GCVE-1988-2026-0520

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:44 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:44
VLAI
Title
Amplitude customers using domain proxies should update their configuration immediately.
Summary
After receiving live analytics requests intended for `api2.amplitude.com`, I contacted `security () amplitude com` and was invited to submit the issue through Amplitude's private Bugcrowd programme. In my view, Amplitude's handling of the report, including closing it as "Not applicable" despite evidence of intercepted customer traffic, caused by insecure configurations and documentation, constitutes a negligent approach to protecting customer data, and a bad-faith bug bounty programme. Two conditions combined to make interception possible. 1. Stale DNS and ephemeral IP reuse Amplitude infrastructure used ephemeral addresses from an AWS public IP pool. After an address was released, it could be reassigned to another party, while systems with a cached DNS answer continued sending traffic to it until the cached record expired. This is not a conventional dangling-CNAME takeover. It is an IP "afterlife" condition involving stale DNS resolutions and recycled public-cloud addresses. 2. Missing upstream TLS certificate validation Amplitude's documentation recommends using a domain proxy to front its services. However, its example NGINX configuration does not enable validation of the upstream TLS certificate. Similar certificate-validation gaps also exist in default or commonly deployed configurations for some cloud load balancers, CDNs and WAFs. Consequently, affected customer proxies accepted invalid or self-signed certificates when forwarding requests towards `api2.amplitude.com`. The combination of stale address resolution and missing certificate validation enabled traffic intended for Amplitude to be intercepted by a party controlling a reassigned cloud address. The duration and full scope of the exposure are not known. The sample intercepted traffic provided privately to Amplitude contained requests originating from the following sites: * `www.f5.com` * `uplatform.team` * `mystylus.ai` No captured traffic, identifiers, payloads or user data are being disclosed. Timeline: * 26 June 2026: Contacted `security () amplitude com`. * 9 July 2026: Received an invitation to Amplitude's private Bugcrowd programme and submitted the report. * 16 July 2026: Amplitude disputed that the evidence demonstrated interception. * 17 July 2026: I clarified that the requests contained data categorised as personal data in Amplitude's own documentation, including persistent device identifiers, session identifiers and linkable usage data. * 18 and 20 July 2026: Reported additional batches of live traffic. * 20 July 2026: Identified that Amplitude's recommended NGINX domain-proxy configuration omitted upstream certificate validation. * 21 July 2026: Amplitude acknowledged that the captured traffic had passed through customer domain proxies that did not validate upstream certificates. Bugcrowd subsequently closed the report as "Not applicable". Recommended action: Amplitude should contact affected customers, advise them of the potential interception of personal data, review its DNS and load-balancer architecture, and revise its domain-proxy documentation so that upstream certificate and hostname validation are enabled by default. Customers should enable certificate-chain and hostname validation on every HTTPS connection from a proxy, CDN, WAF, service mesh or load balancer to Amplitude. Customers should also review DNS caches and forwarding logs, identify traffic sent to previously assigned cloud addresses, assess whether analytics events were intercepted or lost, and rotate any sensitive values present in affected requests. _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
unknown Amplitude customers using Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Credits

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          "vendor": "unknown",
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          "value": "After receiving live analytics requests intended for `api2.amplitude.com`,\nI contacted `security () amplitude com` and was invited to submit the issue\nthrough Amplitude\u0027s private Bugcrowd programme.\n\nIn my view, Amplitude\u0027s handling of the report, including closing it as\n\"Not applicable\" despite evidence of intercepted customer traffic, caused\nby insecure configurations and documentation, constitutes a negligent\napproach to protecting customer data, and a bad-faith bug bounty programme.\n\nTwo conditions combined to make interception possible.\n\n1. Stale DNS and ephemeral IP reuse\n\nAmplitude infrastructure used ephemeral addresses from an AWS public IP\npool. After an address was released, it could be reassigned to another\nparty, while systems with a cached DNS answer continued sending traffic to\nit until the cached record expired.\n\nThis is not a conventional dangling-CNAME takeover. It is an IP \"afterlife\"\ncondition involving stale DNS resolutions and recycled public-cloud\naddresses.\n\n2. Missing upstream TLS certificate validation\n\nAmplitude\u0027s documentation recommends using a domain proxy to front its\nservices. However, its example NGINX configuration does not enable\nvalidation of the upstream TLS certificate. Similar certificate-validation\ngaps also exist in default or commonly deployed configurations for some\ncloud load balancers, CDNs and WAFs.\n\nConsequently, affected customer proxies accepted invalid or self-signed\ncertificates when forwarding requests towards `api2.amplitude.com`.\n\nThe combination of stale address resolution and missing certificate\nvalidation enabled traffic intended for Amplitude to be intercepted by a\nparty controlling a reassigned cloud address. The duration and full scope\nof the exposure are not known.\n\nThe sample intercepted traffic provided privately to Amplitude contained\nrequests originating from the following sites:\n\n* `www.f5.com`\n* `uplatform.team`\n* `mystylus.ai`\n\nNo captured traffic, identifiers, payloads or user data are being disclosed.\n\nTimeline:\n\n* 26 June 2026: Contacted `security () amplitude com`.\n* 9 July 2026: Received an invitation to Amplitude\u0027s private Bugcrowd\nprogramme and submitted the report.\n* 16 July 2026: Amplitude disputed that the evidence demonstrated\ninterception.\n* 17 July 2026: I clarified that the requests contained data categorised as\npersonal data in Amplitude\u0027s own documentation, including persistent device\nidentifiers, session identifiers and linkable usage data.\n* 18 and 20 July 2026: Reported additional batches of live traffic.\n* 20 July 2026: Identified that Amplitude\u0027s recommended NGINX domain-proxy\nconfiguration omitted upstream certificate validation.\n* 21 July 2026: Amplitude acknowledged that the captured traffic had passed\nthrough customer domain proxies that did not validate upstream\ncertificates. Bugcrowd subsequently closed the report as \"Not applicable\".\n\nRecommended action:\n\nAmplitude should contact affected customers, advise them of the potential\ninterception of personal data, review its DNS and load-balancer\narchitecture, and revise its domain-proxy documentation so that upstream\ncertificate and hostname validation are enabled by default.\n\nCustomers should enable certificate-chain and hostname validation on every\nHTTPS connection from a proxy, CDN, WAF, service mesh or load balancer to\nAmplitude.\n\nCustomers should also review DNS caches and forwarding logs, identify\ntraffic sent to previously assigned cloud addresses, assess whether\nanalytics events were intercepted or lost, and rotate any sensitive values\npresent in affected requests.\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
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        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
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      "x_gcve": [
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          "relationships": [],
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            "contentSha256": "bbaecd2b03587e71271eb8106668f87c1c931131f74b7160ac07b5b3261f2e03",
            "evidenceScore": 6,
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            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/27",
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    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T08:44:17Z",
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  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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}



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