CWE-639

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "pingora-cache"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-2836"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T20:57:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nPingora versions prior to 0.8.0 generated cache keys using only the URI path, excluding critical factors such as the host header. This allows an attacker to poison the cache and serve cross-origin responses to users.\n\nThis vulnerability affects users of Pingora\u0027s alpha proxy caching feature who relied on the default CacheKey implementation. An attacker could exploit this for cross-tenant data leakage in multi-tenant deployments, or serve malicious content to legitimate users by poisoning shared cache entries.\n\nNote: Cloudflare customers and Cloudflare\u0027s CDN infrastructure were not affected by this vulnerability, as Cloudflare\u0027s default cache key implementation uses multiple factors to prevent cache key poisoning and never made use of the previously provided default.\n\n### Patches\nWe strongly suggest users should upgrade to Pingora v.0.8.0 or higher, which removes the default CacheKey implementation.\n\n### Workarounds\nDo not rely on the provided CacheKey default, and at minimum use the host / :authority and the upstream peer TLS scheme as part of building the CacheKey, as well as other factors that may apply to the deployment e.g. HTTP method. \n\n### References\nSee [CVE-2026-2836](https://cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-2836) and the [Cloudflare blog post](https://blog.cloudflare.com/pingora-oss-smuggling-vulnerabilities/) for more details.\n\n### Credits\nDisclosed responsibly by Rajat Raghav (@xclow3n) through the Cloudflare [Bug Bounty Program](https://www.cloudflare.com/disclosure/).",
  "id": "GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T20:46:06Z",
  "published": "2026-03-05T20:57:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/security/advisories/GHSA-f93w-pcj3-rggc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2836"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0035.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Pingora vulnerable to cache poisoning via insecure-by-default cache key"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33700"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T21:21:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T16:16:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `DELETE /api/v1/projects/:project/shares/:share` endpoint does not verify that the link share belongs to the project specified in the URL. An attacker with admin access to any project can delete link shares from other projects by providing their own project ID combined with the target share ID.\n\n## Details\n\nThe permission check in `canDoLinkShare` (`pkg/models/link_sharing_permissions.go:53-70`) validates admin access on the project from the `:project` URL parameter. However, the `Delete` method at `pkg/models/link_sharing.go:305` queries only `WHERE id = ?` using the share ID, without verifying it belongs to the URL-specified project:\n\n```go\nfunc (share *LinkSharing) Delete(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {\n    _, err = s.Where(\"id = ?\", share.ID).Delete(share)\n    return\n}\n```\n\nThis is the same vulnerability class as GHSA-jfmm-mjcp-8wq2 (task attachment IDOR) and the fixed GHSA-mr3j-p26x-72x4 (task comment IDOR).\n\nAdditionally, `ReadOne` at line 203 has the same pattern (`WHERE id = ?` only), though it is not currently exploitable because `CanRead` fails first due to an unrelated issue with the hash parameter binding.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated user with admin access to any project can:\n- Delete link shares belonging to any other project in the system\n- Disrupt collaboration by removing shared access links\n- Link share IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial\n\n## Reproduction\n\n1. User A creates Project A and a link share on it (share ID = X)\n2. User B creates Project B (gaining admin access)\n3. User B calls `DELETE /api/v1/projects/{projectB_id}/shares/{X}`\n4. The permission check passes (User B is admin on Project B)\n5. The delete executes `WHERE id = X` \u2014 deleting User A\u0027s link share\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nChange `Delete` at `pkg/models/link_sharing.go:305` to:\n\n```go\n_, err = s.Where(\"id = ? AND project_id = ?\", share.ID, share.ProjectID).Delete(share)\n```\n\nAlso fix `ReadOne` at line 203 as defense in depth.",
  "id": "GHSA-f95f-77jx-fcjc",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T21:21:20Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T21:21:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-f95f-77jx-fcjc"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33700"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.2-was-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikunja has a Link Share Delete IDOR \u2014 Missing Project Ownership Check Allows Cross-Project Link Share Deletion"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-58660"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T18:16:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Kanboard through 1.2.52, fixed in commit 564cc30, BoardAjaxController save() method (used by the kanban board drag-and-drop endpoint) validates the caller\u0027s role on the attacker-supplied project_id but never verifies that the supplied task_id actually belongs to that project. Because task identifiers are sequential integers shared across the entire instance, any authenticated user who is a member of at least one project can enumerate and move (corrupt/hide) tasks belonging to any other project on the same instance, including private projects they have no membership or role on.",
  "id": "GHSA-f95x-r3pv-jh63",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T18:31:58Z",
