - and does so before it attempts to open the file as a
Crystal Report. Reordering those two calls alone would break the chain.
The traversal rides in nodeName rather than in the uploaded filename, because
ASP.NET already strips any client-side directory from the multipart filename.
Sending nodeName = \..\..\ normalises the destination to the WaCrpt application
root, a directory that always exists, so the provisioning check is satisfied with no
report project created and no report directory present; ASP.NET request validation
inspects for HTML-dangerous sequences and not for backslash or dot-dot, so nothing
filters it. The bound is exactly two dot-dot levels - three or more are refused with
HttpException "Cannot use a leading .. to exit above the top directory".
The chain is three HTTP requests plus a follow-on GET. Request 1 harvests
__VIEWSTATE (1056 bytes) and __EVENTVALIDATION (92 bytes) while establishing the
traversed destination. Request 2 posts a 510-byte ASP.NET page as FileUpload1 with
fileSubmit=Upload; SaveAs writes it into the application root, ReportDocument.Load
then throws and the server returns HTTP 500 - a red herring, since the write already
completed. Request 3 GETs the written page, which the build manager compiles on first
request and executes inside w3wp.exe, running cmd.exe /c with captured stdout. No
credentials, no user interaction, no race window, no memory corruption, no prior
server state. A User-Agent header is mandatory: without one the CrystalDecisions
viewer control throws a NullReferenceException, the form never renders and the chain
stalls at step 1 - a trap that makes an unaffected conclusion easy to reach wrongly.
Authentication. No authorization decision exists anywhere in the application, and
that half is artifact-proven: Page_Load performs no session, cookie, token or
principal check and carries no auth filter, and its failure branch is a
Response.Redirect to the login page - a navigation aid, not an access denial. The
shipped WaCrpt Web.config declares an authentication mode but has no authorization
deny rule and no custom authentication module; there is no global.asax in the
directory; eight sibling files in the module call a session-existence check and
CrystalRpt.cs is not among them. The omission signature is decisive: addTemplate.cs,
the SECOND report-upload handler in the same module, enforces a case-insensitive
.RPT comparison while CrystalRpt.cs enforces nothing. The product has a working
mechanism - waconfig90 controllers carry an auth filter with session plus csrfToken
validation - and this page is not enrolled in it.
The one gap, stated as a gap: whether IIS delivers an anonymous request to the
WaCrpt application path lives in the site's applicationHost.config, and no such
excerpt, no installer-authored IIS fragment and no vendor documentation of that
factory setting was obtained. PR:N is published on a structural argument plus lab
reproduction, not on an extracted artifact - the product's own operator login page
cannot function unless the hosting site accepts anonymous requests, and it is served
by the same IIS site. An administrator who disabled anonymous authentication on that
path, or fronted it with an authenticating gateway, is not exposed on this vector,
and the conditional score below prices exactly that.
Scoring. All three readings the analysis priced are published:
- PRIMARY, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- CONDITIONAL, 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, applying
where IIS authentication is enforced on the WaCrpt application path or an
authenticating gateway fronts it; nothing else in the finding changes.
- REJECTED, 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, considered
because the traversal depth and the mandatory User-Agent are non-obvious and
rejected because both are fixed constants under the attacker's control, which is
not the CVSS 3.1 meaning of AC:H.
Scope is Unchanged deliberately: the compromise executes as the pool identity of the
vulnerable product's own web application, so the gain crosses a privilege level, not
a component's security scope. S:C on the same impact values would compute to 10.0
and is not claimed.
On scoring accuracy: the primary vector computes to ISS 0.914816, Impact under S:U of
5.873119, Exploitability 3.887043 and base 9.760161495, which the CVSS 3.1 Roundup
rule renders as 9.8. The figure the research record carried for this finding is the
figure its own vector computes, so no correction was required. We say so because
several earlier advisories in this repository carried recorded scores that did not
compute for their recorded vectors; those are being recomputed rather than copied.
Impact. Confidentiality High: full read of the product's configuration, the SCADA
project tree it serves and database connection material - these nodes routinely hold
the point list, alarm configuration and historian data for the monitored process.
Integrity High: a generic write primitive placing an attacker-named file with
attacker-chosen content into a served, script-executing directory, plus arbitrary
command execution, making product binaries, configuration, the report tree, tag and
alarm data and host state modifiable; manipulation of served HMI content, tag values
and alarm thresholds is why this is an operational-technology incident and not only
a web-application one. Availability High: the web tier, the SCADA runtime it fronts
and the host can be stopped or corrupted, removing operator visibility of the
monitored process even where the controlled process keeps running.
Execution identity caveat. The verified identity was nt authority\system with
SeTcbPrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege and SeBackupPrivilege
enabled - the full SYSTEM set - but that was the VERIFICATION application pool,
configured in the lab as LocalSystem. No shipped pool identity is asserted: the
installer binds broadweb to DefaultAppPool and a separate helper writes the pool's
IdentityType at install time, a value that could not be resolved from static
strings. The rating does not depend on it, since C:H/I:H/A:H are assessed on the
code-execution primitive itself.
Relationship to previously published work. A previously published advisory covers an
unrestricted file upload on this product scored 8.8 with
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - PR:L, an authenticated caller - affecting
9.2.1 with a fix in 9.2.2, and it does not name the affected endpoint. This finding
is PR:N, and the unvalidated sink was confirmed by decompilation in 9.2.3, after that
fix. Two readings are consistent with the evidence and the advisory does not pretend
to settle between them: either the earlier fix addressed a different upload path and
CrystalRpt.aspx was never covered, making this an independent unauthenticated
variant, or the fix did not close the unauthenticated route into the same code,
making this an incomplete-fix variant. Without a byte-level diff between 9.2.2 and
9.2.3, overlap cannot be excluded to certainty, and the advisory says so rather than
claiming more novelty than the evidence carries.
