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WID-SEC-W-2026-4669
Vulnerability from csaf_certbund - Published: 2026-11-18 23:00 - Updated: 2026-11-18 23:00| Product | Identifier | Version | Remediation |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Open Source MISP
Open Source
|
cpe:/a:misp:misp:-
|
— |
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{
"category": "legal_disclaimer",
"text": "Das BSI ist als Anbieter f\u00fcr die eigenen, zur Nutzung bereitgestellten Inhalte nach den allgemeinen Gesetzen verantwortlich. Nutzerinnen und Nutzer sind jedoch daf\u00fcr verantwortlich, die Verwendung und/oder die Umsetzung der mit den Inhalten bereitgestellten Informationen sorgf\u00e4ltig im Einzelfall zu pr\u00fcfen."
},
{
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"title": "Produktbeschreibung"
},
{
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"text": "Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in MISP ausnutzen, um seine Privilegien zu erh\u00f6hen, um Informationen offenzulegen, um Dateien zu manipulieren und um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen.",
"title": "Angriff"
},
{
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"text": "- Linux\n- UNIX",
"title": "Betroffene Betriebssysteme"
}
],
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"contact_details": "csaf-provider@cert-bund.de",
"name": "Bundesamt f\u00fcr Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik",
"namespace": "https://www.bsi.bund.de"
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"category": "self",
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},
{
"category": "self",
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"url": "https://wid.cert-bund.de/portal/wid/securityadvisory?name=WID-SEC-2026-4669"
},
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{
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"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-V22R-R5GX-2F8V"
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"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-MJQ6-R62F-5PQR"
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"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-R295-W87Q-M4QC"
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"source_lang": "en-US",
"title": "MISP: Mehrere Schwachstellen",
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},
"release_date": "2026-11-18T23:00:00.000+00:00",
"title": "CVE-2026-132144"
},
{
"cve": "CVE-2026-132636",
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},
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},
"release_date": "2026-11-18T23:00:00.000+00:00",
"title": "CVE-2026-132637"
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{
"cve": "CVE-2026-132641",
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"title": "CVE-2026-132641"
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{
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"product_status": {
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},
"release_date": "2026-11-18T23:00:00.000+00:00",
"title": "CVE-2026-132643"
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{
"cve": "CVE-2026-132644",
"product_status": {
"known_affected": [
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},
"release_date": "2026-11-18T23:00:00.000+00:00",
"title": "CVE-2026-132644"
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{
"cve": "CVE-2026-132645",
"product_status": {
"known_affected": [
"T063396"
]
},
"release_date": "2026-11-18T23:00:00.000+00:00",
"title": "CVE-2026-132645"
}
]
}
CVE-2026-132144 (GCVE-0-2026-132144)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:41 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:54| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 13:14 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch
502df2ebb69b… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
a1fe5058dc75
|
fix: [security] Login e-mails are admin-only under external | 502df2ebb69b… |
Fix summary
The authorization check for changing a login email now explicitly denies the operation for non-site-admin users when any external authentication backend is active (Security.auth is set, ApacheSecureAuth.apacheEnv is configured, or Plugin.CustomAuth_enable is true). Only site administrators retain the ability to modify login emails in an external-authentication deployment, preventing non-admin users from redirecting their directory identity lookup to an arbitrary account.
Patch summary
In app/Controller/UsersController.php, the __canChangeLogin() method was restructured: after the existing site-admin bypass and MISP.disable_user_login_change check, three additional conditions are now required for non-admins to change their login email: Security.auth must be empty, ApacheSecureAuth.apacheEnv must be unset, and Plugin.CustomAuth_enable must be unset. A new regression test class LoginChangeExternalAuth in tests/testregressions.py verifies that self-service and org-admin email changes are refused when external auth is enabled, while site-admin changes remain permitted, and that self-service changes still work when no external auth is configured.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The attack is a single API call to change the email field; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: No prior tampering of system data is required. PR:L: An authenticated non-admin user with a valid API key is sufficient. UI:N: No victim interaction is needed; the attacker acts on their own account. VC:L: The attacker gains read access to data visible to the captured identity. VI:H: The integrity of the identity-to-account binding is fundamentally broken; the attacker assumes a different identity and its privileges. VA:N: No denial-of-service impact. SC:N: No secondary-component confidentiality impact beyond what is captured. SI:H: The external directory's identity resolution is subverted for the attacker's session. SA:N: No availability impact on the directory service.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-285 The __canChangeLogin() authorization check failed to restrict the login-email change action based on the active authentication context. When external authentication was in use, the check should have denied non-admin email changes because the email is the directory identity key, but it only evaluated a single configuration flag.
