GCVE-1988-2026-0482

Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30
VLAI
Title
VestaCP <= 0.9.8-26: authenticated config-parser eval sinks -> root RCE (VESTACP-2026-001)
Summary
Advisory ID: VESTACP-2026-001 / GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72 Product: Vesta Control Panel (VestaCP) Versions: <= 0.9.8-26 (unmaintained since 2019-09; no upstream fix exists) Severity: Critical - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.9 CWE: CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-95 (Eval Injection) Reporter: Bryan Ramirez - SYSDOP LLC <security () sysdop com> SUMMARY ------- VestaCP stores per-account objects (domains, cron jobs, DNS, mail, users) as KEY='value' lines under $USER_DATA/*.conf. The shared shell library func/main.sh - sourced by every v-* administration script, all of which run as root - parses those lines with `eval`, so the assignments land in the calling shell's environment. Values in those files are controllable by an authenticated panel user (cron command fields, domain/alias fields, DNS and mail records, names/comments). Any value that lands with an unescaped single quote breaks out of the quoted assignment and injects arbitrary shell, executed as root the next time any v-* script parses that object - which happens on routine panel operations and on cron-driven sync jobs, without further interaction. This is the same sink class published for VestaCP's downstream fork HestiaCP as GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc (config parser eval -> root RCE, fixed in 1.9.5), GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v and GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3 (unquoted cron argument -> crontab injection). Hestia patched the class in the fork; VestaCP itself never received an advisory or a fix and remains deployed worldwide - notably in VPS templates (e.g. Virtualizor images) still offered by hosting providers today. AFFECTED SINKS (func/main.sh, 0.9.8-26) ------------------------------------- is_object_value_empty, is_object_value_exist, get_object_value, update_object_value, add_object_key: eval "$object" over a grep'd conf line. search_objects, sync_cron_jobs: eval $line per matching line. ARGUMENTS builder: eval echo \$${I} (also a latent glob-expansion bug). is_format_valid: eval arg=\$$arg_name. bin/v-add-cron-job: echo $7 unquoted -> raw newlines land in the crontab (GHSA-5fpv class). The central pattern (verbatim shape in stock 0.9.8-26): object=$(grep "$2='$3'" $USER_DATA/$1.conf) eval "$object" EXPLOITATION ------------ 1. Attacker holds an ordinary authenticated VestaCP account (hosting customer) or any write path landing data in ~/conf/*.conf (panel fields bypassing %quote% escaping, backup/restore, API/import paths). 2. A crafted value containing an unescaped ' is stored, e.g. a cron CMD: CMD='x'; id > /tmp/pwned; # 3. On the next root-run v-* invocation parsing the object, the eval runs the injected commands as root. Impact: tenant-to-host escape - full root on the node, exposing every site, mailbox and database of every account it hosts. A self-contained PoC simulating the vulnerable parse and the hardened parser neutralizing it is published in the repository (poc/poc-eval-sink.sh). ADDITIONAL FINDING ------------------ While certifying equivalence of the hardened parser (1,165 field comparisons against real confs): the stock `eval echo $4` path performs glob expansion - a literal `*` in a field expands to a directory listing instead of returning verbatim. The non-eval parser returns `*` correctly: the replacement is equivalent and fixes a latent parsing bug. MITIGATION ---------- No upstream fix exists (abandonware). Operators still running VestaCP should: 1. Replace the eval parser with a non-eval key/value parser - the repository includes a drop-in parse_object_kv_list (strict KEY='value' regex + `declare -g` assignment; values become literals, never executed) plus a porting recipe for all eval sites (mitigation/non-eval-parser.sh). 2. Enforce %quote%/%dots% escaping on every v-* entry point ingesting user data; quote every expansion (echo "$7" in v-add-cron-job). 3. Restrict the panel port by firewall/IP allow-list; monitor $USER_DATA/*.conf for unexpected writes. 4. Migrate to a maintained control panel. TIMELINE -------- 2019-09 Last upstream VestaCP release (0.9.8-26); project abandoned. 2026-08 Sinks identified, PoC confirmed and remediation developed during a defensive security audit of production hosting infrastructure. 2026-10-06 Public disclosure (GitHub Security Advisory + this post); CVE requested via MITRE. VENDOR CONTACT -------------- None possible - no active maintainer, no published security contact, inactive community. Disclosed publicly for the install base still running VestaCP in production. REFERENCES ---------- GHSA: https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce/security/advisories/GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72 Repository (advisory, PoC, mitigation): https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce Related HestiaCP advisories (same class, fixed downstream): https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3 -- Bryan Ramirez SYSDOP LLC security () sysdop com _______________________________________________ Sent through the Full Disclosure mailing list https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure Web Archives & RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/
Severity
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
VULNARCHIVE GNA GNA-1988
GNA scorecard E 38/100 over 581 records in the last 180 days details
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
Vesta Control Panel (VestaCP) Affected: unknown
guessed Create a notification for this product.

