OESA-2026-4416 (CVE-2026-35189)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-10-22 14:34 – Updated: 2026-10-22 14:34 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
openssl security update
Details

OpenSSL is a robust, commercial-grade, and full-featured toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols.

Security Fix(es):

Issue summary: A certificate with many nameRelativeToCRLIssuer CRL distribution points causes disproportionate heap growth when OpenSSL caches X.509 extensions.

Impact summary: Receiving a crafted certificate from a malicious peer can lead to significant memory pressure and possible Denial of Service in clients or in servers that solicit client certificates.

CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

Description: A certificate or a set of certificates that fits under the limit for size of certificates accepted from the peer (~100 KiB) can result in allocation of several hundred MiB of resident memory on the receiving side during a normal TLS handshake. This may be enough to crash the client or server, if multiple concurrent connections lead to similarly large memory allocations.

The fix postpones processing of the CRL distribution points extensions in certificates to the time when the processed value is required for CRL processing. This avoids keeping large memory allocations for a long time when such certificates are received.

FIPS impact: no The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.(CVE-2026-35189)

Issue summary: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for ECDSA and SM2 signature operations with curves that do not have a dedicated implementation leaks information about the secret nonce through timing.

Impact summary: An attacker able to measure signing times may learn information about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures can, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the private key.

CWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy

Description: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for curves that do not have a dedicated constant-time implementation pads the secret scalar with non-constant-time BIGNUM operations, so the time taken depends on the value of the secret scalar derived from the ECDSA and SM2 nonce.

The leak is very small; observing it requires a large number of measurements. The effect is largest for curves whose group order lies on a machine-word boundary, such as brainpoolP384r1.

Applications using ECDSA signing over the Brainpool and other generic prime curves, and SM2 signing on platforms that use the generic implementation, are vulnerable to this issue.

The NIST curves P-256, P-384 and P-521 use dedicated constant-time implementations and are not affected.

FIPS Impact: no The FIPS modules are not affected: the approved NIST curves used in the FIPS provider have dedicated constant-time implementations and do not use the affected code path.(CVE-2026-54872)

Issue summary: An established DTLS 1.2 association using an AEAD cipher suite can be terminated by a single unauthenticated datagram whose encrypted fragment is shorter than the mandatory explicit IV and authentication tag overhead.

Impact summary: An attacker who can send a datagram that is routed to an existing DTLS 1.2 association can tear that association down without knowing any key material. This is a Denial of Service limited to the targeted association. There is no memory safety or confidentiality impact.

CWE: CWE-1284: Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input

Description: In TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 every record protected by an AEAD cipher suite carries an explicit IV followed by the ciphertext and an authentication tag. When decrypting such a record the record layer passed the record length to the cipher implementation before checking that the record was long enough to contain the explicit IV and the tag. For a record shorter than that overhead the cipher implementation rejected the impossible length, and the record layer treated this as an internal failure and raised a fatal internal_error alert instead of treating the record as one that failed authentication.

In TLS 1.2 the same record causes a fatal internal_error alert instead of the expected bad_record_mac alert. Since any undecryptable record already terminates a TLS connection, this is a protocol conformance issue rather than a security issue in TLS.

The fix validates the record length against the explicit IV and tag length before any AEAD processing, so that TLS reports bad_record_mac and DTLS silently discards the record.

FIPS impact: no The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.(CVE-2026-75806)

Issue summary: SM2 signature generation uses non-constant-time arithmetic on secret values, forming a timing side-channel.

Impact summary: An attacker able to measure SM2 signing times may learn information about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures can, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the private key.

CWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy

Description: SM2 signature generation computes the signature value using variable-time BIGNUM operations on the secret nonce and the private key, so the time taken to produce an SM2 signature depends on these secret values, forming a timing side-channel.

Applications performing SM2 signature generation are affected on all platforms.

FIPS Impact: no SM2 is not a FIPS algorithm.(CVE-2026-77696)

Issue summary: The DTLS retransmission logic does not correctly handle a handshake message write that is suspended part-way through. The retransmitted message can be read past the message buffer and the retransmission overwrites the internal state the suspended write needs to resume correctly.

Impact summary: The retransmitted message can disclose a heap memory to the peer as plaintext handshake data or cause a crash and a Denial of Service when the read reaches an unmapped memory region.

