CVE-2026-81568 (GCVE-0-2026-81568)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-15 18:50 – Updated: 2026-09-15 19:29
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7
Summary
Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Arbitrary file read via `task=download` in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.2, 4.0.0-4.0.22, 4.1.0-4.1.7 - `J2StoreModelOrderdownloads::getFilePath()` built the on-disk path to a purchased digital download by concatenating the configured attachment folder with the product file's stored `product_file_save_name`, using only `JPath::clean()` (which normalises separators but does not resolve or reject `..` segments) and a plain `JFile::exists()` check — never confirming the resolved path stayed inside the configured attachment folder. If a product file's `product_file_save_name` ever contained a `../` traversal segment — most plausibly via the CSRF-forgeable admin product-file save actions described in Issue 1, but equally by any future integration or bug that writes that field — any customer holding a valid download `token`/`pid` pair for that product file could have the traversal resolve to a path outside the attachment folder and download any file readable by the web server (e.g. `configuration.php`).
Severity
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: yes
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-15 19:29 UTC
CWE
- CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
Assigner
References
1 reference
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://www.j2commerce.com/ | product |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| j2commerce.com | J2Store extension for Joomla |
Affected:
1.0.0-3.3.22
Affected: 4.0.0-4.0.22 Affected: 4.1.0-4.1.7 |
guessed |
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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