- CWE-639 The login email is a user-controlled key used by the external directory to resolve identity. Because non-admins could modify this key, they could redirect the directory lookup to an arbitrary account, bypassing the intended identity binding.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker, holding a low-privilege MISP account, changes their login email to match a higher-privilege directory account. On next login the external backend resolves the email to the target identity, granting the attacker the target's organization and role. This is a direct privilege escalation via identity capture. The mapping is the closest standard CAPEC; no more specific CAPEC for directory-identity capture exists in the CAPEC catalog.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit that lack the external-auth check in __canChangeLogin() are assumed affected.
- The vulnerability requires that at least one external authentication backend (Security.auth, ApacheSecureAuth, or CustomAuth) is configured; instances using only local MISP authentication are not affected by this specific issue.
- The CVSS VC:L assumes the attacker gains data access scoped to the captured identity's permissions; a higher-privilege target could yield higher confidentiality impact.
- CAPEC-126 (Privilege Escalation) is the closest standard mapping; no CAPEC specifically covers directory-identity capture via email-key substitution.
- The SSVC technical_impact of 'total' assumes the captured directory identity's full privilege set is transferred to the attacker; if the target identity has limited privileges, the practical impact may be lower.
- The commit date (2026-11-18) and AI co-authorship (Claude Opus 5.5) are noted from metadata but do not affect the vulnerability analysis.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | high | 6 |
- 2026-11-18 09:15 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873): fix: [security] Login e-mails are admin-only under external https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch
- 2026-11-18 13:14 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch
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"subject": "fix: [security] Login e-mails are admin-only under external",
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-285",
"rationale": "The __canChangeLogin() authorization check failed to restrict the login-email change action based on the active authentication context. When external authentication was in use, the check should have denied non-admin email changes because the email is the directory identity key, but it only evaluated a single configuration flag."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-639",
"rationale": "The login email is a user-controlled key used by the external directory to resolve identity. Because non-admins could modify this key, they could redirect the directory lookup to an arbitrary account, bypassing the intended identity binding."
}
]
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CVE-2026-132636 (GCVE-0-2026-132636)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:45 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:56| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/a01c82ea2 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 20:42 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch
d05794e76ce9… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
a01c82ea2b95
|
fix: [security] Event searches match only what the user can | d05794e76ce9… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a visibleElementConditions() helper in the Event model that wraps every attribute- and object-level search subquery with the same distribution, sharing-group, and soft-deleted visibility rules enforced by MispAttribute::buildConditions(). New helper methods (visibleAttributeTagSubquery, visibleAttributeTagEventIds, visibleAttributeTagConditions) apply the same checks to tag-based filters. All search code paths in EventsController, Event, MispAttribute, MispObject, and ReportFromEvent now pass the authenticated user into these helpers so that sub-entities hidden from the user no longer influence search results.
Patch summary
Added Event::visibleElementConditions(), Event::visibleAttributeTagSubquery(), Event::visibleAttributeTagEventIds(), Event::visibleAttributeTagConditions(), and Event::elementDistributionRules() to enforce per-attribute/object ACL and deleted-scope checks inside search subqueries. Modified EventsController __quickFilter, __setIndexFilterConditions, and __eventIdsTaggedWithGalaxy to use the new visibility-aware tag lookups instead of raw AttributeTag queries. Wrapped all attribute and object subquery conditions in set_filter_wildcard, set_filter_value, set_filter_uuid, add_value_filter_subquery, and MispObject::buildFilterConditions with visibleElementConditions(). Updated MispAttribute::set_filter_tags and ReportFromEvent::getObjects to pass the user context. Added a comprehensive regression test class EventSearchAttributeAcl covering value, prefix, searchall, tag, soft-deleted, object, galaxy, and quick-filter probes for an outsider, owner, and site admin.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The attack requires only standard search API calls with crafted values or prefixes; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: No prior tampering with system data is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated MISP user with access to at least one event that contains hidden sub-entities. UI:N: No victim interaction is required; the attacker queries their own search. VC:L: Confidentiality impact is limited to specific attribute values, tags, and existence of soft-deleted elements within events the attacker can already see; full system data is not exposed. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: No impact on other systems.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The search subqueries on attributes and objects lacked the per-element authorization checks (distribution, sharing group, soft-deleted scope) that are enforced elsewhere in MISP. The event-level ACL was satisfied, but the sub-entity-level ACL was absent from the search path.
