CVE-2026-132636 (GCVE-0-2026-132636)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-18 20:45 – Updated: 2026-11-18 20:56| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/a01c82ea2 | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-18 20:42 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch
d05794e76ce9… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
a01c82ea2b95
|
fix: [security] Event searches match only what the user can | d05794e76ce9… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a visibleElementConditions() helper in the Event model that wraps every attribute- and object-level search subquery with the same distribution, sharing-group, and soft-deleted visibility rules enforced by MispAttribute::buildConditions(). New helper methods (visibleAttributeTagSubquery, visibleAttributeTagEventIds, visibleAttributeTagConditions) apply the same checks to tag-based filters. All search code paths in EventsController, Event, MispAttribute, MispObject, and ReportFromEvent now pass the authenticated user into these helpers so that sub-entities hidden from the user no longer influence search results.
Patch summary
Added Event::visibleElementConditions(), Event::visibleAttributeTagSubquery(), Event::visibleAttributeTagEventIds(), Event::visibleAttributeTagConditions(), and Event::elementDistributionRules() to enforce per-attribute/object ACL and deleted-scope checks inside search subqueries. Modified EventsController __quickFilter, __setIndexFilterConditions, and __eventIdsTaggedWithGalaxy to use the new visibility-aware tag lookups instead of raw AttributeTag queries. Wrapped all attribute and object subquery conditions in set_filter_wildcard, set_filter_value, set_filter_uuid, add_value_filter_subquery, and MispObject::buildFilterConditions with visibleElementConditions(). Updated MispAttribute::set_filter_tags and ReportFromEvent::getObjects to pass the user context. Added a comprehensive regression test class EventSearchAttributeAcl covering value, prefix, searchall, tag, soft-deleted, object, galaxy, and quick-filter probes for an outsider, owner, and site admin.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The attack requires only standard search API calls with crafted values or prefixes; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: No prior tampering with system data is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated MISP user with access to at least one event that contains hidden sub-entities. UI:N: No victim interaction is required; the attacker queries their own search. VC:L: Confidentiality impact is limited to specific attribute values, tags, and existence of soft-deleted elements within events the attacker can already see; full system data is not exposed. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: No impact on other systems.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The search subqueries on attributes and objects lacked the per-element authorization checks (distribution, sharing group, soft-deleted scope) that are enforced elsewhere in MISP. The event-level ACL was satisfied, but the sub-entity-level ACL was absent from the search path.
- CWE-200 The missing sub-entity authorization allowed an authenticated user to infer the existence and content (via prefix enumeration) of attributes, objects, and tags that were restricted to other organisations or sharing groups, or that had been soft-deleted.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker leverages a legitimate trusted relationship (visibility of a community-distributed event) to probe sub-entities (attributes, objects, tags) that carry stricter access controls. The search API is a trusted, authenticated interface, but the sub-entity ACL was not enforced within it. This is the closest CAPEC to the pattern of using a permitted operation to access data at a finer granularity than the operation's authorization scope covers. Uncertainty: no CAPEC precisely models 'search endpoint missing sub-entity ACL'; CAPEC-126 is the best available match because the core mechanism is exploiting a broader trust (event visibility) to reach narrower-protected data (attribute values).
Assumptions to verify
- The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the fix is assumed to apply to all versions prior to this commit.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs a standard authenticated MISP account with access to at least one event; no specific role or permission beyond event visibility is required.
- CVSS VC:L reflects that the disclosure is scoped to sub-entities within events the attacker can already see, not a full database dump; however, prefix enumeration can reconstruct full attribute values over time.
- CAPEC-126 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC precisely describes a search endpoint missing sub-entity authorization checks.
- The commit date (2026-11-08) and the presence of 'Claude Opus 5.5' as co-author are taken at face value from the patch metadata; no independent verification was performed.
