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    1 vulnerability by eMudhra Limited

    GCVE-1-2026-20311

    Vulnerability from gna-1 – Published: 2026-10-22 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-22 12:32
    VLAI
    Title
    eMudhra subordinate Certification Authority (CA) certificates Compromised Private Keys
    Summary
    A critical cryptographic key generation failure affected eight intermediate Certificate Authority (CA) certificates issued by eMudhra, comprising six TLS certificate authorities and two code-signing certificate authorities. The affected elliptic-curve P-384 private keys were generated with insufficient cryptographic entropy, resulting in private key values smaller than 256. This weakness allows an attacker to trivially reconstruct the corresponding private keys from publicly available certificate information. An attacker possessing these reconstructed private keys could issue fraudulent TLS certificates for arbitrary domains, potentially enabling website impersonation, man-in-the-middle attacks, and interception of encrypted communications on systems that continue to trust the compromised certificate authorities. The compromised code-signing CA keys could also enable the creation of fraudulent code-signing certificates. The incident was reported on October 17, 2026, and independently confirmed by major browser vendors. Several affected intermediate certificates were also cross-signed by Sectigo, extending the potential impact across multiple certificate trust hierarchies. Following disclosure, the affected certificates were revoked, and browser vendors implemented emergency certificate-blocking mechanisms. Google reported that no TLS certificates chaining to the six compromised TLS intermediates had been recorded in Certificate Transparency logs before its blocking action, preventing fraudulent certificates from being accepted by clients enforcing Certificate Transparency during that period. The incident illustrates a fundamental failure in cryptographic key generation and CA operational security, potentially undermining the trustworthiness of the public key infrastructure (PKI) for affected clients.
    CWE
    • CWE-338 - Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG)
    Assigner
    CIRCL GNA GNA-1
    GNA scorecard A 91/100 over 279 records in the last 180 days details
    References
    Impacted products
    Vendor Product Version
    eMudhra Limited emSign Affected: 0 , ≤ 20261017 (semver)
    Create a notification for this product.

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