OESA-2026-4685 (CVE-2026-59983)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-11-04 13:54 – Updated: 2026-11-04 13:54 – Source websiteOpenEXR is a high dynamic-range (HDR) image file format originally developed by Industrial Light & Magic for use in computer imaging applications.
Security Fix(es):
OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. OpenEXR versions before 3.2.11, 3.3.0 through 3.3.12, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13 are vulnerable on ILP32 builds to an out-of-bounds read. The vulnerability is reached when a crafted uncompressed deep-tile EXR causes the sample-count table size calculation in OpenEXRCore decoding.c to wrap before unpack_sample_table() iterates over the full attacker-controlled tile dimensions, allowing denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14.(CVE-2026-59983)
OpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions before 3.2.11, 3.3.0 through 3.3.12, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13, exrmultiview can write past a heap allocation when it combines two attacker-supplied, individually valid scanline EXR files whose union dataWindow is not aligned to one view's channel subsampling. The utility allocates sampled channel storage using a truncated union_width / xSampling, then reads the sampled input through a Slice based on the misaligned union window, producing a heap out-of-bounds write. The trigger is normal public-tool processing, such as exrmultiview left A.exr right B.exr out.exr with crafted but valid inputs, so this is not solely an API or caller-precondition issue. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14.(CVE-2026-68515)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"OpenEXR-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"OpenEXR-debuginfo-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"OpenEXR-debugsource-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"OpenEXR-devel-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"OpenEXR-libs-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"OpenEXR-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"OpenEXR-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"OpenEXR-debuginfo-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"OpenEXR-debugsource-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"OpenEXR-devel-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"OpenEXR-libs-3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "OpenEXR",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/OpenEXR\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.11-10.oe2403sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "OpenEXR is a high dynamic-range (HDR) image file format originally developed by Industrial Light \u0026amp;amp; Magic for use in computer imaging applications.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nOpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. OpenEXR versions before 3.2.11, 3.3.0 through 3.3.12, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13 are vulnerable on ILP32 builds to an out-of-bounds read. The vulnerability is reached when a crafted uncompressed deep-tile EXR causes the sample-count table size calculation in OpenEXRCore decoding.c to wrap before unpack_sample_table() iterates over the full attacker-controlled tile dimensions, allowing denial of service. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14.(CVE-2026-59983)\n\nOpenEXR is the reference implementation and specification for the EXR image format, widely used in the motion picture industry. In versions before 3.2.11, 3.3.0 through 3.3.12, and 3.4.0 through 3.4.13, exrmultiview can write past a heap allocation when it combines two attacker-supplied, individually valid scanline EXR files whose union dataWindow is not aligned to one view\u0026apos;s channel subsampling. The utility allocates sampled channel storage using a truncated union_width / xSampling, then reads the sampled input through a Slice based on the misaligned union window, producing a heap out-of-bounds write. The trigger is normal public-tool processing, such as exrmultiview left A.exr right B.exr out.exr with crafted but valid inputs, so this is not solely an API or caller-precondition issue. This issue is fixed in versions 3.2.11, 3.3.13, and 3.4.14.(CVE-2026-68515)",
"id": "OESA-2026-4685",
"modified": "2026-11-04T13:54:28Z",
"published": "2026-11-04T13:54:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4685"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59983"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68515"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenEXR security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-59983",
"CVE-2026-68515"
]
}
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