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{
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              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-73829",
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                    "Automatable": "no"
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                "timestamp": "2026-08-19T18:55:14.304500Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:58:33.322Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
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          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027"
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          "packageName": "mpp",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp",
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            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo.ex"
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            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027"
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eThe race is only reachable when \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo\u003c/code\u003e is configured with a dedup store (\u003ccode\u003e\"store\"\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e). The default is \u003ccode\u003enil\u003c/code\u003e, which runs the library statelessly and provides no application-level replay protection at all, a documented property rather than part of this issue.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "The race is only reachable when `MPP.Methods.Tempo` is configured with a dedup store (`\"store\"` in `method_config`). The default is `nil`, which runs the library statelessly and provides no application-level replay protection at all, a documented property rather than part of this issue."
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          "value": "The race is only reachable when MPP.Methods.Tempo is configured with a dedup store (\"store\" in method_config). The default is nil, which runs the library statelessly and provides no application-level replay protection at all, a documented property rather than part of this issue."
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          "value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
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          "value": "E.FU"
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      "datePublic": "2026-06-29T00:00:00.000Z",
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eTime-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe \u003ccode\u003etype=\"hash\"\u003c/code\u003e credential path in \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2\u003c/code\u003e guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: \u003ccode\u003echeck_hash_unused/2\u003c/code\u003e reads the dedup store, an \u003ccode\u003eeth_getTransactionReceipt\u003c/code\u003e round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does \u003ccode\u003emark_hash_used/2\u003c/code\u003e write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store\u0027s atomic \u003ccode\u003echeck_and_mark/2\u003c/code\u003e primitive is available and used by the \u003ccode\u003etype=\"transaction\"\u003c/code\u003e path, but the hash path calls plain \u003ccode\u003eget\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003eput\u003c/code\u003e even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default \u003ccode\u003enil\u003c/code\u003e store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses.\n\nThe `type=\"hash\"` credential path in `MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2` guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: `check_hash_unused/2` reads the dedup store, an `eth_getTransactionReceipt` round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does `mark_hash_used/2` write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store\u0027s atomic `check_and_mark/2` primitive is available and used by the `type=\"transaction\"` path, but the hash path calls plain `get` and `put` even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default `nil` store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to redeem one confirmed on-chain payment for multiple paid-resource accesses.\n\nThe type=\"hash\" credential path in MPP.Methods.Tempo.verify/2 guards against replay with a non-atomic check-then-mark sequence: check_hash_unused/2 reads the dedup store, an eth_getTransactionReceipt round trip verifies the payment on chain, and only then does mark_hash_used/2 write the mark. Concurrent requests carrying the same settled payment hash all pass the read before any of them writes, so each is issued a receipt. The store\u0027s atomic check_and_mark/2 primitive is available and used by the type=\"transaction\" path, but the hash path calls plain get and put even when the configured store implements it. Exploitation requires a dedup store to be configured; the default nil store is stateless and documented as offering no replay protection at all.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.1."
        }
      ],
      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-29",
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "lang": "en",
              "value": "CAPEC-29 Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
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            "Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 6.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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              "value": "GENERAL"
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      ],
      "problemTypes": [
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          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-367",
              "description": "CWE-367 Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T17:19:43.696Z",
        "orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
        "shortName": "EEF"
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          "url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-w8j7-7qc3-5f24"
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          "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-73829.html"
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      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Non-atomic hash-credential dedup in mpp Tempo allows replay of a confirmed payment under a concurrent race"
    }
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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-73829",
    "datePublished": "2026-08-19T17:19:43.696Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-17T11:15:02.320Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:58:33.322Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
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              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-73541",
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                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
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                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-19T18:45:45.477502Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:47:04.542Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
          "cpes": [
            "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
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          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "modules": [
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027",
            "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo\u0027"
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          "packageName": "mpp",
          "packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp",
          "product": "mpp",
          "programFiles": [
            "lib/mpp/methods/tempo/fee_payer_policy.ex",
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              "name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u0027:validate/3"
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            {
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eOnly deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through \u003ccode\u003e\"fee_payer\" =\u0026gt; true\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e with either local co-signing (\u003ccode\u003efee_payer_private_key\u003c/code\u003e) or hosted sponsorship (\u003ccode\u003efee_payer_url\u003c/code\u003e). Sponsorship is disabled by default.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Only deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through `\"fee_payer\" =\u003e true` in `method_config` with either local co-signing (`fee_payer_private_key`) or hosted sponsorship (`fee_payer_url`). Sponsorship is disabled by default."
