GCVE-1988-2026-0193
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| unknown | Weak Password Complexity |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Weak Password Complexity",
"vendor": "unknown",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Andrey Stoykov"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "# Exploit Title: Elgg - Lack of Password Complexity\n# Date: 1/2026\n# Exploit Author: Andrey Stoykov\n# Version: 6.3.3\n# Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04\n# Blog:\nhttps://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-48-weak.html\n\n// HTTP Request - Changing Password\n\nPOST /action/usersettings/save HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\nContent-Length: 216\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\nCookie: Elgg=5ivi0vt1g9jqu1sju70hfnm0mc\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n__elgg_token=nIY_M_wh53bUxoHvuKO1YA\u0026__elgg_ts=1769266299\u0026username=admin\u0026name=Admin+User\u0026email_password=\u0026email=\nadmin () example com\n\u0026current_password=[REDACTED]\u0026password=Passw0rd%21\u0026password2=Passw0rd%21\u0026language=en\u0026guid=46\n\n\n// HTTP Response - Changing Password\n\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:52:07 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nLocation: http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\nVary: User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 394\n\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\n \u003chead\u003e\n \u003cmeta charset=\"UTF-8\" /\u003e\n \u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=\u0027\nhttp://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\u0027\"; /\u003e\n\n \u003ctitle\u003eRedirecting to http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\u003c/title\u003e\n \u003c/head\u003e\n \u003cbody\u003e\n Redirecting to \u003ca href=\"http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\";\u003e\nhttp://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\u003c/a\u003e.\n \u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n\n\n// HTTP Request - Changing Password - Following Redirect\n\nGET /settings/user/admin HTTP/1.1\nHost: elgg.local\nUser-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:148.0)\nGecko/20100101 Firefox/148.0\nAccept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8\nAccept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9\nAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br\nOrigin: http://elgg.local\nSec-GPC: 1\nConnection: keep-alive\nReferer: http://elgg.local/action/usersettings/save\nCookie: Elgg=5ivi0vt1g9jqu1sju70hfnm0mc\nUpgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\nPriority: u=0, i\n\n\n\n// HTTP Response - Changing Password - Following Redirect\n\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nDate: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 14:52:11 GMT\nServer: Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)\nCache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private\nx-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN\nexpires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT\npragma: no-cache\nx-content-type-options: nosniff\nVary: Accept-Encoding,User-Agent\nKeep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100\nConnection: Keep-Alive\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 27859\n\n[...]\n\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-message elgg-message-success\"\u003e\u003cdiv class=\"elgg-inner\"\u003e\u003cdiv\nclass=\"elgg-body\"\u003ePassword changed\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\u003c/div\u003e\n[...]\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
},
"references": [
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Jan/29"
},
{
"tags": [
"technical-description"
],
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/29"
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local"
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/action/usersettings/save"
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin"
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\""
},
{
"url": "http://elgg.local/settings/user/admin\u0027\""
},
{
"url": "https://msecureltd.blogspot.com/2026/01/friday-fun-pentest-series-48-weak.html"
},
{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
},
{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/29"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Weak Password Complexity - elggv6.3.3",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0193",
"x_vulnarchive": {
"archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Jan/29",
"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "18cfea4f759fd84244b618cc40ebf3187468c436649ef826365957fccaee8142",
"evidenceScore": 7,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/29",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
"sourceFormat": "text/html",
"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-01-24T18:01:43Z"
}
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
"datePublished": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:57:41Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0193"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.