Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-PVQ3-XJ8X-X2HV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-15 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-15 21:31

Details

Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via task=download in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath() built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored product_file_save_name, using only JPath::clean() (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject .. segments) and a plain JFile::exists() check — never confirming the resolved path stayed inside the configured attachment folder. If a product file's product_file_save_name ever contained a ../ traversal segment — most plausibly via the CSRF-forgeable admin product-file save actions described in Issue 1, but equally by any future integration or bug that writes that field — any customer holding a valid download token/pid pair for that product file could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. configuration.php).

Severity

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-81568"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-15T19:17:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file\u0027s stored `product_file_save_name`, using only `JPath::clean()` (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject `..` segments) and a plain `JFile::exists()` check \u2014 never confirming the resolved path stayed inside the configured attachment folder. If a product file\u0027s `product_file_save_name` ever contained a `../` traversal segment \u2014 most plausibly via the CSRF-forgeable admin product-file save actions described in Issue 1, but equally by any future integration or bug that writes that field \u2014 any customer holding a valid download `token`/`pid` pair for that product file could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. `configuration.php`).",
  "id": "GHSA-pvq3-xj8x-x2hv",
  "modified": "2026-09-15T21:31:20Z",
  "published": "2026-09-15T21:31:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81568"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.j2commerce.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-81568 (GCVE-0-2026-81568)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-15 18:50 – Updated: 2026-09-15 19:29

Title

Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7

Summary

Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored `product_file_save_name`, using only `JPath::clean()` (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject `..` segments) and a plain `JFile::exists()` check — never confirming the resolved path stayed inside the configured attachment folder. If a product file's `product_file_save_name` ever contained a `../` traversal segment — most plausibly via the CSRF-forgeable admin product-file save actions described in Issue 1, but equally by any future integration or bug that writes that field — any customer holding a valid download `token`/`pid` pair for that product file could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. `configuration.php`).

Severity

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: yes Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-15 19:29 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory

Assigner

Joomla mitre root

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://www.j2commerce.com/	product

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
j2commerce.com	J2Store extension for Joomla	Affected: 1.0.0-3.3.22 Affected: 4.0.0-4.0.22 Affected: 4.1.0-4.1.7

Credits

Phil Taylor, mysites.guru

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-81568",
                "options": [
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                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
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                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-15T19:29:28.406527Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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              "type": "ssvc"
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          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-15T19:29:37.647Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
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    ],
    "cna": {
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          "vendor": "j2commerce.com",
          "versions": [
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            },
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      "credits": [
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            "valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
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        "orgId": "6ff30186-7fb7-4ad9-be33-533e7b05e586",
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      "references": [
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          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://www.j2commerce.com/"
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      "source": {
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7",
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.