Verification boundary, stated plainly. Everything dynamic was produced by deploying
the shipped WaCrpt application - CrystalRpt.aspx (2381 bytes), Web.config and
bin\WaCrpt.dll, the shipped files as documented in the research record, used without
modification - into a real IIS site and driving it over HTTP on loopback. The whole
request path is genuine: IIS request handling, the Web Forms pipeline, event
dispatch into fileSubmit_Click, Server.MapPath normalisation, FileUpload.SaveAs, the
build manager compiling a freshly written page and process creation in w3wp.exe.
A complete default installation of WebAccess Node 9.2.3 was NOT achieved: the 1.9 GB
self-extracting installer hung in Session 0 and never produced a stock,
vendor-configured deployment, so the test was surgical rather than end-to-end. Three
consequences are carried explicitly. First, the site configuration was authored in
the lab rather than read from the installer and the application was served at the
site root over loopback, so the /broadweb/WaCrpt/ prefix is derived from a literal
inside the decompiled Page_Load - the Response.Redirect to
/broadweb/user/signinonly.asp - plus the application's placement in the
distribution, and is strong inference rather than an observed request against a stock
install. Second, the SYSTEM identity was the lab pool's; the shipped site binding,
shipped pool identity and interaction with the rest of the product were never
observed at runtime. Third, the record documents the installer and its size and an
unpacked deployment archive holding those files and asserts they are the real
product's, but does not log the extraction step, so no end-to-end provenance chain is
claimed - what is asserted is that nothing in them was altered for the test. Three
accommodations modified the hosting environment, not the vulnerable code:
CrystalDecisions assembly redirects to match the lab host's GAC, a log4net copy from
the legacy GAC_32 location, and the LocalSystem pool identity.
Also not exercised: no interaction with the rest of the product; no network-path
test, every request having traversed loopback from one Windows host with no
firewall, reverse proxy, WAF or TLS terminator in between; no GET-only variant of
request 1; no overwrite test, no non-page payload and no persistence test; no
privilege enumeration under a restricted pool.
What is nevertheless established at strength: two independent client implementations
with two independently written payloads of different sizes (510 and 450 bytes) and
different leaf names produced the same result, corroborated from the target
filesystem and the IIS W3C log rather than from client responses alone - the written
page sat in the application root at exactly 510 bytes, byte-identical to what was
transmitted, with an on-disk timestamp matching the logged POST, and the log shows
the two POSTs returning 200 then 500 immediately followed by a 200 for the uploaded
file. An attacker-chosen marker was echoed and a second, unrelated binary invoked on
the same command line. An independent adversarial review attacked the chain from
seven angles and did not refute it; only the execution-identity angle returned
partially confirmed. A separate re-analysis pass over the same decompiled sources
independently returned CONFIRMED.
Also recorded in the advisory, from the same exhaustion pass over the web tier: a
genuine SQL injection in the unauthenticated /Login operation of the product's WCF
mobile service, which does NOT escalate to code execution because that path's
backend is a Microsoft Access .mdb offering no xp_cmdshell or comparable
OLE-automation primitive, and the SQL Server SQLEXPRESS instance elsewhere in the
product is not reached from it.
Affected-version statement: 9.2.3 is the only release whose binaries were decompiled
and exercised; other versions were not enumerated and no cross-version byte
comparison was performed. Validate your own build.
Remediation is set out in the advisory in priority order and reduces to: validate
the extensio
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| N/A | Advantech Webaccess Node |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in Advantech\nWebAccess Node 9.2.3, the closed-source industrial SCADA/HMI web server from\nAdvantech (Taiwan).\n\nType: unrestricted file upload (CWE-434) compounded by path traversal (CWE-22), on\na page that performs no authorization decision at all (CWE-306). CWE-73 and CWE-862\nalso map; CWE-250/CWE-269 apply conditionally where the pool runs at high\nprivilege. In the WaCrpt ASP.NET Web Forms application served under\n/broadweb/WaCrpt/, the fileSubmit_Click handler in bin\\WaCrpt.dll concatenates two\nattacker-supplied form fields into\nServer.MapPath(\"~/report/\" + projName + \"_\" + nodeName + \"/\"), gates the result on\nnothing but Directory.Exists(rptDirPath), then calls FileUpload1.SaveAs(filePath)\nwith no extension validation - and does so before it attempts to open the file as a\nCrystal Report. Reordering those two calls alone would break the chain.\n\nThe traversal rides in nodeName rather than in the uploaded filename, because\nASP.NET already strips any client-side directory from the multipart filename.\nSending nodeName = \\..\\..\\ normalises the destination to the WaCrpt application\nroot, a directory that always exists, so the provisioning check is satisfied with no\nreport project created and no report directory present; ASP.NET request validation\ninspects for HTML-dangerous sequences and not for backslash or dot-dot, so nothing\nfilters it. The bound is exactly two dot-dot levels - three or more are refused with\nHttpException \"Cannot use a leading .. to exit above the top directory\".\n\nThe chain is three HTTP requests plus a follow-on GET. Request 1 harvests\n__VIEWSTATE (1056 bytes) and __EVENTVALIDATION (92 bytes) while establishing the\ntraversed destination. Request 2 posts a 510-byte ASP.NET page as FileUpload1 with\nfileSubmit=Upload; SaveAs writes it into the application root, ReportDocument.Load\nthen throws and the server returns HTTP 500 - a red herring, since the write already\ncompleted. Request 3 GETs the written page, which the build manager compiles on first\nrequest and executes inside w3wp.exe, running cmd.exe /c with captured stdout. No\ncredentials, no user interaction, no race window, no memory corruption, no prior\nserver state. A User-Agent header is mandatory: without one the CrystalDecisions\nviewer control throws a NullReferenceException, the form never renders and the chain\nstalls at step 1 - a trap that makes an unaffected conclusion easy to reach wrongly.