The Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (CIRCL) is a government-driven initiative designed to provide a systematic response facility to computer security threats and incidents.
- Website
- https://www.circl.lu
- info@circl.lu
- GNA identifier
- GNA-1 GCVE registry Recent publications
Recent vulnerabilities
355 GCVE records assigned by this organization as GNA-1GCVE-1-2026-20157 (CVE-2026-77812)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-08-21 14:06 – Updated: 2026-11-06 11:18- CWE-311 - Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://support.dji.com/help/content?customId=en-… | technical-description |
| https://github.com/Wh02m1/CVE-2026-77812 | technical-description |
| https://cyber-defence-campus.github.io/projects/v… | technical-description |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| DJI | Neo |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.0400
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Neo 2 |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.0500
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | DJI Flip |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.1200
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Air 3 |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.1600
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Air 3S |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.1400
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Avata 2 |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.0400
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Avata 360 |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.0300
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Mavic 3 |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.1400
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Mavic 3 Classic |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.0800
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Mavic 3 Pro |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.01.0700
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Mavic 4 Pro |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.0500
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Mini 2 |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.07.0200
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Mini 3 |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.0500
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Mini 3 Pro |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.0900
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Mini 4 Pro |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.1100
(semver)
|
|
| DJI | Mini 5 Pro |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 01.00.0600
(semver)
|
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"value": "DJI drones transmit DUML (DJI Universal Markup Language) protocol messages over BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) without encryption. When a client attempts to connect to the drone over Wi-Fi, or when the drone is switched to QuickTransfer mode, the DJI Fly application exchanges DUML messages with the drone over BLE, including the Wi-Fi credentials. An attacker within BLE range can passively sniff this traffic and recover the credentials in cleartext, including the drone\u0027s Wi-Fi PSK, SSID, and trusted identifier UUID. Obtaining these credentials allows the attacker to join the drone\u0027s internal Wi-Fi network, interact with network services exposed by the drone, and decrypt Wi-Fi traffic exchanged between the drone and the legitimate user.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003e* An attacker within BLE range recovers the Wi-Fi SSID and PSK in cleartext, and can then join the drone\u0027s network \u003cbr\u003e* The same capture also exposes the session UUID identifier, which is the only thing the drone uses to tell a trusted client from an unknown one, so the attacker can replay it and skip the physical confirmation of new connected devices.\u003cbr\u003e* The credentials do not change between sessions unless the operator manually resets the Wi-Fi settings, so one capture stays valid indefinitely\u003cbr\u003e* The attack is fully passive, with nothing transmitted and no connection made, so neither the operator nor the drone has any indication the session was observed\u003cbr\u003e* A BLE sniffer and presence during one normal DJI Fly connection are needed\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eAffected models are DJI Neo until 01.00.0400, DJI Neo 2 until 01.00.0500, DJI Flip until 01.00.1200, DJI Air 3 until 01.00.1600, DJI Air 3S until 01.00.1400, DJI Avata 2 until 01.00.0400, DJI Avata 360 until 01.00.0300, DJI Mavic 3 until 01.00.1400, DJI Mavic 3 Classic until 01.00.0800, DJI Mavic 3 Pro until 01.01.0700, DJI Mavic 4 Pro until 01.00.0500, DJI Mini 2 until 01.07.0200, DJI Mini 3 until 01.00.0500, DJI Mini 3 Pro until 01.00.0900, DJI Mini 4 Pro until 01.00.1100, and DJI Mini 5 Pro until 01.00.0600.\u003cbr\u003e\u003cbr\u003eRemediation requires a firmware update from the vendor. There is no user-side mitigation that fully addresses the vulnerability without upgrading."