- CWE-200 The missing sub-entity authorization allowed an authenticated user to infer the existence and content (via prefix enumeration) of attributes, objects, and tags that were restricted to other organisations or sharing groups, or that had been soft-deleted.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker leverages a legitimate trusted relationship (visibility of a community-distributed event) to probe sub-entities (attributes, objects, tags) that carry stricter access controls. The search API is a trusted, authenticated interface, but the sub-entity ACL was not enforced within it. This is the closest CAPEC to the pattern of using a permitted operation to access data at a finer granularity than the operation's authorization scope covers. Uncertainty: no CAPEC precisely models 'search endpoint missing sub-entity ACL'; CAPEC-126 is the best available match because the core mechanism is exploiting a broader trust (event visibility) to reach narrower-protected data (attribute values).
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the fix is assumed to apply to all versions prior to this commit.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs a standard authenticated MISP account with access to at least one event; no specific role or permission beyond event visibility is required.
- CVSS VC:L reflects that the disclosure is scoped to sub-entities within events the attacker can already see, not a full database dump; however, prefix enumeration can reconstruct full attribute values over time.
- CAPEC-126 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC precisely describes a search endpoint missing sub-entity authorization checks.
- The commit date (2026-11-08) and the presence of 'Claude Opus 5.5' as co-author are taken at face value from the patch metadata; no independent verification was performed.
- SSVC exploitation is set to 'none' because no PoC, active exploitation, or public disclosure is evidenced in the patch; the ENISA report is referenced but its contents are not available.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-08 15:00 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (a01c82ea2b954db3223da56b4c206c1a84fd037e): fix: [security] Event searches match only what the user can https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch
- 2026-11-18 20:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch
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CVE-2026-132637 (GCVE-0-2026-132637)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:51 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:13| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/b7c1071d1 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 20:48 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/b7c1071d1.patch
7abc20137170… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
b7c1071d1283
|
fix: [security] Event correlations only for events and | 7abc20137170… |
Fix summary
The fix adds an event-level authorization check in the controller using fetchSimpleEvent, which enforces the user's distribution and sharing-group permissions and returns a uniform 404 for both hidden and non-existent events. The Default correlation engine now applies ACL conditions (organisation, event/attribute/object distribution, sharing-group membership) to the queried event's own attributes in both the correlation collection query and the related-events query. The OnDemand engine now includes the source attribute ID in its post-query ACL filter so that correlations are discarded if either side of the row is invisible to the user.
Patch summary
CorrelationsController.php: added a fetchSimpleEvent call before processing; throws NotFoundException if the event is not visible to the user, and casts the resolved ID to int. DefaultCorrelationBehavior.php: added a new __aclConditions() private method that builds SQL OR/AND conditions for org_id, event_distribution, event_sharing_group_id, object_distribution, object_sharing_group_id, distribution, and sharing_group_id; these conditions are merged into the __collectCorrelations query and the __filterRelatedEvents query. OnDemandCorrelationBehavior.php: __filterCorrelationsByAcl now collects both the target attribute ID and the source_id into the ACL check set, and the visibility test requires both to be present. tests/testregressions.py: added EventCorrelationsAcl test class with four test methods covering invisible-event 404, hidden-attribute filtering, related-event filtering, and owner/admin regression.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: exploitation requires only a valid session and a target event ID; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: no attack-target manipulation is needed. PR:L: any authenticated user with the least-privileged role can trigger the issue; no admin or specific role required. UI:N: no victim interaction needed. VC:L: partial confidentiality loss - attribute IDs and values (IPs, domains) of hidden events/attributes are disclosed, but not full database or credential exposure. VI:N, VA:N: no integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: no impact beyond the vulnerable component itself.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The eventCorrelations action performed no check that the authenticated user was permitted to view the event identified by the event ID parameter before returning its correlations. This is a classic missing authorization check at the resource level.
- CWE-863 The correlation engines applied ACL filtering only to the target (related) side of each correlation row and omitted the queried event's own source attributes. This is an incomplete/incorrect authorization check that allowed hidden attribute data to be exposed.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The attacker manipulates the event ID path parameter in the correlations/eventCorrelations/<id> endpoint to reference an event they are not authorised to view. The server accepted the parameter without validating the caller's access to that specific event. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed attack: the user supplies a parameter value (event ID) that the application fails to authorize. Uncertainty: CAPEC-126 (Leveraging Trusted Relationships) is also plausible because the user leverages a valid session, but the core defect is the missing per-resource authorization check triggered by the tampered parameter.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is unknown; the patch does not specify a version boundary. All MISP releases prior to this commit are assumed affected.