- SSVC exploitation is set to 'none' because no PoC, active exploitation, or public disclosure is evidenced in the patch; the ENISA report is referenced but its contents are not available.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-08 15:00 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (a01c82ea2b954db3223da56b4c206c1a84fd037e): fix: [security] Event searches match only what the user can https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch
- 2026-11-18 20:41 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch
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{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T20:42:18Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-132636",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T20:56:31.544145Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-18T21:17:57.600",
"references": [
{
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"url": "https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/a01c82ea2"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-200"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-862"
}
],
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
},
"vulnrichment": {
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-132636",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T20:56:31.544145Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T20:56:34.099Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"modules": [
"app/Controller/EventsController.php",
"app/Model/Event.php",
"app/Model/MispAttribute.php",
"app/Model/MispObject.php",
"app/Lib/EventReport/ReportFromEvent.php"
],
"product": "MISP",
"programFiles": [
"app/Controller/EventsController.php",
"app/Model/Event.php",
"app/Model/MispAttribute.php",
"app/Model/MispObject.php",
"app/Lib/EventReport/ReportFromEvent.php"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/misp/misp",
"vendor": "MISP",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "2.5.51",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"versionEndIncluding": "2.5.51",
"versionStartIncluding": "0",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "ENISA"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5.5"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "MISP contains an authorization bypass in its event search and filter functionality. When a user performed searches through events/restSearch (value, value prefix, searchall, type, uuid, attribute tags, object filters), objects/restSearch, or the event index tag, galaxy, and quick filters, the underlying SQL subqueries matched against attributes and objects without enforcing the per-attribute distribution, sharing-group, or soft-deleted visibility rules that apply when fetching individual elements.\n\nA user who could view an event (for example, a community-distributed event) could therefore use search to determine whether organisation-only, sharing-group-restricted, or soft-deleted attributes and objects existed within that event. Because the value filter supports prefix matching (LIKE), an attacker could enumerate the full value of a hidden attribute one character at a time. Tags attached exclusively to hidden attributes also leaked through the tag, galaxy, and quick-filter paths on the event index.\n\nThe vulnerability affects the EventsController quick-filter and index-filter logic, the Event model wildcard/value/uuid/tag filter methods, the MispAttribute tag filter, the MispObject buildFilterConditions and restSearch methods, and the ReportFromEvent object filter. Site administrators and users belonging to the event\u0027s own organisation retain full visibility, and sync users continue to match soft-deleted elements as intended.\n\nThe issue was reported by ENISA."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-126 Leverage Trusted Relationships"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
},
{
"format": "SSVC",
"other": {
"content": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T20:42:18Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "SSVC"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"description": "CWE-862 Missing Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-200",
"description": "CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T20:45:41.550Z",
"orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"shortName": "CIRCL"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/misp/misp/commit/a01c82ea2"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The fix introduces a visibleElementConditions() helper in the Event model that wraps every attribute- and object-level search subquery with the same distribution, sharing-group, and soft-deleted visibility rules enforced by MispAttribute::buildConditions(). New helper methods (visibleAttributeTagSubquery, visibleAttributeTagEventIds, visibleAttributeTagConditions) apply the same checks to tag-based filters. All search code paths in EventsController, Event, MispAttribute, MispObject, and ReportFromEvent now pass the authenticated user into these helpers so that sub-entities hidden from the user no longer influence search results."
}
],
"title": "MISP Event Search Discloses Hidden Attribute and Object Data via Missing Sub-Entity Authorization",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "full",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; the fix is assumed to apply to all versions prior to this commit.",
"CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs a standard authenticated MISP account with access to at least one event; no specific role or permission beyond event visibility is required.",
"CVSS VC:L reflects that the disclosure is scoped to sub-entities within events the attacker can already see, not a full database dump; however, prefix enumeration can reconstruct full attribute values over time.",
"CAPEC-126 is the closest available mapping; no CAPEC precisely describes a search endpoint missing sub-entity authorization checks.",
"The commit date (2026-11-08) and the presence of \u0027Claude Opus 5.5\u0027 as co-author are taken at face value from the patch metadata; no independent verification was performed.",
"SSVC exploitation is set to \u0027none\u0027 because no PoC, active exploitation, or public disclosure is evidenced in the patch; the ENISA report is referenced but its contents are not available."
],
"capecRationale": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"rationale": "The attacker leverages a legitimate trusted relationship (visibility of a community-distributed event) to probe sub-entities (attributes, objects, tags) that carry stricter access controls. The search API is a trusted, authenticated interface, but the sub-entity ACL was not enforced within it. This is the closest CAPEC to the pattern of using a permitted operation to access data at a finer granularity than the operation\u0027s authorization scope covers. Uncertainty: no CAPEC precisely models \u0027search endpoint missing sub-entity ACL\u0027; CAPEC-126 is the best available match because the core mechanism is exploiting a broader trust (event visibility) to reach narrower-protected data (attribute values)."