\n\nAuthentication. No authorization decision exists anywhere in the application, and\nthat half is artifact-proven: Page_Load performs no session, cookie, token or\nprincipal check and carries no auth filter, and its failure branch is a\nResponse.Redirect to the login page - a navigation aid, not an access denial. The\nshipped WaCrpt Web.config declares an authentication mode but has no authorization\ndeny rule and no custom authentication module; there is no global.asax in the\ndirectory; eight sibling files in the module call a session-existence check and\nCrystalRpt.cs is not among them. The omission signature is decisive: addTemplate.cs,\nthe SECOND report-upload handler in the same module, enforces a case-insensitive\n.RPT comparison while CrystalRpt.cs enforces nothing. The product has a working\nmechanism - waconfig90 controllers carry an auth filter with session plus csrfToken\nvalidation - and this page is not enrolled in it.\n\nThe one gap, stated as a gap: whether IIS delivers an anonymous request to the\nWaCrpt application path lives in the site\u0027s applicationHost.config, and no such\nexcerpt, no installer-authored IIS fragment and no vendor documentation of that\nfactory setting was obtained. PR:N is published on a structural argument plus lab\nreproduction, not on an extracted artifact - the product\u0027s own operator login page\ncannot function unless the hosting site accepts anonymous requests, and it is served\nby the same IIS site. An administrator who disabled anonymous authentication on that\npath, or fronted it with an authenticating gateway, is not exposed on this vector,\nand the conditional score below prices exactly that.\n\nScoring. All three readings the analysis priced are published:\n- PRIMARY, 9.8 Critical, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H\n- CONDITIONAL, 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, applying\n where IIS authentication is enforced on the WaCrpt application path or an\n authenticating gateway fronts it; nothing else in the finding changes.\n- REJECTED, 8.1 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, considered\n because the traversal depth and the mandatory User-Agent are non-obvious and\n rejected because both are fixed constants under the attacker\u0027s control, which is\n not the CVSS 3.1 meaning of AC:H.\nScope is Unchanged deliberately: the compromise executes as the pool identity of the\nvulnerable product\u0027s own web application, so the gain crosses a privilege level, not\na component\u0027s security scope. S:C on the same impact values would compute to 10.0\nand is not claimed.\n\nOn scoring accuracy: the primary vector computes to ISS 0.914816, Impact under S:U of\n5.873119, Exploitability 3.887043 and base 9.760161495, which the CVSS 3.1 Roundup\nrule renders as 9.8. The figure the research record carried for this finding is the\nfigure its own vector computes, so no correction was required. We say so because\nseveral earlier advisories in this repository carried recorded scores that did not\ncompute for their recorded vectors; those are being recomputed rather than copied.\n\nImpact. Confidentiality High: full read of the product\u0027s configuration, the SCADA\nproject tree it serves and database connection material - these nodes routinely hold\nthe point list, alarm configuration and historian data for the monitored process.\nIntegrity High: a generic write primitive placing an attacker-named file with\nattacker-chosen content into a served, script-executing directory, plus arbitrary\ncommand execution, making product binaries, configuration, the report tree, tag and\nalarm data and host state modifiable; manipulation of served HMI content, tag values\nand alarm thresholds is why this is an operational-technology incident and not only\na web-application one. Availability High: the web tier, the SCADA runtime it fronts\nand the host can be stopped or corrupted, removing operator visibility of the\nmonitored process even where the controlled process keeps running.\n\nExecution identity caveat. The verified identity was nt authority\\system with\nSeTcbPrivilege, SeDebugPrivilege, SeImpersonatePrivilege and SeBackupPrivilege\nenabled - the full SYSTEM set - but that was the VERIFICATION application pool,\nconfigured in the lab as LocalSystem. No shipped pool identity is asserted: the\ninstaller binds broadweb to DefaultAppPool and a separate helper writes the pool\u0027s\nIdentityType at install time, a value that could not be resolved from static\nstrings. The rating does not depend on it, since C:H/I:H/A:H are assessed on the\ncode-execution primitive itself.\n\nRelationship to previously published work. A previously published advisory covers an\nunrestricted file upload on this product scored 8.8 with\nAV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - PR:L, an authenticated caller - affecting\n9.2.1 with a fix in 9.2.2, and it does not name the affected endpoint. This finding\nis PR:N, and the unvalidated sink was confirmed by decompilation in 9.2.3, after that\nfix. Two readings are consistent with the evidence and the advisory does not pretend\nto settle between them: either the earlier fix addressed a different upload path and\nCrystalRpt.aspx was never covered, making this an independent unauthenticated\nvariant, or the fix did not close the unauthenticated route into the same code,\nmaking this an incomplete-fix variant. Without a byte-level diff between 9.2.2 and\n9.2.3, overlap cannot be excluded to certainty, and the advisory says so rather than\nclaiming more novelty than the evidence carries.\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly. Everything dynamic was produced by deploying\nthe shipped WaCrpt application - CrystalRpt.aspx (2381 bytes), Web.config and\nbin\\WaCrpt.dll, the shipped files as documented in the research record, used without\nmodification - into a real IIS site and driving it over HTTP on loopback. The whole\nrequest path is genuine: IIS request handling, the Web Forms pipeline, event\ndispatch into fileSubmit_Click, Server.MapPath normalisation, FileUpload.SaveAs, the\nbuild manager compiling a freshly written page and process creation in w3wp.exe.