- PR:L assumes that any authenticated user with the least-privileged role (perm_add) can trigger the vulnerability, as demonstrated by the regression tests. If a higher privilege level is required in some deployments, PR would be H.
- VC:L assumes the exposed data (attribute values such as IPs and domains) constitutes a partial but not total loss of confidentiality. If the deployment treats all attribute data as highly sensitive, VC could be argued as H.
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- The commit date (2026-11-09) is taken at face value from the patch metadata; no independent verification of the timeline is performed.
- The Co-Authored-By line credits Claude Opus 5.5 as a remediation developer; this is recorded as metadata evidence without independent verification of the contribution.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-09 08:35 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (b7c1071d1283e442ff437970d38434a397b232ac): fix: [security] Event correlations only for events and https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/b7c1071d1.patch
- 2026-11-18 20:47 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/b7c1071d1.patch
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CVE-2026-132641 (GCVE-0-2026-132641)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:59 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:10| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/518ce0fe6 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
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patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 20:55 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/518ce0fe6.patch
0232bacda057… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
518ce0fe67fb
|
fix: [security] Delegation requests only name sharing groups | 0232bacda057… |
Fix summary
The fix adds an authorization check using checkIfAuthorised() on the submitted sharing_group_id before it is persisted. The ID is validated as a positive integer (ctype_digit) and the requesting user's membership in the referenced sharing group is verified. If the ID is malformed, missing, or the user is not a member, a generic 404 NotFoundException is raised, producing the same response for all unauthorized or invalid inputs to prevent enumeration. The validated (or default '0') value is then stored, ensuring only authorized sharing group references are recorded.
Patch summary
In EventDelegationsController.php delegateEvent(), a new block validates the submitted sharing_group_id: it casts the value to a string, checks ctype_digit, and calls SharingGroup::checkIfAuthorised() with the current user. On failure it throws NotFoundException. The previously inline ternary that stored the raw submitted value is replaced with the validated $sharingGroupId variable. A regression test class EventDelegationSharingGroupAcl is added to tests/testregressions.py covering: rejection of unauthorized, missing, and malformed sharing group IDs with uniform 404 responses; acceptance of the requester's own sharing group with distribution 4; ignoring of sharing_group_id when distribution is not 4; and confirmation that a site admin may reference any sharing group.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a web application accessed over the network. AC:L: The attack requires only submitting a different sharing_group_id value in a standard HTTP POST; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: No attack target manipulation is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with delegation permission (perm_delegate). UI:N: No victim interaction is required beyond the attacker's own request. VC:L: The impact is limited to disclosure of a sharing group's name (a short string), not full data or credentials. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: No impact on subsequent components.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The delegateEvent method stored a user-supplied sharing_group_id without verifying that the requesting user was authorized to reference that sharing group. The authorization check (checkIfAuthorised) was entirely absent before the fix.
- CWE-200 The delegation view rendered the stored sharing group's name to the requester, disclosing the name of groups the user's organisation was not a member of. This is the observable security impact of the missing authorization check.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker manipulates the sharing_group_id HTTP parameter to reference a sharing group they are not a member of. The application accepted the tampered value without authorization, storing it and later displaying the group name. This is a direct parameter tampering attack where a user-controlled identifier is used to access an object the user should not reference. The mapping is the closest available CAPEC; a more specific IDOR pattern is not present in the CAPEC catalog.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the fix applies to the codebase at the time of the commit and all prior versions lacking the checkIfAuthorised call in delegateEvent.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs a standard authenticated user with perm_delegate; the exact role requirements are inferred from the test setup (least_privileged_role with perm_add and perm_delegate).
- VC:L assumes the sharing group name is the only sensitive data disclosed; the patch does not indicate that group membership lists or other metadata are leaked.
- CAPEC-126 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available mapping; a dedicated IDOR or broken-object-level-authorization CAPEC is not present in the catalog.
- The Co-Authored-By line credits an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5) as a remediation developer; this is recorded as it appears in the commit metadata but is atypical for CVE credit conventions.
