GCVE-1988-2026-0518
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:44 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:44| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/14 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Whistlelink Site-access password |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Whistlelink Site-access password",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
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"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
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"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Red Nanaki via Fulldisclosure"
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"descriptions": [
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"lang": "en",
"value": "Whistlelink: Site-access password exposed in web server access logs via GET\nquery string\n\n\nSeverity: CRITICAL\n\nSUMMARY\n\nThe Whistlelink reporting portal protects optionally-enabled, password-gated\nwhistleblowing sites with a site-access password. When a visitor unlocks such a\nsite, the client validates the password by issuing an HTTP GET request that\ncarries the password as a URL query-string parameter:\n\nGET /sys/api/v1.0/wl/publish_site/check_password?password=\n\nThe value is only Base64-encoded (js-base64), which is a reversible transport\nencoding, not encryption or hashing. Because the secret travels in the request\nline / URI, it is written verbatim into the front-end web server\u0027s access log\n(the deployment fronts the application with nginx, which logs the full request\nURI by default) on every unlock attempt, and is similarly retained by any\nreverse proxy, load balancer, WAF, CDN, observability / log-aggregation\npipeline, log backup, and the user\u0027s browser history.\n\nAnyone able to read those logs can trivially Base64-decode the value and recover\nthe cleartext site-access password, defeating the access control for the entire\nprotected whistleblowing site. For a whistleblowing platform - where the\nconfidentiality of who may reach the reporting channel is a primary protection\ngoal - this is treated as CRITICAL.\n\n\nCVSS\n\nCVSS v3.1 Base: 7.7 (High)\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N\n\nCVSS v3.1 Environmental (whistleblowing asset, Confidentiality Requirement\nHigh): 9.8 (Critical)\nCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N/CR:H\n\nCVSS v4.0: High\nCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N\n\nThe operative rating for this product class is the environmental score: the\nprotected asset is a whistleblowing channel whose access confidentiality is\nparamount (potential whistleblower-safety consequences), justifying CR:H, which\nraises the score to 9.8 / Critical and the CRITICAL tag.\n\nMetric justification (v3.1 Base):\n\n- Attack Vector: Network. Access logs are routinely centralized to\nnetwork-reachable systems (log/observability platforms, off-host backups,\nobject storage). If logs are only local files, AV:L applies and the Base\nscore drops to ~6.\n- Attack Complexity: Low. The secret is present, in recoverable form, in every\ncheck_password log line; decoding Base64 is trivial.\n- Privileges Required: Low. Reading the logs requires some access to logging /\noperations infrastructure - a materially lower and broader-trust bar than\nknowing the site password itself. If logs are exposed to an unauthenticated\nparty (e.g. a misconfigured log bucket), PR:N applies and Base ~ 8.6.\n- User Interaction: None. No victim interaction needed to read the stored value.\n- Scope: Changed. The vulnerable component (the web application) writes the\nsecret into a separate security authority (the host / log subsystem), and the\nimpact lands on the protected site and its users.\n- Confidentiality: High. Full disclosure of the site-access credential (and,\nwhere reused, the underlying password), granting access to the protected\nwhistleblowing site.\n- Integrity / Availability: None. The flaw discloses data; it does not directly\nmodify or deny service.\n\nScore derivation (v3.1):\n\n- ISCBase = 1 - (1 - 0.56) = 0.56\n- Impact (Scope Changed) = 7.52 x (0.56 - 0.029) - 3.25 x (0.56 - 0.02)^15 ~\n3.99\n- Exploitability = 8.22 x 0.85 (AV) x 0.77 (AC) x 0.68 (PR, scope-changed) x\n0.85 (UI) ~ 3.11\n- Base = Roundup(min(1.08 x (3.99 + 3.11), 10)) = Roundup(7.67) = 7.7 (High)\n- Environmental with CR:H: MISC = min(1 - (1 - 0.56 x 1.5), 0.915) = 0.84\n-\u003e Modified Impact ~ 5.93\n-\u003e Roundup(min(1.08 x (5.93 + 3.11), 10)) = 9.8 (Critical)\n\n\nCOMPONENT\n\nbackend (API endpoint design) / packaging (web server logging configuration)\n\n\nFOUND BY\n\nPassive HAR traffic audit + static analysis of the published client bundle.\n\n\nAFFECTED ENDPOINT\n\nGET /sys/api/v1.0/wl/publish_site/check_password?password=\n\nClient request construction (published JS bundle, de-minified):\n\n// password validation service\ncheckPassword: function (t) {\nreturn C.a.get(\"\".concat(T, \"/check_password\"), { params: { password: t } });\n}\n\n// caller - submit handler of the password gate\nsubmit: function () {\n// ...