}
],
"commit": "a01c82ea2b954db3223da56b4c206c1a84fd037e",
"confidence": "medium",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "ENISA"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "iglocska"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "Claude Opus 5.5"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: The attack requires only standard search API calls with crafted values or prefixes; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: No prior tampering with system data is needed. PR:L: The attacker must be an authenticated MISP user with access to at least one event that contains hidden sub-entities. UI:N: No victim interaction is required; the attacker queries their own search. VC:L: Confidentiality impact is limited to specific attribute values, tags, and existence of soft-deleted elements within events the attacker can already see; full system data is not exposed. VI:N, VA:N: No integrity or availability impact. SC:N, SI:N, SA:N: No impact on other systems.",
"draft": false,
"fixSummary": "The fix introduces a visibleElementConditions() helper in the Event model that wraps every attribute- and object-level search subquery with the same distribution, sharing-group, and soft-deleted visibility rules enforced by MispAttribute::buildConditions(). New helper methods (visibleAttributeTagSubquery, visibleAttributeTagEventIds, visibleAttributeTagConditions) apply the same checks to tag-based filters. All search code paths in EventsController, Event, MispAttribute, MispObject, and ReportFromEvent now pass the authenticated user into these helpers so that sub-entities hidden from the user no longer influence search results.",
"generatedAt": "2026-11-18T20:42:18.710235Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"potentialErrors": [],
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 11,
"assumptionCount": 6,
"confidence": "medium",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 6
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "d05794e76ce9e759c8bab58bcbbb75321edf3da0da99042433e5f6aa6c3ce902",
"patchSummary": "Added Event::visibleElementConditions(), Event::visibleAttributeTagSubquery(), Event::visibleAttributeTagEventIds(), Event::visibleAttributeTagConditions(), and Event::elementDistributionRules() to enforce per-attribute/object ACL and deleted-scope checks inside search subqueries. Modified EventsController __quickFilter, __setIndexFilterConditions, and __eventIdsTaggedWithGalaxy to use the new visibility-aware tag lookups instead of raw AttributeTag queries. Wrapped all attribute and object subquery conditions in set_filter_wildcard, set_filter_value, set_filter_uuid, add_value_filter_subquery, and MispObject::buildFilterConditions with visibleElementConditions(). Updated MispAttribute::set_filter_tags and ReportFromEvent::getObjects to pass the user context. Added a comprehensive regression test class EventSearchAttributeAcl covering value, prefix, searchall, tag, soft-deleted, object, galaxy, and quick-filter probes for an outsider, owner, and site admin.",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "a01c82ea2b954db3223da56b4c206c1a84fd037e",
"date": "Sun, 8 Nov 2026 16:00:36 +0100",
"patchSha256": "d05794e76ce9e759c8bab58bcbbb75321edf3da0da99042433e5f6aa6c3ce902",
"retrievedAt": "2026-11-18T20:41:31.278387Z",
"source": "https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Event searches match only what the user can"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch",
"ssvc": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T20:42:18Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"subject": "fix: [security] Event searches match only what the user can",
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"rationale": "The search subqueries on attributes and objects lacked the per-element authorization checks (distribution, sharing group, soft-deleted scope) that are enforced elsewhere in MISP. The event-level ACL was satisfied, but the sub-entity-level ACL was absent from the search path."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-200",
"rationale": "The missing sub-entity authorization allowed an authenticated user to infer the existence and content (via prefix enumeration) of attributes, objects, and tags that were restricted to other organisations or sharing groups, or that had been soft-deleted."
}
]
}
},
"bcp-05-x-03": {
"x_timeline": {
"events": [
{
"description": "Corrective change authored (a01c82ea2b954db3223da56b4c206c1a84fd037e): fix: [security] Event searches match only what the user can",
"id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
"references": [
"https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-08T15:00:36Z",
"type": "fix-developed"
},
{
"description": "Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time.",
"id": "evt-fix-available-1",
"references": [
"https://github.com/mISP/misp/commit/a01c82ea2.patch"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-18T20:41:31.278387Z",
"type": "fix-available"
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "gcve-1-2026-20348"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-132636",
"datePublished": "2026-11-18T20:45:41.550Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-18T20:45:38.127Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-18T20:56:37.198Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
}
}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.