- The commit date (2026-11-09) is taken at face value from the patch metadata.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-09 08:57 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (518ce0fe67fb62097d00aaff7c0c3a2c599f3314): fix: [security] Delegation requests only name sharing groups https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/518ce0fe6.patch
- 2026-11-18 20:54 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/518ce0fe6.patch
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CVE-2026-132642 (GCVE-0-2026-132642)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 21:04 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:25| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/de1a25aa0 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 21:02 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/de1a25aa0.patch
1c33ce45dacf… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
de1a25aa0d27
|
fix: [security] Tag endpoints only act on events and | 1c33ce45dacf… |
Fix summary
The tag endpoints now load their target event or attribute using ACL-aware fetch methods (fetchSimpleEvent, fetchAttributeSimple) that apply the calling user's visibility rules before returning the object. A hidden event or attribute now produces the same response as a non-existent one, eliminating both the tag-enumeration information leak and the ability of host-organisation users to modify tags on records they cannot see. A clarifying comment was added to ACLComponent::canModifyTag to document that the caller must load the object with visibility applied first.
Patch summary
In EventsController::addTag (single and bulk paths) and EventsController::removeTag, replaced unscoped $this->Event->find('first', ['recursive' => -1, ...]) calls with $this->Event->fetchSimpleEvent($this->Auth->user(), $id), and added an explicit empty-check in removeTag returning 'Invalid event.' for hidden targets. In AttributesController::removeTag, replaced $this->MispAttribute->find('first', ['recursive' => -1, ...]) with $this->MispAttribute->fetchAttributeSimple($this->Auth->user(), [...]). Added a documentation comment in ACLComponent::canModifyTag noting that the event or attribute must be loaded with the user's visibility applied before the check. Added a regression test class TagEndpointsHiddenTargets covering hidden-event tag enumeration, host-org tag add/remove on hidden and visible records, bulk addTag, and site-admin behaviour.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a web application accessed over the network. AC:L: The attack requires only a standard API call with a known or guessable event/attribute ID; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with at least the tagger role (perm_tagger) or host-organisation membership; this is a low-privilege requirement in MISP's role model. UI:N: No user interaction is required. VC:L: The removeTag endpoint leaks which tags are present on a hidden event, a limited confidentiality impact on metadata. VI:L: Host-org users can add or remove local tags on hidden events/attributes, a limited integrity impact on tag metadata. VA:N: No availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: No impact on other systems or resources beyond the MISP instance.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The tag endpoints performed tag add/remove operations on events and attributes without first verifying that the calling user had visibility (ACL) on the target object. The authorization check (canModifyTag) was applied to an unscoped object, effectively missing the visibility authorization step.
- CWE-200 The removeTag endpoint returned different responses for a tag present versus absent on a hidden event, leaking information about the tag set of records the user was not authorized to view.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-128 MISP implements a custom ACL/visibility system for events and attributes. The tag endpoints incorrectly implemented this access control by loading the target object without applying the user's visibility filter before performing the operation. The access control mechanism existed (canModifyTag) but was applied to an unscoped object, making it ineffective. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed pattern of a custom authorization check being bypassed due to incorrect implementation. Uncertainty: CAPEC-100 (Parameter Tampering) could also apply since the attacker supplies an ID of a record they cannot see, but the root cause is the missing visibility scoping in the server-side load, making CAPEC-128 the more precise match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit are assumed affected.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs only the tagger role (perm_tagger) or host-org membership, which is a low-privilege role in MISP's model; the exact minimum role was inferred from the test setup.
- VC:L assumes the tag-enumeration information disclosure is a low confidentiality impact; if the tag names themselves are considered sensitive, the impact could be higher.
- CAPEC-128 was selected as the closest match; CAPEC-100 (Parameter Tampering) is a secondary candidate but the root cause is server-side missing visibility scoping rather than client-side parameter manipulation.
- The commit date (2026-11-10) and the presence of 'Claude Opus 5.5' as co-author are taken at face value from the patch metadata; no independent verification was performed.
- No specific MISP release version is identified as the first fixed version; the patch is a single commit without a tag or release reference.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-10 09:53 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (de1a25aa0d273ce5efcd73e138f8fcdbff9a79b0): fix: [security] Tag endpoints only act on events and https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/de1a25aa0.patch
- 2026-11-18 21:01 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/de1a25aa0.patch
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"The commit date (2026-11-10) and the presence of \u0027Claude Opus 5.5\u0027 as co-author are taken at face value from the patch metadata; no independent verification was performed.",
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CVE-2026-132643 (GCVE-0-2026-132643)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 21:08 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:25| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/415f07967 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 21:06 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/415f07967.patch
0eacdfd112fc… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
415f07967704
|
fix: [security] Anonymised sightings cannot be attributed | 0eacdfd112fc… |
Fix summary
A new authorization check (orgFilterAllowed) is introduced in the Sighting model. When Sightings_anonymise is enabled, a non-site-admin user's org_id filter targeting another organisation is rejected: listSightings returns an empty result set, and restSearch either skips the negated condition or substitutes an impossible value (-1) for the positive filter. Site administrators and users filtering by their own organisation retain full functionality. When anonymization is disabled, the filter behaves as before.
