RUSTSEC-2022-0063 (CVE-2022-36086)

Vulnerability from osv_rustsec – Published: 2022-09-07 12:00 – Updated: 2026-10-12 17:47 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
Multiple vulnerabilities resulting in out-of-bounds writes
Details
  • The heap initialization methods were missing a minimum size check for the given heap size argument. This could lead to out-of-bound writes when a heap was initialized with a size smaller than 3 * size_of::<usize> because of metadata write operations.
  • When calling Heap::extend with a size smaller than two usizes (e.g., 16 on x86_64), the size was erroneously rounded up to the minimum size, which could result in an out-of-bounds write.
  • Calling Heap::extend on an empty heap tried to construct a heap starting at address 0, which is also an out-of-bounds write.
  • One specific way to trigger this accidentally is to call Heap::new (or a similar constructor) with a heap size that is smaller than two usizes. This was treated as an empty heap as well.
  • Calling Heap::extend on a heap whose size is not a multiple of the size of two usizes resulted in unaligned writes. It also left the heap in an unexpected state, which might lead to subsequent issues. We did not find a way to exploit this undefined behavior yet (apart from DoS on platforms that fault on unaligned writes).
Severity
8.4 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "categories": [
          "memory-corruption"
        ],
        "cvss": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
        "informational": null
      },
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "affected_functions": null,
        "affects": {
          "arch": [],
          "functions": [],
          "os": []
        }
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "linked_list_allocator",
        "purl": "pkg:cargo/linked_list_allocator"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.0.0-0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "SEMVER"
        }
      ],
      "versions": []
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-36086",
    "GHSA-xg8p-34w2-j49j"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "license": "CC0-1.0"
  },
  "details": "* The heap initialization methods were missing a minimum size check for the given heap size argument. This could lead to **out-of-bound writes** when a heap was initialized with a size smaller than `3 * size_of::\u003cusize\u003e` because of metadata write operations.\n* When calling `Heap::extend` with a size smaller than two `usize`s (e.g., 16 on `x86_64`), the size was erroneously rounded up to the minimum size, which could result in an **out-of-bounds write**.\n* Calling `Heap::extend` on an empty heap tried to construct a heap starting at address 0, which is also an **out-of-bounds write**.\n  * One specific way to trigger this accidentally is to call `Heap::new` (or a similar constructor) with a heap size that is smaller than two `usize`s. This was treated as an empty heap as well.\n* Calling `Heap::extend` on a heap whose size is not a multiple of the size of two `usize`s resulted in unaligned writes. It also left the heap in an unexpected state, which might lead to subsequent issues. We did not find a way to exploit this undefined behavior yet (apart from DoS on platforms that fault on unaligned writes).",
  "id": "RUSTSEC-2022-0063",
  "modified": "2026-10-12T17:47:59Z",
  "published": "2022-09-07T12:00:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://crates.io/crates/linked_list_allocator"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0063.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rust-osdev/linked-list-allocator/commit/013b0758643943e8df5b17bbb495460ff47e8bbf"
    }
  ],
  "related": [],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Multiple vulnerabilities resulting in out-of-bounds writes"
}



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