CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13142 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QXQ8-54XM-WC87
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:32 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:32PHP Scripts Mall Cab Booking Script 1.0.3 allows Directory Traversal into the parent directory of a jpg or png file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-9064"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-02-23T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "PHP Scripts Mall Cab Booking Script 1.0.3 allows Directory Traversal into the parent directory of a jpg or png file.",
"id": "GHSA-qxq8-54xm-wc87",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:32:35Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:32:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9064"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackingvila.wordpress.com/2019/02/18/directory-traveler-or-path-traveler-vulnerability-in-cab-booking-script-php-script-mall"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXQH-F93M-86FP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 00:47 – Updated: 2025-04-20 03:45A path traversal information disclosure vulnerability exists in Schneider Electric's U.motion Builder software versions 1.2.1 and prior in which an unauthenticated user can execute arbitrary code and exfiltrate files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-7974"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-26T01:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "A path traversal information disclosure vulnerability exists in Schneider Electric\u0027s U.motion Builder software versions 1.2.1 and prior in which an unauthenticated user can execute arbitrary code and exfiltrate files.",
"id": "GHSA-qxqh-f93m-86fp",
"modified": "2025-04-20T03:45:53Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T00:47:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-7974"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.schneider-electric.com/en/download/document/SEVD-2017-178-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/99344"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXRM-876Q-9C6P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:07 – Updated: 2025-04-11 04:14Directory traversal vulnerability in Spring Signage Xibo 1.2.x before 1.2.3 and 1.4.x before 1.4.2 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the p parameter to index.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-5979"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-10-02T22:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in Spring Signage Xibo 1.2.x before 1.2.3 and 1.4.x before 1.4.2 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the p parameter to index.php.",
"id": "GHSA-qxrm-876q-9c6p",
"modified": "2025-04-11T04:14:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:07:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-5979"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.launchpad.net/xibo/+bug/1093967"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.baesystemsdetica.com.au/Research/Advisories/Xibo-Directory-Traversal-Vulnerability-%28DS-2013-00"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.baesystemsdetica.com.au/Research/Advisories/Xibo-Directory-Traversal-Vulnerability-(DS-2013-00"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QXRX-V92J-RJVH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:58 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:58A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability exists in the Web Interface API of TightRope Media Carousel Digital Signage before 7.3.5. The RenderingFetch API allows for the downloading of arbitrary files through the use of directory traversal sequences, aka CSL-1683.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-14573"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-23T23:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability exists in the Web Interface API of TightRope Media Carousel Digital Signage before 7.3.5. The RenderingFetch API allows for the downloading of arbitrary files through the use of directory traversal sequences, aka CSL-1683.",
"id": "GHSA-qxrx-v92j-rjvh",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:58:55Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:58:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14573"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://release-notes.trms.com/txt/448"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXV2-4687-J5VV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:51 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:51Directory traversal vulnerability in 7 Media Web Solutions eduTrac before 1.1.2 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the showmask parameter to installer/overview.php.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-7097"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2014-01-08T15:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Directory traversal vulnerability in 7 Media Web Solutions eduTrac before 1.1.2 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in the showmask parameter to installer/overview.php.",
"id": "GHSA-qxv2-4687-j5vv",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:51:43Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:51:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-7097"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.htbridge.com/advisory/HTB23190"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/64255"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-QXVG-H7Q2-HCXH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 18:53 – Updated: 2026-06-23 18:53Summary
A multi‑stage chain in motionEye leads to remote code execution. The chain combines:
- Arbitrary file read (LFI) via the picture download endpoint for local motion cameras using absolute paths.
- Pass‑the‑hash admin auth due to accepting request signatures computed with password hashes.
- Unsafe config restore that extracts attacker‑controlled tarballs into
CONF_PATH. - Unauthenticated action execution via
/action/<id>/<action>.
If the normal user password is unset, the chain becomes unauthenticated RCE. If a normal password exists, a normal user can still achieve admin escalation and RCE.