  "published": "2026-07-15T18:31:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58660"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kanboard/kanboard/issues/5852"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kanboard/kanboard/pull/5853"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/kanboard/kanboard/commit/564cc30e1e360959572e01e158734d9475c05903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/kanboard-boardajaxcontroller-missing-ownership-check-via-drag-and-drop"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grackle-ai/mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.132.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grackle-ai/plugin-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.132.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@grackle-ai/auth"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.132.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-613",
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T19:35:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAuthorization for scoped (agent) MCP callers is enforced **inline, per tool**, and is applied inconsistently \u2014 several mutating tools silently omit the ancestry/workspace check that their siblings perform. Because the MCP server authenticates all outbound gRPC with the full server API key and the backend gRPC handlers perform **no caller-based authorization**, the MCP tool layer is the *sole* authorization boundary. A malicious or prompt-injected scoped agent can therefore perform cross-task and cross-session operations it should not be allowed to (an IDOR / privilege-boundary bypass).\n\nThis advisory bundles the audit\u0027s **Systemic Pattern A** findings: **F2, F6, F7, F12** (and the duplicate F19).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`@grackle-ai/mcp` (with `@grackle-ai/plugin-core` / `@grackle-ai/auth`) at **0.132.1** and earlier.\n\n## Root cause\n\n- `mcp-server.ts:111-127` (`createGrpcClients`) sets `Authorization: Bearer ${apiKey}` (the full server key) on every outbound gRPC call.\n- Backend handlers (`updateTask`, `deleteTask`, `resumeTask`, `killAgent`, `getTask` in `plugin-core`) take only the request message \u2014 no `AuthContext` \u2014 and act on whatever ID is passed.\n- Therefore scope must be enforced in each MCP tool handler. Some call `assertCallerIsAncestor` (`task_complete`, `task_start`, `session_attach`, `session_send_input`); their destructive siblings do not. New tools that forget the check **fail open**.\n\n## F2 \u2014 task_update / task_delete / task_resume bypass ancestry (High)\n\n**Location:** `packages/mcp/src/tools/task.ts:226` (task_update), `:393` (task_delete), `:465` (task_resume).\n\nThese accept an arbitrary `taskId` with only a `ROOT_TASK_ID` special-case and no `assertCallerIsAncestor`. The central dispatcher hardcodes its workspace gate to `name === \"task_show\"`, and these tools\u0027 Zod schemas have no `workspaceId` field (so the blanket injection is stripped). They are not in `DEFAULT_SCOPED_MCP_TOOLS` but **are** in the shipped `ORCHESTRATOR_MCP_TOOLS` / `ADMIN_MCP_TOOLS` presets.\n\n**Exploit:** a scoped agent under the orchestrator persona learns a sibling/parent/cross-workspace task ID (via `task_list`/`task_search`), then `task_delete {taskId: \u003cvictim\u003e}` (permanently destroys another agent\u0027s or the human parent\u0027s work) or `task_update` to flip a sibling to `complete`/`failed` or rewrite its dependency DAG and budgets.\n\n## F6 \u2014 session_kill / session_resume bypass ancestry (Medium)\n\n**Location:** `packages/mcp/src/tools/session.ts:95` (session_resume), `:178` (session_kill).\n\nCall `client.killAgent` / `client.resumeAgent` directly with no auth context, unlike `session_attach`/`session_send_input`. `session_kill` is in the orchestrator preset. **Exploit:** cross-session SIGKILL DoS against a sibling agent or the root orchestrator; foreign session resume.\n\n## F7 \u2014 Workspaceless scoped token fails open to all workspaces (Medium)\n\n**Location:** `packages/mcp/src/mcp-server.ts:565-600`.\n\nThe per-task cross-workspace check (`task_show` block) is gated on `authContext.workspaceId` being truthy. A task created without a workspace (a supported config) mints a scoped token with `pid: \"\"` \u2192 `workspaceId: undefined`, so the check is skipped and the injected `workspaceId` becomes `\"\"`, which the backend treats as \"all workspaces.\" **Exploit:** a malicious agent in a workspaceless session calls `task_list` (no args) \u2192 reads every task in every workspace, then `task_show {taskId}` cross-workspace (title/description/branch/review-notes). `schedule_show` (in the default scoped allowlist) resolves by ID with no workspace check. Read-only cross-workspace disclosure.\n\n## F12 \u2014 Scoped-token revocation is dead code (Low)\n\n**Location:** `packages/auth/src/scoped-token.ts:23,142-149`.\n\nThe consuming check is wired (`auth-middleware.ts:90-92`), but `revokeTask()` is **never called outside tests** \u2014 no task-abort/stop flow invokes it \u2014 and the backing `revokedTasks` Map is in-memory only (lost on restart). A compromised agent that exfiltrated its scoped token keeps authenticating for the full 24h TTL regardless of task lifecycle.\n\n## Remediation\n\n- **Systemic fix:** enforce scope **centrally** in the `CallToolRequest` dispatcher (`mcp-server.ts`) via a per-tool `targetTaskIdArg` / `targetSessionIdArg` descriptor so any tool that targets a task/session **fails closed** unless the caller is an ancestor (or self).\n- Immediately, add `assertCallerIsAncestor` (or self-or-ancestor) to `task_update`, `task_delete`, `task_resume`, `session_kill`, `session_resume`, mirroring `task_complete`/`task_start`.\n- F7: do **not** fail open on empty `workspaceId` \u2014 treat a scoped non-root caller with no workspace as having access to *no* workspace; apply the `task_show` membership check whenever the caller is scoped and not `ROOT_TASK_ID`; add a per-id membership check to `schedule_show`.\n- F12: wire `revokeTask()` into task-abort/stop flows with SQLite-backed persistence (like channel-grant revocation), or remove the dead API and document the 24h window.\n- Add regression tests mirroring the existing `task_complete` ancestor tests for each mutator.\n\n## CWEs\n\nCWE-862 (Missing Authorization), CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key / IDOR), CWE-613 (Insufficient Session Expiration).",