Patch summary
Adds a private method orgFilterAllowed() to app/Model/Sighting.php that returns true only when anonymization is off, the user is a site admin, or the org_id matches the user's own organisation. In listSightings(), an early return of an empty array is inserted when the filter is not allowed. In restSearch(), when the filter is not allowed, negated conditions are skipped (continue) and positive conditions are set to org_id = -1 to match nothing. A new regression test class SightingsAnonymisedOrgFilter in tests/testregressions.py validates that non-admins cannot unmask reporters via either endpoint, that site admins retain filter access, and that the filter remains functional when anonymization is disabled.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application; the vulnerable endpoints are HTTP APIs. AC:L: Exploitation requires only adding an org_id parameter to a standard API call; no race conditions, timing, or complex setup needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: An authenticated user with perm_sighting (sighting read) is sufficient; site admin is not required. UI:N: No victim interaction is needed; the attacker simply calls the API. VC:L: The impact is limited to revealing which organisation reported a sighting; full record contents and other data remain protected. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: No impact on subsequent components or safety.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-200 The primary impact is disclosure of the reporter's organisation identity, which the anonymization feature is designed to conceal. A non-privileged user can determine which organisation reported a sighting by filtering on that organisation's ID.
- CWE-862 The root cause is the absence of an authorization check on the org_id filter parameter. The endpoint accepted and applied any caller-supplied organisation ID without verifying whether the requesting user was permitted to filter by that organisation, especially in the context of anonymized sightings.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-66 The attacker manipulates the org_id request parameter to filter results by a specific organisation, thereby bypassing the anonymization control. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed attack: a legitimate parameter is used in a way that circumvents a security policy (anonymization). Uncertainty: this is not a classic parameter tampering (e.g., altering a price or ID to access another user's data) but rather exploiting a filter parameter to infer information that should be masked. No CAPEC specifically covers 'bypassing anonymization via filter parameter', so CAPEC-66 is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The Sightings_anonymise setting must be enabled for the vulnerability to be exploitable; when disabled, the org_id filter is expected behavior and not a vulnerability.
- The user must have perm_sighting (sighting read permission) but must NOT be a site admin (perm_site_admin); site admins are explicitly allowed to filter by any organisation.
- The affected version range is unknown; the patch does not specify a version boundary. All versions of MISP with the Sightings_anonymise feature and the pre-fix listSightings/restSearch code are assumed affected.
- CAPEC-66 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available attack pattern; no CAPEC specifically describes bypassing an anonymization control via a filter parameter, so this mapping carries uncertainty.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs only a standard authenticated MISP user account with sighting read permissions; the exact minimum role is inferred from the test setup (least_privileged_role with perm_add and perm_sighting).
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-09 13:31 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (415f07967704bbc83b1c7ff599c913b752581457): fix: [security] Anonymised sightings cannot be attributed https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/415f07967.patch
- 2026-11-18 21:05 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/415f07967.patch
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},
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CVE-2026-132644 (GCVE-0-2026-132644)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 21:13 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:24| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4ac836afd | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 21:10 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4ac836afd.patch
7d89e603fc49… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
4ac836afde4a
|
fix: [security] Galaxy cluster imports no longer take over | 7d89e603fc49… |
Fix summary
The fix adds an authorization check (__mayUpdateCapturedCluster) before any update to an existing Galaxy Cluster, permitting the operation only for the cluster's owner organization, a sync user with visibility to the cluster, or a site administrator. It also introduces a CAPTURE_FIELDS allow-list applied via CakePHP's fieldList option on save(), which restricts writable fields and explicitly excludes org_id and orgc_id from the update path, preventing ownership transfer. The captureOrganisationAndSG() call is moved after the authorization check so that a rejected request cannot alter ownership.