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GCVE-1-2026-20054 (CVE-2026-123660)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-11-06 08:43 – Updated: 2026-11-06 09:04| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerabi… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| vulnerability-lookup | vulnerability-lookup |
Affected:
5.5.1 , < 6.4.1
(semver)
|
- Report to fix
- same day (reported 2026-11-05 19:41 UTC → fix available 2026-11-06 08:24 UTC)
- Report to disclosure
- same day (reported 2026-11-05 19:41 UTC → public disclosure 2026-11-06 08:24 UTC)
- 2026-11-05 19:41 UTC Reported researcher Private report sent to info@circl.lu, based on a bounded local run against commit 2bb9b2f0; no request was sent to the public service.
- 2026-11-06 Validated vendor Reproduced on the save and delivery paths; review found related amplification via repeated placeholders and an unhandled recursion error.
- 2026-11-06 fix-deployed vendor 6.4.1 deployed on the CIRCL production instance.
- 2026-11-06 08:10 UTC Fix developed vendor https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/2076ffdae3d024649114eeb6fd185338d4bb1f40
- 2026-11-06 08:24 UTC Fix available vendor Vulnerability-Lookup 6.4.1 released. https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/releases/tag/v6.4.1
- 2026-11-06 08:24 UTC Public disclosure vendor Fix and changelog entry describing the issue made public with the 6.4.1 release. https://github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/blob/v6.4.1/CHANGELOG.md
- 2026-11-06 08:43 UTC Identifier assigned gna GCVE-1-2026-20054 assigned.
- 2026-11-06 08:43 UTC Advisory published gna https://vulnerability.circl.lu/vuln/gcve-1-2026-20054
EU-CRA
EU
Not applicable
No exploitation observed; the Article 14 notification obligations for actively exploited vulnerabilities do not apply.
Deadlines and status are stated by the publisher. Submitting on time is not evidence of compliance, and this page does not judge it.
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GCVE-1-2026-20186 (CVE-2026-119682)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-10-30 12:59 – Updated: 2026-10-30 14:20- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://pitstop.manageengine.com/portal/en/commun… | release-notes |
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Affected:
450 , < 4507
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GCVE-1-2026-20247 (CVE-2026-119680)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-10-30 12:49 – Updated: 2026-10-30 14:14- CWE-79 - Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting')
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://pitstop.manageengine.com/portal/en/commun… | release-notes |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
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Unaffected:
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GCVE-1-2026-20310 (CVE-2026-112192)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-10-19 09:28 – Updated: 2026-10-30 10:05| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6c02f0f5c | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-19 09:23 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6c02f0f5c.patch
e7e99bab776b… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
6c02f0f5c33a
|
fix: [settings] Module settings keep the flags the module | e7e99bab776b… |
Fix summary
The fix ensures that the redacted and cli_only flags declared by a module in its own setting definition are preserved when the server rebuilds the setting for API exposure. By carrying these flags through to the final setting object, the existing enforcement logic (which checks these flags before serving values or accepting edits) now correctly applies to module-supplied settings, preventing disclosure of redacted values and blocking API-based modification of CLI-only settings.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Server.php, within the readModuleSettings() method, a loop was added after the setting fields are populated that iterates over the strings 'redacted' and 'cli_only'. For each flag, if the module's own result array contains a truthy value for that key, the flag is set to true on the rebuilt $setting object before it is stored in $serverSettings. This is a 6-line addition that preserves the module-declared guard flags that were previously discarded during the setting reconstruction.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a web application accessible over the network. AC:L: No special race conditions or complex setup are needed; a standard API call to the settings endpoint triggers the issue. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker needs an authenticated MISP account with permission to view server settings. UI:N: No user interaction is required. VC:L: Sensitive module API keys are exposed, but the scope is limited to settings of modules that declare the redacted flag. VI:N: No direct integrity impact on the vulnerable component's data beyond the VA impact. VA:L: CLI-only settings can be modified via the API, representing a limited integrity impact on the vulnerable component's configuration. SC/SI/SA:N: No evidence of impact on other components or systems.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-200 The redacted flag, which instructs the server to mask a setting's value (e.g., an API key), was dropped during setting reconstruction. This caused the sensitive value to be served in plaintext via API endpoints to any authenticated user, constituting an information exposure.