Affected Code (motionEye repo)
1) LFI (absolute path) — picture/<id>/download
Files:
- motioneye/motioneye/handlers/picture.py → download() (local motion camera branch)
- motioneye/motioneye/mediafiles.py → get_media_content()
Issue: get_media_content() only blocks .. and then joins target_dir with path. Absolute paths (e.g. /etc/hosts) bypass the join and are read directly.
2) Pass‑the‑hash admin auth
File: motioneye/motioneye/handlers/base.py → get_current_user()
Issue: The signature check allows signatures computed using the admin password hash (SHA1) as the key. If the hash is leaked (via LFI), admin access can be obtained without the plaintext password.
3) Unsafe restore (tar extraction)
File: motioneye/motioneye/config.py → restore()
Issue: tar zxC CONF_PATH is used on user‑supplied data without sanitizing entries. A crafted tar can drop executable files into CONF_PATH.
4) Unauthenticated action execution
File: motioneye/motioneye/handlers/action.py → post()
Issue: No authentication decorator is present. It executes <action>_<camera_id> found in CONF_PATH with subprocess.Popen.
Exploit Chain (Detailed)
- Create or find a local motion camera id (local motion cameras are required for the vulnerable LFI path).
- LFI via picture download:
- Request:
/picture/<id>/download/<absolute_path> - Example:
/picture/1/download/%2Fetc%2Fhosts - Result: Arbitrary file read.
- Read admin hash from
/etc/motioneye/motion.conf: - Contains
@admin_password <SHA1_HASH>. - Pass‑the‑hash admin:
- Compute signature for
/config/restore?_username=adminusing the hash as key. - Admin access is accepted with hash‑based signatures.
- Restore malicious tar:
- Upload a tar containing
lock_<id>(or any action) as an executable. - File is written into
CONF_PATHby restore. - Trigger unauth action:
- POST
/action/<id>/lock - The server executes the injected file.
Proof of Execution (Observed Output)
In local testing, the injected action created a marker file:
/tmp/meye_rce_ok
Verification command:
docker exec -it motioneye ls -la /tmp | grep meye_rce_ok
Example output:
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 ... /tmp/meye_rce_ok
Preconditions / Requirements
- At least one local motion camera exists (e.g.,
netcam_url,videodevice). picture/<id>/downloadis reachable:- Unauth if
@normal_passwordis empty (default in some installs). - Auth required if normal password is set (attacker needs normal creds).
Impact
- Unauth RCE (normal password unset).
- Authenticated RCE (normal user → admin → RCE).
- Arbitrary file read on server filesystem.
- Full compromise of motionEye process account.
Suggested Fixes
- Block absolute paths in
get_media_content()andget_media_path(). - Remove hash‑based signature acceptance; only accept signatures computed with plaintext passwords.
- Harden restore: reject absolute paths,
.., symlinks, non‑regular files. - Require authentication on
ActionHandler(admin‑only).