Patch summary
In app/Model/GalaxyCluster.php: (1) Added a private const CAPTURE_FIELDS array listing the only fields captureCluster() may write, excluding the 'default' field. (2) Moved the existingGalaxyCluster lookup and the locked-cluster check before the captureOrganisationAndSG() call. (3) Added a call to the new __mayUpdateCapturedCluster() method that enforces owner-org, sync-user-visibility, or site-admin authorization. (4) Changed both save() calls to use ['fieldList' => self::CAPTURE_FIELDS]; the update path further removes org_id and orgc_id from the field list. (5) Added the __mayUpdateCapturedCluster() private method implementing the three-way authorization check. In tests/testregressions.py: added a GalaxyClusterCaptureUpdateGate test class with six test cases covering cross-org refusal, owner acceptance, sync-user visibility gating, and ownership preservation.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application; the import endpoint is reachable over HTTP. AC:L: The attacker needs only a valid galaxy-editor account and a target cluster UUID (discoverable via API enumeration or prior knowledge); no race condition or special timing is required. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is needed. PR:L: The attacker requires an authenticated account with the perm_galaxy_editor role, which is a non-trivial but not administrative privilege. UI:N: No victim interaction is required; the import is a server-side API call. VC:N: The primary impact is on integrity of cluster data and ownership; while an attacker could read cluster fields in error responses, the vulnerability is not a confidentiality bypass. VI:H: The attacker can overwrite cluster content (value, description, distribution, etc.) and transfer ownership (org_id, orgc_id) of clusters belonging to other organizations, severely compromising data integrity. VA:N: No denial-of-service impact is evident. SC:N: No impact on connected or downstream systems is demonstrated. SI:H: The integrity of shared threat-intelligence data across the MISP instance is compromised, affecting all consumers of the affected clusters. SA:N: No impact on the security posture of other systems.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The captureCluster() update path performed no check that the requesting user was authorized to modify the specific cluster identified by UUID. Any user with the galaxy editor role could update and take ownership of clusters belonging to other organizations. The authorization logic was entirely absent for the cross-organization case.
- CWE-639 The cluster UUID, supplied by the attacker in the import payload, was used as the sole key to identify the target row for update without verifying that the caller had a legitimate relationship (ownership, sharing-group visibility, or admin role) to that specific resource.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The attacker manipulates the UUID parameter in the galaxies/import request to target a specific Galaxy Cluster belonging to another organization. The system uses this user-supplied identifier to locate and overwrite the target row without validating the caller's authorization over that resource. This is the closest CAPEC to the observed attack: a legitimate API parameter (UUID) is used to redirect the operation to an unauthorized target. Uncertainty: CAPEC-114 typically describes tampering with multiple parameters or injecting unexpected values; here the parameter value is a valid UUID, and the core flaw is the missing authorization check rather than the parameter itself. However, no CAPEC more precisely captures 'using a valid resource identifier to perform an unauthorized operation on that resource,' making CAPEC-114 the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the vulnerability is assumed to affect all versions containing the pre-fix captureCluster() implementation.
- The galaxy editor role (perm_galaxy_editor) is assumed to be a non-administrative, non-trivial permission that can be granted to multiple organizations on a shared MISP instance.
- CVSS VC is rated None because the primary demonstrated impact is integrity (modification and ownership transfer); any incidental confidentiality exposure via error messages is not the core vulnerability.
- CAPEC-114 (Parameter Tampering) is the closest available mapping; the core flaw is missing authorization rather than parameter manipulation per se, but no CAPEC more precisely describes 'using a valid resource identifier to perform an unauthorized operation.'
- The 'default' field exclusion from CAPTURE_FIELDS is noted in the commit message but its specific security significance is not further detailed in the patch; it is assumed to prevent modification of a cluster's default/flag status.
- The Co-Authored-By line references an AI assistant (Claude Opus 5.5); it is credited as a tool rather than a human remediation developer.
- No specific MISP release version is identified as the first fixed version; the commit date (2026-11-10) is the only temporal anchor available.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
5 | 11 | medium | 7 |
- 2026-11-10 16:49 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (4ac836afde4a29a90cd19322f6fb75a6940fb731): fix: [security] Galaxy cluster imports no longer take over https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4ac836afd.patch
- 2026-11-18 21:09 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/4ac836afd.patch
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CVE-2026-132645 (GCVE-0-2026-132645)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 21:19 – Updated: 2026-11-18 21:29| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/fc1ce99a6 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 21:15 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/fc1ce99a6.patch
5be467cde9c7… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
fc1ce99a660b
|
fix: [security] Galaxy imports no longer rewrite default or | 5be467cde9c7… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces an object-level authorization check (__mayUpdateCapturedGalaxy) that enforces three rules before any existing galaxy record is modified: default galaxies are never updatable via import or sync; non-default galaxies may only be updated by a site admin, the owning organization, or a sync user who has visibility on the record. The role-level permission check is moved before the captureOrganisationAndSG() call so that no organization or sharing-group data is captured for an unauthorized user. When an update is permitted, the org_id, orgc_id, and default fields are explicitly excluded from the write, preventing ownership transfer or default-flag demotion even by authorized updaters.