- CWE-862 The cli_only flag, which restricts a setting to command-line modification only, was dropped during setting reconstruction. This allowed the setting to be modified via the web API without the intended authorization restriction, effectively bypassing the access control the module author specified.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The primary impact is that sensitive data (module API keys marked as redacted) is discoverable via standard API endpoints because the redaction flag was not enforced. An authenticated user querying server settings can obtain credentials that the module author intended to keep hidden. This is the closest CAPEC to the information-disclosure aspect of the vulnerability. The secondary aspect (CLI-only settings editable via API) is an authorization bypass that does not map cleanly to a single CAPEC; CAPEC-126 is selected as the best available match for the overall pattern of accessing data that should be restricted.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version boundary is inferred from the tag_version_boundary metadata (fix is 10 commits after v2.5.48); the exact fixed release version is not stated in the patch metadata.
- PR:L assumes that reading server settings requires an authenticated MISP user with appropriate role permissions; the patch does not specify the exact permission level required.
- The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern for the information-disclosure aspect; the authorization-bypass aspect (cli_only) does not have a precise CAPEC match and is subsumed under the same mapping.
- VC:L assumes the exposed data is limited to module-specific API keys rather than system-wide credentials; the actual sensitivity depends on which modules are installed.
- The commit message references a separate issue (branch read) reported by Jeroen Pinoy; this vulnerability was discovered as a side effect of fixing that issue, so Jeroen Pinoy is not credited as a finder of this specific vulnerability.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-28 10:14 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (6c02f0f5c33aab96e90df8791c3873303d7e99ce): fix: [settings] Module settings keep the flags the module https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/6c02f0f5c.patch
- 2026-09-29 08:11 UTC Fix available Fix released in MISP v2.5.48. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/releases/tag/v2.5.48
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GCVE-1-2026-20344 (CVE-2026-116469)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-10-26 10:34 – Updated: 2026-10-27 18:14| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/misp-guard/commit/9868b1d… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| MISP | misp-guard |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 1.3
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp-guard:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-26 10:33 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/misp-guard/commit/9868b1d93fc9cc40cc7c69ca11c86afd825bbc1c.patch
26a847175a70… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
9868b1d93fc9
|
fix: [security] match categories and required taxonomies | 26a847175a70… |
Fix summary
The fix makes all policy-matching comparisons case-insensitive by applying .lower() to both the input value (tag name, attribute category, sharing-group UUID) and the configured policy value (required taxonomy prefix, allowed tags, blocked categories, blocked UUIDs) before performing the comparison. This ensures that a tag such as 'TLP:AMBER' is correctly recognized as belonging to the 'tlp' taxonomy and is checked against the allowed-tags list, and that a blocked category or UUID is matched regardless of letter case.
Patch summary
In src/mispguard.py, four comparison sites were changed: (1) check_required_taxonomy_exists now uses tag['name'].lower().startswith(required_taxonomy.lower() + ':') instead of a case-sensitive startswith; (2) check_required_taxonomy_tags_allowed applies .lower() to both the tag name and the required taxonomy prefix in the startswith check; (3) check_blocked_attribute_categories compares attribute['category'].lower() against a lowercased list of blocked categories; (4) check_blocked_analyst_data_sharing_groups_uuids compares the UUID in lowercase against a lowercased list of blocked UUIDs. Ninety-one lines of test cases were added to src/test/test_misp_guard.py covering mixed-case TLP tags in required-taxonomy checks and mixed-case blocked attribute categories.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The MISP feed is consumed over the network (HTTP). AC:L: Exploitation requires only changing the letter case of a tag, category, or UUID string. AT:N: No log or audit tampering is needed. PR:L: The attacker needs the ability to create or modify events in a MISP instance, which typically requires a low-privilege user account or a connected instance. UI:N: No user interaction is required. VC:H: The primary impact is unauthorized disclosure of data that the operator intended to restrict (non-allowed TLP tags, blocked categories, blocked sharing groups are forwarded to feed consumers). VI:N: The data content is not modified, only improperly shared. VA:N: No availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: No secondary system impact is evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-178 The root cause is that string comparisons used to enforce security policies (taxonomy prefix matching, category blocking, UUID blocking) were case-sensitive, allowing an attacker to bypass the checks by altering letter case. CWE-178 is the most specific and accurate mapping.