\n\nA complete default installation of WebAccess Node 9.2.3 was NOT achieved: the 1.9 GB\nself-extracting installer hung in Session 0 and never produced a stock,\nvendor-configured deployment, so the test was surgical rather than end-to-end. Three\nconsequences are carried explicitly. First, the site configuration was authored in\nthe lab rather than read from the installer and the application was served at the\nsite root over loopback, so the /broadweb/WaCrpt/ prefix is derived from a literal\ninside the decompiled Page_Load - the Response.Redirect to\n/broadweb/user/signinonly.asp - plus the application\u0027s placement in the\ndistribution, and is strong inference rather than an observed request against a stock\ninstall. Second, the SYSTEM identity was the lab pool\u0027s; the shipped site binding,\nshipped pool identity and interaction with the rest of the product were never\nobserved at runtime. Third, the record documents the installer and its size and an\nunpacked deployment archive holding those files and asserts they are the real\nproduct\u0027s, but does not log the extraction step, so no end-to-end provenance chain is\nclaimed - what is asserted is that nothing in them was altered for the test. Three\naccommodations modified the hosting environment, not the vulnerable code:\nCrystalDecisions assembly redirects to match the lab host\u0027s GAC, a log4net copy from\nthe legacy GAC_32 location, and the LocalSystem pool identity.\n\nAlso not exercised: no interaction with the rest of the product; no network-path\ntest, every request having traversed loopback from one Windows host with no\nfirewall, reverse proxy, WAF or TLS terminator in between; no GET-only variant of\nrequest 1; no overwrite test, no non-page payload and no persistence test; no\nprivilege enumeration under a restricted pool.\n\nWhat is nevertheless established at strength: two independent client implementations\nwith two independently written payloads of different sizes (510 and 450 bytes) and\ndifferent leaf names produced the same result, corroborated from the target\nfilesystem and the IIS W3C log rather than from client responses alone - the written\npage sat in the application root at exactly 510 bytes, byte-identical to what was\ntransmitted, with an on-disk timestamp matching the logged POST, and the log shows\nthe two POSTs returning 200 then 500 immediately followed by a 200 for the uploaded\nfile. An attacker-chosen marker was echoed and a second, unrelated binary invoked on\nthe same command line. An independent adversarial review attacked the chain from\nseven angles and did not refute it; only the execution-identity angle returned\npartially confirmed. A separate re-analysis pass over the same decompiled sources\nindependently returned CONFIRMED.\n\nAlso recorded in the advisory, from the same exhaustion pass over the web tier: a\ngenuine SQL injection in the unauthenticated /Login operation of the product\u0027s WCF\nmobile service, which does NOT escalate to code execution because that path\u0027s\nbackend is a Microsoft Access .mdb offering no xp_cmdshell or comparable\nOLE-automation primitive, and the SQL Server SQLEXPRESS instance elsewhere in the\nproduct is not reached from it.\n\nAffected-version statement: 9.2.3 is the only release whose binaries were decompiled\nand exercised; other versions were not enumerated and no cross-version byte\ncomparison was performed. Validate your own build.\n\nRemediation is set out in the advisory in priority order and reduces to: validate\nthe extensio"
}
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}
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"title": "[0day-rubbish] Advantech WebAccess Node 9.2.3 unauthenticated CrystalRpt.aspx file upload and path traversal to code execution in w3wp.exe (9.8)",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0464
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SCHUTZWERK-SA-2025-002: Privilege escalation in Lobster_pro through request replaying
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA512
Privilege escalation via request replaying in Lobster_pro
=========================================================
version 4.12.12-LTS and potentially other versions prior to 25.1.3.
Metadata
========
- - Affected product: Lobster_pro
- - Vendor: Lobster DATA GmbH
- - CVE ID: CVE-2026-3322
- - CVE URL: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-3322
- - CVSS 4.0 score: 5.6
- - Advisory URL: https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2025-002/
Details
=======
Risk
====
information stored in Lobster_pro.
Solution/Mitigation
===================
Update Lobster_pro to version 25.1.3 or later.
Timeline
========
- - 2025-06-26 Vulnerability reported to vendor
- - 2025-10-09 Vendor releases version 25.0.1 to address the vulnerability
- - 2025-11-19 Vendor releases version 25.1.3 with additional fixes
undisclosed reasons.
- - 2026-10-26 Advisory released
Credits
=======
The vulnerability was discovered by Daniel Marner of SCHUTZWERK GmbH.
Footnotes
=========
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Action_Message_Format
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--
SCHUTZWERK GmbH, Pfarrer-Weiß-Weg 12, 89077 Ulm, Germany
Zertifiziert / Certified ISO 27001, 9001 and TISAX
Phone +49 731 977 191 0
advisories () schutzwerk com / www.schutzwerk.com
Geschäftsführer / Managing Directors:
Jakob Pietzka, Michael Schäfer
Amtsgericht Ulm / HRB 727391
Datenschutz / Data Protection www.schutzwerk.com/datenschutz
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SCHUTZWERK-SA-2025-002 Privilege escalation |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0464 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-3322
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "SCHUTZWERK-SA-2025-002 Privilege escalation",
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"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/35"
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{
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-3322"
},
{
"url": "https://www.schutzwerk.com/en/blog/schutzwerk-sa-2025-002/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
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],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "SCHUTZWERK-SA-2025-002: Privilege escalation in Lobster_pro through request replaying",
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}
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"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0464",
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"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:00Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:00Z",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0463
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
APPLE-SA-10-26-2026-5 macOS Tahoe 26.7.2
Summary
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA256
APPLE-SA-10-26-2026-5 macOS Tahoe 26.7.2
macOS Tahoe 26.7.2 addresses the following issues.
Information about the security content is also available at
https://support.apple.com/149522.
