CVE-2026-87119 (GCVE-0-2026-87119)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-22 11:16 – Updated: 2026-09-22 12:02
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
mpp Tempo subscription key authorization is not bound to the issuing challenge, allowing a captured activation credential to be replayed
Summary
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.
The payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer's wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain's own semantics for re-installing an existing key.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-22 12:02 UTC
CWE
- CWE-294 - Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisorie… | relatedvendor-advisory |
| https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-87119.html | related |
| https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-87119 | related |
| https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/db464dfa9a8… | related |
| https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/4b6eaec02af… | patch |
Impacted products
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-87119",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-22T12:02:12.184296Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T12:02:31.484Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027"
],
"packageName": "mpp",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp",
"product": "mpp",
"programFiles": [
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex",
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:verify/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:wallet_params/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:from_rpc/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027:verify/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
"vendor": "ZenHive",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.16.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.14.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027"
],
"packageName": "zenhive/mpp",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp",
"product": "mpp",
"programFiles": [
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex",
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:verify/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:wallet_params/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:from_rpc/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027:verify/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
"vendor": "ZenHive",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eOnly deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires \u003ccode\u003esubscription_access_key_private_key\u003c/code\u003e in the Tempo \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer\u0027s signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires `subscription_access_key_private_key` in the Tempo `method_config`. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer\u0027s signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer."
}
],
"value": "Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires subscription_access_key_private_key in the Tempo method_config. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer\u0027s signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.16.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.14.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "E.FU"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "E.FU"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-09-15T15:20:31.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eAuthentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe payer signs a Tempo \u003ccode\u003eKeyAuthorization\u003c/code\u003e over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003elib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex\u003c/code\u003e pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4\u003c/code\u003e deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, \u003ccode\u003eclaim_activation\u003c/code\u003e succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer\u0027s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain\u0027s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo `KeyAuthorization` over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3` in `lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex` pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4` deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, `claim_activation` succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer\u0027s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain\u0027s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2."
}
],
"value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer\u0027s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain\u0027s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-60",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eAn attacker who obtains a payer\u0027s subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client\u0027s own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer\u0027s wallet and re-authorize the server\u0027s access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "An attacker who obtains a payer\u0027s subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client\u0027s own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer\u0027s wallet and re-authorize the server\u0027s access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry."
}
],
"value": "An attacker who obtains a payer\u0027s subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client\u0027s own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer\u0027s wallet and re-authorize the server\u0027s access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-294",
"description": "CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "GitHub Advisory",
"tags": [
"related",
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-p9fv-9w58-95x2"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-87119",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-87119.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-87119",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-87119"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit db464df in ZenHive/mpp",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 4b6eaec in ZenHive/mpp",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "mpp Tempo subscription key authorization is not bound to the issuing challenge, allowing a captured activation credential to be replayed"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-87119",
"datePublished": "2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-11T18:00:02.032Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T12:02:31.484Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"epss": {
"cve": "CVE-2026-87119",
"date": "2026-11-15",
"epss": "0.00574",
"percentile": "0.47979"
},
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027"
],
"packageName": "mpp",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp",
"product": "mpp",
"programFiles": [
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex",
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:verify/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:wallet_params/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:from_rpc/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027:verify/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
"vendor": "ZenHive",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.16.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.14.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027"
],
"packageName": "zenhive/mpp",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp",
"product": "mpp",
"programFiles": [
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex",
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:verify/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:wallet_params/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:from_rpc/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027:verify/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
"vendor": "ZenHive",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer\u0027s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain\u0027s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-87119",
"lastModified": "2026-09-22T19:09:32.273",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-87119",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-22T12:02:12.184296Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-22T12:17:14.150",
"references": [
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-87119.html"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-p9fv-9w58-95x2"
},
{
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-87119"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-294"
}
],
"source": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-87119",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-22T12:02:12.184296Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T12:02:21.205Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://repo.hex.pm",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027"
],
"packageName": "mpp",
"packageURL": "pkg:hex/mpp",
"product": "mpp",
"programFiles": [
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex",
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:verify/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:wallet_params/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:from_rpc/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027:verify/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
"vendor": "ZenHive",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0.16.2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0.14.0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"collectionURL": "https://github.com",
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"modules": [
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027",
"\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027"
],
"packageName": "zenhive/mpp",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/zenhive/mpp",
"product": "mpp",
"programFiles": [
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex",
"lib/mpp/methods/tempo/subscription.ex"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:verify/3"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:wallet_params/2"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization\u0027:from_rpc/1"
},
{
"name": "\u0027Elixir.MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription\u0027:verify/2"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp",
"vendor": "ZenHive",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"configurations": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eOnly deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires \u003ccode\u003esubscription_access_key_private_key\u003c/code\u003e in the Tempo \u003ccode\u003emethod_config\u003c/code\u003e. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer\u0027s signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires `subscription_access_key_private_key` in the Tempo `method_config`. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer\u0027s signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer."