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          "value": "Advisory ID:   VESTACP-2026-001 / GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72\nProduct:       Vesta Control Panel (VestaCP)\nVersions:      \u003c= 0.9.8-26 (unmaintained since 2019-09; no upstream fix exists)\nSeverity:      Critical - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.9\nCWE:           CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), CWE-95 (Eval Injection)\nReporter:      Bryan Ramirez - SYSDOP LLC \u003csecurity () sysdop com\u003e\n\nSUMMARY\n-------\nVestaCP stores per-account objects (domains, cron jobs, DNS, mail, users) as\nKEY=\u0027value\u0027 lines under $USER_DATA/*.conf. The shared shell library\nfunc/main.sh - sourced by every v-* administration script, all of which run\nas root - parses those lines with `eval`, so the assignments land in the\ncalling shell\u0027s environment.\n\nValues in those files are controllable by an authenticated panel user (cron\ncommand fields, domain/alias fields, DNS and mail records, names/comments).\nAny value that lands with an unescaped single quote breaks out of the quoted\nassignment and injects arbitrary shell, executed as root the next time any\nv-* script parses that object - which happens on routine panel operations\nand on cron-driven sync jobs, without further interaction.\n\nThis is the same sink class published for VestaCP\u0027s downstream fork HestiaCP\nas GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc (config parser eval -\u003e root RCE, fixed in 1.9.5),\nGHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v and GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3 (unquoted cron argument -\u003e\ncrontab injection). Hestia patched the class in the fork; VestaCP itself\nnever received an advisory or a fix and remains deployed worldwide - notably\nin VPS templates (e.g. Virtualizor images) still offered by hosting\nproviders today.\n\nAFFECTED SINKS (func/main.sh, 0.9.8-26)\n-------------------------------------\nis_object_value_empty, is_object_value_exist, get_object_value,\nupdate_object_value, add_object_key: eval \"$object\" over a grep\u0027d conf line.\nsearch_objects, sync_cron_jobs: eval $line per matching line.\nARGUMENTS builder: eval echo \\$${I} (also a latent glob-expansion bug).\nis_format_valid: eval arg=\\$$arg_name.\nbin/v-add-cron-job: echo $7 unquoted -\u003e raw newlines land in the crontab\n(GHSA-5fpv class).\n\nThe central pattern (verbatim shape in stock 0.9.8-26):\n\n    object=$(grep \"$2=\u0027$3\u0027\" $USER_DATA/$1.conf)\n    eval \"$object\"\n\nEXPLOITATION\n------------\n1. Attacker holds an ordinary authenticated VestaCP account (hosting\n   customer) or any write path landing data in ~/conf/*.conf (panel fields\n   bypassing %quote% escaping, backup/restore, API/import paths).\n2. A crafted value containing an unescaped \u0027 is stored, e.g. a cron CMD:\n   CMD=\u0027x\u0027; id \u003e /tmp/pwned; #\n3. On the next root-run v-* invocation parsing the object, the eval runs\n   the injected commands as root.\n\nImpact: tenant-to-host escape - full root on the node, exposing every site,\nmailbox and database of every account it hosts.\n\nA self-contained PoC simulating the vulnerable parse and the hardened parser\nneutralizing it is published in the repository (poc/poc-eval-sink.sh).\n\nADDITIONAL FINDING\n------------------\nWhile certifying equivalence of the hardened parser (1,165 field comparisons\nagainst real confs): the stock `eval echo $4` path performs glob expansion -\na literal `*` in a field expands to a directory listing instead of returning\nverbatim. The non-eval parser returns `*` correctly: the replacement is\nequivalent and fixes a latent parsing bug.\n\nMITIGATION\n----------\nNo upstream fix exists (abandonware). Operators still running VestaCP should:\n\n1. Replace the eval parser with a non-eval key/value parser - the repository\n   includes a drop-in parse_object_kv_list (strict KEY=\u0027value\u0027 regex +\n   `declare -g` assignment; values become literals, never executed) plus a\n   porting recipe for all eval sites (mitigation/non-eval-parser.sh).\n2. Enforce %quote%/%dots% escaping on every v-* entry point ingesting user\n   data; quote every expansion (echo \"$7\" in v-add-cron-job).\n3. Restrict the panel port by firewall/IP allow-list; monitor\n   $USER_DATA/*.conf for unexpected writes.\n4. Migrate to a maintained control panel.\n\nTIMELINE\n--------\n2019-09    Last upstream VestaCP release (0.9.8-26); project abandoned.\n2026-08    Sinks identified, PoC confirmed and remediation developed during\n           a defensive security audit of production hosting infrastructure.\n2026-10-06 Public disclosure (GitHub Security Advisory + this post);\n           CVE requested via MITRE.\n\nVENDOR CONTACT\n--------------\nNone possible - no active maintainer, no published security contact,\ninactive community. Disclosed publicly for the install base still running\nVestaCP in production.\n\nREFERENCES\n----------\nGHSA: https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce/security/advisories/GHSA-m2mc-xwq7-pw72\nRepository (advisory, PoC, mitigation):\n  https://github.com/sysdopllc/vestacp-config-eval-rce\nRelated HestiaCP advisories (same class, fixed downstream):\n  https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-w3mx-xq85-8qqc\n  https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-cr7q-frhq-xw4v\n  https://github.com/hestiacp/hestiacp/security/advisories/GHSA-5fpv-c8rg-x6r3\n\n--\nBryan Ramirez\nSYSDOP LLC\nsecurity () sysdop com\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
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