GHSA-GXM7-28H3-VF9J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-11 09:31 – Updated: 2026-11-11 09:31
VLAI
Details

Inefficient algorithmic complexity in the JSON reader of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.6 and 6.3.7 allows a remote attacker to hold the server's mail delivery threads or its REST API's worker threads, making mail delivery, the REST API and the webmail unavailable. 6.3.6 fixed CVE-2026-107574, in which reading a JSON object searched the member names already read for each new name, by keeping the names in a hash set; the set uses the standard library's hash, which takes no secret, so member names chosen to fall in one bucket of it still cost time growing with the square of their number. Against the released reader, one such object of 16 MB took about 5 seconds to read in the Linux build, and one of under 6 MB about 23 seconds in the Windows build, where objects of the same sizes with other names took under a tenth of a second. A remote unauthenticated attacker reaches the reader by mailing such an object as a TLS-RPT report, up to 16 MB once decompressed, to a hosted domain's report mailbox, where an administrator has set one; it is read on a mail delivery thread (ten by default), and those threads deliver all mail, local and outbound, so a stream of such reports stops all delivery for as long as it continues. It is also reached without an account through the reply to a password-protected message, with the message's link alone, where the REST API is on (it is off by default) and a public base URL for such links is set; and by any account through the webmail's routes granted 16 MB, and by an application's API key through the send API. Each such request holds one of the REST API's four worker threads, in the process that also serves SMTP, IMAP and POP3.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-126623"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-407"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-11T09:17:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Inefficient algorithmic complexity in the JSON reader of Progressive Robot hMailServer 6.3.6 and 6.3.7 allows a remote attacker to hold the server\u0027s mail delivery threads or its REST API\u0027s worker threads, making mail delivery, the REST API and the webmail unavailable. 6.3.6 fixed CVE-2026-107574, in which reading a JSON object searched the member names already read for each new name, by keeping the names in a hash set; the set uses the standard library\u0027s hash, which takes no secret, so member names chosen to fall in one bucket of it still cost time growing with the square of their number. Against the released reader, one such object of 16 MB took about 5 seconds to read in the Linux build, and one of under 6 MB about 23 seconds in the Windows build, where objects of the same sizes with other names took under a tenth of a second. A remote unauthenticated attacker reaches the reader by mailing such an object as a TLS-RPT report, up to 16 MB once decompressed, to a hosted domain\u0027s report mailbox, where an administrator has set one; it is read on a mail delivery thread (ten by default), and those threads deliver all mail, local and outbound, so a stream of such reports stops all delivery for as long as it continues. It is also reached without an account through the reply to a password-protected message, with the message\u0027s link alone, where the REST API is on (it is off by default) and a public base URL for such links is set; and by any account through the webmail\u0027s routes granted 16 MB, and by an application\u0027s API key through the send API. Each such request holds one of the REST API\u0027s four worker threads, in the process that also serves SMTP, IMAP and POP3.",
  "id": "GHSA-gxm7-28h3-vf9j",
  "modified": "2026-11-11T09:31:30Z",
  "published": "2026-11-11T09:31:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-126623"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/releases/v6.3.8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/hmailserver/hmailserver/-/work_items/111"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-107574"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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