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "motioneye"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.44.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-269",
"CWE-306",
"CWE-347",
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T18:53:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\nA multi\u2011stage chain in motionEye leads to remote code execution. The chain combines:\n\n1. **Arbitrary file read (LFI)** via the picture download endpoint for **local motion cameras** using absolute paths.\n2. **Pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin auth** due to accepting request signatures computed with password hashes.\n3. **Unsafe config restore** that extracts attacker\u2011controlled tarballs into `CONF_PATH`.\n4. **Unauthenticated action execution** via `/action/\u003cid\u003e/\u003caction\u003e`.\n\nIf the **normal user password is unset**, the chain becomes **unauthenticated RCE**. If a normal password exists, a **normal user** can still achieve **admin escalation and RCE**.\n\n---\n\n## Affected Code (motionEye repo)\n\n### 1) LFI (absolute path) \u2014 `picture/\u003cid\u003e/download`\n**Files:**\n- `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/picture.py` \u2192 `download()` (local motion camera branch)\n- `motioneye/motioneye/mediafiles.py` \u2192 `get_media_content()`\n\n**Issue:** `get_media_content()` only blocks `..` and then joins `target_dir` with `path`. Absolute paths (e.g. `/etc/hosts`) bypass the join and are read directly.\n\n### 2) Pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin auth\n**File:** `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/base.py` \u2192 `get_current_user()`\n\n**Issue:** The signature check allows signatures computed using the **admin password hash** (SHA1) as the key. If the hash is leaked (via LFI), admin access can be obtained without the plaintext password.\n\n### 3) Unsafe restore (tar extraction)\n**File:** `motioneye/motioneye/config.py` \u2192 `restore()`\n\n**Issue:** `tar zxC CONF_PATH` is used on user\u2011supplied data without sanitizing entries. A crafted tar can drop executable files into `CONF_PATH`.\n\n### 4) Unauthenticated action execution\n**File:** `motioneye/motioneye/handlers/action.py` \u2192 `post()`\n\n**Issue:** No authentication decorator is present. It executes `\u003caction\u003e_\u003ccamera_id\u003e` found in `CONF_PATH` with `subprocess.Popen`.\n\n---\n\n## Exploit Chain (Detailed)\n\n1. **Create or find a local motion camera id** (local motion cameras are required for the vulnerable LFI path).\n2. **LFI via picture download**:\n - Request: `/picture/\u003cid\u003e/download/\u003cabsolute_path\u003e`\n - Example: `/picture/1/download/%2Fetc%2Fhosts`\n - Result: Arbitrary file read.\n3. **Read admin hash** from `/etc/motioneye/motion.conf`:\n - Contains `@admin_password \u003cSHA1_HASH\u003e`.\n4. **Pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin**:\n - Compute signature for `/config/restore?_username=admin` using the **hash** as key.\n - Admin access is accepted with hash\u2011based signatures.\n5. **Restore malicious tar**:\n - Upload a tar containing `lock_\u003cid\u003e` (or any action) as an executable.\n - File is written into `CONF_PATH` by restore.\n6. **Trigger unauth action**:\n - POST `/action/\u003cid\u003e/lock`\n - The server executes the injected file.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Execution (Observed Output)\nIn local testing, the injected action created a marker file:\n\n```\n/tmp/meye_rce_ok\n```\n\nVerification command:\n```\ndocker exec -it motioneye ls -la /tmp | grep meye_rce_ok\n```\nExample output:\n```\n-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 0 ... /tmp/meye_rce_ok\n```\n\n---\n\n## Preconditions / Requirements\n\n- At least **one local motion camera** exists (e.g., `netcam_url`, `videodevice`).\n- `picture/\u003cid\u003e/download` is reachable:\n - **Unauth** if `@normal_password` is empty (default in some installs).\n - **Auth required** if normal password is set (attacker needs normal creds).\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n- **Unauth RCE** (normal password unset).\n- **Authenticated RCE** (normal user \u2192 admin \u2192 RCE).\n- Arbitrary file read on server filesystem.\n- Full compromise of motionEye process account.\n\n---\n\n## Suggested Fixes\n1. **Block absolute paths** in `get_media_content()` and `get_media_path()`.\n2. **Remove hash\u2011based signature acceptance**; only accept signatures computed with plaintext passwords.\n3. **Harden restore**: reject absolute paths, `..`, symlinks, non\u2011regular files.\n4. **Require authentication** on `ActionHandler` (admin\u2011only).",
"id": "GHSA-qxvg-h7q2-hcxh",
"modified": "2026-06-23T18:53:04Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T18:53:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-qxvg-h7q2-hcxh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "motionEye: LFI \u2192 pass\u2011the\u2011hash admin \u2192 unsafe restore \u2192 unauth action exec (RCE)"
}
GHSA-QXVV-WW3J-HM75