  "id": "GHSA-f9ff-5x35-7gfw",
  "modified": "2026-07-02T19:35:03Z",
  "published": "2026-07-02T19:35:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle/security/advisories/GHSA-f9ff-5x35-7gfw"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Grackle: Fail-open authorization in the MCP tool layer lets scoped agents perform cross-task and cross-session mutations (IDOR)"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57652"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T15:16:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in JS Help Desk \u003c= 3.1.0 versions.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9qq-cqgc-cmmx",
  "modified": "2026-06-26T15:32:18Z",
  "published": "2026-06-26T15:32:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57652"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/js-support-ticket/vulnerability/wordpress-js-help-desk-plugin-3-1-0-insecure-direct-object-references-idor-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-4819"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T15:45:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in Campcodes Online Laundry Management System 1.0. It has been classified as problematic. Affected is an unknown function of the file admin_class.php. The manipulation of the argument type with the input 1 leads to improper authorization. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-263940.",
  "id": "GHSA-f9qv-x24h-c8g8",
  "modified": "2025-02-20T18:31:15Z",
  "published": "2024-05-14T18:30:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4819"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yylmm/CVE/blob/main/Online%20Laundry%20Management%20System/IDOR.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.263940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.263940"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.333058"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-3998"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-20T08:15:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The wpDiscuz plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing authorization check on the userRate function in versions up to, and including, 7.6.3. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to increase or decrease the rating of a post.",
  "id": "GHSA-fc94-mp7c-xmpq",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T08:50:38Z",
  "published": "2023-10-20T09:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3998"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wpdiscuz/trunk/utils/class.WpdiscuzHelperAjax.php#L886"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9d09bdab-ffab-44cc-bba2-821b21a8e343?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-5195"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-12T11:15:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 17.9 before 17.10.7, 17.11 before 17.11.3, and 18.0 before 18.0.1. It was possible for authenticated users to access arbitrary compliance frameworks, leading to unauthorized data disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-fccc-r92h-5q24",
  "modified": "2025-06-12T12:32:04Z",
  "published": "2025-06-12T12:32:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5195"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/534960"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-41086"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-02T14:16:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the access control system of the GAMS licensing system that allows unlimited valid licenses to be generated, bypassing any usage restrictions. The validator uses an insecure checksum algorithm; knowing this algorithm and the format of the license lines, an attacker can recalculate the checksum and generate a valid license to grant themselves full privileges without credentials or access to the source code, allowing them unrestricted access to GAMS\u0027s mathematical models and commercial solvers.",
  "id": "GHSA-ff5f-4h34-m3c8",
  "modified": "2026-01-30T21:30:19Z",
  "published": "2025-12-02T15:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41086"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.gams.com/latest/docs/RN_51.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/authorization-bypass-gams-gams-development-corp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-1436"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-18T14:16:05Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Improper Access Control (IDOR) in the Graylog API, version 2.2.3, which occurs when modifying the user ID in the URL. An authenticated user can access other user\u0027s profiles without proper authorization checks. Exploiting this vulnerability allows valid users of the system to be listed and sensitive third-party information to be accessed, such as names, email addresses, internal identifiers, and last activity. The endpoint \u0027http://\u003cIP\u003e:12900/users/\u003cmy_user\u003e\u0027 does not implement object-level authorization validations.",
  "id": "GHSA-ff7j-jwgr-hgxp",
  "modified": "2026-02-18T21:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-02-18T15:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-1436"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-graylog"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}