GCVE-1988-2026-0466
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Adm",
"vendor": "Asustor",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "disclosure via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "0day Rubbish Research Team is publicly disclosing a vulnerability in the\nmedia handler of the ADM (ASUSTOR Data Master) management portal, verified by\nstatic analysis on the AS602T running ADM 3.5.9.RWM1 (x86-64, first-\ngeneration G1 firmware line, from the distributed image\nADM_X64_G1_3.5.9.RWM1_AS602T.img).\n\nType: OS command injection (CWE-78), enabled by an argument-quoting breakout\n(CWE-88) and by an incomplete list of disallowed values (CWE-184). In the\nact=live branch of usr/builtin/webman/portal/apis/fileExplorer/music.cgi the\nhandler composes an ffmpeg transcode command with snprintf at 0x4029a9 using\nthe format string at 0x4035f8, which places the stored media file path inside\na pair of literal shell double quotes, and executes the result at 0x4029b6\nthrough As_System in libgeneral.so.0.0 (0x4509b), which is system(), that is\n/bin/sh -c. The stored path arrives through the file parameter of act=add,\nread by O_CGI_AGENT::Get_Param at 0x401cab, split only on comma, colon and\nquestion mark (0x4036f7) and copied verbatim into the music-list entry field\nat +0x84; the handler never imports the library\u0027s general escaping helper.\nBefore execution As_System calls\nTry_Escaping_Characters_To_Avoid_Command_Injection (0x44f95), whose deny-list\nat 0xb25da is exactly two bytes, the backtick and the dollar sign. When\nneither appears the helper returns 0x72, the escape buffer stays empty and the\noriginal string reaches the shell unmodified, so a file name of the shape\nx\";id\u003emarker;#.mp3 closes the application\u0027s own quote, chains a command with a\nsemicolon and comments out the rest of the format string with a hash, using\nneither denied byte. Because the dollar sign is escaped, command substitution\ndoes not work, and the injected command must be free of slash, comma, colon\nand question mark; the quote, semicolon, pipe, ampersand, redirection\ncharacters and hash are never examined.\n\nScoring. Three readings are published with their vectors rather than one\nflattering number:\n- PRIMARY, 8.8 High, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. The only\n property consulted between caller and handler on this path is session\n validity: O_CGI_AGENT::Revive_Session (0x4017b0 / 0x4017ee) is fail-closed\n and runs before any act dispatch, and nothing in the handler\u0027s entry path\n consults a role or privilege attribute.\n- CONDITIONAL AND UNTESTED, 7.2 High,\n CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, for a deployment that\n confines the media library or the file explorer to the administrator role.\n No authentication of any kind took place in this research, no ADM\n permission artefact establishing that confinement was located, and the\n reading was never exercised, so it is published as a configuration-\n dependent alternative and not as an observation.\n- CONSIDERED AND REJECTED, the unauthenticated vector\n CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, which would compute to 9.8.\n It is not claimed: the session gate is fail-closed, the eleven\n pre-authentication portal interfaces enumerated during this research\n contain no As_System or As_Popen sink, and two independent sweeps of the\n unauthenticated surface, HTTP and non-HTTP, both concluded the sink is not\n reachable without a session.\n\nA factory default administrator credential pair (CWE-798) also exists in this\nbuild and is reported as a separate issue. It is not the vector used here and\nit justifies no metric value above.\n\nImpact: command execution in the CGI process\u0027s identity on a storage\nappliance, which reaches every volume, share and snapshot the device hosts,\nincluding other users\u0027 home shares and backup data landed on the device,\nbecause no privilege separation exists between the portal role and the file\nsystem; stored data can be modified or destroyed, firmware-update staging\nfiles replaced, persistent implants installed in the root filesystem or in\nscheduled tasks, and configuration and credential stores rewritten; the\ndevice can be stopped, rebooted, its shares unmounted, or its data encrypted\nor wiped. Where the portal is published to the internet for remote access, one\nvalid portal credential is the only barrier between an internet-based attacker\nand that outcome. CVSS scope stays Unchanged: vulnerable and impacted\ncomponents sit inside one security authority.