- CWE-20 More broadly, the guard failed to validate input against the policy in a canonical form, which is a form of improper input validation. CWE-20 is included as a secondary, broader mapping.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-10 The attacker tampers with the letter case of tag names, attribute categories, or sharing-group UUIDs in MISP events to bypass the guard's policy checks. This is a form of parameter tampering where the input is modified in a way that the validation logic does not anticipate. CAPEC-10 is the closest available pattern; the uncertainty is that the tampering occurs in structured event data rather than in a traditional request parameter, but the underlying technique (modifying input to evade validation) aligns with this pattern.
Assumptions to verify
- The MISP Guard is assumed to operate as a proxy filtering outbound MISP feed data; the attacker is assumed to have the ability to create or modify events in a MISP instance that feeds through the guard. The patch does not specify the exact deployment topology.
- PR:L assumes that creating events in MISP requires at least a low-privilege authenticated account. If the guard is used in a context where events are pushed from a connected MISP instance without per-event authentication, PR could be None.
- The CAPEC-10 mapping is the closest available pattern; the actual attack involves modifying structured JSON event fields rather than traditional HTTP parameters, so the mapping is approximate.
- No specific affected or fixed version numbers are provided in the patch metadata; the version range is marked as unspecified.
- The commit message references 'ID 004' as a prior related fix, suggesting this is a follow-up to an earlier incomplete case-sensitivity fix, but no further details about that prior fix are available in the patch.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-10-26 09:25 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (9868b1d93fc9cc40cc7c69ca11c86afd825bbc1c): fix: [security] match categories and required taxonomies https://github.com/MISP/misp-guard/commit/9868b1d93fc9cc40cc7c69ca11c86afd825bbc1c.patch
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GCVE-1-2026-20219 (CVE-2026-118173)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-10-27 18:11 – Updated: 2026-10-27 18:11| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/misp-guard/commit/6127d94… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| MISP | misp-guard |
Affected:
0 , < 1.4
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp-guard:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-27 18:09 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/misp-guard/commit/6127d94c350e4dfe31fd4426ba26f51294ed3867.patch
96c08da8be43… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
6127d94c350e
|
fix: [security] enforce allowed tags on every tag of a | 96c08da8be43… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a new validation function, check_required_taxonomy_tags_allowed, that iterates over every tag belonging to a required taxonomy and verifies each one is present in the configured allowed-tags list, raising a ForbiddenException if any tag is not allowed. This check is applied at both the event level and the attribute level. Additionally, an inherit_event_taxonomies flag is introduced so that attributes without their own required-taxonomy tags inherit the event's already-validated taxonomy, while attributes that do carry tags of the required taxonomy are still fully validated against the allowed list. This ensures that no non-allowed tag of a required taxonomy can pass the guard regardless of whether an allowed tag is also present.