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-04 12:31 – Updated: 2024-12-04 12:31The Classic Addons – WPBakery Page Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Limited Local PHP File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 3.0 via the 'style' parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, and permissions granted by an Administrator, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other “safe” file types can be uploaded and included. The vulnerability is limited to PHP files in a Windows environment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-11952"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-04T09:15:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Classic Addons \u2013 WPBakery Page Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Limited Local PHP File Inclusion in all versions up to, and including, 3.0 via the \u0027style\u0027 parameter. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, and permissions granted by an Administrator, to include and execute arbitrary files on the server, allowing the execution of any PHP code in those files. This can be used to bypass access controls, obtain sensitive data, or achieve code execution in cases where images and other \u201csafe\u201d file types can be uploaded and included. The vulnerability is limited to PHP files in a Windows environment.",
"id": "GHSA-qxvv-ww3j-hm75",
"modified": "2024-12-04T12:31:45Z",
"published": "2024-12-04T12:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-11952"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/classic-addons-wpbakery-page-builder-addons/tags/3.1/addons/testimonial-slider-item/testimonial-slider-item.php#L28"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9645b17e-6a7c-4cdd-ae43-7d2c84b624cc?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXWC-WCVF-47FQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-12 18:30 – Updated: 2024-11-18 18:30Path traversal in Ivanti Endpoint Manager before 2024 November Security Update or 2022 SU6 November Security Update allows a local unauthenticated attacker to achieve code execution. User interaction is required.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-50322"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-12T16:15:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Path traversal in Ivanti Endpoint Manager before 2024 November Security Update or 2022 SU6 November Security Update\u00a0allows a local unauthenticated attacker to achieve code execution. User interaction is required.",
"id": "GHSA-qxwc-wcvf-47fq",
"modified": "2024-11-18T18:30:48Z",
"published": "2024-11-12T18:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-50322"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/Security-Advisory-EPM-November-2024-for-EPM-2024-and-EPM-2022"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXX2-7H4C-83F4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 23:47 – Updated: 2026-02-04 21:55An attacker who can influence the tar stream from a QEMU guest VM could write files outside the intended workspace directory on the host. The retrieveWorkspace function extracts tar entries without validating that paths stay within the workspace, allowing Path Traversal via ../ sequences.
Fix: Fixed in 6e243d0d. Merged in release.
Acknowledgements
melange thanks Oleh Konko from 1seal for discovering and reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "chainguard.dev/melange"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.11.3"
},
{
"fixed": "0.40.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24843"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T23:47:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-04T20:16:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An attacker who can influence the tar stream from a QEMU guest VM could write files outside the intended workspace directory on the host. The `retrieveWorkspace` function extracts tar entries without validating that paths stay within the workspace, allowing Path Traversal via `../` sequences.\n\n**Fix:** Fixed in [6e243d0d](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/commit/6e243d0d46699f837d7c392397a694d2bcc7612b). Merged in release.\n\n**Acknowledgements**\n\nmelange thanks Oleh Konko from [1seal](https://1seal.org/) for discovering and reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-qxx2-7h4c-83f4",
"modified": "2026-02-04T21:55:20Z",
"published": "2026-02-03T23:47:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/security/advisories/GHSA-qxx2-7h4c-83f4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/commit/6e243d0d46699f837d7c392397a694d2bcc7612b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "melange QEMU runner could write files outside workspace directory"
}
GHSA-QXXC-5WX2-MH2Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-14 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:32Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities exist in the nas.cgi add_dir() functionality of Wavlink AC3000 M33A8.V5030.210505. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to permission bypass. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger these vulnerabilities.A directory traversal vulnerability exists within the disk_part POST parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39787"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T15:15:23Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Multiple directory traversal vulnerabilities exist in the nas.cgi add_dir() functionality of Wavlink AC3000 M33A8.V5030.210505. A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to permission bypass. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger these vulnerabilities.A directory traversal vulnerability exists within the `disk_part` POST parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-qxxc-5wx2-mh2q",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:32:16Z",
"published": "2025-01-14T15:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39787"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2024-2057"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2024-2057"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.