Apple maintains a Security Releases page at
https://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent
software updates with security advisories.
Accelerate Framework
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted image may lead to unexpected
app termination
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
CVE-2026-86971: an anonymous researcher
Accounts
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: A malicious application may be able to bypass Privacy
preferences
Description: A logging issue was addressed with improved data redaction.
CVE-2026-113898: Bhaswanth Chigurupati
AirPort
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to read sensitive location information
Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state
management.
CVE-2026-112551: Nguyen Duc Anh of Noventiq, Sindre Sorhus
APFS
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: Mounting a maliciously crafted disk image may cause unexpected
system termination or corrupt kernel memory
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
CVE-2026-84496: 준우 이, Maher Azzouzi, Jonathan Bar Or (@yo_yo_yo_jbo),
Marco Schmitt, Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon), Aswin Kumar Gokulakannan,
Narendra Singh (@_3P1C), Thanatos Tian (HKPolyU) & wgg with Diffract,
Jakob Pammer, an anonymous researcher, Bhuwan Bhetwal, Kwak kiyong
(@Pwnkai23), Song nuri
APFS
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
read kernel memory
Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds
checking.
CVE-2026-112525: We Muftihaturrahmah, Aswin Kumar Gokula Kannan, Ruslan
Dautov, Peter Malone
APFS
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
write kernel memory
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
CVE-2026-112536: Ruslan Dautov, Thomas Guillem, Narendra Singh (@_3P1C),
Kwak Kiyong (@Pwnkai23), Song Nuri, Thanatos Tian (HKPolyU) & wgg with
Diffract
App Store
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to bypass network restrictions
Description: This issue was addressed with improved checks.
CVE-2026-112467: Sindre Sorhus
App Store
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: A remote attacker may be able to break out of the WebContent
sandbox
Description: This issue was addressed with improved input validation.
CVE-2026-112690: Claudio Bozzato and Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos
Apple Intelligence
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data
Description: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state
management.
CVE-2026-86920: Johan Wahyudi
Apple Neural Engine
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
CVE-2026-84595: tamdao
Apple Neural Engine
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
corrupt kernel memory
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
CVE-2026-112696: Jaeyeong Lee
AppleAVD
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted video file may lead to
unexpected app termination
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
CVE-2026-112416: an anonymous researcher, Meta Red Team X - Nik
Tsytsarkin, Narendra Singh (@_3P1C), Hcamael and 章鱼哥@aipy
(aipyaipy.com), Dohyeon An @PILAB Technology, Inc
AppleAVD
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
corrupt process memory
Description: An out-of-bounds write was addressed with improved input
validation.
CVE-2026-112415: Rahul Raj, Hcamael and 章鱼哥@aipy (aipyaipy.com)
AppleAVD
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: A malicious app may be able to break out of its sandbox
Description: An information leakage was addressed with additional
validation.
CVE-2026-112704: Josh Maine of Calif.io
AppleMobileFileIntegrity
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: A malicious app may be able to read or write to protected files
Description: A permissions issue was addressed with additional
restrictions.
CVE-2026-112539: Claudio Bozzato and Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos
AppleRAID
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination
Description: A use after free issue was addressed with improved memory
management.
CVE-2026-112531: Chanwit Muenprakoddee (ChemIndy)
Archive Utility
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An attacker with root privileges may be able to access protected
user data
Description: A permissions issue was addressed with additional
restrictions.
CVE-2026-86939: Lance Cain - Senior Security Researcher at SpecterOps
Inc.
ArchiveService
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may bypass Gatekeeper checks
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.
CVE-2026-86937: YingMuo (@YingMuo) of DEVCORE Research Team, Paul
Montgomery (@nullevent)
ArchiveService
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted file may bypass Gatekeeper
checks
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.
CVE-2026-112568: an anonymous researcher
Audio
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected app
termination
Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds
checking.
CVE-2026-112546: lunar815, Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon), Piotr Jerzy
Duszynski, an anonymous researcher, Surej Sekhar, r3pwnx (@r3pwnx), Lily
Cohl (@GenericCoding)
Audio
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data
Description: This issue was addressed with additional entitlement
checks.
CVE-2026-112675: Lakshay Sharma (MrW0r57), Abodi Dawoud
AVEVideoEncoder
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
CVE-2026-112705: Marco Schmitt, Andrey Chernykh, Josh Maine of Calif.io
AVEVideoEncoder
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
corrupt kernel memory
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
input validation.
CVE-2026-112689: Franco Belman at Blackwing Intelligence
AVEVideoEncoder
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
corrupt kernel memory
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
CVE-2026-112470: Hcamael and 章鱼哥@aipy (aipyaipy.com)
CVE-2026-112468: Hcamael and 章鱼哥@aipy (aipyaipy.com)
CVE-2026-112469: Hcamael and 章鱼哥@aipy (aipyaipy.com)
AVEVideoEncoder
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
read kernel memory
Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input
validation.
CVE-2026-112466: Hcamael and 章鱼哥@aipy (aipyaipy.com)
Bluetooth
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An attacker in physical proximity may be able to cause a
denial-of-service
Description: A null pointer dereference was addressed with improved
validation.
CVE-2026-112566: Chris Bailey - Short Circuit
BOM
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: A maliciously crafted ZIP archive may bypass Gatekeeper checks
Description: A file quarantine bypass was addressed with additional
checks.
CVE-2026-84610: Andreas Jaegersberger & Ro Achterberg of Nosebeard Labs,
Murray Mike
BOM
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to heap
corruption
Description: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved
input validation.
CVE-2026-112670: Bhaswanth Chigurupati
BOM
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: A maliciously crafted ZIP archive may bypass Gatekeeper checks
Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.