Patch summary
In src/mispguard.py: (1) Added a new method check_required_taxonomy_tags_allowed that loops over all tags of a required taxonomy and rejects any tag not in the allowed list. (2) Modified check_event_required_taxonomies to call the new method after the existing existence check. (3) Modified check_attribute_required_taxonomies to accept an inherit_event_taxonomies parameter; when True, the existence check is skipped (the event already satisfied it) but the new allowed-tags check still runs on any tags the attribute does hold. (4) Added the inherit_event_taxonomies parameter to check_attribute_level_rules and check_object_level_rules, threading it through recursive calls for ShadowAttribute and object attributes. (5) Updated check_required_taxonomy_exists to accept an entity parameter for clearer error messages. (6) Added 172 lines of test cases in src/test/test_misp_guard.py covering: event with both allowed and non-allowed taxonomy tags (blocked), untagged attribute under a tagged event (allowed), attribute in
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via MISP feed endpoints. AC:L: The attack is straightforward; the attacker simply includes a non-allowed tag alongside an allowed one. AT:N: No need to manipulate or bypass any additional protection. PR:H: The attacker requires high privileges, specifically the ability to author or modify MISP events in a feed source (write access to a MISP instance). UI:N: No user interaction is required. VC:N/VI:N/VA:N: The guard process itself is not compromised in terms of its own confidentiality, integrity, or availability. SC:N: No direct impact on connected systems' confidentiality. SI:H: The integrity of the data distribution policy is significantly violated; data with higher sensitivity/classification is distributed to consumers who should only receive lower-classification data, undermining the trust model of the feed. SA:N: No cascading security impact on other systems.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-20 The guard's validation logic for required taxonomy tags was incomplete: it only checked for the existence of at least one allowed tag rather than verifying that all tags of the required taxonomy were in the allowed list. This is a classic incomplete input validation flaw where the check does not cover all relevant input values.
- CWE-285 The guard's purpose is to enforce authorization policies on data flowing through MISP feeds. The incomplete tag check effectively allowed unauthorized (non-allowed) tags to pass, resulting in improper enforcement of the data distribution authorization policy.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-120 The closest plausible attack pattern is parameter tampering: an attacker who can author MISP feed events manipulates the tag parameters to include a non-allowed taxonomy tag (e.g., tlp:red) alongside an allowed one (e.g., tlp:clear), exploiting the guard's incomplete validation that only checked for the presence of at least one allowed tag. The uncertainty is that this is not a traditional HTTP parameter tampering scenario but rather manipulation of structured data fields (tags) within MISP event objects; however, the fundamental technique of altering input values to bypass validation aligns with CAPEC-120.
Assumptions to verify
- The CAPEC-120 mapping is the closest available match but is not a perfect fit; the attack involves manipulation of structured MISP event tag fields rather than traditional HTTP parameters. No more specific CAPEC for structured-data tag manipulation exists in the CAPEC catalog.
- The CVSS PR:H assumption is based on the inference that an attacker needs write access to a MISP instance to author events with non-allowed tags. If the guard is deployed in a context where feed sources are fully trusted, the practical exploitability may be lower.
- The exact fixed version is not specified in the patch metadata. The tag_version_boundary indicates v1.4 is the nearest tag with 15 commits after the fix, suggesting the fix landed in a version after 1.4, but the precise version number is unknown.
- The SI:H rating assumes the data distribution policy violation (higher-TLP data reaching lower-TLP consumers) constitutes a significant integrity impact on the feed's trust model. A different rating (e.g., SI:L) could be argued if the policy is considered advisory rather than binding.
- The patch does not specify whether the vulnerability was discovered through a security audit, bug report, or internal testing. No finder or reporter credit is assigned beyond the remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-10-26 07:44 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (6127d94c350e4dfe31fd4426ba26f51294ed3867): fix: [security] enforce allowed tags on every tag of a https://github.com/MISP/misp-guard/commit/6127d94c350e4dfe31fd4426ba26f51294ed3867.patch
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GCVE-1-2026-20298 (CVE-2026-116372)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-10-26 08:35 – Updated: 2026-10-26 08:36- CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/misp-guard/commit/b5f606a… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| MISP | misp-guard |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 1.3
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp-guard:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-26 08:33 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/misp-guard/commit/b5f606a4e57a49cc4dbf9b3ef0c6ddd19f866735.patch
c553e477781b… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
b5f606a4e57a
|
fix: [security] block successful feed responses other than | c553e477781b… |
Fix summary
The fix adds an explicit check in process_feed_response that rejects any HTTP response with a status code in the 201-299 range (i.e., successful responses other than 200) by returning a 403 Forbidden response. This ensures that only responses with exactly status code 200 are subject to the normal filtering pipeline, and all other 2xx responses are blocked before they can reach the MISP instance, closing the bypass vector.
