GCVE-1988-2026-0519
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 08:44 – Updated: 2026-11-02 08:44| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/16 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Whistleblowersoftware.com confidentiality and |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Whistleblowersoftware.com confidentiality and",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Red Nanaki via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Whistleblowersoftware.com: confidentiality and anonymity leakage to third\nparties\n\n## Summary\n\nThe anonymous reporting flow on `whistleblowersoftware.com` encrypts report\ntext end-to-end in the browser but does not extend the same guarantee to\nattachments and exposes the reporter\u0027s network identity and timing to a US-based\nthird party. Together these weaken the confidentiality and anonymity\nproperties the platform is expected to provide.\n\n## Components\n\n- `api.whistleblowersoftware.com`: public reporting and mailbox endpoints\n- `ws-api-production-occurrence-data.s3.eu-central-1.amazonaws.com`: attachment\nstorage\n- Front-end SPA on `whistleblowersoftware.com`\n\n## Findings\n\n### 1. Attachments are processed in plaintext by third parties (High)\n\nReport text (title, description, and message responses) is encrypted in the\nbrowser before transmission using a hybrid scheme (RSA public key plus AES,\nwith a PBKDF2-derived passphrase key at 600,000 iterations). Attachments are\nnot handled the same way.\n\nTo strip file metadata, the client uploads the **original, unencrypted** file to\na third-party storage bucket (Amazon S3, `eu-central-1`), the file is processed\noff the user\u0027s device, and the client then retrieves the cleaned file in\n**cleartext** before encrypting and re-uploading it. The plaintext attachment is\ntherefore handled by parties other than the recipient organisation: the platform\noperator, anyone with access to the storage bucket, and Amazon as the cloud\nprovider can read the full contents of every attachment, and a plaintext copy\npersists in the temporary storage prefix until it is removed.\n\nNo evidence of a data protection agreement (DPA) between the operator and Amazon\nwas found, so there is no documented contractual basis constraining how the\ncloud provider may process or retain the plaintext attachments it receives.\n\nEndpoints involved:\n\n```text\nPOST /api/companies/file-entries/signed-s3-url/public # request upload URL\nPOST / # upload original file\nPOST /api/companies/file-entries/remove-metadata/public # server strips metadata\nGET /tmp/ # cleaned file, in cleartext\n```\n\nOn a whistleblowing platform, attachments are frequently the most sensitive and\nmost deanonymizing part of a disclosure (documents, photos, embedded\nEXIF/author/GPS metadata). Stripping that metadata off the user\u0027s device means\nthe very data a reporter needs hidden is exposed to third parties before it is\nremoved.\n\n**Impact:** loss of confidentiality for all uploaded evidence; exposure of\ndeanonymizing file metadata to the operator and the third-party cloud provider;\nresidual plaintext copies in temporary storage; no documented data protection\nagreement governing the cloud provider\u0027s handling of that plaintext.\n\n**Recommendation:** perform metadata removal client-side, in the browser,\nbefore encryption, so the server never receives plaintext. If server-side\nprocessing cannot be avoided, stop presenting attachments as end-to-end\nencrypted, guarantee immediate verifiable deletion of temporary plaintext\nobjects (lifecycle in minutes), and treat the metadata-stripping service as an\nin-scope, trusted component that sees plaintext.\n\n### 2. Third-party telemetry on the anonymous reporter flow (Medium)\n\nThe reporter pages load a third-party error/telemetry SDK that transmits\nsession data to an externally hosted, US-operated endpoint during the\nsubmission flow. Each session sends the reporter\u0027s source IP address, user\nagent, application release, and millisecond-precision session start/stop\ntimestamps with correlatable session identifiers.\n\nNo report content was transmitted in this channel, but it discloses the\nreporter\u0027s network identity and submission timing to a party outside the\nrecipient organisation, raises cross-border personal-data-transfer concerns for\nan EU-targeted service, and is a latent content-leak vector should error capture\nor breadcrumbs ever be enabled with default settings.\n\n**Recommendation:** remove third-party telemetry from the reporter flow, or\nself-host it within first-party, EU-resident infrastructure; disable PII,\nsession tracking, and breadcrumb capture on these pages; review all\ncross-origin connection targets permitted on the reporter flow against the\nanonymity threat model.\n\n## Positive observations\n\n- Report text, message responses, and file names are encrypted client-side\n(RSA + AES; PBKDF2 at 600,000 iterations with a per-report salt).\n- Strong transport and browser hardening: HSTS with preload, a strict Content\nSecurity Policy (`default-src \u0027none\u0027` on the API, `frame-ancestors \u0027none\u0027`,\n`object-src \u0027none\u0027`, mixed content blocked), `X-Frame-Options: DENY`,\n`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`, a restrictive `Referrer-Policy` and\n`Permissions-Policy`.\n- CORS restricted to the exact application origin rather than a wildcard.\n- Attachment storage uses short-lived temporary credentials, a private ACL, and\nupload policies that pin bucket, key, content type, and a content-length\nrange, with short upload and download expiry windows.\n- Rate limiting is applied to report submission.\n- The reporting flow uses no cookies, authorization headers, or other\nidentifying request metadata.\n\n## Severity ranking\n\n1. Attachments processed in plaintext by third parties: High\n2. Third-party telemetry on the anonymous reporter flow: Medium\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T08:44:17Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Jul/16"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/16"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/16"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Whistleblowersoftware.com: confidentiality and anonymity leakage to third parties",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0519",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Jul/16",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "ca27d53b70da72ed35ad5582645d63ba6b4eed90741f4853ccf3e21d5eba2cff",
"evidenceScore": 7,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jul/16",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-06-21T11:07:14Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-11-02T08:44:17Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T08:44:17Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0519"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.