CVE-2026-112672: 준우 이, Pasquale Scola
Calendar
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data
Description: A permissions issue was addressed with additional
restrictions.
CVE-2026-112678: Neon, Niels Hofmans, Mustafa Calap (@ordinal0, dbg.re)
Carbon Core
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data
Description: A logging issue was addressed with improved data redaction.
CVE-2026-84528: zenith
Carbon Core
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may bypass Gatekeeper checks
Description: A file quarantine bypass was addressed with additional
checks.
CVE-2026-86941: Andreas Jaegersberger & Ro Achterberg of Nosebeard Labs
CloudKit
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: A malicious app may be able to gain root privileges
Description: A permissions issue was addressed with additional
restrictions.
CVE-2026-86896: Andreas Jaegersberger & Ro Achterberg of Nosebeard Labs
ColorSync
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted file may disclose process
memory
Description: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds
checking.
CVE-2026-112429: Mateusz Jurczyk of Google Project Zero
Compression
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to disclose kernel memory
Description: A memory initialization issue was addressed with improved
memory handling.
CVE-2026-113910: Tucker Willenborg
configd
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to gain root privileges
Description: A parsing issue in the handling of directory paths was
addressed with improved path validation.
CVE-2026-112545: Frederick Kaludis (Coiffeur0x90), Andreas Jaegersberger
& Ro Achterberg of Nosebeard Labs
Control Center
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: A malicious application may be able to bypass Privacy
preferences
Description: A permissions issue was addressed with additional
restrictions.
CVE-2026-112462: DEVADATH V L, Junyeong Lee (jylab.github.io), Weeraphat
Srisutham, Yejun Kim, an anonymous researcher, Zwei Tasse Kaffee,
Lakshay Sharma (MrW0r57)
copyfile
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to modify protected parts of the file system
Description: This issue was addressed with improved handling of
symlinks.
CVE-2026-86966: Jihwan Yoon
Core Image
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted image may lead to unexpected
process termination
Description: A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds
checking.
CVE-2026-112471: Meta Red Team X - Nik Tsytsarkin
CoreAudio
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
corrupt process memory
Description: A race condition was addressed with improved locking.
CVE-2026-112708: Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon)
CoreAudio
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
corrupt kernel memory
Description: An out-of-bounds write was addressed with improved input
validation.
CVE-2026-86969: Meta Red Team X - Nik Tsytsarkin
CoreAudio
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: Processing a maliciously crafted media file may lead to
unexpected app termination or corrupt process memory
Description: An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved
bounds checking.
CVE-2026-113912: an anonymous researcher, 章鱼哥@aipy (aipyaipy.com), Roman
Zabicki, Anna Groza (@pwnlambda) of Calif.io
CoreAudio
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or
corrupt process memory
Description: A buffer overflow issue was addressed with improved memory
handling.
CVE-2026-113907: Meta Red Team X - Nik Tsytsarkin
CoreAudio
Available for: macOS Tahoe
Impact: An attacker in radio range ma
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
8 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apple | Macos Tahoe |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0463 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-112410
- related CVE-2026-112413
- related CVE-2026-112414
- related CVE-2026-112415
- related CVE-2026-112416
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- related CVE-2026-112425
- related CVE-2026-112428
- related CVE-2026-112429
- related CVE-2026-112430
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- related CVE-2026-112437
- related CVE-2026-112438
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- related CVE-2026-112442
- related CVE-2026-112443
- related CVE-2026-112444
- related CVE-2026-112447
- related CVE-2026-112449
- related CVE-2026-112451
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- related CVE-2026-112455
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- related CVE-2026-112464
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- related CVE-2026-112467
- related CVE-2026-112468
- related CVE-2026-112469
- related CVE-2026-112470
- related CVE-2026-112471
- related CVE-2026-112473
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- related CVE-2026-86991
- related CVE-2026-86992
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Macos Tahoe",
"vendor": "Apple",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Apple Product Security via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----\nHash: SHA256\n\nAPPLE-SA-10-26-2026-5 macOS Tahoe 26.7.2\n\nmacOS Tahoe 26.7.2 addresses the following issues.\nInformation about the security content is also available at\nhttps://support.apple.com/149522.\n\nApple maintains a Security Releases page at\nhttps://support.apple.com/100100 which lists recent\nsoftware updates with security advisories.\n\nAccelerate Framework\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: Processing a maliciously crafted image may lead to unexpected\napp termination\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nCVE-2026-86971: an anonymous researcher\n\nAccounts\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: A malicious application may be able to bypass Privacy\npreferences\nDescription: A logging issue was addressed with improved data redaction.\nCVE-2026-113898: Bhaswanth Chigurupati\n\nAirPort\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to read sensitive location information\nDescription: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state\nmanagement.\nCVE-2026-112551: Nguyen Duc Anh of Noventiq, Sindre Sorhus\n\nAPFS\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: Mounting a maliciously crafted disk image may cause unexpected\nsystem termination or corrupt kernel memory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nCVE-2026-84496: \uc900\uc6b0 \uc774, Maher Azzouzi, Jonathan Bar Or (@yo_yo_yo_jbo),\nMarco Schmitt, Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon), Aswin Kumar Gokulakannan,\nNarendra Singh (@_3P1C), Thanatos Tian (HKPolyU) \u0026 wgg with Diffract,\nJakob Pammer, an anonymous researcher, Bhuwan Bhetwal, Kwak kiyong\n(@Pwnkai23), Song nuri\n\nAPFS\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\nread kernel memory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds\nchecking.\nCVE-2026-112525: We Muftihaturrahmah, Aswin Kumar Gokula Kannan, Ruslan\nDautov, Peter Malone\n\nAPFS\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\nwrite kernel memory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nCVE-2026-112536: Ruslan Dautov, Thomas Guillem, Narendra Singh (@_3P1C),\nKwak Kiyong (@Pwnkai23), Song Nuri, Thanatos Tian (HKPolyU) \u0026 wgg with\nDiffract\n\nApp Store\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to bypass network restrictions\nDescription: This issue was addressed with improved checks.\nCVE-2026-112467: Sindre Sorhus\n\nApp Store\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: A remote attacker may be able to break out of the WebContent\nsandbox\nDescription: This issue was addressed with improved input validation.\nCVE-2026-112690: Claudio Bozzato and Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos\n\nApple Intelligence\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data\nDescription: An authorization issue was addressed with improved state\nmanagement.\nCVE-2026-86920: Johan Wahyudi\n\nApple Neural Engine\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nCVE-2026-84595: tamdao\n\nApple Neural Engine\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\ncorrupt kernel memory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nCVE-2026-112696: Jaeyeong Lee\n\nAppleAVD\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: Processing a maliciously crafted video file may lead to\nunexpected app termination\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nCVE-2026-112416: an anonymous researcher, Meta Red Team X - Nik\nTsytsarkin, Narendra Singh (@_3P1C), Hcamael and \u7ae0\u9c7c\u54e5@aipy\n(aipyaipy.com), Dohyeon An @PILAB Technology, Inc\n\nAppleAVD\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\ncorrupt process memory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write was addressed with improved input\nvalidation.\nCVE-2026-112415: Rahul Raj, Hcamael and \u7ae0\u9c7c\u54e5@aipy (aipyaipy.com)\n\nAppleAVD\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: A malicious app may be able to break out of its sandbox\nDescription: An information leakage was addressed with additional\nvalidation.\nCVE-2026-112704: Josh Maine of Calif.io\n\nAppleMobileFileIntegrity\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: A malicious app may be able to read or write to protected files\nDescription: A permissions issue was addressed with additional\nrestrictions.\nCVE-2026-112539: Claudio Bozzato and Francesco Benvenuto of Cisco Talos\n\nAppleRAID\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination\nDescription: A use after free issue was addressed with improved memory\nmanagement.\nCVE-2026-112531: Chanwit Muenprakoddee (ChemIndy)\n\nArchive Utility\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An attacker with root privileges may be able to access protected\nuser data\nDescription: A permissions issue was addressed with additional\nrestrictions.\nCVE-2026-86939: Lance Cain - Senior Security Researcher at SpecterOps\nInc.