Patch summary
In src/mispguard.py, a new conditional block is inserted at the top of process_feed_response, before the existing status-code check. The new block tests whether flow.response.status_code is greater than 200 and less than 300, and if so, calls self.forbidden() to return a 403 response with a descriptive log message. In src/test/test_misp_guard.py, a new parametrized async test test_feed_non_200_success_response_is_blocked is added, covering status codes 201, 203, and 206, asserting that the response is blocked (status 403) and the appropriate log message is emitted.
CVSS rationale
The vulnerability is exploitable over the network (AV:N) with low complexity (AC:L) since the attacker only needs to return a different HTTP status code. No attack target manipulation (AT:N), no privileges (PR:N) since the attacker is the feed host itself, and no user interaction (UI:N) is required. The vulnerable component (mispguard) itself suffers no direct confidentiality, integrity, or availability impact (VC:N, VI:N, VA:N). The primary impact is on the downstream MISP instance, whose integrity is compromised because unfiltered feed data is ingested (SI:H). No secondary confidentiality or availability impact (SC:N, SA:N) is evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-20 The code validated the HTTP status code incompletely: it checked for != 200 to decide whether to pass through, but failed to account for other 2xx codes (201, 203, 206) that represent successful responses whose content MISP may still ingest. The validation logic did not cover the full range of inputs that required filtering, constituting improper input validation.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-2 The attacker (a feed host) manipulates the HTTP response status code parameter to a value (203, 206) that the filtering logic does not properly handle, causing the response to bypass all filtering rules. This is the closest CAPEC pattern: the attacker controls an input parameter (the status code) to trigger an unintended code path. Uncertainty: no CAPEC pattern specifically addresses HTTP status code manipulation for proxy bypass; CAPEC-2 is the best available match for parameter-level manipulation to defeat validation logic.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is unknown; the patch does not specify a version boundary or tag. All versions of mispguard prior to this commit are assumed affected.
- The assumption that MISP will ingest content from 2xx responses other than 200 is stated in the commit message and code comments but not independently verified; the fix treats this as a security requirement regardless.
- CAPEC-2 (Input Parameter Manipulation) is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers HTTP status code manipulation to bypass proxy filtering logic.
- The CVSS vector assumes the attacker controls or compromises a feed endpoint configured in the MISP instance; no additional authentication or network position is assumed beyond that.
- The SSVC technical impact is assessed as 'partial' based on the assumption that the MISP instance remains operational but with degraded filtering; a 'total' impact would require evidence of data corruption or system failure.
- The commit date (26 Oct 2026) is in the future relative to typical analysis timelines; this is taken at face value from the patch metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-10-26 07:53 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (b5f606a4e57a49cc4dbf9b3ef0c6ddd19f866735): fix: [security] block successful feed responses other than https://github.com/MISP/misp-guard/commit/b5f606a4e57a49cc4dbf9b3ef0c6ddd19f866735.patch
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GCVE-1-2026-20311
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-10-22 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-22 12:32- CWE-338 - Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://blog.google/security/protecting-chrome-an… | technical-description |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| eMudhra Limited | emSign |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 20261017
(semver)
|
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GCVE-1-2026-20287 (CVE-2026-112991)
Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-10-19 22:19 – Updated: 2026-10-20 08:41| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/misp/misp-modules/commit/98a1c… | patch |
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| MISP | misp-modules |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 3.0.12
(semver)
cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp_modules_\(html_to_markdown_expansion_module\):*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* |
qwen3.8:27b
1 event
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-10-19 22:15 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/misp/misp-modules/commit/98a1c2c2f297665dd8d4609e9cd644007a57516b.patch
a1b0755b91dd… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
98a1c2c2f297
|
fix: [html_to_markdown] block unspecified, shared, ULA and | a1b0755b91dd… |
Fix summary
The fix extends the BLOCKED_RANGES list in is_safe_url() to include the previously missing IP address ranges: 0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, ::/128, fc00::/7, and fe80::/10. The existing IPv4-mapped IPv6 normalisation logic ensures that mapped forms (e.g., ::ffff:0.0.0.0) are also blocked. Regression tests are added covering both literal IP addresses in URLs and hostnames that resolve to the newly blocked ranges.
