OESA-2026-3601 (CVE-2026-56209)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-09-05 15:03 – Updated: 2026-09-05 15:03 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
aom security update
Details

The Alliance for Open Media’s focus is to deliver a next-generation video format that is:

Security Fix(es):

An arbitrary address write vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. A missing bounds check in the SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control function allows an attacker to inject an arbitrary pointer into the cyclic refresh map field via crafted image pixel values. The encoder then writes approximately 1,200 bytes at the attacker-controlled address. This is fully deterministic and does not require a separate information leak. An attacker who can supply frames to a network-facing libaom encoder with SVC enabled could exploit this for denial of service or potential code execution.(CVE-2026-56209)

A heap-buffer-overflow read vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. A missing bounds check in the SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control function allows setting a spatial_layer_id exceeding the configured number of layers. This causes an out-of-bounds heap read of approximately 40,728 bytes when computing a layer context array index. An attacker who can influence SVC encoder parameters in a network-facing service could exploit this for information disclosure (heap content leak) or denial of service (segmentation fault from hitting unmapped memory).(CVE-2026-56210)

A remote code execution vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. Insufficient bounds validation in the AV1 encoder's SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control allows an attacker to supply crafted video frame pixels that overlap with internal encoder layer context structures. In fork-based video processing services, an attacker can use this to hijack the cyclic refresh map pointer, brute-force the process base address via a crash oracle, and redirect control flow to achieve arbitrary command execution. Exploitation requires the target service to use libaom with SVC encoding enabled and accept attacker-supplied video frames.(CVE-2026-56211)


{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "aom-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "aom-debuginfo-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "aom-debugsource-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "libaom-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
          "libaom-devel-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "aom-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "aom-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "aom-debuginfo-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "aom-debugsource-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "libaom-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
          "libaom-devel-3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4",
        "name": "aom",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/aom\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.8.0-5.oe2403sp4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "The Alliance for Open Media\u2019s focus is to deliver a next-generation video format that is:\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nAn arbitrary address write vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. A missing bounds check in the SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control function allows an attacker to inject an arbitrary pointer into the cyclic refresh map field via crafted image pixel values. The encoder then writes approximately 1,200 bytes at the attacker-controlled address. This is fully deterministic and does not require a separate information leak. An attacker who can supply frames to a network-facing libaom encoder with SVC enabled could exploit this for denial of service or potential code execution.(CVE-2026-56209)\n\nA heap-buffer-overflow read vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. A missing bounds check in the SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control function allows setting a spatial_layer_id exceeding the configured number of layers. This causes an out-of-bounds heap read of approximately 40,728 bytes when computing a layer context array index. An attacker who can influence SVC encoder parameters in a network-facing service could exploit this for information disclosure (heap content leak) or denial of service (segmentation fault from hitting unmapped memory).(CVE-2026-56210)\n\nA remote code execution vulnerability was found in libaom, the reference AV1 codec implementation. Insufficient bounds validation in the AV1 encoder\u0026apos;s SVC (Scalable Video Coding) layer ID control allows an attacker to supply crafted video frame pixels that overlap with internal encoder layer context structures. In fork-based video processing services, an attacker can use this to hijack the cyclic refresh map pointer, brute-force the process base address via a crash oracle, and redirect control flow to achieve arbitrary command execution. Exploitation requires the target service to use libaom with SVC encoding enabled and accept attacker-supplied video frames.(CVE-2026-56211)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-3601",
  "modified": "2026-09-05T15:03:02Z",
  "published": "2026-09-05T15:03:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3601"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56209"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56210"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56211"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "aom security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-56209",
    "CVE-2026-56210",
    "CVE-2026-56211"
  ]
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.