\ncs.checkPassword(ds[\"a\"].encode(this.password)).then(function (e) {\nif (e.data.data) {\nlocalStorage[\"authtoken\"] = ds[\"a\"].encode(this.password); // reversible Base64,\nalso reused as the Auth header\n// route into the protected site\n}\n});\n}\n\nds is js-base64 v3.7.8 (standard alphabet A-Za-z0-9+/=), so\nds.a.encode(password)\nis plain, reversible Base64 - not a hash and not encryption.\n\n\nDETAILS\n\nTwo distinct defects combine:\n\n1. CWE-598 - Sensitive information transmitted in a GET request query string.\nThe site-access password is sent as the \"password\" query parameter rather than\nin a request body. URLs / query strings are persisted far more widely than\nrequest bodies: front-end web server access logs (nginx logs the full request\nURI by default), reverse proxies, load balancers, WAFs, CDNs,\nlog-aggregation / observability pipelines, log backups, and the local browser\nhistory. Even over TLS, the value is recorded in cleartext at these endpoints.\n\n2. CWE-261 / CWE-312 - Weak (reversible) encoding of a credential.\nThe value is only Base64-encoded. Base64 provides no confidentiality; anyone\nreading a log line recovers the cleartext password by decoding it. The same\nreversible token is also placed in localStorage and replayed as the Auth header\non every request, broadening exposure.\n\nThe combined result (CWE-532 - Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log\nFile):\nthe cleartext site-access password is durably stored, in recoverable form, in\nweb\nserver access logs on every unlock attempt. The password is a single shared\nsecret\ngating the whole protected site, so a single log read defeats the access control\nfor all visitors.\n\n\nIMPACT\n\n- Disclosure of the site-access credential to any party with read access to web\nserver / proxy / aggregated logs or their backups - a broader and lower-trust\npopulation than those authorized to access the protected site (operations\nstaff, log-platform users, backup holders, third-party log processors, or an\nattacker who obtains logs via a separate flaw).\n- Complete bypass of the password gate for the protected whistleblowing site,\nexposing the existence, configuration, and reporting channel that the password\nwas meant to keep confidential.\n- Credential-reuse blast radius: if the configured site password is reused\nelsewhere (common for shared, human-chosen site passwords), the impact extends\nbeyond the platform.\n- Long-lived exposure: log retention and backups mean the secret remains\nrecoverable long after any password rotation, until all historical logs are\npurged.\n\n\nATTACK SCENARIO\n\n1. A whistleblowing site is configured with site-access password protection.\n2. Visitors (and the operator during setup / testing) unlock the site; each\nunlock emits GET .../check_password?password=, logged by nginx and\ndownstream systems.\n3. A log-platform user, backup holder, third-party log processor, or an attacker\nwho has obtained the access logs greps for \"check_password\", Base64-decodes\nthe captured value, and recovers the cleartext password.\n4. The actor unlocks the protected whistleblowing site at will; rotating the\npassword does not remediate historical log copies.\n\n\nREMEDIATION\n\n1. Stop sending the password in the URL. Validate via POST with the credential\nin the request body (TLS-encrypted, not logged in the request line). This is\nthe primary fix.\n2. Never log the secret. Ensure the body-based credential is excluded from\naccess / error logs and from any observability / WAF capture; scrub historical\nlogs and backups that contain check_password?password=.\n3. Do not rely on Base64 for confidentiality. Treat the site password as a\nsecret\nend-to-end; do not persist a reversible copy in localStorage / the Auth header\n- derive a short-lived, server-issued session token instead (as already done\nfor case authentication).\n4. Rotate any site passwords that may have been logged, and treat reused\npasswords as compromised.\n5. Server-side enforcement: confirm the password gate is enforced on the\nprotected data endpoints server-side, not only via the client-side route guard.\n6. Throttle check_password and avoid a plain boolean oracle to limit brute\nforce.\n\n\nREFERENCES\n\n- CWE-598: Use of GET Request Method With Sensitive Query Strings\n- CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File\n- CWE-312: Cleartext Storage of Sensitive Information\n- CWE-261: Weak Encoding for Password\n- OWASP ASVS v4.0.3 7.1.1 (no sensitive data in logs), 8.3.1 (sensitive data not\nsent in URL parameters)\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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"source": {
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"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Whistlelink: Site-access password exposed in web server access logs via GET query string",
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