OESA-2026-1553 (CVE-2026-28434)

Vulnerability from osv_openeuler – Published: 2026-03-15 11:10 – Updated: 2026-08-06 11:10 – Source website
VLAI
Summary
cpp-httplib security update
Details

A C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. It's extremely easy to setup. Just include httplib.h file in your code!

Security Fix(es):

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, when a request handler throws a C++ exception and the application has not registered a custom exception handler via set_exception_handler(), the library catches the exception and writes its message directly into the HTTP response as a header named EXCEPTION_WHAT. This header is sent to whoever made the request, with no authentication check and no special configuration required to trigger it. The behavior is on by default. A developer who does not know to opt in to set_exception_handler() will ship a server that leaks internal exception messages to any client. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0.(CVE-2026-28434)

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, cpp-httplib (httplib.h) does not enforce Server::set_payload_max_length() on the decompressed request body when using HandlerWithContentReader (streaming ContentReader) with Content-Encoding: gzip (or other supported encodings). A small compressed payload can expand beyond the configured payload limit and be processed by the application, enabling a payload size limit bypass and potential denial of service (CPU/memory exhaustion). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0.(CVE-2026-28435)

cpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to version 0.37.0, cpp-httplib uses std::regex (libstdc++) to parse RFC 5987 encoded filename* values in multipart Content-Disposition headers. The regex engine in libstdc++ implements backtracking via deep recursion, consuming one stack frame per input character. An attacker can send a single HTTP POST request with a crafted filename* parameter that causes uncontrolled stack growth, resulting in a stack overflow (SIGSEGV) that crashes the server process. This issue has been patched in version 0.37.0.(CVE-2026-29076)

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
References
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "ecosystem_specific": {
        "aarch64": [
          "cpp-httplib-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp2.aarch64.rpm",
          "cpp-httplib-debuginfo-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp2.aarch64.rpm",
          "cpp-httplib-debugsource-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp2.aarch64.rpm",
          "cpp-httplib-devel-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp2.aarch64.rpm"
        ],
        "src": [
          "cpp-httplib-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp2.src.rpm"
        ],
        "x86_64": [
          "cpp-httplib-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp2.x86_64.rpm",
          "cpp-httplib-debuginfo-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp2.x86_64.rpm",
          "cpp-httplib-debugsource-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp2.x86_64.rpm",
          "cpp-httplib-devel-0.37.0-1.oe2403sp2.x86_64.rpm"
        ]
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP2",
        "name": "cpp-httplib",
        "purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/cpp-httplib\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.37.0-1.oe2403sp2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "severity": "High"
  },
  "details": "A C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. It\u0026amp;apos;s extremely easy to setup. Just include httplib.h file in your code!\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\ncpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, when a request handler throws a C++ exception and the application has not registered a custom exception handler via set_exception_handler(), the library catches the exception and writes its message directly into the HTTP response as a header named EXCEPTION_WHAT. This header is sent to whoever made the request, with no authentication check and no special configuration required to trigger it. The behavior is on by default. A developer who does not know to opt in to set_exception_handler() will ship a server that leaks internal exception messages to any client. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0.(CVE-2026-28434)\n\ncpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to 0.35.0, cpp-httplib (httplib.h) does not enforce Server::set_payload_max_length() on the decompressed request body when using HandlerWithContentReader (streaming ContentReader) with Content-Encoding: gzip (or other supported encodings). A small compressed payload can expand beyond the configured payload limit and be processed by the application, enabling a payload size limit bypass and potential denial of service (CPU/memory exhaustion). This vulnerability is fixed in 0.35.0.(CVE-2026-28435)\n\ncpp-httplib is a C++11 single-file header-only cross platform HTTP/HTTPS library. Prior to version 0.37.0, cpp-httplib uses std::regex (libstdc++) to parse RFC 5987 encoded filename* values in multipart Content-Disposition headers. The regex engine in libstdc++ implements backtracking via deep recursion, consuming one stack frame per input character. An attacker can send a single HTTP POST request with a crafted filename* parameter that causes uncontrolled stack growth, resulting in a stack overflow (SIGSEGV) that crashes the server process. This issue has been patched in version 0.37.0.(CVE-2026-29076)",
  "id": "OESA-2026-1553",
  "modified": "2026-08-06T11:10:33Z",
  "published": "2026-03-15T11:10:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-1553"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28434"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28435"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29076"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.7.2",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "cpp-httplib security update",
  "upstream": [
    "CVE-2026-28434",
    "CVE-2026-28435",
    "CVE-2026-29076"
  ]
}



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