\n\nArchiveService\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may bypass Gatekeeper checks\nDescription: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.\nCVE-2026-86937: YingMuo (@YingMuo) of DEVCORE Research Team, Paul\nMontgomery (@nullevent)\n\nArchiveService\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: Processing a maliciously crafted file may bypass Gatekeeper\nchecks\nDescription: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.\nCVE-2026-112568: an anonymous researcher\n\nAudio\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to unexpected app\ntermination\nDescription: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds\nchecking.\nCVE-2026-112546: lunar815, Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon), Piotr Jerzy\nDuszynski, an anonymous researcher, Surej Sekhar, r3pwnx (@r3pwnx), Lily\nCohl (@GenericCoding)\n\nAudio\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data\nDescription: This issue was addressed with additional entitlement\nchecks.\nCVE-2026-112675: Lakshay Sharma (MrW0r57), Abodi Dawoud\n\nAVEVideoEncoder\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nCVE-2026-112705: Marco Schmitt, Andrey Chernykh, Josh Maine of Calif.io\n\nAVEVideoEncoder\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\ncorrupt kernel memory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\ninput validation.\nCVE-2026-112689: Franco Belman at Blackwing Intelligence\n\nAVEVideoEncoder\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\ncorrupt kernel memory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nCVE-2026-112470: Hcamael and \u7ae0\u9c7c\u54e5@aipy (aipyaipy.com)\nCVE-2026-112468: Hcamael and \u7ae0\u9c7c\u54e5@aipy (aipyaipy.com)\nCVE-2026-112469: Hcamael and \u7ae0\u9c7c\u54e5@aipy (aipyaipy.com)\n\nAVEVideoEncoder\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\nread kernel memory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved input\nvalidation.\nCVE-2026-112466: Hcamael and \u7ae0\u9c7c\u54e5@aipy (aipyaipy.com)\n\nBluetooth\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An attacker in physical proximity may be able to cause a\ndenial-of-service\nDescription: A null pointer dereference was addressed with improved\nvalidation.\nCVE-2026-112566: Chris Bailey - Short Circuit\n\nBOM\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: A maliciously crafted ZIP archive may bypass Gatekeeper checks\nDescription: A file quarantine bypass was addressed with additional\nchecks.\nCVE-2026-84610: Andreas Jaegersberger \u0026 Ro Achterberg of Nosebeard Labs,\nMurray Mike\n\nBOM\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: Processing a maliciously crafted file may lead to heap\ncorruption\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved\ninput validation.\nCVE-2026-112670: Bhaswanth Chigurupati\n\nBOM\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: A maliciously crafted ZIP archive may bypass Gatekeeper checks\nDescription: The issue was addressed with improved checks.\nCVE-2026-112672: \uc900\uc6b0 \uc774, Pasquale Scola\n\nCalendar\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data\nDescription: A permissions issue was addressed with additional\nrestrictions.\nCVE-2026-112678: Neon, Niels Hofmans, Mustafa Calap (@ordinal0, dbg.re)\n\nCarbon Core\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to access sensitive user data\nDescription: A logging issue was addressed with improved data redaction.\nCVE-2026-84528: zenith\n\nCarbon Core\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may bypass Gatekeeper checks\nDescription: A file quarantine bypass was addressed with additional\nchecks.\nCVE-2026-86941: Andreas Jaegersberger \u0026 Ro Achterberg of Nosebeard Labs\n\nCloudKit\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: A malicious app may be able to gain root privileges\nDescription: A permissions issue was addressed with additional\nrestrictions.\nCVE-2026-86896: Andreas Jaegersberger \u0026 Ro Achterberg of Nosebeard Labs\n\nColorSync\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: Processing a maliciously crafted file may disclose process\nmemory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds read was addressed with improved bounds\nchecking.\nCVE-2026-112429: Mateusz Jurczyk of Google Project Zero\n\nCompression\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to disclose kernel memory\nDescription: A memory initialization issue was addressed with improved\nmemory handling.\nCVE-2026-113910: Tucker Willenborg\n\nconfigd\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to gain root privileges\nDescription: A parsing issue in the handling of directory paths was\naddressed with improved path validation.\nCVE-2026-112545: Frederick Kaludis (Coiffeur0x90), Andreas Jaegersberger\n\u0026 Ro Achterberg of Nosebeard Labs\n\nControl Center\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: A malicious application may be able to bypass Privacy\npreferences\nDescription: A permissions issue was addressed with additional\nrestrictions.\nCVE-2026-112462: DEVADATH V L, Junyeong Lee (jylab.github.io), Weeraphat\nSrisutham, Yejun Kim, an anonymous researcher, Zwei Tasse Kaffee,\nLakshay Sharma (MrW0r57)\n\ncopyfile\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to modify protected parts of the file system\nDescription: This issue was addressed with improved handling of\nsymlinks.\nCVE-2026-86966: Jihwan Yoon\n\nCore Image\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: Processing a maliciously crafted image may lead to unexpected\nprocess termination\nDescription: A buffer overflow was addressed with improved bounds\nchecking.\nCVE-2026-112471: Meta Red Team X - Nik Tsytsarkin\n\nCoreAudio\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\ncorrupt process memory\nDescription: A race condition was addressed with improved locking.\nCVE-2026-112708: Nathaniel Oh (@calysteon)\n\nCoreAudio\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\ncorrupt kernel memory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds write was addressed with improved input\nvalidation.\nCVE-2026-86969: Meta Red Team X - Nik Tsytsarkin\n\nCoreAudio\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: Processing a maliciously crafted media file may lead to\nunexpected app termination or corrupt process memory\nDescription: An out-of-bounds access issue was addressed with improved\nbounds checking.\nCVE-2026-113912: an anonymous researcher, \u7ae0\u9c7c\u54e5@aipy (aipyaipy.com), Roman\nZabicki, Anna Groza (@pwnlambda) of Calif.io\n\nCoreAudio\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An app may be able to cause unexpected system termination or\ncorrupt process memory\nDescription: A buffer overflow issue was addressed with improved memory\nhandling.\nCVE-2026-113907: Meta Red Team X - Nik Tsytsarkin\n\nCoreAudio\nAvailable for: macOS Tahoe\nImpact: An attacker in radio range ma"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:00Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/48"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/48"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
},
{
"url": "https://support.apple.com/100100"
},
{
"url": "https://support.apple.com/149522"
},
{
"url": "https://support.apple.com/downloads/"
},
{
"url": "https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/48"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "APPLE-SA-10-26-2026-5 macOS Tahoe 26.7.2",
"x_gcve": [
{
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112410",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112413",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112414",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112415",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112416",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112421",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112423",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112424",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112425",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112428",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112429",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112430",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112434",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112437",
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112470",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112471",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112473",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112475",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112476",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112477",
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{
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"destId": "CVE-2026-112480",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112481",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112482",
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"destId": "CVE-2026-112483",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112484",
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{
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{