\n\nVerification boundary, stated plainly, and it is narrower than the finding may\nfirst appear. No physical AS602T was used, no whole-system emulation of ADM\nwas achieved, and no request was ever sent to a device: login.cgi, upload.cgi\nand music.cgi were never addressed over the network, so every request and\nresponse shape published comes from static analysis, and end-to-end HTTP\nexploitation against a NAS is not claimed. The executed evidence is a faithful\nC replication of the sink semantics, reproducing the format string, the\nargument order, the 1024-byte buffer bound and the backslash-parity counting\nlogic of the escaping helper including the 0x72 return, compiled and run as\nuid 0 on a generic x86-64 Linux analysis host: the quote-breakout payload\nproduced a 39-byte root-owned marker containing uid=0(root) gid=0(root)\ngroups=0(root), while a command-substitution control payload, which shows the\nescaper does work on the dollar sign, and a benign file name produced nothing.\nuid 0 was measured only in that harness; the on-device CGI process identity\nwas never measured and root on the appliance is an inference from how handlers\nof this class commonly run on network-attached storage. Neither the real\nmusic.cgi binary nor the real libgeneral.so.0.0 was executed. The static chain\nwas independently re-derived from the raw disassembly by a second analyst,\nincluding the sink, the call site, the register mapping (rcx the fixed ffmpeg\nliteral, r8 the stored path at +0x84, xmm0 the seek time), the identity of\nAs_System and the two-byte deny-list, and an adversarial falsification pass\nover four angles could not refute any link.\n\nAffected scope: ADM 3.5.9.RWM1 on AS602T is verified; ADM 4.0.7.RVG1 on\nAS1002T (ARM Marvell 88F6820) is cross-checked at code and command level,\nmusic.cgi importing As_System and Get_Param but not Get_Escaped_String_General\nwith a byte-identical -i \"%s\" sink format, and the constructed command\nproducing a root marker under ARM user-mode emulation with that build\u0027s own\nroot filesystem, which is not a demonstration that its HTTP surface behaves\nidentically; other ADM builds older than 5.1.2 on other models are unverified\ncandidates that this advisory does not report as affected; and in the newer\nADM 5.1.4 build compared during this research As_System and As_Popen remain\nexported at the same offsets but have no callers, with command execution moved\nto Execute_Command_File and Execute_Command_Line (fork plus execv plus an\nargument tokeniser, no shell), so that build was recorded as having no\nequivalent remote code execution. No modern ADM release was run dynamically\nand nothing here implies that any current release is vulnerable.\n\nFix direction, in short: invoke the transcoder with fork plus execv instead of\nsystem(), retire the As_System and As_Popen wrappers library-wide, stop\ntreating a two-byte deny-list as an injection defence, allow-list file names\nat both ingest and the command-construction site, store uploads under a\nserver-generated name, and run the media handlers under a non-root service\naccount. The vendor already ships the argv-based primitive in newer builds.\n\nFull technical analysis and a reproducible proof-of-concept, whose dry-run\nmode performs no network I/O:\n https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/asustor-adm-music-cgi-live-command-injection\n\nProject archive (ongoing disclosure series):\n https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish\n\nThe vendor has been notified through the product-security intake it publishes\nfor reports about its products.\n\n--\n0day Rubbish Research Team\ndisclosure () 0day-rubbish com\nhttps://0day-rubbish.com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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"cweId": "CWE-184",
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"cweId": "CWE-78",
"description": "CWE-78",
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"cweId": "CWE-798",
"description": "CWE-798",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-88",
"description": "CWE-88",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
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"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:00Z",
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"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com"
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"url": "https://0day-rubbish.com/blog/asustor-adm-music-cgi-live-command-injection"
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"url": "https://github.com/Exploit-Garbage/0day-Rubbish"
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"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
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"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/3"
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "[0day-rubbish] Asustor ADM 3.5.9.RWM1 (AS602T) music.cgi act=live stored-filename command injection reaching system() (8.8 primary, PR:L)",
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"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:00Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:00Z",
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