CVE-2026-132144 (GCVE-0-2026-132144)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:41 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:54| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 13:14 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch
502df2ebb69b… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
a1fe5058dc75
|
fix: [security] Login e-mails are admin-only under external | 502df2ebb69b… |
Fix summary
The authorization check for changing a login email now explicitly denies the operation for non-site-admin users when any external authentication backend is active (Security.auth is set, ApacheSecureAuth.apacheEnv is configured, or Plugin.CustomAuth_enable is true). Only site administrators retain the ability to modify login emails in an external-authentication deployment, preventing non-admin users from redirecting their directory identity lookup to an arbitrary account.
Patch summary
In app/Controller/UsersController.php, the __canChangeLogin() method was restructured: after the existing site-admin bypass and MISP.disable_user_login_change check, three additional conditions are now required for non-admins to change their login email: Security.auth must be empty, ApacheSecureAuth.apacheEnv must be unset, and Plugin.CustomAuth_enable must be unset. A new regression test class LoginChangeExternalAuth in tests/testregressions.py verifies that self-service and org-admin email changes are refused when external auth is enabled, while site-admin changes remain permitted, and that self-service changes still work when no external auth is configured.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The attack is a single API call to change the email field; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: No prior tampering of system data is required. PR:L: An authenticated non-admin user with a valid API key is sufficient. UI:N: No victim interaction is needed; the attacker acts on their own account. VC:L: The attacker gains read access to data visible to the captured identity. VI:H: The integrity of the identity-to-account binding is fundamentally broken; the attacker assumes a different identity and its privileges. VA:N: No denial-of-service impact. SC:N: No secondary-component confidentiality impact beyond what is captured. SI:H: The external directory's identity resolution is subverted for the attacker's session. SA:N: No availability impact on the directory service.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-285 The __canChangeLogin() authorization check failed to restrict the login-email change action based on the active authentication context. When external authentication was in use, the check should have denied non-admin email changes because the email is the directory identity key, but it only evaluated a single configuration flag.
- CWE-639 The login email is a user-controlled key used by the external directory to resolve identity. Because non-admins could modify this key, they could redirect the directory lookup to an arbitrary account, bypassing the intended identity binding.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker, holding a low-privilege MISP account, changes their login email to match a higher-privilege directory account. On next login the external backend resolves the email to the target identity, granting the attacker the target's organization and role. This is a direct privilege escalation via identity capture. The mapping is the closest standard CAPEC; no more specific CAPEC for directory-identity capture exists in the CAPEC catalog.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit that lack the external-auth check in __canChangeLogin() are assumed affected.
- The vulnerability requires that at least one external authentication backend (Security.auth, ApacheSecureAuth, or CustomAuth) is configured; instances using only local MISP authentication are not affected by this specific issue.
- The CVSS VC:L assumes the attacker gains data access scoped to the captured identity's permissions; a higher-privilege target could yield higher confidentiality impact.
- CAPEC-126 (Privilege Escalation) is the closest standard mapping; no CAPEC specifically covers directory-identity capture via email-key substitution.
- The SSVC technical_impact of 'total' assumes the captured directory identity's full privilege set is transferred to the attacker; if the target identity has limited privileges, the practical impact may be lower.
- The commit date (2026-11-18) and AI co-authorship (Claude Opus 5.5) are noted from metadata but do not affect the vulnerability analysis.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | high | 6 |
- 2026-11-18 09:15 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873): fix: [security] Login e-mails are admin-only under external https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch
- 2026-11-18 13:14 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch
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"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-285"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-639"
}
],
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-132144",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T20:53:57.986486Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T20:54:00.851Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"modules": [
"UsersController (app/Controller/UsersController.php)"
],
"product": "misp",
"programFiles": [
"app/Controller/UsersController.php"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP",
"vendor": "misp",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "2.5.51",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndIncluding": "2.5.51",
"versionStartIncluding": "0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Francois-Xavier Stellamans from the NATO Cyber Security Centre with OpenAI Daybreak support (using GPT5.6-Cyber)"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5.5"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "MISP contains an authorization flaw in the user login-email change logic. When an external authentication backend is configured (LDAP, Shibboleth, ApacheSecureAuth, or CustomAuth), the login email address serves as the key by which the directory service resolves a user\u0027s identity, organization, and role on each login. The __canChangeLogin() method in UsersController only checked the MISP.disable_user_login_change setting and site-admin status; it did not account for whether an external authentication backend was active. As a result, any authenticated non-admin user (including org admins) could change their own login email to an address that matches a higher-privilege account in the external directory. On the user\u0027s next login, the external backend would resolve that email to the target directory identity, granting the attacker the organization and role associated with that identity. This constitutes an account-identity capture and privilege escalation: the attacker effectively assumes the identity of any directory account whose email they can guess or discover. The vulnerability requires an authenticated session with a valid API key or session token and a MISP instance configured with at least one external authentication backend. The impact is limited to the scope of the captured directory identity\u0027s privileges within MISP."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-126 Privilege Escalation"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 8.3,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
},
{
"format": "SSVC",
"other": {
"content": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T13:14:53Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "SSVC"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-285",
"description": "CWE-285 Improper Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-639",
"description": "CWE-639 Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T20:41:10.546Z",
"orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"shortName": "CIRCL"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The authorization check for changing a login email now explicitly denies the operation for non-site-admin users when any external authentication backend is active (Security.auth is set, ApacheSecureAuth.apacheEnv is configured, or Plugin.CustomAuth_enable is true). Only site administrators retain the ability to modify login emails in an external-authentication deployment, preventing non-admin users from redirecting their directory identity lookup to an arbitrary account."