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"destId": "CVE-2026-112487",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112488",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112491",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112492",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112493",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112494",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112495",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112497",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112498",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112501",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112502",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112504",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112505",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112508",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112510",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112511",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112512",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112514",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112515",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112516",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112517",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112519",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112521",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112522",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112523",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112524",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112525",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112526",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112529",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112530",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112531",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112532",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112533",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112534",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112535",
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112536",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112537",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112539",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112540",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112541",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112542",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112543",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112545",
"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112546",
"type": "related"
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{
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"type": "related"
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{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112550",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112551",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112552",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112553",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112554",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112555",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112556",
"type": "related"
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{
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"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112558",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112559",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112560",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112561",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112562",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112563",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112565",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112566",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112567",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112568",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112569",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112570",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112571",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112575",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112576",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112593",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112604",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112606",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112610",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112611",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112614",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112622",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112624",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112625",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112627",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112628",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112629",
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},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112630",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112632",
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},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112633",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112634",
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},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112638",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112642",
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},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112647",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112652",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112656",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112660",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112665",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112668",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112670",
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},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112671",
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},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112672",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112675",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112676",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112677",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112678",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112682",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112683",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112688",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112689",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112690",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112696",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112698",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112704",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112705",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-112708",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-113896",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-113898",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-113899",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-113900",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-113907",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-113910",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-113912",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-113913",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-113915",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-28864",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-43736",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-64750",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-64789",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-65327",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-65350",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-65363",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-65368",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-65373",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-65397",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84495",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84496",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84498",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84528",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84539",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84542",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84545",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84590",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84595",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84604",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84610",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-84627",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86896",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86916",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86920",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86923",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86929",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86931",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86936",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86937",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86939",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86941",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86942",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86945",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86946",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86954",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86958",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86964",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86966",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86969",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86970",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86971",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86972",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86984",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86990",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86991",
"type": "related"
},
{
"destId": "CVE-2026-86992",
"type": "related"
}
],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0463",
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"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:00Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:00Z",
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displaying 111 - 120 publications in total 581