OESA-2026-3670 (CVE-2026-66046)
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-05 15:03 – Updated: 2026-09-05 15:03 – Source websiteexpat is a stream-oriented XML parser library written in C. expat excels with files too large to fit RAM, and where performance and flexibility are crucial.
Security Fix(es):
Expat through 2.8.3 contains a denial of service vulnerability caused by quadratic algorithmic complexity in the storeAtts() function in xmlparse.c, where processing N specified attributes with non-normalized values triggers an O(N^2) linear scan of elementType->defaultAtts to determine CDATA status. A remote unauthenticated attacker can supply a single well-formed XML document of a few megabytes to an application parsing untrusted XML to cause excessive CPU consumption, resulting in denial of service without requiring authentication, external entity resolution, or non-default parser options.(CVE-2026-66046)
Expat through 2.8.3 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that allows attackers to trigger memory corruption by processing XML with external entity parsers created via XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate. A struct size mismatch between ELEMENT_TYPE members causes storeAtts to read the attIndex member past allocated memory boundaries, resulting in failure to normalize whitespace in non-CDATA attributes or a wild pointer dereference causing a segfault. This vulnerability was introduced by the fix for CVE-2026-66046.(CVE-2026-76641)
libexpat before 2.8.4 lacks handler call depth tracking with custom encoding callbacks. Thus, a use-after-free can occur. NOTE: this is similar to CVE-2026-50219, CVE-2026-56131 and CVE-2026-56412.(CVE-2026-76957)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"expat-2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"expat-debuginfo-2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"expat-debugsource-2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"expat-devel-2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4.aarch64.rpm"
],
"noarch": [
"expat-help-2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4.noarch.rpm"
],
"src": [
"expat-2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"expat-2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"expat-debuginfo-2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"expat-debugsource-2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"expat-devel-2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:22.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "expat",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/expat\u0026distro=openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.1-31.oe2203sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "expat is a stream-oriented XML parser library written in C. expat excels with files too large to fit RAM, and where performance and flexibility are crucial.\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nExpat through 2.8.3 contains a denial of service vulnerability caused by quadratic algorithmic complexity in the storeAtts() function in xmlparse.c, where processing N specified attributes with non-normalized values triggers an O(N^2) linear scan of elementType-\u0026gt;defaultAtts to determine CDATA status. A remote unauthenticated attacker can supply a single well-formed XML document of a few megabytes to an application parsing untrusted XML to cause excessive CPU consumption, resulting in denial of service without requiring authentication, external entity resolution, or non-default parser options.(CVE-2026-66046)\n\nExpat through 2.8.3 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability that allows attackers to trigger memory corruption by processing XML with external entity parsers created via XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate. A struct size mismatch between ELEMENT_TYPE members causes storeAtts to read the attIndex member past allocated memory boundaries, resulting in failure to normalize whitespace in non-CDATA attributes or a wild pointer dereference causing a segfault. This vulnerability was introduced by the fix for CVE-2026-66046.(CVE-2026-76641)\n\nlibexpat before 2.8.4 lacks handler call depth tracking with custom encoding callbacks. Thus, a use-after-free can occur. NOTE: this is similar to CVE-2026-50219, CVE-2026-56131 and CVE-2026-56412.(CVE-2026-76957)",
"id": "OESA-2026-3670",
"modified": "2026-09-05T15:03:46Z",
"published": "2026-09-05T15:03:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3670"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-66046"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76641"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76957"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "expat security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-66046",
"CVE-2026-76641",
"CVE-2026-76957"
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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