Patch summary
In app/Model/Galaxy.php: (1) a new private method __mayUpdateCapturedGalaxy() is added, returning false for default galaxies, true for site admins or same-org users, and true for sync users only if the galaxy passes the user's visibility conditions; (2) the existing-galaxy lookup and the __mayUpdateCapturedGalaxy() gate are moved before the captureOrganisationAndSG() call, so unauthorized users are rejected before any org/SG capture; (3) the role permission check (perm_site_admin / perm_galaxy_editor) is moved to the top of the method, before any data mutation; (4) when an existing galaxy is updated, org_id, orgc_id, and default are unset from the existing record before the field-diff loop, ensuring they are never overwritten; (5) a regression test suite (GalaxyCaptureUpdateGate in tests/testregressions.py) is added covering: other-org editor cannot update visible or hidden galaxies, owner can update own galaxy, sync user can update visible but not hidden galaxies, site admin can update without taking over, a
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The attacker only needs to submit a valid import payload with a matching UUID; no race conditions or special timing are required. AT:N: No attack-target manipulation is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated user with the perm_galaxy_editor role (a low-privilege role in MISP). UI:N: No victim interaction is required; the import is a server-side operation. VC:N: No confidentiality impact is evident from the patch. VI:H: Integrity of galaxy records is severely compromised: ownership (org_id, orgc_id) is transferred and the default flag is cleared, corrupting shared threat-intelligence metadata. VA:L: Demoting default galaxies may degrade the instance's threat-intelligence functionality for all users, but the service remains operational. SC:N: No secondary confidentiality impact. SI:H: Secondary integrity impact extends to other organizations' galaxy data and the shared default galaxy set. SA:N: No secondary availability impact beyond the primary VA.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The captureGalaxy() method performed only a coarse role-level check (perm_galaxy_editor) without verifying object-level ownership or the default-galaxy status of the target record. Any user with the editor role could overwrite galaxies belonging to other organizations or system default galaxies, which is a missing object-level authorization control.
- CWE-639 The attacker-supplied UUID in the import payload was used as the sole key to locate and overwrite an existing galaxy record. Because no ownership or default-status check was applied to the matched record, a user-controlled key (UUID) effectively bypassed the intended authorization boundary. This is a secondary, more specific manifestation of the missing authorization.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-114 The attacker crafts a galaxy import payload whose UUID field is set to match an existing galaxy (default or another organization's), thereby targeting a specific record for unauthorized modification. The UUID is a user-controlled parameter that the application used to identify the target object without sufficient authorization validation. This is the closest CAPEC pattern: the attacker tampers with a request parameter (UUID) to redirect the application's write operation to an unintended object. Uncertainty: CAPEC-114 is a broad pattern; a more specific 'authorization bypass' CAPEC does not exist in the catalog, so this is the best available match.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the vulnerability is assumed to affect all versions containing the vulnerable captureGalaxy() logic prior to this commit.
- The perm_galaxy_editor role is assumed to be a low-privilege role available to non-admin users; if it is restricted to admins only, the PR metric would be H rather than L.
- The CAPEC-114 mapping is the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers 'authorization bypass via object-level key matching in a CRUD operation', so Parameter Tampering is used as the best approximation.
- The CVSS VA:L rating assumes that demoting default galaxies degrades but does not fully break instance functionality; if default galaxies are critical for core operations, VA could be H.
- The SSVC technical_impact of 'partial' assumes the integrity compromise does not cascade into a full loss of trust in the MISP instance's data; if downstream consumers rely on galaxy ownership for access control, the impact could be 'total'.
- The patch does not specify whether the vulnerability is exploitable via the sync/pull path ($fromPull=true) in addition to the manual import path; both paths share the same captureGalaxy() code and are assumed equally affected.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-11 00:25 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fc1ce99a660b6f34e936b1947167de6748c11ecd): fix: [security] Galaxy imports no longer rewrite default or https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/fc1ce99a6.patch
- 2026-11-18 21:15 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/fc1ce99a6.patch
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
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