GHSA-89VP-X53W-74FX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 21:55 – Updated: 2026-05-19 20:17Summary
Prior to version 1.4.0, the rmcp crate's Streamable HTTP server transport (crates/rmcp/src/transport/streamable_http_server/) did not validate the incoming Host header. This allowed a malicious public website, via a DNS rebinding attack, to send authenticated requests to an MCP server running on the victim's loopback or private-network interface — violating the MCP specification's transport security guidance.
Impact
An attacker who convinces a victim to visit a malicious page can:
- Enumerate and invoke any tool exposed by a locally-running rmcp-based MCP server.
- Read resources, prompts, and any state accessible via the MCP session.
- Trigger side effects (file writes, shell execution, API calls, etc.) limited only by what tools the victim's server exposes.
Because MCP servers frequently run with the user's privileges and expose developer tooling (filesystems, shells, browser control, language servers, etc.), the practical impact can extend to arbitrary code execution on the victim's machine.
Affected Versions
rmcp < 1.4.0 — all prior releases of the Streamable HTTP server transport. Non-HTTP transports (stdio, child-process) are not affected.
Patched Versions
rmcp >= 1.4.0 (current: 1.5.1).
Patch
Fixed in PR #764 (commit 8e22aa2), released as v1.4.0 on 2026-04-09:
StreamableHttpServerConfig::allowed_hostsnow defaults to a loopback-only allowlist:["localhost", "127.0.0.1", "::1"].- All incoming HTTP requests pass through
validate_dns_rebinding_headers(), which parses theHostheader and returns HTTP 403 if the host is not on the allowlist. - Public deployments can configure an explicit allowlist via
StreamableHttpService::with_allowed_hosts(...), or opt out (not recommended without an upstream reverse proxy that validatesHost) viadisable_allowed_hosts().
This fix validates the Host header only. Origin header validation is tracked as a defense-in-depth follow-up in #822 and is not required to block the DNS rebinding attack described here — the browser cannot forge the Host header sent to the rebound server.
Workarounds for Unpatched Users
- Upgrade to
rmcp >= 1.4.0. - If upgrade is not possible, place the MCP server behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx, Caddy) configured to reject requests whose
Hostheader is not one of your expected hostnames. - Do not bind the MCP server to
0.0.0.0without such a proxy.
Resources
- PR: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/pull/764
- Issue: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/issues/815
- Follow-up (Origin validation): https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/issues/822
- MCP transport security guidance: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/transports#security-warning
Related advisories (same class of vulnerability)
- TypeScript SDK: GHSA-w48q-cv73-mx4w
- Python SDK: GHSA-9h52-p55h-vw2f
- Go SDK: GHSA-xw59-hvm2-8pj6
- Java SDK: GHSA-8jxr-pr72-r468
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "rmcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42559"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-350"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-06T21:55:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T15:16:46Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nPrior to version 1.4.0, the `rmcp` crate\u0027s Streamable HTTP server transport (`crates/rmcp/src/transport/streamable_http_server/`) did not validate the incoming `Host` header. This allowed a malicious public website, via a DNS rebinding attack, to send authenticated requests to an MCP server running on the victim\u0027s loopback or private-network interface \u2014 violating the MCP specification\u0027s [transport security guidance](https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/transports#security-warning).\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who convinces a victim to visit a malicious page can:\n\n- Enumerate and invoke any tool exposed by a locally-running rmcp-based MCP server.\n- Read resources, prompts, and any state accessible via the MCP session.\n- Trigger side effects (file writes, shell execution, API calls, etc.) limited only by what tools the victim\u0027s server exposes.\n\nBecause MCP servers frequently run with the user\u0027s privileges and expose developer tooling (filesystems, shells, browser control, language servers, etc.), the practical impact can extend to arbitrary code execution on the victim\u0027s machine.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n`rmcp \u003c 1.4.0` \u2014 all prior releases of the Streamable HTTP server transport. Non-HTTP transports (stdio, child-process) are not affected.\n\n## Patched Versions\n\n`rmcp \u003e= 1.4.0` (current: 1.5.1).\n\n## Patch\n\nFixed in [PR #764](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/pull/764) (commit `8e22aa2`), released as v1.4.0 on 2026-04-09:\n\n- `StreamableHttpServerConfig::allowed_hosts` now defaults to a loopback-only allowlist: `[\"localhost\", \"127.0.0.1\", \"::1\"]`.\n- All incoming HTTP requests pass through `validate_dns_rebinding_headers()`, which parses the `Host` header and returns HTTP 403 if the host is not on the allowlist.\n- Public deployments can configure an explicit allowlist via `StreamableHttpService::with_allowed_hosts(...)`, or opt out (not recommended without an upstream reverse proxy that validates `Host`) via `disable_allowed_hosts()`.\n\nThis fix validates the `Host` header only. `Origin` header validation is tracked as a defense-in-depth follow-up in [#822](https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/issues/822) and is not required to block the DNS rebinding attack described here \u2014 the browser cannot forge the Host header sent to the rebound server.\n\n## Workarounds for Unpatched Users\n\n- Upgrade to `rmcp \u003e= 1.4.0`.\n- If upgrade is not possible, place the MCP server behind a reverse proxy (e.g. nginx, Caddy) configured to reject requests whose `Host` header is not one of your expected hostnames.\n- Do not bind the MCP server to `0.0.0.0` without such a proxy.\n\n## Resources\n\n- PR: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/pull/764\n- Issue: https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/issues/815\n- Follow-up (Origin validation): https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/issues/822\n- MCP transport security guidance: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/transports#security-warning\n\n## Related advisories (same class of vulnerability)\n\n- TypeScript SDK: GHSA-w48q-cv73-mx4w\n- Python SDK: GHSA-9h52-p55h-vw2f\n- Go SDK: GHSA-xw59-hvm2-8pj6\n- Java SDK: GHSA-8jxr-pr72-r468",
"id": "GHSA-89vp-x53w-74fx",
"modified": "2026-05-19T20:17:47Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T21:55:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-89vp-x53w-74fx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nubo-db/dynoxide/security/advisories/GHSA-fvh2-gm75-j4j7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42559"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/issues/815"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/issues/822"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/pull/764"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk/commit/8e22aa2de28df5a285eed87c11cd89bf15fa90d3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/rust-sdk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/transports#security-warning"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0140.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "rmcp Streamable HTTP server transport has a DNS rebinding vulnerability"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.