}
],
"value": "Only deployments offering Tempo subscriptions are affected, which requires subscription_access_key_private_key in the Tempo method_config. Exploitation further requires the attacker to have obtained a payer\u0027s signed activation credential, in transit over a hop that is not TLS-protected or at rest in a log, an intermediary, or a client retry buffer."
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:ZenHive:mpp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndExcluding": "0.16.2",
"versionStartIncluding": "0.14.0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
],
"operator": "AND"
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "E.FU"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "E.FU"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "coordinator",
"value": "Jonatan M\u00e4nnchen / EEF"
}
],
"dateAssigned": "2026-09-15T15:20:31.000Z",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eAuthentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThe payer signs a Tempo \u003ccode\u003eKeyAuthorization\u003c/code\u003e over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3\u003c/code\u003e in \u003ccode\u003elib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex\u003c/code\u003e pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. \u003ccode\u003eMPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4\u003c/code\u003e deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, \u003ccode\u003eclaim_activation\u003c/code\u003e succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer\u0027s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain\u0027s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\u003c/p\u003e\n\u003cp\u003eThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo `KeyAuthorization` over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3` in `lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex` pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. `MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4` deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, `claim_activation` succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer\u0027s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain\u0027s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2."
}
],
"value": "Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.\n\nThe payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer\u0027s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain\u0027s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.\n\nThis issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-60",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eAn attacker who obtains a payer\u0027s subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client\u0027s own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer\u0027s wallet and re-authorize the server\u0027s access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry.\u003c/p\u003e"
},
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/markdown",
"value": "An attacker who obtains a payer\u0027s subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client\u0027s own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer\u0027s wallet and re-authorize the server\u0027s access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry."
}
],
"value": "An attacker who obtains a payer\u0027s subscription activation credential (from a non-TLS hop, a log, a compromised intermediary, or the client\u0027s own retry buffer) can present it under fresh challenges to settle repeated first-period charges against that payer\u0027s wallet and re-authorize the server\u0027s access key. The payer bears the on-chain cost, limited only by the per-period subscription limit and the subscription expiry."
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackRequirements": "PRESENT",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 8.2,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-294",
"description": "CWE-294 Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z",
"orgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"shortName": "EEF"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "GitHub Advisory",
"tags": [
"related",
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-p9fv-9w58-95x2"
},
{
"name": "EEF CNA record for CVE-2026-87119",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-87119.html"
},
{
"name": "OSV record EEF-CVE-2026-87119",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-87119"
},
{
"name": "Introducing commit db464df in ZenHive/mpp",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/db464dfa9a86ccda58f0827101f6da6bd8aafa78"
},
{
"name": "Fix commit 4b6eaec in ZenHive/mpp",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/4b6eaec02af0e8485cfb4ff68f467d075ed5dd6f"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "INTERNAL"
},
"title": "mpp Tempo subscription key authorization is not bound to the issuing challenge, allowing a captured activation credential to be replayed"
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db",
"assignerShortName": "EEF",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-87119",
"datePublished": "2026-09-22T11:16:56.232Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-11T18:00:02.032Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T12:02:31.484Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Loading…
Loading…
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
Loading…
Loading…
The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Loading…
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.