GCVE-1988-2026-0480
Vulnerability from gna-1988 – Published: 2026-11-02 07:30 – Updated: 2026-11-02 07:30| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclos… | technical-description |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/1 | technical-description |
| https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure | |
| https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/ |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache | Struts2 REST |
Affected:
unknown
|
guessed |
{
"containers": {
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"product": "Struts2 REST",
"vendor": "Apache",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "unknown"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Daniel Owens via Fulldisclosure"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Description\nThe Apache Struts2 REST Plugin\u0027s `DefaultContentTypeHandlerManager.getHandlerForResponse(HttpServletRequest, \nHttpServletResponse)` splits the `Accept` header on commas and passes each resulting token directly to \n`findHandler(String)` without trimming leading or trailing whitespace. `findHandler(String)` only retries a trimmed \nlookup when a token contains a semicolon (`;`), so a token that merely carries a leading space has no such fallback and \nfails the direct map lookup.\n\nImpact\nAny client that sends a standard, comma-space-separated `Accept` header -- the typical of most Hypertext Transfer \nProtocol (HTTP) client libraries -- triggers this. As the lookup fails silently, `getHandlerForResponse()` falls \nthrough to the `defaultExtension` handler instead of the content type the caller actually requested, silently returning \na representation that the client neither asked for nor can necessarily parse. In deployments that rely on content \nnegotiation to select between differently-scoped representations of the same resource -- such as a minimal public \nrepresentation served as the default extension against a fuller representation only intended for a specific, \nexplicitly-requested type -- this fallback can cause the wrong representation to be returned, degrading \ninteroperability and, where the two representations differ in which fields they expose, create a data-exposure \nvulnerability (insecure serialisation). While attackers cannot choose the default representation, they can abuse this \nto search for insecure serialisation, data exposures, and similar information disclosure issues, as well as to see if \nthere is a difference between various representations and the default. Importantly, the default representation and \nensuing serialisation library can be used against the information system (a trivial task).\n\nExamples\nSample Code\n`getHandlerForResponse(HttpServletRequest, HttpServletResponse)` splits the raw `Accept` header on commas and sends \neach token to `findHandler(String)`, whose direct map lookup only has a trimming fallback when the token contains a \nsemicolon, as shown below.\n\n```java\n /**\n * Gets the handler for the response by looking at the extension of the request\n * @param request The request\n * @return The appropriate handler\n *\n * WW-4588: modified to get a handler for the response side and auto generate the response type\n * from the Accept: header\n *\n */\n @Override\n public ContentTypeHandler getHandlerForResponse(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse res) {\n\n String extension = getExtensionIfPresent(request.getRequestURI());\n if (extension == null) {\n extension = defaultExtension;\n final String acceptHeader = request.getHeader(\"accept\") ;\n if (acceptHeader != null) {\n final String[] types = acceptHeader.split(\",\");\n for (final String type : types) {\n final ContentTypeHandler handler = findHandler(type);\n if (handler != null) {\n return handler;\n }\n }\n }\n }\n return handlersByExtension.get(extension);\n }\n\n private ContentTypeHandler findHandler(final String type) {\n ContentTypeHandler handler = handlersByContentType.get(type);\n if (handler == null) {\n // strip off encoding and search again (e.g., application/json;charset=ISO-8859-1)\n final int index = type.indexOf(\u0027;\u0027);\n if (index != -1) {\n return handlersByContentType.get(type.substring(0, index).trim());\n }\n }\n return handler;\n }\n```\nCode snippet from `struts2-rest-plugin`\u0027s \nplugins/rest/src/main/java/org/apache/struts2/rest/DefaultContentTypeHandlerManager.java, lines 128-158\n_______________________________________________\nSent through the Full Disclosure mailing list\nhttps://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure\nWeb Archives \u0026 RSS: https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
"orgId": "4e2abfbf-4a2a-4b76-a4e0-d77c18ba156c",
"shortName": "VULNARCHIVE"
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"references": [
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"technical-description"
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"url": "https://vuln.freearchive.org/archive/full-disclosure/2026/Nov/1"
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"tags": [
"technical-description"
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"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/1"
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{
"url": "https://nmap.org/mailman/listinfo/fulldisclosure"
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{
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/"
}
],
"source": {
"defect": [
"https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/1"
],
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Apache Struts2 REST Plugin Untrimmed `Accept` Header Tokens Break Content Negation Fallback",
"x_gcve": [
{
"recordType": "advisory",
"relationships": [],
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0480",
"x_vulnarchive": {
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"automated": true,
"contentSha256": "39a913e28fcd0c859fde13fe06055f1a775142c59150158b86380e5e9bc1c461",
"evidenceScore": 7,
"messageId": "",
"originalUrl": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2026/Nov/1",
"policy": "vulnarchive-1",
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"sourcePublishedAt": "2026-10-29T11:34:48Z"
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"cveMetadata": {
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"datePublished": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-02T07:30:01Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1988-2026-0480"
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"dataVersion": "5.2"
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