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          ],
          "value": "Only deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through \"fee_payer\" =\u003e true in method_config with either local co-signing (fee_payer_private_key) or hosted sponsorship (fee_payer_url). Sponsorship is disabled by default."
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      "datePublic": "2026-08-02T00:00:00.000Z",
      "descriptions": [
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u003c/code\u003e enforces its ceilings (\u003ccode\u003emax_gas\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003emax_fee_per_gas\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003emax_priority_fee_per_gas\u003c/code\u003e, the worst-case \u003ccode\u003egas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u0026lt;= max_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. \u003ccode\u003ereserve_hash_atomic/2\u003c/code\u003e is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times \u003ccode\u003emax_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\n\n`MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy` enforces its ceilings (`max_gas`, `max_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas`, the worst-case `gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u003c= max_total_fee` budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. `reserve_hash_atomic/2` is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times `max_total_fee`, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0."
            }
          ],
          "value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\n\nMPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u003c= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0."
        }
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          "capecId": "CAPEC-130",
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              "value": "CAPEC-130 Excessive Allocation"
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            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
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            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
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            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-770",
              "description": "CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
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        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T17:20:00.286Z",
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      ],
      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Tempo fee sponsorship in mpp bounds each transaction but not aggregate exposure, allowing concurrent sponsor-wallet drain",
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eOnly deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through \u003ccode\u003e\"fee_payer\" =\u0026gt; true\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e with either local co-signing (\u003ccode\u003efee_payer_private_key\u003c/code\u003e) or hosted sponsorship (\u003ccode\u003efee_payer_url\u003c/code\u003e). Sponsorship is disabled by default.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "Only deployments that enable Tempo server-side fee sponsorship are affected, through `\"fee_payer\" =\u003e true` in `method_config` with either local co-signing (`fee_payer_private_key`) or hosted sponsorship (`fee_payer_url`). Sponsorship is disabled by default."
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy\u003c/code\u003e enforces its ceilings (\u003ccode\u003emax_gas\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003emax_fee_per_gas\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003emax_priority_fee_per_gas\u003c/code\u003e, the worst-case \u003ccode\u003egas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u0026lt;= max_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. \u003ccode\u003ereserve_hash_atomic/2\u003c/code\u003e is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times \u003ccode\u003emax_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\n\n`MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy` enforces its ceilings (`max_gas`, `max_fee_per_gas`, `max_priority_fee_per_gas`, the worst-case `gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u003c= max_total_fee` budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. `reserve_hash_atomic/2` is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times `max_total_fee`, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0."
            }
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          "value": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet through concurrent sponsored payments, denying service to legitimate payers once it is empty.\n\nMPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy enforces its ceilings (max_gas, max_fee_per_gas, max_priority_fee_per_gas, the worst-case gas_limit * max_fee_per_gas \u003c= max_total_fee budget cap, and a validity window) against one transaction at a time, and nothing accounts for exposure across concurrent requests. reserve_hash_atomic/2 is keyed on the transaction hash, so it prevents duplicate broadcast of the same signed transaction but not N distinct sponsored transactions carrying distinct expiring nonces. Committed sponsor exposure is therefore N times max_total_fee, bounded by nothing in the library, and the default 900 second validity window lets co-signed transactions stay broadcastable and uncounted for that entire period.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.12.0."