CWE: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read

Description: DTLS handshake messages can be written out in multiple fragments, and a write can suspend mid-message (returning WANT_WRITE) if the underlying transport temporarily cannot accept more data. While such a write is suspended, the DTLS retransmission timer may independently fire and ask the retransmission logic to resend an earlier, already-acknowledged-as-sent message from its retransmit queue.

The retransmission logic reused the same internal buffer and position tracking as the message that was still being written, without resetting the position back to the start of the message being retransmitted. As a result the retransmission was read starting from wherever the suspended write had left off, producing a mislabelled message whose body was leftover bytes from the other, larger message still in flight - content that was never meant to be sent at that point, and which could run past the end of the allocated buffer.

Separately, even when the retransmission is positioned correctly, allowing it to run to completion while another write is suspended overwrites the same shared bookkeeping that the suspended write depends on to resume. When the application later resumes the suspended write (via a subsequent SSL_read(), SSL_write(), SSL_accept(), or SSL_connect() call), it finds that bookkeeping in a state inconsistent with the message and aborts the process in a debugging build.

The fix resets the retransmission's read position to the start of the message before resending, and skips retransmission entirely whenever a handshake write is still suspended, deferring to the next call that resumes it instead.

FIPS impact: no The affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.(CVE-2026-84782)