}
],
"title": "MISP: Non-admin users can change login email under external authentication to capture a directory identity",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "full",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit that lack the external-auth check in __canChangeLogin() are assumed affected.",
"The vulnerability requires that at least one external authentication backend (Security.auth, ApacheSecureAuth, or CustomAuth) is configured; instances using only local MISP authentication are not affected by this specific issue.",
"The CVSS VC:L assumes the attacker gains data access scoped to the captured identity\u0027s permissions; a higher-privilege target could yield higher confidentiality impact.",
"CAPEC-126 (Privilege Escalation) is the closest standard mapping; no CAPEC specifically covers directory-identity capture via email-key substitution.",
"The SSVC technical_impact of \u0027total\u0027 assumes the captured directory identity\u0027s full privilege set is transferred to the attacker; if the target identity has limited privileges, the practical impact may be lower.",
"The commit date (2026-11-18) and AI co-authorship (Claude Opus 5.5) are noted from metadata but do not affect the vulnerability analysis."
],
"capecRationale": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"rationale": "The attacker, holding a low-privilege MISP account, changes their login email to match a higher-privilege directory account. On next login the external backend resolves the email to the target identity, granting the attacker the target\u0027s organization and role. This is a direct privilege escalation via identity capture. The mapping is the closest standard CAPEC; no more specific CAPEC for directory-identity capture exists in the CAPEC catalog."
}
],
"commit": "a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873",
"confidence": "high",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "Francois-Xavier Stellamans from the NATO Cyber Security Centre with OpenAI Daybreak support (using GPT5.6-Cyber)"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5.5"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The attack is a single API call to change the email field; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: No prior tampering of system data is required. PR:L: An authenticated non-admin user with a valid API key is sufficient. UI:N: No victim interaction is needed; the attacker acts on their own account. VC:L: The attacker gains read access to data visible to the captured identity. VI:H: The integrity of the identity-to-account binding is fundamentally broken; the attacker assumes a different identity and its privileges. VA:N: No denial-of-service impact. SC:N: No secondary-component confidentiality impact beyond what is captured. SI:H: The external directory\u0027s identity resolution is subverted for the attacker\u0027s session. SA:N: No availability impact on the directory service.",
"draft": false,
"fixSummary": "The authorization check for changing a login email now explicitly denies the operation for non-site-admin users when any external authentication backend is active (Security.auth is set, ApacheSecureAuth.apacheEnv is configured, or Plugin.CustomAuth_enable is true). Only site administrators retain the ability to modify login emails in an external-authentication deployment, preventing non-admin users from redirecting their directory identity lookup to an arbitrary account.",
"generatedAt": "2026-11-18T13:14:53.442286Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"potentialErrors": [],
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 11,
"assumptionCount": 6,
"confidence": "high",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 7
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "502df2ebb69b222bcd0fa06bfab41c03d904d3c8b67ca24ef25f98e8042dc60d",
"patchSummary": "In app/Controller/UsersController.php, the __canChangeLogin() method was restructured: after the existing site-admin bypass and MISP.disable_user_login_change check, three additional conditions are now required for non-admins to change their login email: Security.auth must be empty, ApacheSecureAuth.apacheEnv must be unset, and Plugin.CustomAuth_enable must be unset. A new regression test class LoginChangeExternalAuth in tests/testregressions.py verifies that self-service and org-admin email changes are refused when external auth is enabled, while site-admin changes remain permitted, and that self-service changes still work when no external auth is configured.",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873",
"date": "Wed, 18 Nov 2026 10:15:00 +0100",
"patchSha256": "502df2ebb69b222bcd0fa06bfab41c03d904d3c8b67ca24ef25f98e8042dc60d",
"retrievedAt": "2026-11-18T13:14:06.772159Z",
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Login e-mails are admin-only under external"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873.patch",
"ssvc": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T13:14:53Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"subject": "fix: [security] Login e-mails are admin-only under external",
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-285",
"rationale": "The __canChangeLogin() authorization check failed to restrict the login-email change action based on the active authentication context. When external authentication was in use, the check should have denied non-admin email changes because the email is the directory identity key, but it only evaluated a single configuration flag."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-639",
"rationale": "The login email is a user-controlled key used by the external directory to resolve identity. Because non-admins could modify this key, they could redirect the directory lookup to an arbitrary account, bypassing the intended identity binding."
}
]
}
},
"bcp-05-x-03": {
"x_timeline": {
"events": [
{
"description": "Corrective change authored (a1fe5058dc758b0e91bb0ff72f622fa99bdfd873): fix: [security] Login e-mails are admin-only under external",
"id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
"references": [
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"timestamp": "2026-11-18T09:15:00Z",
"type": "fix-developed"
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{
"description": "Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time.",
"id": "evt-fix-available-1",
"references": [
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],
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T13:14:06.772159Z",
"type": "fix-available"
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-20351"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-132144",
"datePublished": "2026-11-18T20:41:10.546Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-18T13:21:34.157Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T20:54:07.518Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
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}
}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.