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      "title": "Tempo fee sponsorship in mpp bounds each transaction but not aggregate exposure, allowing concurrent sponsor-wallet drain",
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            {
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eDisable Tempo fee sponsorship by setting \u003ccode\u003e\"fee_payer\" =\u0026gt; false\u003c/code\u003e (the default), so the client pays its own gas and the sponsor wallet is never committed. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lowering \u003ccode\u003emax_total_fee\u003c/code\u003e and \u003ccode\u003emax_validity_window_seconds\u003c/code\u003e reduces the exposure each concurrent request can commit and how long it stays outstanding, without bounding the aggregate.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
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              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Disable Tempo fee sponsorship by setting `\"fee_payer\" =\u003e false` (the default), so the client pays its own gas and the sponsor wallet is never committed. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lowering `max_total_fee` and `max_validity_window_seconds` reduces the exposure each concurrent request can commit and how long it stays outstanding, without bounding the aggregate."
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          "value": "Disable Tempo fee sponsorship by setting \"fee_payer\" =\u003e false (the default), so the client pays its own gas and the sponsor wallet is never committed. Where sponsorship must stay enabled, lowering max_total_fee and max_validity_window_seconds reduces the exposure each concurrent request can commit and how long it stays outstanding, without bounding the aggregate."
        }
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    "datePublished": "2026-08-19T17:20:00.286Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-18T10:00:02.140Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T18:47:04.542Z",
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        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eOnly deployments that configure a static \u003ccode\u003e\"memo\"\u003c/code\u003e in the Tempo \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e are affected. Deployments using the default per-challenge attribution memo are not: that path binds each settled transfer to the challenge under verification and is single-use by construction.\u003c/p\u003e"
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              "value": "Only deployments that configure a static `\"memo\"` in the Tempo `method_config` are affected. Deployments using the default per-challenge attribution memo are not: that path binds each settled transfer to the challenge under verification and is single-use by construction."
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              "value": "\u003cp\u003eAuthentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003e\u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo\u003c/code\u003e normally binds a settled TIP-20 \u003ccode\u003eTransferWithMemo\u003c/code\u003e to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static \u003ccode\u003e\"memo\"\u003c/code\u003e is configured in \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003echeck_matched_memo_binding/3\u003c/code\u003e returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only \u003ccode\u003etoken\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003erecipient\u003c/code\u003e, \u003ccode\u003eamount\u003c/code\u003e and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a \u003ccode\u003etype=\"hash\"\u003c/code\u003e credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.\n\n`MPP.Methods.Tempo` normally binds a settled TIP-20 `TransferWithMemo` to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static `\"memo\"` is configured in `method_config`, `check_matched_memo_binding/3` returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only `token`, `recipient`, `amount` and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a `type=\"hash\"` credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4."
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          "value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.\n\nMPP.Methods.Tempo normally binds a settled TIP-20 TransferWithMemo to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static \"memo\" is configured in method_config, check_matched_memo_binding/3 returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only token, recipient, amount and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a type=\"hash\" credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4."
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      "impacts": [
        {
          "capecId": "CAPEC-60",
          "descriptions": [
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              "value": "CAPEC-60 Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)"
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            "vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
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              "value": "GENERAL"
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              "cweId": "CWE-294",
              "description": "CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay",
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-19T17:19:52.413Z",
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      "source": {
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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      "title": "Static memo configuration in mpp Tempo disables per-challenge attribution binding, enabling third-party replay",
      "workarounds": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "supportingMedia": [
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/html",
              "value": "\u003cp\u003eRemove the static \u003ccode\u003e\"memo\"\u003c/code\u003e from the Tempo \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e so verification falls back to the default per-challenge attribution binding, which ties each settled transfer to the challenge being verified. Where a static memo must be kept, configure a dedup store (for example \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Tempo.ConCacheStore\u003c/code\u003e) with a TTL at least as long as the challenge expiry, which reduces unlimited replay to a race on the transaction hash rather than closing it.\u003c/p\u003e"
            },
            {
              "base64": false,
              "type": "text/markdown",
              "value": "Remove the static `\"memo\"` from the Tempo `method_config` so verification falls back to the default per-challenge attribution binding, which ties each settled transfer to the challenge being verified. Where a static memo must be kept, configure a dedup store (for example `MPP.Tempo.ConCacheStore`) with a TTL at least as long as the challenge expiry, which reduces unlimited replay to a race on the transaction hash rather than closing it."
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