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "openssl-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "openssl-debuginfo-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "openssl-debugsource-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "openssl-devel-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "openssl-libs-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "openssl-perl-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "noarch": [
          "openssl-help-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.noarch.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "openssl-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "openssl-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "openssl-debuginfo-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "openssl-debugsource-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "openssl-devel-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "openssl-libs-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "openssl-perl-1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4",
        "name": "openssl",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/openssl\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.1.1wa-19.oe2203sp4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "OpenSSL is a robust, commercial-grade, and full-featured toolkit for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) protocols.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nIssue summary: A certificate with many nameRelativeToCRLIssuer CRL\ndistribution points causes disproportionate heap growth when OpenSSL caches\nX.509 extensions.\n\nImpact summary: Receiving a crafted certificate from a malicious peer can lead\nto significant memory pressure and possible Denial of Service in clients or\nin servers that solicit client certificates.\n\nCWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n\nDescription: A certificate or a set of certificates that fits under the limit for\nsize of certificates accepted from the peer (~100 KiB) can result in allocation\nof several hundred MiB of resident memory on the receiving side\nduring a normal TLS handshake.  This may be enough to crash the client or\nserver, if multiple concurrent connections lead to similarly large memory\nallocations.\n\nThe fix postpones processing of the CRL distribution points extensions in\ncertificates to the time when the processed value is required for CRL processing.\nThis avoids keeping large memory allocations for a long time when such\ncertificates are received.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.(CVE-2026-35189)\n\nIssue summary: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for\nECDSA and SM2 signature operations with curves that do not have a dedicated\nimplementation leaks information about the secret nonce through timing.\n\nImpact summary: An attacker able to measure signing times may learn\ninformation about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures\ncan, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the\nprivate key.\n\nCWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy\n\nDescription: The generic elliptic-curve scalar multiplication used for\ncurves that do not have a dedicated constant-time implementation pads the\nsecret scalar with non-constant-time BIGNUM operations, so the time taken\ndepends on the value of the secret scalar derived from the ECDSA and SM2 nonce.\n\nThe leak is very small; observing it requires a large number of\nmeasurements. The effect is largest for curves whose group order lies\non a machine-word boundary, such as brainpoolP384r1.\n\nApplications using ECDSA signing over the Brainpool and other generic prime\ncurves, and SM2 signing on platforms that use the generic implementation,\nare vulnerable to this issue.\n\nThe NIST curves P-256, P-384 and P-521 use dedicated constant-time\nimplementations and are not affected.\n\nFIPS Impact: no\nThe FIPS modules are not affected: the approved NIST curves used in the FIPS\nprovider have dedicated constant-time implementations and do not use the\naffected code path.(CVE-2026-54872)\n\nIssue summary: An established DTLS 1.2 association using an AEAD cipher suite\ncan be terminated by a single unauthenticated datagram whose encrypted\nfragment is shorter than the mandatory explicit IV and authentication tag\noverhead.\n\nImpact summary: An attacker who can send a datagram that is routed to an\nexisting DTLS 1.2 association can tear that association down without knowing\nany key material. This is a Denial of Service limited to the targeted\nassociation. There is no memory safety or confidentiality impact.\n\nCWE: CWE-1284: Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input\n\nDescription: In TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 every record protected by an AEAD cipher\nsuite carries an explicit IV followed by the ciphertext and an authentication\ntag. When decrypting such a record the record layer passed the record length to\nthe cipher implementation before checking that the record was long enough to\ncontain the explicit IV and the tag. For a record shorter than that overhead the\ncipher implementation rejected the impossible length, and the record layer\ntreated this as an internal failure and raised a fatal internal_error alert\ninstead of treating the record as one that failed authentication.\n\nIn TLS 1.2 the same record causes a fatal internal_error alert instead of the\nexpected bad_record_mac alert. Since any undecryptable record already\nterminates a TLS connection, this is a protocol conformance issue rather than\na security issue in TLS.\n\nThe fix validates the record length against the explicit IV and tag length\nbefore any AEAD processing, so that TLS reports bad_record_mac and DTLS\nsilently discards the record.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.(CVE-2026-75806)\n\nIssue summary: SM2 signature generation uses non-constant-time arithmetic\non secret values, forming a timing side-channel.\n\nImpact summary: An attacker able to measure SM2 signing times may learn\ninformation about the per-signature secret nonce, which over many signatures\ncan, via a lattice / Hidden Number Problem attack, lead to recovery of the\nprivate key.\n\nCWE: CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy\n\nDescription: SM2 signature generation computes the signature value using\nvariable-time BIGNUM operations on the secret nonce and the private key, so\nthe time taken to produce an SM2 signature depends on these secret values,\nforming a timing side-channel.\n\nApplications performing SM2 signature generation are affected on all\nplatforms.\n\nFIPS Impact: no\nSM2 is not a FIPS algorithm.(CVE-2026-77696)\n\nIssue summary: The DTLS retransmission logic does not correctly handle\na handshake message write that is suspended part-way through.\nThe retransmitted message can be read past the message buffer and\nthe retransmission overwrites the internal state the suspended write\nneeds to resume correctly.\n\nImpact summary: The retransmitted message can disclose a heap memory\nto the peer as plaintext handshake data or cause a crash and a Denial\nof Service when the read reaches an unmapped memory region.\n\nCWE: CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read\n\nDescription: DTLS handshake messages can be written out in multiple\nfragments, and a write can suspend mid-message (returning WANT_WRITE)\nif the underlying transport temporarily cannot accept more data. While\nsuch a write is suspended, the DTLS retransmission timer may\nindependently fire and ask the retransmission logic to resend an\nearlier, already-acknowledged-as-sent message from its retransmit\nqueue.\n\nThe retransmission logic reused the same internal buffer and position\ntracking as the message that was still being written, without\nresetting the position back to the start of the message being\nretransmitted. As a result the retransmission was read starting from\nwherever the suspended write had left off, producing a mislabelled\nmessage whose body was leftover bytes from the other, larger message\nstill in flight - content that was never meant to be sent at that\npoint, and which could run past the end of the allocated buffer.\n\nSeparately, even when the retransmission is positioned correctly,\nallowing it to run to completion while another write is suspended\noverwrites the same shared bookkeeping that the suspended write\ndepends on to resume. When the application later resumes the\nsuspended write (via a subsequent SSL_read(), SSL_write(),\nSSL_accept(), or SSL_connect() call), it finds that bookkeeping in a\nstate inconsistent with the message and aborts the process in\na debugging build.\n\nThe fix resets the retransmission\u0026apos;s read position to the start of the\nmessage before resending, and skips retransmission entirely whenever a\nhandshake write is still suspended, deferring to the next call that\nresumes it instead.\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe affected code is outside the FIPS module boundary.(CVE-2026-84782)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-4416",
  "modified": "2026-10-22T14:34:53Z",
  "published": "2026-10-22T14:34:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-4416"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35189"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54872"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75806"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77696"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-84782"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "openssl security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-35189",
    "CVE-2026-54872",
    "CVE-2026-75806",
    "CVE-2026-77696",
    "CVE-2026-84782"
  ]
}



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