Patch summary
In misp_modules/modules/expansion/html_to_markdown.py, five new ipaddress.ip_network() entries are added to the BLOCKED_RANGES list: 0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, ::/128, fc00::/7, and fe80::/10. In tests/test_html_to_markdown.py, two new test methods are added: test_blocks_unspecified_shared_ula_and_link_local_literals verifies that is_safe_url() returns False for literal URLs using each blocked range (including IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms), and test_blocks_hostnames_resolving_to_ula_addresses verifies that a hostname resolving to an fc00::/7 address is rejected.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerable URL is supplied via a MISP attribute over the network. AC:L: Crafting a URL with a blocked-range IP is straightforward; no race or special timing is needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the target service is required. PR:L: Creating or modifying a MISP attribute that triggers the expansion module requires authenticated access (assumed; MISP typically requires authentication for attribute operations). UI:N: No victim interaction beyond the initial attribute creation is needed. VC:N, VI:N, VA:N: The MISP server itself is not compromised; it is used as a proxy. SC:H: The SSRF allows reading responses from internal services (e.g., cloud metadata endpoints, internal admin panels), representing a high confidentiality impact on the target system. SI:N, SA:N: The module performs a GET-style fetch for HTML-to-Markdown conversion; no evidence of write or security-impact on the target.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-918 The html_to_markdown module fetches a user-supplied URL server-side. The incomplete IP range allow/block list permitted requests to internal, link-local, and otherwise restricted network destinations, constituting a classic SSRF.
- CWE-20 The is_safe_url() function's BLOCKED_RANGES list was incomplete, failing to validate against all non-routable and internally significant IP address ranges. This is the root-cause input validation deficiency enabling the SSRF.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-12 The patch directly addresses an SSRF condition: the application fetches a URL on behalf of the user, and the validation logic failed to block requests to internal and restricted IP ranges. An attacker crafts a URL with a blocked-range IP (e.g., http://0.0.0.0/admin or http://[fe80::1]/) to cause the MISP server to issue a request to an internal service. This is the canonical CAPEC-12 pattern. No uncertainty in this mapping.
Assumptions to verify
- PR:L assumes that creating or modifying a MISP attribute to trigger the html_to_markdown expansion module requires authenticated access. MISP typically enforces authentication for attribute operations, but the patch does not explicitly state the authentication model.
- SC:H assumes the MISP server can reach internal services (e.g., cloud metadata at 169.254.169.254, internal admin panels, or CGNAT infrastructure) and that the responses are returned to the attacker via the Markdown conversion output. The actual impact depends on the server's network topology.
- The exact affected version range is not specified in the patch. The nearest tag is v3.0.13 with 139 commits after the fix, but the precise release containing the fix is not identified.
- CAPEC-12 is selected as the closest match; no alternative CAPEC more precisely describes an SSRF via incomplete IP-range validation in a URL-fetching module.
- The patch does not indicate whether the module follows redirects to additional unblocked ranges; MAX_REDIRECTS is set to 10, and the redirect target validation is not shown in this patch. If redirect targets are not re-validated, the SSRF surface may be broader than what this patch addresses.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-09-25 22:15 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (98a1c2c2f297665dd8d4609e9cd644007a57516b): fix: [html_to_markdown] block unspecified, shared, ULA and https://github.com/misp/misp-modules/commit/98a1c2c2f297665dd8d4609e9cd644007a57516b.patch
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